Goveranance and Polity

8/17/2019 Goveranance and Polity

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Electoral Reforms

Party Funding

1. Allow open contributions to individual candidates. Currently, our laws allow people

to contribute to parties and not individual candidates. This only results in centralising

the control of party funds and weakening the connection between citien and

candidate.

!. "ow limits ignore the numerous legitimate e#penses associated with campaigning.


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1. $n the private sector, a marketing campaign aiming to reach !% lakh people

may cost at least Rs 1%% per person. &ut to reach !% lakh voters, politicians

cannot spend more than Rs ! per voter'

!. Therefore, across the board, parties have tried to cope by favouring

candidates with black money and the networks and capability to e#pend those

resources.

CBI Autonomy Affidavit

1. Executive interference

1. Accountability Commission: A 3-member Accountability Commission

of retired Supreme Court judges to act as an independent ombudsman to

examine complaints against it C!C "ill be its ex-officio member It "illinsulate t#e CBI$s probe from external influence and may also oversee its

investigation in certain circumstances It "ill be mandated to in%uire into

allegations of misbe#avior& impropriety against CBI officers including t#e

director

!. 'irector of (rosecution: )#e director of prosecution& "#o reports to

t#e la" minister& "ill continue to #ave t#e po"ers to scrutini*e CBI

c#arges#eet once t#e investigation is over +e "ill be responsible for

prosecution of CBI cases and "ill continue to be appointed by t#e Centre

on t#e recommendation of a selection committee #eaded by t#e C!C )#eot#er members of t#e committee "ill be t#e 'o() secretary& #ome

secretary and la" secretary )#e CBI director "ill be t#e member-

convener of t#e committee

(. C!C "ould #ave t#e po"er of superintendence and administration

over t#e CBI for cases to be probed under t#e (oCA )#e Centre "ould

be vested "it# t#e po"er in ot#er matters

2. Sanction

1. (roposal

1. It "ould be examined only by a committee of secretaries&

including Secretary ,(ersonnel& C!C& Secretary of t#e ministry

concerned It "ill give a decision "it#in ./ days post "#ic# sanction

"ould be deemed given

!. )#e order regarding sanction "ould also contain in detail t#e

reasons be#ind t#e decision as "ell


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1. In countries li1e Britain& suc# fusion of executive and legislature is not& by and

large& leading to corruption or patronage )#at is because suc# a political culture #as

been evolved t#ere

2. In our case& public office is perceived to be an extension of one$s property

)#at is "#y& sometimes& public offices are a source of #uge corruption and a means

of extending patronage

3. Constitutional provisions relating to office of profit #ave been violated in spirit

over t#e years even "#en t#e letter is ad#ered to 4egislatures 1ept on expanding

t#e list of exemptions from dis%ualification only to protect #olders of certain offices

from time to time

3. ecommendations

1. 5ften& t#e crude criterion applied is "#et#er or not t#e office carries a

remuneration But t#e real criteria s#ould be "#et#er executive aut#ority is exercised

by t#e office or not

2. Committees of a purely advisory nature can be constituted "it#

legislators irrespective of t#e remuneration and per1s associated "it# suc# an office

3. But appointment in statutory or non-statutory executive aut#orities including

positions on t#e governing boards of public underta1ings "it# direct decision ma1ing

po"ers undoubtedly violate separation of po"ers

4. If a serving inister& by virtue of office& is a member of certain organi*ations li1e

t#e (lanning Commission& "#ere close coordination and integration "it# t#e

executive is vital& it s#all not be treated as office of profit

MPLADS Scheme

1. )#e argument advanced t#at legislators do not directly #andle public funds under t#ese

sc#emes& as t#ese are under t#e control of t#e 'istrict agistrate is fla"ed In fact& no

inister directly #andles public money Even t#e officials do not personally #andle cas#&

except t#e treasury officials and disbursing officers

2. a1ing day-to-day decisions on expenditure after t#e legislature #as approved t#e

budget& is a 1ey executive function

3. )#ese funds s#ould #ave actually gone to t#e (Is

Dispute Resolution Mechanisms and Instiutions

Judiciary

Structure and Organization

Functioning


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6udicial eforms

Audio Recording of Court Proceedings

1. Argument is it could lead to s"ifter dispensation of justice

2. If t#e government is able to provide t#e necessary infrastructure& t#en t#ere is no

problem But doing so "ould be a big c#allenge

3. Sometimes arguments in a single case go on for days ecording suc# lengt#y

arguments& "ill it #elp<

4. =uality of audio recording is also an issue So per#aps it s#ould serve as a secondary

tool and primary s#ould remain t#e stenos

Gag on Judges' Observations in the Judicial Standards and Accountabilit!" #ill

1. Sometimes& in order to elicit a good ans"er from t#e counsel& t#e judge may pose

several %uestions )#at does not mean t#at t#e judge is casting aspersions )#e effort is

only to get t#e correct ans"er from t#e counsel

2. )#e SC is trying to convey to t#e subordinate judiciary t#at t#e judge #as to be

interactive Suc# a gag order goes against t#e spirit

3. >nless a judge expresses #is vie"s& #o" "ill t#e arguing counsel 1no" "#et#er or not

t#e judge is accepting #is arguments

4. )#e interaction bet"een t#e judge and t#e counsel is not t#e decision of t#e judge

)#ere is no need to flas# ne"s on t#e basis of "#at t#e judge observes in court ?#at is

needed is media code of conduct

$ssue of Judicial Overreach

1. ?#en (arliament passes a la"& somebody may approac# a court and t#en t#e court

#as to see if t#e la" is constitutional

2. If t#ere is no legislation on a particular subject& t#e court can suggest certain guidelines

,for example& !is#a1#a guidelines

3. )#is perception is gro"ing because of t#e cases of alleged scams t#at are coming

before t#e courts

On the Collegium

1. 0ames of 1it# and 1in of sitting and retired judges are routinely recommended

1. 5nce t#e collegium ma1es its recommendation& t#e matter goes to t#e

government& "#ic# can %uestion any name and see1 reconsideration )#e only t#ing

is suc# objection must not be due to politics

2. Extraneous considerations suc# as caste& religion& political considerations& personal

%uid pro %uo #ave crept into t#e system

3. )#e system is opa%ue& no one outside 1no"s "#at criteria are t#ere for selection


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4. )#e real issue is not "#o appoints t#e judges but #o" t#ey are appointed Irrespective

of "#et#er it is t#e executive& t#e judiciary or a commission& as long as t#e process is

opa%ue and appointments are made on personal considerations& "e "ill continue to #ave

variations of t#e same problems )#e crucial need is to evolve objective criteria and us#er

in transparency in t#e process

5. 'ata relating to members of t#e judiciary see1ing elevation to #ig#er judiciary s#ould be

available online& available to t#e public

6. ?e can follo" a version of t#e >@ system "#ere all assessment criteria are "ell

defined and assessment is evidence based If t#ere is not enoug# evidence to support a

person;s candidature& #e2s#e is not considered

)#e 6udicial Appointments Commission Bill& 7/3

%stablishment and com&osition of Commission

1. )#e Commission s#all be c#aired by t#e C6I and s#all comprise of t"o ot#er senior

most 6udges of t#e Supreme Court& t#e >nion inister for 4a"& and t"o eminent persons

to be nominated by t#e collegium

2. )#e collegium comprises t#e (rime inister& t#e C6I and 4eader of 5pposition of t#e

4o1 Sab#a )#e eminent members "ill retain members#ip for a t#ree year period and are

not eligible for re nomination

unctions of Commission

1. Its mandate includes recommending persons for appointment as C#ief 6ustice of India

and transfers of all judges

2. )#e procedure for recommendation "it# respect to appointment of +ig# Court 6udges

includes eliciting vie"s of t#e 8overnor& C#ief inister and C#ief 6ustice of +ig# Court of

t#e concerned state& in "riting

Reference to Commission for filling u& of vacancies

1. >pon t#e arising of a vacancy in t#e +ig# Court and Supreme Court& references to t#e

Commission s#all be made by t#e Central 8overnment

1. In t#e case of vacancy due to t#e completion of term& reference s#all be made

t"o mont#s prior to t#e date of occurrence of vacancy

2. In t#e case of vacancy due to t#e deat#& resignation& reference s#all be made

"it#in a period of t"o mont#s from t#e date of occurrence of vacancy

The Constitution (One Hundred and Twentieth

Amendment) Bill, 2!"

1. )#e Bill see1s to enable e%ual participation of 6udiciary and Executive& ma1e t#e


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appointment process more accountable and ensure greater transparency and objectivity in

t#e appointments to t#e #ig#er judiciary

2. Amendment of 7 ,7

1. (roviding for appointment of 6udges to t#e #ig#er judiciary& by t#e

(resident& after consultation "it# 6udges of t#e Supreme Court and High Courts in

the states.

