Gorgias on Nature or That Which Is NotAuthor(s): G. B. KerferdSource: Phronesis, Vol. 1, No. 1 (Nov., 1955), pp. 3-25Published by: BRILLStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4181593Accessed: 31/07/2009 13:34

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Gorgias on nature or that which is not

G. B. KERFERD

T HE remains of Gorgias' treatise 7rtc? 'rou [0 6v?oc m1) 7rrpL CA)q

have not received very much attention from scholars during the last fifty years. This is probably due mainly to two reasons - the highly

technical and indeed to many readers repulsive nature of its content, and the widely held view that it is not meant seriously but is simply a parody or joke against philosophers, or at best a purely rhetorical exercise. 1 The first of these views seems so obviously wrong that it is hardly necessary to devote much time to discussing it. The short answer must be that there is nothing humourous about the treatise and no indication that it was ever intended to be so. In this respect it is in exactly the same position as the second part of Plato's dialogue Parmenides. Its general thesis might conceivably amuse those to whom all attempts at philosophy are in- herently absurd, but such persons could hardly be expected to work through the difficult arguments which make up the contents of the work. The view that it was purely a rhetorical exercise is no more plausible. But it is not intended to argue this question at length here. The final answer to both views must consist in showing just what is the content of the treatise and the serious purposes to which it is directed. There have indeed been those who have treated the work seriously. But its inter- pretation undoubtedly presents quite extraordinary difficulties, and those who have treated it seriously have arrived at very different views as to what Gorgias is saying.2 What follows is in part new, and as a consequence little space is devoted to previous interpretations, and where they are mentioned it is usually in disagreement. It is nonetheless the work of scholars in the past who have laid a foundation both in establishing the text and in interpreting it upon which all future studies must rest.

Our information about the contents of the treatise comes from two separate accounts, the summnary in Sextus Empiricus, Adv. Math. vii. 65-87, and the third section of the work De Melisso Xenophane Gorgia I Cf. H. Gomperz, Sophistik und Rhetorik, Leipzig 191 2, I 8 2 ff., H. Maier, Sokrates, Tlubingen 1913, 2x9ff. For reflections of these views see e.g. K. Freeman, Companion to the Pre-Socratic Philosophers, 3 6 1- 2, and E. Brihier, Histoire de la Philosophie, 1. i. 8 S. 2 Notably G. Calogero, Studi sull' Eleatismo, Roma 1932. M. Untersteiner, I Sofisti, Torino 1949 (English Translation, The Sophists, Oxford: Blackwell 19S4). 0. Gigon in Hermes, lxxi (1936) I86-213. E. Dupreel, Les Sophistes, Neuchatel 1948 [actualy 19491. 1 have not seen D. Viale (= Adolfo Levi), Studi su Gorgia in Logos xxiv (1941).

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(MXG) attributed to Aristotle. The date of this second work cannot be determined. While it is certainly not by Aristotle, it may contain Aristotelian or Peripatetic material and have some relation to Aristotle's

7rp6k M'& MeX(aaou C, tpk a' Evop&vouc, aC, and tp6q TM, ropyLou a, mentioned in the catalogue of Aristotle's works preserved in Diogenes Laertius v. 2g. Diels first" assigned it to a Peripatetic of the third century B.C. but later supposed that it came from the first century A.D. Gigon8

preferred the view that it was based on a series of Peripatetic studies in the Presocratics and in default of further evidence this is probably the most likely. It is usually supposed that the contents of both versions represent a summary of a more extended work by Gorgias himself, though it is not possible to assess the degree to which the original may have been compressed and curtailed. Recently it has been asserted 3 that the text shows 'a very high level of logical skill' unthinkable at the time of Gorgias. But the author does not offer any detailed analysis of the text. As against this view the discussion, e.g. of change, seems wholly pre- Platonic in character. Above all the treatment of the verb 'to be', if the interpretation which is about to be offered is even partially right, would hardly be possible after the work of Plato and Aristotle. All that can be said with reasonable certainty is that Gorgias seems clearly to have committed himself to the central conclusion of the surviving summaries, since this is twice attributed to him by Isocrates.4 This would naturally refer to one of his writings and in fact it is clear that in later years there was a treatise circulating under the name of Gorgias 5,

with the title sept yuaccor or 7tepL toi5 ,lu 6Vxo4 n ept Ypu'ae&g. It has

never I think been seriously suggested that Sextus took his information from the author of MXG. The reverse possibility, that MXG drew upon Sextus is quite out of the question. Whether both or either used inter- mediary sources between themselves and the treatise circulating under the name of Gorgias cannot be known. But there seems to be no need for such a hypothesis in order to explain anything in the surviving versions and accordingly it is probably better left aside. Whether Gorgias was himself responsible for the contents of the treatise which certainly later circulated under his name is another question which once raised can never be conclusively answered. But an attempt will be made

1 Doxogaphi Gracci, (1879), io8f. Later view in Abh. Berlin Ak. igoo, p. 12. 2 Hermes lxxi (1936) 2 1 2.

3 by X. M. Bochenski, Ancient Formal Logic, Amsterdam i95i, 17. 4 IX.3 and XV.26 - Diels-Kranz6 82 B X. 5 Diels-Kranz6 82 A io and B 2.

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to show that there is nothing in the treatise which might not have been expressed by Gorgias in the fifth century and there the matter is perhaps best left.

On the usual view there are fundamental differences in the arguments as presented in the two versions and much discussion has been devoted to the question which of the two versions should be preferred where they differ. Again on the usual view in the first part of both versions the arguments turn round the question whether Being or Not-Being can be said to exist or not. But it is fairly clear that in the two later sections the interest centres round not the existence or otherwise of Being and Not-Being, but the status of objects of perception. A real advance in the study of the treatise came with the suggestion 1 that the first section of the treatise also is concerned with the status of objects of perception, and that the question at issue was not the existence or otherwise of Being and Not-Being, but a different one, namely whether the verb 'to be' can be predicated of phenomena without leading to contra- dictions. It is the aim of what follows to present a fresh reconstruction of the arguments of Gorgias along these lines, and in particular to show that the supposed differences between the versions of MXG and Sextus in the first section of the treatise are more apparent than real.

First the general arrangement of the arguments in the two versions. Both MXG (g7ga 12-13) and Sextus (vii. 65) state the major divisions of the treatise in what are admitted to be identical terms: - Nothing is; If it is, it is unknowable; If it is and is knowable, it cannot be communi- cated to others. Sextus states the arguments for the first step, that Nothing is, according to a straightforward pattern which he summarises in ch. 66 and follows exactly in the succeeding chapters. He first takes the supposition ei T p. gv =t and gives two arguments against this. He then takes the supposition C'L tz U 9=L and argues in the first place that if so it must be either eternal or generated or both eternal and generated, and in the second place it must be either one or many, and none of these concequences is tenable. He then discusses et r6 av g'rL xac T4 [L-1 6v and gives reasons against this, and so finally reaches the required conclusion o068v aT. MXG begins with a general statement dividing the arguments which are to follow into two groups (979 a I 3-24). Of these two groups the second in Gorgias' arrangement is described first in the general statement by the author of MXG. This is made clear by the words in 979 a 23- 24. >?Tr -? 7pnv tlOV cVO' a68LtL &V

h ?yeL 6trL oux am T oV OUt? -voa o65T gl elva. This sentence is Calogero, Studi sull' Eleatismo, 1932.

