Upload
others
View
0
Download
0
Embed Size (px)
Citation preview
GOVERNMENTAL GUIDANCE AND VOLUNTARY ENVIRONMENTAL DISCLOSURE IN STANDALONE REPORTS: AN ANALYSIS OF
DIFFERENCES ACROSS SOUTH KOREAN AND U.S. COMPANIES
Charles H. Cho* Assistant Professor
Department of Accountancy John Molson School of Business
Concordia University 1455, de Maisonneuve Blvd West
Montréal, Québec H3G 1M8, Canada Tel: (514) 848-2424 ext. 2319
E-mail: [email protected]
Jong-Seo Choi Professor
Department of Accounting College of Business Adminstration
Pusan National University South Korea
E-mail: [email protected]
Young-Min Kwak Doctoral Student
Department of Accounting College of Business Adminstration
Pusan National University South Korea
E-mail: [email protected]
Dennis M. Patten Professor
Department of Accounting College of Business
Illinois State University Stevenson Hall Campus Box 5520
Normal, IL 61761-5520 E-mail: [email protected]
Please do not quote, cite, distribute or copy without the consent of the authors * Corresponding author
GOVERNMENTAL GUIDANCE AND VOLUNTARY ENVIRONMENTAL DISCLOSURE IN STANDALONE REPORTS: AN ANALYSIS OF
DIFFERENCES ACROSS SOUTH KOREAN AND U.S. COMPANIES
ABSTRACT In contrast to U.S. governmental departments (and other authoritative boards), South Korea’s Ministry of the Environment provides formal guidelines on standalone corporate environmental reporting. The purpose of our investigation is to determine whether this higher level of governmental support for standalone reporting is associated with differences in the extent of disclosure. Using two separate environmental disclosure scoring metrics (Clarkson et al., 2008, Patten and Crampton, 2004), we examine the extent of environmental disclosure made by a matched sample of 25 South Korean and 25 U.S. companies in standalone sustainability-type reports. Empirical results show, using either disclosure scale, that South Korean companies’ environmental disclosures are significantly more extensive than the disclosures for their U.S. counterparts. These findings provide strong evidence that governmental support and guidance appears to lead to more extensive provision of environmental information in standalone sustainability-type reports, and suggests that calls for more authoritative support for environmental disclosure (see, e.g., Cho and Patten, 2008; Patten and Freedman, 2008) are justified.
1
GOVERNMENTAL GUIDANCE AND VOLUNTARY ENVIRONMENTAL DISCLOSURE IN STANDALONE REPORTS: AN ANALYSIS OF
DIFFERENCES ACROSS SOUTH KOREAN AND U.S. COMPANIES 1. Introduction Ballou, Heitger, & Landes (2006) argue that increasing stakeholder pressure is
leading to an increase in corporate reporting on social and environmental performance,
largely through the issuance of standalone sustainability-type reports. As evidence of
that growth, KPMG International, in its 2008 survey of corporate social responsibility
and sustainability reporting, claims that “nearly 80 percent of the largest 250 companies
worldwide” are now issuing some type of a corporate social responsibility report (KPMG
International, 2008, p.13). Unfortunately, much of the standalone sustainability reporting
has been criticized as being limited in scope (Jupe, 2007), trivial (Gray, 2006), and even
disingenuous (Aras & Crowther, 2008). The problem is that this reporting, like the
provision of social and environmental information in annual reports, continues to take
place largely in a voluntary regime (see, e.g., Gray & Bebbington, 2000; 2007).
Given the concerns with the quality of voluntary environmental disclosure and the
growth of standalone reporting as a tool for disseminating this information, the intent of
our investigation is to provide evidence on whether a higher level of governmental
support for standalone reporting is associated with differences in the extent of disclosure.
In contrast to governmental departments (and other authoritative boards) in the U.S., who
offer no formal guidance on standalone environmental reporting, South Korea’s Ministry
of the Environment (MOE) has had a formal (annually updated) guideline in place since
1999. The MOE’s Business Environmental Report Guideline lays out specific
recommendations for corporate environmental reporting. The existence of this
2
governmental guidance is particularly interesting because South Korea’s historical
emphasis on economic development above all else, as well as its cultural, legal, and
institutional characteristics (Nelson & Deegan, 2002; Leuz, Nanda, & Wysocki, 2003)
both suggest corporate environmental disclosure would otherwise be expected to trail that
of similar U.S. companies.
Using two separate environmental disclosure scoring metrics (Clarkson, Li,
Richardson, & Vasvari, 2008; Patten & Crampton, 2004), we examine the extent of
environmental disclosure made by a matched sample of 25 South Korean and 25 U.S.
companies in standalone sustainability-type reports.1 Our results show, using either
disclosure scale, that the South Korean companies’ environmental disclosures are
significantly more extensive than the disclosures for their U.S. counterparts. This is true
for all major sub-groupings included within each of the respective scoring metrics. These
findings provide strong evidence that governmental support and guidance appears to lead
to more extensive provision of environmental information in standalone sustainability-
type reports. The results thus suggest that calls for more authoritative support for
environmental disclosure (see, e.g., Cho & Patten, 2008; Patten & Freedman, 2008)
appear to be warranted.
