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Writing Sample

What’s the Harm in Climate Change?

Eric S. Godoy

Draft last updated August 31, 2014. Please do not cite or distribute.

ABSTRACT: I critique a popular argument against direct duties (ADD) for individuals to reduce their carbon footprint by uncovering the following three assumptions that this argument makes about the nature of harm: that it must 1) be caused intentionally by a single agent, 2) befall clear victims, and 3) arise through unusual activity. Several thinkers have challenged one or more of these assumptions; however, I show that if we grant that individual agents do not meet these criteria, then we must say the same of state agents. Therefore, we ought to reject ADD’s notion of harm since it would lead to a deficit in which nobody is responsible for the harms associated with climate change. I examine language used in the U.S. State Department’s assessment of the environmental impact of the Keystone XL transcontinental pipeline to show that it invokes the same notion of harm used in ADD to justify the construction. Since this harm must originate in, or be reducible to, individual agents, its application to issues such as climate change is inappropriate. Instead, we should understand climate change as a form of structural injustice (Young) that aggregates individual actions to create harmful effects (Lichtenberg). I end by suggesting that the recent fossil fuel divestment movement offers a way for individuals to meet direct duties in light of a warming planet. This movement seeks to transform the economic structures that encourage climate change by coordinating individual actions to make fossil fuel production less attractive.

Who has moral responsibilities to mitigate or prevent the harms linked to climate change?1 This

is an active and pressing question in recent literature on climate change ethics. Many ethicists

seem to agree that duties fall on collectives such as states and governing bodies.2 This is

1 I am grateful to the following people for their helpful comments on the ideas contained in this paper: Dan

Boscov-‐‑Ellen, Nancy Fraser, Virginia Held, Aaron Jaffe, and Ross Poole. 2 See, for instance: Donald Brown, “The Need to Face Conflicts between Rich and Poor Nations to Solve Global

Environmental Problems,” in The Business of Consumption: Environmental Ethics and the Global Economy, ed. Laura Westra and Patricia H. Werhane (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1998), 31–46; Simon Caney, “Climate Change

What’s the Harm in Climate Change? Eric S. Godoy

Writing Sample Page 2 of 25

relatively non-‐‑controversial since these types of agents can most effectively regulate greenhouse

gas emissions, land use, or other activities that affect our planet’s climate systems.3 Others have

argued that individuals have some duties as well,4 but there is disagreement over whether these

are direct or indirect duties.5 If duties are direct, individuals should take action to reduce their

personal greenhouse gas emissions—by driving and consuming less, conserving electricity,

installing solar panels for their homes, and so on. On the other hand, indirect duties are fulfilled

by pressuring collective agents to act—for instance, by protesting harmful policies, voting for

environmentally-‐‑conscious leaders, and boycotting environmentally-‐‑destructive companies.

This distinction is important because if duties are merely indirect, then there is no reason

for individuals to abstain from activities linked to greenhouse gas emissions. I may continue to

pollute so long as I urge my government to make it illegal or more difficult for me to do so. Yet

it seems that we could achieve the best results for the atmosphere if everyone stopped polluting

and the Duties of the Advantaged,” Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 13 (2010): 203–28; Stephen Gardiner, A Perfect Moral Storm: The Ethical Tragedy of Climate Change (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011); Michael Maniates, “Individualization: Plant a Tree, Buy a Bike, Save the World?” Global Environmental Politics 1 (2006): 31–52; Henry Shue, “Subsistence Emissions and Luxury Emissions,” Law and Policy 15 (1992): 39–60; and Martino Traxler, “Fair Chore Division for Climate Change,” Social Theory and Practice 28 (2002): 101–34.

3 This claim quickly becomes controversial when we ask which states and corporations have duties. See note 2 above and “Part IV: Policy Responses to Climate Change” in Stephen Gardiner et al., ed., Climate Ethics: Essential Readings (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 181–312. There is also some controversy about whether or not collective agents exist. I take for granted that they do insofar as states enact laws and policies, or enter into agreements that can mitigate the effects of climate change. They can also reject laws and policies and renege on international agreements.

4 For instance, see Elizabeth Cripps, “Climate Change, Collective Harm, and Legitimate Coercion,” Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 14 (2011): 171–93; Dale Jamieson, “When Utilitarians Should Be Virtue Theorists,” Utilitas 19 (2007): 160–83; and Peter Singer, One World: The Ethics of Globalization (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2002), 14–50.

5 For instance, see Ben Almassi, “Climate Change and the Ethics of Individual Emissions: A Response to Sinnott-‐‑Armstrong,” Perspectives: International Postgraduate Journal of Philosophy 4 (2012): 4–21; Anne Schwenkenbecher, “Is There an Obligation to Reduce One’s Individual Carbon Footprint?” Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 17 (2014): 168–88; and Walter Sinnott-‐‑Armstrong, “It’s Not My Fault: Global Warming and Individual Moral Obligations,” in Perspectives on Climate Change: Science, Economics, Politics, Ethics Advances in the Economics of Environmental Resources, ed. Walter Sinnott-‐‑Armstrong and Richard B. Howarth (Bingley, UK: Elsevier Ltd., 2005), 285–307.



as soon as possible—that is, if individuals possess both direct and indirect duties. In such a case,

I should stop polluting while asking my government to encourage others to stop as well.

