Good intentions and failed implementations:Understanding culture-based resistance to organizational change

Based on the insight that culture shapes resistance to change in an organization, and the recognition that cultures of organizations are embedded in a broader societal culture, this study seeks to provide empirical evidence on how societal-based cultural understandings and values within an organization serve as a source of resistance to change among employees. The study is based on a case study of a medium-sized Turkish company. The study shows how certain managerial decisions toward a professionally running organizational design are difficult to implement dueto societal-based patterns of understandings and meaning systems gathered around status, hierarchy, and emotion-based (personalized) relations in the company.

Keywords: Case study; Culture; Organizational change; Resistance to change; Turkey.

Change is an organizational reality; and so is resistance to it from employees (Dent & Goldberg, 1999; Kotter & Schlesinger, 1979). Indeed, employees’ resistance to change has been recognized as a main source of failure of change initiatives (Waddell & Sohal, 1998). Thus, research has paid a great deal of attention to understanding the dynamics behind resistance to change (e.g., Judge, Thoreson, Pucik, & Welbourne, 1999; Strebel, 1996). Yet, the focus has been primarily on individual aspects, ignoring the cultural characteristics of organizations. But it is widely acknowledged that change in any aspect of an organizational system is inextricably linked with the cultural context (Baba, 1989; Manring, 2003; Schein, 1992). Cultural values and beliefs have a significant impact on the success and failure of change efforts (Kotter, 1995; Schein, 1992). However, empirically little is known about to what extent resistance to change is related to culture. There are some significant insights on the role of culture as a source of resistance to change (Cooper, 1994; Kirkman & Shapiro, 1997; Kotter, 1995; Schein, 1992). It is argued that when employees are not culturally ready for organizational change, they are more prone to resist it. In particular, Schein (1992) underlines that, at root, it is the culture of the organization that causes resistance to change. Specifically, research suggests that when the direction of change and the way it is handled are not compatible with cultural understandings and meanings characterizing the organization, culture-based resistance to change efforts arise especially in the implementation stage (Cooper, 1994; Schein, 1992). However, there has been no empirical study that focuses on how this process actually occurs. Further, the studies addressing culture as a cause of resistance to change ignore the fact that organizational culture is embedded in a broader societal culture. When an organization’s culture is impacted by the wider societal values and understandings, it may exacerbate the degree of resistance to change as such values and understandings cannot be changed easily because of their societal roots and sociodynamic nature (Meek, 1988; Trompenaars & Hampden-Turner 1998). In this article, I examine the role of the culture of an organization embedded within overarching societal values and understandings, as a source of resistance to change. Taking account of the broader societal culture will provide a more comprehensive understanding of why and how culture based resistance to change occurs in an organization. The study contributes to the existing research in two ways. First, it empirically shows how culture of an organization shapes resistance to change. Second, it provides a more comprehensive theoretical understanding of the impact of societal-based cultural values and beliefs on culture-based resistance within an organization.The study is based on a case study of a construction company in Turkey. It first elaborates on the concepts of ‘‘resistance to change’’ and ‘‘organizational culture’’. Then, how the culture of an organization becomes a basis for resistance to change is portrayed. The next section features the societal culture of Turkey. This is followed by a description of the case study. Subsequently the results of the case analysis are presented. Finally, conclusions are drawn about the implications of the research for scholars and for managers.

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RESISTANCE TO CHANGE

The failure of many organizational changes is traced directly to employee resistance (Spiker & Lesser, 1995; Waddell & Sohal, 1998). Thus, resistance to change has been treated as a key topic in organizational studies. It is defined as ‘‘any conduct that serves to maintain the status quo in face of pressure to alter the status quo (Zaltman & Duncan, 1977, p. 63). It is mostly undesirable behavior or attitudes of employees in response to management imposed change efforts in organizational systems (Lewin, 1952). Employees, in a sense, try to keep the status quo by resisting change. Thus, resistance to change is sometimes regarded as equivalent to the concept of inertia that refers to persistence to avoid change (Rumelt, 1995). It arises as an organizational phenomenon that obscures or hinders change initiatives and their implementations (Ansoff, 1990). Kotter (1995) stated that when organizations attempt a major change, they usually face obstacles that prevent execution, even though employees want to make change happen. Kotter further underlined that such obstacles are rarely located in individuals; instead, they are mostly related to organizational systems, or vision. Similarly, in an earlier work, Lewin(1947) emphasized the role of social field surrounding individuals on impeding and facilitating change within organizations. However, the studies of organizational change have mostly focused on individual aspects as sources of resistance (e.g., Judge et al., 1999; Martinko, Henry, & Zmud, 1996). Recently there is a growing argument that it is the culture that impedes or facilitates organizational change by shaping the way employees resist or adapt to change (Detert, Shroeder, & Mauriel, 2000; Schein, 1992). In this light, a focus on organizational culture may enhance a better understanding of why and how resistance to change occurs.

