Governmental Instability in Siam

Institute of Pacific Relations

Governmental Instability in SiamAuthor(s): Virginia ThompsonSource: Far Eastern Survey, Vol. 17, No. 16 (Aug. 25, 1948), pp. 185-189Published by: Institute of Pacific RelationsStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3022313 .

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GOVERNMENTAL INSTABILITY IN SIAM

BY VIRGINIA THOMPSON

With Pibul Songgram's resumption of the pre-

miership in April 1948 began the eighth admin? istration which Siam has had since the end of the war.

The record indicates an internal instability of which the

end is not in sight. It is entirely possible that the same

elements which effected Pibul's overthrow in July 1944

will again, at least temporarily, band together to oust

the military dictatorship which Pibul and his clique

represent. The cause of these frequent governmental turnovers

appaiently does not lie in Siam's foreign relations, which

were the most pressing problem facing the country after

the Japanese surrender, and on which all political

groups have maintained a remarkably united front. The

price that Siam had to pay for reinstatement in Bri?

tain's good graces was regarded as unavoidable. More?

over, its originally harsh provisions were subsequently softened to the point where they can now be considered

bargain rates. The United States has presented no prob? lem: on the contrary, this country has shown consistent

indulgence to whatever Siamese government has come to

power, partly from traditional sentiment favoring small

independent nations but more from recognition that

Siam is the outstanding non-colonial source of strategic materials in tropical Asia.

Siam's score with China has not yet been settled:

although China has succeeded in achieving an exchange of diplomatic representatives for the first time in his?

tory, Nanking is not satisfied with the treatment ac?

corded the Chinese in Siam, especially in the educa?

tional sphere, nor with the annual immigration quota

of 10,000 imposed in mid-1947. To prevent a veto by France or Russia of its application for membership in the United Nations, Siam had to relinquish the long- disputed border provinces to Indochina and to repeal its anti-Communist law. The former was the bitterest

pill that Siam has had to swallow, and it cannot be said

yet to be fully digested; but no political party has

tried seriously to overthrow the government on that

score. By the end of 1946 the most urgent of Siam's for?

eign relations had been largely resolved, and the country was able to concentrate upon domestic political and

economic problems. The Free Thai movement, which had united dispar-

ate elements in wartime resistance to the Japanese and

to the regime of Pibul, showed signs of disintegration as early as January 1946. Pridi Phamonyong, head of

the movement and Regent of Siam, was at this time

supported by two embryonic political groups composed

AUGUST 25, 1948 VOL XVII NO. 16

GOVERNMENTAL INSTABILITY IN SIAM by Virginia Thompson

Eight administrations have succeeded one another in postwar Siam, accompanied by economic and financial troubles, corruption, and increasing public apathy.

THE FAR EASTERN COMMISSION by Samuel S. Stratton

Commission deliberations will help to determine the future status of Japan in relation to her neighbors.

THE PACIFIC SCIENCE BOARD by Harold ]. Coolidge

A summary of the Board's major activities during the first eighteen months of operation.

Dr. Thompson spent some months last year studying condi? tions in Southeast Asia. She is author of Thailand: The New Siam, Post-Mortem on Malaya, and co-author of a new IPR

study entitled Cultural Institutions and Educational Policy in Sbutheast Asia.

? 185 ?



largely of personal followers who professed a vaguely liberal ideology.1 An opposition to Pridi's clique began to crystallize late in 1945 when Khuang Aphaiwong, a

wealthy landowner and former Minister of Communica- tions who had ousted Pibul as premier more than a year before the war's end, was unexpectedly elected prime minister. Khuang and his deputies, the Pramoj brothers, were leaders of the newly-formed Democrat Party, which

comprised generally conservative elements having in common little more than their distrust of the Free Thai leaders and their fear of Pridi's "radical" tendencies. Nei? ther major group had any clear-cut political platform. Their lack of a positive program or close-knit organiza? tion caused Khuang's downfall in March 1946. The gov? ernment which succeeded was headed by Pridi, who, despite his resignation in August as premier and two

long journeys abroad within the year, remained the

moving force behind the two successive Cabinets formed

by his front-man, Dhamrong Navasawat, until the coup of November 1947.