2. Background and Hypothesis Development While a number of studies investigate whether changes in reporting regulations
and/or authoritative guidance are associated with subsequent changes in environmental
disclosure2 (e.g,, Alciatore, Dee, & Easton, 2004; Larrinaga, Carrasco, Correa, Llena, &
1 Although many of the reports we examine provide information across both social and environmental dimensions, we limit our analysis in this study to only the latter category. 2 Results of these investigations are mixed. For example, both Alciatore et al. (2004) and Patten (2000) report increases in disclosure related to changes in regulations and authoritative guidance for firms in the
3
Moneva, 2002; Patten, 2000), this prior work focuses on mandated (at least in theory)
disclosures to be included in companies’ annual reports. In contrast, in this investigation
we concentrate on disclosures included in voluntary corporate sustainability reports and
attempt to determine whether stronger governmental guidance is associated with more
extensive disclosure. This issue is relevant, because with the exception of one or two
countries (see Hibbitt & Collison, 2004), the choice to issue separate standalone
sustainability-type reports is purely voluntary. Unfortunately, as noted by Gray (2006,
p.803), this voluntary regime has led to a situation where “the vast majority of reports are
company-based . . . partial, and mostly, fairly trivial.” If it can be shown that a proactive
and supportive governmental stance for reporting leads to better information provision,
even given that the reports remain voluntary in nature, then justification can be offered
for increasing pressures on government (and other authoritative bodies) to provide better
disclosure guidance.
We examine the issue of differing governmental guidance for environmental
disclosure relative to standalone reporting by identifying this disclosure for a sample of
companies in South Korea and the United States. In contrast to the U.S., where no formal
governmental guidance on voluntary corporate environmental disclosure3 exists, the
South Korean government, as will be discussed below, does provide substantial guidance.
We believe comparing voluntary disclosure by corporations across these two countries is
a particularly strong test of the value of governmental guidance because other factors -
the longer history of social and governmental interest in environmental protection and
U.S., whereas Larrinaga et al. (2002) find that Spanish company disclosures did not appear to increase following inclusion of requirements for environmental information in disclosure standards issued in 1998. 3 Our focus is entirely on voluntary environmental disclosure through standalone reporting. As discussed below, U.S. companies are required to make some mandatory environmental disclosures, primarily with respect to hazardous waste remediation liabilities, in their financial reports.
4
disclosure, and stronger legal and institutional characteristics in the U.S. - appear to
suggest that South Korean corporate disclosure would otherwise be lower. We discuss
these inter-country differences, as well as the South Korean disclosure guidance, in more
detail below.
Differing Backgrounds
As noted by Heard and Bolce (1981), societal and governmental concern for
environmental matters in the U.S. dates back to at least the early 1960s, and many of the
major governmental enactments relating to corporate environmental performance go back
nearly as far. For example, many major pieces of environmental legislation including the
Clean Air Act and the Federal Water Pollution Control Act were passed in the early
1970s. Requirements for 10-K report disclosures on environmental matters were also
initiated in the 1970s, with major additional guidance for financial report disclosure of
exposures relating to Superfund and other hazardous waste liabilities promulgated in the
late 1980s and early 1990s. And although standalone environmental reporting didn’t take
hold until the early 1990s (Buhr, 2007), disclosure of environmental information in
annual financial reports was already widespread by the 1970s (see, e.g., Ernst & Ernst,
1973 et seq.). In spite of this history and in spite of the growing trend of standalone
sustainability reporting over the past twenty years (Buhr, 2007), no governmental (or
other authoritative board) guidance for standalone sustainability-type reporting has been
issued in the U.S.
South Korea has a different history with respect to its relation between business
and the environment. Compared to other advanced economies, and in particular the U.S.,
the most contrasting feature of South Korea in terms of the relationship between the
5
economy and the environment arises from the fact that the country achieved its economic
development in an extremely short period of time. South Korea transformed itself from
post-war ruins in 1954 into the eleventh largest economy in the world and a member of
the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development by the end of 1996. The
South Korean government put supremacy on economic success over any other values,
including environmental conservation, during the process of compressed economic
development. Historically, the South Korean business community at large shared the
same sentiments as the prevailing governmental powers regarding the value of the
environment. As a result, environmental degradation and exploitation was an inevitable
side effect. However, the growth of the Korean economy also accelerated the expansion
and globalization of business enterprises, which in turn led to increased societal demands
for a cleaner environment. Spurred by high profile cases of river pollution caused by
effluents discharged by South Korean firms during the early 1990s, the South Korean
government passed extensive environmental legislation. These enactments include the
Basic Environment Policy Act of 1990, the Liability for Environment Improvement
Expenses Act of 1991, the Environmental Pollution Damage Dispute Adjustment Act of
1990, and the Natural Environment Preservation Act of 1991, among others (Choi, 1999).
Thus, governmental concern with environmental matters trailed the U.S. by two decades.
