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Globalization and the Study of International SecurityAuthor(s): Victor D. ChaSource: Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 37, No. 3 (May, 2000), pp. 391-403Published by: Sage Publications, Ltd.Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/425352.

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? 2000 JournalofPeaceResearch,lvol37, no.3, 2000,pp. 391-4(03SagePublicationsLondon,ThousandOaks,CA andNew Delhi)[0022-3433(200005)37:3; 391-403; 0126321

Globalization and the Study ofInternational Security*VICTOR D. CHADepartment of Government and School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University

In spite of the plethoraof literatureon securityandglobalization,there is relatively ittle work writtenby securityspecialists hatinterconnects the two. In the case of securitystudies,this hasbeen in no smallpartbecause the field remainsentrenchedin the 'foodfight' of competing realist, iberal,and construc-tionist researchprograms.In the case of the globalizationliterature, t has stemmed from a relativelystrongerfocus on the social and economic processes of globalization. lThisssayexploreshow the pro-cesses ofglobalization havefundamentally hangedthe waywe think about security. t arguesthat non-physicalsecurity,diversificationof threats,and the salience of identityarekeyeffects of globalization nthe securityrealm.Tlhesesecurityeffects translate nto certain behavioraltendenciesin a state'sforeignpolicy that have thus farnot been studied n the literature.First,globalizationcreates an interpenetrationof foreign and domestic ('intermestic) issues such that nationalgovernments increasinglyoperate inspaces defined by the intersection of internalandexternalsecurity.Second,globalizationputs unprece-dented bureaucraticnnovationpressureson governmentsin their searchfor security,and creates multi-lateralistpressuresto cooperate with substate and transnationalpartnersrather than traditionalallies.Third, globalizationmakes the calculationof relativecapabilities extremely complex and non-linear.Finally,globalizationcompels contemplation of new modes of fighting as well as renders commonlyacceptedmodes of strategic thinkingand rationaldeterrence ncreasinglyrrelevant.The 'new' securityenvironmentin the 21st centurywill operate increasingly n the space defined by the interpenetrationbetween two spheres:globalizationand nationalidentity.

IntroductionAt the threshold of the 21 st century, two top-ics have dominated the study of internationalrelations in the USA: globalization and the'new' security environment after the end ofthe Cold War. The latter has been the objectof intense debate, largely dominated by thosearguing about the relative importance ofstructural, institutional, and cultural variablesfor explaining the likelihood of global or

* Thanks to Samuel Kim, Robert I,ieber and RobertGallucci for comments and Balbina Hwang for researchassistance.

regional peace.1 The former dynamic hasbeen discussed so widely in scholarly andpopular circles that it has reached the ignoblestatus of 'buzzword', familiarly used by manyto refer to some fuzzy phenomenon or trendin the world, but hardly understood by any.2This essay explores how the processes ofglobalization have fundamentally changedthe way we think about security. In spite ofthe plethora of literature on security and

1 'I'he works here are too numerous to mention. SeeLebow & Risse-Kappen (1995); Brown (1995, 1996);Katzenstcin (1996b); L,ynn-Jones (1993); Buzan et al.(1997b).2 For a recent insightful work in the non-academic litera-ture, see Friedman (1999).

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392 journal ofPTRAc RESm3sE nRCHglobalization, there is relatively little workwritten by US security specialists that inter-connects the two. In the case of securitystudies, this has been in no small partbecause the field remains entrenched in the'foodfight' of competing realist, liberal, andconstructionist research programs. In thecase of the globalization literature, this hasstemmed from a relatively stronger focus onthe social and economic processes of globali-zation. The 'new' security environment inthe 21st century will operate increasingly inthe space defined by the interpenetrationbetween two spheres: globalization andnational identity.

Securityand GlobalizationGlobalization is best understood as a spatialphenomenon.3 It is not an 'event', but agradual and ongoing expansion of interac-tion processes, forms of organization, andforms of cooperation outside the traditionalspaces defined by sovereignty. Activity takesplace in a less localized, less insulated way astranscontinental and interregional patternscriss-cross and overlap one another.4

The process of globalization is analyticallydistinct from interdependence. The latter, asReinicke states, denotes growth in connec-tions and linkages between sovereign enti-ties. Interdependence complicates external