Furthermore, we ought to consider whether individuals have responsibilities since

governments are not acting quickly enough.6 If individuals have no duties, and governments

are not meeting theirs, then we are faced with a dangerous deficit of responsibility7 while

greenhouse gas emissions and the atmospheric carbon count continue to rise.8 Even if states are

the most effective agents to address climate change, should not individuals find ways to reduce

their impact in lieu of their inactive governments?

In this essay, I defend the claim that individuals have both sets of duties by way of

critiquing a popular version of the argument against direct duties that runs as follows:

Against direct duties (ADD): Individuals are not directly responsible for climate change because their actions connected to it are not themselves harmful in a morally significant way. In order for an action to be harmful in a morally significant way,

1. an agent must intentionally cause harm on her own; 2. the harm must be caused through unusual activity; and 3. the harm must have a clear effect on recognizable victims.9

While thinkers have argued for direct duties by attacking one or more of ADD’s three

requirements for morally relevant harm,10 my critique takes a different approach. I show that if

6 Scientists have determined that at our current rate of emissions we will burn enough carbon to warm the plant

beyond the internationally agreed upon 2 degrees Celsius by 2024, 2027, or 2039 (with respectively 20%, 25%, and 50% probabilities). Our current oil and gas reserves allow us to “vastly exceed” this budget. See Malte Meinshausen et al., “Greenhouse-‐‑Gas Emission Targets for Limiting Global Warming to 2 °C,” Nature 458 (2009): 1158–62.

7 I borrow this term from Christian List and Philip Pettit, Group Agency: The Possibility, Design, and Status of Corporate Agents (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2011), 153–69. List and Pettit claim that group agency is a useful concept in situations where no individuals can be held responsible (hence the deficit). I invert this to show that the worry works both ways: if group agents fail to act, but individuals are excused, then we face a similar deficit.

8 On May 9, 2013, we surpassed an atmospheric carbon concentration of 400 parts per million for the first time since records began in 1958. See Justin Gillis, “Heat-‐‑Trapping Gas Passes Milestone, Raising Fears,” The New York Times, May 10, 2013.

9 I take these from Sinnott-‐‑Armstrong, “It’s Not My Fault,” 289–91.



we grant the above definition of harm, then we are led to the unacceptable conclusion that state

agents are also exculpated. ADD’s version of harm cannot support indirect duties either. I argue

that in order to avoid a deficit of responsibility, in which neither individual nor collective agents

are responsible for climate change, we must reconsider our notion of harm.

In the first section, I discuss the types of harm associated with climate change. The

controversial question here is not whether climate change is harmful, but who has

responsibilities in light of it. In the second section, I give an overview of ADD and its

assumptions about morally significant harm. In the third section, I show how these assumptions

also work to excuse state level actors. In the fourth section, I offer a concrete example of this by

surveying language found in a U.S. State Department report assessing the impact of the

Keystone XL pipeline extension project, which appeals to the same notion of harm that ADD

uses and concludes that the project would not be harmful. In the fifth section, I consider an

alternative way of understanding the harms associated with climate change. While ADD

assumes an atomistic notion of harm that solely arises from and affects individual agents, I

argue that we should understand climate change as a form of structural injustice that

aggregates individual actions to create harmful effects. I end by suggesting that the recent fossil

fuel divestment movement offers a way for individuals to meet direct duties in light of climate

change. This movement seeks to transform the economic structures that encourage climate

change by coordinating individual actions to make fossil fuel production less profitable.

10 For instance, Almassi offers a threshold-‐‑contribution principle that attacks 1 and 3; Jamieson shows how virtue

theory can reject 2 since virtues by definition stand out among usual activities; and Schwenkenbecher responds to 1 and 3 by attacking the notion that individual actions alone do not cause harmful effects. See Almassi, “Climate Change and the Ethics of Individual Emissions”; Dale Jamieson, Reason in a Dark Time: Why the Struggle Against Climate Change Failed—and What It Means for Our Future (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014); and Schwenkenbecher, “Is There an Obligation?”



I. MORAL HARM AND CLIMATE CHANGE

Ethicists have encountered difficulties with thinking about the moral harms associated with a

warming planet,11 though understanding climate change itself as harmful is not one of these

difficulties. For instance, according to the latest Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change

(IPCC) report, we have observed and can continue to expect, among other things, increases in

the following: fatalities associated with extreme weather, extreme floods (especially in coastal

areas) and droughts, acidification of the world’s oceans, and conflict and war due to stresses on

the world’s fresh water and food supply.12 These are harmful phenomena at least in part

because of their effects on people.13 Aside from causing human casualties, storms and floods can

destroy homes and displace families. They disrupt the normal routines and services on which

we depend to meet our needs: water, electricity, sewage removal, transit routes, and so on.

Cetaris paribus, if we avoid these harms without causing others, the world would be better off.