Similar to the time lag for environmental protection legislation, requirements for
mandatory financial report environmental disclosure also came about much later in South
Korea than in the U.S. Requirements for disclosure in the financial reports dates back to
the enactment of article 90, clause 21 of the Corporate Accounting Standards of 1996,
whereby audited firms are required to disclose environment related information in the
6
notes to the financial reports (Choi, 1999). The categories of information required by the
clause include environmental standards and policies, safety and accidents, environmental
investments, consumption of resources and energy, and treatments of wastes and by-
products. However, the disclosure requirement is subject to company discretion as to the
applicability of the information and might be interpreted as subject to a discretionary
materiality threshold. As a result, not all companies provide this information in their
financial reports (Choi, 2006).
Aside from the differences in the history of social and political concerns with
environmental degradation and differences in requirements for mandatory financial report
environmental disclosures, South Korea’s cultural, legal, and institutional characteristics
also suggest that corporate voluntary disclosure would be expected to trail that of U.S.
firms. Nelson and Deegan (2002, p.190-191) note for example, that based on the work of
Hofstede (1980, 1991), Gray (1988) and Eddie (1996), South Korea can be classified as
having “high level of secrecy”, a factor argued to lead to lower disclosure. In support of
this claim, Nelson and Deegan (2002) document that 1998 social disclosure by South
Korean corporations was significantly lower than that of firms from Australia and
Singapore. Somewhat similarly, Leuz et al. (2003) classify the U.S. and South Korea
very differently with respect to legal and institutional characteristics as they apply to
market economies. More specifically, Leuz et al. (2003, p.519) classify the U.S. as
having an “outsider economy.” Countries included in this class all have common law
legal tradition, but also tend to exhibit larger stock markets, low ownership concentration,
and extensive outsider rights. Importantly, Leuz et al. (2003, p.519) also note that
relative to other countries, those with outsider economies are also characterized by strong
7
legal enforcement and higher disclosure levels. In contrast, Leuz et al. (2003) classify
South Korea as an insider economy country with weak legal enforcement.4 Leuz et al.
(2003) provide evidence that companies from countries with outsider economies exhibit
lower levels of earnings management, presumably because the stronger protections limit
insiders’ ability to mask firm performance.
Although not discussed by Leuz et al. (2003), differences in legal enforcement
appear to exist with respect to environmental protection as well. South Korea is not yet
equipped with strong regulatory sanction mechanisms such as the U.S.’s Superfund Act.
Even when violations occur with regard to environmental protection, the guilty
companies are seldom severely punished out of fear of causing substantial operational
risk for the offenders.5
Everything else being equal, it appears that South Korea’s shorter history of social
and political interest in environmental protection and disclosure, along with the
differences in cultural, legal, and institutional factors highlighted by Nelson and Deegan
(2002) and Leuz et al. (2003), would suggest that voluntary environmental disclosure by
South Korean firms would be expected to lag behind that of their U.S. counterparts.
However, all else is not equal.
Separate from the Corporate Accounting Standards, South Korea’s MOE, in late
1999, issued its initial Business Environmental Report Guideline. The Guideline, which
has been updated on an annual basis, provides recommendations for disclosures in
4 Leuz et al. (2003) identify three distinct country clusters. The first cluster includes companies with outsider economies. Clusters two and three both are classified as having insider economies. The distinction, as noted by Leuz et al. (2003, p.519) is that cluster two countries “have significantly better legal enforcement than countries in the third cluster.” 5 For example, in spite of a major oil spill by Samsung Heavy Industries near the port of Daesan in Taean County in 2007, sanctions were minimal.
8
corporate environmental reports including a declaration by the CEO, and information on
the firm’s environmental policy and goals, environmental management systems,
environmental audits, environmental impacts and performance, and stakeholder
partnerships, among other things. These items are encouraged to be included as core
indicators in the environmental reports. Further, since August of 2001, the MOE has been
operating the Corporate Environmental Report pilot project with selected businesses
sporting good environmental management records. The objective of the pilot project was
to publish and disseminate standalone environmental reports that disclose corporate
environmental management records, environmental improvement efforts and other
environmental information to financial institutions and other interested parties. Mainly
motivated by these governmental initiatives, the number of firms preparing standalone
environmental reports or disclosing environment-related information on firm websites
has increased substantially since the early 2000s (Choi, 2006).
In addition to the Corporate Environmental Report pilot project undertaken in
2001, MOE is in the process of developing an Environmental Management Performance
Index to help executives make informed decisions and to meet the demand for reliable
data by interested parties. The index will include information on environmental
improvement impacts and the development of new products, not to mention physical and
chemical indicators of the entire process, so that corporate environmental management
performance may be compared and evaluated. Furthermore, MOE is also proceeding with
the introduction of environmental accounting that enables accurate quantification of
corporate environmental performance. It also supports the development of guidelines for
corporate environmental performance evaluation so that financial institutions can assess
9
corporate environmental performance or environmental risks in advance and confirm the
borrowing company’s asset management. The guideline will also enhance the
competitiveness of environment-friendly businesses through market-based valuation and
encourage the implementation of an environmental management policy (MOE, 2007).
