Global(?)ization, Social Segmentation,

and Democracy in Mexico

paper presented by David R. Dávila Villers1

at the LASA congress, Washington, DC September 2001

Summary: The author contends that two simultaneous processes characterize the millennial change: international integration/disintegration and social segmentation. The Mexican democratic transition is herein related to these two processes.

FIRST PART: INTERNATIONAL PYRAMIDATION The international scenario can be drawn as a confluence of hegemonic systems, old and new. Collapsed systems do not disappear. Like wrecked ships, their floats are driven by the flow of history. Some of the remains sink, while others capriciously re-emerge. It is possible to see part of those remains incorporated into the bodies of new vessels parading across the oceans. One of the best ways to get lost is to try ignoring the past. However, the past cannot be simply put behind. It haunts us for generations, like a ghost whose appearance changes with time but can hardly be exorcised. A glimpse at the international allows us to appreciate the bits and pieces of Spanish, Portuguese, Dutch, French and English vessels, among others even older. So many stories! If they could only talk! Unfortunately, we have to focus our attention on just a few of them for a couple of compelling reasons. One is the author preferring short stories; the other has to do with the fact that previous models seldom crossed the Atlantic, let alone the Pacific Ocean. The author likes transatlantics. It can be said that the XV century started in 1492, although many other events were important at the time. Some of them were considered even more relevant than “reaching Cipango westwards.” One example of those was reaching Asia rounding Africa, a Portuguese exploit. The Portuguese names along the route bear witness to the thrust of that small great nation: Madeira, Açores, Cabo Verde, Moçambique, Angola, Gõa, Macao... 1 UDLAP

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In 1492, Columbus thought he had reached Japan but stumbled into a new continent. Had he known what he had encountered, this mass of land would bear the name of Colombia and Colombians its inhabitants. The Spaniards finally reached Asia by the mid-XVI. But the honor went to Magalhães and Elcano. In a little more than a century, Spaniards and Portuguese had established themselves in most of the continent. Soon after, both powers had finalized a web of inland and maritime routes for their bullion and products, secured by strong naval forces. The Spanish empire, “where the sun never set” (Charles V dictum) stretched from America to the Philippines, in the viceroyalty of New Spain. The Portuguese on their own had built a worldwide network of enclaves, different from the Spanish-style colonies, with the notorious exception of Brazil. The latter’s trade with Africa (especially Angola) came to be a flourishing business.2 A similar statement can be made in relation to the Manila-Acapulco galleon. In time, other monopolitans3 sailed in search of gold and glory, to conquer new land: the French, the Dutch, the English. Valiant fighters and merchants from their point of view, the Spaniards and Portuguese considered them bandits. In time, the Dutch expanded where the Portuguese fainted, controlling strong posts all the way to Java. Then it was the turn of the English, whose imperialism was seriously challenged only few times over the XVIII century. By then, merchants, missionaries and hacendados had built permanent colonies in all continents of the world; exception made of Australia and the Antarctic.4 Those powers fought each other for centuries, in metropolitan and colonial wars, which is a way to say against "civilized" or "non-civilized" peoples, as much as “mainland” or “territory”. Some of those "territories" possessed advanced civilizations, which staunchly resisted the monopolitans and did not dissolved into the "West", like China, India, and the Middle East. Some other's yield to form new hybrid cultures, like in Latin America. And some others were mostly cleared away and repopulated, like in the United States. Sheer brutality in all cases accompanied by European versions of God worshipping. Although they seem eternal, empires come of age. Their imprint is washed away leaving almost no traces when the "territories" change of masters. In the XIX century, it was often the case that such "territories" decided that they had grown up enough as to become independent. Sadly enough, the monopolitans had a different opinion and still considered them subjects of conquest. Politically independent, the territories were subjugated and became economic colonies. So were formed many countries that now share the same language but do not belong to the same sphere of hegemony.

2 Burns (1993) p. 75 and 81 3 My translation from French poet Jacques Prévert 4 Parry (1992) p. 235

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Portugal, Spain, Holland, England, they all had their periods of hegemonic glory. M ay they rest in pieces! Out of Portugal emerged Brazil and Lusophone Africa, plus other territories, which are possessed or being repossessed by previously dominated countries (like Goa in India and Macao in China). Out of Spain came the whole of Hispanic America and the Philippines. From Holland and France, portions of the Caribbean, Africa and South East Asia. From England: the United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, inter allia. The collapse of the Dutch empire happened in the quin tessential hegemonic form: military defeat and the subsequent division of the mainland among the victors. A good deal of the collapse of the Iberian powers happened just to assuage the conquering passion of one unmarried guy that came to control half of Eu rope: Napoleon. Sometimes, portions of the world "controlled" by one empire were transferred peacefully to another. That happened typically between Britain and the US over Latin America, composed mainly Spanish and Portuguese ex -colonies. However, most of the XIX and XX centuries were spent on wars and more wars. Big powers waged them for the possession of land, sea routes, markets or access to resources. Wars were fought about trade and exchanges. However, accurately speaking, wars were about access. Good access helps power maximization. Hence, maximization of power was the name of the game: power to control. He who framed the others won. Power has been historically used to give or deny access to others. We will return to this assertion, later on. As the XXI century dawns, interestingly enough, we do not see military confrontation among powers any more. Powers seem to have acquired the peculiar proclivity to wage war against smaller countries, which is very healthy and self -preserving, if I dare say. 5 As the power of their former metropolis faded away, regions, ex -colonies and countries of one language came to be inserted in different hegemonic spheres, with different metropolitan languages. Trade flows followed new routes and are following “weird” patterns now. The author of this paper seems to be one of the very few that notices the weirdness in the fact that there is less and less trade among countries that speak the same language. This is happening now among Spanish and Portuguese and English speaki ng countries. It should not be surprising if we were accustomed to consider the unintended consequences of integration. England, Spain and Portugal are getting integrated around the Franco-German alliance. Uruguay and Paraguay 6 are spinning around the Arge ntina-Brazil axis. Mexico and Canada are part of an extended North American economy. Australia and New Zealand are part of the less formalized (from an institutional point of view) but nonetheless real Asian economy. Some countries and ex -colonies in Asia that used to speak English, French, Portuguese and Spanish are being re -Asianized; like the Philippines, Vietnam, Hong -Kong or Macao. I am saying that the all important integration processes at work (EU, NAFTA, Mercosur, ASEAN, etc) have obvious but less explored disintegration consequences for the trade 5 Not that I like wars either. 6 Chile and Bolivia have signed accession agreements.

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volumes among Portuguese, Spanish and English speaking communities. The effects are visible among English speaking countries and dramatic in the case of the Spanish -speaking community. Trade between Portuguese-speaking countries is passing from low to insignificant. Particularly as a side result of World War II, some ex -colonies, so-called "peripheral countries"7 were able to industrialize. After the war, however, they were often confirmed in their roles of purveyors of raw materials and markets for the core economies. In the best scenarios, this peripheral modernization sufficed to create hybrids of poor yet industrialized countries like Mexico and the sub -hegemon prospect that is Brazil. We ended up with a collection of new powers, big and small. Portugal, Spain and England are secondary powers now. Brazil and China are powers in the making. The business is owned by the really big which gathered periodically as G -7 to decide the luck of the world under the contested hegemony of the US. Outside this hegemonic arrangement, international relations are more vertical. Complex interdependence and Hegemony characterize North-North relations, thus a peer treatment. Dependence and Domination typify North -South relations, thus a non -peer treatment. South-South relations are virtually non -existent with a few exceptions, notably contiguous countries. Wallerstein 8 had it that the Soviet Union was part of the system which emerged past Second World War. He claimed that the Soviets were functional to US hegemony in the sense that they kept their area of the world under control, making US hegemonic labor easier. That might well be true, but in fact many areas had a hegemonic power (either American or Soviet) by assumption or "by default". Power is to hegemons like payment capacity to bankers: they want the world to believe they have it, but they do not want to use it too often. As their power ages the enchantment shall malfunction. Probably the best characterization of XXI century world politics is US hegemonic decadence without a likely substitute. As we will see this is an effect of others’ growing stronger (particularly EU added membership) rather than the US growing weaker. How did we come to this? At the end of the Second World War, with Germany and Japan defeated and the Soviet Union and Western Europe destroyed, the US came to the peak of its preponderance. In a phrase, all the powers but the US were in retreat. Victor of the conflict, the US was the only possessor of the nuclear bomb, and it was endowed with large natural resources, production, technical and commercial capabilities. The US dollar was the only convertible currency. The US was the most important and only superpower. The US was ahead the rest of the countries in all fields. Not for long, if we consider that a century is not a long period in international relations, let alone half a century!

7 In CEPAL's methodology by opposition to core countries. 8 Wallerstein, Immanuel. 1996. Después del Liberalismo. Mexico, Siglo XXI. [Originally After Liberalism. NY, The New Press. 1995].

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Europe and Japan quickly recovered. Before them, the Soviets were the first and only capable of challenging the U S, albeit solely in the military field. Nikita Kruschov thought his country could defeat the US in the industrial competition as well. He was wrong, of course. The Soviets lacked not genie, but they were unable to put their advanced technology to generate further resources. The Russians had and have evident comparative advantages in relation to many better -off countries. But they have been less able to use them at a wide and profitable scale. In a few decades, the hierarchy of nations changed several time s, with the UK and Russia being displaced by Japan, Germany and France. But the US has remained at the top of the scale until now. The rise and fall of powers should always be represented as a mathematical equation, an algebraic sum of asymmetries because rises and decays have multiplying effects on other competitors. Countries move up and down the scale effecting the international balance of power. Of course the domestic evolution plays a key role in this, but while each particular country has its own national performance, they all intersect in the international scenario. Countries also have institutional ways and capabilities to occupy their national spaces. A comparison between the USSR and Japan offers a most interesting contrast. While the Russians have quite a large territory (some 16.9 million sq. km compared with 9.2 for the US), the Japanese suffer from the lack of it (0.4 million only). The Russians used their state to occupy and develop their land, the Japanese their private industry. Industrial and state forces now exist in both countries, but the are still used differently on each case. Not surprisingly, the Soviets were far more concerned with stately problems (defense, regulation, and state power) and the Japanese with economic competition ( finance, trade). Their national states and those of their host countries normally protect relatively new international actors, like multinational corporations. The European Union is peculiar for its blending of state and private economic forces. It took some time for the US hegemon to discover that the battlefields had evolved towards something different. Military competition characterized relations with the Soviets, but it was a matter of industrial competition with the Japanese side and commercial competition with the European Union. The development of both Russians and Japanese was impressive in their own way. The Soviets had taken the highest toll of physical destruction during the War. Half of the people killed during the conflict were Soviet people . Unlike Japan and Europe, the USSR was not a recipient of the Marshall Plan largesse. Notwithstanding, it made a remarkable comeback to superpower competition, by means of a state-led economy. Contrary to some opinions, the Soviets were not defeated by the North Americans. If that had been the case, we would all be dead by now; especially since the Russians retain a substantial world-destruction capability, even now. It was otherwise: they rather defeated