3. Insertion of ne" article 7A to provide for

1. (arliament to ma1e a la" t#at provides t#e manner of appointment to #ig#er

judiciary

2. 6udicial Appointments Commission to be setup

3. 6AC la" to lay do"n t#e follo"ing features of t#e Commission: ,i t#e

composition& ,ii t#e appointment& %ualifications& conditions of service and tenure of

t#e C#airperson and embers& ,iii t#e functions& ,iv procedure to be follo"ed&

,v ot#er necessary matters

#inistries and $epartments of %o&ernment

Structure and 5rgani*ation

8overnance eforms

Strengths of the %(isting S!stem

1. )ime tested system: Ad#erence to rules and establis#ed norms& "ell developed

institutions

2. Stability: (ermanent civil service #as provided continuity and stability during t#e transfer

of po"er from one elected government to t#e ot#er )#is #as contributed to t#e maturing

of our democracy

3. (olitical neutrality: any important institutions "#ic# are politically neutral #ave

evolved

4. 0ational integration: (ublic servants "or1ing in 8overnment of India as "ell as its

attac#ed and subordinate offices #ave developed a national outloo1 transcending

paroc#ial boundaries )#is #as contributed to strengt#ening national integration

)ea*nesses of the %(isting S!stem

1. >ndue emp#asis on routine functions: )#e inistries are often unable to focus on t#eir

policy analysis and policy ma1ing functions due to t#e large volume of routine "or1 )#is

leads to national priorities not receiving due attention


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2. (rocedures and not outcomes are important

3. 4ac1 of separation of policy ma1ing& implementation and regulatory functions

4. (roliferation of inistries2'epartments: )#e creation of a large number of inistries and

'epartments #as led to illogical division of "or1 and lac1 of an integrated approac# even

on closely related subjects inistries often carve out exclusive turfs and tend to "or1 in

isolated silos

5. An extended #ierarc#y "it# too many levels: It leads to examination of issues at many

levels causing delays& corruption and lac1 of accountability

6. is1 avoidance

7. Absence of coordination

8. 9ragmentation of functions: )#ere #as been a general trend to divide and subdivide

functions ma1ing delivery of services inefficient and time-consuming

Core Princi&les of Reforming Government Structure

1. 8overnment s#ould only focus on its core areas

2. 'ecentrali*ation based on t#e principle of subsidiarity

3. Integration of functions and subjects Subjects "#ic# are closely inter related s#ould be

dealt "it# toget#er

4. Separation of policy ma1ing from implementation: inistries s#ould concentrate on

policy ma1ing "#ile delegating t#e implementation to speciali*ed agencies

5. Agency based system: Improved coordination Agency based system s#ould be

created

6. educing #ierarc#ies )#is "ill improve efficiency and accountability

7. 9latter organi*ational structure for en#anced team "or1

8. Increasing inter-ministerial coordination: It "ould also be unrealistic to expect for

curtailment in t#e si*e of t#e Council of inisters in an era of coalition politics Instead& a

more pragmatic approac# "ould be to retain t#e existing si*e but increase t#e level of

coordination among t#e departments by providing for a senior Cabinet inister to #ead

eac# of t#e 7/-7 closely related 'epartments Individual departments or any combination

of t#ese could be #eaded as re%uired by t#e Coordinating29irst inister& ot#er Cabinet

inister,s2inister,s of State

9unctioning

Pressure %roups and 'ormal nformal Asso*iations

)#eir ole in (olity


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edia eforms

+RA$ Regulations

1. It plans to recommend t#e creation of an Dinstitutional buffer bet"een corporate o"ners

and ne"spaper management$ )#is is to ensure t#at corporate o"ners#ip of media must

be separated from editorial management as t#e media serves public interest )#ere is no

problem "it# corporates investing in or o"ning media #ouses for profits But t#e problem

arises "#en t#e corporate "ants to abuse t#e media it controls to project a colored point

of vie" for vested interests )#ere is conflict of interest #ere

2. )AI "ill also suggest "ays to restrict cross-media o"ners#ip in line "it# practices in

most ot#er democracies Certain media #ouses #ave interests in all forms television&

print& and radio "#ic# led to F#ori*ontal integration )AI is contemplating a Ft"o out of

t#ree ruleG& "#ereby a media #ouse could #ave interests in t"o of t#ree mediums among

print& )! or radio

Statutor+ Bodies

Issues ?it# 9unctioning of Statutory Commissions

Should Different Commissions be Merged ,ith -.RC/

1. Idea is to merge all Commissions into a compre#ensive +uman ig#ts Commission

"it# separate 'ivisions for Sc#eduled Castes& Sc#eduled )ribes& ?omen and

C#ildren C#airpersons of t#e 0C& 0CSC& 0CS) and 0C? are members of 0+C for

t#e disc#arge of various functions except in%uiring into a complaint

2. Hes - merge t#em

1. 5verlapping jurisdictions and duplication

ultiplicity of commissions leads problems of overlapping jurisdictions

and even duplication of efforts in dealing "it# complaints Sometimes different

commissions may even contradict eac# ot#er Example is t#e clas# bet"een

0C and 0+C on Assam riots

)o prevent overlapping jurisdictions and duplication& la"s are t#ere 9or

example& 0+C cannot in%uire into any matter "#ic# is pending before a State

Commission or any ot#er Commission duly constituted under any la" for t#e

time being in force


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But in t#e absence of net"or1ing and regular interaction bet"een

different commissions& implementation of t#e la" is difficult and duplication

exists especially at t#e preliminary stage

)#ere is a need to provide a more meaningful and continuous mode of

interaction bet"een t#e various commissions - bot# at t#e national and t#e state

levels Common electronic databases and net"or1s s#ould be created

Common standards need to be defined

3. 0o - don;t merge

1. )#e existence of a different dedicated Commissions$ s#ould enable eac# one of

t#em to loo1 into specific complaints and areas t#ereby ensuring speedy action

2. erger in larger States and at t#e national level is impracticable and "ould fail

to ade%uately address t#e special problems of different disadvantaged

groups +o"ever& suc# a merger may be possible in case of some of t#e smaller

States

Limited Ca&acit! of the Commissions

1. )#ese institutions are #andicapped because t#ey receive a very large number of

complaints "#ile t#eir capacity to deal "it# t#em is very limited

2. )#ese commissions #ave to depend upon t#e government to provide t#em "it# staff

and funds )#e secretariat of t#ese commissions is not under t#eir control but under t#e

executive;s

3. )#ese commissions do not #ave ade%uate field staff& and mainly depends on temporary

#ires on contract basis for t#eir "or1

Lac* of $nstitutionali0ation

1. )#e c#airperson$s role #as been crucial in deciding t#e focus of eac# successive

commission )#eir functioning reflects t#e perception of t#e c#airperson about t#eir role

2. 0o mec#anisms #ave been developed to institutionalise t#e body and eac# successive

commission seems to be "or1ing more or less independent of t#e previous one

1. 9or example& in 0C? t#e "or1 on t#e 'omestic !iolence Bill "as started in

..7-.3 not#ing "as #eard of it till t#e Annual eport of ...-7///& "#ic#

demanded a compre#ensive legislation on domestic violence "it#out reference to

earlier processes

3. )#eir recommendations #ave been more protective and re#abilitative in nature "it# little

emp#asis on t#e structural aspects Any analysis of budgetary allocations #as been sadly

lac1ing

Process of A&&ointment

1. Clear and objective criteria are not laid do"n for t#e appointments to t#ese

commissions Also t#e appointments are solely t#e prerogative of t#e executive ,except for


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0+C and C!C "#ere a selection committee is t#ere but it is dominated by t#e executive

"it# nobody outside 1no"ing on "#at basis suc# appointments "ere made

2. 5ver time& it #as been observed t#at most of t#e appointments are politically motivated

)#ere #ave also been issues li1e appointments of people "it# serious corruption

allegations against t#em Activists "it# long trac1 record of social "or1 are not appointed

"#ile active politicians are )#is compromises on t#e autonomy

Lac* of Ade1uate ollo,u& Mechanism on Recommendations

1. 4ac1 of implementation po"ers

1. )#ese Commissions can only ma1e recommendations in t#eir reports "#ic# are

to be laid before (arliament

2. 0aturally t#eir effectiveness depends on t#e action ta1en on suc#

recommendations

2. 4ong delays in laying do"n t#e reports in t#e parliament

1. )#e recommendations of t#e report are circulated to t#e concerned offices by

t#e nodal ministry of t#e commission

2. )#e comments furnis#ed by t#em are included in t#e Action )a1en eport&

"#ic# is placed before t#e (arliament indicating "#et#er t#e recommendation is

accepted or not accepted and& if accepted& "#at action is being ta1en If no final

decision #as been ta1en on a particular recommendation& t#e comment inserted is

t#at it is under consideration

3. )#us t#ere is time lag bet"een submission of t#e reports by t#e Commissions

and t#eir placement before t#e (arliament and %uite sometime is ta1en in collecting

comments of concerned government agencies )#e time lag in case of 0ational

Commission for SCs and S)s is as long as t#ree years

3. 8overnment apat#y to"ards t#e recommendations

1. >sually on t#e recommendations radically divergent from status %uo& t#e

bureaucratic tendency is to deflect or reject it )#ey don;t even mention t#e grounds

for rejection in detail

4. (arliamentary apat#y to"ards t#e reports

1. By getting t#e reports laid do"n in t#e parliament& t#e idea "as t#at during t#e

discussion on t#e report& some (s may raise t#e %uestion of non-acceptance of

important recommendations )#e matter may even be pic1ed up by t#e edia or civil

society "#ic# may also build up public opinion for its acceptance

2. But t#e reality is t#at reports do not come up for discussion at all )#is is partly

because by t#e time reports are submitted "it# A)s& t#ey are dated and at times

lose t#eir contextual relevance

3. )#ere is need for creating a separate (arliamentary Standing Committee for


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deliberating on t#e reports of t#ese Commissions