3 Sec Held (1997: 253). As Rosenau (1996: 251) writes, 'Itrefers neither to values nor structures but to sequencesthat unfold either in the mind or behavior, to interactionprocesses that evolve as people and organizations goabout their daily tasks and seek to realize their particulargoals.'4 See Mittelman (1994: 427). Or as Goldblatt et al. (1997:271) note: 'Globalization denotes a shift in the spatialform and extent of human organization and interaction toa transcontinental or interregional level. It involves astretching of social relations across time and space suchthat day-to-day actixvitiesare increasingly influenced byevents happening on the other side of the globe and thepractices and decisions of highly localized groups andinstitutions can have significant global reverberations.'

sovereignty in that sovereign choices have tobe made to accommodate these interdepend-ent ties. Globalization processes are not justabout linkages but about interpenetration.As Guehenno noted, globalization is definednot just by the ever-expanding connectionsbetween states measured in terms of move-ment of goods and capital but the circulationand interpenetration of people and ideas(Guehenno, 1999: 7). It affects not onlyexternal sovereignty choices but also internalsovereignty in terms of relations between thepublic and private sectors (Reinicke, 1997).Contrary to popular notions of globalization,this does not mean that sovereignty ceases toexist in the traditional Weberian sense (i.e.monopoly of legitimate authority over citi-zen and subjects within a given territory).Instead, globalization is a spatial reorganiza-tion of production, industry, finance, andother areas which causes local decisions tohave global repercussions and daily life to beaffected by global events. Comparisons areoften made between globalization at the endof the 20th century and the period beforeWorld War I when the developed world wit-nessed unprecedented high volumes of tradeacross borders and movements of capitalthat led to the dissolution of empires and tra-ditional structures of governance. However,these analogies are not accurate because theprocess of change at the turn of the 20thcentury was driven by, and had as its finaloutcome, nationalism and the consolidationof statehood. A century later, statehood andnotions of sovereignty are not so muchunder attack by so-called 'globalizationforces' as empires were, but are being modi-fied and re-oriented by them. In short, thenation-state does not end; it is just less incontrol. Activity and decisions for the stateincreasingly take place in a post-sovereignspace (Reinicke, 1997; Rosenau, 1996). Inthis sense, globalization is both a boundary-broadening process and a boundary-weakening one (Rosenau, 1996: 251).

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Victor D. Cha G,LOBALIZATION AND SEC(URIT9'YMuch of the literature on globalizationhas focused on its economic rather than

security implications.5 In part, this is becausethe security effects of globalization often getconflated with changes to the internationalsecurity agenda with the end of Cold WarSuperpower competition.6 It is also because,unlike economics where globalization'seffects are manifested and measured every-day in terms of things like international capi-tal flows and Internet use, in security, theeffects are inherently harder to conceptualizeand measure. To the extent possible, theensuing analysis tries to differentiate globali-zation from post-Cold War effects on secu-rity. As a first-cut, one can envision a'globalization-security' spectrum alongwhich certain dialogues in security studieswould fall. For example, the notion of selec-tive engagement, pre-emptive withdrawal,democratic enlargement, or preventivedefense as viable US grand strategies for thecoming century would sit at the far end ofthis spectrum because they are predomi-nantly security effects deriving from the endof bipolar competition rather than fromglobalization.7 Progressively closer to themiddle would be arguments about the 'debel-licization' of security or the obsolescence ofwar which do not have globalization as theirprimary cause, but are clearly related to someof these processes.8 Also in this middle range5 Examples of the non-security bias in the US literatureon globalization include Mittelman (1994); Goldblatt et al.(1997); Reinicke (1997); Rosenau (1996); Nye & Owens(1998); Talbott (1997); Falk (1997); Ohmae (1993); Held(1997).' Representative of works looking at changing definitionsof security at the end of the Cold War are Walt (1991);Gray (1992); Deudney (1990); Chipman (1992); Nye(1989); Lipschutz (1995).7 For debates on selective engagement and pre-emptivedrawback strategies, see Layne (1997); Ruggie (1997). Secalso Huntington (1999); Betts (1998). On preventivedefense see Carter & Perry (1999). European internationalrelations literature that has looked at the post-Cold Wareffects of security (as distinct from globalization's effectson security) include Kirchner & Sperling (1998); Leather-man & Vayrynen (1995); Buzan (1997a).