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themselves. It was their state's inability to ref orm itself and change. They key to the Russian dilemma is state reform. State-led development has some surprises in store. Have a look at China: the 7 th largest economy in the world, according to the last two World Bank Reports9 with well developed military capabilities. The combined exports of China and Hong Kong ( 357902 million dollars) rank the country 4th in the world, ahead of France (307031) and not too far behind Japan (387965). The return of Hong -Kong to China adds to the power of the latter and subtracts it from England’s. The Japanese also suffered heavily during WWII. Their industrial base was in shambles after the conflict, no least because of the nuclear bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Notwithstanding, they made a remarkable comeback to superpower competition, by means of a strong private economy, which, importantly, had access to the US market. Their energies were concentrated on the development of a strong, modern industrial base. A brief comparison of Japan and Germany can give us j ust a hint of how successful the Japanese had been Land area Pop GNP (Rank) GNPpc Rank Exports Imports GDP/Trade Japan 377 126 4,772.3 (2) 38,850 (2) 410,481 347,496 17 % Germany 349 82 2,319.5 (3) 28,260 (7) 511,728 433,043 46 % Source: World Development Report 1998/99. The World Bank. Land area is in 1995 thousand square kilometers. Gross National Product and GNP per capi ta are in 1997 billions of dollars. Exports and Imports of merchandise are in 1996 millions of dollars. The Europeans have succeeded because they learned to cooperate. What had they achieved with the Second World War? Basically to become a bunch of secon d class powers so allowing others to have a decisive influence on European affairs. The Europeans very painfully learned 10 that, even though they did not like each other much, their objectives could be better achieved through cooperation. In this respect, I would go as far as to argue that without the US as the dominant power, the Europeans could have a lesser incentive to cooperate and that they could divide once more. In the 50's, the French, the Germans, the Italians asked the British not only to be a member, but also to play a leading role in the European Union. The British declined such an honor, deeming it useless since they were at the convergence of three circles:

9 World Development Reports 1998/1999 and 1999/2000. 10 In Ernest B. Hass terminology

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a) they had won the war, together with the US, and so they had a strong special relationship with that country,

b) they headed a Commonwealth composed of many nations, and c) Britain was the most important country in Europe. In spite of that, in April 1951the "continent" advanced towards the creation of the European Coal and Steel Communi ty formed by six states: France, Germany, Italy and Benelux (Belgium, Netherlands and Luxembourg). The agreement was signed in Paris and came into effect in July 1952. By March 195711 in Rome, two more treaties were signed, one providing for the creation of the European Economic Community (that is, the common market agreements), and Euratom (cooperation on nuclear energy). When England realized how important it was to have access to the European market and applied for membership, General De Gaulle vetoed i t. In his eyes, the United Kingdom aspired to be the "little Trojan horse of the US" inside the European Community. The British endeavor to create their own free -trade agreement: EFTA (European Free Trade Association) with a number of non -contiguous participants. All of them now belong in the European Union, with the exception of Norway, as I write this. EFTA was created in Stockholm in January 1960, entered into force on May the same year, and included seven nations: Austria, Denmark, Norway, Portugal, Sw eden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. Greece signed an association agreement with the EC in 1961 12 to become the first non-contiguous and non-economically developed country to reach such status. However, the actual entry of Greece in the EEC came years later, in January 1981 13. Years before, in 1973, three new states had been accepted; among which, two from EFTA. The newcomers were Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom (General De Gaulle was already resting in peace). In January 1986, Spain and Portu gal acceded to the European agreement. Concerns were raised about the new members’ lack of readiness to fully participate in the liberalization schemes; much in the same vein as Greece had been before. Still, the decision was taken for political rather economic reasons: Europe wanted to help stabilize those two countries. It worked out very well. Finally, in 1995 three more states came into the European Union, Sweden, Finland and Austria, raising the total number to fifteen in the EU. Moreover, there is a rather long list

11 In effect in January 1958. 12 In effect in November 1962. 13 The treaty providing for Greece to became the 10th member (Denmark, Ireland and the UK preceded her) was signed in May 1979.

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of future possible members including Switzerland, Poland, Hungary, the Baltic states, other East-European countries and a long -awaiting Turkey. Would these newcomers add much to the present power of the EU? Let us do simple arithmetic ag ain, by adding just Switzerland, Poland and Hungary, which seem to be the first candidates on line.

Land Pop GDP Exports Imports

EU-15 3.133 374 8.070 2.060 1.947 EU-18 3.569 430 8.544 2.178 2.079 US 9.159 268 7.746 0.575 0.815 Japan 377 126 4.202 0.410 0.348

Source: World Development Report 1998/99. The World Bank. Land area is in 1995 thousand square kilometers. Gross National Product and GNP per capita are in 1997 trillions of dollars. Exports and Imports of merchandise are in 1996 millions of dollars.

Let us now put the table in ratios. The EU-15 is the unity.

Land Pop GDP Exports Imports

EU-15 1 1 1 1 1 EU-18 1.14 1.15 1.06 1.06 1.07 US 2.92 0.72 0.96 0.28 0.42 Japan 120.33 0.34 0.52 0.20 0.18

In plain terms, except for land (which remains a substantial difference), the EU is already bigger than the US; particularly in trade. How much bigger? Well: in population, the EU has 106 million inhabitants more. In GDP, the EU has 324 billion more. And the EU exports 1.485 billion more than the US. Given the huge size of the EU and US economies, t he addition of fair middle -sized economies to the EU (Switzerland, Poland and Hungary) would appear minimal, but it would not be negligible. Let us recall that we are talking of 436 thousand square kilometers of land (more than the entire Japanese territor y), 56 million inhabitants, 474

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billion -dollars of GDP, 118 billion -dollars of exports, and 132 billion -dollars worth of imports. Lest have a look to other indicators like nuclear energy. 14 Adding up the nuclear reactors of the principal European countries , we have:

Country Nuclear reactors Total capacity France 57 59,948 MW(e)

Germany 20 22,282 MW(e) U.K. 35 12,928 MW(e) Spain 9 7,207 MW(e) Belgium 7 5,712 MW(e) Holland 2 504 MW(e)

Total 130 108,581 MW(e)

The US has some nuclear 110 reactors producing 100,685 MW(e) against 108,581 MW(e) of Europe. Admitting that these data can be proven inaccurate, the image projected is very balanced again. These six EU countries combined exceed slightl y the US nuclear capability for electricity production. We are intentionally simplifying, by not including here, the many countries in the world with nuclear capabilities. They are 33. 15 We are going to discuss elsewhere (perhaps in an article) the implic ations of nuclear proliferation for hegemony in this context. There is host of middle powers across the world. Although, as I shall further illustrate, it takes the combined resources of the 15 members of the European Union to offset the power (at least in the commercial and financial fields) of a single nation: the US. And unlike the US, Europe is not a single nation. That is no obstacle as we can observe, nowadays, for the EU to grow more "independent" in trade matters (the Helms -Burton law and European investment in Cuba), in fossil fuels (the D'Amato law and French companies in Iran) and in military capabilities (after Kosovo). It is true that no other country or group of countries can challenge the US power simultaneously, in the economic and military realms. But power is not hegemony, as we shall further argue. Power-seeking nations are differently endowed with resources (people, a well -developed territory, etc.) as they compete for access to new "international" more abundant resources.

14 Data from the World Almanac 1998. 15 Argentina, Armenia, Belgium, Bra zil, Bulgaria, Canada, China, Czech Republic, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, India, Japan, Kazakhstan, South Korea, Lithuania, Mexico, Holland, Pakistan, Rumania, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, Ukraine, Un ited Kingdom, and United States.

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But gaining a ccess is not everything: exploitation -efficiency is needed if those resources are to enhance national power. Here comes the difference between "poor" and "rich" nations: a superior organization of the forces of production. Over the last 50 years, previously depressed empires and even some hitherto undeveloped nations have been able to gain such an efficiency to compete in the international arena. The world then became first bipolar, then multipolar. System, power, hegemony, domination, cooperation… But is it not a gross simplification to reduce international relations to an equation consisting of NAFTA, the EU and Japan only, however important may they be towards a world politics parsimonious scheme? Let us recall one of our previous assertions: In International Relations, concepts should be handled like mathematical equations. The power, hegemony, domination, cooperation, etc of a country means little without reference to other states, without the proper historical framework, and without the contemporar y context. As in mathematical equations, International Relations concepts like resources are meant to be "terms" whose content can be filled out with different values; for instance, the power of Russia, the power of Germany, etc. This should be self -evident for scholars, but I often see equations treated as simple additions. We still basically perceive things on a fixed plan. We contemplate the world like we see a still picture. At most we can see the movie of the world, as in a sequence of pictures; however, the thread of the screenplay remains linear. And that is for the sake of a clear explanation. Our perceptions, however, do not stop the world from being more complicated than we recognize. What a good researcher can do if he/she wants to be understood, is to present a good canvass; at best, a good video of the situation. It is in our human nature to see life as a string of events. Teleology is pervasive in social sciences, particularly in International Relations. Short -term teleology can be even more misleading, as it can be conducive to think that recent events are more important than long -term trends. In other words: social sciences exist in a Newtonian space, inasmuch the disciplines have been unable to incorporate relativity. Furthermore: social s cientists are often pre-Newtonian. Admittedly, because of the subject-discipline, International Relations specialists may be better placed than their similar other social sciences, “balance” being such a central concept here. Yet, internationalists themsel ves also have their little sins to purge. Probably the best description of contemporary world politics is US hegemonic decline without likely successor. This “description” leaves several questions to be answered: Hegemony? Decline? International system? How long a period? Hegemony is a very old concept, and there is a Classic beauty in its lengthy existence dating back to the Peloponnesian Wars. If the concept has been used ever since, it must

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be because it is useful. But "useful" not only means "often u sed for the same purpose"; it means several uses, too. International society has changed, power has changed, the "world" is bigger and different, but we keep on using the same concept to refer to evolved phenomena. Many scholars use the term hegemon to refer indistinctly to powers in different periods of history: Athens, Spain, France, Holland, England and the US. But is this not an oversimplification, however useful it might be? Is it really the case that the described phenomenon is "roughly" the same ac ross the ages? I would answer that the phenomenon has evolved, and so should the concept. Globalization is another example of oversimplification. There is nothing new about "globalization," writes Alexander Cockburn:

As the world nears its rendezvous with the third Christian millennium, a refined system of exploitation has been put into almost universal successful execution. The poor countries are held in helotry just as they were in the colonial world of the nineteenth century, their assigned task still the provision of raw materials or cheap goods manufactured under imperial license. There is nothing new about "globalization," just elaboration of the process. To insure that these poor countries continue to depend on exports for survival, the Western powers have made sure that the possibility of robust internal markets is thwarted. Austerity programs imposed by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank have laid waste the domestic sectors of these economies, creating small elites servile to the imperial powers, amid vast oceans of poverty and desperation.