Economic Difficulties

During the year and a half of power enjoyed by Pridi's group a series of political events and economic circumstances conspired to undermine public confidence in its government. Siam's new constitution came into force in May 1946. Despite the virtually unanimous ac-

ceptance of it by the National Assembly, it had the

practical effect of packing the upper chamber?the House of Elders?with Pridi's followers. By-elections for the House of Representatives, held the following August, gave Pridi so firm a majority in Parliament that there was no likelihood of a legal change in government until another appeal could be made to the electorate two

years thence. Meanwhile the mysterious death of King Ananda in the preceding June had become a political football, the opposition accusing the government of

complicity therein, and the latter retaliating with

inept measures. Domestic political events alone, how?

ever, played as they are in Siam almost wholly over the heads of the masses, would probably not have produced another coup d'etat. It was primarily adverse economic circumstances which the government was impotent to check that created an atmosphere propitious for a violent overthrow of the government.

In part this economic situation was due to the in? ternational difficulties into which the Pibul government had led the country by its collaboration with Japan and its declaration of war on Britain and the United States. The Anglo-Siamese Treaty of January 1, 1946, provided that Siam was "to prohibit, except in accordance with

the recommendations of the Combined Boards in Wash-

ington, or any successor body, and in the case of rice, under the direction of a special organization to be set

up for the purpose, any exports of rice, tin, rubber, and teak and to regulate trade in, and stimulate the pro? duction of, tin, rubber and teak." The same treaty com-

pelled Siam to make available free of charge its rice

surplus, believed at that time to amount to one and one- half million tons. When it became clear that very little of that amount would be forthcoming, the rice clauses were replaced by successive agreements providing ever-

increasing payments for a progressively reduced surplus. To aid Siam further, Britain helped vastly in the restora- tion of Siam's means of transportation. The Siamese

government itself encouraged paddy production by dis-

tributing implements, cattle, and inducement goods. Yet official rice shipments for 1947 totaled barely a third of Siam's normal export of one and one-half million

tons; probably about the same amount was smuggled out of the country to the far more remunerative black markets of Malaya and China. From this illicit trade

profits accrued to smugglers, officials, and merchants but not to farmers or the government. Such proportions were reached by the contraband trade in rice that as

early as mid-1946 Siam's southern provinces experienced a severe rice shortage, and the capital itself began to feel the pinch a few months later.

Somewhat the same situation affected Siam's other

major produce, on which treaty restrictions?though not controls?were lifted in July 1947. In the case of teak,

exports were resumed in 1946 (despite complications in

ownership claims for logs felled during the war), although

they aggregated only about a third of those in 1941. Re-

sumption of tin exports was slower, owing to protracted negotiations for compensation of war losses to the for?

eign companies which had been the chief miners of Siam's tin before the war. In December 1946 an Anglo-Amer? ican agreement was signed providing that all tin con- centrates shipped from Siam should be purchased on a

fifty-fifty basis by the two signatory countries.2 Most of the small postwar exports?5,500 tons in 1947, com-

pared with 24,000 in the peak year 1940?came from

poor-quality stocks and a monthly output of about 100

tons from Chinese mines. The refusal of the foreign

companies to resume operations until rehabilitation

arrangements were completed and claims adjusted, the deterioration and loss of mining equipment, transport

1 Political parties in Siam have never been legalized, and the term "political club" more accurately describes the group- ings of retainers around a leader. The groups consist almost wholly of politicians and not of the population at large.

2 Not until October 1947 was an accord reached whereby Siam agreed to pay ?1,250,000 in compensation to Common? wealth mine-owners for wartime production, estimated at 12,000 tons, of tin. This did not settle the larger question of com? pensation for loss and deterioration of equipment during the Japanese regime, but against such claims and to help in the immediate rehabilitation of the industry Siam agreed to lend ?500,000 from its frozen assets in London and an additional 22.5 million baht in three yearly installments.

186 FAR EASTERN SURVEY



difflculties, and the shortage of food and labor, as well as the prevalence of crime in the southern mining pro? vinces?all have retarded exploitation of this important source of foreign exchange. Yet for the past two years a brisk smuggling trade has flourished from hoarded stocks (estimated at about 17,000 tons at the time of the Japanese surrender). It is not now anticipated that Siam will resume full tin production before the end of 1949. In the meantime the government is chary of per- mitting foreign prospecting of the new deposits reportedly discovered during the war.