would be discussions on 'rogue' or 'pariah'states as this term is a function of the end ofthe Cold War;at the same time, however, thespread of information and technology expo-nentially raises the danger of these threats.Similarly, the end of the Cold War providesthe permissive condition for the salience ofweapons of mass destruction as the Sovietcollapse directly affected the subsequentaccessibility of formerly controlled sub-stances such as plutonium or enriched ura-nium. But an equally important driver isglobalization because the technologies forcreating these weapons have become easilyaccessible (Falkenrath, 1998). Finally, at thefar end of the 'globalization-security' spec-trum might be the salience of substateextremist groups or fundamentalist groupsbecause their ability to organize transnation-ally,meet virtually, and utilize terrorist tacticshas been substantially enhanced by the glo-balization of technology and information.While the US security studies field has madereference to many of these issues, a more sys-tematic understanding of globalization'ssecurity effects is lacking.9

Agency and Scope of ThreatsThe most far-reaching security effect of glo-balization is its complication of the basicconcept of 'threat' in international relations.This is in terms of both agency and scope.Agents of threat can be states but can also benon-state groups or individuals. While thevocabulary of conflict in international secu-rity traditionally centered on interstate war(e.g. between large set-piece battalions andnational armed forces), with globalization,terms such as global violence and humanx For the seminal work, see Mueller (1989). See also Man-delbaum (1999); Van Creveld (1991).9 For a more comprehensive and useful characterizationof security studies, see Buzan (1997a), although this cate-gorization takes the post-Cold War rather than globaliza-tion as its point of departure.

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394 journal of PEACE RESEARCHsecurity become common parlance, wherethe fight is between irregular substate unitssuch as ethnic militias, paramilitaryguerrillas,cults and religious organizations, organizedcrime, and terrorists. Increasingly, targets arenot exclusively opposing force structures oreven cities, but local groups and individuals(Buzan, 1997a: 6-21; Klare, 1998: 66; Nye,1989; Vayrynen, 1998; Waeveret al., 1993).Similarly, security constituencies, whilenominally defined by traditional sovereignborders increasingly are defined at everylevel from the global to the regional to theindividual. Or as Buzan (1997a: 11) notes:'What can be clearly observed is that thestate is less important in the new securityagenda than in the old one. It still remainscentral, but no longer dominates either as theexclusive referent object or as the principleembodiment of threat'. Thus the providersof security are still nationally defined interms of capabilities and resources; however,increasingly they apply these in a post-sovereign space whose spectrum rangesfrom nonstate to substate to transstatearrangements. For this reason, securitythreats become inherently more difficult tomeasure, locate, monitor, and contain(Freedman, 1998a: 56; Reinicke, 1997: 134).

Globalization widens the scope of secu-rity as well. As the Copenhagen school hasnoted, how states conceive of security andhow they determine what it means to besecure in the post-Cold War era expandbeyond military security at the nationallevel. ? Globalization's effects on securityscope are distinct from those of the post-Cold War in that the basic transaction pro-cesses engendered by globalization - instan-taneous communication and transportation,exchanges of information and technology,flow of capital - catalyze certain dangerousphenomena or empower certain groups inways unimagined previously. In the former10 See Buzan (1997a). For applications, see Haas (1995);(:ha (1997).

category are things such as viruses and pollu-tion. Because of human mobility, disease hasbecome much more of a transnational secu-rity concern.11 Global warming, ozonedepletion, acid rain, biodiversity loss, andradioactive contamination are health andenvironmental problems that have intensi-fied as transnational security concerns pre-cisely because of increased human mobilityand interaction (Matthew & Shambaugh,1998; Vayrynen, 1998; Zurn, 1998).Globalization also has given rise to a 'skillrevolution' that enhances the capabilities ofgroups such as drug smugglers, political ter-rorists, criminal organizations, and ethnicinsurgents to carry out their agenda moreeffectively than ever before (Arquilla &Ronfeldt, 1996; Brown, 1998: 4-5; Godson,1997; Klare, 1998; Rosenau, 1998: 21-23;Shinn, 1996: 38). It is important to note thatthe widening scope of security to these trans-national issues is not simply a short-term fix-ation with the end of bipolar Cold Warcompetition as the defining axis for security.The threat posed by drugs, terrorism, trans-national crime, and environmental degrada-tion has been intensified precisely because ofglobalization. Moreover, the security solu-tions to these problems in terms of enforce-ment or containment increasingly areineffective through national or unilateralmeans. 12

Globalization has ignited identity as asource of conflict. The elevation of regionaland ethnic conflict as a top-tier security issuehas generally been treated as a function ofthe end of the Cold War. However, it is alsoa function of globalization. The process ofglobalization carries implicit homogeniza-tion tendencies and messages,13 which incombination with the 'borderlessness' of the1l For example, the re-emergence of tuberculosis andmalaria as health hazards has been related to the develop-ment of resistant strains in the South (because of black-market abuses of inoculation treatments), which then re-entered the developed North through human mobility.