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followed by the statement of three arguments and it seems clear that all three are part of the 'special' demonstration mentioned in the sentence quoted. This is confirmed by the words which conclude the statement of the three arguments - oroq tv o p&rog 1 6yoq bxevou (79 a 33) which seem clearly to refer to the statement in 979 a 23 just quoted. The three arguments are then criticised by the author of MXG (979 a 34- b i9) and he resumes the statement of Gorgias' views with the words

jieT& o 6ntov 'r6v M6yov (p-nxv x'rX. (979 b 20). There follow the arguments about generated and ungenerated, one and many, and the argument about motion which has no parallel in Sextus. The arguments about generated and ungenerated, and one and many are clearly those described in the general statement by the author of MXG (979a I3-23)

before he describes the 'special' demonstration of Gorgias. This arrangement in MXG led Gigon2 to argue that the presentation

of the arguments differs fundamentally in Sextus and MXG. He holds that in MXG the 'special' demonstration covers the ground of the whole of the first division in Sextus, namely et r? t 'ov 9=, ?etr6 v laTn and et 6 &v &crL xcxl 'r6 ,u? 6v. On this view MXG deals with e't r gv I in quite a different way from Sextus, without using the arguments about eternal or generated, one or many at all for this purpose. In MXG these are held to form a supplement, after the special argument which has covered the whole ground already, while in Sextus they are the essential and indeed only arguments directed to the question e't ' v &T=L. If this is true we are confronted at the outset with a radical and perhaps insoluble problem. One of the two versions has completely recast the original treatise at this point and there is no clear indication as to which preserves the earlier arrangement. Alternatively we would have to suppose that in some sense there were two original versions each different from the other. :

MXG begins its statement of the 'special' demonstration of Gorgias with the words oux XXs o5hr elvoL okhe jiu etvotL. That the text is sound is shown by the repetition of the phrase in g7gb i 8ti{ r oiv oVx

t=v od?e elvoct ok, FL?) elva; Three different renderings might be offered for the phrase: i. 'neither Being nor Not-Being exists'. This is the commonest rendering and might be called the traditional inter- pretation. 2. 'neither Being nor Not-Being can exist'. 3. 'it is not

1 This word is a conjecture by Diels. See x below p. 17. ' Hermes lxxi (1936) 192-3. He is followed in this by Untersteiner, Sofisti, Testimonianze

c Frammenti, Fasc. 2. p. 4o n. and T'he Sophists, E.T. i66 n. 26.

8 as Untersteiner, The Sophists, 172 n. 75.

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possible (for it) either to be or not to be.' 1 That the third meaning is the natural one cannot gain much support from the dubious doctrine that an infinitive without an article cannot be the subject of a verb in Greek 2, but seems to follow from the regular use of the infinitive after la'n in the sense 'it is possible to....'. The obvious parallels to the present phrase are Parmenides fr. 2.3

(a .v &t&o {a'w ' xod c oux

{as; ?t VL and fr. 6. 2-3 gartL TYP clv?t, / tv8 8'oX gaLv and it is in fact likely that Gorgias had these phrases of Parmenides in mind. Unfortunately this does not absolutely settle the meaning, as the phrases in Parmenides have been variously interpreted. We are here only concerned directly with the meaning of &rn followed by the infinitive. In the first case Kranz 3, followed by Gigon 4 take the meaning of c's oiux I= C elvm to be 'dass Nichtsein niicht ist'. But the vast majority of scholars would probably agree that the natural meaning is 'it cannot be'. Certainly this is suggested by the antithesis two lines later in the fragment m (' Ag ou'x lO'TtV -re XtL 4 Xpec'v ea=TL

' cvaL where Xpe'V

&CL li' eIvCL seems to show that the eIvct in the earlier line is a predicate.5 There is greater difficulty with the second passage from Parmenides, fr. 6.2 =t yap elvax. While possibly a majority of scholars would prefer the meaning 'it can be', the meaning 'Being exists' has received considerable support.6 In fact both in this case and in the previous case a definite decision would require a full consideration of Parmenides' philosophy. Even if Parmenides' meaning could be esta- blished with certainty it would not necessarily follow that Gorgias was using the phrase with the same meaning since the extent to which Gorgias is discussing the position of Parmenides is itself problematic. What must be decisive for Gorgias must be the arguments by which he seeks to establish 6'T oV'x =tLv oute elvat o6re * ? V(XL and it will be argued that these require the meaning 'it canot either be or not be'.

The first argument in MXG is full of difficulties. The accepted text there reads oix 9aLV oU'T ?tVmL ou'e tJ etvaC (the phrase already discussed). e'L piv yap To6 etvaL ea=t [ ?vact, ou8&v av Atov '6 p

1 Loveday and Forster in the Oxford Translation of Aristotle, Vol. VI. 2 asserted e.g. in Burnet, Early Greek Philosophy . 173 n. 2, given some support in Kiihner-Gerth, ii. 3-S, rejected with examples by Verdenius, Parmenides, some comments on his poem, 1942, 3g and Fraenkel ad Aesch. Ag. S84. 3 in Diels-Kranz i5 P. 231, as against Diels in ii3 p. IS2. 4 Ursprung der griechischen Philosophie, 1945, 251. a cf. Verdenius, op. cit. 32 n. S. 4 cf. Heidel, Proc. Am. Ac. of Arts and Sciences, xlviii (1913) 72x, Kranz in Diels- Kranz il p. 232, Verdenius, op. cit. 37, Gigon, Ursprung, 257.

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8,v ToU 6voq et. t6 re yap tvj 6v 'cn L x ov X&L T'0 8v 8v (e ov86

FL0V eVoCM 1 OCUX CtVxL 'ra 7p0yM. For this the Oxford translation for example gives 'it is not possible either to be or not to be. For, he says, if Not-to-Be is Not-to-Be, then Not-Being would be no less than Being. For Not-Being is Not-Being and Being is Being, so that things no more are than are not'. Now after the preliminary statement 6'rL oUX

la-Lv o6re evtvcL o5're ' EvavL we would expect to find one or other or possibly both of these alternatives taken up. We should expect the next sentence to be et j.iv yap X=>v elvtv or its equivalent, or e? v?v ydp

gL c ?tv or both together. Even if the argument is compressed and something of this kind is to be understood, we should expect the conclusion to be something directly relevant to oi'x garv o5'm EttvL

o&' ,L7t etvoxL. Alternatively if the argument began ?1 0&v yap r 6 ctvxr. ? v? elvoc we might expect the conclusion to be some sort of denial of this hypothesis. In fact we have something quite different. But the really serious objection to the traditional interpretation here is a further point. As it stands, and as it has been translated, the argument makes nonsense of itself. Not only does it not produce the required conclusion, it produces the very opposite of the required conclusion. If Not-Being is no less than Being, the conclusi'on must be that both Not-Being and Being exist. It will not then be the case that things no more exist than not exist. The only conclusion possible would be that all things exist, both those that are Not-Being and those that are Being. But we must set a limit to the confusion of mind which we are justified in attributing even to a sophist. A fallacious argument is one thing and a fallacious argument leading to the wrong conclusion is quite another and we cannot allow the argument to rest in this condition until all other resources have been tried.