)#e 0ational +uman ig#ts Commission

Po,ers 2 unctions

1. In%uiry po"ers

1. )o in%uire& suo motu or on t#e basis of a petition or on a direction of a court& into a

complaint of #uman rig#ts violation

2. ?it# regard to in%uiries into complaints& it #as similar po"ers of a civil court ie

summon attendance& re%uire production of any document and as1 for oat#s (roceedings

before it are deemed to be judicial proceedings

3. Additionally& it can re%uire any person to furnis# information in relation to t#e in%uiry

4. It #as searc# and sei*ure po"ers

5. It can ta1e aid of any government agency for its investigations upon t#eir

concurrence

6. As an outcome of its investigation& it can recommend to t#e concerned government

to pay compensation to t#e victim and2or to initiate prosecution proceedings against t#e

offender

2. )o intervene in any #uman rig#ts case pending before a court It may also approac# t#e SC

and t#e +Cs for relief

3. )o visit any jail or any ot#er state institutions to see t#e living conditions of t#e inmates andma1e recommendations

4. )o revie" t#e constitutional and legal safeguards for #uman rig#ts and ma1e

recommendations

5. )o revie" t#e factors t#at in#ibit #uman rig#ts and ma1e recommendations

6. )o study international treaties on #uman rig#ts and ma1e recommendations

7. )o promote #uman rig#ts researc#

8. )o spread #uman rig#ts a"areness

9. )o encourage 085s "or1ing for #uman rig#ts

Com&osition1. )#e members are selected by a selection committee comprising of (& spea1er and deputy

c#airman& #ome minister& leaders of opposition in +o( and CoS

2. It consists of a retired C6I as c#airman& a serving or retired judge of SC as member& one serving

or retired c#ief justice of a #ig# court& 7 eminent people #aving 1no"ledge and experience in #uman

rig#ts& c#airpersons of minorities commission& SC commission& S) commission and "omen

commission


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3. A 0+C c#airman or a member can;t be removed unless t#e president dismisses t#em on

grounds of proved misbe#avior ascertained by SC after t#e president as1s it to conduct an en%uiry

Positive Points of -.RC

1. Easy accessibility to t#e Commission Anyone can approac# 0+C t#roug# telep#one&

letter& application& mobile p#one or internet All t#e documents& reports& ne"sletters& speec#es&etc of t#e Commission are also available on t#is "ebsite

2. 0+C #as "or1ed immensely to create a"areness among public t#roug# seminars&

"or1s#ops& lectures& literature& 085s )#e rising number of complaints on #uman rig#ts

violations only proves t#e fact t#at a"areness is gro"ing about 0+C

3. )#e Commission #as succeeded in getting t#e #uman rig#ts education included in t#e

curriculum

4. any recommendations made by 0+C #ave been implemented by t#e public aut#orities

)#ese include bonded and c#ild labor& narco analysis& mental #ealt#& manual scavenging&

endosulfan& rig#ts of p#ysically c#allenged etc

5. )#e Commission #as been instrumental in persuading states to set up +uman ig#ts

Commissions and t"enty states #ave set up t#e State +uman ig#ts Commissions

-egative Points of -.RC 3- Panel"

1. )#e lac1 of pluralism in its composition: )#ere is dominance of t#e judiciary in its

composition )#e >0 panel rejected t#e suggestion t#at suc# restrictions "ere justified

because of t#e %uasi judicial functions performed by t#e 0+C (ointing out t#at t#is is Jbut

one of t#e / functionsJ enumerated in t#e 0+C la"

2. 4ac1 of independent investigation: 7 1ey posts in t#e 0+C secretary general and

director general of investigations "ould #ave to be filled by t#ose "#o come on deputation

from "it#in t#e government Complaints given to t#e 0+C "ere entrusted to t#e police "#ic#

eit#er didn;t investigate at all or investigated after substantial delay and in a biased manner

3. 4ittle engagement "it# #uman rig#ts defenders

4. 4ac1 of independence: )#e 0+C is currently re%uired to report to t#e inistry of +ome

Affairs )#ere are serious %uestion mar1s over t#e selection process

)#e 0ational inorities Commission

Com&osition

1. It consists of a C#airperson& a !ice C#airperson and five embers to be nominated by t#e

Central 8overnment from amongst persons of eminence provided t#at five embers including

t#e C#airperson s#all be from amongst t#e minority communities

Po,ers and unctions

1. )o revie" t#e constitutional and legal safeguards for minorities and ma1e recommendations


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2. In%uiry po"ers

1. )o in%uire& suo motu or on t#e basis of a petition or on a direction of a court& into a

complaint of #uman rig#ts violation

2. ?it# regard to in%uiries into complaints& it #as similar po"ers of a civil court ie

summon attendance& re%uire production of any document and as1 for oat#s (roceedingsbefore it are deemed to be judicial proceedings

3. Additionally& it can re%uire any person to furnis# information in relation to t#e in%uiry

4. It #as searc# and sei*ure po"ers

5. It can ta1e aid of any government agency for its investigations upon t#eir

concurrence

6. As an outcome of its investigation& it can recommend to t#e concerned government

to pay compensation to t#e victim and2or to initiate prosecution proceedings against t#e

offender

S&ecific Constitutional Safeguards for Minorities

1. Art 7. ,: ig#t of any section of t#e citi*ens to conserve its distinct language& script or

culture

2. Art 7. ,7: estriction on denial of admission to any citi*en& to any educational institution

maintained or aided by t#e State& on grounds only of religion& race& caste& language or any of

t#em

3. Art 3/ ,: ig#t of all minorities& "#et#er based on religion or language& to establis# and

administer educational institutions of t#eir c#oice

1. )#ey are exempted from t#e admission policies of t#e state even if aided

2. )#ey are exempted from )E

4. Art 3/ ,7: 9reedom from discrimination on t#e ground t#at any educational institution is

under t#e management of a minority& in t#e matter of receiving aid from t#e State

5. Art 3: If any land is ta1en from a minority institution& t#en full compensation is payable

6. Art 3K: Special provision relating to t#e language spo1en by a section of t#e population of

any State

7. Art 3/ A: (rovision for facilities for instruction in t#e mot#er-tongue at primary stage

8. Art 3/ B: Special 5fficer for 4inguistic inorities

0ational Commission for ?omen

Com&osition

1. It consists of a c#airperson and members of eminence ,all appointed by government and

at least one "ill be from SC and one from S)

Po,ers 2 unctions

1. It monitors "or1ing of safeguards and la"s for "omen and ma1e recommendations


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2. It investigates complaints ,including suo moto ?#ile investigating it #as all t#e po"ers of a

civil court ie summoning presence& re%uiring production of evidence& as1 for oat#s and

affidavits

3. It inspects jail and ot#er state institutions to see t#e condition of "omen inmates and ma1e

recommendations4. It funds litigation in issues involving large number of "omen

5. Its reports are laid do"n before parliament ,state legislature if a state is concerned along

"it# explanation on action ta1en and reasons of non-acceptance

6. )o promote a"areness on "omen issues

7. )o promote researc# on "omen issues

8. )o encourage 085s "or1ing on "omen issues

9. )#e 0C? is to be consulted by t#e government on all important policy issues concerning

"omen It is to participate and advise in t#e planning process on issues concerning "omen

Re&ort Card of -C) unctioning a&art from the common issues"

1. )#e denial of t#e scale and nature of sexual violence in 8ujarat 7//7

2. )#e statement of a member of t#e commission on t#e angalore pub attac1 case

3. )#e statement t#at being called FsexyG s#ould be ta1en as a compliment

4. )#e statement as1ing girls not to ape t#e "est blindly after a girl "as publicly molested in

8u"a#ati

5. 5n A9S(A and police violence& all commissions #ave been sadly silent

CIC


18/56


19/56

$ssues ,ith C$C

1. A #ig# number of cases are pending before t#e CIC Information soug#t t#roug# )I

applications is often most relevant at a particular time If an appeal before t#e CIC routinely

ta1es more t#an a year to be #eard& citi*ens may not find it imperative to turn to it

2. Anot#er problem is t#e CIC$s inability to ensure compliance "it# its orders )#e CIC does not

#ave contempt po"ers and t#e only "ay in "#ic# it can ensure compliance is to use its po"er

to impose a penalty

Bringing (olitical (arties >nder )I

+he Order

1. It ruled t#at political parties are public aut#orities under )I

2. )#e national parties s#ould appoint mandatory information aut#orities

3. )#ey s#ould also disclose information under relevant sections of )I

4. )#e decision "ould definitely #ave been encouraged by t#e trust deficit t#e general


20/56

public #as "it# politicians and t#e political parties

+he Rationale #ehind the Order

1. (olitical parties perform public duty

2. (ublic funding

1. )#e act states t#at a non-government organisation substantially financed&

directly or indirectly by funds provided by t#e appropriate government& is also

included in t#e definition of a public aut#ority

2. )#ey receive substantial public funding in t#e form of subsidised land and

building& income tax exemptions& free airtime on radio and )!