The rubber situation is somewhat better than that of

tin, owing to the comparatively small foreign invest- ment in this industry and to the fact that the machinery required is far less complicated. Plantations were neg- lected during the war; yet by the end of 1947 the outlook for rubber was fairly bright. Production had been resumed generally, the poor-quality wartime stocks had been disposed of, and ships were transporting rubber from the southern producing areas directly to the United States. It is hoped that by the end of 1948 rubber shipments will approximate the 40,000-ton figure reached in prewar years. Resumption of ex?

ports of tin and rubber, unlike those of rice and

teak, means almost pure profit for Siam since they earn

foreign currency and create neither shortages nor high prices in the local market, which uses very little of either commodity.

Need for Dollars and Sterling

Shortage of foreign exchange has been the greatest single obstacle to the recovery of Siam's economy, for the country has always been an exporter of raw or semi-

processed materials and an importer of manufactured

goods. Since its four major exports have been hampered recently by international controls and by smuggling, Siam has lacked the dollars and sterling wherewith to

buy such essential imports as clothing, medicines, ma?

chinery, and other necessities. Pending the resumption of its normal export trade and to counter the growing inflation, the government has tried various means to

acquire foreign exchange. Despite these efforts and the existence of a favorable trade balance of twenty million baht as early as 1946, two years after the war's end the country was still suffering from depleted consumer

stocks, lack of adequate foreign credit, insufficient ex?

port goods, an inadequate transportation system, and

prevalence of crime. In the postwar period the average Siamese has had

difficulty in securing food, clothing, and medicine. At the end of the war the latter two commodities were very expensive though food remained abundant and cheap. On the resumption of foreign trade the whole picture was reversed. Food was sent out of the country, both

legally and illegally, in such quantities that local rice

and meat prices skyrocketed and scarcities were acute; and, while the availability of clothing and medicines

increased, their prices came down only slowly. By 1947 the cost-of-living index was more than ten

times what it had been in 1938, and note circulation

during the same period increased from about 300 mil? lion baht to more than 2,269 million. For this state of affairs the government blamed the merchants for hoard-

ing and profiteering, the merchants blamed the govern? ment for unnecessary restrictions on trade and for graft, and the public blamed both, but chiefly the government for weakness and corruption.

Bound by treaty restrictions and affected by world

shortages, the government was not a free agent. It re-

ceived little cooperation from the mercantile community or the demoralized population. Various legislative at-

tempts to remedy the domestic situation were ineffec-

tive because never strictly enforced and invariably cir- cumvented. A major attempt to acquire foreign cur?

rency was represented by the sale late in 1946 of Siam's

gold reserve in the United States for $9,000,000. The

sum realized was to be placed at the disposal of importers at the official exchange rate, but importers claimed

that they received only an infinitesimal portion of this

sum and still had to buy their major requirements of

foreign exchange at black-market rates. Almost simul-

taneously the government sold in Bangkok part of its

gold reserves in the Bank of Siam, but with little better

effect on the cost of living or on the local price for gold. Next the government tried to reduce note circula?

tion. By exchanging new twenty- and fifty-baht notes for old ones, the government collected 100 million baht in counterfeit notes, but only a very slight reduction in

note circulation was effected. The ill-informed public

interpreted the note-withdrawal move as indicating the financial instability of the government and hastened to

convert its available cash into merchandise. Nor did the

raising of foreign and internal loans or the sale of gold reserves appreciably affect the people's purchasing power.

Perhaps the most unfortunate and certainly the most

unsavory attempt made by the government to drive down the cost of living was the creation late in 1946 of a government agency, the Food Drive Organization (FDO), for the sale to the public of food other than rice. Retailers sent agents to the FDO sales depots to

buy up the entire stocks and resell them later at far

higher prices. The FDO went into action without a

properly prepared plan and with an inexperienced staff which proved no match for wily veteran traders nor immune to the temptation of bribes.

Still another failure was the government's attempt to control the price and distribution of rice in twenty-seven of Siam's seventy provinces. As each agency proved in-

effective, control was shifted successively from the Min-

AUGUST 25, 1948 187



istry of Commerce to the police, to the Siamese Cham? ber of Commerce, and to a specially created Bureau of Internal Consumption. Yet the rice shortages continued, for the public, believing a rice famine to be imminent,

began to buy all available rice stocks, with the inev? itable effect on its price level and with no diminution of the smuggling trade.

