Going Beyond Whether or Not White Phosphorus Is a Weapon:

Legitimate Tools of the Military from Laws to Leadership

Lisa M. Beck

December 2, 2014

Note: Part of this paper includes references to an operation initially known as “Operation Phantom Fury,”

but whose name was changed to “Operation al -Fajr.” “Al-Fajr” which means “dawn” in Arabic refers to

what many commonly call the battle of Fallujah that took place during the last few months of 2004. It may

or may not have been referred to as simply Operation Dawn, but it should be noted that other conflicts have

been given the same name (e.g., the 1967 planned Egyptian offensive against Israel, the 1983 Iranian

offensive in the Iran-Iraq War, or the 2012 Turkish Armed Forces operation against the Kur distan

Workers Party). Nor does it refer to Operation New Dawn (Afghanistan) or Operation New Dawn

(referring to U.S. and coalition participation in the Iraq War after August 2010). Throughout this paper,

the second battle of Fallujah will be referred to as Operation al-Fajr. Though I was unable to find

documentation of any official change of name with a record of when the change took place, I have found a

couple of resources that indicate the change took place not long before this second battle at

Fallujah began.1

Introduction

Italy’s national public broadcasting company (RAI — Radiotelevisione italiana S.p.A.), alleged in a

documentary titled, “Fallujah, The Hidden Massacre” that the U.S. used white phosphorus as a weapon.2 But

did the U.S. really use it as a weapon? Or perhaps, like any other weapon, is it possible that the use of it may

have been inappropriate? If white phosphorus was used as a weapon, was the U.S. justified in using it as

such? U.S. military leaders have already addressed this issue and contended that the use of white phosphorus

during military combat operations in Iraq was authorized, just, and in complia nce with laws of armed conflict .

In fact, during a U.S. Department of Defense press briefing in November of 2005, the then-Chairman of the

Joint Chiefs of Staff, Marine General Peter Pace, said this in response to a question about U.S. use of white

phosphorus in urban areas:

White phosphorus is a legitimate tool of the military. It is used for two primary purposes. One is to mark a

location for strike by an aircraft, for example. [It is also] used as a screening agent so that you can move your

forces without being seen by the enemy. It is not a chemical weapon, … and it is well within the law of war to

use those weapons as they are being used for marking and for screening.3

But General Pace did more than just explain how the U.S. military uses white phosphorus . His real command

message was one that addressed both respect for law and order as well as following procedures, two things

that can seem so easy, but without certain basic elements can become much harder to achieve . His message

1 Al-Anbar Awakening, vol. I (American Perspectives): U.S. Marines and Counterinsurgency in Iraq, 2004-2009, Ed. Chief Warrant Officer 4 Timothy S. McWilliams and

Lietenant Colonel Kurtis P. Wheeler (Quantico: Marine Corps University Press, 2009), p. 8. Retrieved November 30, 2014 from http://books.google.com/books?id=KtkK__Xd_n0C&pg=PA8&lpg=PA8&dq=%22ayad+allawi%22%22al+fajr%22&source=bl&ots=cALXQJOuLb&sig=4-psEwMwPel-gxkW65gaB20XuD8&hl=en&sa=X&ei=8WR7VI2oH5e0oQSm9oLoCA&ved=0CCoQ6AEwAg#v=onepage&q=%22ayad%20allawi%22%22al%20fajr%22&f=false. A second source of this information comes from: Matt M. Matthews, Introduction to Operation AL FAJR: A Study in Army and Marine Corps Joint Operations. Global War on Terrorism Occasional Paper 20. (Fort Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2006), p. 1. 2 Sigfrido Ranucci and Maurizio Torrealta, Fallujah, The Hidden Massacre, RAI (Italy’s state television network). Broadcast Date: November 8, 2005. Documentary.

Retrieved November 29, 2014 from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=h9fvR9l7ITE. 3 Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld and Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Peter Pace (November 29, 2005). News Briefing [Television Transcript]. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense. Transcribed by Federal News Service. Retrieved November 22, 2014 from http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=1492.

rose to the surface after he was asked whether or not a weapon like white phosphorus should be used in an

urban area such as Fallujah, where fierce battles were fought between the U.S. military and Iraqi insurgents in

2004. He answered the question by stating:

No armed force in the world goes to greater effort than your armed force to protect civilians and to be ve ry

precise in the way we apply our power…. I would rather have the proper instrument applied at the proper time

as precisely as possible to get the job done in a way that kills as many of the bad guys as possible and does as

little collateral damage as possible.4

I could not agree with him more, but before I examine any issues regarding the use of white phosphorus, it

would be good to begin with some background about both Operations Vigilant Resolve and al -Fajr.