As noted above, and in contrast to the guidance for standalone environmental
reporting being provided by the MOE in South Korea, no governmental agencies in the
U.S. have issued any type of guidance or requirements for environmental or other
disclosure in standalone environmental or sustainability-type reports. We believe the
existence of the guidance in South Korea is likely to lead to more extensive disclosure of
environmental information in standalone reports for their companies relative to those
from the U.S., both because the guidance offers specific recommendations on the types of
information to disclose and because the Guidelines (and other related initiatives) signal
public policy interest in the reporting. We state our formal hypothesis (in alternative
form) as:
H1: Ceteris paribus, standalone sustainability-type reports issued by South Korean companies will include more extensive environmental disclosures than reports issued by firms from the United States. 3. Research Methods Sample selection
Sample selection was based on the following criteria:
1. Companies had to have issued a stand-alone sustainability report over the period from 2006 through 2008.6
2. Companies had to have an identifiable industry or sector in their respective
country. 6 In contrast to financial reports, many companies do not issue standalone sustainability reports on an annual basis.
10
3. Companies had to have financial data available (for size proxy). We started by identifying a sample of 33 firms listed on the Korea Securities Exchange
with recently issued and available standalone sustainability-type reports. We then
attempted to match each of these companies with a U.S. firm based on industry and
relative size within industry (based on total assets) by country.7 However, the U.S.
matched company also had to have issued a standalone sustainability-type report over the
period of interest. Using these criteria we were unable to identify suitable matches for
eight Korean firms. Our final sample thus consists of 50 companies, 25 Korean and 25
U.S. matched firms. Sample companies represent 12 industries. Firm size (based on
2006 total assets) ranges from $3.2 billion to $1.35 trillion with a mean (median) of 132.4
billion ($25.4 billion) for the U.S. firms and ₩986.6 billion ($1.1 billion) to ₩119.3 trillion
($128.3 billion) with a mean of ₩19.32 trillion ($20.8 billion) and median of ₩11.96
trillion ($12.9 billion) for the Korean companies.8
Disclosure indexes
To measure the extensiveness of environmental disclosures, we use, first, the
discretionary disclosure index from Clarkson et al. (2008). This comprehensive scheme
was largely designed based on the guidelines set forth by the Global Reporting Initiative
(GRI). The GRI is a large joint initiative launched in 1997 by the Coalition for
Environmentally Responsible Economics, a U.S. non-governmental organization, and the
United Nations Environmental Program. Its major objective is to develop a global 7 Due to the inherent size difference between Korean and U.S. markets and economies, relative rank within industry was deemed a better match choice than absolute size. 8 Due to our matching on relative position within industry, the U.S. firms are, on average, significantly larger than their Korean counterparts. Almost all prior studies of environmental disclosure find that the extent of environmental disclosure is positively related to firm size, suggesting a potential bias in our analysis. However, as we report below, we find less extensive disclosure for the U.S. companies, indicating, if anything, the matching understates the magnitude of the difference in disclosure between U.S. and Korean firms.
11
reporting framework to continuously improve the quality, credibility and relevance of
sustainability reporting (Global Reporting Initiative, 2009). The G3 guidelines constitute
the “cornerstone” of the GRI framework and the organization recommends it should be
used as the basis for annual reporting on sustainability. These guidelines present
principles and guidance related to both report content (materiality, stakeholder
inclusiveness, sustainability context, and completeness) and report quality (balance,
comparability, accuracy, timeliness, reliability, and clarity).
The Clarkson et al. (2008) index consists of two major sections, classified as
“hard disclosure items” and “soft disclosure items.” The “hard disclosure” area includes
four sub-groups categorized as (1) governance and structure management systems, (2)
credibility, (3) environmental performance indicators (EPIs) and (4) environmental
spending/ On the other hand, the “soft disclosure items” include three sub-groups labeled
as (1) vision and strategy claims, (2) environmental profile and (3) environmental
initiative. Several disclosure items are included within each sub-group. The total
maximum possible score is 95 of which 60 are potentially generated by the EPIs sub-
group due the various weights attributed for each EPI item.
We repeat our analysis using a second disclosure metric, the scale developed by
Patten and Crampton (2004). While less comprehensive in scope than the Clarkson et al.
(2008) scale, Patten and Crampton’s (2004) scheme better captures both more specific
environmental spending disclosures as well as information relating to negative aspects of
environmental performance. Patten and Crampton (2004) break their scale into “positive
or neutral” disclosures (17 separate items across three major sub-groups – economic,
12
pollution abatement, and other), and negative disclosures (four items). With the Patten
and Crampton scale, total disclosure scores can range from zero to 21.
4. Analysis and Results
We use a t-test of means to identify the statistical significance of our hypothesized
relations.9 Table 2 presents the results of the analyses of differences in voluntary
environmental disclosure scores, measured using the Clarkson et al. (2008) index,
between U.S. and South Korean firms. Panel A of the table summarizes the hard
disclosure items while Panel B presents the differences in disclosure across the soft
disclosure items.