Most of the Globalization stuff is a tardy and naïve discovery of the way capitalism works. Neither world politics nor the world political economy are global or becoming so. They are both are hie rarchical and pyramidal. There are fundamental, qualitative differences between North-North relations when compared with North -South relations and South-South relations. "Interdependence" is likewise different. Globalization theorists tend to think that th e maturation of complex interdependence among North countries is also happening at the North -South level. These theoreticians first avoid dealing with North -South issues, and next they bluntly think that the whole world has turned into a northern suburb, w ith just some local color here and there. Globalizers thus display a tremendous ignorance of history prior to the 1960's. Their reconstruction of world historical processes spins also around the North. They cast some quick, timid, self -reassuring glance s to the Third World, always protecting their curious eyes behind round economist dark glasses. For instance: the 1970s Latin American debt crisis is presented, inaccurately, as an example of globalization. And they figure they found something new!

During previous Latin American debt crises, first world lenders simply stopped lending to third world borrowers, sometimes for decades.16

16 Schaeffer. 1997, p. 93.

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The truth is that most Latin American countries got indebted before being recognized by great powers as independent nation s. France invaded Mexico in 1838, after the latter failed to pay arrears; an episode known in Mexican history as the Pastry War.17 Foreign debt was also the pretext for the war and occupation of Mexico after 1862, which led to the installation of an Austri an-Belgian couple as emperors of the country. The foreign debt issue has figured so prominently in Latin American history that opposition to coercive collection of foreign debts became part of Latin American countries' foreign policy doctrines18. Unless their conditions were met, world powers could refuse to recognize national governments and the same thing happens today. These are not examples of previous globalization processes. The world was not global then, neither it is now. The world was and it is hi erarchical. One of the main tenets of globalization has to do with trade agreements, as if trade agreements were hitherto unseen forms of trade liberalization. One of the main diplomatic battles of Brazil during the XIX century was convincing Europeans th at their products should pay taxes. Many times Latin American countries were under custom receivership. What kind of credible authority do colonized peoples had to apply the laws of their land to colonizers? Should I recall how the British used opium to ge t into the Chinese market? Trade liberalization has existed long before the globalizers can imagine. It is a normal mechanism of capitalist expansion, and it is not the only method: there are more violent ones. Ironically, trade agreements may be the oppo site of full-blunt trade liberalization, as it implies recognition of others’ right to regulate their own market. Good things may as well come with capitalist expansion. The abolition of slavery, and Fordism enabled millions of human beings to share in th e joys of consumption (under-consumption for many). Mass production transformed luxury items into cheap products: "democratization of luxury" (Max Weber). After the world wars, women gained citizenship. The First World peoples were incorporated into econo mic citizenship. Should I recall that most of this was not achieved without a fight? Economic integration precedes trade deals most of the time. Deals appear and are sustained by issue density. International trade deals do languish and fade away in the absence of issue density. It is true that free trade agreements can eliminate negative barriers to international trade. They can even prescribe positive integration steps; but they would never be a likely substitute for trade itself, which impinges upon heg emony and domination.

17 The funny name comes from the facts that prompted the war: the complaints of a French baker in Mexico City of his business been looted by unruly Mexicans. 18 The Drago Doctrine bears the name of Luis M. Drago, the Argentine diplomat who created it after a European navy (England, Germany and Italy) attacked Venezuela to collect arrears, at the end of 1902.

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There is a host of failed trade liberalization agreements among Third World countries for everyone who wishes to documents his/her optimism on the matter. Successful integration agreements are the exception, not the rule. Such succe ss stories are explained by a collection of preconditions. For the Third World, such necessary (but insufficient) preconditions are more astringent than for developed countries: contiguity, similarity, complementarity, interdependence, symmetry, and last b ut not least, hegemonic support. Large geographical distances separate First World countries, yet the distance among them is minimal in economic terms. The Pacific Ocean divides Japan and the US; nevertheless, the two economic giants are very important tr ade partners. The opposite happens among Third World countries, which are often contiguous geographically and very remote in economic terms. Some Third World neighbor countries live back to back in economic terms, with little or no adequate transportation infrastructure connecting them. Such is the case of Bolivia and Paraguay, despite their partnership in trade agreements. But there is no doubt that Third World countries are adequately connected (Caribbean economist would say “hooked-up”) to the First. Those rare cases of South-South economic interdependence can only be accounted for an adequate supply of hegemonic goods (finance, market, energy and security) which can be supplied by the North or by "grown-up" countries of the South; i.e.: Brazil. Trade liberalization is a hegemonic device. Trade liberalization constitutes one of the 10 points of the so-called Washington Consensus, and the IMF insists upon it before further lending. But the trade liberalization globalizers hope for, one that would wipe ou t all obstacles to goods’ circulation can only happen in an ideal world of buyers, where human and consumer are synonymous. Most of the inhabitants of the Third World cannot be defined as consumers. They are rather producers living in inhumane conditions, with no access to economic citizenship. Social segmentation, the consequence of rapid economic integration and neoliberlism are explored in the second part of this presentation. In the Third World, globalization benefits are for the very few, the drawbacks for most of the population. Again, trade liberalization is nothing new. The first attempt towards free trade for the Americas came more than one hundred years ago. In October 1889, the First International Conference of American States rejected a US proposal for a customs union. 19 We should not be surprised if it fails again. All of the Latin American countries are fairly well connected to the US and Europe; but, with some noticeable exceptions, the economic distance among them is very large. The same is true within and between regions of the Third World.

19 The conference was held in Washington, DC, with the attendance of Argentina, Bolivia, Brazi l, Colombia, Costa Rica, Chile, Ecuador, El Salvador, the US, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela.

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One of the conclusions of Hoogvelt20 reinforces this assertion.

The record of world trade can neither be summoned to testify to 'the increasing interconnectedness which characterises our world economy', nor to evidence of 'the deepening and widening penetration by the core of the periphery'. Rather it stands as evidence of a modestly thickening network of economic exchanges within the core, a significant redistribution of trade participation within the core, the graduation of a small number of peripheral nations with a comparatively small population base to 'core' status, but above all to a declining economic interaction between core and periphery, both relative to aggregate world trade and relative to total populations participating in the thickening network.

We cannot but agree that the process at stake is in itself exclusionary. And although the declining economic interaction between core and periphery may well be a seasonal effect, it is no doubt that the persistent lack of South-South interconnectedness is a powerful evidence of the vertical and hierarchical nature of the so -called globalization. The present stage of capitalism is not global, it is hegemonic and it has rather the shape of a pyramid . The world is not a globe. It is a pyramid, a sort of tripod if I am allowed the metaphor. So, instead globalization, we should as well talk about international economic pyramidation, etc… Yet another tenet of the globalization approach is democratizatio n.

Although democratization had very different causes in each region, its political and economic consequences were very much the same everywhere21.

I cannot but underline the effort to make the cap fit.

In political terms, democratizing countries drafted new constitutions, held elections, and allowed numerous and diverse political parties to participate.22

Since citizenship rights are not mentioned, we can safely assume that the globalizers are satisfied with formal democratic requisites pertaining to el ectoral participation. The persistence of human right violations and growing misery (thus lack of economic citizenship) in the Third World is apparently less important for them.

In economic terms, most democratizing countries opened their economies to foreign investment and trade, sold state-owned assets and industries to

20 Ankie Hoogvelt, 1997, p. 75. 21 Scaheffer, 1997, p. 264 22 Idem

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private investors and entrepreneurs, and reduced military spending and downsized armies.

Let us give some examples of neoliberal Latin American regimes: 1. Among the Latin American regime s, General Pinochet's was the first and foremost

pioneer of economic opening. A fine example of neoliberal democracy, no doubt! 2. As in Chile, neoliberalization was imposed to the peoples of the Third World. One

after the other, the Latin American voters co ntemplated how their elected presidents turned neoliberal after having campaigned as populists. It took a “Peronist” like Menem to temporarily undermine the Argentine unions ’s strength.

3. Another examples of neoliberal champions are Fujimori in Peru and a S errano Elías in Guatemala who reintroduced the concept of "self -inflicted coup d'état".

4. Mexico has so far given the neatest example of privatization of state -owned assets and industries into the hands of relatives and friends, but other examples can be fo und in Brazil, Argentina, Guatemala, Peru, etc, etc. The neoliberal governments have accumulated quite a record in Latin America!

The reduction of military spending and army downsizing is a positive development shadowed by the persistence of limited arme d conflict and the nuclear proliferation. But the human rights violators are not gone forever. Let us never forget that most of the dictators with or without uniform and their friends are still very much in power, as they have been able to escape punishmen t for human rights atrocities. By the way, all those who need further information on the US complicity and involvement in the assassination not only of Chileans, but also of US citizens can consult the National Security Archives, at the address bellow. 23 Why all those mass atrocities against the peoples of the Third World and selective repression against individuals in the First World? Simple: because they were an obstacle to the march of global(?)ization that, in the eyes of hard -core globalizers, deserved to be removed. However the Latin American economies have “recovered”, in the brave -new-world that is emerging, the bad old poverty keeps on growing. Globalization rhymes with deprivation, with starvation with social segmentation. Dependence and Domina tion typify North-South relations because there is no Complex interdependence between the North and the South. Northern interference in the domestic affairs of Southern countries is a normal occurrence as it is military aggression. The minds the First Worl d peoples’ are so stuffed with crappy stereotypes that they could hardly ever have room for something different. Writing on the "Prattle of Seattle," Eric Alterman wrote:

23 http://www.seas.gwu.edu/nsarchive/NSAEBB/NSAEBB8/nsaebb8i.htm Information on human rights atrocities in Guatemala can be obtained from the US State Department.

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The singular political problem in America is the ability of the corporate class, through its campaign contributors, lobbyists and media apologists, to manipulate the system on a daily basis.

It is with such lenses that the First World looks about, and so the world seems round! Well-off people around the world come to share this vision as well. I guess it is much nicer to watch TV than feeding the poor. Soon, according to their view, there will be computers (but nothing is said about food) in every household, anyway. First World countries are getting "globalized" and some Third World el ites, as well; but not the globe, not the world. Let us remember that the First World encompasses 13% of the global population. I should add that not all the population of the First World is living through a global village experience as we speak. To partic ipate in such a wonderful experience you need income; or more precisely, economic citizenship rights. That is not always the case in the First World, let alone the Third. First World countries' economies and societies have certainly increased their compl ex inter-dependence. Around 60% of the international trade, measured in imports or exports, is conducted among advanced nations, as we know 24. This is just an indicator. Huge non -commodity international transactions are carried out every day. Accordingly, international regimes have been created to govern such a complicated agenda, in which no single topic is consistently the top priority. That is what Keohane calls complex interdependence. In such an association, the US is primus inter pares, like in King Arthur's Round Table. The European Union was created by a group of knights to offset the tremendous power of the US in this assembly. First World theoreticians call this "round table" the system. At most, they acknowledge that there is something beyond th e North, but they figure it can be accounted for with a parsimonious model. By focusing the central features of the system they should get to know the whole of it. This is a frequently used good old research strategy indeed. Science owes many favors to this device. The problem comes when researches lose sight of the whole, when they truly believe that North -North relations are a representative sample of what goes on in the whole world; or worse, when researchers think the rest in unimportant. After all, tha t is what a good model should allow us to do: focus the important, discard minutiae. But we must admit that in the age of computers, such a model is over-parsimonious. It is even more so, in the presence of a raising number of nation states and non -state international actors. The only explanation I can come with is that such First World theoreticians are bounded by their culture-centric approach to reality, or rather, by their epistemological horizon, in words of Louis Althusser. It could also be that the advocacy of such a view comes from a person committed to give proper meaning to very specific First World interests and to convey a such a view: a First World organic intellectual, to use the words of Antonio Gramsci. 24 According to the 1998 World Bank report, the EU, NAFTA and Japan combined represented 56% of the world imports and 62% of the world exports in 1996.