Battle of Fallujah I (aka Operation Vigilant Resolve)

Background

The official reason for executing Operation Vigilant Resolve was summed up in this statement by B rigadier

General Kimmitt: "These are the first of a series of actions taken to attack anticoalition and anti-Iraqi forces,

to re-establish security in Fallujah and begin the process of civil military assistance projects in Fallujah.”5

But others have more vividly, albeit bluntly, described its purpose as a mission to “clean out a viper’s nest”6

following the deaths of four U.S. contractors7 who were burned, beheaded, and proudly hung from a bridge as

a crowd of Fallujans celebrated below. Even so, U.S. military leaders closer to the troop level than Kimmitt

were careful to avoid such language. In a report by a correspondent who accompanied a unit of Marines

chosen to participate in Operation Vigilant Resolve, Major Pete Farnum, operations officer for 1st Battalion,

5th Marines gave this explanation for the need to implement Operation Vigilant Resolve: “ … the problem of

Fallujah has festered to the point where dealing with it represents a pivot opportunity to improve the

atmosphere in the entire [area of responsibility].” 8

He was firm in the assertion that the operation was not

“retribution for the butchery of March 31”9 and quoted the admittedly unpolitically correct then-Commanding

General of 1st Marine Division, Major General James Mattis. It isn’t necessary for me to quote Mattis in this

paper, but what many do not know is that he was known for inculcating good will toward non -combatants …

maybe not the enemy, but for everyone else, war should not strip a warrior of a benevolent spirit

toward mankind.

4 Ibid. 5 Jane Arraf, Jim Clancy, Barbara Starr, Kevin Flower, Kianne Sadeq, “Marines, Iraqis join forces to shut down Fallujah,” April 6, 2004. Cable News Network. Retrieved November 29, 2014 from http://www.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/meast/04/05/iraq.main/index.html. 6 “This is no time for the US to falter in Iraq,” The Telegraph, May 1, 2004. Features Comment. Retrieved November 30, 2014 from http://www.telegraph.co.uk/comment/telegraph-view/3605461/This-is-no-time-for-the-US-to-falter-in-Iraq.html. 7 Contractors from Blackwater USA: A 38-year-old former U.S. Navy SEAL (Scott Helvenston), a 32-year-old former U.S. Army Ranger (Jerry Zovko), a 38-year-old former member of a special operations aviation regiment (Michael Teague), and a 48-year-old civilian (Wesley Batalona) [Sources: Multiple to include: Jaymes Song, “Tragedy in Iraq shakes community on Big Isle,” April 4, 2004. The Honolulu Star Bulletin. Retrieved November 29, 2014 from http://archives.starbulletin.com/2004/04/04/news/story3.html). Operation Vigilant Resolve may have also been a response, in part, to the deaths of five American soldiers in Habbaniyah, just days prior to the contractor deaths. 8 Robert D. Kaplan, “Five Days in Fallujah,” The Atlantic, July 1, 2004. Retrieved November 30, 2014 from http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2004/07/five-days-in-fallujah/303450/. 9 Ibid.

Key Events Prior to and During Operation Vigilant Resolve10

March 31 – May 1, 2004

The period between Battle of Fallujah I and Battle of Fallujah II

Six months passed between the battles. Insurgents dug tunnels, prepared defenses, and stocked weapons and

ammunition. Some of the weapons in their possession were obtained by a handover from the Fallujah

Brigade, a militia unit the U.S. initially supported but which proved to be incapable of combating the

numerous insurgent groups in the region. Some of these groups may have been funded by Saudi Arabia and

Europe according to intelligence gathered during the prosecution of the second battle in Fallujah.11

Battle of Fallujah II (aka Operation al-Fajr)

Background

With the authority of the U.S.-appointed Iraqi Interim Government, a joint operation of coalition forces was

launched to rid Fallujah of insurgents which had been allowed to operate freely and gain strength since

Operation Vigilant Resolve ended in May of 2004 and even more so when the Fallujah Brigade disbanded

in September.