The addition of the word “moral” signifies that the harm or its remedy is relevant to the action

of moral agents. Those who fall victim to a natural disaster, such as a severe storm or drought,

are suffering moral harm since these events raise the question of whether other agents should

aid disaster victims. Or, if floods and storms are linked to greenhouse gas emissions, then those

causing the emissions ought to reduce them. In other words, I assume that moral harms are

11 I have already cited a number of works that deal with this topic, but see especially Gardiner, A Perfect Moral

Storm, and Jamieson, Reason in a Dark Time. 12 The IPCC’s Second Working Group on Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability emphasizes repeatedly that those

who stand to suffer most from these changes are the world’s poor, especially in developing countries where 95% of all natural disaster-‐‑related deaths occurred from 1970 to 2008. See IPCC, Climate Change 2014: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), “Summary for Policy Makers,” 1–32; and draft chap. 1, p. 16, available online at http://www.ipcc.ch.

13 In order to narrow my focus I will not here consider the harmful effects on other living things or ecosystems.



those for which some agents are responsible, but as I have suggested above, the difficult

question is, which agents have moral responsibilities to mitigate these harms?

The concept of a natural disaster also becomes problematic with regard to climate change

since humans are causing the changes. Scientists now overwhelmingly agree that climate

change is anthropogenic;14 there is some connection between human activity and “natural”

weather phenomena such as intense storms and droughts. We cannot determine if a particular

hurricane would have been more or less strong had so much fossil fuel not been combusted

over the past 200 years since there is a natural variability inherent in such events. However,

climate data and scientific modeling confirms that, in general, storms are likely to intensify.15

What it cannot pinpoint is which agents have a moral obligation to alter their actions to prevent

further harms or to address the harms we have already witnessed.

II. AGAINST DIRECT DUTIES FOR INDIVIDUALS

The inability to link individual actions to clear effects is part of the reason that ADD seems so

attractive. It is difficult to imagine how my relatively miniscule contribution to a sea of

emissions can make matters any worse. Take for instance my hobby of joyriding in a large

suburban utility vehicle (SUV).16 Do I have a direct duty to give it up? One advocate for ADD is

Sinnott-‐‑Armstrong. Specifically, he argues that individuals do not have moral obligations to

14 IPCC, Climate Change 2013: The Physical Science Basis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), “Summary

for Policy Maker,” 3–29, available online at http://www.ipcc.ch. 15 It is “more likely than not” that storms will intensify in the late 21st century. Ibid., 23. 16 Both Jamieson and Sinnott-‐‑Armstrong employ this example in their writing, though it is the latter who defends

an unqualified version of ADD. See Jamieson, “When Utilitarians Should Be Virtue Theorists,” 167; and Sinnott-‐‑Armstrong, “It’s Not My Fault.”



abstain from carbon-‐‑heavy leisure activities such as joyriding on a “sunny Sunday afternoon.”17

The article in which he makes this argument is aptly titled “It’s Not My Fault” (emphasis

original). In it, he argues that individuals should petition their government to make activities,

such as joyriding, illegal; whether they continue to joyride or not while doing so makes no

significant moral difference.18 He comes to this conclusion after surveying fifteen different

principles, all of which he claims fail to show there is anything morally wrong with joyriding.

Harm plays a central role in Sinnott-‐‑Armstrong’s survey. What he calls “the harm

principle” is the first of the fifteen principles that he discusses. It reads: “We have a moral

obligation not to perform an act that causes harm to others.”19 He rejects this principle because

he believes that climate change does not “cause harm” (I explain why below). Afterwards,

many of the subsequent fourteen principles, each of which he also rejects, appeal back to the

harm principle. It acts as a keystone principle in his thoroughgoing rejection of direct duties for

individuals.

In order to argue that climate change does not cause harm, Sinnott-‐‑Armstrong must

insist on three requirements for morally relevant harm. He argues that joyriding is morally

permissible because: (a) I do not alone sufficiently cause the harms to which it is connected; (b)

my joyriding is not an unusual activity since many others participate in it; and (c) my joyriding

does not cause measurable suffering in clear victims. I discuss these in turn below, briefly

17 Ibid., 288. 18 Perhaps a more accurate, less controversial version of Sinnott-‐‑Armstrong’s conclusion is a fallibilistic one. He

claims we do not know if joyriding is morally wrong, since we can find no principles prohibiting it, though it is possible someone will discover one (ibid., 303). The main idea is that if individuals must choose between either adopting direct duties or indirect duties, they ought to go with the latter. Of course, individuals can choose both, but Sinnott-‐‑Armstrong finds no compelling moral principle requiring them to do so.

19 Ibid., 289.



considering some objections. However, I reserve my main challenge to ADD for the next section

where I discuss state agents.

A. No sole author

Even if I do my best to reduce my carbon footprint—even if I retreat from civilization

determined to reduce my impact to zero, or even if I dedicate myself to making my greenhouse

gas contribution negative by cultivating new forests to surround my hermitage, and so on—on

my own, I cannot prevent global warming. It is questionable if I alone can even diminish it by a

miniscule degree.20 This is not surprising given the scale and scope of the issue. No one

individual is capable of causing or preventing the harms in question. Even with the best of

intentions, individuals can only do so much.21 In other words, “my individual act [joyriding] is

neither necessary nor sufficient for global warming.”22 If I abstain from my hobby, many others

will continue producing the emissions necessary for warming. Sinnott-‐‑Armstrong concludes

from this that joyriding on its own is not harmful. It only becomes harmful when considered in

light of all the other greenhouse gas-‐‑emitting activities in which humans participate.