As highlighted in Table 2 Panel A, the South Korean firms have significantly
higher disclosure scores than their U.S. counterparts for all four sub-groups within the
hard disclosure category. More specifically, (1) South Korean firms’ mean government
structure and management systems score is 3.08 in comparison to a mean score of 1.36
for U.S. firms; (2) South Korean firms’ environmental credibility is 6.32, on average,
versus 2.56 for the U.S. firms; (3) South Korean firms’ environmental performance
indicator mean score is 26.56 as opposed to a mean of 7.44 for U.S. companies; and (4)
South Korean firms’ environmental spending score is 1.88, on average, compared to 0.56
for the U.S. sample companies. Finally, the mean total score for hard item disclosure is
37.84 for South Korean firms while their U.S. counterparts’ average score is only 11.09.
All these differences are highly significant (p < .01, two-tailed).
Results for soft disclosure items are presented in Table 2 Panel B and are similar
to hard disclosure item results. All sub-groups (vision and strategy claims, environmental
9 Tests of differences were repeated using non-parametric Mann-Whitney tests. Results, not presented, were essentially equivalent to the results of our parametric tests.
13
profile, and environmental initiative) reflect significantly higher mean total disclosure
scores for the South Korean firms in comparison to the U.S. companies (p < .01, two-
tailed). Mean disclosure scores for the South Korean companies are 5.08, 2.28, and 3.96
across the vision and strategy claims, environmental profile, and environmental initiative
areas, respectively, in comparison to the U.S. mean scores of 3.68, 1.44, and 0.92. The
differences in both soft disclosure total score (mean of 11.32 for South Korean companies
and 6.04 for U.S. firms) and total disclosure scores (South Korean firms’ average score is
49.16, U.S. mean score is 17.96) are also highly significant (p < .01, two-tailed). It is
worth noting that there were no items of either hard or soft disclosure where the U.S.
sample firms out-disclosed (at statistically significant levels) their South Korean matches.
These results provide strong evidence in support of our hypothesis that stronger
governmental guidance is associated with more extensive voluntary environmental
disclosure.
[Table 2 about here]
Table 3 presents results for the analysis of differences in disclosure based on the
Patten and Crampton (2004) disclosure scale. Consistent with the results presented above,
South Korean firms again are shown to provide significantly more extensive
environmental disclosure in their standalone reports than the cohort of U.S. companies.
This is true across both positive/neutral disclosures (summarized in Panel A of Table 3)
and negative disclosures (Panel B). The average positive item total score for the South
Korean firms was 12.84 in comparison to a mean score of 6.16 for the U.S. companies.
This difference is statistically significant at p < .01, two-tailed. While the South Korean
companies, on average, disclosed significantly more across all three sub-groups within
14
the Patten and Crampton (2004) positive/neutral category, perhaps the most interesting
difference relates to the disclosure of economic information. The mean score for the
South Korean firms for this area was 1.96 (out of a possible 4) compared to an average of
only 0.24 for the U.S. companies. The South Korean companies were also more
forthcoming than their U.S. counterparts with information of a negative nature (a mean of
1.00 compared to the U.S. average of 0.32), although disclosure in this area was more
limited than for any positive/neutral sub-groups.10 The difference in mean negative
disclosure scores is also statistically significant (at p <. 05, two-tailed). Consistent with
the results based on the Clarkson et al. (2008) disclosure metric, these findings support
the hypothesis that stronger governmental guidance leads to more extensive voluntary
environmental disclosure.
[Table 3 about here]
5. Discussion and conclusion Empirical results presented in this study find that firms based in South Korea
make significantly more extensive environmental disclosures in their standalone
sustainability reports than U.S. counterparts do in theirs. These results hold for most
individual disclosure items contained in both the disclosure indexes and checklists
developed by (1) Clarkson et al. (2008), which is heavily based on GRI guidelines, and
(2) Patten and Crampton (2004), which better classifies both economic-related and
negative environmental disclosures. We attribute the more extensive South Korean
disclosure to the existence of formal governmental guidance for environmental reporting
in that country.
10 In contrast, the mean negative disclosures score for the U.S. sample firms was slightly higher than the mean score for the economic disclosures (0.32 versus 0.24).
15
Our study was motivated by concerns that, even though more and more
companies across the world appear to be disseminating standalone sustainability reports,
the quality of the information being provided has been criticized as being, partial, trivial
and even misleading. Our findings suggest that more extensive guidance for
environmental reporting, even in an admittedly still voluntary regime, appears to
substantially increase at least the extensiveness of information provision. Given that the
Clarkson et al. (2008) scale is heavily weighted on GRI guidelines, our findings also
suggest higher quality disclosure, at least to the extent that GRI is viewed as an indicator
of quality (see, e.g., Hedberg and von Malmborg, 2003; but also Gray, 2006; Milne, Ball,
& Gray, 2008; Moneva, Archel, & Correa, 2006). Pressuring governments (or perhaps
other authoritative bodies) to provide more guidance may thus be a powerful step toward
improving corporate environmental reporting.
Like all studies, our investigation is subject to limitation. It is possible, for
example, that some omitted factor other than the existence of governmental guidance
drives the higher disclosure of the South Korean firms. Investigations of differences in
disclosure across other countries with perhaps varied levels of guidance would thus
appear warranted. We also focus only on large, very visible firms within the countries’
respective environments. The degree to which guidance filters, if at all, to smaller
companies remains unanswered. Finally, we focus only on environmental information.