Key Events Prior to and During Operation al_Fajr12

September 10 – December 23, 2004

10 Sources: Multiple, to include: U.S. Marines in Iraq, 2004-2008: Anthology and Annotated Bibliography, compiled by Nicholas Schlosser (Washington, D.C.: United States Marine Corps: History Division, 2010), pp. 261-263. Retrieved November 29, 2014 from http://www.marines.mil/Portals/59/Publications/U.S.%20Marines%20In%20Iraq,%202004-2008%20Anthology%20and%20Annotated%20Bibliography%20%20PCN%2010600001900_3.pdf. 11

Christopher M. Blanchard and Alfred B. Prados, “Saudi Arabia: Terrorist Financing Issues,” CRS Report for Congress, Updated September 14, 2007, p. CRS-8. 12 U.S. Marines in Iraq, 2004-2008: Anthology and Annotated Bibliography, pp. 262-263

Mar 31: Blackwater contractors are murdered and mutilated while delivering food in Fallujah.

Apr 1: The Deputy Director of U.S. military operations in Iraq promises an ‘overwhelming’

response to the Blackwater USA deaths.

Apr 5: Units from I MEF launch Operation Vigilant Resolve.

Apr 9: Marines are ordered to suspend offensive operations against the insurgency.

Apr 9-30: Skirmishes continue.

May 1: I MEF withdraws from Fallujah and hands authority over to the Fallujah Brigade.

Sep 10: The Fallujah Brigade disbands; it is unable to secure the city.

Nov 7: Marines from I MEF conduct operations in preparation for a second attempt to clear

Fallujah of insurgents. Activities include securing key bridges, conducting surgical

air strikes, and seizing insurgent nodes outside the city.

Nov 8: Operation al-Fajr launches.

Nov 13: The initial attack on Fallujah is completed. Search and attack operations begin.

Dec 23: Operation al-Fajr concludes. Fallujah is secured and cleared of insurgents.

Repopulation of the city commences.

In the timeline above, you’ll notice that the initial attack on Fallujah during this second battle was completed

in less than a week, hardly the work of an armed force bent on the indiscriminate destruction of a people (or

an area) on the way to its objective.

Law of Armed Conflict’s Four Core Principles and How They Apply to White Phosphorus in Fallujah

The four core principles of the law of armed conflict are distinction, military necessity, unnecessary

suffering, and proportionality. In this paper, I try to address all four of those principles as they apply to

Operations Vigilant Resolve and al-Fajr.

But before I address those principles, it should be known that t he first question one should probably ask when

it comes to matters of contention in armed conflict is this: Is the issue at hand an international armed conflict

or a non-international armed conflict? Different sets of laws have been established for each one and without

getting into detail about the history of the establishment of such laws or their relevance today, let’s assume

that this issue is still relevant. In the case of the contention surrounding the Battle of Fallujah, I think we can

agree that the battles there were cases of international armed conflict. The United States had declar ed war

against Iraq. In today’s age, it is hard to be more international than that. These are not the days of WWI

or WWII.

Operation Vigilant Resolve and the Case for Distinction and Proportionality

In a CNN article, it was reported:

The Marines came under intense fire late Monday, with Iraqi insurgents firing mortars and rocket -

propelled grenades at their positions from a mosque and from an open field. U.S. forces moving against

those positions also came under attack from Iraqis who fired machine guns and threw grenades at them

from a BMW sedan. The Marines killed one and wounded at least two of their attackers, taking the

survivors into custody. An Air Force AC-130 Spectre gunship, armed with a 105 mm cannon, was called

in to push back the attackers 13

This is just one example demonstrating that coalition forces do not act indiscriminately. In fact, when asked

why they took so long to take action after warrants had been issued for Muqtada al -Sadr,14

and his supporters,

Coalition Provisional Authority spokesman Dan Senor said “it was the Iraqi judge’s call.”15

In another article, this one from the L.A. Times, it was reported:

The Marines called in air support to take out some enemy positions …. At d aylight, Marines planned to

distribute leaflets and broadcast radio messages asking residents of Fallujah to stay in their homes and

13

Jane Arraf, Jim Clancy, Barbara Starr, Kevin Flower, Kianne Sadeq, “Marines, Iraqis join forces to shut down Fallujah.” 14 Muqtada al-Sadr had repeatedly demanded an immediate withdrawal of all U.S.-led coalition forces and as of at least April 5, 2004, an Iraqi judge had issued a warrant for his arrest. [Source: “Muqtada al-Sadr.” GlobalSecurity.org. Retrieved November 29, 2014 from http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/iraq/al-sadr.htm.] 15