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Victor D. Cha GLOBA,IZA'TION AND SEC(URI''Yglobalization phenomenon elicits a culturalpluralist response.'4

At the same time, globalization has madeus both more aware and less decisive aboutour motivations to intervene in such ethnicconflicts. Real-time visual images of horrorand bloodshed in far-off places transmittedthrough CNN make the conflicts impossibleto ignore, creating pressures for interven-tion. On the other hand, the hesitancy to actis palpable, as standard measures by which todetermine intervention (i.e. bipolar competi-tion in the periphery) are no longer appropri-ate, forcing us to grope with fuzzymotivations such as humanitarian interven-tion.

Non-Physical ecurityGlobalization has anointed the concept ofnon-physical security. Traditional definitionsof security in terms of protection of territoryand sovereignty, while certainly not irrelevantin a globalized era, expand to protection of12 As Matthew & Shambaugh argue, it is not the luxuryof the Soviet collapse that enables us to elevate the impor-tance of transnational security but the advances in humanmobility, communication, and technology that force us to.See Matthew & Shambaugh (1998: 167). A related exam-ple of how security agency and scope have changed is theprivatized army. These groups are not a new phenomenonin international politics, dating back to the US revolution-ary war (i.e. Britain's hiring of Hessian soldiers) and theItalian city-states (of the 14th century (i.e. the condottiers).However, their salience today is a function of the changeswrought by the globalization of technology. Increasingly,national armies are retooled to fight high-intensity, high-technology conflicts and less equipped to fight loxv-inten-sity conflicts in peripheral areas among ethnic groupswhere the objectives in entering battle are unclear. Thisdevelopment, coupled with the decreasing Cold War eraemphasis on the periphery and the absence of domesticsupport for casualties in such places, has made the'jobbing-out' of war increasingly salient. See Shearer(1998); Silverstein (1997); Thomson (1996).13 Examples of homogenization impulses include the dif-fusion of standardized consumer goods generally from thedeveloped North; Western forms (If capitalism (and notAsian crony capitalism); and Western liberal democracy(not illiberal democracy).

information and technology assets. Forexample, Nye & Owens (1998) cite 'infor-mation power' as increasingly defining thedistribution of power in international rela-tions in the 21st century. In a similarvein, therevolution in military affairs highlights notgreater firepower but greater informationtechnology and 'smartness' of weapons asthe defining advantage for future warfare.'5These non-physical security aspects havealways been a part of the traditional nationaldefense agenda. Indeed, concerns about theunauthorized transfer of sensitive technolo-gies gave rise to such techno-nationalist insti-tutions as COCOM during the Cold War.However, the challenge posed by globaliza-tion is that the nation-state can no longercontrol the movement of technology andinformation (Simon, 1997). Strategic alli-ances form in the private sector among lead-ing corporations that are not fettered bynotions of techno-nationalism and driveninstead by competitive, cost-cutting, orcutting-edge innovative needs. The result is atransnationalization of defense productionthat further reduces the state's control overthese activities.16

More and more private companies, indi-viduals, and other non-state groups are the14 As Falk (1997: 131-132) states, 'The rejection of theseglobalizing tendencies in its purest forms is associatedwith and expressed by the resurgence of religious and eth-nic politics in various extremist configurations. Reveal-ingly, only by retreating to premodern, traditionalistorientations does it now seem possible to seal off sover-eign territory, partially at least, from encroachments asso-ciated with globalized lifestyles and business operations'.See also Mittelman (1994: 432); Guehenno (1999: 7); andWaver (1993).15 These are defined in terms of things such as ISR (intel-ligence collection, surveillance, and reconnaissance), C41,and precision force that can provide superior situationalawareness capabilities (e.g. dominant battlespace knowl-edge; 'pre-crisis transparency'). See Nye & Owens (1998);Cohen (1996); Freedman (1998b); Laird & Mey (1999).Freedman correctly points out that the emphasis on infor-mation and technology is not in lieu of, but in conjunctionwith, superior physical military assets. The former cannotcompensate for the latter. See Freedman (1999: 51-52).