Sustainability is a broader concept, and whether increasing environmental disclosure will
lead to more sustainable companies is yet to be determined.
16
REFERENCES Alciatore, M., Dee, C. C., & Easton, P. (2004). Changes in environmental regulation and
reporting: The case of the petroleum industry from 1989 to 1998. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, 23(4), 295-304.
Aras, G., & Crowther, D. (2008). Corporate sustainability reporting: A study in
disingenuity? Journal of Business Ethics, 87(S1), 279-288. Ballou, B., Heitger D. L., & Landes, C. E. (2006). The future of corporate sustainability
reporting. Journal of Accountancy, 200(6), 65-74. Buhr, N. (2007). Histories of and rationales for sustainability reporting. In Sustainability
Accounting and Accountability, Unerman, J., Bebbington, J., and O’Dwyer, B. (eds.). London: Routledge, 57-69.
Cho, C. H., & Patten, D. M. (2008). Did the GAO get it right? Another look at corporate
environmental disclosure. Social and Environmental Accountability Journal, 28(1), 21-32.
Choi, J. S. (1999). An Investigation of the initial voluntary environmental disclosures
made in Korean semi-annual financial reports, Pacific Accounting Review, 11(1), 73-102.
Choi, J. S. (2006). An exploration of corporate environmental reporting in Korea
following financial crisis. Social and Environmental Accounting Journal, 26(2), 3-8.
Clarkson, P. M., Li, Y., Richardson, G. D., & Vasvari, F. P. (2008). Revisiting the
relation between environmental performance and environmental disclosure: an empirical analysis. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 33(4/5), 303-327.
Eddie, I. (1996). Consolidation accounting disclosures: An empirical study of the
association between national cultural values and accounting practices in ten countries of the Asia-Pacific region. Unpublished PhD thesis, University of New England.
Ernst & Ernst. (1973 et seq.). Social Responsibility Disclosure. Cleveland, OH: Ernst &
Ernst. Global Reporting Initiative. (2009). Available at http://www.globalreporting.org. Gray, R. (2006). Social, environmental and sustainability reporting and organizational
value creation? Whose value? Whose Creation? Accounting, Auditing and Accountability Journal, 19(6), 793-819.
17
Gray, R., & Bebbington, J. (2007). Corporate sustainability: accountability and the pursuit of the impossible dream. In Handbook of Sustainable Development, Atkinson, G., Dietz, S. and Neumayer, E. (eds.). Chletenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing.
Gray, R., & Bebbington, J. (2000). Environmental accounting, managerialism, and
sustainability: is this planet safe in the hands of business and accounting? Advances in Environmental Accounting and Management, 1, 1-44.
Gray, S. (1988). Towards a theory of cultural influence on the development of accounting
systems internationally. Abacus, 24(1), 1-15. Heard, J. E., & Bolce, W. J. (1981). The political significance of corporate social
reporting in the United States of America. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 6(3), 247-254.
Hedberg, C., & von Malmborg. F. (2003). The Global Reporting Initiative and corporate
sustainability reporting in Swedish companies. Corporate Social Responsibility and Environmental Management, 10(3), 153-164.
Hibbitt, C., & Collison, D. (2004). Corporate environmental disclosure and reporting
developments in Europe. Social and Environmental Accounting Journal, 24(1), 1-10.
Hofstede, G. (1980). Culture’s Consequences: International Differences in Work Related
Values. Beverly Hills: Sage Publications. Hofstede, G. (1991). Cultures and Organizations. London: McGraw-Hill. Jupe, R. (2007). An analysis of disclosures in corporate environmental reports. Social and
Environmental Accounting Journal, 27(2), 8-11. KPMG International. (2008). KPMG International Survey of Corporate Responsibility
Reporting 2008. Amstelveen, The Netherlands: KPMG International. Larrinaga, C., Carrasco, F., Correa, C., Llena, F., & Moneva, J. M. (2002).
Accountability and accounting regulation: The case of the Spanish environmental disclosure standard. European Accounting Review, 11(4), 723-740.
Leuz, C., Nanda, D., & Wysocki, P. D. (2003). Earnings management and investor
protection: An international comparison. Journal of Financial Economics, 69(3), 505-527.
Milne, M. J., Ball, A., & Gray, R. (2008). Wither ecology? The triple bottom line, the
Global Reporting Initiative, and the institutionalization of corporate sustainability reporting. Working paper, University of Canterbury, Christchurch, NZ.
18
Moneva, J. M., Archel, P., & Correa, C. (2006). GRI and the camouflaging of corporate unsustainability. Accounting Forum, 30(2), 121-137.
Nelson, M. & Deegan, C. (2002). Global expectations and their association with
corporate social disclosure practices in Australia, Singapore, and South Korea. The International Journal of Accounting, 37(2), 183-213.
Patten, D. M. (2000). Changing Superfund disclosure and its relation to the provision of
other environmental information. Advances in Environmental Accounting and Management, 1, 101-121.