Jane Arraf, Jim Clancy, Barbara Starr, Kevin Flower, Kianne Sadeq, “Marines, Iraqis join forces to shut down Fallujah.”

help identify insurgents and those responsible for last week's killings. Marines said they had no plans to

conduct door-to-door searches; they instead intended to work from a list of addresses where intelligence

suggested suspects might be hiding and weapons might be stored. Members of the new Iraqi Army and

the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps were playing support roles. Maj. Rand on McGowan, executive officer of

the Marines' 2nd Battalion, 1st Regiment, called the operation "the first of many steps toward bringing

stability to Fallujah."16

Neither of these articles even hints at a military force bent on acting indiscriminately or v iolating

international humanitarian laws.17

In addition to distributing leaflets and broadcasting messages over the radio, evidence of the efforts U.S.

troops employed to only target enemy combatants also included the use of laser -guided bombs and heavy use

of snipers. Both of these approaches indicate U.S. interest in using targeted, focused methods for the

purposes of eliminating the threat and protecting innocent civilians. Beyond even that, psychological

operations teams were employed in efforts to try to draw the enemy out. Does any of this sound like an

armed force who has little regard for the lives of innocent human beings?

As for proportionality, by some accounts, the number of insurgents inside Fallujah was reported to have been

as low as 3,000 to as high as 20,000. To even attempt to root out insurgents in a city of approximately

300,000 with a force of 2,20018

at most is the very epitome of using force with discretion, proportion, and

commitment to abiding by international humanitarian laws.

As far as use of actual weapons is concerned, it is true that 318 bombs and 391 rockets and missiles were

dropped and 93,000 machine gun and cannon rounds were fired19

, but the bombs that were dropped were

precision bombs and the other weapons were used by those who undergo extensive training and pride

themselves on their accurate marksmanship skills. None of this training includes doctrine that guides

shooters on how to aim at or kill innocent civilians . In today’s professional armed forces , it would not

be tolerated.

Furthermore, we have personal accounts from brigadier generals in Iraq’s newly formed army that operations

were conducted with precision. Brigadier General Abdul Qadir Muhammed Jasim, in a Washington Post

article is quoted as saying, “The operation is going very precise (sic) and with a very small number of

16 Tony Perry and Edmund Sanders, “Marines preparing for raid on Fallujah,” Los Angeles Times, April 5, 2004. Reposted by The Baltimore Sun. Retrieved November 29, 2014 from http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2004-04-05/news/0404050273_1_marines-iraq-battalion. 17

For even greater insight into the deliberations that go into some of the hard decisions that were made during the first battle of Fallujah and how an event can

morph from the truth into sensationalized fiction, read “The Massacre That Wasn’t” by Major Alfred B. “Ben” Connable.. Reprinted from a chapter by the same name in the book, Ideas as Weapons: Influence and Perception in Modern Warfare. You can also find the chapter in U.S. Marines in Iraq, 2004-2008: Anthology and Annotated Bibliography at http://www.marines.mil/Portals/59/Publications/U.S.%20Marines%20In%20Iraq,%202004-2008%20Anthology%20and%20Annotated%20Bibliography%20%20PCN%2010600001900_3.pdf. 18 “First Battle of Fallujah.” Wikipedia. Retrieved November 29, 2014 from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/First_Battle_of_Fallujah. 19 Lieutenant Colonel Kenneth W. Estes, USMC (Ret.), Into the Fray: U.S. Marines in Iraq, 2004-2005 (Washington, D.C.: United States Marine Corps: History Division, 2011), p. 78. Retrieved November 30, 2014 from http://www.mcu.usmc.mil/historydivision/Pages/Publications/Publication%20PDFs/Estes%20Into%20the%20Fray%20Boards_Det%20One%20copy.pdf.