The best edition of the text is that of Diels 1, which uses two manu- scripts, L and R. Of these Diels remarks 'Codices LR satis fideliter ex libro corruptissimo descripti sunt. In universum accuratius L, sed variat fortuna legendi. Interdum R oculos magis intendit et imprimis finem versus L solito neglegentior. archetypi igitur imago clare enitescit, quem etiam pluribus et difficilioribus compendiis exaratum fuisse patet'. 2 He adds 'codicis L praestantia non ipsius diligentia ac fide sed etiam eo niti videtur, quod coniecturis subinde felicibus eius exemplar

1 Aristotelis qui fertur de Melisso Xenophane Gorgia libellus, Abh. der k. Akad. d. Wiss. zu Berin, 9goo. The text is not in Diels-Kranz, though to be included in future editions. It is included in Untersteiner, Frammenti, Fasc. ii. s ib. p. S.

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correctum erat' and 'instructus autem erat archetypus variis lectionibus'. This raises the possibility that L has removed traces of other readings in the archetype which R may have preserved through default of 'happy' conjectures. In the first sentence of the present argument the received text is that of L. But R has et ,uv yxp t6 ,L rVXL i ca'rLt p' e1VocL. I believe that what lies behind this is eL ,udv yap t' lvoL cat <t.v> g fi

e OLC [r1 EVXL and this is the right reading here. This will help to make sense of the argument as I will attempt to show shortly. But there are further reasons for adopting it which may be discussed first. Sextus begins his first argument with EL yap t6 [iq ov e'TL and his second with xcxL &),o dL T6 8 zV gaT The second argument in MXG begins with El 8'6L T6 pJ LIVatL 9L (979a 28). The second argument in MXG is clearly the same argument as the second argument in Sextus, and while discussion of the first argument in Sextus must be postponed for the present it is clear that it has at least some elements in common with the first argument in MXG. Accordingly a double symmetry will be obtained if in the first argument in MXG we read eL Cuev yocp T6 [0? ?v(XL

<9=Ltv>. Further support may be derived from the opening of the criticism of the first argument in MXG. Here R has d yap xxl X 7cO-

8?(X,VUa,V, WM;@ gtOayeXeTML. ELt T6 [L &V galV i 9=L aJXTC& CEtsEv et-

xO Lal C xL Ca-tV 610LOV ' 6V. L has a y&p x&L a (lacuna of two

letters) 7o8CLXVt%UaLV, ou6cTc 8XtayEToCL. dt T6 I IOV g'TLV ' a oq ?lt7tCV

?LI xoK 1TV 6C.tOLQV sU? 6v. Both manuscripts then continue To53to gi oUtre qaNCvT xLT oiTg oure &voyxI and reasons are given for this remark. For the first sentence of the criticism recent scholars follow Diels and write & yocp x&ct &<'XXot oC>no8LXVtuuaLv, oVP g O LUO Ty<X>CT0CL.

But the criticisms which follow refer to the 'special' demonstration of Gorgias which the author of MXG has already clearly distinguished from the proofs which Gorgias took from others, namely those concerned with the one and the many, etc. This being the case the introduction of &XXoL here makes the author of MXG contradict himself. Moreover whatever the second sentence means it must be some sort of recapitu- lation of what Gorgias has said. Only so can the ro&3o in the third sentence be explained.' Therefore 8Lao?ye'-roL should be retained with the manuscripts, and for the first sentence as a whole we should read something like a yap xcxL oc<&6r aX>7ro8exLvuaLv OUSTcq 8L0CXeyZT0L. The second sentence may seem desperate. But it begins e r? Io 'ov gartL and there is nothing at all in the manuscripts to suggest an original di sZ tLh

1 so Cook-Wilson in Class. Review vi (1892) 4+1-2.

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cv I= <qk 6v> or &I 6 ILv < Ll 8v> gcar which Cook-Wilson I saw would be required to represent the et vIv yap T IL etvoct =l piL ctvvL

of the first sentence of the first argument in MXG. In fact et r6 ,i *wrr in the criticism is the same as de tap r * Sv & I= at the beginning of the first argument in Sextus. Accordingly it supports the reading proposed for the first sentence of the first argument in MXG, Et J.v ymp

'r L ?ZevOC <ImTLV> h Im 0 ?tCv(c... Again the beginnig of the second argument in MXG, dE 8' 6?ac aq r? 1V lv fart, 'r6 elvaL, cp*a,

oux laTL r6 M<V'LxzLvzvOv, is represented in the criticism (979b i I) by o6x &vck'yx- y&p d1 r6 tLs v ga'li xacx 'r 8v tv? elvaZt. Since in this case 'r ri~ 8v crrt in the criticism corresponds to et 'r6 [i CtvL dart in the argument criticised, we may conclude that in the case of the first argument also et 'r r?h 69v I in the criticism implies et ih ClVOL

Iro in the argument critisised. For the second sentence in the criticism one might suggest cE -r6 tui 8v ot, h &nv, &(7A6)4 tCtCLV &v e6) &TL ILV

xocl &anv 6LoLov (or with Diels 6o1CAoq) tuh 6v. This is based on R and would explain how the manuscript reading appears there as it does. Moreover as will be seen it makes the whole passage of criticism

intelligible and makes possible a single interpretation underlying the first argument in Sextus taken in conjunction with the first argument in MXG.

The interpretation must now be discussed. With the reading proposed the first argument in MXG will run et ,uiv ydp 'r [L' elvtL <aTtLV>,

gai L 11L ?TVML, oV8 &v fvtrov tr6 p v '! - O5 6G'rog ct. '6 re ydp ! &V ga'n .L, av xt 'T6 v 6v, (O)a'c OV86V [L&XXOV cvaL % oUx ?lvoCL ?& 7CpOyCLOCM.

This of course follows immediately after the introductory sentence oux gatV O5Tc elvOt Oe'4 e ltVaL. The whole may be rendered: 'it is not possible (for anything) either to be or not to be. For if it is possible that it should not be, inasmuch as it is (possible for it) not to be, it would be no less that which is not than it would be that which is. For that which is not is not, and that which is, is, so that things will no more be than not be. (This is absurd, therefore it is not possible for things not to be - oix arTt I elva-L or Z td elvocr oux 9=v). This gives the needed simple follow on from the initial proposition ou'x aTLv o5Tr

cIvoc o6e t ctvoc. MXG like Sextus takes up the negative alternative first ou'x CgTI e lvct in the one case, t6 tL?v v o'ux gaTn in the other. In the second part of the first sentence in MXG '6 pL9 ! 6v can easily be understood as a predicate once the reading f ga'L ji) ectvaC is adopted.

1 ibid. Reinhardt, Parmenides, p. 37 in fact proposed to read in the first argument in Sextus cE y&p 'r6 t? 8v aTt <[L? 6v>.

