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‘Go Forth and Multiply’ The Politics of Religious Demography Eric Kaufmann and Vegard Skirbekk

‘Go Forth and Multiply’ The Politics of Religious Demography Eric Kaufmann and Vegard Skirbekk

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‘Go Forth and Multiply’The Politics of Religious Demography

Eric Kaufmann and Vegard Skirbekk

Outline

Religion determined by demography

Fertility

Migration

Cohort variation in affiliation/intensity

Implications

Religion and politics

Conclusion

Religious individuals tend to have higher fertility – and often see their childbearing patterns to be an outcome of their religion (Borooah 2004; McQuillan 2004)

Total fertility rate (TFR) by affiliation in Austria, 2001 (Goujon 2007)Muslim: 2.3, Catholic: 1.3, Protestant: 1.2, No religion: 0.9

by intensity in Larsmo/Finland 1979, Protestants (Finnäs 1991). Lesthadians (more conservative): 6.5 , non-Lesthadian: 1.7

fertility

affiliation and religious intensity

Country (region) of origin

Country of residence Period Somalia Pakistan Turkey Iran

(Western) Europe3) Source

Austria 2000–05 3.0 Kytir 2006

Denmark 1999–2003 5.2 3.6 1.8 1.6Statistics Denmark

2004

England and Wales

2001 4.7 ONS 2006

France2) 1991–98 3.2 1.7 Toulemon 2004

The Netherlands

2005 4.4

(1999)2.2

1.1(1999)

1.5 CBS 2006

Norway 1997-8 5.2 3.6 3.1 1.9 2.0 Østby 2002

Sweden 2005 3.8 2.6 1.3 1.6 Statistics Sweden 2006

Migration Migrants’ fertility (if religious) often relatively high

Many studies consider how values affect demography, few study how demographic dynamics affect values

cohorts

Affiliation may change along cohort lines

age

Pro

po

rtio

n w

ith

ou

t af

filia

tio

n b

y co

ho

rt, S

pai

n

Birth year

Example: Later born cohorts in Spain are more secular (Skirbekk et al. 2008)

projection methodology

Multi-state cohort-component projection

Time t + xTime t

A B AB

Male Female Male Female

age

Ageing A B AB

Mortality by status

Migration by status

Transitions by status

A B AB

Fertility differentials by status

Intergenerational transmission of status

A B AB

a

a + x

projecting beliefs European identityIn Science (2006) Lutz, Kritzinger and Skirbekk estimated and projected European identity as a function of cohort and age

Survey question: Do you see yourself as having some degree of European identity – as opposed to only national identity?

Data: Eurobarometer surveys for EU 15.

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

15-1

9

20-2

4

25-2

9

30-3

4

35-3

9

40-4

4

45-4

9

50-5

4

55-5

9

60-6

4

65-6

9

70-7

4

75-7

9

Age

Per

cen

t with

som

e de

gree

of E

urop

ean

Iden

tity

1996

2004

2030

Survey question: Do you see yourself as having some degree of European identity – as opposed to only national identity? Survey question: Do you see yourself as having some degree of European identity – as opposed to only national identity?

Source: Statistics Austria, Census 1900 to 2001, projections IIASA / VID, FcnvMmedTcon

Roman Catholics

Protestants

Muslims

Others

Without Religion

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

1900 1911 1921 1931 1941 1951 1961 1971 1981 1991 2001 2011 2021 2031 2041 2051

religion Austria

Religion and politics directly entwined through establishment or religious regulation (Iran)

But even if not, religion bears on politics through:• Electoral cleavages• Domestic policy (alcohol, school prayer, abortion, religious law)• Foreign Policy (alliances, conflict sacralization, missionary unilateralism)• Nongovernment actors (such as terrorism)

Near-majority of civil wars and terrorism now involves religion (Toft 2007; Philpott 2007)

religion Politics

Political Demography of ReligionShifts in Groups by Religious Tradition• Civilizational (i.e. Christianity, Islam, Hindu, Judaic)– affects IR and

can form the basis of domestic conflicts• Church/Sect (i.e. Lutheran, Shia, Pentecostal)– affects domestic

politics, but often has transnational effects

Shifts in Groups by Religious Intensity• Attendance, belief/theology (i.e. conservative/Orthodox vs.

liberal/modernist; regular v occasional attenders)

Why Now?A Demographic Revolution• Global demographic disparities + globalization = migration from

religious to secular regions• In developed world, values increasingly drive fertility

Sociological Change• Democratization makes population size important• Secularization in West, but:

– ‘Strict churches’: revival of conservative Islam, Pentecostalism

Net effect: direct & indirect conservative religious growth

religion as civilization

Global past and future

Domestic religious affiliation

Catholic non-Hispanic

Catholic Hispanic

Hindu/Buddhist

Jewish

Muslim

No Religion

Other

Protestant Black

Protestant Funda-

mentalist

Protestant Liberal

Protestant Moderate

0%

2%

4%

6%

8%

10%

12%

14%

16%

18%

20%

2003 2008 2013 2018 2023 2028 2033 2038 2043

`

religious intensity

Conclusion

• Changing balance of religious traditions/intensities affects domestic and international politics

• Islam will grow• Secularism will grow in the West until 2020-50• Conservative theologies are expanding in major Abrahamic faiths• Longer term (2020-50) effects, apart from Israel• Proximate mechanism often awareness of change, which can spark

anxiety and conflict

Attitudes to Shari'a and Fertility, Islamic Countries, by Urban and Rural, 2000 WVS (Muslims Only)

1.5

1.7

1.9

2.1

2.3

2.5

2.7

2.9

3.1

3.3

3.5

Str. Agree Agree Neither Disagree Str. Disagree

Ch

ildre

n E

ve

r B

orn

city > 100k

town < 10k

Source: WVS 1999-2000. N = 2796 respondents in towns under 10,000 and 1561 respondents in cities over 100,000. Asked in Algeria, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Jordan, Pakistan, Nigeria and Egypt.

coun

try

relig

tot fertility rate1.4048 7.1

.592294

.98574

Source: 2000 WVS and World Bank.

Religiosity and Fertility in Muslim Countries, 2000

Tanzania

Jordan

Egypt

Algeria

Bosnia

Iran

Azerbaijan

'95-97

Bangladesh

Albania 2000

Turkey

Indonesia

Pakistan

Morocco

Nigeria

Uganda

Albania '95-97

Thank you

Resident population

Protestant Fundamentalist

20.6%

Catholic non-Hispanic19.5%

Catholic Hispanic

8.1%

No Religion15.0%Protestant Black

9.7%

Muslim0.4%

Other4.1%

Hindu/Buddhist 0.9%

Protestant Moderate

9.5%

Protestant Liberal10.4%

Jewish1.7%

Net migrants

ProtestantFunda-

mentalist5%

Catholic non-

Hispanic10.3%

Catholic Hispanic34.8%

No Religion16.8%

Protestant Black0.8%

Muslim8.4%

Other12.9%

Hindu/Buddhist

9.6%

Protestant Moderate

0.7%

ProtestantLiberal0.7%

Jewish0.01%