Laws against hoarding, profiteering, and smuggling followed one another, the most drastic being those of

August 1947. In the general effort to check bribery, special allowances and privileges were granted to offi?

cials, but this simply augmented budgetary expenditures and increased public dissatisfaction with the overstaffing of government offices. Some notoriously corrupt officials were dismissed but in too many cases they were simply shifted to another post or allowed to rcsign with their

ill-gotten gains. Nor did scandal spare the highest ranks of offi-

cialdom. Many members of Parliament, who had been given money to facilitate their constituents' re-

demption of twenty- and fifty-baht notes, failed to re? turn these advances, and others sold to Bangkok dealers at a profit the permits given them to aid farmers' pur? chases of agricultural equipment. Cabinet ministers, in?

cluding the premier, established banks to finance their own cliques' particular interests and these banks specu- lated, in some cases disastrously, with their clients' ac- counts. The forced closures of the Bank of Asia and the Bank of Ayuthia, following the flight of Pridi to Singa? pore after the coup of November 1947, laid bare a shock-

ing misuse of public funds by institutions closely asso? ciated with prominent members of the Dhamrong ad? ministration.

The November Coup

By the fall of 1947 confidence in the government had been so undermined that it was expected to disintegrate. Signs of dissension had long been evident even among the ranks of the government parties, some of whose members had broken away in June to form the Farmers'

Party. In March Pibul had given the first intimation that he intended to re-enter the political arena when he formed the Tharmathipat Party, "dedicated to demo? cratic principles." In July 1947 party discipline proved to be weak also in the opposition forces when some Dem? ocrats resolved to form the Prachachon Party. This trend indicated a serious weakening of the existing political groups and of the personal loyalties which had held them together. It left the way open for the upsurge of a new force which, under existing conditions, could at- tain power only by violent means.

That Khuang and Seni Pramoj should willingly have

accepted the collaboration of Pibul, whose bitter war? time enemy both had been, is explicable only if they believed that military aid was indispensable to displace

the existing government, that the use of extra-legal means was justifiable in terms of the benefit that would accrue to the public, and that once the coup had been achieved the military could be controlled. All revolts in

Siam, successful and otherwise, have traditionally en- listed army cooperation or have originated with the

military; the experience of the 1932 and 1933 revolts

may have misled the civilian leaders of the November 1947 coup into thinking that the military would step gracefully aside once they had performed the essential seizure of physical power. And events during the fol?

lowing few months seemed to justify that assumption. The coup was short and bloodless. The provisional

constitution which was immediately proclaimed differed from its predecessor mainly in giving more prerogatives to the Grown. Under its provisions the king was to ap- point a five-man privy council to act as his advisers or his regents, and to nominate the 100 members of the new Senate?this body now having as many members as the House of Representatives, which was to remain elective. The type of men almost immediately appointed to the council and the Senate inspired confidence?re-

spected princes, experienced civil servants, retired army officers, and wealthy merchants abounded?although both bodies were obviously conservative and in age even senescent. The Khuang Cabinet itself embodied an array of talent, experience, and integrity unique in the country's administrations. The government was, however, very loosely organized; it represented a throw-back to the days of the absolute monarchy, and in ideology it was related to the group which had backed the abortive 1933 revolt. Its platform, curiously enough, had virtually the same objectives as all the postwar governments in Siam have had:

respect for treaty obligations and cooperation with the United Nations; a determined campaign against cor-

ruption and smuggling; a reduction in the cost of liv?

ing; promotion of education and welfare; and the like. The public could only hope that this time the govern? ment meant it.

At the outset the military remained admirably dis- creet. Immediately after the coup the high command

gave its solemn assurance that it would withdraw from

politics after corruption had been cleaned up and counter-revolutionaries disposed of, and later that it would neither participate in nor interfere with the elections for the House of Representatives to be held in January 1948. Pibul accepted a demotion from the position of

supreme commander of all the armed forces to that of

the army alone, and disclaimed any personal political aspirations. Before the stipulated ninety days the mili?

tary relinquished the emergency powers which had been

vested in them by the Senate. Pridi broadcast from

Singapore, urging his followers to desist from blood-

shed and the government to refrain from reprisals

188 FAR EASTERN SU RVEY



against them. Khuang, for his part, promised to re-

sign if the military attempted to influence the admin? istration. He asserted, however, that for the time being Pibul was essential as the only man capable of disarm-

ing the Free Thais, who, it was claimed by coup sup- porters, had been plotting to overthrow the monarchy and set up a republic. More corruption of the Dhamrong government was uncovered and a thorough shakeup of

the provincial administration and police force was effected. Finally the government achieved recognition by foreign powers.