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That it should be so understood is supported by the criticism where A 6v after 6FoLov or poLoccoq is clearly a predicate (979a 36). It is only if the argument is interpreted in this way that the conclusion ceases to be nonsense. If Gorgias is arguing that both r6 &tu 6v and or 6v exist, he cannot possibly conclude that things areno more existent thannon- existent, he can only conclude that things exist in any case, whether they are sZ 6v or tZ 6v. But if in the first sentence of the argument Gorgias maintins that things are both ILh 6v and 6v then the conclusion follows and all is well." Again the occurrence of the expression 'r rcp 'xra in the conclusion makes it clear that it is not the existence of Being or Not-Being which is in question, but something much wider. This seems confirmed by the occurrence of &ravTM2, in the criticism at 979b 8.

The criticism by the author of MXG must next be considered, more particularly as it has not always received proper attention in the past. With the proposed reading in the first sentence this will run: For what he himself gives as a demonstration he expresses as follows. If that which is not is (possible), in so far as it is so it would be possible to say simply that it is, and yet all the same it is that which is not. But this is not self evident, nor is it a necessary conclusion. For suppose there are two things, one of which is (something) and another which is not. Of these the first is, but in the case of the other it is not true that it is that which is not.' (Reading &mepel uolv 6vroLv, 'rou [Av 6vtro, 'rO5i 6 Oux 6vTo4,

'r Xdv fl, 'r 9' oiux "?qOk 6&t *art 'r p.v tr? 6v). The point of this criticism is this: Gorgias has supposed that if you say of anything that it is that which is not something else, e.g. if you say 'X is not Y' then you are saying that it both is and is not. The author of MXG replies that if you say that something is something, you are saying that it is (existential import), but if you say that something is not something, you are not saying that it is something that is not, i.e. you are not saying that it is not (no negative existential import is this case). Accordingly if you say 'X is not Y' you are not saying 'X is not' and so Gorgias' supposed contradiction does not result. Here the use of the dual 6vtotv shows that it is things in general which are being discussed, and not simply Being and Not-Being since the latter would not be included under 6vrotv. Moreover it is only in this way that the proper force is given to the PZv which has bothered editors in piv tz1 6v.

1 There is no question here of o686v ~?&Xov having a sceptic sense - it involves a positive assertion that 7pyFawa both are and are not, as in the case of Democritus' tLh VXXov 'r6 8iV M 'r- "i86 ctvOCL, Diels-Kranz, 68 B i S6. 2 So L. R has '& winv cf. MXG 97fa 30-36 - Diels-Kranz6, 3o A E.

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In the next sentence the reading is uncertain but the general sense is clear. &L&' Tr 0oV O0X 9=LV o5tre ?ZV(XLt o6Te .L0 eIVaXL, 'r 8& &Iqxt o5O 1tepov oux 1=v; 1 'Why then is it not possible for anything either to be or not to be, why are not both or either alternatives possible?' This. is followed by a further statement of Gorgias' argument introduced by yap which shows that the preceding rhetorical questions are to be inter- preted in the light of what follows as well as in the light of what precedes them. The statement as given in L and completed by Foss reads: oWv

y&dp <~jrov>, qpVJcT(v, reb) a'r Iv?) Et tva t )ou ?eVXlv, dtnep et-I tL xOxL 'r

Il0 EtVOCL, 6TE OUgE? vT-aLV eVMo T6 IL' EtVOL o06x.t6. The clause 8rL ou8e(3( op-qaLv etIVL T6 er? tvci o068tuL is difficult. The Greek can hardly carry the meaning given by Apelt 2, 'no one says that there is no sense in which Not-Being is'. But the other meaning 'no one says that Not-Being is in any sense' is not satisfactory either. Firstly it is not true,the atomists being a well known case to the contrary.3 Secondly, as Cook-Wilson saw4, what is wanted is not some external objection, but something which Gorgias has himself said and which is inconsistent with the previous statement ?tncp Ct7 TL xxl T6 [ CtVML. This is secured if o&v8d is read in place of oie8e.5 In this case qnlat refers to Gorgias as it does else- where in the criticism 6 and the meaning will be 'while at the same time he denies absolutely that Not-to-be involves being.'

With this change the course of the whole criticism down to and including the present passage will be: Gorgias argues that 'is not' involves both 'is' and 'is not' and this is a contradiction. So 'is not' is not possible. To this the criticism replies that 'X is not Y' does not involve 'X is not' in the sense 'X does not exist.' Accordingly we have no reason to conclude that things cannot either be or not be. They may be both, or at any rate things can be. For Gorgas is saying that 'not-to-be' would involve being no less than 'to-be' would involve being, if it is true that (ererp) 'not-to-be' involves being something. This last is what Gorgias is saying, while at the same time curiously enough he says that 'not-to-be' absolutely excludes being. Another way of putting the point might have been this: If 'X is not' involves 'X is and is not' this in turn involves 'X is and is', as the second 'is not' itself involves 'is and is not' and so on indefinitely. 1 possibly -r6 8i &pca A 6 ' repov o4x Masrtv; cf. Plato, Hipp. Min. 376a 3. 2 Rh. Mus. xliii (i888) 208. 3 cf. Aristotle, Met. A. 98sb 4. Diels-Kranz6, 67 A 6. 4 Class. Review vi (1 89 2) 443-4. 5 This suggestion by Cook Wilson is adopted in the Oxford translation. Another possibility would be oUC8' &v in place of o48kv. 6 cf. 978 a i 8, 979 b 2. For a corrupt o)8lc( with c7)n7Lv see 980 a i i .

I 2

The criticism then proceeds to the second line of attack. 'Even if that which is not something is non-existent, even so it does not follow that which is not is in the sense in which that which is, is. For that which is not is not, while that which is, still is'. Suppose we concede to

Gorgias what we refused to concede earlier, that if you say 'X is not Y' you are saying 'X is not,' i.e. 'X does not exist,' this still does not lead to the contradiction which Gorgias supposes to follow. The contra- diction occurred in the conclusion 'X is and is not'. But when we say 4X is not Y' we are not using 'is' of X in the same sense in which we are using it when we say 'X is Y.' This last case implies that X exists, while 'X is not Y' does not involve the existence of X. Consequently, suppose 'X is not Y' does involve supposing that X does not exist, there is no resultant contradiction, since 'X is not Y' does not involve supposing that X exists.

