Global trends in CBRN terrorism: Implications for pathogen security

Dr Robert StaggDepartment of Defence

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The CBRN terrorism threat in context…• Terrorism is likely to remain the preferred tactic of non-state actors to

violently address grievances

• Most terrorist groups have and will probably remain ‘tactically conservative’

– Explosives will continue to be the overwhelmingly preferred tactic

• Some will continue to seek CBRN to

achieve tactical and/or strategic goals

– Most organisations don’t start with CBRN but escalate

– Potential to increase fear, attention and scale

– Requires a degree of organisational learning

– Acquisition of expertise and material

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WMD vs. CBRN

• Mass casualties can be achieved without CBRN

– 9/11 attacks killed 3000 people after hijacking four planes with box cutters

• Most interest in CBRN is not for the purposes of causing mass casualties

– Typically insurgents pursuing discreet and small-scale targets

• But… CBRN attacks do represent one of the most viable ways for terrorists to inflict mass casualties

Who pursues CBRN?1. Lone actors – with personal grievances and ready access to

CBRN materials or expertise. eg 2001 ‘Amerithrax’ attacks

2. Insurgencies – where most CBRN activity is seen– A small proportion of insurgents invariably consider CBRN

– Discreet targets, low scale, crude in nature

3. Religious cults - perpetrators of historical CB attacks

4. Terrorists with local grievances– Political, nationalist, religious, issue-motivated

– Low-level interest in CBRN that is rarely put into practice

5. Violent global Jihadists (AQ and AQ-inspired)– Seek WMD-like CBRN capabilities

– Prepared to invest time and resources in sophisticated effort

Very few groups seek mass casualties

Crude vs. sophisticatedCrude• Extension of conventional tactics and goals

• Often improvised or requires little preparation

• Requires minimal expertise and uses readily available materials

• Purchase or theft of off-the-shelf toxic chemicals or radiological material

• Dispersal by IEDs, food supplies, conventional munitions

• Expect low scale casualties

Sophisticated• Usually for the explicit purpose of causing mass casualties (civilian targets)

• Requires access to specialised expertise – experienced scientists

• Requires specialised materials – CW agents, BW agents, fissile material

• Technical challenge of weaponisation (varying difficulty)

• Time consuming and relatively heavy investment of resources

• Potential to cause tens of thousands of casualties

Examples of crude CBR terrorism

• Crude CBR devices incorporate readily available materials

– Require little to no manipulation – cyanides, pesticides, chlorine…

– Terrorists utilise existing expertise – recognition of additional fear factor, increased casualties & complication of the response process

– Most cases use explosives to disseminate the CBR material

• Chlorine IEDs in Iraq (AQI), acid IEDs in Thailand

• Terrorists in Afghanistan continue to seek poisons

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Toxicity and dissemination both limiting factors

impact

difficulty

Explosives Improvised chemical or radiological dispersal

Poisons

WMD-like weapons

‘Cliff face’Will not be scaled by accident

Comparative difficulty

Sophisticated CBRN over time

Rajneeshee cult Salmonella-attack

(1984, USA)

Intent

Aum Shinrikyo sarin attack(1995, Japan)

AQ WMD program (1999-2001, Afghanistan)

AQ inspired groups(current threat)

time

Lone actors? cults?

Anthrax letters(2001, USA)

Rajneeshees: The first sophisticated CBRN terrorists (1984)

• Religious cult who sought to win County elections (USA)

• Aimed to incapacitate opposition voters

- Purchased and cultured a Salmonella enterica strain

- Used a freeze dryer

- Infected 750 people via contamination of salad bars in 10 restaurants

- 45 hospitalisations but no deaths

• The only group to have conducted a successful large scale bioterrorist attack

Aum Shinrikyo:The most sophisticated CBRN effort

• A Japanese-based apocalyptic cult

• > 10 000 members including dozens of scientists with post-graduate qualifications

• Hundreds of millions of dollars of assets

• WMD development was the centrepiece of the group’s goals– Investigated acquisition of fissile material

– 1993 – commenced program to manufacture VX and sarin

– 1994 – Tested sarin and VX on sheep in Australia

– 1994 – Used sarin in assassination attempts – 7 killed

– 1995 – Tokyo subway attack – sarin kills 12, thousands injured

– Attempted anthrax attacks – but used vaccine strain

Afghanistan: AQ’s WMD efforts(1999 – 2001)

• Commenced about 1999 but went unnoticed– Recruited multiple scientists and established multiple labs

• Concentrated on traditional agents – anthrax, plague, nerve & blister agents, nuclear devices

• Outreach to Jemaah Islamiyah to acquire ‘appropriate’ expertise– Recruitment of Yazid Sufaat – a U.S. trained biochemist - to isolate and culture

Bacillus anthracis in a laboratory near Kandahar

– Isolation almost certainly failed

• Considered weaponisation– Interest in crop dusters for dissemination of agent

• Disrupted by Coalition invasion– Removal of safe haven and key operatives

– Without disruption, WMD efforts may have been successful

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AQ post 2001

• AQ have not realised WMD ambitions (yet)

• Maintained intent (rhetoric), but what about in practice?– Have they had significant time/ space/ resources to achieve development of relatively

sophisticated agents?