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In our view: the world is not a globe, it is a pyramid!

U.S. and the G-7

(hegemonic dominant coalition)

First World Countries (non-members of the hegemonic dominant

coalition)

Big Third -World countries

Small Third World countries

At the top of the pyramid there is the str ong North-North economic interdependence and hegemony, which decreases horizontally until nearly disappear at the bottom. At the base of the pyramid there is the strong North -South Dependence and Domination, which decreases vertically, almost disappearing at the top. This is a pyramid with three faces. At its vortex, where well -oiled communication (and “globalization”) work, are the First World countries of North America, Europe and Asia. The economic distance among countries of Asia, Europe and America is smaller at the top and larger at the bottom. Third World countries are connected to the top mainly through one of the metropolis.

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SECOND PART: SOCIAL SEGMENTATION

Here comes Mexico!

The Mexican economy had long been integrated to the US economy. For more than a century before NAFTA, the US had been growing to become Mexico's single most important source of capital and technology, its major import and export market, the main destination of its immigrants. The Mexican integration into the US was already so important, that NAFTA became necessary as an attempt to regulate and foster it.

The economic importance of Mexico for the US has historically verged on the negligible; exception made of certain important states of the American Union. In recent years, if we believe the US Department of Commerce statistics, Texas alone accounts for more than 50% of the bilateral trade between the US and Mexico. None of the remaining states is as important in this respect; although Mexico can be very important, as a forei gn market, for some states like Hawaii. So, why would Mexico be important at all for the mighty US? Well, Mexico possesses the largest bio-diversity among NAFTA countries. It is actually one of the largest in the world; the largest in reptiles, for instan ce.25 Mexico is very rich in mineral deposits, including oil, as you all know. It is quite a large foreign market for the United States now: second to Canada only, ahead of Japan. 26 In commercial terms, Mexico represents half Latin America for the US. The Spanish -speaking population in the US equals one quarter the total population of Mexico. Stop for a minute to consider that the United States ranks 7 th among the 20 countries that speak Spanish in the world (with Hispanic speakers matching in numbers the total population of Peru27). The US is, of course, the only one of those countries to reject Spanish as an official language. But I came here to talk about social segmentation and international integration, and that you will have. Mexico is now a world-class exporter of manufactured goods. Unlike in the 80's, Mexico's top exports are now: automobiles, auto-parts, electric equipment, etc.; no foodstuff (Mexico is rather a large importer of grains) . . . By 1986, Mexico's total exports were about 16 billion d ollars a year. Now Mexican exports to the US are in excess of 12 billion dollars . . . a month! 28

25 That is not including those who work in the government: the PRInosaurs; which is a family of political species. The PRInosaurs are very old as a species, and al though some specialists think they are endangered, they have proven to be very adaptable and resilient. 26 I am not saying that Mexico is more important than Japan, and I am aware that the Japanese and the Mexican trade are different in kind. 27 Peru had 24 million inhabitants in 1996. 28 According to the Mexican Finance Ministry (Secretaría de Hacienda y Crédito Público - SHCP), in August1999 the trade balance of Mexico registered a 405 million dollar deficit, with monthly exports of 12.322 billion and impo rts of 12.727 billion. CNI en Línea, (http://www.cnienlinea.com.mx .) 8 October

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A couple of graphs can help illustrate this point. 29

In the first graph, it can be observed that the export performance of Mexico is catching up with the fierce East Asian Tigers'. By 1997, Mexico was way ahead of Brazil and Malaysia, getting closer to Singapore and Korea and still far away from Hong Kong. But

1999. The US Department of Commerce last figure is 9,572 for June 1999. See http://www.stat-usa.gov/Online.nsf/ vwFileLookup/for -trd.cen/$File/for-trd.cen?OpenElement 29 The data comes from the IMF/DOTS 1998 series.

WORLD EXPORTS

20

50

80

110

140

170

1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997

years

US

$ b

n

HongKong

Korea

Singapore

Mexico

Malaysia

Brazil

EXPORT GROWTH RATES

0.8

1.0

1.2

1.4

1.6

1.8

2.0

2.2

2.4

2.6

1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997

years

1991

=1

Mexico

Malaysia

Singapore

HongKong

Korea

Brazil

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when it comes to export growth rates, we find that the Mexican burro is doing better than the fiercest of the tigers! The burro is clearly running faster than the Asian felines. I must now proceed to explain some of this extremely fast growth’s complexities. In June-July 1999, you could find at least three magazines 30 in Mexico's newsstands containing basically the same information on Mexico’s top 100. The last one on the list, reported sales for an amount in excess of 58.5 million dollars, during 1998. I am certainly against boring figures and company names that may mean nothing to you; so I am consigning just the top ten corporations, together with the economic sector they belong to and their yearly sales, in US millions (at a ten pesos rate).

NAME SECTOR SALES 1. Teléfonos de México Telecommunications 11, 414. 6 2. Cémex Cement 4, 272. 0 3. Grupo Industrial Alfa Steel, food , petrochem. 3, 604. 3 4. FEM, Bancomer Beverage, banking 3, 353. 0 5. Grupo Industrial Bimbo Food 2, 506. 0 6. Savia Agrobiotechnology 2, 500. 3 7. Vitro, Serfin Glass, banking 2, 484. 3 8. Comercial Mexicana Retail 2, 352. 5 9. Ind. Peñoles, P. de Hierro Mining, retail 2, 268. 5 10. Desc Autoparts 2, 149. 8 ______________________ Source: Expansión (26 May-9July 1999) p.

A good deal of this business flourished or was created by the wave of privatization under the Mexican Neoliberal governments (from 1982 to date). US businessmen complained that most of the privatization was not arms -length operation. That was true, as it also was shorthand for “I wanted a bigger slice of the cake” Allow me to smile! What else could they expect from the Revolutionary Family? By the end of Miguel De la Madrid's sexenio (1988), the Mexican government had ordered the privatization of nearly 750 state companies. By mid -1991, the state owned only 260 companies, out of the 1155 that it had in 1982. Between 1983 and 1991, the Federal Government closed down 48% of its companies, it sold 32% to the private sector, merged 9% with pre-existing companies, trimmed down all federal subsidies by 7% and it transferred 3% to state governments. 31 As we shall see later on, privatization was not necessarily conducive to economic efficiency, neither it meant the end of corr uption.

30 Business Mexico (vol. IX-6, June 1999), Expansión (26 May-9July 1999), and Latin Trade (July 1999). 31 Barry, Tom 1993. p 142-143 and footnotes.

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Another magazine, Latin Trade,32 consigned the top 100 companies in Latin America (classified by market value). If Mexico had been doing so well, Mexican corporations should be bigger than the rest of Latin America's. Well, no. Mexico happens to be a distant second to Brazil. You can see by yourselves, the companies are distributed as follows:

Brazil 49 Mexico 29 Chile 11 Argentina 9 Venezuela 1 Peru 1 TOTAL 100

But then, if on the one hand I am saying that Mexico is now exportin g more in a month than it used to in a year, how come Mexico has not overcome Brazil? Very simple, most of the bilateral trade between Mexico and the US is intra -firm trade (around 80%), and it is largely dominated by US corporations. This is perfectly co nsistent with Mexico's exports composition. Most of the products exported “by Mexico” are highly monopolized products. So, Mexico's success story becomes less impressive when we realize that most of the country's automobiles and auto-parts are actually produced by US, Japanese and European corporations. And the same goes for most Mexican exports to the US. Symptomatically, the automobile industry was one on the remaining obstacles a free -trade agreement between the European Community and Mexico. The EU wants the Mexican cars to be Mexican at 70%; Mexico wants less than 50%. I have heard and read lots of complain about job losses because US companies are moving to Mexico. Let me tell you, if I were a rich American, I would invest on maquiladoras too.33 You can bring all the resources of the first World from California or Texas into Mexico while having secure access to the US market. Then you can come to Mexico to exploit young, under-paid, non-unionized, disposable girls. You can have every assurance that the Mexican government will try and make your life easy. You will find attractive tax exemptions on the grounds that you are re -exporting (the maquiladora regime), cheap energy and cheap raw materials. You pay what you need in pesos and you sell your product in US dollars.

32 Latin Trade (July 1999), p 52-54. 33 In-bond industries

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The Mexican economy grows rapidly 34. The maquiladoras are creating jobs for the Mexicans. And that is helping my country to address a problem of structural proportions. On 1998 Mexico created more jobs than ever before, but not enough though to alleviate the crying misery of millions and millions. 35 And let me assure you that a maquiladora job is NOT the job you and I would covet. Let me recall a recent example of a Korean maquiladora, which set shop in a poor village in my State (Puebla , just next to Mexico City). The company warned it would leave if the villagers kept on complaining against their appalling labor conditions. "If you do not like us, other will!" -so the Koreans said. Mexico is undergoing a rapid economic transformation c oupled with a social segmentation process. That is what I will try to explain now. From Two Mexicos to Three Mexicos Assertions abound that income concentration is the logic result of Neoliberal policies applied throughout the Third World. It is also sai d that, as a consequence of the globalization36 process, the gap between the rich and the poor countries has widened. The combined effect of both domestic and international changes and policies has sized down the old developmentalist state. The rationale be hind such transformation (from a Neoliberal perspective) is the conversion of largely inefficient into “competitive” economies.37 But since oblivion has not proven to be the right medicine against poverty conditions, new social divides are now manifest in s everal perverse ways. There is a new social configuration emerging from the ancien regime submitted to erosion by such internal and external agents. The ancien regime Authors of diverse ideological persuasions have aptly described the Mexican corporatist state. Even those authors, who emphasized its classist nature, had nevertheless admitted its notorious all-inclusive vocation. 38 The Mexican state has long been, simultaneously, the leading economic performer, the continent of politics and the number one co mmunity developer. In the economic realm, the public sector has been largely dominant, as it was at the origins of the private sector itself. At the very height of such dominance, 39 the Mexican state came to directly intervene on every single aspect and a rea of the national economy through state-owned companies, federal trusts, banks, monopolies, price controls and all sorts of regulations. Through such instruments, the “Institutional Revolutionary” state secured the growth of national industry during the so-called substitutive industrialization;

34 See Mexican newspapers, 13 September 1999. The year 2001, a recession year, may end in a slow growth, after all. 35 According to the latest figures, 1.155,056 workers are maquiladora employees. CNI en Línea. (http://www.cnienlinea.com.mx .) 29 September 1999. This is a very small fraction of the Mexican labor force. But many non- in-bond companies are doing maquila now. 36 We will deal with the process that the “globalization” notion mystifies. 37 Euphemism for colonies that be productive rather than well -dressed only. 38 See, for instance, González Casanova, Pablo. El Estado y los Partidos Políticos en México. Mexico, Era. 1981. 39 December 1982; which also marks the beginings of its rapid decline.