3. Establis#ed by Election Commission

1. )#e Act of states t#at any institution can be declared a public aut#ority if it is

establis#ed t#roug# t#e Constitution& legislative action or by notification by an

Fappropriate governmentG

2. CIC interpreted t#e term appropriate government as t#e Election Commission

"#ose registration is needed for a political party to be recogni*ed as suc#

Order is Good

1. )ransparency "ill increase t#e confidence of t#e people in public institutions Citi*ens

s#ould #ave a rig#t to 1no" about t#e political parties "#ic# run t#eir government

2. It "ill also strengt#en intra party democracy

3. It #as been argued t#at political parties "ill no" #ave to be accountable to t#e

commission )#e )I is a citi*en empo"erment tool& not a commission empo"erment

one

Order is #ad

1. Issues in enforcement

1. )#ere is limited scope for t#e enforcement of t#e penalty clauses

2. )#e person "#o "ould be appointed as (I5 "ould #ardly be dependent upon

mont#ly salary and #is "or1 as (I5 "ill not determine #is career progression in

politics

3. )#erefore& a maximum penalty of s 7&/// "ould #ardly act as a deterrent

0or "ill t#ere be any fear of jeopardising #is career in politics

4. If persons "it# criminal records are appointed (I5s& "#o "ill dare approac#

t#em for accessing information

2. Counter action by parliament

1. (arties may bring an ordinance or pass an act to overturn t#is order

3. Impractical

1. )I ma1es extensive demands on public aut#orities for not just financial

transparency but also transparency of decision-ma1ing and exercise of aut#ority In


21/56

t#e case of political parties& financial transparency must be separated from decision-

ma1ing and ot#er processes of a political party

2. )I& "it#out accompanying electoral reforms& "ill adversely affect cas#

contributions or "ill furt#er discourage parties from reporting t#em

R+$ Ruling as a )indo, of O&&ortunit! for %lectoral Reforms

1. )I& "it#out accompanying electoral reforms& "ill adversely affect cas# contributions or

"ill furt#er discourage parties from reporting t#em

2. If political parties are so vital to India;s democratic functioning t#at t#ey can be

considered public aut#orities& t#en it is only logical t#at t#e state s#ould fund t#em in a

befitting manner

3. State funding "ill strengt#en less "ealt#y but more "ort#y activists "#en t#ey demand

party tic1ets

4. ?it# regards to costs& state funding cost estimates #ave ranged from only s &///

crores to s /&/// crores

5. 9urt#er& parties s#ould only be able to receive state funding if t#ey meet some criteria of

transparency and accountability t#is "ill spur t#em to improve t#eir internal processes

including record-1eeping and disclosure

6. 8ermany provides parties matc#ing grants& to t#e extent of t#e amount t#ey raise from

private sources It does not limit contributions or expenditure& and re%uires disclosure of

only large donors 5ver time& t#is #as resulted in parties raising private funds mostly

t#roug# small contributions and members#ip dues

0ational Commission for (rotection of C#ild ig#ts ,7//K

unctions and Po,ers

1. )o revie" t#e safeguards for protection of c#ildren and ma1e recommendations

2. )o in%uire into complaints ,suo moto also and ma1e recommendations

3. )o visit any juvenile #ome or ot#er state 2 085 institutions meant for c#ildren to see t#e

condition of inmates and ma1e recommendations

4. Its ot#er po"ers are same as 0C?0ational Consumer 'isputes edressal Commission

C!C

A&&ointment


22/56

1. )#e selection committee consists of t#e (rime inister& t#e +ome inister and t#e 4eader of

t#e 5pposition in t#e 4o1 Sab#a

Po,er4 unctions and Res&onsibilities

1. )#e C!C advises t#e union government on all matters pertaining to t#e maintenance of

integrity in administration2. It exercises superintendence over t#e "or1ing of t#e CBI in cases referred to it

egulator+ Bodies

Indian edical Council

A&&ointment

Po,er4 unctions and Res&onsibilities

Quasi-Judicial Bodies

The Press Council of India functions under

the Press Council Act, 1978. It is a statutory, quasi-judicial body

Appointment

Power, Functions and Responsibilities

Important Aspects of Governance

Transparency and Accountability

Citizen Charters

-.%o&ernan*e

m.%o&ernan*e


23/56

Applications

E-8overnance is 0ot About ;e;& its About 8overnance

Com&uterisation of Land Records

Land Records

This issue is back on the agenda now because of two main reasons. First, land markets in

several parts of the country have exploded. Land prices in these regional markets — all of

urban India and large rural areas like Punjab and Haryana — are the highest in the world.

Generating revenue from this market is now a serious concern again. Second, the old process

of land acquisition has broken down. The state has been forced to develop a new land

acquisition bill (circulating for two years now). Private sector players are demanding ever larger

quantities of land for purchase or acquisition. The entire process of land conversion — from


24/56

agricultural to other use — is held up if land titles are unclear or disputed.

There is a real possibility that a process that tries to formalise land title claims may unleash

disputes and litigation on a massive scale. Many conflicting claims of land ownership remain

simmering. Rivals often work out informal arrangements, avoiding full-scale legal disputes. But

if the situation changes — if the claims have to be settled one way or another because they

have to be inscribed for good on maps and cadastres that represent finality, a permanent

settlement so to speak, then every simmering and "adjusted" dispute has to come out in the

open. Because anyone who does not stake a claim then will for ever lose her claim.

1. (roject

1. )orrens system is based on principles:

1. (rinciple of a single "indo" to #andle land records

2. )#e FmirrorG principle& "#ic# states t#at& at any given time& land records

mirror t#e ground reality

3. )#e FcurtainG principle& "#ic# refers to t#e fact t#at t#e record of title is a

true depiction of t#e o"ners#ip status& mutation is automatic follo"ing

registration and title is a conclusive proof of o"ners#ip

4. (rinciple of title insurance - t#e title is guaranteed for its correctness and

t#e party concerned is indemnified against any loss arising because of

inaccuracy in t#is regard

2. )#e aim "as complete digiti*ation "it# extensive surveys by t#e end of 7t#

9H( and )orrens system by t#e end of 3t# 9H(

2. 7 major problems remain 9irstly& t#e maps in use are totally outdated and secondly& t#e

titles indicated in relation to t#e land are not up-to-date

3. Several departments are involved in managing land records in most of t#e States& and

t#e citi*en #as to approac# more t#an one agency for complete land records& eg&

evenue 'epartment for textual records and mutations Survey L Settlement ,or

Consolidation 'epartment for t#e maps egistration 'epartment for verification of

encumbrances and registration of transfer& mortgage& etc )#ese departments "or1 in a

stand-alone manner& and updating of records by any one of t#em ma1es t#e records of t#e

ot#ers outdated

4. )#e programme includes t"o CSS:

1. Strengt#ening of evenue Administration L >pdating of 4and ecords

2. Computeri*ation of 4and ecords

3. )#e major components of t#e programme are computeri*ation of all land


25/56

records including textual and spatial records and mutations& survey2re-survey and

updation of all survey L settlement records

• Status

1. In most States& land record computeri*ation #as been limited to t#e issue of

ecords of ig#ts ,o utation& "#ic# is a more complex process& #as been

computeri*ed in only a #andful of states 0o State in India #as reac#ed a stage

"#ic# integrates t#e functioning of t#e 3 departments

2. 5utdated records "ere being computeri*ed and scanned

3. Even basic computeri*ed delivery #as not reac#ed t#e entire population It is

restricted to talu1a level and many districts continue in manual mode

• Analysis of failure

1. )#e sc#eme failed to address t#e main problem in case of land records ie t#e

land records do not reflect t#e factual ground reality

2. )#e most important activity for updation of land records& ie& survey "as

neglected by most of t#e States

3. odern tec#nology can be of assistance in %uic1ly carrying out t#e

measurements of land But& unless mec#anisms are put in place to ensure t#at any

c#ange in titles is %uic1ly captured by t#e land records& any amount of IC) "ould not

provide optimal solutions )#erefore& t#e existing mec#anism for updating land

records "#ic# includes multiplicity of departments and obsolete processes "ould

need to be reformed

4. )#ere are bound to be disputes "#ere land titles are concerned All state land

records la"s provide for a dispute resolution mec#anism M t#e revenue courts 5ver

time& t#e functioning of t#is mec#anism #as left muc# to be desired )#ere is urgent

need to build t#e capability of t#is mec#anism

5. In many cases& even basic process reforms li1e simplification and rationali*ing

of forms& and putting in place an appointment and %ueue management system #ave

not been underta1en

6. Computerisation of existing land records "it#out corroborating it "it# t#e actual

field position only led to perpetuation of existing loop#oles and errors and #ence

more litigation So t#e sc#eme failed to even ta1e off

7. 9unds "ere t#inly spread

8. )#ere "as no time frame to finis# t#e sc#eme

9. System of monitoring and evaluation "as not provided for

10. In case of urban lands& t#e situation is graver as records are virtually non-

existent )#e 04( does not cover urban lands 8ro"t# in urbani*ation "ould

result in continuous conversion of rural land into urban land )#us& t#ere cannot be