Patten, D. M. & Crampton, W. (2004). Legitimacy and the internet: An examination of
corporate web page environmental disclosures. Advances in Environmental Accounting and Management, 2, 31-58.
Patten, D. M. & Freedman, M. (2008). The GAO investigation of corporate
environmental disclosure: an opportunity missed. Critical Perspectives on Accounting, 19(1), 435-449.
19
Table 1 Descriptive statistics n (sample size) 50 Firm size (2006 total assets) U.S. firms Mean $132.4 billion Median $25.4 billion South Korean firms Mean ₩19.32 trillion ($20.8 billion) Median ₩11.9 trillion ($12.9 billion)
20
Table 2 Comparison of disclosure index (based on Clarkson et al., 2008) scores assessing the content of voluntary environmental disclosures for U.S. and South Korean firms Panel A Hard disclosure items Total score Average score11
U.S. South Korean
U.S. N = 25
South Korean N = 25
(A1) Governance structure and management systems (max score is 6) 1. Existence of a Department for pollution control and /or management positions for environmental management (0-1) 2 20 0.08 0.80***
2. Existence of an environmental and/or a public issues committee in the board (0-1) 8 15 0.32 0.60* 3. Existence of terms and conditions applicable to suppliers and/or customers regarding environmental practices (0-1) 8 18 0.32 0.72***
4. Stakeholder involvement in setting corporate environmental polices (0-1) 6 2 0.24 0.08 5. Implementation of ISO14001 at the plant and/or firm level (0-1) 9 21 0.36 0.84*** 6. Executive compensation is linked to environmental performance (0-1) 1 1 0.04 0.04
Governance structure and management systems total score 34 77 1.36 3.08*** (A2) Credibility (max score is 10) 1. Adoption of GRI sustainability reporting guidelines or provision of a CERES report (0-1) 10 23 0.40 0.92*** 2. Independent verification/assurance about environmental information disclosed in the EP report/web (0-1) 2 23 0.08 0.92*** 3. Periodic independent verifications/audits on environmental performance and /or systems (0-1) 4 14 0.16 0.56*** 4. Certification of environmental programs by independent agencies (0-1) 2 9 0.08 0.36** 5. Product certification with respect to environmental impact (0-1) 2 15 0.08 0.60*** 6. External environmental performance awards and/or inclusion in a sustainability index (0-1) 13 16 0.52 0.64 7. Stakeholder involvement in the environmental disclosure process (0-1) 4 1 0.16 0.04 8. Participation in voluntary environmental initiatives endorsed by EPA or Department of Energy (0-1) 8 21 0.32 0.84*** 9. Participation in industry specific associations/initiatives to improve environmental practices (0-1) 12 16 0.48 0.64 10. Participation in other environmental organizations/assoc. to improve, environmental practices (if not awarded under 8 or 9 above) (0-1) 7 20 0.28 0.80***
Credibility total score 64 158 2.56 6.32***
11 The significance levels presented in the last column are from two-sample t-statistics that test the difference between U.S. and South Korean firm groups. ***, **, * represent significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. Non-parametric Mann-Whitney tests and t-tests provided similar results.
21
Hard disclosure items (continued) Total score Average score2
U.S. South Korean
U.S. N = 25
South Korean N = 25
(A3) Environmental performance indicators (EPI) (max score is 60)12 1. EPI on energy use and/or energy efficiency (0-6) 37 84 1.48 3.36*** 2. EPI on water use and/ or water use efficiency(0-6) 27 82 1.08 3.28*** 3. EPI on greenhouse gas emissions (0-6) 40 82 1.60 3.28*** 4. EPI on other air emissions (0-6) 22 75 0.88 3.00*** 5. EPI on TRI (land, water, air) (0-6) 4 59 0.16 2.36*** 6. EPI on other discharges, releases and/or sills (not TRI) (0-6) 12 68 0.48 2.72*** 7. EPI on waste generation and/or management (recycling, re-use, reducing, treatment and disposal) (0-6) 32 78 1.28 3.12*** 8. EPI on land and resources use, biodiversity and conservation (0-6) 3 47 0.12 1.88*** 9. EPI on environmental impacts of products and services (0-6) 2 56 0.08 2.24*** 10. EPI on compliance performance (e.g., exceedances, reportable incidents) (0-6) 7 46 0.28 1.84***
Environmental performance indicators total score 186 664 7.44 26.56*** (A4) Environmental spending (max score is 3) 1. Summary of dollar savings arising from environment initiatives to the company (0-1) 5 23 0.20 0.92*** 2. Amount spent on technologies, R&D and/or innovations to enhance environmental performance and/or efficiency (0-1) 7 19 0.28 0.76***
3. Amount spent on fines related to environmental issue s(0-1) 2 5 0.08 0.20 Environmental spending total score 14 47 0.56 1.88***
Hard disclosure items total score 298 946 11.09 37.84***
12 The scoring scale of environmental performance data is from 0 to 6. A point is awarded for each of the following items: (1) Performance data is presented; (2) Performance data is presented relative to peers/rivals or industry; (3) Performance data is presented relative to previous periods (trend analysis); (4) Performance data is presented relative to targets; (5) Performance data is presented both in absolute and normalized form; (6) Performance data is presented at disaggregate level (i.e., plant, business unit, geographic segment).