CULTURE IN ORGANIZATIONS

The understanding of culture-based resistance to change first requires elaboration on the concept of culture in organizations. Organizational culture has been conceptualized in many ways. In spite of this variety, there seems to be general agreement that organizational culture consists of understandings and meanings shared by a group of people within an organization (Beyer, Hannah, & Milton, 2000, p. 324; Louis, 1985, p. 74). Nevertheless, how to study culture in organizations is a controversial issue (Martin, 2002; Ott, 1989; Smircich, 1983). First, there is a wide variety of cultural elements varying in their subjectivity or objectivity (Rousseau, 1990), leading to organizational culture studies to be grouped as cognitive materialistic approaches (Martin, 2002). Whereas culture from cognitive perspective is conceptualized mainly in terms of patterns of basic assumptions, values, and norms (Geertz, 1973; Schein, 1992), the researchers of the materialistic approach tend to focus on observable elements such as symbols, customs, and ritualized practices (Barley, 1991; Trice & Beyer, 1984; van Maanen, 1991). On the other hand, although organizational key actors, mainly founders and pioneering leaders, have certain impacts on the formation and change of cultural values and practices (Schein, 1992), there is a considerable acceptance that organizational culture emerges and develops on the basis of interaction between organizational members and contains mosaics of realities, understandings, and meanings rather than having a uniform nature (Meek, 1988; Morgan, 1986). In this line, Martin (2002) underlined that culture of an organization contains not only consistently shared understandings and values but also elements differentially and fragmentally held among organizational actors. Therefore, to decipher culture of an organization, one needs to focus on the descriptions of meanings loaded to the occurring events, the symbols used, and the style of behaviors observed in organizations, as well as on patterns of value systems.Furthermore, it should also be noted that although cultural understandings and meaning systems idiosyncratically evolve within an organization depending on the interactions among organizational members, they are not only company specific but also consist of a subset of societal values and norms (Feldman, 1988; Hofstede, 1985; Torbio¨ rn, 1982). In spite of the fact that organizational culture and societal culture are two different phenomena, interaction between them cannot be disregarded (Laurent, 1986; Nelson & Gopalan, 2003; Pratt, Mohrweis, & Beaulieu, 1993; Ruigrok & Achtenhagen, 1999). The culture of an organization necessarily takes form based on the culture(s) of the organization members who have grown up in a societal culture, as well as the overarching goals and directions of organization management (Adler & Jelinek 1986; Schneider, 1988).

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Societal culture, consisting of commonly shared values and norms manifested as collective patterns of thinking, feeling, and acting that characterize the members of a particular society (Hofstede & Hofstede, 2005, p. 4; Kluckhohn, 1951, p. 86), in certain ways forms the cultures of the organizations existing within the society. Particularly, deeply seated understandings and values within an organization are more likely to be shaped by societal culture and relatively resistant to change (Laurent, 1986). Societal-based values and understandings may even become dominant within the firms in which organizational values and norms are not strongly established (Adler, 1997). Therefore, it is important to consider broader societal culture to decipher the patterns of understandings and meanings within an organization.

CULTURE-BASED RESISTANCE TO CHANGE

Cultural understandings and meaning systems, once evolved and established within an organization, have a key role in what to think and how to act among employees, and thus characterize the way of life and the way things are done in the work setting (Bate, 1984; Deal & Kennedy 1982). They provide frameworks for interpreting events and solving problems. However, they cannot be changed easily because of their societal roots and socio-dynamic nature (Gregory, 1983; Meek, 1988). Then, any attempt to change organizational systems and policies may not be consistently supported with a corresponding change in patterns of understandings and meaning systems. The management of organization may even somehow have to get along with existing patterns of understandings and meaning systems held by organizational actors. This would turn out to be an inevitable reality especially for small and medium-sized companies that are unable to devote a sufficient amount of funds for an effective selection/socialization process. It is then likely that such cultural understandings and meanings, when incompatible with change initiatives, may cause resistance to change (Adler, 1997; Zaltman & Duncan, 1977). In this way, a study by Amis, Slack, and Hinings (2002) demonstrates that when the changes being proposed do not coincide with the cultural values of employees, some form of resistance is enacted. Indeed, Kirkman and Shapiro (1997) provided fruitful insights about how certain cultural values of employees affect resistance to change regarding self-management teams. They emphasize, for instance, cultural values of high power distance, being orientation, and determinism among employees as sources of resistance to self-management. For them, employees with strong cultural emphasis on high power distance, being orientation, and determinism resist to change because self-management, in which individuals set goals, self-monitor, and self-evaluate, is incompatible with such values. It seems that when employees are not culturally ready for organizational change, they usually foster resistance to change (Orlikowski & Hofman, 1997). Likewise, Schein (1992) insists that the basic reason for resistance to change is the culture of organization. When change initiative does not coincide with or support the existing cultural understandings and meaning systems, culture-based resistance will be the resulting consequence (Amis et al., 2002). Moreover, resistance to change initiative will be more likely in an organization where societal-based understandings and values are deeply rooted, as they remain fairly impervious to change. Then, success of change implementation will be less likely in such an organization. How can cultural understandings and meaning systems carried in the minds of employees affect change efforts of organizational redesign? In essence, the extant research underlines the importance of congruence between organizational design and culture (Buenger, Daft, Conlon, &Austin, 1996; Meek, 1988; Sathe, 1985). There is recognition that cultural values and understandings are the driving force behind organizational design (Buenger et al., 1996; Sathe, 1985). Organizational design is based on value-based choice of organizational actors (Hinings, Thibault, Slack, & Kikulis, 1996). Therefore, when structural decisions are not compatible with cultural understandings and meaning systems of organizational actors that characterize organization, they may resist to such decisions (Amis et al., 2002).