Finally we have the following criticism. 'Suppose it is true to say simply that which is not exists, strange though it would be to say so, does the result follow that all things are not rather than are? For exactly the opposite seems to emerge. For if that which is not exists, and that which is exists, then all things exist. For both the things which are exist and the things which are not exist'. If the received text is sound, the author of MXG misrepresents what Gorgias says, though it does not affect the point of his criticism. Gorgias did not say < =ae tai&?ov oux EIV(L i aVOxL r(t& Ta Op&yjT but 45X?re ou&v [X&ov ?tVXL - oVx ?IVML

-i 7rpotyjOCs, i.e. he did not say that all things are not rather than are, but that they no more are than are not. But in the criticism R has lvaL h jL elvXL and L has e ?tLvaL FA elva. In both cases elvaL is placed

before {cA dvocl and it is likely that the right reading is &6repov <oU>

0tYLRov tutL &Ptcvv'nx Zcov L vL7 CIVeL; This would bring the criticism into accord with Gorgias' words and the whole will run 'Suppose it is true to say simply that that which is not exists, strange though it would be to say so, does the result follow that all things no more are than they are not? For exactly the opposite seems to emerge. For if that which is not exists and that which is exists, then all things exist. For both the things which are exist and the things which are not exist'. This criticism might be expressed in the following way. If 'X is not Y' involves us in supposing that X exists, strange though this supposition may seem, there is no need to conclude 'X is and X is not'. The right conclusion would be the opposite, namely 'X exists' since 'X is not Y' involves 'X exists' and 'X is not Y' involves 'X exists'.

It is time now to turn to the version of Sextus. Here fortunately the

13

text is sound 1, and there is only one major problem of translation, namely the meaning to be assigned to the phrases r6 [h 6v and 'r 6v. We have first a summary and then the statement of the first argument (chs. 66-7). On the one view this would be translated. That nothing exists he argues after the following manner: if anything exists, either Being exists or Not-Being exists, or both Being and Not-Being exist. But Being does not exist as he will establish, nor does Not-Being exist as he will explain, nor do Being and Not-Being exist, as he will make plain. Therefore nothing exists. Now Not-Being does not exist. For if Not-Being exists, it will both exist and not exist at the same time. For in as much as it is thought of as not being, it will not exist, but in as much as it is not being, it will exist again. But it is absurd that a thing should both exist and not exist at the same time. Therefore Not-Being does not exist'. On the other view we would have 'That nothing is he argues after the following manner: if anything is, either that which is is, or that which is not is, or that which is and is not is. But neither that which is is, as he will establish, nor that which is not is as he will explain, nor that which is and is not, as he will make plain. Now that which is not is not. For if that which is not is, it will both be and not be at the same time. For in as much as it is thought of as not being, it will not be, but in as much as it is not being 2, it will be again. But it is absurd that a thing should both be and not be at the same time. Therefore that which is not is not).

As far as concerns the Greek of Sextus there seems little reason to prefer either rendering to the other down to this point.3 There is clearly a close relation to the first argument in MXG and an attempt has been made above to show that the arguments are in fact identical. It has been pointed oUt 4 that in the statement of Gorgias' arguments MXG uses a terminology attested for the fifth century, at least in related forms, while Sextus is at least to some extent rewriting Gorgias in later philosophic terminology. In the criticism by the author of MXG which has already been discussed we find r6 eIlvot and r6 , elvhat replaced by 'r6 6v and 'r L 6v except in the case of direct quotation of Gorgias' words.5 There is every reason to suppose that the same thing has 1 it is included in Diels-Kranz, but without translation. 2 or possibly 'in as much as it is that which is not,' keeping the i6 of N. 3 On the traditional view Diels felt the need to insert 'r6 into the text after Bekker at the end of the summary. This is unneeded on the second view. 4 Calogero, Studi sull' Eleatismo, 1932, IS8 n. 4; for the language, of Dc Melisso and Dc Xenophane see Diels' Praefatio p. ioff in his edition of MXG. 5 This helps to confirm the proposed oWv in the criticism, above p. io.

'4

happened in Sextus. It has been argued above that the use of the infinitive was rather agaist the meaning Being and Not-Being. Buat so far the question must be left open as far as concerns Sextus.

The second proof in the version of Sextus as usually understood is as follows: And again, if Not-Being exists, Being will not exist. For these are opposites one to another, and if existence is applied as a term to Not-Being, then non-existence will be applicable as a term to Being. But it is not the case that Being does not exist. On this view of what Gorgias is saying, he proves that Not-Being does not exist by showing that if it does exist, the consequence will be that Bei does not exist. This he clearly regards as a reductio ad absurdum - we cannot say that Being does not exist - o'UXI 86 ye t'o U o'ux =rLv. Therefore we must deny the statement which would produce this absurdity, we must say that Not-Being does not exist. Yet it is hard to believe that Gorgias could have argued in this way. He apparently appeals as to a decisive agreed principle to the fact that we cannot say that Being does not exist. Yet immediately after the conclusion of this second argument he goes on with the words 'Nor does Being exist. For if Being exists it is either eternal or generated or both eternal and generated...' The decisive agreed principle is thus immediately denied by Gorgias himself. In fact it is clearly the essence of Gorgias' whole position to deny that 'r 8v g&r' and for him seriously to assert the contrary would destroy his position utterly on the usual view of the way in which he is arguing his case. This difficulty was seen already by Foss in 1828 1, but so far no satis- factory solution has been propounded. The phrase does not occur in the corresponding argument in MXG and Gigon 2 argued that it was an addition by Sextus. The second argument in MXG is as follows: eL 8' 6?cs t6 pn e,vO(L gaGTL, TO elvoc, , o1x gTL T '

OtLXEt(LeV. eL yap T6

PL] EIVOLL (CL TO etVOL [L?' EaV L IMpO 'xe. faTe o0x &v o05ro, ca(v, ou v&v s a 28-30) which may be rendered: If all the same that things should not be, is (possible), that they should be, this being the opposite, is not (possible). For if that they should not be, is, then it is proper to say 'is not' of that they should be. So that not even in this way, he says, would anything exist.

This is criticised by the author of MXG in the following terms: He first simply denies that if we say nro ,- elvmL eTt it follows that To evxr. oux gaTL, but does not give reasons, presumably because he regards the 1 De Gorgia Leontino commentarium. Halis Saxonum, 1828, p. 174. Similarly H. Gomperz, Sophistik und Rhetorik, 23-4, and Gigon. Hermes lxxi (1936) 195. 2 ibid.

I g

point as obvious. He then goes on to argue that supposing we say t6 ,uh ov 9=L does involve '6 8v oux aTTL it does not follow that nothing would exist. For although ta 6vx on this view would not exist, t& >h 6v'T would exist, since we have said '6 IL Uv cart. This is clearly a valid criticism of the argument of Gorgias as stated by the author of MXG, and it is so obvious that it is difficult to believe that Gorgias would not have seen it. The answer is that, just as in Sextus, the argument which Gorgias is using proceeds by a reductio ad absurdum. The difference between the two versions is that in Sextus the penultimate step in the argument is expressly stated o?uxc 86 ye T6 8v oux gTn whereas in MXG it must be understood. 1 If we say r6 ' elvcxt an this leads to '6 ?tv(XL oux 9cL. We cannot say this. Therefore we cannot say x! t

dvXL 9. So far as this argument goes we still have nothing of which we can say 90rTL. Thus the step ouxl 8s ye t6 6v oux ga'L is vital to the argument both in Sextus and MXG, and cannot be dismissed as an intrusion. How then is it to be explained? The answer surely is that Gorgias was not concerned to deny the existence of Being and Not- Being at all. What he was concerned with was the status of phenomena, which are quite plainly the subject of discourse in the second and third divisions of the treatise where he argues that if anything is it cannot be known, and if it is and can be known it cannot be communicated to other human beings. What he is saying is that the verb 'to be' cannot be used of phenomena either positively or negatively without contradiction resulting. If this is realised it becomes possible to approach the arguments both in Sextus and MXG from a different point of view. The question confronting us is this: is it possible to say of something that it is not? Gorgias has two arguments to show that it is not possible. In the first argument he claims that it would lead to the contradictory assertion that it both is and is not. In the second argument he claims that it would lead to the equally intolerable result that that which is is not. In each case we should suppose that behind the phrases r6 tv' 6v and '6 6v in Sextus lie an original r6 ji' eIvat and 6 ?tvcat. The subject of the infinitives will be an indefinite 'it' which is naturally expanded on occasion into

6v'rac or so 7rp&iocyro in MXG. If we say that it is possible for things not to be - fE r tLz e EatL - this leads us to the assertion that that which is is not, which is a contradiction and so impossible.