casualties. In every place we finish an operation, our forces start to distribute aid, food, clothes , blankets and

even money…. We are very sure that we are moving in the right way and will do the tasks we are asked to do

very precisely."20

Operation al-Fajr and the Case for Military Necessity

If coalition forces did not have a case for military necessity before the first battle of Fallujah, they had it by

the second. Despite that, it is important to note that even though coalition forces were six times the size they

were during the first battle of Fallujah – Operation Vigilant Resolve – discretion remained among the troops

even though they faced a “heavily armed and well-entrenched fanatical enemy.”21

What is more, this was no

ragtag innocent bunch of infidels of no consequence or threat. From a New York Times article during this

time period, the following was reported: “Senior Pentagon and military officials predict no easy success in

their effort, acknowledging that the insurgency is resilient, well -armed, lavishly financed and organized in

cells without the typical hierarchy of leaders and subordinates.”22

Even Donald Rumsfeld himself had this to

say about the insurgents, “… these folks are determined…. These are killers. They chop people's

heads off.”23

Disposition, Discretion and Distinction

The Oxford Dictionary gives us a definition for all three of these words. Disposition is defined as “A

person’s inherent qualities of mind and character,” discretion is defined as, “The freedom to decide what

should be done in a particular situation,” and distinction as “A difference or contrast between similar things

or people.”24

Unless things have drastically changed in the United States Marine Corps, and other branches of service I

would presume, I know that discretion, as in it being the better part of valor, is learned before the principle of

“distinction” in the rule of law. But even before a Marine or a soldier or some other service member learns or

reads of discretion, he or she has formed a disposition and it is this disposition that determines, largely,

whether or not that individual is likely to practice discretion. Men and women don’t join a branch of service

to learn about matters of right and wrong. I would argue that they have already formed such opinions and

that many join the armed services, in part, because they already have a code of ethics and they are motivated

20 Jackie Spinner, Karl Vick, and Omar Fekeiki, “U.S. Forces Battle Into Heart of Fallujah,” Washington Post, November 10, 2014. Retrieved November 30, 2014 from http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A35979-2004Nov9.html. 21

Commander, U.S. Marine Forces, Central Command. “I Marine Expeditionary Force Summary of Action.” Adapted from its “Presidential Unit Citation” award

recommendation for extraordinary heroism and exceptional performance, from August 2, 2004 to February 1, 2005 and reprinted in U.S. Marines in Iraq, 2004-2008: Anthology and Annotated Bibliography (Washington, D.C.: United States Marine Corps: History Division, 2010), p. 83. 22 Thom Shanker and Eric Schmitt, “Fallujah Data Said to Pressure Guerillas,” New York Times, December 3, 2004. Retrieved November 30, 2014 from http://www.lexisnexis.com.offcampus.lib.washington.edu/lnacui2api/results/docview/docview.do?docLinkInd=true&risb=21_T21048639355&format=GNBFI&sort=RELEVANCE&startDocNo=1&resultsUrlKey=29_T21048639359&cisb=22_T21048639358&treeMax=true&treeWidth=0&csi=6742&docNo=3. 23 Corky Siemaszko, “U.S. Firestorm Rips Fortress Fallujah,” News Wire Services, November 9, 2004. Retrieved November 30, 2004 from http://www.lexisnexis.com.offcampus.lib.washington.edu/lnacui2api/results/docview/docview.do?docLinkInd=true&risb=21_T21048639355&format=GNBFI&sort=RELEVANCE&startDocNo=1&resultsUrlKey=29_T21048639359&cisb=22_T21048639358&treeMax=true&treeWidth=0&csi=151550&docNo=5. 24 “Disposition.” “Discretion.” “Distinction.” Oxford Dictionaries. Retrieved November 30, 2014 from http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/american_english/disposition?searchDictCode=all, http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/american_english/discretion?searchDictCode=all, and http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/american_english/distinction?searchDictCode=all.

by doing “what is right.” So, when I read the following in Robert Kaplan’s article on his experiences with

Marines during Operation Vigilant Resolve25

"Today is Palm Sunday," he began. "The day of Jesus' triumphal entry into Jerusalem, where he broke

the bounds of Hell. Tonight commences your triumphal entry into Fallujah, a place in the bounds of Hell.

This is a spiritual battle, and you Marines are the tools of mercy." As Hall invoked the Holy Spirit, the

Marines all dropped to one knee and bowed their heads, removing their bush or field caps as they did so.

and Kaplan’s reflection on it:

I had become accustomed to such sermons. For young men living in austere conditions, going out daily

to risk their lives, morale is based not on polite subtleties but on a stark belief in their own

righteousness, and in the iniquity of the enemy. The spirit of the U.S. military is fiercely evangelical,

even as it is fiercely ecumenical. Although both kosher and halal MREs are provided, and soldiers and

Marines of all races, religions, and regions of the country are welcomed into the ranks, the fact is that

not all races, religions, and regional types join up in equal numbers. So it is that the martial

evangelicalism of the South and the Bible Belt gives the military its true religious soul, along with its

compassion for innocent civilians—a phenomenon I had seen in Afghanistan, the Philippines, and other

places, and would see again in Fallujah.