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which incidentally de -capitalized the countryside, whose resources were depleted in such a thrust. In a hitherto unfinished process, a radical privatization program ensued the 1982 economic crisis. Enterprises be longing to the national “patrimony” were sold out by numbers, in an attempt to bring the economy afloat, attract foreign capital and pay the sovereign debt. Concurrently, the Mexican state (was it the IMF’s persuasive endeavors, or was it Mexico’s own conviction?40) reduced its social justice claims to mere rhetoric. The impact of Neoliberal policies was cruel. Income concentration was brutal. Salaries shrunk. Millions of Mexicans fell under the poverty line, while the budget share devoted to education, health, etc., attained ridiculously small proportions. By relinquishing its moral duties towards the dispossessed, in the name of economic efficiency, the government was sapping the national social pact foundations. It is my contention that three Mexicos have emerged from such a process, as I expect to further illustrate. At this point of my explanation I realize that some of my readers might got lost already without a clear reference to Gregorian years. I could argue that each one of the emerging Mexicos would purport a different periodization of the transformations occurred 41. For the sake of clarity, a six -stage breakdown is presented bellow, in a last concession to those who only speak Economist. Six Stages in Mexico’s Recent Economic Evolution The recent economic evolution of Mexico can be divided in six different stages. Stage one (Stabilizing Development) spans over the 25 previous years to the 1970s’ economic crisis. It is universally acknowledged that Mexico enjoyed a period of macroeconomic stability and sustained economic growth, characterized by a yearly 6% GDP and a fixed exchange rate at 12.50 pesos per US dollar. The Mexicans seemed to have learned to live under PRI hegemony. Those were wonder years for the Mexican corporatist system (rekindled by Lázaro Cárdenas). The countryside produced exportable surplus while the national industry grew protected by high tariff barriers and generous subsidies. The political system worked like a well -oiled machine, even in the face of occasional challeng es, like in 1968. Stage two (Shared Development) covers only seven, very intense years: 1970-76. Economic growth continued albeit erratically. There was a dramatic increase in the national foreign debt and the Mexican peso was devalued twice, at the end o f this period.

40 President Salinas de Gortari claimed it was Mexico’s own conviction and not, in any way, a foreign imposition. 41 Mexico-1 would divide the period into economic stages. Mexico-2 into political stages; probably presidential terms. For Mexico -3, Zapata is still alive! Its timing is apparently irrational (i.e.: different from Economics or Politics, as we will see).

24

Self-sufficiency in basic grains was lost, as the agricultural sector went bankrupt. Third Worldism permeated Mexican policies as the state -owned sector grew enormously to generate 60% of the GNP. The period is also marked by an increase in social and political mobilization and a growing divide between the Mexican government and business. The Consejo Coordinador Empresarial, an independent coordinating entrepreneurial body was created in 1975. Stage three (Oil Growth) goes from 1976 through 1982. Economic growth figures of 9% were attained thanks to the 1974 oil discoveries; but most of such growth was concentrated in that state-owned sector. The Mexican economy over-specialized in crude production while the national foreign debt continued its frantic growth. It can be asserted that the oil bonanza only postponed the lurking economic and political crises. Unhappily, the Arab-like oil riches of Mexico turned out to be a mirage. At the end of this period, the Mexican government had to nationa lize the banking system. Stage four (Crisis and Recovery): 1982-1988. After the oil bonanza came the time of reckoning. In 1983, Mexico went through one of its worst42 economic crisis. Many giant companies filed for bankruptcy. The government was left no other option but to declare a foreign debt moratorium. Many state -owned companies were sold out as growth figures reversed. However, as oil prices plummeted down, the Mexican economy was de-petrolized. The domestic market shrunk and national prices became “highly competitive” (shorthand for “miserably low”). To add movement to this dramatic picture, a couple of major earthquakes devastated the country’s capital city in 1985. Mexico began to export large amounts of its manufactured goods that could not otherwise be consumed domestically.43 In those circumstances, the national protectionist barriers were lowered, effectively opening our then Lilliputian national market to foreign imports. Stage five (the First World): 1988-on. The Mexican political system de eply resented such macro-economic earthquakes. PRI should have lost the 1988 elections, but a two-hour computer breakdown spared the presidency for Carlos Salinas de Gortari. Throughout his sexenio, however, PRI crisis continued and a three -party system was created, with PAN and PRD challenging the hitherto unquestioned PRI hegemony. When Salinas inherited the country, the crisis was fading away. He pursued an aggressive privatization strategy (debt for equity) made the foreign debt manageable while attract ing large amounts of foreign, often speculative, investment. The size of the state was consistently reduced. Being a member of GATT, OECD and NAFTA; was not Mexico a First World country already?44 Such a consideration, plus the return of macro -economic stability and healthy public finance made many believe it. The Mexican economy was fast integrating to the US, so it was forecasted to grow at a sustained 10% and to register and equally sound trade surplus. The 1994 economic crash proved these calculations were Oh, so wrong! and I am Oh, so happy! not to be an economist!45 President Clinton came to the rescue,

42 Until 1994, naturally. 43 Up to 1985, only 35% of the total Mexican exports were oil and oil products. 44 George Bush dixit. 45 The GDP official figure for 1995 was a negative 6.9% !

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offering up to 40 billion US dollars if needed. In a few years, Mexico was back on its feet, as we have seen in the previous section. Three Mexicos in the making

Two major agents are causing the Mexican society to segment. Those causal factors are: 1. Neoliberal economic reforms 2. The fast incorporation of Mexico into the US economy As a result of the combined impact of two agents, the Mexican society is splitting in three: 1. Internationalized Mexico 2. National Mexico 3. Communitarian Mexico

The demise of the Mexican corporatist state and the country’s fast incorporation to the US economy are having a tremendous impact on the society and polity. In this paper, I am about to argue that three distinctive Mexicos are emerging as a result. No core-periphery theory, no dual economy theory or two speed-economy approach (i.e.: Italy) either can account for this ongoing development. For it is not economics what defines and explains it. What I am attempting to describe is three institutional speeds 46, three collective paces, involving three forms of occupying a space, three logics of social action, three rationales, three forms of efficiency (efficiency in economic ter ms, in political terms, and survival -efficiency) three approaches to life, three forms of social relationships. I have labeled them Mexico 1, 2 and 3 for the sake of a clear explanation. In fact, they have appeared in history, in reverse order. None of my categories are either teleological or desirable . Mexico-1 This is competitive Mexico. This Mexico arrives on time, experiences the stress of productivism and spiritual vacuum, is networked or getting networked, has relatively high salaries, occupies high posts in the public administration and in the (mainly but not only) service industry, speaks Spanish and foreign languages, drives (or is driven in) new cars, personal airplanes and helicopters (from atop high buildings in Mexico City) lives comfortably in nice neighborhoods or suburbs, eats in nice restaurants (eats more bread than tortillas), is body -conscious, travels abroad, stays in fancy hotels, is holder of international credit cards, is educated in fine Mexican and international universities, attends international events, conferences etc.

46 For a definition, see page 13 and subs.

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Mexico-1 is integrated or likes to think it is integrated to the First World (its is “abroad” within Mexico), and that might well be its main source of power and prestige. This Mexico owns a computer (or several) and has access to all devices and services: cellular telephones, fax, cable TV, etc. It is white-skinned or looks at itself as such. It is as cosmopolitan as money can be. It is very influential (on Mexico 2) but does not get organized in political part ies; it rather forms pressure groups. It is the less ascriptive of the three Mexicos (all Mexico is ascriptive). Money rules over ascription. It makes money very fast and benefits greatly from “financial coup d’états”. It is both “rational” and prejudiced . It incarnates “future” and “progress.” It does function at the speed of money: its “time is money.” Its life is paced by the stock market, the banks, industry, etc. Mexico-1 is a “projection” and can be more easily understood using the tools of the economic science. Religion and official rituals are subsumed in economics. Mexico-1 suffers from complicated First World diseases which require expensive treatments, but it has access to the best private hospitals, the elite of the national public hospitals (IMSS, ISSSTE47, etc.) and, of course, foreign hospitals. This Mexico has well -paid servants, private gardens, consumes more than it needs (and pays with major credit cards). In its trash bins one can find old TV sets, radios, etc. Mexico -1 likes expensive sports and hobbies. It has developed “economic reflexes” as it can buy whatever, or whoever; but, above all, Mexico-1 exists to sell48. It can be found in all major cities of Mexico and in all the nicest parts of the country, as well. Included in this Mex ico are Mexican and foreign competitive corporations and companies, the modern agricultural industry, some parts of the federal administration, some advisory cabinets, parts of the administration of the states, some private and few public universities and higher education institutions as a whole. But also some pockets of excellency in both public and private universities, some national newspapers, some elite groups in the national army and police, parts of the Church hierarchy, etc. Mexico-1 represents a tiny proportion of the national population, and should not be mistaken by a group of income, a political or social group, and is certainly not politically coherent, neither does it act as a group. It is rather part, or a would -be part of an “international c ommunity”. Mexico-2 This Mexico-2 sets the pace of the nation. This Mexico arrives almost on time, works at a slower pace than Mexico-1, is not networked, has a salary, occupies posts in the public administration and in the industry, speaks Spanish and c an speak foreign languages, too (it is mimetic). It drives used cars (more persons by car than Mexico -1; typically a small

47 IMSS (Instituto Mexicano del Seguro Social), and ISSSTE (Instituto de Seguridad y Servicios Sociales para los Trabajadores del Estado) are the main two social security institutions, the first should be for workers of private companies only, the second for state workers, only. 48 Mexico-1 wants to produce and market as many products with as less people involved as it can, and with the highest profit margin.