Those familiar with Parfit might charge Sinnott-‐‑Armstrong with making a mistake in

“moral mathematics” by assuming that individuals are not responsible for overdetermined

20 Nolt proposes a method for calculating harm and finds that the average American alive today will be

responsible for the death or serious harm of at least two future persons. See John Nolt, “How Harmful Are the Average American’s Greenhouse Gas Emissions?” Ethics, Policy, and Environment, 14 (2011): 3–10. However, it is not clear if reducing my emissions would save even one person. It is also not clear how the effects of my abstention from using carbon resources will not encourage others to use more of them. According to supply and demand, my abstention would increase the supply and thereby deflate the price, making its consumption a more attractive alternative. See Gardiner, A Perfect Moral Storm, 98n.

21 Aufrecht argues that there are structural limitations to our minimum personal emissions. See Monica Aufrecht, “Climate Change and Structural Emissions: Moral Obligations at the Individual Level,” International Journal of Applied Philosophy 25 (2011): 201–13.

22 Sinnott-‐‑Armstrong, “It’s Not My Fault,” 289.



harms.23 However, Sinnott-‐‑Armstrong thinks there is a difference with regard to joyriding

because joyriders are not intending harm. The same cannot be said for Parfit’s torturers and

simultaneous shooters.24 Sinnott-‐‑Armstrong insists that it is “not that my exhaust is overkill, like

poisoning someone who is already dying from poison.”25 Poisoning, torturing, or shooting

someone are intrinsically harmful acts; I cannot perform them without having ill intentions.26

Likewise, Sinnott-‐‑Armstrong includes an example in which five people push a car with

someone locked inside off of a cliff. Although three people could have managed this on their

own, the fourth and fifth members of the group are indeed harming the victim since it is

difficult to argue that they are not intending to cause any harm.27 Joyriding is different. No one

is intending droughts, floods, or intense storms when they joyride. They just want to

experience, “ah, the feeling of power!”28

B. Not unusual activity

Next, Sinnott-‐‑Armstrong suggests that joyriding is not harmful since morally significant harm

must arise from unusual activity. Driving a car, even for pleasure, is certainly not unusual. He

offers two reasons to hold this view. First, usual events are not morally significant causes. He

uses an example of lighting a match. In order for a match to light there must be both oxygen

and friction, and “since oxygen is usually present…we say that the friction causes the match to

23 Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), 67–86. 24 In these examples, multiple people torture or shoot at a victim, so the inaction of any one of these people would

not have led to less harm. See ibid. and Sinnott-‐‑Armstrong, “It’s Not My Fault,” n23, though Sinnott-‐‑Armstrong does use “overkill” instead of “overdetermined.” See below.

25 Sinnott-‐‑Armstrong, “It’s Not My Fault,” 291. 26 Though there may be room for special circumstances such as mercy killings or torturing one to save many. 27 Ibid., 289. 28 Ibid., 288.



light.”29 Second, the assignation of moral praise and blame can be more effective when it is

reserved for unusual matters: “We should distribute blame (and praise) so as to give incentives

for the worst offenders to get better.”30 Otherwise we lose our ability to distinguish between

morally average, better, and worse. Both of these arguments are focused on the effects of

singling out unusual activities as morally relevant harm. We praise or blame the unusual since

this is the most effective way to identify and affect behaviors that lead to harm.

Not every ethicist so readily yields to this consequentialist line of reasoning. Kantians

insist that how commonly practiced an action is has no bearing on it being right or wrong, and

retributivists argue that the guilty deserve blame regardless of the outcome. For instance,

history is rife with examples of once-‐‑common practices that are now considered wrong. Yet

many of these examples from the past violate the harm principle since they fail to meet the

other two conditions: for instance, the harms associated with slavery could be traced to a single

author (the slave master), and it affected clear victims (the slaves).

What moral difference would it make if carbon-‐‑producing activities were unusual?

Imagine a world in which fossil fuel use was not so integrated into our everyday activities. In

this world a small group of one hundred extremely wealthy people enjoy joyriding in super jets.

Call this hobby jetriding—“ah, that feeling of power…in the sky!” These jets are so large that,

collectively, the jetriders burn carbon equivalent to the amount that our world has burned, so

these one hundred people are putting their world in the same kind of climate jeopardy that we

face in our world. Imagine that one of the jetriders asks us:

29 Ibid., 290. 30 Ibid.



Should I abstain from jetriding? Even if I do, I know ninety-‐‑nine others will continue, and what more, on account of the vacant airspace I leave, they will jetride more. Therefore, the total amount of carbon released will be the same whether or not I abstain.