I felt as if I knew exactly what he was talking about. Kaplan’s observations support this characterization

when he writes about the compassionate reaction of Marines to the death of civilians accidentally shot.

Despite a few bad apples that engage in activities that aren’t worth repeating the vast majority of those who

serve in the armed services have good intentions and have a reverence for humanity and the laws designed to

protect it.

Even more importantly, Kaplan also casts some light on Marine Corps leadership and how they react to

judgment that infringes upon the rules of engagement designed to protect innocent civilians. One Marine

Corps captain quoted in the article asks a Marine, “"Did he have a weapon? No! So where in the ROEs [Rules

of Engagement] does it say you can shoot at him?" A person’s disposition leads to discretion, which leads to

making better decisions when it comes to distinction. When mistakes are made, leaders should be capable,

qualified, and willing to make a correction especially when humanitarian laws are at stake.

What Can Counts Tell You About the Principle of Distinction?

If one were to make the case that U.S. troops and its coalition partners deliberately act indiscriminately,

wouldn’t it also then be true that the number of civilian casualties would go up proportionally? In this case,

the number of friendly troops who fought in the second battle of Fallujah – Operation al-Fajr -- increased by

600 percent; the number of civilian deaths increased by just 30 percent. If attacks by U.S. troops were

indiscriminately conducted, the death toll for civilians should be much, much higher, but they weren’t.

25 Robert D. Kaplan, “Five Days in Fallujah.”

Furthermore, let’s take a look at the ratio of civilian deaths to enemy combatant deaths. In the first battle of

Fallujah – Operation Vigilant Resolve – civilian casualties/losses were almost three times higher than for

enemy casualties/losses. During the second battle, civilian casualties/losses were just half of the enemy

casualties/losses. Again, none of this appears to be evidence that the U.S. acted indiscriminately during

either of these battles and especially not dur ing Operation al-Fajr.

Attempts to Warn Civilians

U.S. forces attempted to warn the citizens of Fallujah that attacks were imminent. Though I have not seen

any leaflets that were specifically created for Operations Vigilant Resolve or al-Fajr, I have seen numerous

leaflets that were dropped over Iraq between 2002 and 2003. In some of these leaflets, it is clear that

coalition forces are aware of the rules of law and even make use of the phrase “non -combatant” declaring that

coalition forces “do not wish to harm or injure” them.26

In fact, of the more than 60 leaflets and posters I saw

that were created for Operation Iraqi Freedom, the larger operation under which Operations Vigilant Resolve

and al-Fajr were a part of, at least 14 different versions of them were specifically addressed toward the people

of Iraq and measures they could take to try to distingu ish themselves from the enemy. To illustrate attempts

by coalition forces to ensure the safety of the civilian population, some content from one of the leaflets

is below:

•Park your vehicles in squares no larger than battalion size.

•Stow artillery and air defense artillery [systems] in travel configuration.

•Display white flags on vehicles.

•No [visible] man portable air defense systems.

•Personnel must gather into groups, a minimum of one kilometer away from their vehicles.

•Officers may retain their sidearm, others must disarm.

•Do not approach Coalition forces.

•Wait for further instructions.

I am unaware of any reports that have attempted to obj ectively measure the effects of these types of efforts on

the civilian populace, but I have read several reports that indicate many of Fallujah’s citizens had fled the city

before the second battle of Fallujah began. If this was an intended consequence of these activities, then I

26

“Operation Iraqi Freedom Leaflets.” IZD-036. Retrieved November 29, 2014 from http://www.psywarrior.com/IraqNFL030.html.

Coalition

Forces

Enemy

Forces

Coalition

Forces

Enemy

Forces

Civilians

Killed

Battle of Fallujah, I 2,200 3,600 271

184-228 572-616

Battle of Fallujah, II 13,350 3,700-4,000 720 1,200-1,500 8001Killed only.