26/56

t"o systems for management of rural and urban lands

• Pass&ort 2 5isa MMP

1. In t#e case of passports& t#e reduction in t#e "aiting time is very marginal as

only submission of application "as partially computeri*ed leaving most of t#e bac1-

end process in t#eir old inefficient form

2. (assport Seva (roject: It contracts private service providers for digitisation of

t#e entire passport services It is expected t#at t#e process for issue of a ne"

passport "ould be expedited to t#ree "or1ing days subject to police verification

(assports applied under t#e Dtat*al $ sc#eme "ould be dispatc#ed t#e same day&

subject to address and police verification ?#ile t#e inistry of External Affairs ,EA

"ould continue to perform t#e sovereign function suc# as verification and grant of

passport& all perip#eral activities "ould be done by t#e private service provider

-ational %6Governance Plan

3. ole of local governments

1. )#ere is no role for t#e local governments in t#e implementation of t#e

plan and not even at 1ios1 level

2. onitoring bodies of elected local body representatives s#ould be set

up to monitor t#e implementation of t#e plan

3. (Is s#ould also spread a"areness among t#e people about t#e

services being offered and encourage t#em to utili*e t#em

4. Business process restructuring and capacity building issues

1. )#e (s #ave t#e potential of creating a direct impact on citi*ens

since t#ey provide #ig# volume 87C services >nfortunately& t#ese are t#e very

sectors "#ere progress in implementation is lagging

2. )#e most critical bottlenec1 is delay in business process restructuring

and insufficient capacity building

3. )#e large scale of t#e transactions involved& prevalence of outdated and

cumbersome procedures& inertia and resistance to c#ange& t#e over#ang of old

and outdated records are ot#er issues

5. (roject management issues

1. )#ere is lac1 of clear demarcation of responsibility among t#e project

aut#orities

2. ost of t#e State level e-8overnance projects are still at t#e conceptual

stage

1. any of t#e projects #ave pre-maturely gone a#ead "it# t#e IC)

component "it#out first prioriti*ing t#e governance reforms t#at are a pre-

re%uisite )#is "ould result in automation of t#e existing inefficiencies in


27/56

t#e system

Core (rinciples for a Successful E-8overnance (roject

1. (ublic trust

1. Clarity of (urpose

It s#ould be based on "#at citi*ens need rat#er t#an "#at t#e

tec#nology can ac#ieve

!. It must deliver substantial visible benefits& specially single "indo"

grievance redressal as in 4o1!ani in >(& 8yandoot in ( or single "indo"

facility to pay taxes and bills& to t#e end users

(. Benc#mar1s for service delivery need to be created andcommunicated to t#e users

). $t must have mechanisms to win public trust like giving them a chance to

review the computeried records, having a screen facing them, use of local

language.

!. Accountability

1. *eople must be held accountable for their actions.

!. *roper security mechanisms, including digital signature, biometrics as in the

&hoomi *ro+ect in arnataka, should be there at each layer so as to fi#

accountability.(. -cope of the pro+ect

1. earing that new systems may not deliver, managers tend to continue manual

systems in parallel, and thus there is no incentive for staff to switch over to the

new system. &ut it must not run as a secondary system, along with the paper

based system. Rather focus must be to make it the only system as soon as

possible.

!. -caling up should be attempted only after the success of pilot pro+ects.

-ystems should have the fle#ibility to incorporate changes mid/way

(. The user charges should not be high so as to deter the users. -till self/

sustainable pro+ects have a higher chance of success.

). *ro+ect management

1. $mplementation

The pro+ect management team must have an empowered leader with a

dedicated team. -uch a team must be given sufficient time to finish its work.


28/56

!. *lanning

E/preparedness of the organiation must be kept in mind while

planning for pro+ects and fi#ing time frames.

Reinventing the wheel should be prevented. *ro+ects must learn from

the success and failures of the previous e/governance processes.

At present various pro+ects are ad hoc and unrelated to each other.

0any are vendor driven and not scalable. -o common standards and

platforms should be evolved.

(. Evaluation

There should be a precise definition of the parameters against which

any future evaluation would be done.

*eriodic evaluations against such parameters should be conducted.

. *rocess re/engineering

1. Environment building

Assessment of changes to be made in the legal framework needs to be

done in advance.

As the task involves redesigning of governmental processes at

various levels, it would re2uire strong political support at all levels.

3overnment personnel would have to be incentivised to change old

habits and ac2uire new skills. 4wnership by the staff is essential and

ade2uate stress should be laid on generating interest among the staff

members.

4rganiational capacity building is absolutely essential. $t includes

reforms in recruitment and personnel policies, out/sourcing, re/engineering

internal processes, delegation of authority, creation of enabling legal

framework, developing 0$- and proper incentive systems.

$n the public, awareness needs to be created so that there is a constant

demand for reforms.

Effective grievance redressal mechanism needs to be built in the

process.

!. There should be end to end computeriation. &ut in pro+ects such as payment

of bills, filing of returns, e/procurement, waiting for computeriation in

government departments is not needed to start the pro+ect.

(. 3!& pro+ects

Entire e/procurement processes must be designed to avoid human

interface i.e., supplier and buyer interaction.

They must provide anonymity and level playing field to all vendors.


29/56

There should be automatic bid evaluation based on the evaluation

parameters given to the system to eliminate sub+ectivity.

Tender documents containing all details are hosted on the website and

be freely downloadable by all.

They don5t re2uire e#tensive back end computeriation and hence can

be easily taken up.

6. -upporting infrastructure

1. *ower supply, literacy, connectivity, and backend support are the essential

pre/re2uisites.

!. Ade2uate redundancy and backups should be provided specially to meet with

disaster challenges.

Personnel $ssues in $m&lementation of %6Governance Pro7ects

1. )#reats of job losses increase resistance

2. Employees resist retraining

3. 8overnment staff may resent external staff It #elps a great deal if external staff #ave

t#e time and patience to tal1 to employees

4. +ig# level support doesn;t ensure staff buy in Staff can come in only "#en t#ey see

benefits from moving to a ne" system

5. Staff are unent#usiastic "#en credit is not s#ared: A common perception is t#at an e-

government project is an I) department project and if t#e project is successful& t#e I)

department "ill get all t#e credit

6. 9earing t#at ne" systems may not deliver& managers tend to continue manual systems

in parallel& and t#us t#ere is no incentive for staff to s"itc# over to t#e ne" system

%6Mitra Pro7ect in Ra7asthan

1. )#ere are t"o major components M Dbac1 office processing$ and Dservice counters$ Bac1

office processing includes computeri*ation of participating departments and establis#ing a

mini data centre at t#e district level (rivate partners ,4ocal Service (roviders run t#e

1ios1s2 service counters

2. It is in ((( mode In case of collection of bills& t#e 4ocal Service (rovider does not

c#arge t#e citi*en& but gets reimbursement from t#e concerned organi*ation

0ational e-8overnance (lan


30/56

Pro7ect

1. It comprises of 3 ission ode (rojects ,(s and / components !arious (s

are o"ned and spear#eaded by t#e concerned ministries

2. (#ysical Arc#itecture

1. 'ata Centers

2. 0o90 - 7bps net"or1 connectivity to eac# (anc#ayat

3. @ios1s at t#e front end for eac# N village cluster follo"ing #oney comb

structure @ios1s to #ave a (C along "it# basic support e%uipment li1e printer&

scanner and >(S

3. 87C Services to be 5ffered

1. 4and records

2. egistration of ve#icles

3. Issue of certificates

4. Employment exc#ange

5. ation cards

6. Electoral services

7. (ension sc#emes

8. Issue of licenses

9. (ublic grievance

10. (ayment of bills

Mission Mode Pro7ects

1. CA 7: )#e ( is in its post-implementation stage and is providing electronic

services to t#e Companies for t#eir related activities suc# as allocation and c#ange of

name& incorporation& online payment of registration c#arges& c#ange in address of

registered office& vie"ing of public records and ot#er related services It also ma1es public

t#e company related data

2. (ension: A "ebsite provides updated information on government pension rules and

regulations #elps facilitating registration of grievances enables monitoring timely sanction

of pension maintains a database of pensioners

3. Income )ax: It offers services including facility for do"nloading of various forms& online

submission of applications for (A0& trac1ing t#e applications& e-filing of Income )ax

eturns& e-filing of )'S returns& online payment of taxes& issue of refunds

4. (assport& !isa and Immigration: )#e e-services being offered under t#e ( include

re-issue of (assport& issue of duplicate (assport& issue of )at1al (assport& c#ange in

name& address& EC02 EC suspensions& passport status en%uiry etc

5. Central Excise: )#e important e-services being offered include e-filing of Import and


31/56

Export documentation& electronic processing of declarations& facilities for e-filing of Central

Excise and Service )ax returns& e-registration services& digital signatures& e-payment of

Customs 'uties

6. Ban1ing: It includes Electronic Central egistry and 5ne India 5ne Account for (ublic

Sector Ban1s

7. >I'