22
Panel B Soft disclosure items Total score Average score2
U.S. South Korean
U.S. N = 25
South Korean N = 25
(A5) Vision and strategy claims (max score is 6) 1. CEO statement on environmental performance in letter to shareholders and/or stakeholders (0-1) 19 25 0.76 1.00*** 2. A statement of corporate environmental policy, values and principles, environ. codes of conduct 25 25 1.00 1.00 3. A statement about formal management systems regarding environmental risk and performances (0-1) 12 22 0.48 0.88*** 4. A statement that the firm undertakes periodic reviews and evaluations of its environmental performance (0-1) 6 19 0.24 0.76*** 5. A statement of measurable goals in terms of future environmental performance (if not awarded under A3) (0-1) 12 16 0.48 0.64
6. A statement about specific environmental innovations and/or new technologies (0-1) 18 20 0.72 0.80 Vision and strategy claims total score 92 127 3.68 5.08***
(A6) Environmental profile (max score is 4) 1. A statement about the firm’s compliance (or lack thereof) with specific environmental standards (0-1) 5 21 0.20 0.84*** 2. An overview of environmental impact of the industry (0-1) 9 10 0.36 0.40 3. An overview of how the business operations and/or products and services impact the environment (0-1) 16 21 0.64 0.84 4. An overview of corporate environmental performances relative to industry peers (0-1) 6 5 0.24 0.20
Environmental profile total score 36 57 1.44 2.28*** (A7) Environmental initiative (max score is 6) 1. A substantive description of employee training in environmental management and operations (0-1) 3 22 0.12 0.88*** 2. Existence of response plans in case of environmental accidents (0-1) 2 14 0.08 0.56*** 3. Internal environmental awards (0-1) 0 5 0.00 0.20** 4. Internal environmental audits (0-1) 5 17 0.20 0.68*** 5. Internal certification of environmental programs (0-1) 2 17 0.08 0.68*** 6. Community involvement and/or donations related to environ. (if not awarded under A1.4 or A2.7) (0-1) 11 24 0.44 0.96***
Environmental initiative total score 23 99 0.92 3.96***
Soft disclosure items total score 151 283 6.04 11.32***
TOTAL DISCLOSURE ITEMS SCORE 449 1229 17.96 49.16***
23
Table 3 Comparison of disclosure index (based on Patten and Crampton, 2004) scores assessing the content of voluntary and required environmental disclosures for U.S. and South Korean firms Panel A Positive/Neutral Disclosures Total score Average score2
U.S. South Korean
U.S. N = 25
South Korean N = 25
Economic 1. Current or Past Capital Expenditures for Pollution Abatement or Control 4 21 0.16 0.84*** 2. Current or Past Operating Costs for Pollution Abatement or Control 2 20 0.08 0.80*** 3. Projection of Future Expenditures for Pollution Abatement or Control 0 5 0.00 0.20** 4. Projection of Future Operating Costs for Pollution Abatement or Control 0 3 0.00 0.12*
Economic total score 6 49 0.24 1.96*** Pollution Abatement 1. Air Emission Information is Provided 19 25 0.76 1.00*** 2. Water Discharge Information is Provided 9 22 0.36 0.88*** 3. Solid Waste Disposal Information is Provided 7 24 0.28 0.96*** 4. Pollution Control or Abatement Facilities or Processes are Discussed 12 23 0.48 0.92*** 5. Compliance Status is Mentioned or Discussed 6 23 0.24 0.92***
Pollution abatement total score 53 117 2.12 4.68*** Other Disclosures 1. Discussion or Mention of Environmental Regulations or Requirements 11 22 0.44 0.88*** 2. Statement of Environmental Policies or Company Concern for the Environment 23 25 0.92 1.00 3. Conservation of Natural Resources Discussed 8 11 0.32 0.44 4. Mention or Discussion of Environmental Awards 13 17 0.52 0.68 5. Recycling Information Provided 16 24 0.64 0.96*** 6. Disclosure of an Office or Department for Environmental Control 4 18 0.16 0.72*** 7. Discussion of Environmental Attributes of Products 16 21 0.64 0.84 8. Discussion of Environmental Audit Activities 4 17 0.16 0.68***
Other disclosures total score 95 155 3.80 6.20***
Positive items total score 154 321 6.16 12.84***
24
Panel B Negative Disclosures Total score Average score
U.S. South Korean
U.S. N = 25
South Korean N = 25
Negative Environmental Disclosures 1. Discussion of Exposures Due to Past or Present Remediation Problems 1 5 0.04 0.20* 2. Specific Disclosure that the Company Has Been Named as a Potentially Responsible Party 1 4 0.04 0.16 3. Disclosure of Monetary Accruals and/or Expenses Incurred for Remediation 1 3 0.04 0.12 4. Discussion of Exposures Due to Other, Non-Remediation-Related Environmental Problems 5 13 0.20 0.52**
Negative items total score 8 25 0.32 1.00**
TOTAL DISCLOSURE ITEMS SCORE 162 346 6.48 13.84***