SOCIETAL CULTURE IN TURKEY

Since there is a strong recognition that cultures of organizations follow the contours of societal culture (Hofstede, 1985; Trompenaars & Hampden- Turner, 1998), it is important to understand the broader culture in which the research is conducted. The research setting for this study is a company operating in Turkey. In

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essence, Turkey is a developing country lying in between the East and the West not only in geographical sense but also in social and political senses. Although certain subcultural differences have been recognized in Turkish society, particularly based on dichotomy and conflict in traditionalism and modernism (Aldemir, Arbak, & Ozmen, 2003; Humphreys & Brown, 2002; Kozan, 2002; Mardin, 1973), it is still possible to observe certain overarching values and assumptions prevalent in the Turkish society (Pasa, Kabasakal, & Bodur, 2001; Sargut, 2001). Turkey has been recognized to have high levels of collectivism, high power distance, high uncertainty avoidance, and relatively moderate femininity (Hofstede, 2001). In addition, paternalistic values appear to be dominant among Turkish managers (Aycan et al., 2001; Pasa et al., 2001). Such cultural tendencies lead most members of the society to emphasize power, relationships, status, prestige, loyalty, and authority (Pellegrini &Scandura, 2006), to prefer to work mostly with those whom they are acquainted, to view titles as an indication of social status, and to use different prefixes depending on the status and age of people. For Turkish managers, it is important that subordinates are loyal and comply with their directions (Sargut, 2001). As establishment of good relationships is largely important among Turkish people, Turkish managers try to build close relationships and avoid conflicting situations with their subordinates. It is uncommon to handle organizational issues and conflicts in an open discussion (Danısman & Ozgen, 2003). These tendencies have been recognized as the traditional characteristics of Turkish culture in the work setting. On the other hand, recently, professionalism and rationalism tend to arise as other cultural tendencies among Turkish people in the business world (Aldemir et al., 2003; Danısman & Ozgen, 2008). The tendency to professionalism and rationalization seems to be increasingly prevalent as western-based modern values particularly among young Turks who are familiar with the realities of global world. Thus, observing a split and an interaction between traditional and modern cultural values and norms appears to be very likely in many business organizations in today’s Turkey.Professionalism and rationalism orientations together with a cultural emphasis on power, hierarchy, and relationships, for instance, can be seen in most Turkish firms (Danısman & Ozgen, 2008). How would such traditional and modern values and understandings evolve within a Turkish organization and display an interaction among them as a source of resistance to change towards organizational redesign efforts? The next section explores these questions by presenting a case study.

CASE STUDYThe company and data. The research was conducted in a construction company operating in the C¸ ukurova region of Turkey.

The company, established in 1977, mainly operates in the field of asphalt as a family-owned business. The company has an administrative office and a work site, located in separate places in the region of Cukurova. The company, other than the owner who serves as the CEO, has 10 employees in the office and over 100 staff working in the work site. The office employees, at the time of the study, were working in different specialized areas such as technical and adjudication affairs, accounting, finance, and support affairs. As the major customers of the company are composed of governmental organizations and municipalities, which legally do purchasing by adjudication, the company has not needed to employ any marketing staff; instead, it had only an employee working on the quest for adjudications. Average tenure within the company was over 10 years. The case study was based on observations within the company, participation in the management meetings, unstructured interviews with the office staff, and the written documents. The research within the company started along with the change process in 2003 and took 2 years. The researcher was given the opportunity to observe all managerial meetings regarding organizational redesign and to have conversations with all employees in the office, as well as was provided access to the relevant company documents. The company was holding meetings on a weekly, monthly, and yearly basis. However, the issue of organizational redesign was not on the agenda in all the meetings. The company was informing the researcher in advance when the organizational redesign issue was going to be handled. Over 10 meetings handled the issue of organizational redesign within 2 years. Meetings lasted from 2 to 5 hours depending on the agenda. Although the interviews were conducted mainly with the office staff, employees in the work site were also included when found necessary. Yet, as the employees in the work site were hardly involved in the decision-making process on

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organizational design issues, no need arose to administer a formal interview with them. The interviews with the office employees took from half an hour to one and half hours. The researcher was also able to talk to employees about the issues on the agenda right after the meetings. Thus, the researcher, a Turkish himself, was able to have a deep understanding of different and conflicting cultural mindsets.

Change initiative in the companyAlmost all personnel were feeling that certain kinds of things were somehow changing in the company, particularly over the last 5 years. There was a feeling among veteran employees that the company had not been operating professionally in the past and now there was at least an effort to make progress towards a more professionalized and established organizational system. Thus, certain things were different from what they had been before. One crucial factor behind this was that the CEO at the time had been running the company with his older brother until 1998, and since then he started serving as the head on his own. From the day the company was founded in 1977 until 1998, the elder brother was the one to say the last word regarding organization and management of business and staff. This was extremely important since employees expressed that the two brothers displayed rather different personality traits and management styles. For instance, whereas the elder was highly autocratic and had a personality wishing almost all things to be under his control, the younger, seemed to be more democratic in most ways. With the younger brother as the new CEO in 1998, things naturally started to change within the company. The new CEO, wishing to reflect his personality and management style to his company, made some attempts to introduce changes in organizational systems and practices. He began to exhibit a more democratic leadership style over time. It should also be noted that the change in the company may also have been triggered by the requirement of ISO 9000 Quality Management System, which encourages fundamental changes in companies seeking high standards and quality. Although the company changed significantly towards being more professional, most in the company believed that there was still much to do in this respect. Thus, the CEO and his employees embarked on the task to enable the company to become more professional. In a meeting, the CEO was strongly emphasizing the fact that ‘‘We should keep our feelings and emotions away. We have to act professionally in our business and keep moving on in the same direction.’’ However, making progress towards professionalism was not an easy task for the company. To what extent were they able to act and behave professionally? In fact, not only professionalism orientation but also paternalism, hierarchy orientation, and emotion-based (personalized) relations as a manifestation of societal culture could be observed in any typical Turkish organization (Aycan et al., 2001; Danısman &Ozgen, 2008; Pellegrini & Scandura, 2006; Sargut, 2001) and the company is apparently not an exception.