8. e-5ffice: )#e functioning of government offices "ould be computeri*ed

9. Insurance: )#e ( is an industry initiative ,by public sector insurance companies

)#e ( aims at facilitating customer services& automating grievance redressal

mec#anism and& creating a database

$ntegrated MMPs

1. e-Courts: )#e first p#ase includes building computer infrastructure in t#e lo"er courts

and upgrading it at +ig# Courts and t#e Supreme Court )#e second p#ase of t#e (

includes providing services li1e availability of copies of judgments& e-filing of cases& video

conferencing of outstation "itnesses& issue of notices to clients t#roug# e-mail

2. Electronic 'ata Interc#ange2e-)rade ,E'I: It aims at facilitating electronic data

interc#ange amongst various agencies involved in t#e process of imports and exports It

offers services li1e electronic filing and clearance of EOI documents and e-(ayments of

duties

3. India (ortal: It provides a single "indo" access to information about governments at all

levels& in a multilingual form

4. e-(rocurement: )#is ( of t#e inistry of Commerce aims at rolling-out I)-enabled

procurement by government departments

5. oad )ransport: )#is ( proposes to offer many e-Services li1e ve#icle registration&

driving licenses and Smart Card based registration certificates to citi*ens

6. Agriculture: )#e ( aims at providing information regarding farm practices& mar1et

trends& agricultural and tec#nical 1no"-#o" It #as t"o components ie A8IS0E) and

A8A@0E) A8A@0E) aims at creating an information net"or1 "#ic# "ill

capture2update information at various mandis A8IS0E) aims at bac1-end

computeri*ation of State Agriculture departments

7. e-'istrict: )#is ( aims at delivery of #ig# volume& citi*en-centric services t#roug#

1ios1s )#ese "ould primarily be services not covered by ot#er specific (s A minimum

of K services "ill be delivered in every State

Anal!sis of -eGP

1. )#e Institutional Structure

1. It #as become essential to ensure t#at t#e numerous projects being

implemented by t#e different governments and departments are consistent "it# a


32/56

broad policy and ad#ere to common standards

2. )#is re%uires empo"ered institutional arrangements to oversee t#e projects

2. ole of local governments

1. )#ere is no role for t#e local governments in t#e implementation of t#e plan and

not even at 1ios1 level

2. onitoring bodies of elected local body representatives s#ould be set up to

monitor t#e implementation of t#e plan

3. (Is s#ould also spread a"areness among t#e people about t#e services being

offered and encourage t#em to utili*e t#em

3. Business process restructuring and capacity building issues

1. )#e (s #ave t#e potential of creating a direct impact on citi*ens since t#ey

provide #ig# volume 87C services >nfortunately& t#ese are t#e very sectors "#ere

progress in implementation is lagging

2. )#e most critical bottlenec1 is delay in business process restructuring and

insufficient capacity building

3. )#e large scale of t#e transactions involved& prevalence of outdated and

cumbersome procedures& inertia and resistance to c#ange& t#e over#ang of old and

outdated records are ot#er issues

4. (roject management issues

1. )#ere is lac1 of clear demarcation of responsibility among t#e project

aut#orities

2. ost of t#e State level e-8overnance projects are still at t#e conceptual stage

3. any of t#e projects #ave pre-maturely gone a#ead "it# t#e IC) component

"it#out first prioriti*ing t#e governance reforms t#at are a pre-re%uisite )#is "ould

result in automation of t#e existing inefficiencies in t#e system

Status of $m&lementation

1. Status of (s: 5ut of t#e 3 (s& (s are delivering t#e full range of

services "#ile . #ave started delivering some services to t#e citi*ens

2. e-)AA4: It is a "eb portal "#ic# aggregates and analyses t#e statistics of e-governance

projects including (s on a real time basis It is expected to en#ance t#e outcome focus

of e-8overnance programs

3. obile Seva: It is a uni%ue country"ide initiative on mobile governance to provide

public services to t#e citi*ens t#roug# mobile p#ones As on date& departments are on

it offering over 7// services A mobile AppStore #as also been launc#ed "it# 3

applications

4. 0o90: (ilot #as been conducted and rollout is in progress

5. e-8ov AppStore: It "ill #ost successful e-governance applications "#ic# can be


33/56

replicated by all government departments intending to implement e-8ov initiatives& t#ereby

saving immense time and costs

6. e-(rocurement: All departments #ave been directed to s"itc# over to it

7. eg#raj: )#is is t#e ne" 8overnment of India cloud ,8I Cloud computing environment

to be created at t#e national level It "ill bring t#e benefits of cloud computing

8. 0ational e-8overnance Academy: )o promote researc#& documentation& training& t#is

academy "ill be opened

odels

Successes& (otential and 4imitations

Ci&il Ser&i*es

ole in a 'emocracy


34/56

PRAKASH SINGH CASE


35/56

elations#ip "it# t#e (olitical 4eaders#ip

Constitutionall! %nvisioned Scheme

1. )#e secretary #as to advise t#e minister impartially and fearlessly and tell #im about t#e

legality of #is orders and suggest t#at eit#er suc# orders not be given or t#at t#ey be

suitably modified

2. )#e minister may #ave t#e mandate of t#e people to govern& but t#e secretary #as an

e%uivalent constitutional mandate to advise t#e inister3. 5nce #is advice #as been suitably considered& unless t#e minister passes an illegal

order& t#e secretary is bound to implement it "it#out bias and fear or favor )#e minister&

on #is part& is re%uired to support t#e secretary "#o is implementing #is order

Status

1. 4oss of political neutrality


36/56

1. In t#e initial years after Independence& relations bet"een inisters and civil

servants "ere c#aracteri*ed by mutual respect and understanding of eac# ot#er$s

respective roles& "it# neit#er encroac#ing upon t#e ot#er$s domain

2. +o"ever& in subse%uent years& matters started c#anging for t#e "orse ?#ile some

civil servants did not render objective and impartial advice to t#eir inisters& often some

inisters began to resent advice t#at did not fit in "it# s#ort-term political interests

3. )#ere "as also a tendency for some inisters to focus more on routine

administrative matters suc# as transfers in preference to policy ma1ing

4. As a result& Dpolitical neutrality$ "#ic# "as t#e #allmar1 of t#e civil service in t#e pre-

Independence era as "ell as in t#e period rig#t after Independence& "as gradually

eroded

2. 'isc#arge of delegated functions

1. )#ere is an increasing tendency in government departments to centrali*e aut#ority

and also after #aving first delegated aut#ority do"n"ards& to interfere in decision ma1ing

of t#e subordinate functionaries

2. )#ere is a perception t#at do"n"ard delegation of responsibilities "ill lead to abuse

and more corruption But t#e correct "ay is to institute mec#anisms to prevent t#at

Challenges

1. 'efining accountability

1. Civil servants in India are accountable to t#e ministers& but in practice& t#e

accountability is vague and of a generalised nature Since t#ere is no system of ex ante

specification of accountability& t#e relations#ip bet"een t#e minister and t#e civil servants

is essentially issue-sensitive and civil servants deal "it# t#e ministers as t#e issues

present t#emselves

2. )#e accountability relations#ip can be anyt#ing from all pervasive to minimalistic

and it is left to t#e incumbent minister to interpret it in a manner t#at is most convenient to

#im2#er )#is leads to eit#er collusive relations#ip or to discord& bot# of "#ic# can

adversely affect t#e administration

3. )#us t#ere is an urgent need to codify t#is relations#ip preferably by enacting a la"

4. Accountability can be defined in t#e relations#ip only in an output - outcome

frame"or1 5utputs are specific services t#at t#e civil servants deliver& and t#erefore&

t#e civil servants s#ould be #eld accountable for t#e delivery of 1ey results& "#ic#

becomes t#e basis for evaluation of t#eir performance )#is can be ac#ieved t#roug#

agreements "it# t#e minister specifying t#e performance targets )#ese performance

agreements s#ould be put in t#e public domain )#ey s#ould #ave clearly spelt out

objective and measurable goals

5. 5utcome is t#e success in ac#ieving social goals and t#e political executive


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2. (ublic policy is a complex exercise re%uiring in-dept# 1no"ledge and expertise in public

affairs A permanent civil service develops expertise as "ell as institutional memory for

effective policy ma1ing

3. A permanent and impartial civil service is more li1ely to assess t#e long-term social

payoffs of any policy

4. A permanent civil service #elps to ensure uniformity in public administration and also

acts as a unifying force particularly in vast and culturally diverse nations

(rosecution of Civil Servants

Article 899

1. 0o civil servant s#all be dismissed by an aut#ority subordinate to t#at by "#ic# #e "as

appointed

2. 0o suc# person s#all be dismissed or removed or reduced in ran1 except after an

in%uiry in "#ic# #e #as been informed of t#e c#arges against #im and given a reasonable

opportunity of being #eard

3. (rovided furt#er t#at t#is clause s#all not apply

1. "#ere a person is dismissed or removed or reduced in ran1 on t#e ground of

conduct "#ic# #as led to #is conviction on a criminal c#arge or

2. "#ere t#e aut#ority empo"ered is satisfied t#at for some reason& to be recorded

by t#at aut#ority in "riting& it is not reasonably practicable to #old suc# in%uiry or

3. "#ere t#e (resident or t#e 8overnor& as t#e case may be& is satisfied t#at in t#e

interest of t#e security of t#e State& it is not expedient to #old suc# in%uiry

Art 8:; and Art 89:

1. Article 3/.: 4egislature may regulate t#e recruitment and conditions of service of civil

services

2. Article 3/: Civil servants #old office during t#e pleasure of t#e (resident 2 8overnor

Other Protections

1. CBI can not conduct any investigation except "it# t#e previous approval of t#e Central

8overnment "#ere suc# allegation relates to t#e employees of t#e Central 8overnment of

t#e level of 6oint Secretary and above or e%uivalent position in C(S>s

2. Sanction for prosecution of a public servant is re%uired from an aut#ority not lo"er t#an

t#at competent to remove #im

3. A case under t#e (oCA can only be registered by t#e CBI or t#e anti-corruption agency

of a state and not by t#e civil police


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4. 5nly a special judge is competent to ta1e cogni*ance of an offence of corruption