The conclusion of the second argument in MXG has a qualification attached to it - s?L 'T(xu'v la'LV eIvct -rc xaL ?Xti c and this I The need for this step in the argument in MXG is recognised by Untersteiner, The Sophists, E.T. p. 146.

qualification is taken up in a separate argument (g7 a 31-33). This states that if 'to be' and 'not to be' are the same, even so nothing would be. For that which is not, is not, and that which is, is not. Of this argument the criticism says: if 'to be' and 'not to be' are the same, even so it would not follow that nothing is rather than that something is. For just as he argues that if that which is not and that which is are the same, then that which is and that which is not alike are not; so, reversing the position it is equally possible to say that everything is; for that which is not is and that which is, is, so that everything is. At first sight this criticism seems correct - indeed it might seem proper to go further and say not only is it possible to make the reversal but necessary to do so. The preceding argument began by asking us to suppose that it is possible that it should not be. We are then told that this involves us in saying that 'to be' is 'not to be' which is a contradiction unless 'to be' and 'not to be' are the same. If they are the same and we suppose that it is possible that it should not be, then in whatever way we work out the following steps, we should surely arrive at only one conclusion, namely that it is. But closer inspection of what Gorgias is made to say in the third argument suggests a different chain of reasoning. He takes as his starting point T6 'r yap ,uh 6v oUx *GL. If ElIVocL and CIvoL are the same then the inference to be drawn will depend on whether you start from the proposition tr LJ 'ov gato or rL7' 'v o x lart. Gorgias chooses to start from t6 p3) ov oiux laTL and from this as a starting point his conclusion follows with sufficient show of reason. But how can he take such a starting point? He has already posited for the sake of argument that

p3) edVOCL gtCL and has admitted that this is not so far disproved if we posit the identity of [3) etVlL and Vac.L. How then can he appeal to this principle 'Z6 &u 'v o ux 9T as a starting point? The only possible answer is that for Gorgias there is a distinction in meaning between 'r6 p3 FtvmL

9CM and '6 p) 'ov gorc, the first meaning 'it is possible that it should not be' and the second meaning 'that which is not is' or something similar in each case. The first involves the second but is not the same as it. Gorgias holds it as self-evident, or at any rate as beyond possible dispute that that which is not is not. The supposition that it is possible for it not to be involves the further supposition that that which is not is. This is impossible, and so the original supposition must be rejected. We thus have the position that in the second argument it was necessary to appeal to the principle that that which is, is, and in the third argument in MXG we have an appeal to the principle that that which is not is not. In each case these are not principles which Gorgias is setting out to

17

prove, but principles which he feels able to use in order to establish other contentions.

A similar problem arises in the argument which comes at the end of the first section in Sextus (ch. .5). As usually interpreted this runs something like this: and that they do not both exist, Being and Not- Being, is easy to prove. For if Not-Being exists and Being exists, Not- Being will be the same as Being in respect of existence. And for this reason neither of them exists. For that Not-Being does not exist is agreed, and Being has been shown to be the same as Not-Being. There- fore, it, Being, will not exist. Thle objection to this argument was seen by Calogero: 1 From the identity of Not-Being with Being the con- clusion should be that both exist, not that neither exists. Once again the answer depends upon the starting point which is adopted. Let us suppose the identity of 'Z 6v and 'r6 1c 6v. Take next the proposition that r6 &v I=? and it would follow that therefore both 'c 6v and 'r [u' 6v are. Alternatively take as a second proposition that r6 t v o6x M=r; and it would follow that both are not. Gorgias in fact takes the second course with the words 'rLt -&p r6 ,uh 5v. Here the source of his adopted starting point is not clear. Because of the place in which the argument under discussion occurs in the account of Sextus it may be that Gorgias on this occasion regarded &rL '6 tL3 8v oux =tLv as something established earlier, namely in the first two arguments at the beginning of the treatise. But the antithesis between o66oyov and WeCxTLa suggests that this is not so. The second has been shown, the first is something which does not need to be shown but can be appealed to as something upon which there is general agreement. If this is the case, then once again we have an appeal to an agreed principle outside the course of the argument itself. And again as in the previous case we have a superficial inconsistency. He begins by saying tL T6 &? tv ?GL and in the course of refutation says 6X1 T6 t Zv o&Vx 0rrLV, o6'6Xoyov. This suggests that the original course of the argument may have been something like this: For if it is possible that it should not be and also that it should be, that which is not will be identical with that which is in respect of being. And for this reason neither of them will be (possible). For that which is not is not, as is agreed, and it has been shown that that which is is the same as that which is not. 1 op. cit. z69-170. The attempted answer of Untersteiner, The Sophists, E.T. p. 146 and

note 33 does not seem to meet the difficulty. The point is tbat once it has been said as here that -r6 Gv exists and sb i?h 8v exists, then their identity in respect of existence must be an identity in respect of 'positive existence', i.e. they must both exist, and not both not exist.

i8

This argument in Sextus has obvious similarities to the third argument in MXG which has already been discussed (979a 31-33). It has in fact been maintained that the two are identical and that we have here a further example of the different arrangement of the arguments in the two versions of the original. This may be true. But the fiuctions of the two arguments are different in each case. In MXG the argument occurs within a framework of discussion directed to establish that 'r6 [t va o?x &an and it purports to be an answer to a possible objection that might be taken to the previous two arguments. In Sextus on the other hand its finction is to deal with ihe combined possibility that bothr6 6v and 'r ' 6v may be, and it is rounded off by a further argument which expressly deals with the same combined possibility (ch. 76). There is nothing unlikely in supposing that Gorgias may have used the same argument in different connections and in effect repeated himself, and this is probably the easier hypothesis in the present case.

The statement of the third argument in MXG is followed by the short sentence which in L reads OU6'W pv o5v O aUT6 X6yo &xeEvou while R has o0roq in place of o&rwq. For this Diels proposed oroa uidv oiuv o 7rp&')oq Xyoq exEvou and it would be equally possible to read taoq in place of 7p&oq. In either case the reference is clearly to the earlier statement at 979a 23-24 where we have the phrase pt& 'cT-v tpw'rqv Y.&OV oCUrO5 &not8eLELV EV h ?&EyL 6rt OVX 1=tv 0t) CtYOLL Oa C I.t'Y elvocL.