First attempt at reorganization: No matter who you are, just do what your status requires!Perhaps the first fundamental issue in the change process was the arrangement of regular meetings with administrative and office staff on weekly, monthly, and yearly basis. These meetings provided a great opportunity to handle numerous long-term unstated and untouched issues and problems in the company. As the CEO displayed a tendency towards openness orientation and a participative management style, the managers and employees were feeling free to speak up their minds, expressing issues not only about company affairs but also about their personal problems. Nevertheless, although all issues were expressed openly and freely, the CEO tended to have the last say on final decisions, leading things in the company to be centered on the boss. On one hand, the employees were feeling that they had little responsibility, authority, and autonomy; and, on the other, the CEO was concerned that he was unduly involved in details. Indeed, he was the owner of another business other than this company, and had new investment plans. Thus, he needed to devolve some of his duties and authorities to lower levels, as he needed more time for his other business activities. However, at the same time, he wanted things to be under his control. This was a dilemma for him. On one hand, professional norms were encouraging and somehow forcing him to hand over his authority; on the other, his willingness to keep the organizational activities and operations under his own control was impeding this process. Moreover, the employees needed to use positional titles in their relations and communication with the third parties. As a solution to this issue, the CEO decided to designate managerial positions and titles for each functional job. Thus, the company turned out to have a number of managers in accounting, finance, construction projects,

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adjudication, and support affairs. The purpose was that managerial titles were going to be used to represent the firm in relations and communication with the third parties, but the same style within the company was going to remain as before. However, things did not work as desired. Unexpectedly, the employees began to focus on managerial positions and titles defining the limits of their jobs in line with the titles they possessed. In essence, for a person who is familiar with the Turkish culture, this was not an abnormal situation; what matters is not what you are, but who you are (Trompenaars & Hampden-Turner, 1998). As a reflection of these cultural tendencies, the employees in a sense were emphasizing their status rather than the duties, tasks and responsibilities a job would require. As a result, they started to define the limits of their jobs in terms of what is appropriate and what is not for a ‘‘typical manager’’. They came to a point where they stopped doing some tasks they had been doing before just because they started to associate such tasks with positions lower than theirs. For instance, the employee responsible for technical affairs was saying that he should not be in charge of following transactions in the Social Insurance Organization anymore as, in his understanding; this was something to be done by a regular employee rather than by a manager. In addition, some managers tended to stop doing the routines they used to do, for instance, such as photocopying, filing, and passing documents between units. Such patterns of understandings, after a while, started to have an impact on the functioning of the organization. Some employees came to a point where they began to take advantage of their managerial positions rather than performing the requirements of the job. As a result, it became problematic to have a certain kind of work done in the organization. Apparently, the use of managerial titles brought about a significant dilemma in the organization. On one hand, employees needed to use managerial titles to represent the firm against third parties for organizational image, and on the other, the use of their managerial titles led them to categorize the work as ‘‘appropriate’’ or ‘‘inappropriate’’. Consequently, the CEO realized that the use of managerial titles was not going to work. Thus, their use was terminated and the company reverted back to its old system and practices.

Second attempt at reorganization: Coordinator between the boss and me? No way!Following the failure of the first attempt, there was an impression that there was a need to go through reorganization. That would presumably improve the functioning of the organization. As an initial step, a job analysis was done to define the tasks, responsibilities, authorities, and specifications of the jobs.The results of the job analysis were going to be used for the redesigning. For most, the redesigning was a good idea, and things could develop with the redesign of organizational activities, roles, and responsibilities. However, it had different meanings for different people. For instance, for the CEO, it meant handing over of his authority and responsibilities to others so that he would abstain from becoming involved in too many details. The redesigning of the organization, for some employees, was a means to possess a higher status over others. For some others, who had no managerial position, it meant a kind of obstruction in direct communication with the CEO. Still, for others, it was the employment of a better organizational structure that specifies the assignment of functions, roles, and responsibilities so that they would know exactly what to do. These contrasting meanings appeared to be based on diverse grounds. For example the view that organizational redesign was a means to share authority and responsibilities appeared to be a reflection of professional values. This was what should be seen in a professionally functioning organization. However, viewing the organizational redesign as a means to possess a higher status over others seemed to have traditional roots in the culture of the Turkish society. As demonstrated by Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner (1998), Turkish managers tend to see organizational structure as a means to use official authority over others rather than see it as a means to enlighten employees on how functions are allocated and coordinated. In this company, what some employees seemed to be focusing on was a manifestation of these common understandings among the Turkish people. In essence, the main problem with the present structural arrangements was that almost all office and managerial staff in the organization were directly responsible to the CEO. This undoubtedly resulted in wasting a great amount of his time, keeping him busy with daily routines and minor issues. Moreover, there were no precise job definitions in the present organizational structure, though it became relatively more formalized and standardized through the adaptation of the Quality Management System. Thus, one of the main challenges in the process of organizational redesign was the formation of functional units and positions. As the CEO wanted to delegate