Debate - Remove Art 311

1. Complicated procedures #ave arisen out of t#is article "#ic# #ave in practice s#ielded

t#e guilty )#ese complicated safeguards also lead to inordinate delays and render even

most "ell meant legislations and institutions li1e C!C ineffective

2. 6udicial decisions too #ave cro"ded out t#e real intent of Article 3 and s#ielded t#e

guilty (rocedure #as become more important t#an t#e substance emoving t#e article

"ould render suc# judgments void

3. Suc# a provision is not available in any of t#e democratic countries including t#e >@

4. )#is article "as drafted at a time "#en due to post-colonial administrative up#eavals& it

"as felt necessary to prescribe certain guarantees to t#e bureaucracy In t#e present

scenario& t#is is not necessary 8overnment is no longer t#e only significant source of

employment Indeed& in t#e present debate of even providing outcome oriented

contractual appointments puts a %uestion mar1 on t#e desirability of t#e permanency in

t#e civil services )#e role of 8overnment as a model employer cannot override public

good

5. ?#en Sardar (atel argued for protection of civil servants& t#e intention "as clearly to

embolden senior civil servants to render impartial and fran1 advice to t#e

political executive "it#out fear of retribution But t#e compulsions of e%ual treatment of all

public servants and judicial pronouncements #ave made suc# a protection applicable to

everybody and t#is #as crated a climate of excessive security #ampering efficiency and

"or1 culture

Debate 6 Do not Remove Art 899

1. It subjects t#e doctrine of pleasure contained in t#e preceding Article 3/ to certain

safeguards and c#ec1s arbitrary action on executive;s part India doesn;t #ave a spoils

system

2. Safeguard of an opportunity of being #eard #as been #eld to be a fundamental principle

of natural justice It is argued t#at even if Art 3 is not t#ere& natural justice cannot be

compromised and t#e aggrieved party can get relief from t#e courts But experience of

past N decades s#o"s t#at executive #as scant regard for t#e spirit of t#e la" and

inordinate delays and large number of cases may arise out of t#e confusing situation

3. )#e re%uirement t#at only an aut#ority "#ic# is t#e appointing aut#ority or superior can

impose a punis#ment also appears reasonable as t#e government follo"s a #ierarc#ical

structure

4. It is t#e rules governing disciplinary en%uiries& and not Article 3 itself& t#at are

responsible for t#e delays

+he #alanced A&&roach


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1. Article 3 of t#e Constitution s#ould be repealed Simultaneously& Article 3/ of t#e

Constitution s#ould also be repealed Suitable legislation to protect civil servants from

arbitrary actions of t#e executive s#ould be provided under Article 3/.

Debate 6 -eed for Sanctions

1. 5fficers at senior levels #ave important decision ma1ing roles ?#ile ta1ing

t#ese decisions t#ey s#ould be able to do so "it#out any fear Exposing t#em could #ave

a demorali*ing effect and encourage t#em most of t#e time to be ris1 averse

2. It can be argued t#at if at all t#e sanction protection is to be given& t#e po"er s#ould

vest "it# an independent body li1e t#e C!C& "#ic# can ta1e an objective stand So t#e

government #as decided to create a committee of secretaries involving t#e C!C to grant

sanctions "it#in ./ days beyond "#ic# t#e sanction "ould be deemed to #ave been

granted

Removal from Service< Criminalit! vs $ncom&etence

1. )#e standard for probity in public life s#ould be not only conviction in a criminal court

but propriety as determined by suitable independent institutions specifically constituted for

t#e purpose

2. It may not al"ays be possible to establis# t#e criminal offence in a court ,for lo"ering

service delivery standards in return of personal favors but t#e government servant can

still be removed from service on grounds of incompetence

Removal from Service< Criminalit! vs Administrative Action

1. Criminal conviction re%uires Jbeyond reasonable doubtJ Administrative action does notre%uire ;beyond reasonable doubt; It re%uires Jt#e preponderance of probabilityJ ,A fair

probability of corruption by t#e official is sufficient

Disciplinary Proceedings

1. Issues

1. JIn%uiryJ as prescribed under Article 3 "#ic# often tends to become li1e a full

fledged court proceeding s#ould be replaced by a FmeetingG or intervie" to discuss

t#e c#arges made out against #im

2. inor penalty can be imposed after calling for and considering t#e explanation

of t#e accused employee ajor (enalties can be imposed only after a detailedin%uiry

2. ecommendations

1. )#e ne" Civil Services 4a" s#ould set out only t#e minimum statutary

disciplinary and dismissal procedures re%uired to satisfy t#e criteria of natural justice

leaving t#e details of t#e procedure to be follo"ed to t#e respective departments


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2. )#e penalty of dismissal or removal of a public servant s#ould only be

imposed by an aut#ority t#ree levels #ig#er t#an t#e present post #eld by t#at

public servant "#ereas all ot#er penalties may be imposed by an aut#ority "#o is

t"o levels #ig#er

3. )#e c#arges against t#e government servant s#ould be communicated to #im in

"riting

4. )#e in%uiry process s#ould be based to t#e maximum extent possible

on documentary rat#er t#an oral evidence

5. 9ixed and brief time limits s#ould be prescribed for admission and denial

of documents from bot# sides follo"ed by a meeting 2 intervie" to give t#e

government servant a c#ance to respond to t#e c#arges

6. (reponderance of probabilities rat#er t#an beyond reasonable doubt "ould be

t#e standard of evidence re%uired for t#e in%uiry aut#ority to reac#

#is2#er conclusions

7. Imposition of major penalties s#ould be recommended by a committee in

order to ensure objectivity

Issues in Civil Services eforms

Attitudinal $ssues

1. Issues1. Civil servants still believe in t#e +egelian prescription t#at t#ey represent t#e universal

interest of t#e society +egel argued t#at t#e most important institution in t#e state "as t#e

bureaucracy "#ic# represented t#e absolutely universal interests of t#e state )#e exercise of

po"er by t#e bureaucracy "as a mission sanctioned by 8od

2. It believes t#at its aut#ority is derived not from t#e mandate of t#e people but from an

immutable corpus of rules t#at it #as prescribed for itself It #as no need to give due regards to

t#e aspirations of t#e people and rule of la"

3. ?it# reforms& t#e role of private sector and civil society #as increased immensely So t#e

civil servants need to vie" t#em as partners instead of asserting t#eir o"n pre-eminenceResult Orientation

1. Issues

1. Civil Service in India is more concerned "it# t#e internal processes t#an "it# results

2. )#ere is too muc# focus on amount of inputs used - "#et#er t#e full budget is used or

not As a result outcomes get neglected and civil servants are not #eld accountable for t#e

results


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3. )#e structures are based on #ierarc#ies and t#ere are a large number of veto points

4. )o compound it& t#e si*e and t#e number of ministries and departments #ave proliferated

and diminis#ed t#e capacities of t#e individual civil servants to fulfill t#eir responsibilities

2. ecommendations

1. 'evolution: Ac#ievement of results "ould re%uire substantial devolution of managerialaut#ority to t#e implementing levels )#is "ould re%uire giving civil servants in t#e

implementing agencies greater flexibility and incentives to ac#ieve results as "ell as relaxing

t#e existing central controls

2. Accountability: )#e counterpart of devolution s#ould be more accountability )#is can be

ac#ieved t#roug# agreements "it# t#e minister specifying t#e performance targets )#ese

performance agreements s#ould be put in t#e public domain )#ey s#ould #ave clearly spelt

out objective and measurable goals

Resistance to Change

1. Issues

1. )#e perception is t#at t#ey resist c#ange as t#ey are "edded to t#eir privileges and

prospects )#us t#ey #ave prevented us from reali*ing t#e full benefits of t#e K3rd and Kt#

Amendments since it clas#es "it# t#eir o"n aut#ority

2. )#ey also resist simplification of procedures "#ic# is a pre-re%uisite for introduction of e-

governance since it "ould undermine t#eir importance

Accountabilit!

1. Accountability mec#anisms can be #ori*ontal "#ic# refer to t#ose located "it#in t#e government

and vertical "#ic# are t#ose outside it and include t#e media& civil society and citi*ens

2. 'isciplinary action against non performing officers is a rarity and is a long process

3. )#e life-long job security furt#er leads to distorted incentive structure

4. ?#ile t#e performance of government organi*ations and t#eir sub-units are periodically subjected

to in-dept# revie"s& seldom are efforts made to lin1 organi*ational performance to t#e performance

of an individual civil servant

%(it Mechanisms

1. Issues

1. At present& rarely does a civil servant get dismissed from service or is punis#ed

on grounds of incompetence

2. ecommendations

1. It is necessary t#at all civil servants undergo a rigorous assessment of performance&

at regular intervals& and on t#e basis of suc# evaluation a civil servant can be retired

compulsorily )#e compulsory retirement can #appen say after 7/ years

2. 0e" appointments s#ould be made only for a fixed period& say 7/ years& after "#ic# if t#e

performance is not satisfactory& #e can be removed Suc# provisions are t#ere in armed forces


43/56

Se&aration of Polic! Ma*ing and $m&lementation +as*s

1. Issues

1. )#e policy formulation function of senior civil servants needs to be distinguis#ed from t#e

policy implementation function Currently due to diverse "or1load& t#eir most important

function& of tendering policy advice to t#e ministers& often gets neglected2. ecommendations

1. )#ere is a need for a separation of policy formulation and implementation responsibilities

by extensive restructuring

2. 9latter structures and outcome oriented agencies need to be created and po"ers

delegated do"n"ards

ield Postings of Officers during the $nitial Part of +heir Career

1. )#ere #ave been instances "#ere state governments #ave posted t#e officers during #is

early career to t#e Secretariat instead of t#e field )#is is not in t#e public interest since it is

necessary for an officer to #ave ade%uate experience in t#e field So no secretariat postings

s#ould be given for first / years at least

Domain Com&etenc!

