goldman short FRBNY-TOWNS-R1-204748

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  • 8/7/2019 goldman short FRBNY-TOWNS-R1-204748

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    Clinton Lively/NY/FRS11/03/200806:01 PM

    Toccbcc

    Subject

    Jonathan PolklNY/FRS@FRS

    Fw: AIG questions from our meeting with Govs. Kohn andWarsh

    ----- Forwarded by Clinton Lively/NY/FRS on 11/03/200805:57 PM -----

    Clinton Lively/NY/FRS11/03/200804:12 PM

    Mike

    To

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    SUbject

    Michael S Gibson/Board/FRS@BOARDDeborah P Bailey/BOARD/FRS@BOARD, Jim Mahoney/NY/FRS@FRS,Jon D Greenlee/BOARD/FRS@BOARD, KieranFallon/BOARD/FRS@BOARD, Michael S Gibson/BOARD/FRS@BOARD,Paul WhynottlNY/FRS@NY, Rich Ashton/BOARD/FRS@BOARD, SarahDahlgren/NY/FRS@FRS, Scott Alvarez/BOARD/FRS@BOARD, Steven JManzarilNY/FRS@FRSRe: AIG questions from our meeting with Govs. Kohn and Warsh

    Several weeks ago AIG created a governance structure for the wind down ofFP which includes a Steering Committee upon which Jonathan Polk and I sit asFRBNYobservers. I have attached below a copy ofthe agenda and discussion document forthe meeting that occurred last Friday OCT 31. The plan foranorderly unwind of FP and the oversight structure is set forth on pages 22 through 30 of the document. AIG has engaged Blackrock and McKinsey as advisors inthe unwind.My observation of the status to date is that AIG has largely been dealing with the organizational and human resource issues required to set upan orderly unwind.In particular, they have been working to identify and retain key personnel to lead and execute the disposition of the firm. Once thisis completed - perhaps soon they should be able to begin proactive disposition of the books. In the meantime there has been a fair amount of activity accommodating clientlcounterpartyrequests to terminate or collateralize trades. Part ofthe governance process has been to define levels of materiality (in terms of cash f low and p/l) at whichtermination requests are escalated. Overall I would say the termination activity that has taken placeso far has not materially changed the risk profi le of FP andthat substantive changes in risk wil l l ikely occur only when AIG begins to proactively target books for disposition.We are putting together a list of deals FP has with tax-exempt entit ies and will send that along soon.Regards,Clint Lively

    FP Steering Committee OCT 31 200S.ppt

    CONFIDENTIAL FRBNY-TOWNS-Rl-204748

  • 8/7/2019 goldman short FRBNY-TOWNS-R1-204748

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    MichaelS Gibson/Board/FRS@BOARDSent by: Michael S Gibson/BOARD/FRS@BOARD

    To10/31/2008 02:41 PM

    Sarah,

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    Subject

    Sarah Dahlgren/NY/FRS@FRSDeborah P Bailey/BOARD/FRS@BOARD, Jon DGreenlee/BOARD/FRS@BOARD, Kieran Fallon/BOARD/FRS@BOARD,Paul WhynottlNY/FRS@NY, Rich Ashton/BOARD/FRS@BOARD, StevenJ Manzari/NY/FRS@FRS, Clinton Lively/NY/FRS@FRS, JimMahoney/NY/FRS@FRS, Michael S Gibson/BOARD/FRS@BOARD, ScottAlvarez/BOARD/FRS@BOARDAIG questions from ourmeeting with Govs. Kohn and Warsh

    We met with Govs. Kohn and Warsh today to updatethem on the package of measures being prepared for AIG.The governors asked two questions in the meeting that we did not knowthe answers to. I expectthese are issues that someone on your team is already workingon, but we would like to getthe latest information from you so we can get back to the governors with answers.1. Who is overseeing the tear-up process on the COS? There are two issues here, concessions and Goldman.Concessions: the worry is that giving the counterparties par in exchange for the underlying COO security might be giv ing them a gif t - they no longer have AIGcredit risk, and whatever CVA they have taken against potential future exposure to AIG will be released upon tear-up. If a counterparty has not received all thecollateral it has called for, the tear-up eliminates current exposure also. On the other hand, AIG is now receiving government support so the perceived credit risk ofAIG is less. Also, AIG needs to get the CDS torn upto put its problems behind it, so its bargaining power may be weak. If I understand the current version oftheproposed structure, any concessions will result in an excess amount left in the escrow account which pays down the Fed's senior note. This may reduce AIG'sincentive to bargain for the best concession possible. Is Morgan Stanley or some advisor from ourside embedded in the tear-up negotiations to track theseissues?Goldman: is a special case because their CDS with AIG are a naked short position and they don't own the bonds. I f the CDS are just torn up at current mark-tomarket, the value of that mark influences the cash Goldman will receive in a way that is not the case forthe counterparties who own the bonds and will bereceiving par. The Fed, Goldman's senior management, and Treasury all havean interest in making sure the negotiation of the mark between AIG and Goldman isdone in a fair way. However, the normal procedure might be for the negotiations to be done between someone at AIGFP and their counterpart on a trading desk atGoldman. A Goldman trader may not share the perspective of Goldman's senior management and may attach higher value to an extra bil lion dollars of P&L thatcould affect his or her 2008 bonus, even ifthat carries significant reputation risk for Goldman as a firm. Again, is Morgan Stanley or some advisor involved hereand aware of the issue? Is there a contingency plan to approach Goldman at a more senior level if roadblocks start appearing in the negotiations?2. What public disclosures will be made of the mark-to-market on ML II and ML III once they are consolidated on FRBNY's balance sheet?The governors were concerned that the market could attach a disproportionate significance to any public disclosureof "the Fed's" marks on the nonagency RMBSand ABS COO portfolios once ML II and ML III are consolidated onto FRBNY's balance sheet. Do we have a strategy for that? Would the disclosure be the sameas Maiden Lane LLC (quarterly disclosure of fair value of the holdings of ML II and ML III on the H.4.1)?Three more questions that are mine, not the governors.1. Given all the public hue and cry about the transit authorities whose tax-motivated lease transactions are in danger of unwinding due to AIG's downgrade belowAAA, are there other similar transactions that we should know about (and alert the governors about)? I assume this transaction was part of the AIGFP TOGportfolio; do what know what else lurks there?2. What is the status of the FP winddown?3. Can we have an update on the asset disposal process?Thanks,Mike

    CONFIDENTIAL FRBNY-TOWNS-Rl-204749