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some of his authority and responsibilities, the focal point in the redesigning decision was to establish a structural arrangement that would allow the distribution of authority from top to bottom. It was thought that it would be better having two functional units with a relatively high level of authority and responsibility. One function would be composed of the financial and administrative affairs; the other would be made up of technical and adjudication affairs. The financial and administrative department would include the tasks of accounting, finance, personnel, and support, whereas the technical department was going to comprise the administration of projects, adjudications, and work sites. The management of the company, then, had a decision to make on who would be designated to these executive positions. The CEO, in a meeting, underlying the need for the redesigning of the organization, asked for ideas of his employees regarding the right persons for such positions. One was seen as the right person almost in consensus to be appointed as head for the financial and administrative department. He was then unanimously made the financial and administrative department director. No one appeared to be appropriate for the head of technical affairs. The right person was to be hired for this position in the near future. As a matter of fact, the director for financial and administrative department was the one with the highest education among other potential candidates for this position. He had degrees in law and business administration. He had been with the firm for over 12 years. He was also the oldest and the most experienced among his officemates. Nobody raised any objection to his appointment as Head for this department during and after the meeting. Occupying this executive position, he was going to have an authority and responsibility over planning, organizing, leading, and controlling administrative, financial, and accounting affairs. He was mostly going to act as a coordinator between the CEO and the employees in such functional areas. He was going to be in charge of six people. In essence, he himself did not seem to be enjoying commanding and ruling over people. However, he was inclined to define the limits of appropriate tasks and behaviors for such a position. He was sufficiently competent to manage and organize things under his responsibility. However, his directorship interestingly turned out to be a serious problem for some who became subordinates to him. There was then a reaction to the existence of the financial and administrative affairs department. That was not directly related to his personality and management style either, yet it seemed to be related to some concealed understanding that ‘‘having a mediator between themselves and the boss could set up a barrier against their direct communication and contact with the boss’’. One employee, for instance, was saying: ‘‘Won’t we able to speak and report directly to A. Abi1 [the CEO] anymore?’’ Losing their direct communication and contact with the CEO appeared to give them an impression that they would go away from the centre where power was located in the company once they had a coordinator between themselves and the CEO. Because of such understandings and views, employees started to resist the continuation of the financial and administrative affairs department. In essence they preferred to keep silent at the very outset during the decision-making process about the constitution of the financial and administrative affairs department, not to be seen as those obstructing decisions, harmony, and unity in the company. Indeed, there seem to be significant implications in such understandings and behaviors. In spite of all efforts for professionalism, it is not that easy to establish a working atmosphere where things could openly and clearly be discussed. Typically, open discussion of conflicts and disagreements were not a characteristic of Turkish organizations (Danısman & Ozgen, 2003). The CEO, however, attempted to establish a working atmosphere in which conflicts and disagreements were openly discussed. It seems though, not to have exactly worked in the company due to common understanding and assumption among employees that ‘‘raised objection against the boss could have negative consequences for their personal interests’’. Rather than direct objection, passive reaction appeared to be preferred. Such an approach did not bring out any drawback during the decision making process, but caused a significant problem during the implementation of decisions. Moreover, the willingness to stand close to the centre, namely the power, seemed to have stemmed from the understanding that ‘‘having higher hierarchy could yield a larger power distance to the boss’’. For them, that may reduce the status of subordinates to the financial and administrative affairs department in the eyes of the boss. In a dialogue, the person responsible for financial affairs, for instance, was saying to the boss, ‘‘the others do not have any coordinator. I do not understand why we need another person between us’. Consequently, the CEO understood that the attempts wouldn’t work and thus suspended the implementation of the redesigning decision again. Things turned out to be the same as before. That is, everyone again was reporting to the CEO. That was another case of change obstruction.