I think we are inclined to say that she should give up her hobby. It is hard to imagine what kind

of person would continue jetriding when the source of climate-‐‑related harms—droughts,

flooding, etc.—is so easily given up. In contrast, in the actual world, driving cars for fun is

perfectly usual, but so are most of the activities that create a demand for fossil fuels: flipping on

the lights to read, refrigerating food to prevent spoilage, or charging a laptop to write

philosophy. Such activities are so thoroughly integrated into our daily routines that they are not

easily avoided without sacrificing other connected goods:31 for instance, we read books to

educate ourselves and become more responsible citizens, we refrigerate our food so that we can

regularly cook nutritious foods for ourselves and our families, and we write philosophy to

contribute to the field and attempt to answer questions such as whether it is harmful to write

philosophy powered by fossil fuels. Here, “usual activities” refers to those so commonly

performed they do not require justification under normal circumstances. Once we begin

demanding justification of each of our daily carbon-‐‑producing activities, we are quickly

overwhelmed. Even the most conscientious among us would be hard pressed to justify each and

every action. Blaming everyone for each step in her daily routine would require us to

disentangle the complicated network of seemingly good activities supported by fossil fuel

consumption. Insofar as this is not possible, and insofar as my activities alone do not cause

harms to clear victims, carbon-‐‑producing activities are not harmful in a morally significant way.

31 This is truer of the affluent world, which is far more dependent on fossil fuel use than the many who live in

poverty. Shue’s distinction between luxury and subsistence emissions is helpful here. See Shue, “Subsistence Emissions and Luxury Emissions.”



C. No clear victims

The actions of an uncoordinated collective of people diffused throughout the world culminate

in climate change. The effects of these actions are equally diffused. As we saw above when

thinking through the causes of intensified storms, both the actor and the outcome of actions are

impossible to trace with even an iota of precision. Though we can track groups, nations, and

activities that produce more carbon than others, we cannot link individuals to specific harms.

Likewise, we can identify groups of people who are more and less vulnerable to the effects of

climate change.32 What I mean by tracing harms is that we cannot say that because person A in

affluent nation X drives to work every day rather than taking public transit, person D in

developing nation Y will lose her home due to flooding. Even though we know that fossil fuel

combustion leads to climate change, which leads to floods and freak storms, there are far too

many complexities in the moral equation to discern a one-‐‑to-‐‑one, perpetrator-‐‑to-‐‑victim ratio.

We can identify the victim of the car-‐‑pushers, but not those of the joyriders.

Notice again that what is not in question is whether people are suffering harm. It would

be nice of me to help those who have lost their home due to flooding. All that ADD claims is

that as a joyrider I have no additional obligations by virtue of my joyriding since there is no

individual we can say would be better or worse off on account of my actions.

32 For instance, indigenous people, women and girls, urban poor people, and people in rural dry lands are all

especially vulnerable to the effects of climate change. See Robin Mearns and Andrew Norton, ed., Social Dimensions of Climate Change Equity and Vulnerability in a Warming World (Washington DC: World Bank Publications, 2011), 18–23.



III. GOVERNMENTS AND CLIMATE CHANGE

The conclusion of ADD is that the scope and scale of climate change excuses individuals from

direct duties to prevent harms associated with a warming planet. If individuals are not

responsible, then perhaps governments ought to be doing more. Sinnott-‐‑Armstrong writes:

global warming is such a large problem that it is not individuals who cause it or who need to fix it. Instead, governments need to fix it, and quickly. Finding and implementing a real solution is the task of governments. Environmentalists should focus their efforts on those who are not doing their job rather than on those who take Sunday afternoon drives just for fun.33

It’s not my fault because it’s not my job; my duties, at best, are indirect. This conclusion has its

appeal. After all, climate change is a structural issue. For instance, even a large group of

committed environmental ethicists—who do a good job convincing people that they have an

obligation to reduce their fossil fuel use—is not likely to have the same degree of influence as a

law regulating greenhouse gas emissions. (Let us assume for the moment that these two events

are in no way connected, though I will return to this idea below.) If governments step up and

do their job, then they can affect the practices of individual citizens much faster and far more

effectively than environmental ethicists, who attempt to convince people to take responsibility

for their actions.

However, if we accept this conclusion, but do nothing to modify our conception of

morally relevant harm, then it is hard to see why any particular government would take

responsibility for climate change. The same objections that apply to direct duties for individual

agents also apply to individual state agents. No state alone causes climate change, no clear

victims of harm can be identified because of government action or inaction, and there is nothing

33 Sinnott-‐‑Armstrong, “It’s Not My Fault,” 304.



unusual about a government protecting the interest of its own people. I will discuss each of

these points in turn.

A. Only cooperation can avert climate change

Recall that according to ADD there is nothing wrong with individual joyriders, in part, because

taken one at a time their activities alone could not affect the climate. Rather it is the collective

action of many individuals that does this, and governments are best at directing or shaping the

actions of many through laws and policy. Therefore, governments, not individuals, have the

direct duties. Assume that the United States passes a nationwide anti-‐‑joyriding law. This will

not end joyriding since some will break the law, though it will decrease its frequency. Such a

law on its own cannot stop climate change. Other nations would need to adopt similar laws.

Even if the United States passes the law, Australia may not. Passing such laws would upset the

joyriding lobby. A government may wish to indulge these citizens by claiming that it makes no

difference whether they pass the law or not since climate change is not caused by any one

nation. Why should one government risk becoming unpopular with its citizenry if such a law

will not even do any good?