• Possibility of ongoing highly compartmented projects– Increasingly difficult with CT efforts

• AQ doctrine offers religious sanction, strategic preference and practical justification for using WMD and specifically CBRN

• AQ has been able to influence elements of other groups with overlapping ideology– JI bombings against Western targets in Indonesia

• Some groups susceptible to AQ’s influence have greater access to expertise and materials

Bioterrorism:The worst of a bad bunch

• Bioterrorism probably represents a greater threat than chemical, radiological or nuclear terrorism

• Compared to bioterrorism:

– Radiological terrorism has lower potential to cause casualties

– Nuclear terrorism is very unlikely to occur

– Chemical terrorism has less potential to proliferate

What can bioterrorists achieve?• Disruption, annoyance, fear

– White powder scares

• Augment conventional attacks– Increase impact and complicate response to IED attack

• Poisoning of food or water– Suitable for attacking a discreet group of people

– But why not use chemicals? Incapacitate instead of kill?

• Agricultural terrorism– Economically devastating

• Mass casualties– Probably relies on inhalation of organism

Bioterrorism threat: a product of intent and capability…

• ‘Low impact’ bioterrorism could meet the goals of many terrorist groups– Few groups have shown intent in the past

• ‘High impact’ bioterrorism only meets the goals of very few groups– AQ and affiliates– ‘Lone scientist’– Apocalyptic cults

• Capability of terrorist group– Financial & logistical resources– Knowledge/skill acquisition– Materials & technology acquisition– Production, weaponisation and delivery

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Threat = intent x capability

Biological agents of concern• Agricultural diseases

– eg Foot and Mouth Disease, wheat rust

– Huge costs to a country’s economy

• Human pathogens suitable for ‘low impact’ bioterrorism– Salmonella, Shigella, E. coli, influenza and other respiratory viruses, malaria, TB, HIV

etc

– Relatively low fatality rate

– The Rajneeshee Salmonella attacks

• Human pathogens suitable for ‘high impact’ bioterrorism– Bacillus anthracis, Yersinia pestis, Clostridium botulinum…

– Suitable for weaponisation (inhaled, environmentally hardy)

– High fatality rate

– No terrorist group has ever obtained a suitable strain

Terrorist interest in biological agents

• Predominantly traditional biological warfare agents

– Recognition of state development as weapons

– Volume of reporting and experimental data on internet

– Media coverage of agents eg AQIM & plague

– Preparation by governments to respond to the threat

• Bacillus anthracis, Yersinia pestis, Clostridium botulinum, toxins including botulinum toxin, ricin, etc.

• List of potential agents is almost endless

– Particularly if mass casualties are not a priority

– Selected agent will be influenced by availability & expertise

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The science fiction side

• Artificial manufacture of BW agents

– Synthesis of smallpox virus

• Genetically modified ‘super germs’

– Interleukin or toxin expressing viruses

• Theoretically possible and increasingly within the capabilities of states or elite researchers

• Non-state actors have shown little to no interest

• Non-state actors do not have the expertise or resources to attempt such efforts

– Exception of ‘lone scientist’?

Successful tactics proliferate

• Driven by media exposure and ease of information sharing

• Chlorine IEDs in Iraq– Idea proliferated on the internet and in extremists circles

– Has not resulted in proliferation of chlorine attacks

• Consider bioterrorism– No ‘trigger’ since the rise of AQ

– Ease of proliferating material

• Expect that once acquired, a BW-suitable agent would proliferate– Highlights the importance of preventing initial acquisition

(pathogen security)

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Importance of biosecurity

Obtaining a suitable pathogen has been the key stumbling block for would-be bioterrorists

The most likely scenario for terrorists to develop WMD is by weaponisation of a suitable biological strain

obtained from a legitimate facility

The key step for reducing the threat of a high impact CBRN terrorism attack is to better secure pathogen

stocks

• Significant burden of infectious disease in Asia and increasing microbiology sector

• Increasing amount of infectious material housed in laboratories, collection venues, veterinarian clinics, etc.

Some thoughts on biosecurity

• Traditionally, biosecurity has focused on containing the pathogen rather than securing the facility.– Some biosafety practices contribute to biosecurity

• Biosecurity requires multiple different security layers that, when combined, dramatically reduce terrorist access to pathogens– Vetting of staff

– Culture of responsibility

– Controlled access to material

– Improved facility security

– Inventory control

– Management of infectious material

• Understanding where pathogens are housed– Importance of considering ‘small’ facilities

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