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Third attempt at reorganization: No matter what you are if we are not acquainted!The present structure, as specified before, was problematic from both the CEO’s and employees’ perspectives. On one hand, the CEO had to be involved in many details and routines; on the other, employees were feeling little autonomy, and empowerment, as major authority for making decisions on many issues was under the CEO’s control in the present structure. The CEO brought the redesigning issue on the agenda 1 year after the suspension of the implementation. This time the story was a little different. It was thought that the company should hire a construction engineer with a long-term experience in the management and execution of construction and highway projects. This person would be assigned to the directorship for technical affairs. Not only construction and highway projects but also the work sites would be dependent on this position. That was a very attractive position with a large authority and responsibility for the employees in the company. The possible candidates for this position were recruited via newspaper ads. That is, there was no kinship of candidates with either the CEO or with the employees. However, the person was not going to be brought to this position right away. Instead, he/she was going to be given responsibility in a highway project, whose timely completion was of vital importance for the company. The evaluation of the possible candidates was done altogether. That is, all of the administrative staff were present in the interviews and the CEO asked for their ideas about the appropriateness of the candidates for the firm. Finally, almost all employees and the CEO himself focused upon one person, and then this person was hired. He was a long-term experienced construction engineer and thus was directly designated as the person responsible for an urgent highway project soon after a short-term orientation. An engineer, who had been in charge of the construction and highway projects for the company for over 8 years, was going to assist this person in the management of the project. Although this engineer was about 30 years old, the newly hired person was around 50. After a while, the CEO once more, brought to the agenda the appointment of heads for both the financial and administrative affairs, and the technical affairs departments. This time he said the persons for these executive positions should be determined by vote. For the head of the financial and administrative affairs department, everybody again agreed on the appointment of the same old director. As a matter of fact, everybody knew that he was the most appropriate choice for this position, compared to other potential candidates. The CEO himself and all the employees in the meeting voted for him. However, the appointment of the right person for the technical affairs department caused a serious problem. In essence, most were aware that the most suitable person for this position would be the recently employed one. Nevertheless, it had been just 3 months since he was hired. Most did not have any close acquaintance with him. On the other hand, their friend, the younger, could also be considered for this position. The CEO also knew that if he was to appoint the older, he might have got a passive reaction from the younger, which was the rationale behind proposing voting. On one hand, the younger was like a family member because of the long-term togetherness and acquaintance. Moreover, he had made great contributions to the company. However, he was not experienced enough for such a position. Yet, he knew that if he was offered the position, he would most likely accept it. Thus, one way to work out such difficulties for the CEO was to go for voting. The vote, though, turned out to be very interesting. Nobody raised his/her hands neither for the younger nor for the older. The finance person said: ‘‘the way to follow here is not appropriate since, we, as employees, should not be the ones to decide on the person for such a position’’ [turning to the CEO] said: ‘‘It should be you, A. Abi, to appoint the right person for such a position and everybody is supposed to respect your decision and comply with it.’’ The CEO, however, did not want to take the responsibility of such an appointment. He was of the opinion that the best choice for such a position was the appointment of the recently hired person. The younger could gain more managerial experience with him. However, he knew that this was a very sensitive issue. On the one hand, there was his long-term working employee, but with insufficient managerial experience; on the other hand, the other person seemed to have a long-term managerial and project experience, but with a very short-term tenure with the firm. Although great steps had been taken from emotion-based relationships to professionalism, such a situation was rather formidable to work out. On the other hand, the younger was not the one to displease the CEO. Actually, in a negotiation, The CEO was speaking of the younger: ‘‘He is an exceptional person for me. He has made great and special contributions to the company. And, here is his first company. I strongly count on him in many respects. I cannot give up and displease him.’’ In essence, the CEO wished both technical

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employees to work together collaboratively. He charged the same authority and responsibility to both in a highway project. He was continuously suggesting that both be working like team members. However, both appeared to see each other as rivals rather than team members. The younger nearly wished to see the older make mistakes. He was most of the time reluctant to assist him especially in cost estimations, on which he was clearly more competent in terms of ability in using computer programs and knowledge on local suppliers and the market. The newly hired person seemed to act more professionally; yet, in response to the younger’s treatment and approaches to him; he began to exceed the limits of professionalism and almost started digging a pit for the younger. Although both were responsible for the completion of the project, there was no understanding of being a team member. Instead, both were submitting reports on different parts of the project, which highly contradicted each other. Each one was implicitly accusing the other of the contradiction. After weeks of this, the CEO understood that it was not going to work. He then again gave up the idea of a directorship for technical affairs. He just tried to charge each one on distinct projects, keeping direct contact with each one. Apparently, the company went back to the previous structure and system. The newly hired person did not work in the company for a long time. He left the company after a while. As a result, things turned out to be running the same as before.

CONCLUSIONS

This study attempted to explore culture of organization as a source of resistance to change through a case analysis in a Turkish company. Culture has been regarded from an interpretive perspective as a set of understandings, rooted in society as well as in organizational interactions (Feldman, 1988; Meek, 1988). The results of the case study showed that while there was a tendency towards professionalism and rationalization orientations in the company studied, the employees traced the patterns of understandings gathered around the status, hierarchy, and emotion-based personalized relationships as consistent with the traditional cultural characteristics of Turkish society. Such understandings, however, did not exhibit a complete consistency; instead, they tended to arise among employees in differentiation and contradiction as well, as was pointed out by Martin (2002). They then led to useless attempts in the implementation of managerial decisions towards a professionally running organizational design. Both the CEO and his employees had a strong willingness to establish a professionally running organizational design from their own views. However, the attempts towards the establishment of organizational redesign resulted in unimplemented decisions due to contradictory understandings of the status and relationships that characterize the organization. Consequently, although a significant change occurred in the company toward professionalism in various respects in a sense, the attempts of the management to establish a well-running organizational design turned out to be useless, resulting in things remaining stable. The first attempt for reorganization failed because it became difficult to find people to have certain routines done in the company due to the understandings that it is not appropriate to perform all kinds of work as a manager. After a while, the company went for the formation of two departments based on functions. However, there was another cultural impediment this time against the implementation of this decision. Having a coordinator between the CEO and themselves led some employees to have a concern that they would go away from the centre where power and status was located in the company and then to resist against the implementation of decisions. There was a third attempt and again it failed due to unwillingness of the employees to prefer a person, whom they are not much acquainted with, over their long-term intimate friend. Thereby, this study, consistent with a line of argument (Detert et al., 2000; Kirkman & Shapiro, 1997; Schein, 1992), provides evidence that resistance to change, going beyond the individual reactions of employees, tends to have a cultural base. Accordingly, cultural understandings and meanings systems evolve within organizations in different manners, that is consistently and contradictorily (Martin, 2002), and affect the reactions of employees to change efforts. They then make the implementation of certain decisions possible or impossible. It seems that, as Schein (1992) underlined, culture of organization shapes resistance to change. The change efforts incompatible with the cultural understandings characterizing the organization tend to produce resistance from employees. There are several conclusions that can be drawn from this case study. First, it has strengthened the argument that culture is a crucial factor in change management (Kotter, 1995; Schein, 1992). Thus,