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Volkswagen) and uses public transportation, lives in standard neighborhoods or suburbs, eats in “comida corrida” restaurants (bread and tortillas), with more calorie and protein intake than Mexico -3. And unlike Mexico -1, is not body-conscious, travels seldom abroad, stays in pensions and medium class hotels, is holder of national credit cards, is educated in Mexican educational institut ions, attends national events, conferences etc. It has access to telephone and fax machines (its elite brags about cellular telephones and pagers). It watches the national TV channels and radio stations. Mexico-2 wants to be white as it is mainly mestizo and criollo. Mexico-2 protects Mexico-1 from Mexico-3 because it sees Mexico-1 as the “future” and as an agent of change. It does have a job. This is organized Mexico: it is “permanent” and defends the “status quo.” Mexico-2 sets the standard of the nation, represents Mexico as a nation (actually, it is a representative sample) and is not integrated, as a whole, to the First World. Its life is marked by the political calendar (political power is national): elections, national politics, the “destape.” In such respect, its life is subject to stress. It is politically ascriptive by region, education, political party, family bonds. This Mexico has institutionalized the myths of the nation. In the past, it attempted and failed to laicize the country. Mexic o-2 is the national structure, and so can be more easily understood using the tools of political science. Mexico -2 is the national; consequently, its international activity is nationally based and the political rules its economic activity. It has developed political reflexes; its elite can force whatever or whoever to comply with the rules of the nation (this reflex exists from the higher ranks to the lower bureaucrat) 49. If Mexico-1 sells, Mexico-2 concedes. Mexico-2 has secured access to the social security (IMSS, ISSSTE, etc.)50, and may have domestic servants, but increasingly uses part -timers. It has almost no -credit these days (it is indebted). Mexico-2 likes physical endurance national sports: soccer, boxing, and family outings to private and public g ardens. This Mexico manages to meet its needs (or almost) but leaves no trash to be re-used. Included in this Mexico are most Mexican companies, most of the national private agricultural sector, most of the federal and state level administration, most of the educational system, big regional newspapers, the national army and police as a whole, and most of the religious body of the country. Mexico-2 represents a sizable proportion of the national population, and should not be mistaken by a group of income, a political or a social group; but it is certainly coherent around the national values. It sees itself as “the nation.” It reclaims monopoly over the conduction of foreign affairs.

49 Mexico-2 set the rules but cannot live according to them any longer. The national law lacks moral strength; ergo, Mexico-2 is in crisis. 50 Only 36.5% of the Mexicans have access to social security ser vices. La Jornada. 22 April 1996.

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Mexico-3 This is a messianic Mexico. It represents the nation’s past and roots. It can produce saints, virgins, wizards, a leader in ski mask (Marcos) or a masked wrestler -city-dweller-champion (Superbarrio). Often cosmogonic, Mexico -3 is the champion of survival and resistance and its “economic” and “political” activities are geared towards survival51. This is the Mexico of rural and urban economic poverty. It includes the sub -employed and unemployed, as well as a great deal of the informal economy. It is local, but can emigrate (and can be reinforced by southern emigrati on). Mexico-3 has no visible purchasing power or credit. It re-uses Mexico-1 and Mexico-2 trashes. It cannot afford a life and it dies young. This dark-skinned Mexico has its own notion of time (it appears to be timeless) marked by climatic seasons, natu ral disasters, religious festivities, seasonal jobs, etc. It does not experience the stress of productivism; it works hard, but its main worry is survival. It has low income, occupies no permanent post in the public administration or the industry. It does not speak foreign languages, although it happens to speak Indian languages, uses overcrowded public transportation, pesero, 2nd class buses, trains, horses, mules, and it walks. It dwells in poor housing. It does not have servants. It is often a servant it self, with women taking the worst part. Mexico-3 is increasingly female. This Mexico eats more tortillas than bread, in “ fondas and taquerías.” with very low calorie and protein intake; such nutrients, it has substituted for fried spicy albumin. Not surprisingly, this Mexico suffers the most from epidemic and endemic diseases (Cholera, TB and all sort of poverty-conditions). Mexico-3 works manually, does not travel abroad (but can emigrate), seldom stay in hotels, does not have credit, is nearly illitera te52, plays “llanero” soccer, likes boxing, wrestling, low-class movies, and have access only to the most powerful of the national TV and radio stations. It leisures at almost grass -less public parks when it is urban, in the town centers when it is rural. This Mexico has almost no access to the telephone (including rural telephony). This is backward Mexico. Mexico -3 has almost no contact with Mexico-1, let alone the First World. But it can suddenly gain international salience. When it does, its internationa l activity is locally based. If Mexico-1 sells and Mexico -2 concedes, Mexico-3 trades in kind, as it has developed submissive reflexes in relation to Mexico -1 and Mexico-2; that is, in relation to money and political power. Within itself, however, Mexico -3 has developed extraordinary solidarity bonds. It is difficult to understand Mexico -3, because this Mexico has first been denied, and then selectively incorporated and institutionalized into “modern” Mexico (Mexico -2, i.e.:

51 Mexico-3 wants to reproduce, so it engages in “production” using as many persons as it can, with the highest social “welfare” impact possible. 52 Only 32% of the Mexican households possesses more than 20 books. Nexos [Mexican magazine]. May 1996. p 39.

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Mexico-1). Mexico-3 constitutes the nation’s very foundation, as well as the byproduct of national economic “development”: urban misery. It can be more easily understood using the tools of History and Anthropology. Included in this Mexico are most of the non-permanent workers of the national industry, most of the small and micro industry itself, the Mexican countryside as a whole (as we will explain), some parts of the backward municipal administration. Additionally, it embraces parts of the administration of certain federal states, even some public and private so-called “universities” and educational institutions. But mainly, this Mexico is composed of the miserable, the destitute, the disenfranchised, the marginalized 53. Mexico-3 represents a large proportion of the national popula tion, and it does not constitute a group of income. It is rather defined by its lack of a stable and permanent income. It is not coherent; neither it acts as a group. Beware when it does, for if it is pushed to hard, it might not have anywhere else to go! A family picture of the three Mexicos A group picture of the three Mexicos should look as a smoking volcano: The skirts of the volcano would gather Mexico-3, a Mexico shaped by tradition and custom, bordering with Mexico-2. This is the unorganized socie ty. Every time that a group of “illegal”54 Central Americans crosses the Mexican southern border, Mexico -3 grows, as well as with every crisis (natural, economic or political) and by numbers. . . This Mexico has almost no contact with Mexico -1 (except through a window when a red light stops a luxury car, or when an Anthropologist decides to live among poor people). This Mexico is very ingenious, like a hungry coyote. 55 The search for survival gives meaning to its collective action. 3-5% 37-45 % 60-50%

53 “The Virgin of Guadalupe is the creation of a helpless people in need of a generous and protective mother”. Fernando Benítez in La Jornada. 5 June 1996. 54 According to Mexican laws, entering the country without documents constitutes an administrative fault but not a legal offense. 55 Nezahualcóyotl (“hungry coyote”) was the most clever of the Aztec monarchs.

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Mexico-2 gives definite shape to the mountain. Mexico -2 incorporates, frames, formalizes, recruits, educates, disciplines (labor, political militancy, etc.). It is law and order. It knows its way through, like a lawyer. The search for political power gives meaning to its collective action. Every time a Mexican gets a permanent job or an education or enters the army or the party, Mexico-2 grows. The border between Mexico-3 and Mexico-2 is, thus, formal. Neo-liberalism and the consequent trimming of the state have weakened Mexico-2 in economic terms, and the current crisis of the PRI, in political terms. Mexico-1 occupies the snowy peak (and the smoke) of Popocatépetl. This Mexico wants to be des-incorporated, does not want to be framed, formalized, recruited or disciplined. It sees itself as the incarnation of change and transformation, like a stockbroker does. Every time that a part of Mexico is trans -nationalized or inter -nationalized, Mexico -1 gets stronger. The border between Mexico-2 and Mexico-1 is thus informal. What are the origins of this division and how it is being affected by Mexico’s quick integration to the US economy? Mexico has long been noted for its political stability, centered on the PRI regime. For many years, the Mexican state represented all Mexicos together. It was the main agent of change, and the promoter of welfare. It helped the rich to get richer and poor to be less poor. It protected the rich against foreign competition by erecting commercial barriers, and it gave the poor some relief (public education and welfare, etc.). There was a national consensus around state intervention being required to address underdevelopment generated imbalances. Such a consensus around the developmentalist approach went bankrupt at the beginning of the 80’s, in sight of the notorious governmental incompetence and corruption scandals. Public enterprise was synonymous of inefficiency and corruption. Private enterprise (until recently) was deemed the opposite. Enter Globalization, an unfortunate term for a process that is no globe -shaped. In fact, the so-called Globalization is very irregular purporting the strengthening of complex inter-dependence between First World countries, only. Some Third World countries’ dependency links with some regions of the First World are just being modernized. You have to think of countries like India and China, which concentrate most of the population of the globe, to start laughing at the “unglobal” globalization. In the particular case of Mexico, “globalization” has brought about the growing divide within the Mexican society that I am endeavoring to illustrate. One of the main ingredients for this explosive cocktail (a spitting volcano , in my illustration) is, of course, the latest information revolution, which is increasing the institutional speed of Mexico -1, in relation to the other two Mexicos.56 However, access to computers is not the only explaining factor. Each one of the three Me xicos reproduces itself in a different

56 In 1995, there are about two million personal computers in the country. According to INEGI (Nat ional Institute for Statistics, Geography and Informatics) only 5 million Mexicans knew how to use a computer. These figures have remained unchanged in the year 2001.

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(economic, political or survival oriented) way, and reacts accordingly to macro changes.

57 We are talking about three different ways of occupying a space (economic possession, versus sovereignty, versus physical pre sence). Implied also are three forms of timeliness (Mexico-3 lives a shorter life, Mexico -1 lives a longer and hectic life, Mexico -2 defines the national time. In other words, we are talking of three Eco -Nomies, which imply three different efficient utili zations of space and time (with three different rationales). 58 Measurement Criterion Mexico-1’s institutional speed is set according to the international economic frenzy. Its life is an economic venture. Its very diverse activities can be assumed to be pa rt of an economic expansion grand design. Likewise, the figures and trends that the economic science has developed are appropriate indicators to measure its success; so, the number of excellent exporting companies, their rates of return, their internationa l projection, their capital and influence, all give good notice of its progress. The growth of other “non -economic” institutions, activities, individuals, etc., matching Mexico -1’s institutional speed should be assessed (case by case) and added to the equation. Mexico-2’s institutional speed is set according to the political calendar, the pulse of the nation. Its life is eminently political. It plays the “big game” of politics. Thus we have to look at indicators such as union and party affiliation, school enrollment, social security coverage, land ownership, employment, housing, etc., to assess its victories, stalemates and defeats. Similarly to the previous case, other “non -political” institutions, activities, individuals, etc., matching Mexico -2’s institutional speed should be count up. Mexico-3’s apparently timeless institutional speed follows a communitarian rhythm. Climatic seasons (rains, droughts), agrarian cycles (particularly that of maize), religious and some civic festivities, natural and man -made disasters and the calendar of resistance and solidarity pace its life. The poor suffer the most from the recurrence of disasters that afflict the country: yearly seasonal droughts, hurricanes and floods, devastating earthquakes (Puebla and Oaxaca in 1999 just to mention the two most recent), and all sort of man-caused industrial accidents. Explosions, like the 1984 gas explosion in San Juanico (North of Mexico City), or another in 1994 resulting from gasoline leaks to the sewage system in Guadalajara. Or the 1999 powder deposit accident in Celaya. Or mud flooding in several states (Hidalgo, Puebla, Veracruz, Tabasco, Oaxaca, Chiapas) during this same year. Environmental changes, ecological disasters and the exodus resulting from them. For Mexico-3 is fatal istic with reason. La vida no vale nada (life is worth nothing).