Confronting climate change requires global cooperation—not merely the coordinated

cooperation of the citizens of one particular state, but that of all states. Since carbon dioxide

does not need a passport to cross political boundaries it does not matter how well any one state

or region is able to curb its greenhouse gas emissions. A state may stay under its “fair share”

(whatever this might be)34 but countries such as the United States, China, or a number of other

countries can take us beyond the two-‐‑degree limit all by themselves without any contributions

34 For a discussion of several methods for calculating this share, see Singer, One World, 14–50.



from other countries. 35 Additionally, basic supply and demand suggests that if affluent

countries stop buying so many fossil fuels as they transition to cleaner alternatives, those fuels

will become cheaper and, therefore, more attractive to other countries.36 So it will take global

cooperation to prevent raising the concentration of atmospheric carbon above the safe limit, or

going over the so-‐‑called carbon cliff.

But the world’s governments are not cooperating. The United States has twice now

backed out of what could have been substantial first steps toward coordinated international

action to address climate change.37 Presently, it seems that the United States has begun to get

more serious about cutting its emissions,38 perhaps in preparation for the next United Nations

Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCC) Conference of the Parties (COP) in Paris,

but at the same time, other countries are getting more lax. Japan and China are using more

coal.39 Australia is killing its carbon tax.40 Germany, the world’s leader in renewables, has been

turned into a cautionary tale against going “too green” lest it harm the economy (energy prices

in Germany are now double those in the United States).41 China announced a plan to begin

converting coal into gas, which will increase the already high carbon emissions associated with

35 Gardiner, A Perfect Moral Storm, 95–8. 36 Ibid., 98n. 37 In particular, Agenda 21 and the Kyoto Accord. See Brown, “The Need to Face Conflicts”; and Singer, One World,

22–6. 38 Coral Davenport, “Obama to Take Action to Slash Coal Pollution,” The New York Times, June 1, 2014. Available

online at http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/02/us/politics/epa-‐‑to-‐‑seek-‐‑30-‐‑percent-‐‑cut-‐‑in-‐‑carbon-‐‑emissions.html. Last accessed August 27, 2014. This, many argue, is a small improvement after years of inaction.

39 Osamu Tsukimori and Florence Tan, “Japan Turns to Coal as Yen Drives Up Energy Costs,” Reuters, March 28, 2013. Available online at http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/03/28/japan-‐‑coal-‐‑idUSL3N0CC1AA20130328. Last accessed August 26, 2014.

40 Lenore Taylor, “Australia Kills Off Carbon Tax,” The Guardian, July 16, 2014. Available online at http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2014/jul/17/australia-‐‑kills-‐‑off-‐‑carbon-‐‑tax. Last accessed August 26, 2014.

41 Matthew Karnitschnig, “Germany’s Expensive Gamble on Renewable Energy,” The Wall Street Journal, August 26, 2014. Available online at http://online.wsj.com/articles/germanys-‐‑expensive-‐‑gamble-‐‑on-‐‑renewable-‐‑energy-‐‑1409106602. Last accessed August 26, 2014.



that fuel source.42 All of this is happening while scientists have found evidence that the

Antarctic ice shelf may have begun an irreversible process of collapse that could raise the global

sea level beyond what the last IPCC report predicted.43 State agents and individual agents alike

can appeal to the lack of cooperation to absolve them from the responsibility for harms

associated with climate change. Sans cooperation, their actions will make no difference.

B. No clear victims of government action or inaction

It is too difficult to calculate the effects of the miniscule levels of greenhouse gases emitted by

isolated individuals (e.g., by my joyriding). Even though we are working with larger quantities

of these gases when we consider those emitted by state actors, and even though we may be able

to more accurately gauge the results of larger quantities of greenhouse gas emissions emitted by

entire nations, there is no way to link these emissions directly to harmful effects. We cannot say

that it was the emissions of country X, Y, or Z that made the typhoon strong enough to

devastate country D. Again, state agents can appeal to the same notion of harm that ADD uses

to absolve individual agents from responsibility.

42 Massoud Hayoun, “China’s Planned Coal-‐‑to-‐‑Gas Plants Would Emit More CO2, Report Says,” Aljazeera America,

July 23, 2014. Available online at http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2014/7/23/china-‐‑coal-‐‑gas.html. Last accessed August 26, 2014.

43 Ian Joughin, Benjamin E. Smith, and Brooke Medley, “Marine Ice Sheet Collapse Potentially Under Way for the Thwaites Glacier Basin, West Antarctica,” Science 344 (2014): 735–8. The study claims there is enough ice to increase seal level by as much as 13 feet, while the 5th IPCC report predicted a maximum of about 3.2 feet. See IPCC, Climate Change 2013: The Physical Science Basis, “Summary for Policy Makers,” 25. However, I should note that the time scale of the two predictions is dissimilar. The IPCC predicted the rise to occur by 2100, while Joughin et al. predicted it would not occur until at least 2214, but possibly much longer. The concern is that the collapse of this ice sheet is a threshold phenomenon. Once we cross it, we will see rapid, irreversible change. The important thing is that this process may already be taking place and eventual collapse may be inevitable.



C. Results from usual government activity

Every state engages in international trade while attempting to grow its economy and remain

competitive with other states. There is nothing unusual about a state defining its own policies

that regulate emissions in a manner fitting to its economic interest. Sans any global governance

structure, states must have a strong reason to enter into international agreements that will limit

their power and growth. And just as is the case with individual agents, a single state may have

to choose between competing interests. Fossil fuel energy needs are tied to a number of other

reasonable competing interests, for instance, weighing short-‐‑term economic gain from fossil fuel

use against long-‐‑term costs associated with climate change. The debates surrounding the

Keystone XL project in the United States and Canada illustrate both these tensions and how the

notion of harm associated with ADD makes its way into the policy debates of state agents.