1. Issues

1. )#e increasingly complexity of c#allenges today demand #ig#er levels of 1no"ledge and

deeper insig#ts from public servants )#is "ould mean t#at civil servants - especially in policy

ma1ing positions - s#ould possesses in-dept# 1no"ledge of t#e sector

2. 'omain competence is distinct from specialised tec#nical 1no"ledge in t#at it refers to a

broad understanding of t#e relevant field and more importantly managerial abilities derived

from practical experience in t#at field

3. )#ere is considerable confusion about t#e concept of domain competence It is generally

discussed in t#e context of t#e ministry an officer may be best suited for 'omain competence

actually refers to functions and not inistries

2. ecommendations

1. Assigning specific domains to civil servants early in t#eir career and retaining t#em in t#e

assigned domain is an important reform

2. Steps need to be ta1en to assign civil servants at t#e start of t#eir mid-career to specific

domains 'omain assignment at t#is stage of t#e career "ould also be appropriate because

"#en t#e officer is eligible to be at t#e level of 6oint Secretary #e2s#e "ould #ave #ad at least

t#ree to four years exposure to a domain

3. )#ese domains s#ould stri1e a rig#t balance bet"een flexibility and needs for speciali*ed

expertise and need to be defined suitably Some domains could be: general administration&

urban development& rural development& security& financial management& infrastructure& #uman

resource development& natural resource management


44/56

De&utation of Public Servants $nto Private Sector

1. Conflict of interest possible even after retirement

2. =uid pro %uo assignments in private sector mean only a small number of civil servants #olding

assignments in certain Dsoug#t after$ sectors "ill benefit A vast majority of civil servants& especially

t#ose "or1ing in t#e social sector and sectors li1e rural development& "ill per#aps not be affected by

suc# a policy )#is could result in an increasing reluctance by government servants to "or1 in t#ese

crucial social sectors

3. In India& civil servants #ave created a number of post-retirement jobs& including t#ose in

regulators& "#ic# t#ey can conveniently latc# on to once t#ey retire from t#eir jobs )#is seems

preferable to civil servants moving into t#e private sector

Motivating Civil Servants

1. Issues

1. Civil servants today adopt a Dminimalist$ approac# in t#eir functioning& and confine t#eir

"or1 to disposing of files ma1ing no special effort at resolving problems )#ey rarely "al1 t#at

Dextra mile$

2. )#ere is #ardly any performance for pay incentive available to t#em 0atural increases in

salary are very muc# guaranteed to government employees )#is leads to a situation "#ere

employees do not exert t#emselves

3. )#ere is no external motivation for ris1-ta1ing and delivering a #ig#er level of

performance& because t#oug# t#e ris1-ta1ing is punis#ed if t#ings go "rong& it is not re"arded

if t#ings improve

4. (oor "or1ing conditions

5. >nfair personnel policies6. Excess supervision

7. Absence of fair-play and transparency in t#e government system

8. 4ac1 of opportunity for self-expression

9. (olitical interference into officers; jurisdiction

2. ecommendations

1. (erformance based monetary incentives

2. ecognition: )#oug# national a"ards are given to t#ose civil servants "#o #ave made

outstanding contributions to public service but t#e criteria and process are opa%ue and

fre%uently misused (adma a"ards s#ould be given more fre%uently to serving civil servants

Selection for suc# a"ards is made t#roug# an objective and transparent mec#anism because

t#e value of suc# a"ards s#ould not get compromised by eit#er subjectivity or lac1 of

transparency 5t#er a"ards s#ould be instituted

3. 6ob enric#ment: 'elegation s#ould be made a part of t#e performance appraisal at eac#

suitable level


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4. 4in1ing career prospects "it# performance: Arbitrary political actions must stop

Civil Services Bill

Draft Public Services #ill4 =::>

1. Appointment to public services to be based on t#e principle of merit

2. )ransfers before t#e specified tenure s#ould be for valid reasons to be recorded in

"riting )#e normal tenure of all public servants s#all not be less t#an t"o years

3. It proposes t#e constitution of a Civil Services Aut#ority

1. It s#all aid and advise t#e Central 8overnment in all matters concerning t#e

management of civil servants

2. evie" t#e adoption& ad#erence to and implementation of t#e Civil Service

!alues and send reports to t#e Central 8overnment

3. Assign domains to all officers of t#e All India Services and t#e Central Civil

Services on completion of 3 years of service

4. 9ormulate norms and guidelines for appointments at DSenior anagement

4evel$ in 8overnment of India

5. Evaluate and recommend names of officers for posting at t#e

DSenior anagement 4evel$ in 8overnment of India

6. Identify t#e posts at DSenior anagement 4evel$ in 8overnment of India "#ic#

could be t#ro"n open for recruitment from all sources

7. 9ix t#e tenure for posts at t#e DSenior anagement 4evel$ in 8overnment of

India

8. Submit an annual report to (arliament

4. It includes public service values and t#e Code of Et#ics

5. )#e Bill enjoins government to prepare a (ublic Service anagement Code "it# t#e aim to

develop civil services into a professional& merit-based institution& maintain #ig# levels of

excellence It provides for ACs to be made public It provides for periodic pay and incentives

revie"& training& guidelines for promotions

6. It enjoins t#e government to define t#e relations#ip bet"een t#e political executive and civil

services

Desired ?ualities of a Civil Services #ill

1. It acts as a legal basis for t#e legislature to express t#e important values and culture it

"ants in t#e civil service

2. It #as a mec#anism by "#ic# government decisions can be implemented

3. It #as a frame"or1 for setting out t#e role and po"ers of t#e #eads of t#e agencies

and departments


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4. It spells out t#e relations#ip bet"een civil services and political leaders#ip in a clear and

transparent "ay

5. It lets civil servants 1no" clearly "#at is expected of t#em

6. It deals "it# important aspects li1e transfers& performance management& civil services

aut#ority& postings& entry to senior executive service

7. It contains public service standards and et#ical values and #o" t#ey s#ould be applied

Anal!sis of the Draft Public Services #ill4 =::>

1. 0ame: )#e term public servant #as a muc# "ider connotation So t#e name of t#e Bill

s#ould be c#anged to Civil Services Bill

2. Appointment to (ublic Services: It ma1es t#e principle of merit ,subject to reservations& fair

and transparent competition as t#e guiding principles for appointments It "ould be better to

prescribe t#at all appointments including in (S>s& various boards& "#et#er permanent or

s#ort-term or contractual s#ould be made on t#is basis

3. (ublic service values and Code: )#e Bill can list do"n an ex#austive set of values

clearly& currently it doesn;t

4. (erformance management system: )#e Bill can lay do"n t#e guidelines and principles

to be follo"ed "#ile devising performance management systems

5. 9unctions of t#e Central Civil Services Aut#ority: Its recommendations s#ould be made

binding If t#e government rejects it& "ritten reasons s#ould be given and made public

6. Creation of executive agencies in government: 8overnment s#ould be aut#ori*ed to

create executive agencies )#e role of t#e ministries s#ould primarily be on policy

formulation "#ile implementation s#ould be left to t#e executive agencies

Civil Services Authorit!

1. )#ere s#ould be an independent aut#ority to deal "it# matters of assignment of domains&

empanelment of officers& fixing tenures for various posts& appointments and transfers& deciding

on posts "#ic# could be advertised for lateral entry

2. It s#ould be given a statutory bac1ing and clear objective criterion s#ould be laid do"n for its

members#ip Serving government servants or politicians s#ould not be appointed to it

3. )#e members s#ould be appointed by a collegium in a transparent manner

4. )#e aut#ority s#ould be given personnel and financial autonomy as "ell

(lacement at t#e )op anagement 4evel

Senior %(ecutive Service

1. It comprises of a group of civil servants "#o are appointed to top-level positions across


47/56

ministries& departments and agencies

2. It usually occupies policy-ma1ing positions or #eads major operating agencies or line

departments

3. It "or1s closely "it# t#e political executive

4. It constitutes a very small fraction of t#e civil service

5. It is bound by a distinctive set of et#ical standards suc# as values and code of conduct

Position Based SES

1. )#e position-based SES as in Australia& 0e" Pealand& >@ is more open because

appointments to senior positions are made from a "ider pool comprising all civil servants as

"ell as t#ose applicants from t#e private sector Its openness is its basic strengt#

S%S in $ndia

1. (resent system

1. In

Documents

Goveranance and Polity