Accordingly there can be no doubt that the three arguments in MXG which have already been discussed together constitute what the author regarded as the special demonstration of Gorgias. It has been argued above that all three of these arguments are concerned only with the possibility 6tcL 'Z !L' EIVaL IaL. In this case the words oGr e1VML O6Tc

ILI elvoc do not correctly characterise the three arguments and this may be taken as an objection to the interpretation offered above. But the situation can perhaps be explained if the author of MXG is actually quoting the words of Gorgias at the beginng of the so called special demonstration, and if Gorgias were there stating or repeating his whole thesis and not merely that part of it which he proposed to deal with first.

So far we have been concerned with the possibility that that which is not might be and the consequences which would follow from the adoption of that supposition. Next comes the consideration of the possibility that that which is might be. Here the version of Sextus is relatively full and easy to follow. The version in MXG is briefer and in places the text is quite uncertain. But it will be argued that there is no difference between the two versions in the substance of what they give,

I 9

and both accord with the general interpretation of Gorgias' position which is here being propounded. Sextus begins: Moreover that which is is not (possible). For if it is, it is either eternal or generated or at the same time eternal and generated. But it is not eternal nor is it generated, nor is it both, as we shall show. Therefore that which is is not (possible). Corresponding to this in MXG we have simply el 8i tortv ffrOL &y6v7yrov h yev6tLevov lvtoL. No subject is expressed and the meaning must be: if anything is, it is either ungenerated or generated. The arguments which follow all have no expressed subject but an implied indefinite one. In the general summary provided by the author of MXG at 979a i8 we have avc xV eap, tiv, TL I=?L FLJTC IV ,M7 7tOXAOC ?tIVOCL L7T? 'T &IVMZ

4rc yev6,zevoc and the same form is used in the recapitulatory passage at 979b 33: c' ONi &VXyx71 Riv Et7rep &aL TL ?JroL &y6v-n'rov X ye9v6tLvov etvaL. These expressions confirm that the subject of the arguments is an indefinite 'anything'. There is every reason to suppose that the phrase 'if anything is' is a shorter and more convenient formulation of the full formula 'if it is possible that it should be' eld 8 gaLV elvot, and both expressions point against the view that the subject of discourse is the existence or otherwise of Being and Not-Being.

In support of the contention that that which is is neither eternal nor generated Sextus gives the following. If that which is, is eternal, it is infinite, and if it is infinite it is nowhere. For in order for it to be some- where there must be that in which it is. If that in which it is is other than that which is it will be larger than it, which is impossible if that which is is infinite. On the other hand if that in which it is is that which is, then that which is will be two things, namely space and body, which is impossible. So if that which is is nowhere it is not. (Therefore that which is, is not eternal). In the first part of this argument it is clear that Gorgias is proceeding equivocally from infinite in a temporal sense to infinite in a spacial sense. Aristotle appears to have charged Melissus with making the same equivocation 1 and it is probable that the charge is correct." In MXG the corresponding argument is stated much more briefly: If it is ungenerated he concludes that it is infinite by the princi- ples of Melissus. 8 The text then continues: - . &r7CLpOv o'X xv avvoct;

7iou (for nore of LR) o6'm yap 'v ai6'-r o6r' Lv &dp c1voL. &uo yocp &v

o6Tco; 7rXetco ?XvXL r6 -re &s6v xal 'r v P. The objection that 'it would be two' will not refer to the first step in Sextus, where the objection was

1 Soph. El. i68b 39 = Diels-Kranz, 3o A io. 2 see Ross, Aristotle's Physics, pp. 471-2. 3 for which see Diels-Kranzs, 3o B 2-3.

20

not this, but that it would not be infinite if in something other than itself, but to the second step in Sextus' argument, namely if it is located within itself. This is seen from Sextus' words xact &'o yeAae'rakc r 6v. In MXG it is usual to read 7rtdp& in place of 7 s\eEc of LR. But the completion of the argument in MXG is referred to Zeno, and Zeno supposed not only that the place of 'r 6v would be distinct from -r6 6v but that an infinite series of places would need to be posited.l Accordingly there is no reason to reject j 7cel@.

The next step in the argument is to show that it cannotbegenerated. This in both versions has two parts. If it is generated it must be generated either out of that which is or out of that which is not. But the arguments used to deny these alternative possibilities are different in the two versions. In Sextus we have: If it is something which is, it has not come into being but already is. (Therefore it has not come into being out of that which is). Secondly it cannot be generated out of that which is not. For that which is not cannot generate anything since that which is to generate anything must possess substance. Both these arguments are attributed by Aristotle to early philosophers in general terms (Phys. I91 a 23-3 I). This suggests a possible answer to the discrepancy between the two versions - it may be that Gorgias gave a series of arguments to establish each point, and as the theme was a well worn one, only one argument is reported in each case. MXG has for the first step el yo&p -rb

&V Lteromk6aOL, OUX &v 9t' elVocL 'r 6v, &o=ep y' ?et xAo'L T' .L' 6v ykVOLtO,

oux &ai 9L e 6v. The soundness of the opening words seems es- tablished by the similar statement by Melissus 2 and the meaning must be: If that which is were to change into something it would no longer be that which is, just as, if that which is not were to become something, it would no longer be something which is not. The first half of the sentence is clearly an argument against generation out of that which is. The contention is that if anything came into being out of that which is, then that which is would become that which is not, i.e. that which is not what it was. This must be rejected - we cannot say that that which is is not, as this is a contradiction. Once again Gorgias is making an appeal to a principle regarded as independently established, the principle o5XL 8e ye Sr6 ov o6x 9=cv. A difficulty has been found in the second half of the sentence because it has seemed to be offering a proof that nothing can come into being out of that which is not, and this is the problem

1 Diels-Kranz6, 29 A 24. For 8vo ^ -trcXc( cf. MXG 975a x2 - Diels-Kranz*, 30 A S and 977a 25 = 21 A 28. 2 Diels-Kranz", 3o B 8, par. 6.

2 I

attacked in the following proof in such a way as to imply that it has not previously been established.' But it is probable that the purpose of the second half of the sentence is different from this, and that the comparison between the two halves is simply formal. If that which is were to change it would not then be that which is, just as if that which is not were to become something it would not then be something which is not, and if anything else were to change it would no longer be that which it had been before the change took place. In other words we are not here asked to suppose that there is any absurdity involved in sayig 'if that which is not were to become something which is'. The reasons for supposing that this is impossible have yet to be given. These are given next. If we say that that which is not is not, nothing can come out of it, since it is nothing. On the other hand if we say that that which is not is, 2 then nothing will come into being out of it for the same reason that nothing will come into being out of that which is. In other words that which is not would be the same as that which is and so the argument about that which is will apply.