57 Therefore, Mexico needs a president that is a consummate populist (to rally the peo ple behind him) and a skillful technocrat (to bring the economy afloat). 58 At the end of the day, and since Social Sciences still move in a fairly Newtonian world, Time and Space are just two measures of Matter: Time indicates its aging, Space its exte nt. In this paper, Space and Time are to be defined in the social realm, as well as the collective existence of the three Mexicos.

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Mexico-3 is signaled by its exclusion and marginalization from the civis. So, the “have-nots” are for once important indicators. Illiteracy, income concentration, land concentration, structural unemployment, endemic and epidemic diseases, malnutrition, inadequate dwelling, infant mortality, etc., but above all, child-birth give accounts of Mexico-3’s extraordinary fitness for survival against all odds. Like in the two previous cases, all those “economic” or “political” activities matching this communitarian institutional speed belong into Mexico -3. Could I ever find statistics to justify my points of view? 59 That might be the easiest part of my job. Official figures, as an example, show that 60% of the Mexicans are undernourished, that 40% are functionally illiterate, etc., etc., etc. On the other extreme, only few Mexicans (10 % of the total; roughly 10 million) concentrate more than half of the national income, etc., etc. etc. I can also d ocument the fact that Mexico-1 and Mexico-3 elude corporatized Mexico (that is, Mexico-2) because of their different institutional speed and rationality, as I have been arguing. Preliminary Definitions To create an adequate theoretical framework, I have thought of Tönnies (on ascription), Durkheim (on social solidarity), Weber (on collective action), Norbert Elias (on the civilization process), Edgar Morin (his search for a new paradigm) Jean -Marie Vincent (on a critique of work), Karel Kosík (on the quotidian) and many other authors, mainly philosophers.60 However, I would be lying if I said that I had a pre -conceived theoretical framework beforehand, and that I am now making use of it to explain reality. Quite the contrary, the following paragraphs are es says on acknowledging, ex post facto, the authors whose approaches are connected with my own enterprise. The most convergent of such established lines of reasoning is German sociology in three of its main exponents: Max Weber, Ferdinand Tönnies and Norber t Elias. From Max Weber, I appeal to his account of modern society emerging out of the Medieval Church (the State avant la lettre) which once embodied economics, politics, moral, science, religion, tradition, etc. The Mexican state cannot, for sure, be equated to Church. However, some parallels can be drawn. True that the Mexican state failed to completely laicize the country; 61 but it created nevertheless a very powerful Mexican revolution ideology .62 Furthermore, the Mexican state, emerging from the revo lutionary movement, acted as the main, often the sole, agent for economic reconstruction and advancement. Needless to say that, in political terms, state -inspired political parties have monopolized power, coopting or

59 It is easier to lie without than with statistics! 60 Kant, Einstein, and Hawking on the nature of time. But also Social History, as a discipline, in relation with temporalities. 61 During the “Cristero war” the school teachers were regarded as the apostles of the revolution. 62 See Córdova, Arnaldo. La Ideología de la Revolución Mexicana. 5th ed. Mexico, Era. 1977 .

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destroying all credible opposition. 63 Finally, the Mexican state promoted “social justice” through numerous institutional means: agrarian reform, social welfare, public education, housing, etc., etc. In other terms, the Mexican state incarnated a unity that is now been dissociated into three, as described in length, pages ago. Other features of Weber’s work cannot be applied as readily. In particular, classes, as conceived in his theoretical framework, do not correspond to the social entities I am endeavoring to analyze. Each one of the three Mexicos would be, in a Weberian sense, a cluster of classes sharing a common institutional speed. Arguably, the three Mexicos will eventually crystallize in something new, whose definite contours are not yet visible to me. Now, for those who jumped over several pages of this paper, I must clarify that many “economists” have distinguished, at least, two Mexicos. 64 The point is however, whether or not Mexico ever moved at a single institutional speed . Before social segmentation, Mexico-3 (the oldest Mexico) came to feel included in the State. Mexico -1 detached itself from the State in very recent date.65 Norbert Elias study of the civilizational process is another possible connection with my research. Culture is proper to Mexico-3; not only in the sense of “original” source, 66 but as a recurrent influence. The nation’s foundational myth is associated with Mexico -3, and the latter has reappeared several times in history, in successive, often revolutionary conjunctures, shaping the contemporary Mexican society a nd impressing it with its unique “popular” character. Countless Mexican Spanish words, site names, plants, food, traditions, festivities are original Mexican. The nation’s past and roots are one with Mexico-3: deep Mexico. Civilization, on the contrary, h as long been prerogative of elites organized around Mexico-2, whether conservative or liberal, laic or religious. They have organized and codified all sorts of variegated influences into something national and Mexican. Apart from that, Norbert Elias’s the oretical framework would be subjected to severe stress if it could be extrapolated to analyze Mexican syncretism, hybridations, mestizaje, etc.67 From Ferdinand Tönnies’ theoretical approach there is a main aspect to be retrieved: his account of society’s passage from Gemeinschaft to Gessellschaft. 63 “It is a mistake to live outside the budget”--the say goes. 64 Witness the abundant literature on Structural Dualism in Latin America. 65 The seventies and eighties. 66 The Mexican nation built its identity on a rejection of the Spaniard ( reaffirming the Aztec) much in the same way Spain had rejected its Arab identity three centuries before. 67 To analyze Mexico-3, besides of the tools of Rural Sociology, those of History and Anthropology are required.

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Mexico-1 approximates his description of an associational society, as Mexico -3 nears his representation of an ascriptive society. Mexico-2, from such a point of view, would fit somewhere in the middle. However, the enduring existence of Mexico -368 and Mexico-2, and the recent detachment of Mexico-1 from the latter, conspire against this approach centered on the transit from one to the other. Instead, we need to focus the simultaneity of the three Mexicos and the relativity of their three institutional speeds. Whether the three Mexicos shall crystallize and solidify in something new, I see dependent on the quotidian life each one of the Mexicos leads. But once more, to the difference of Karel Kosík, we need to focus three different quotidianities, centered on institutions of different nature, running at different speeds. As it can be observed, the analysis of the three Mexicos calls for a multidisciplinary approach, inasmuch social sciences in their evolution -as Edgar Morin has made clear - led to reality being parceled out. 69 The current Mexican transition offers a fine opportunity for intellectual adventure. Old paradigms should be dusted and new synthesis proposed. After more than 30 years of Latin American c riticism, it should be clear (but sadly enough it is not, for many) that economic growth and development are NOT the same thing, and that poverty is not “previous to” but a consequence of “development.” 70 At all costs, my problem is to theorize, in holist ic terms, “my” three Mexicos. Despite the ongoing re-elaboration of this paper, I can offer some definitions already. Mexico, as I have said, can be divided in three. Some main features can be summarized as follows: Mexico-1 Economics Pressure Individual groups Mexico-2 Politics Parties, Mass politics unions, etc. Mexico-3 History and Social Communities Anthropology movements We are dealing with three for ms of integration/disintegration71 processes at a social-institutional level. Three forms of socio-political integration, out of the former “unity” represented by the Mexican corporative, all -inclusive state. These three layers in the Mexican society act according to three rationalities (Economic gain, Political gain, and 68 Which can be traced back to pre-Columbian times. 69 See the first volume of La Methode. Morin warns us of such dangers, and he attempts to re -install human nature at the center of our attention. 70 I am referring mainly but not only to the work of CEPAL. The lack of understandi ng of such fact is the reason why “structural” has to be used in connection with other terms; vgr. “structural unemployment,” etc., etc. 71 With systolic/diastolic movements.

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Survival) and can be better understood using the tools of Economics, Politics, and History and Anthropology, respectively. In other words, I am attempting to describe the rise of social di vides, in an unfinished process, that could eventually crystallize in three different social configurations within the Mexican society. The process unfinished character is precisely what leads me to use terms like “institutional pace” and “collective speed .” Should these dynamics continue, the three emergent Mexicos may crystallize into rock -hard social configurations with the characteristics so far outlined. One clear example of the three Mexicos at work happened, when Acapulco was hit by a hurricane in 1 998. Mexico-3 (Acapulco-3, since Mexico-3 is local) got to matter immediately, risking lives to save lives and their small but cherished possessions, establishing informal supply networks, canalizing the help available. Unknown leaders emerged, new capabil ities were discovered. It was all a collective experience of solidarity and self-help. As it often happens, Mexico-2 got there late to supplant existing "informal" networks with formal, institutionalized organisms (the army, the Red Cross, etc). With Mex ico-2 also came corruption, mismanagement and the use of the available resources for political purposes. When I saw the TV coverage, I had to laugh of outrage. There it was the powerful Televisa telecommunications consortium reporting that everything was fine already, since the main roads were cleared and hotels back in working conditions, ready to receive the tourists. Clearly, there were three different "rational" ways of addressing the same problem: 1. Neighborhood solidarity (Acapulco-3): subsistence 2. Governmental institutions (Mexico -2): governance 3. Business (Mexico-1): profitability This is just a recent example. The same happened during the 1985 earthquake in Mexico City.72 The three Mexicos operated then according to their different ideals and goa ls just like in 1998 Acapulco. I cannot draw any correlation in the framework of this study, but Mexico City, as later Acapulco, was gained by the left; that is by PRD (Partido de la Revolución Democrática). Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas has been called the "the ca ndidate of the disorganized society" by Lorenzo Meyer, a prominent Mexican scholar. Uniquely, this process embraces different aspects pertaining to diverse concepts, like quotidianity, socialization, reproduction. But largely a result of its unfinished, t ransitory character, this Mexican society re -configuration goes beyond such concepts’ reach. 72 The author was there. Believe me, it was a moving experience.