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396 journal of PEACE RES E ARC(Hproducers, consumers, and merchants of aUS$50 billion per year global arms market(Klare & Lumpe, 1998). The end of the ColdWar has certainly been a permissive condi-tion for the indiscriminate, profit-basedincentives to sell weapons or dual-use tech-nologies to anybody. But globalization ofinformation and technology has made barri-ers to non-state entry low and detectioncosts high. Moreover, while enforcementauthorities still have the benefit of thesetechnologies, two critical developments havealtered the equation: (1) Absence of discrim-ination: over the past two decades, the pri-vate sector, rather than the government, hasbecome the primary creator of new technol-ogies, which in essence has removed any rel-ative advantages state agencies formerlypossessed in terms of exclusive access toeavesdropping technology, surveillance, andencryption.17 Governments once in the posi-tion of holding monopolies on cutting edgetechnologies that could later be 'spun off' inthe national commercial sector are now con-sumers of 'spin-on' technologies. (2) Volumeand variety: the sheer growth in volume andvariety of communications has overwhelmedany attempts at monitoring or control(Mathews, 1997; Freedman, 1999: 53).18 As16 As Goldblatt et al. point out, MNCS now account fora disproportionately large share of global technologytransfer as a result of EDI; joint ventures; internationalpatenting; licensing; and knowhow agreements. Thismeans they are more in control of transferring dual-usetechnologies than traditional states. See Goldblatt et al.(1997: 277-279).17 On the growing commercial pressure for liberalizationof encryption technology, see Freeh (1997). See alsoFalkenrath (1998: 56-57); Corcoran (1998: 13). On thegrowing reliance of the US Defense Department on com-mercial technological advances compared with the 1950-1970s, see Carter & Perry (1999: 197-198).18 The results of this are well known: instantaneous com-munication by facsimile, cellular phone, satellite phone,teleconferencing, alpha-numeric pagers, e-mail, computermodems, computer bulletin boards, and federal expressare the norm. Approximately 250,000 Global PositioningSystem satellite navigation receivers are sold eachmonth orcommercial use.

noted earlier, these phenomena of glo-balization most dangerously manifest them-selves as the threat posed by substate actorswith violent intentions. Through the Internetand the privatization of formerly securednational assets (e.g. plutonium or highlyenriched uranium), these groups are nowable to start substantially higher on the learn-ing curve for building a weapon of massdestruction. Building an inefficient fissionweapon capable of killing 100,000 in anurban center or cultivating cultures for bio-logical use is child's play relative to the past(Falkenrath, 1998: 54-55; Carter & Perry,1999: 151).19 Thus in a globalized world,information and technology increasingly arethe currency of non-physical security.

Propositionsfor SecurityBehaviorIf non-physical security, diversification ofthreats, and the salience of identity are keyeffects of globalization in the security realm,then how might this translate in terms of astate's foreign policy? The literature on glo-balization in both Europe and the USAremains conspicuously silent on this ques-tion. Globalization authors might argue thatthis criticism is inappropriate because it sug-gests an ideal endstate at which a 'globalized'country should arrive. However, the pointhere is not to suggest that there will be a sin-gle uniform model, but that as globalizationprocesses permeate a state's security agenda,this might be manifested in certain generalinclinations and contours of behavior. Putanother way, we should observe globaliza-tion processes altering in some cases, and

19 In the case of biological weapons, effective deliveryrequires some form of aerosol spray technology. But thepoint is that such technology, if it were perfected, wouldmost likely be the result of commercial needs and there-fore easily available to anyone. In a related vein, Hoffman(1997) has found positive correlations between the spreadof information and technology and the lethality of terror-ist attacks.

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Victor D. Cha GLOBALIZATION AND SECURI1TYcreating in other cases, new sets of securityinterests for states.

IntermesticSecurityFirst, the globalization and security literatureasserts but does not elaborate how securitydecisions increasingly take place outside thetraditional purview of sovereignty. Globali-zation creates an interpenetration of foreignand domestic issues that national govern-ments must recognize in developing policy.One example of this 'intermestic' approachto security policy might be an acceptancethat the transnationalization of threats hasblurred traditional divisions between internaland external security (Katzenstein, 1996a).The obverse would be the frequency withwhich a state adheres to 'delimiting' security,formulating and justifying policy on the basisof 'national security' interests rather thanuniversal/global interests (Moon Chung-in,1995: 64). Examples of the former are Euro-pean institutions such as Interpol, TREVI,and the Schengen Accord, which representan acknowledgment that domestic issuessuch as crime, drug-trafficking, terrorism,and immigration increasingly require trans-national cooperation. TREVI was composedof ministers of the interior and justice of ECmember-states whose purpose was to coor-dinate policy on terrorism (at Germany's ini-tiative in 1975) and international crime. TheSchengen Accords also represented a con-vergence of internal and external securitywith regard to common standards bordercontrols, pursuit of criminals across borders,asylum procedures, and refugees (Katzen-stein, 1998: 11-14). In Asia, one might seeenvironmental pollution and transnationalcrime as issues where international anddomestic security converge ('Special Focus:China and Hong Kong', 1996). However, inthe near future, maritime piracy is the mostlikely focal point. These are cases where sub-state actors armed with sophisticated weap-