The Return of Pibul

Late in January 1948 elections for the House of Rep? resentatives took place calmly and constitutionally with? out evidence of either public enthusiasm or army in- timidation. Khuang and his Democrats won a clear

majority?fifty-four seats?while the Independents ran a poor second (nineteen seats) and the Tharmathipat gained only seven seats; the pre-coup government par? ties were virtually obliterated. Khuang's fourth Cabinet was almost identical with his third, and the vote of con? fidence he received in both houses was apparently con- clusive. Yet his government lasted only until April 8, when it resigned to make way for a Pibul-led adminis?

tration, reportedly after refusing to accede to a twenty- four-hour ultimatum from the army which demanded the formation of a coalition Cabinet, the removal of Ministers of royal blood, stringent measures for the con? trol of inflation, and the protection of Siamese from

foreign exploitation. Signs of subsurface unrest had been evident in Bang-

kok as early as mid-December 1947. By that time the

military's uncovering of corruption and plots had be-

gun to smack of persecution of liberal elements, and was marked by wholesale arrests and house searches for hidden arms. Even before the January elections there was evidence of a rift between government and mili?

tary, an obvious consequence of the former's outspoken determination to push the latter into the background. The overwhelming defeat suffered by the Tharmathipat Party at the polls could not but be interpreted as a man? date to the civilian leaders of the November coup. Pro- Pibul demonstrations were countered by others organ? ized by leaders of the 1932 coup, and it was apparent that the military could come to power only by a threat, if not by the actual use, of force.

Coups d'etat are effected with ease in Siam. A few tanks roll through the street at midnight; the next

morning a new government is firmly installed; and by afternoon the shops have reopened. Siamese memories are notoriously short, Buddhism has created a distaste for bloodshed, and the national talent for compro? mise expedites such facile changes. Yet friends of Siamese democracy are disheartened by the continued

passivity of the populace, especially in view of the evidence of greater popular interest taken in politics throughout 1947. Inevitably the Japanese occupation and Pibul's dictatorial wartime regime heightened po? litical consciousness; successive elections to the postwar legislatures have been preceded by a barrage of printed and personal propaganda unprecedented in Siamese his?

tory; and the widespread attention given to the first broadcast of a general parliamentary debate in May 1947 was outstanding. Yet the coup of last November and the recent displacement by Pibul of a government which had received overwhelming evidence of popular support at the polls took place in an atmosphere of general apathy. Foreign recognition of both the Khuang and Pibul regimes has apparently been the crowning touch, for the Siamese are aware of their dependence on world markets and are sensitive to foreign criticism.

Outlook for the Siamese People The Siamese have evidently lost faith in a leadership

that has failed them, both economically and politically. Living conditions for the masses have grown steadily worse, while corrupt officials and unscrupulous mer? chants have prospered phenomenally. Not that graft per se is condemned?the Siamese tend to censure offi? cials who are too honest to feather their family nests comfortably?but they want it to be held to reasonable proportions and not to be achieved at great popular expense. For more than a year there has been a ten- dency in Siam to look nostalgically back on the "good old days" of the Pibul regime when order was maintained, there was plenty to eat, and graft was only mod? erate. Pibul's cooperation with the Japanese is no longer held against him, as it has proved to be less harmful to the country than was believed at the time of the Japa? nese surrender. Largely from nationalistic sentiments, the military have always been coddled by enormous ap- propriations averaging from a quarter to a fifth of total budgetary expenditures, and they are quite ready to remain in the saddle.

If Pibul can reduce the cost of living or even hold the line, which no other postwar government has succeeded in doing; if he can control lawlessness and glar- ing graft; if he can hold down the unpopular Chinese community; and above all if he has learned from experience not to interfere too annoyingly in the daily lives of the people by foolish regulations of their drcss and customs, he will probably meet with no popular re? sistance. Iron has never been forged in the Siamese soul by the necessity to fight for the country's inde? pendence. Danger to his regime comes from the politicians, both high-minded and corrupt, whom he has dis- placed. It is only sixteen years since Siam achieved a constitutional government, and it is perhaps too soon to expect democracy to have taken root in its soil.

AUGUST 25, 1948 189



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Governmental Instability in Siam