IV. KEYSTONE CONFUSIONS

The proposed construction would expand a network of extant pipelines connecting the tar

sands of Alberta with Gulf Coast refineries. If completed, it would increase the capacity of the

network, allowing it to transmit up to 830,000 barrels of crude oil per day. Environmentalists

have taken Keystone as a rally point on the grounds that the tar sands contain enough carbon to

raise its atmospheric concentration by 120 parts per million (ppm).44 Since we recently reached

400 ppm, and since the safely regarded target is 450 ppm, the Keystone would take us well

44 This is according to the climate scientist James Hansen. See James Hansen, “Game Over for the Climate,” New

York Times (op-‐‑ed), May 9, 2012, available online at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/10/opinion/game-‐‑over-‐‑for-‐‑the-‐‑climate.html, last accessed August 29, 2014. There is also concern that the proposed extension of the pipeline would cross the Ogallala Aquifer, jeopardizing that important water source for people and agriculturalists. In my discussion, I restrict my attention to those arguments that concern climate change.



beyond what experts consider a maximally safe level of atmospheric carbon.45 So far, the project

has been delayed and will not move forward until it receives approval from the President of the

United States. While the U.S. State Department produced a report assessing the expansion’s

impact,46 politicians, economists, and scientists have all offered different interpretations of its

meanings and likely reasons for moving forward or not.

One of the major points of contention has revolved around a single line in this three-‐‑

volume report, which states “significant impacts to most resources are not expected,” including

impact to atmospheric carbon concentration.47 Reading further, however, the following caveat

appears in the table “Summary of Potential Impacts” next to “Climate Change and Greenhouse

Gases”:

approval or denial of any one crude oil transport project, including the proposed [Keystone XL] Project, remains unlikely to significantly impact the rate of extraction in the oil sands, or the continued demand for heavy crude oil at refineries in the United States.48

In other words, the report concludes that there will be no significant impact on the atmosphere only if

we assume that tar sand oil will be extracted and burned in either case. Taken individually, “any one”

project makes no difference. It is not a huge leap to read “significant impact” here in the context

of climate change as “moral harm” in the sense that I have been discussing it in this article. So

45 IPCC, Climate Change 2014, Mitigation of Climate Change, “Summary for Policymakers,” 10. This target

corresponds with one suggested by the previous, Fourth Assessment Report. However, there is a growing movement to endorse a stricter target of 350 ppm, endorsed even by the lead scientist of the IPCC, Rajendra Pachauri. See Bill McKibben, “Pachauri’s Call For 350ppm Is Breakthrough Moment For Climate Movement,” The Guardian, August 26, 2009. Available online at http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2009/aug/26/pachauri-‐‑350ppm-‐‑breakthrough-‐‑climate. Last accessed August 29, 2014.

46 United States Department of State, Final Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement For the Keystone XL Project, Applicant for Presidential Permit: TransCanada Keystone Pipeline, LP (Executive Summary), Washington, DC: January 2014, available online at www.keystonepipeline-‐‑xl.state.gov.

47 Ibid., chap. 4, sect. 16, p. 1. 48 Ibid., chap. 4, sect. 16, p. 7.



the claim is that it would not be morally harmful for the United States to approve the pipeline extension.

As I have suggested above, this assumes the same notion of harm deployed by ADD.

First and second, the report assumes that the United States is not the sole author of the

harm in question because usual market behavior will lead to the oil being developed and

burned regardless of the actions of any one state. Notice the number of interconnecting agents

that must be involved for fossil fuel production. Canada owns the crude oil and permits

companies to extract it. The United States transports the oil to plants that will refine it, making it

consumable by any number of countries that might wish to import it. There is nothing unusual

about international trade, but since we are dealing with a product identified as one of the major

sources of greenhouse gases, we should at least take a moment to reflect on whether it is a good

thing for business as usual, despite its being usual, to continue as it has.

Third, in assessing the impact of climate change, consideration of those who will suffer

its effects is conspicuously absent from the report. The authors of the impact statement do note

that carbon dioxide is linked to climate change and that

A warmer planet causes large-‐‑scale changes that reverberate throughout the Earth’s climate system, including higher sea levels, changes in precipitation, and altered weather patterns (e.g., an increase in more extreme weather events).49

Despite this, there is no mention of who will be affected by extreme weather and how. It is often

the extreme poor (domestic and in the developing world) and racial minorities that bear the

brunt of the impact. For instance, only six months after the State Department report was

published, the United States announced plans to dedicate $10 million solely to Native American

49 Ibid, chap. 4, sect. 14, p. 2.



tribes to help them adapt to climate change.50 Clearly, then, it is possible to identify people who

will be harmed by climate change. But so long as we assume the oil will be extracted anyway,

citing business as usual, there will be a disconnect assumed between any individual project and

the suffering to which it is linked.