The arguments about generated and ungenerated are followed both in Sextus and MXG by a further group introduced by xal &) in Sextus and by 9Tn in MXG, which makes it clear that we are to be concemed with further arguments to establish that that which is is not (possible). It may be noted that this time both Sextus and MXG have an indefinite subject. It is argued that if it is, it is either one or many. In Sextus the first alternative is discussed under four headings and it is argued that whichever of these is adopted the result is that that which is is not one. The text in MXG does not allow of restoration with any certainty, but we seem to have a summary statement covering two of the four headings used by Sextus, namely a6lcx and 6Eye0Oo. For the second alternative we have only broken words in MXG which require supplements in order to make sense but there is no indication that they refer to a different argument from that which is provided by Sextus.

Finally something must be said about the argument concerning XtnaLc

which appears only in MXG. It is usually treated as an argument to show that change does not exist. It falls into two parts, the first concerned with change other than movement in space and the second with loco- motion. The text is quite unreliable in each case, but the conclusions and the general nature of the arguments seem clear. In the first case it is argued that, if anything changed, it would not be the same as it was

1 Cook Wilson, op. cit., 44S-6. 2 Reading cE 8' I 6 6 ' 6v with the Oxford translators.

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before, and that which is would become that which is not 1, and that which is not would have come into existence. In the second case, if anything moved, it would cease to be because movement involves division, and this, in some way not at all clear from the argument as stated, involves the non-existence of that which moves. Now as Gorgias maintains it as true that nothing is, the conclusion thatx[viaLq leads to not being or non-existence can hardly be for him a ground for rejecting the existence of motion or change. And in fact the arguments offered are quite intelligible on a different supposition, namely if his contention was 'if anything is, it would not be liable to change or movement. But things are liable to change and movement, therefore they are not'. This suggested interpretation gains support from the way the argument opens - ou8' &v xtLw 7vo (GLV oiov. Here the &v implies a preceding 'if' clause either expressed or understood. The &v should be retained and not changed to av3 with Apelt. The preceding 'if' clause is obviously the 'L {CL which is also the hypothesis preceding the arguments about generated and ungenerated and about one and many. With this as a starting point we can read and understand the whole argument in the following way. 'Nor, he says, if anything is, would it move. For if it moved, it would no longer be in the same state as before, but that which is would not be, and that which is not would have come to be. And further if it moves and changes position, being no longer continuous, that which is is divided, etc.

So much for the detailed arguments in the first division of Gorgias' treatise. Much must necessarily remain uncertain, more especially in view of the state of the text for the version in MXG. But it is hoped that enough may have been said to suggest that there is no reason to think that the arguments were differently arranged in the two versions nor that their contents are at variance. Moreover it had been argued that the main question with which Gorgias is concerned in the first division of the treatise is not the existence or otherwise of Being and Not-Being but the question how far the verb 'to be' can be used of phenomena without contradictions resulting. A complete investigation would require an examination of the Eleatic tradition in order to determine Gorgias' relation to it, since obviously if the interpretation here offered is sound, this also will need to be stated differently from the way in which it has been commonly stated. This cannot be attempted here. The interpretation is put forward as one which arises out of a reading of 1 or possibly 'that which is would cease to be', tr 6aLv <&v> oiux &iv cb instead of TO' p.iv 4&v> oDx &v cEl2.

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the text of the two versions of the treatise of Gorgias and which explains the difficulties in them better than the usual way of reading them. But two general points may be mentioned in conclusion.

The interpretation here propounded accords well with the way in which Sextus introduces his summary of Gorgias' views. Sextus treats Gorgias immediately after Protagoras. He begins with the statement 'Gorgias of Leontini belonged to the same group as those who abolished the criterion, although he did not adopt the same line of attack as Protagoras and his followers'. He concludes his account with the words 'the criterion of truth is thus abolished as far as concerns the difficulties raised by Gorgias. For there would be no criterion of that which neither is nor can be known nor is of such a nature as to be communicated to another'. Now Sextus makes it clear that, on his view at least 1, Protagoras was concerned with phenomena and the truth of statements made about them. In the example used by Plato in the Theaetetus, which is not Sextus' example, but is none the less a convenient one, Protagoras would say that the same wind is both hot and not hot, so that in any one case we could always say with equal truth 'it is' and'it is not.' Since all appearances are both true and false we are left with no criterion for distinguishing true from false, and consequently for Sextus the theory of Protagoras comes close to scepticism, though he will not accord him that title since on certain matters he dogmatizes. Gorgias, on the view argued for in the present paper, held that we cannot say of phenomenal objects either that they are or that they are not because in either case absurd results would follow. This in the eyes of Sextus amounts to the abolition of phenomena and consequently he concludes that there can be no criterion of truth for Gorgias, since there can be no criterion of that which has no being. If Gorgias had been merely concerned with the status of Being and Not-Being it is not so clear how his views could have been linked with those of Protagoras. But this is perfectly natural if both Gorgias and Protagoras were regarded as developing their distinctive doctrines with primary reference to phenomenal objects. Another piece of evidence concerning Gorgias points in the same direction. When Isocrates briefly and quite incidentally has occasion to refer to the views of Gorgias, a man whose work he knew and admired, he twice 8

expresses the paradox of Gorgias in the fonn ou'&v rc-ov 6vrcwv lCr'v.

Here the plural o'r 6v'rx is natural enough if Gorgias was concerned with

1 Cf. his Pyrr. Hyp. 1. 2I6-219. For discussion I may refer to Durham University Journal, Dec. 1949, 20-26.

2 IX.3 and XV.26, = Diels-Kranzg, 82 B i.

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phenomena, but much less natural if his main contention was that neither Being nor Not-Being exists.

Secondly there is an interesting piece of evidence to be found in Aristotle's Physics A. 2. i85b 2g (Diels-Kranz6, 83. 2). According to this passage the sophist Lycophron wished to remove the I=L from sentences in order to avoid making the one many, while others adjusted the form of the expression, saying of a man not Xeux6 ea-t but Xe bx&zL. According to Themistius 1 Lycophron would say simply

Xxxpa'nq Xeux6q in place of Icoxpa& q ?eux6q ELV, and would confine the use of the verb 'to be' to existential uses. The attempt to abolish

FaTL as a copula was not confined to Lycophton as Aristotle shows and Aristotle discusses the matter in a rather Eleatic context. But he tells us that the matter was one of considerable concern to oL 6=epot ?i-V oppoXcxv among whom he apparently includes Lycophron. As to the identity of the others speculation has suggested Antisthenes, the Megarians and the Eretrians.1 The question must have continued to interest philosophers long afterwards as we find in Cicero, Tusc. Disp. i. I 3 that because Crassus is dead we are asked to prefer the formula Miser M. Crassus to Miser est M. Crassus because the latter expression would imply that Crassus is alive while at the same time he is dead. The origin and extent of the movement to abolish the copula cannot now be determined. But it seems clear that Lycophron was in effect a disciple of Gorgias in other matters 3 and the abolition of the copula would have been an extremely appropriate step for him to take if he also subscribed to Gorgias' doctrine that its retention is bound to lead to contradictions.

Manchester.

I In Ar. Phys. Paraphrasis 6.28 (Schenkl), not in Diels-Kranz. 2 cf. Ross ad Ar. Phys., loc. cit. 3 cf. Zeller-Nestle, Ph. d. Gr. i6, 1323 n. 3.

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