Combatants Casualties/Losses

would say they were effective. Who knows how many innocent civilian lives were saved because they heeded

the warnings and fled the city to safer havens? Perhaps we will never know, but for the record, it is clear that

U.S. troops and coalition partners do everything they can think of to protect the lives of non-combatants.

White Phosphorus and Unnecessary Suffering

Though I have seen at least one claim that during Operation al -Fajr, articles of the Geneva conventions were

disregarded,27

I am unaware of any voice of authority claiming that conventions were violated during that

operation. It is true that the Washington Post reported that some artillery guns fired white phosphorus rounds

but that does not mean they were used intentionally as a weapon. White phosphorus has many uses other than

use as a weapon and to my knowledge neither has it been U.S. Department of Defense policy or common

practice to use it as such.

My own experience as a United States Marine never indicated any uses of it that would contradict this.

Though it is true I was never an infantry or artillery Marine, even those Marines who serve more of a support

role are required to fire a rifle, sometimes at night, and in the absence of a good, working pair of night vision

goggles, if the night can be lit up with an effective incendiary, like white phosphorus, it certainly helps a

Marine aim in on the target. All things considered, I would think the world at large would be quite in favor

of warriors who, through the use of an incendiary, can shoot with more precision. In addition, the

Washington Post report I saw on this did not indicate who, specifically, had fired the white phosphorus

rounds.28

Though it may be true that the U.S. Department of Defense does n ot use it as a weapon, I cannot be

certain that other nations -- coalition forces or local national forces – follow that same policy.

Nevertheless, despite the one Washington Post report I read, more reporting surfaced that blurs the line of its

use as simply an incendiary or a weapon. A BBC article on this topic referenced an article three soldiers had

written about their activities in Fallujah. The BBC included this excerpt from that article:

[White Phosphorus (WP)] proved to be an effective and versatile munition. We used it for screening

missions at two breeches and, later in the fight, as a potent psychological weapon against the insurgents

in trench lines and spider holes where we could not get effects on them wi th HE [High Explosive]. We

fired "shake and bake" missions at the insurgents, using WP to flush them out and HE to take

them out."29

Though the phrase “shake and bake” does little to instill in one’s mind that unnecessary suffering is always at

the forefront of a warrior’s mind, this does not mean that the intentions of these young men weren’t still of a

noble character. If this method of rooting out the insurgents ultimately helped prevent the unnecessary

27 Jonathon Holmes, “The legacy of Fallujah,” The Guardian, April 3, 2007. Retrieved November 30, 2014 from http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2007/apr/04/iraq.iraq. Holmes actually claims that 70 Geneva conventions were breached during the “siege warfare” Fallujah was subjected to during Operation al-Fajr. 28 Jackie Spinner, Karl Vick, and Omar Fekeiki, “U.S. Forces Battle Into Heart of Fallujah.” 29

Paul Reynolds, “White Phosphorus: weapon on the edge,” British Broadcasting Corporation, November 16, 2005. Retrieved November 30, 2014 from

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/4442988.stm.

suffering of innocent civilians, wouldn’t it be their duty to pursue this method of extracting them from their

hiding places? Even beyond that, would it be better to do nothing at al l and allow insurgents to continue

holding the citizens of Fallujah hostage? I think General John Sattler, USMC (Ret.), and former I Marine

Expeditionary Force Commander would agree. In an American Forces Press Service article he is quoted as

saying, “Our focus was on breaking the backbone of the insurgents and restoring the rule of law in Fallujah.

We want to give Fallujah back to Fallujah's people."30

Conclusion

I began this paper with some comments by General Pace in response to a question about U.S. use of white

phosphorus in urban areas. I stepped away from the topic for a bit to give some background on the military

operations in which its use has been questioned recently and then discussed some other principles of the laws

of armed conflict and how U.S. and coalition forces used every method thinkable to ensure such laws were

upheld. I did that to make the point that conduct in war isn’t so much about a classification of a thing or even

an application of a rule. It is a philosophy and a commitment that must be endemic throughout the

organization in order for these laws to stand any chance of succeeding. Humans are not robots and situations

are not static or just like you see them in a textbook. Sound philosophy, leadership, and an ethos that

respects and protects is really what will serve humanity best.

30

John Valceanu, “Coalition Fights to Destroy Remaining Fallujah Insurgents,” American Forces Press Service, November 14, 2004. Retrieved December 1, 2014 from

http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=24835.

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