V. RETHINKING HARM

If we accept what I call the keystone principle of ADD, the harm principle, there is nothing

wrong with building the Keystone Pipeline. The argument absolves states as well as individuals

from direct duties. I suggest that this points to a problem with accepting ADD’s understanding

of harm. I do not here have the space to present a detailed argument for an alternative notion of

harm; however, I can offer a brief sketch of two key concepts that are helpful for constructing

such an alternative: aggregate harm and structural injustice.

First, Lichtenberg makes a distinction between aggregate and intrinsic harm that is

useful for thinking about climate change. 51 There is nothing intrinsically harmful about

releasing greenhouse gases. Otherwise, we would have to justify activities such as boiling water

for tea or going for a jog.52 Rather, the harmful effects of anthropogenic climate change only

manifest themselves as the aggregation of many individual acts, and when more agents are

involved in an act, we are less likely to think that our contribution is meaningful. This is part of

what makes ADD so tempting and individuals inclined to pass responsibility on to their

governments. Yet, while it may seem that state agents are better suited to address aggregate

50 Raina Thiele and Susan Ruffo, “Task Force on Climate Preparedness and Resilience Announces Tribal Climate Resilience Program,” blogpost in President Obama and the Native American Community, July 16, 2014, available online at www.whitehouse.gov.

51 Judith Lichtenberg, “Negative Duties, Positive Duties, and the ‘New Harms,’” Ethics 120 (2012): 557–78. 52 Sinnott-‐‑Armstrong, “It’s Not My Fault,” 293.



harms, I have shown above that as long as we assume ADD’s notion of harm, there is no more

compelling reason for states to cooperate with one another than there is for individuals. The

problem replicates itself at the level of state agents. Instead of looking for sole authors, unusual

activities, and clear victims, addressing aggregate harms requires an examination of the

collective effect of many interacting agents.

This brings me to the second, related concept: climate change is a form of structural

harm or injustice. According to Young, we must think of harms that arise from this form of

injustice as different from the wrongs of individual actors (sole authors), or even of particular

state policies:

Structural injustice occurs as a consequence of many individuals and institutions acting to pursue their particular goals and interests, for the most part within the limits of accepted rules and norms.53

In other words, structural injustice arises through usual activities and without ill intentions.

Furthermore, the resulting harms may not affect individual victims, but groups of people in

certain social positions:

Structural injustice…exists when social processes put large groups of persons under systematic threat of domination or deprivation of the means to develop and exercise their capacities, at the same time that these processes enable others to dominate or to have a wide range of opportunities for developing and exercising capacities available to them.54

Climate change is an excellent example of this type of harm. Different populations of the world

occupy positions that are more or less vulnerable to the harms that result from climate change.

Some even stand to benefit from these harms, especially those who hold stock in fossil fuels, or

who enjoy inexpensive fuels for luxurious activities, such as joyriding, while being relatively

53 Iris Marion Young, Responsibility for Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 52. 54 Ibid.



insulated from the environmental costs. If we lose sight of the way that individuals and states

participate in reproducing social structures through usual, everyday activities, then we are

likely to miss how these activities are connected to structural harms. All of this suggests that a

better way to understand such harm is to consider individual actions not as isolated or

atomized, as does ADD, but as structurally connected and aggregatory. My emissions alone are

not enough to cause or prevent climate change, which is exactly why I should not focus on my

emissions alone, but on how my emissions combine with the emissions of others, and how our

actions together cause great harms.

VI. CONCLUSION

I have argued against ADD by way of a reductio. If we assume its notion of harm, which

absolves individuals, then we also absolve state agents. This is an unacceptable conclusion

because it leaves a deficit of responsibility in which no one is responsible for the harms of

climate change. This also means we should reconsider whether ADD applies to individuals.

Government is but one way to address aggregate harms and structural injustice, though there

are others. These ways become especially interesting when governments are not acting or are

acting too slowly. To conclude, I will say a brief word about an environmental group, 350.org,55

that is helping individuals act collectively to transform unjust structures contributing to climate

change without appealing to direct government action.

55 350.org. (2014), http://350.org/.



Fossil Free, 56 a project of 350.org, encourages individuals, universities, religious

institutions, and local governments to divest of fossil fuels. This effectively attaches individual

actions to a larger, collective intent meant to deter further investment in fossil fuel production.

Individual acts of divestment are not isolated, atomistic attempts to reduce carbon emissions

(assumed by ADD); rather, they are part of a collective project to reshape the social structures

that make fossil fuels profitable and attractive. So far, thirteen colleges and universities, twenty-‐‑

eight foundations, thirty cities, forty-‐‑four religious institutions, and thousands of individuals

have made divestment commitments.57 This project is modeled after the successful divestment

movement that helped end South African apartheid. It is pessimistic to believe that individuals

are impotent in the face of global climate change. Atomized actions indeed have little effect on

their own, but we ought to remember how our actions, when combined with others, can be a

powerful force for change. This is a form of political action, but it need not rely on government.

Aside from diverting capital from fossil fuels, divestment sends a strong political message to

our leaders. A well-‐‑mobilized populace committed to divestment may be all the oil needed to

accelerate change when governing structures are stuck on the idea that the harms linked to

dirty energy are not their problem.

56 Fossil Free (2014), http://GoFossilFree.org. 57 Ibid., “Commitments.”



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