ons, satellite-tracking technology, andcutting-edge document-forging equipmenthijack vessels in the South and East Chinaseas with millions of dollars worth of cargo(Cha, 1998: 51-53; Sullivan & Jordan, 1999).These groups operate transnationally; plan-ning may occur at one destination, trackingof the ship at another, the attack launchedfrom another port, and the cargo off-loadedat yet another port. These acts fall under thepurview of local law enforcement, but theyare clearly 'intermestic' security issues. Theattacks occur in overlapping sovereignwaters or international waters, and some-times receive the tacit consent of govern-ments where the pirated vessels areclandestinely ported. Moreover, if targetedcargos move beyond luxury autos and videocassette recorders to strategic goods such asplutonium, then distinctions between exter-nal and internal security and criminal andstrategic threats disappear (Falkenrath, 1998;Guehenno, 1999: 11).

MultilateralismSecond, the globalization literature acknowl-edges that security is increasingly conceivedof in post-sovereign, globalized terms, butdoes not delineate how the modes of obtain-ing security should change. As noted above,globalization means that both the agency andscope of threats have become more diverseand non-state in form. This also suggeststhat the payoffs lessen for obtaining securitythrough traditional means. Controlling pollu-tion, disease, technology, and informationtransfer cannot be easily dealt with throughnational, unilateral means but can only beeffectively dealt with through the applicationof national resources in multilateral fora orthrough encouragement of transnationalcooperation. As UN Secretary-General KofiAnnan intimated, US bombing of targets inSudan in retaliation for terrorist bombings oftwo US embassies in Africa is a unilateral

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398 journal of PTEACE(RESEARCHpiecemeal approach far inferior to concertedglobal efforts at denying terrorists sanctuar-ies, financing, and technology and encourag-ing their extradition and prosecution.20

Thus one would expect globalized secu-rity processes reflected in a state's striving forregional coordination and cooperative secu-rity. It should emphasize not exclusivity andbilateralism in relations but inclusivity andmultilateralism as the best way to solve secu-rity problems. At the extreme end of thespectrum, globalization might downplay theimportance of eternal iron-clad alliances andencourage the growth of select transnational'policy coalitions' among national govern-ments, nongovernmental organizations(NGOs), and individuals specific to eachproblem (Reinicke, 1997: 134).In conjunction with multilateralism, glo-balized conceptions of security should bereflected in norms of diffuse reciprocity andinternational responsibility. This is admit-tedly more amorphous and harder tooperationalize. While some self-servinginstrumental motives lie behind most diplo-macy, there must be a strong sense of globalresponsibility and obligation that compelsthe state to act. Actions taken in the nationalinterest must be balanced with a basic princi-ple that contributes to a universal, globalizedvalue system underpinning one's own values.

Bureaucratic nnovationThe globalization literature has not done jus-tice to the role bureaucratic innovation playsin response to the new challenges of globali-zation. On this point, indeed, the literaturehas not kept pace with the empirics. Forexample, in the USA, the Clinton Adminis-tration created the position of Undersecre-tary for Global Affairs, whose portfolioincluded environmental issues, promotion ofdemocracy and human rights, population20 See comments by President Clinton and UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan as cited in Crossette (1998).

and migration issues, and law enforcement(Talbott, 1997: 74). In a similar vein, the USState Department's Foreign Service Institutenow has a new core course for FSOs onnarcotics-trafficking, refugee flows, andenvironmental technologies (albott, 1997:75). In May 1998, the Clinton Administra-tion put forward its first comprehensive planto combat world crime, identifying drug-traf-ficking, transfer of sensitive technology andWMD, and trafficking of women and chil-dren as threats to the USA (EWashingtonost,1998).21One might also expect to see foreignservice bureaucracies placing greater empha-sis on international organizations and NGOsin terms of representation, placement, andleadership if these are recognized as the keyvehicles of security and politics in a glo-balized world.