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understanding the nature and source of resistance to organizational change requires the elaboration of organizational culture. It seems that cultural understandings and meaning systems embedded in societal culture shape individuals’ reactions to organizational change. This study, however, does not deny the individual related reactions to organizational change. As shown in several studies (e.g., Judge et al., 1999; Martinko et al., 1996; Wanberg & Banas, 2000), individual aspects necessarily have influence on resistance to organizational change. Yet, taking these insights further, the observations in the case study provide empirical evidence that individual reactions of employees are based in cultures of organizations (Detert et al., 2000; Schein, 1992). That is, individual reactions tend to occur under the inducement of organizational culture. As Feldman (1986) put it, culture shapes actions— resistance to change in this study—by inducing a certain set of motions and motivations. It appears that resistance to change actions arise among employees comply with societal-based cultural understandings characterizing organization. Thus, it can be concluded that cultures of organizations should not be overlooked in understanding the nature of resistance to change for the success of organizational change efforts. This study also confirms the arguments that any change in design should conform to cultural understandings and values (Amis et al., 2002; Pettigrew, 1987). There seems to be a need to go beyond the argument that organizational design is based on a value-based choice (Hinings et al., 1996). The observations from the case study indicate that organizational design could be a culture-bound choice rather than just being a value-based choice. In a sense, Feldman (1986, p. 603) appears to be right when he said: ‘‘culture is an important force that holds organization in a given form over time . . .’’. Changes in organizational design, as also indicated by Amis et al. (2002), do not seem to be achieved when the choices for design are incoherent to the cultural understandings and meaning systems characterizing organization. Otherwise, change attempts are likely to face culture-based resistance. Thus, cultural understandings and values seem to restrain alternative design choices. Perhaps, the extent to which culture restricts organizational design choices would be a fruitful topic for the future research. Finally, this study implies that resistance to change is characterized by societal-based values and understandings dominating an organization. Although there are a great number of studies focusing on resistance to change, they have mostly been conducted within the context of North America. Therefore, not much empirical evidence exists about how resistance to change could be influenced by societal cultures. This study presents some unique characteristics from Turkish culture. It seems that cultural understandings characterizing Turkish society dominate the company and have a key role on the way employees react to change. Based on these findings, it should be considered that the same attempts on organizational redesign would receive different reactions in another societal culture. Thus, the results of this case study points that cultures of organizations should be elaborated as a source of resistance to change in companies from different nations to disclose differences across societal cultures. These conclusions, however, should be evaluated under the consideration that the study is based on a case study approach that relies on the researcher’s own observations and interpretation from a single company. Such a situation, clearly, constitutes a threat to reliability and validity of the research and limits generalization of the results. Although the researcher was highly meticulous regarding a robust interpretation of events, there is still the possibility that description of the case may have been biased to some extent. Furthermore, as the company studied was relatively medium in size and had a primarily simple structure, there is a sense that most managerial and organizational arrangements had not been well established in the company. Moreover, the company was unable to devote sufficient amount of funds for an effective selection/socialization process. Therefore, it should be considered that culture-based resistance to change might have been manifested in different ways in another firm with different features.

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Extended SummaryOrganizational subcultures and their sources: An empirical research study in a manufacturing firm Abstract

Following the view that organizations have different subcultures as well as consistently shared values and understandings, we examined the existence of subcultures and their sources in a firm operating in Turkey. The data used for the research was collected from the white-collar employees of a large manufacturing company. The cluster analysis on seven cultural dimensions brought out two subcultures, which could be called as power culture and professional culture. When we looked at the distribution of organizational members to these subcultures to understand their sources, we found that the differences mostly lie in the distinctions between administrative staff and technical staff/specialist as well as in different business-based departments. Besides, there is also indication that organizational subcultures within the company studied are likely to be associated with the societal-level cultural differentiation in Turkey. Implications of the research results for the literature on organizational subcultures and Turkish context are also discussed.Keywords: Subcultures, organizational culture, cultural differentiation, Turkey, cluster analysis.