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Conversely, it would seem that, to adequately address the problem at stake, quotidianities, socializations and reproductions are in need of refining. Important ongoing transformations add to urgency of such fine -tuning. For behind the process is the changing nature of economy, political power and labor in the Mexican society. The economy is transnationalized, its commanding heights are much more responsive to international market and financial information than to national indicators. The stock market (highly sensitive to changes in the New York stock index) gives the national economy’s pulse as never before. Political power is also changing, with the decay of th e all-inclusive, corporatist, populist Mexican state. Trimming the Mexican public sector of the economy and brutally reducing the traditionally insufficient national welfare system have severely diminished the clientelistic ascendancy of the PRI -government, and gave new meaning to political power struggle. Power over-concentration in the President hands seems doomed to fade away, as the PRI-system accelerates its demise. The Mexican polity has grown more complex. Civil society has grown stronger. Labor is also transformed73. There is a lack on centrality, a lesser importance of contemporary blue-collar workers in industry, due to the new, service -oriented processes of production. Concurrently, the national economy’s informal sector has acquired gargantuan d imensions fueled by chronic unemployment, sub -employment and unremitting crises in the countryside. And there is also a decline of unions’ political influence, as affiliation to the main unions and confederations continues to drop. As a result of such transformations new social divides have emerged, characterized by three different collective speeds, marked by paces of different institutional nature. The three different paces (the Internationalized, the National, and the Communitarian) correspond to different institutions (which work according to different calendar - settings) and quotidianities. Institutional speed is here defined as the collective pace at which a set of institutions moves. Their economic, political or social nature derives from the objective to attain. The continuum time -space of each of the three Mexicos can intersect with the others’. As a matter of fact, Mexico-2’s institutional speed (the national pace: “normalcy”) can suddenly be altered, and it is also possible that, on specific occu rrences, Mexico-3 comes to mark the national pace itself. 74 In the following table I have attempted to summarize, for the three Mexicos, the ideals, reproduction environments and goals 75. 73 For an excellent discussion of the transformation of labor (in philosophical terms) see Jean -Marie Vincent. Critique du Travail: le faire et l’agir. Paris, Presses Universitaires de France.1987. 74 When a Third World nation customarily moves at Mexico -1’s speed, we can say it has joined the First World. 75 Mexico-2’s institutions to address the needs of Mexico-1 and Mexico-3 are subjected to quick transformation as I have argued.

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Mexico-1 Profit, Rent Macroeconomic stability Market expansion Mexico-2 Power Political stability, Power maximization Governance Mexico-3 Survival Solidarity Social distribution maximization The three Mexicos basically aim at three different general objectives and those can be summarized as being economic (the logic of capital accumulation), political (the logic of political reproduction) and communitarian (the logic of survival, and community preservation). The nature of the National political institutions outlines the separation between the three Mexicos. There is a formal separation between Mexico -2 and Mexico-3 inasmuch Mexico-2’s institutions describe citizenship limits: access to economic citizenship, in particular. The separation between National institutions and those placed above the National institutional framing (e.g.: Mexico -1) are less formal. As I have said before, Internationalized Mexico wants to escape the National institutional framing, while Communitarian Mexico just cannot get into it. As a matter of fact, for Mexico -3 emigration may be most at hand than acquiring full citizenship. A particular set of institutions is central to each one of the three Mexicos; their activities, aims and timing r evolve around such social constructs. Institutions like the stock markets of Mexico City and New York, the banks, and all sorts of international financial indicators pace out the life of Internationalized Mexico . Its quotidianity is molded in rich neighborhoods and suburbs, foreign schools, elite clubs, expensive cars, fine restaurants, holidays abroad, etc. As we have said before, internationalized Mexico leads a fairy -tale life. It has a growing self -perception of itself as a special internationalized el ite apart from the rest of the country, as a leader with know-how and capabilities to rule. But it speaks and moves in “Economiland”. As for National Mexico, it is rather institutions of statesmanship creation that pace out its life: the Presidential agen da, Legislative Power sessions, courts, the National University official calendar and other schooling systems’, elections, union elections, major political moves, alliances, etc. National Mexico is aware that it can afford a life thanks to the public insti tutions, it lives within the “welfare state”. In this respect only, Mexico -2 may be close to “class-conscience”. . But it speaks and moves in “Politiland”. Now, Communitarian Mexico is arranged following agricultural cycles, promiscuous dwelling, early in corporation to home-duties, sub-employment, unemployment and apprenticeship of urban and rural handiwork, religious festivities, communitarian and local institutions pertaining to ethnicity, region, language, etc. Communitarian Mexico is

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excluded and margi nalized, it leads a life of deprivation. It has a vague conscience of being the underdog (Los de abajo), but the urban and rural poor are uncoordinated in their actions and reactions, which are mainly locally based. Quotidian life in Communitarian Mexico is market either by its limited, non -permanent access to jobs, basic schooling, public health systems, land, etc, or by its complete exclusion from such goods and services. Life in poor communities (rural or urban) bears on strong solidarity bonds created to survive in very hard, helpless conditions. Its crises are Third World crises. This dark -skinned Mexico includes the Indian part of Mexico as a whole and is concentrated in the country’s Deep South; which is to say, mostly in central and southern Mexico .76 It leads a communal life. Its main aim is the reproduction of the community. Its life is timed by the maize cycle, rainy seasons, oxen yokes (when available), barefooted journeys, natural disasters and religious festivities. Rural Mexico-3 is dramatical ly poor and increasingly female. It prays a lot, and God knows for how many years, now. But its saints --Indian-like saints -- are seemingly deaf. In many communities, those that have not emigrated are either too old or too young to escape. And Mexican Democracy On the social side, poverty and social segmentation grew as a result of PRI’s abandonment of social re -distributive policies, and as direct consequence of the application of the neoliberal economic policies and the fast incorporation of the Mexi can economy with the US. However, the destitution of half of the Mexican population lurked behind the impressive macroeconomic figures that depicted the country in 1994. Mexico was richer and poorer at the same time. The Zapatista uprising in the remote s tate of Chiapas brought international attention back to the Mexican indians, and to the shortcomings of an economic policy that claimed First World goals and standards. Mexico went into a period of accelerated transition affecting social, political and economic levels. Social segmentation threatened to introduce deep divisions in society, as the old inclusive political system gave way to a new globalized elite, while also perpetuating and aggravating rural and urban destitution. The single party system ha s been attacked on multiple flanks. But the greatest challenge came from the very modernization policies that the government has consistently applied since 1982. Ernesto Zedillo Ponce de León was not meant to be President of the Republic (1995-2001). The official candidate of PRI had already been unveiled and he was conducting his presidential campaign in Tijuana, when he was murdered. The death of the young 76 Aguascalientes, Campeche, the Federal District, Guerrero, the state of Mex ico, Nuevo León, Oaxaca, Puebla, Querétaro, Quintana Roo, San Luis Potosí, Tlaxcala, Yucatán y Zacatecas: old Mexico! It can also be found in all major Mexican and American cities.

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populist Luis Donaldo Colosio held the country in suspense until Zedillo’s name was pronounced by President Salinas, as the new official candidate. Zedillo’s administration has been hailed for its successful economic policies. As we have seen in previous sections, Mexico has gotten richer and poorer at the same time. But massive emigration to the US continued to embarrass his otherwise “successful” administration. The Mexican government disposes of an immense amount of economic resources, but those are not being used to alleviate the poverty of the vast majorities. Instead, the government has chosen to help the richest, like a bizarre Robin Hood. Social conflict has risen accordingly. The conflict involving the i ndian guerrillas in Chiapas endured and was unsolved during his entire administration. Negotiations were conducted and have broken off many ti mes. An encircled EZLN (Zapatista National Liberation Army) denounced the federal government for its lack of compliance with its own written word: the San Andrés Agreements. Other guerrilla movements have emerged in the country. And although only two of them may be consequential, EPR (Ejército Popular Revolucionario) and ERPI (Ejército Revolucionario del Pueblo Insurgente), both in the state of Guerrero, the existence of many other groups have been documented in recent years. The students of UNAM ((National Autonomous University of Mexico) conducted a year long strike against the privatization of higher education that was broken by police forces. Many students were arrested and kept in jail under dubious charges amid complaints from human rights organizatio ns. Zedillo’s administration met with some success in the drug wars, although the problem is far from being resolved. Quite the contrary, the Mexican cartels seem to have been successful in inheriting the position of privilege formerly enjoyed by the Colo mbians. Democratization has slowly progressed as witnessed by the number of states ruled by the opposition. But electoral results are far from being pristine. The 2001 Presidential succession took place in a dangerous political environment marked by the d ecomposition of the age-old, corrupted political system. The polls showed alternatively Labastida (PRI) and Fox (PAN) leading in popular support. Electoral results were unpredictable. As the opposition won its first ever presidential election, Zedillo face d the crucial responsibility of advancing democracy peacefully, rather than setting it back forcibly. The Partido Acción Nacional (now in power) was founded in 1939 as a conservative group to contest the policies followed by President Cárdenas, particular ly the subjugation of the Church by a strong, centralized, and lay state. PAN’s conservatism is that of the Christian Democracy, although it also has a social democratic component. It strives for larger participation of the private sector in the economy, less centralization, more checks and balances, and a reduction in the size of the

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public sector. In practice, there is little difference between this program and the official policy of the past PRI-government. PAN’s strongholds are in the Northern border states, plus Yucatán, Jalisco, Guanajuato, and Mexico City. PAN has been gaining sounded municipal victories since the 80s. In 1993, in Baja California, the party achieved control of the first state government ever lost by the official party. Over time, PAN has been able to attract the support of the urban middle classes and highly educated Mexican population; but it has failed to attract the support of the peasantry and the urban workers. The victory of the conservative Alianza por el Cambio (i.e: PAN) expressed the fatigue of the Mexican people with a corrupt regime that consistently applied unpopular measures. The thrust of this coalition penetrated the stronghold of the PRD. By mid August 2000, Alianza por el Cambio controlled the legislature in Mexic o City after long deliberations in the Electoral College. The Mexico City Chamber of Deputies is now composed as follows: Alianza por el Cambio 34 deputies (24 PAN + 10 PVEM) PRD 26 deputies PRI 5 deputies PDS 1 deputy

80 deputies For once, and unlike the United States , Mexico has a president that was voted in uncontested elections and a genuine equilibrium between p olitical forces representing a wide political spectrum. Mexico is still undergoing a long protracted period of transition tha t may be greatly accelerated by the new administration. This broad and far -reaching transition goes well beyond political aspects alone. As we have seen, the Mexican economy has been undergoing dramatic changes including the privatization process, the sig nature of free trade agreements with different economic blocs, the emergence of a compact group of Mexican based international corporations, the explosive growth of foreign trade, etc. Concurrently, the foreign debt has reached very manageable levels. In short, the economy has grown in quantitative and qualitative terms: all the macroeconomic indicators speak of a robust, fast growing, and modernizing economy. Yet these transformations have associated costs. Thousand of small and medium sized companies, unable to face competition, go bankrupt every year. As most jobs are

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associated with these companies, unemployment has risen. The new jobs that are being created are temporary, part-time or both, often requiring new training. Massive emigration to the US represents continuing and unfortunate proof that wealth is not trickling down. Briefly said, Mexico is a case study of pronounced social segmentation threatening to split the country in three. There is a booming Mexico -1, very competitive and international (the Mexico of money), a decadent Mexico-2 (the Mexico of PRI-politics), and a resilient Mexico -3 (the poor Mexico of survival and resistance). This social segmentation process is the direct result of the combined impact of: 1. The fast incorporation of Mexico into the North American economy 2. Neoliberal economic policies

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