Implicit in each of these examples is thetrend toward greater specialization in thepursuit of security. As globalization makessecurity problems more complex anddiverse, national security structures need tobe re-oriented, sometimes through elimina-tion of anachronistic bureaucracies orthrough rationalization of wasteful and over-lapping ones. In the US system, for example,while combating the spread of weapons ofmass destruction is widely acknowledged asa key security objective in the 21st century,various branches of the government operateautonomously in dealing with these threats.Hence, there are greater calls for renovationand coordination to eliminate the overlap,inefficiency, and lack of organization amongState, Defense, Commerce, Energy, CIA,and FBI in combating proliferation.22

Another trend engendered by the securitychallenges of globalization is greater cross-A1 The degree to which this is 'spin' or substantiveremains to be seen..2 For a detailed set of recommendations on how to ren-ovate and create institutions to deal with these problems,see Carter & Perry (1999: 143-174). See also Schmitt(1999).

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Victor D. Cha GL(OBALIZATION AND SECURITYfertilization between domestic law enforce-ment and foreign policy agencies. This rela-tionship, at least in the USA (less the case inEurope), is at worst non-existent becausedomestic law enforcement has operated tra-ditionally in isolation from national securityand diplomatic concerns, or at best is amutually frustrating relationship because thetwo have neither inclination nor interest incooperating. States that understand the chal-lenges of globalization, particularly on issuesof drug-trafficking, environmental crimes,and technology transfer, will seek to bridgethis gap, creating and capitalizing on syner-gies that develop between the two groups.Foreign policy agencies will seek out greaterinteraction with domestic agencies, not onlyon a pragmatic short-term basis employinglaw enforcement's skills to deal with a partic-ular problem, but also on a longer-term andregular basis cultivating familiarity, transpar-ency, and common knowledge. On thedomestic side, agencies such as the FBI,Customs, and police departments (of majorcities) would find themselves engaged in for-eign policy dialogues, again not only at thepractitioner's level, but also in academia andthink-tank forums.23

One of the longer-term effects of special-ization and cross-fertilization is that securityalso becomes more 'porous.' Specializationwill often require changes not just at thesovereign national level, but across bordersand with substate actors. 'Boilerplate' secu-rity (e.g. dealt with by 'hardshell' nation-states with national resources) becomesincreasingly replaced by cooperation andcoordination that may still be initiated by thenational government but with indispensablepartners (depending on the issue) such asNGOs, transnational groups, and the media.The obverse of this dynamic also obtains.23 In this vein, it might not be unusual in the future to seethe commissioner of New York City Police or the head ofthe FBI participating in discussions of the Council on For-eign Relations or the Brookings Institution.

With globalization, specialized 'communi-ties of choice' (e.g. landmine ban) areempowered to organize transnationally andpenetrate the national security agendas withissues that might not otherwise have beenpaid attention to (Guehenno, 1999: 9;Mathews, 1997).

AggregatingCapabilitiesThe globalization literature remains relativelysilent on how globalization processes sub-stantially alter the way in which states calcu-late relative capabilities. The single mostimportant variable in this process is the dif-fusion of technology (both old and new). Inthe past, measuring relative capabilities waslargely a linear process. Higher technologygenerally meant qualitatively better weaponsand hence stronger capabilities. States couldbe assessed along a ship-for-ship, tank-for-tank, jet-for-jet comparison in terms of thethreat posed and their relative strength basedon such linear measurements. However, thediffusion of technology has had distortingeffects. While states at the higher end tech-nologically still retain advantages, globaliza-tion has enabled wider access to technologysuch that the measurement process is moredynamic. First, shifts in relative capabilitiesare more frequent and have occurred in cer-tain cases much earlier than anticipated. Sec-ond, and more significant, the measurementprocess is no longer one-dimensional in thesense that one cannot readily draw linearassociations between technology, capabili-ties, and power. For example, what giveslocal, economically backward states regionaland even global influence in the 21st centuryis their ability to threaten across longer dis-tances. Globalization facilitates access toselect technologies related to force projec-tion and weapons of mass destruction, whichin turn enable states to pose threats that areasymmetric and disproportionate to theirsize. Moreover, these threats emanate not

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400 journal of PEACE RESEARCHfrom acquisition of state-of-the-art but oldand outdated echnology. Thus countries likeNorth Korea, which along most traditionalmeasurements of power could not compare,can with old technology (SCUD and rudi-mentary nuclear technology) pose threatsand affect behavior in ways unforeseen in thepast (Bracken, 1998).