This study examines the existence of subcultures and their sources in a firm operating in Turkey. The concept of culture in the study is handled as commonly shared values, norms, and practices in a work setting. We follow the argument that as the values, norms and practices display a systematic differentiation within an organization, different subcultures arise. Organizational subcultures usually take form on the basis of functional units, managerial levels, occupations, demographic characteristics, or societallevel differences (Schein, 1996; Jermier et al., 1991; Hofstede, 1998; Jones, 1983). However, all subgroups cannot be considered subcultures (Boisnier and Chatman, 2003). Subgroups should have a set of common values and norms to constitute an organizational subculture. For a subculture to exist, its members do not have to work together or to carry a common feature, but they have to share a set of common cultural elements. To understand subcultures, we use the cultural dimensions suggested by Danısman and Özgen (2003). Their dimensions are rule orientation, hierarchy orientation, result orientation, clan orientation, supportiveness, team orientation, innovation, professionalism, and openness orientation. The study seeks to examine which of these cultural tendencies are shared by a particular number of employees consistently among themselves but distinctively from others within an organization. In this way, it tries to identify subcultures and their sources within a firm operating in Turkey based on these cultural dimensions. Based on the theoretical arguments and empirical evidence, cultural dimensions of professionalism, rule orientation, and clan orientation are thought to be basic elements of different subcultures. Accordingly, while the source for professionalism oriented subculture is expected to be top level managers, a subculture characterized by rule orientation is considered prevalent among technical staff and a subculture constituted by clan type relationships can be a basic characteristic of office staff. Yet, such prepositions are of importance in terms of organization-within dynamics. It is likely that societal-level cultural differences may also be a source for distinct organizational subcultures. Research shows that cultures in organizations vary significantly across societies (Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner, 1998; Soeters and Schreuder, 1988; Danısman and Özgen, 2003) and there are necessarily different cultural orientations in each society (e.g. Kozan, 2002; Mardin, 1973; Aldemir, Arbak, and Özmen, 2003). Thus, it is important to take cultural differences within the Turkish society to understand organizational subcultures better in a firm operating in Turkey. A split between modernism and traditionalism is noticeable at the societal level in Turkey (Mardin, 1973; Kozan, 2002; Aldemir et al., 2003). This seems to be resulted from being a society between the East and the West. On the one hand, western based values and practices have been adapted to the social life prevalently throughout a century; on the other hand, historically-based understandings and value systems still keep their importance among many Turkish individuals. Therefore, subcultures in a Turkish organization may be expected to lie in a distinction between professionalism, power/status, and relationship orientations as a manifestation of traditionalism and modernism. Besides, it is likely that clan type relationships arise along with a power orientation since power orientation in the Turkish organizations seems to emerge with paternalism style approaches (Aycan et al., 2001; Pasa, Kabasakal, and Bodur, 2001; Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner, 1998; Pellegrini ve Scandura, 2006). As a result, subcultures in a Turkish organization can be expected to form around

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power and relationship oriented values and norms on the one hand, and rationalism and professionalism oriented values and norms on the other hand. The interaction between modernism and traditionalism in Turkish society is sometimes likely to lead to appearance of mixed values and practices together. Thus, it is not uncommon to see people in the society neither fully democrat nor fully autocrat, neither fully reformist nor fully conservative, and neither fully collectivist nor fully individualist. It is also possible to observe many individuals being both conservative and open to change, and emphasizing achievement and qualification orientations as well as family type relations and status at the same time (Göregenli; 1995; Esmer, 1998). As a result, it would not be surprising to observe subcultures in a Turkish firm carrying some mixed cultural elements. A questionnaire method was used to understand subcultures and their sources in a Turkish company. The data used for the research was collected from the white-collar employees of a large manufacturing company. At the time research was conducted there were 2700 employees in the firm. Of this, 320 were white-collar employees. The questionnaires were sent to all white-collar employees through the Human Resource Department and 134 of them returned as usable for analysis. The cultural dimensions were measured using an instrument developed by Danısman and Özgen (2003) to be conducted for a comparison between Turkish and Canadian firms. Their study included nine dimensions to measure organizational culture. We revised some of the items used in their study and added some new ones, ended up with 49 items in total. Each statement had a 7 point Likert response scale. The criterion of α > .60 was used for acceptable level of reliability. Reliability scores were found to be above .60 for seven cultural dimensions but below it for two dimensions. This led to leave out two scales from further analysis. As a result, results orientation and openness orientation remained out, and the analysis to recognize organizational subcultures were done using rule orientation, hierarchy orientation, clan orientation, supportiveness, team orientation, innovation, and professionalism orientation. The cluster analysis using Ward method on seven cultural dimensions brought out two subcultures, which could be called as power culture and professional culture. Noticeably, in the power subculture only hierarchy orientation had a higher value compared to professional subculture; the values for all other six dimensions were found to be lower in power subculture. In contrast, professional subculture was found to be characterized by a stronger emphasis on innovation, rule orientation, clan orientation, and team orientation as well as by professional values and practices. Apparently professionalism and clan orientation exist together in the same work setting. It seems that while work is done in terms of rational and professional requirements, relationships and emotions are not left aside completely.To understand sources of organizational subcultures, we looked at the distribution of organizational members to them. The results of the analysis showed that the differences mostly lie in the distinctions between administrative staff and technical staff/specialist as well as in different business-based departments. It seems that cultural values and norms vary by whether one has a managerial role or not. While most managerial staff tend to see their work setting as professional culture, hierarchy and power orientations are likely to be more noticeable among qualified non managerial staff such as engineers and specialists. These findings are in support of previous arguments and research results (Schein, 1996; Hofstede, 1998; Raelin, 1986). Particularly, perception of professional values and norms among those who have managerial positions seems to exhibit a universal nature. Besides, there is also indication that organizational subcultures within the company studied are likely to be associated with the societal-level cultural differentiation in Turkey. Power subculture tends to arise as an alternative subculture to professional values and norms in the company studied. Hierarchy and professional orientations are known as the basic elements characterizing Turkish organizations as a manifestation of traditionalism and modernism (Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner, 1998; Hofstede, 2001; Danısman and Özgen, 2003). It seems that hierarchy oriented values and norms lose their importance among managers being replaced by professionalism oriented values and norms.The study also implies that although subcultures are organizational phenomena, they do not seem to emerge in the same way everywhere. The subcultures identified in this research study carry different characteristics from those identified by Schein (1996) and Hofstede (1998), providing an implication that organizational subcultures and their formation may vary across societies.

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