Strategiesand OperationalConsiderationsFinally, the literature on globalization is nota-bly silent on the long-term impact of globali-zation processes on time-tested modes ofstrategic thinking and fighting. In the formervein, the widening scope of security engen-dered by globalization means that the defini-tion of security and the fight for it will occurnot on battlefields but in unconventionalplaces against non-traditional security adver-saries. As noted above, when states cannotdeal with these threats through sovereignmeans, they will encourage multilateralismand cooperation at the national, transna-tional, and international levels. However, thenature of these conflicts may also requirenew ways of fighting, i.e. the ability to engagemilitarily with a high degree of lethalityagainst combatants, but low levels of collat-eral damage. As a result, globalization's wid-ening security scope dictates not only newstrategies (discussed below) but also newforms of combat. Examples include incapac-itating crowd control munitions such asblunt projectiles (rubber balls), non-lethalcrowd dispersal cartridges, 'stick 'em' and'slick 'em' traction modifiers, or 'stink'bombs. 'Smart' non-lethal warfare that inca-pacitates equipment will also be favored,including rigid foam substances, and radiofrequency and microwave technologies todisable electronics and communications(CFR Task Force, 1999).

Regarding strategy, as the agency andscope of threats diversifies in a globalized

world, traditional modes of deterrencebecome less relevant. Nuclear deterrencethroughout the Cold War and post-Cold Wareras, for example, was based on certainassumptions. First, the target of the strategywas another nation-state. Second, thisdeterred state was assumed to have a degreeof centralization in the decisionmaking pro-cess over nuclear weapons use. Third, andmost important, the opponent possessedboth counterforce and countervalue targetsthat would be the object of a second strike.While this sort of rationally based, existen-tial deterrence will still apply to interstatesecurity, the proliferation of weaponizednon-state and substate actors increasinglyrenders this sort of strategic thinking obso-lete. They do not occupy sovereign territo-rial space and therefore cannot be targetedwith the threat of retaliation. They also mayoperate as self-contained cells rather than anorganic whole which makes decapitatingstrikes at a central decisionmaking structureineffective. In short, you cannot deter withthe threat of retaliation that which you can-not target.

Governments may respond to this in avariety of ways. One method would be, asnoted above, greater emphasis on the spe-cialized utilization of whatever state, sub-state, and multilateral methods are necessaryto defend against such threats. A secondlikely response would be greater attentionand resources directed at civil defense prep-aration and 'consequence' management tominimize widespread panic and pain in theevent of an attack. A third possible responseis unilateral in nature. Governments mayincreasingly employ pre-emptive or preven-tive strategies if rational deterrence does notapply against non-state entities. Hence onemight envision two tiers of security in whichstable rational deterrence applies at thestate-state level but unstable pre-emptive/preventive strategies apply at the state-non-state level.

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Victor D. Cha GL O 3BALI, AI'I o N A N D S ICUR Il'YConclusionWhat then is the 'new' security environmentin the 21st century that the globalization/security literature must strive to understand?It is most likely one that sits at the intersec-tion of globalization and national identity. Inother words, as globalization processes com-plicate the nature of security (i.e. in terms ofagency and scope), this effects a transforma-tion in the interests that inform security pol-icy. Globalization's imperatives permeate thedomestic level and should be manifested insome very broad behavioral trends or stylesof security policy. Manifestations of thistransformation are inclinations toward inter-mestic security, multilateralism, and bureau-cratic innovation and specialization.

However, it would be short-sighted toexpect that all states will respond similarly.Insome cases, policies will emerge that directlymeet or adjust to the imperatives of globali-zation, but in other cases the policy thatemerges will not be what one might expectto linearly follow from globalization pres-sures. The latter outcomes are the types ofanomalies that offer the most clear indica-tions of the causal role of domestic factors inthe 'new' security environment (Desch,1998: 158-160); however, these alone onlyhighlight national identity as a residual vari-able (i.e. capable of explaining only aberra-tions) in the 'new' security environment.One would expect, therefore, that the formeroutcomes would be as important to process-trace: If policy adjustments appear outwardlyconsistent with globalization but the under-lying rationale for such action is not, thenthis illustrates that the domestic-ideationalmediation process is an ever-present one.The new security environment would there-fore be one in which globalization pressureson security policy and grand strategy arecontinually refracted through the prism ofnational identity.

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VICTOR D. CHA, b. 1961, PhD in PoliticalScience(ColumbiaUniversity,1994);AssistantProfessor, Georgetown University (1995-);Hoover National Fellow (StanfordUniversity,1998); Fulbright Scholar (Korea, 1999). Mostrecent book:AlignmentDespiteAntagonism:heUnited tates-Korea-JapanecurityriangleStan-ford University Press, 1999).

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