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Global Strategy:
The World is your Oyster
(if you can shuck it!)
Bibliographical Data and Classifications
Library of Congress Classification HD30.28, HD62.4, HD2746.5, HD3612,
(LCC) HB99.5
http://lcweb.loc.gov/catdir/cpso/lcco/lcco_h.pdf
Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) G34, D21, F42, K2, K3, K4, L51
http://www.aeaweb.org/journal/jel_class_system.html
Free keywords Global Strategy
Strategic Management
International Business
International Acquisitions
Mergers & Acquisitions
Rules
Institutions
Erasmus Research Institute of Management - ERIMThe joint research institute of the Rotterdam School of Management (RSM)and the Erasmus School of Economics (ESE) at the Erasmus Universiteit RotterdamInternet: www.erim.eur.nl
ERIM Electronic Series Portal: http://hdl.handle.net/1765/1
Inaugural Addresses Research in Management SeriesReference number ERIM: EIA-2014-059-S&EISBN 978-90-5892-395-0© 2014, Taco H. Reus
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Global Strategy:
The World is your Oyster
(if you can shuck it!)
Address delivered at the occasion of accepting the appointment ofEndowed Professor of Global Strategy
at the Rotterdam School of Management, Erasmus Universityon behalf of Vereniging Trustfonds EUR, on Friday, December 5, 2014
Taco H. Reus
Rotterdam School of ManagementErasmus University RotterdamP.O. Box 17383000 DR RotterdamE-mail: [email protected]
Abstract
In this inaugural address, I will briefly talk about the disciplinary background,central research questions and themes of Global Strategy. I also present what maybe the dominant framework of understanding how global strategy works andwhat determines its success: i.e., the formation and implementation of globalstrategies involves intricate connections between – and savvy decision-makingabout – resources, relations, and rules. I call this the R3 of Global Strategy. Whatcomes into play particularly in the international context is the role of rules. Mygoal here today is to spur your interest in the variety of forms, functions, andforces of rules. Many kinds of rules matter in Global Strategy, and they arehoused at the supranational, national, organizational, individual, and otherlevels to shape how people and firms behave in a global context, how they differ,what determines their success or failure, and how strategic decisions, practices,and processes are conditioned. To illustrate the diverse roles of rules, I willdiscuss the international acquisition process – one of the most important andconsequential strategic events for firms. This illustration seems to suggest thatsuccess in Global Strategy relies for an important part on a curiosity, or a desireto know about how rules – both our own and others, both local and foreign –influence who we and others are as individuals and as organizations.
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Samenvatting
In deze lezing vertel ik kort over de disciplinaire achtergrond, centraleonderzoeksvragen en thema's van Global Strategy. Vervolgens presenteer ikmisschien wel het meest invloedrijke raamwerk over hoe Global Strategy werkten hoe succes kan worden verklaard: het vormen en uitvoeren van wereldwijdestrategieën vereisen ingewikkelde verbindingen tussen – en slimme besluit -vorming over – resources, relaties en regels. Ik noem dit de R3 van Global Strategy.Maar wat vooral belangrijk is in de internationale context is de rol van regels.Mijn doel in deze lezing derhalve is uw interesse te verhogen in de diversiteit aanvormen, functies en krachten van regels. In Global Strategy spelen vele soortenregels een rol op supranationale, nationale, organisatorische, individuele enandere niveaus. En samen bepalen deze diversiteit aan regels hoe mensen enbedrijven zich gedragen in een internationale context, hoe ze verschillen, waaromze succesvol of onsuccesvol zijn, en hoe strategische beslissingen, praktijken enprocessen worden geconditioneerd. Als illustratie van het belang van regelsbespreek ik het internationale overnameproces – één van de belangrijkstestrategische gebeurtenissen voor bedrijven. Deze illustratie laat zien dat succesin Global Strategy voor een belangrijk deel wordt bepaald door een nieuws -gierig heid of verlangen om te begrijpen hoe regels – zowel die van onszelf alsvan anderen, zowel lokale als buitenlandse – ons en anderen beïnvloeden alsindividuen en als organisaties.
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Content
Samenvatting 4
Abstract 5
Content 7
1. Introduction 9
2. Domain of the Global Strategy Field 11
3. The Global Strategy R3 – Resources, Relations & Rules 15
4. The Many Forms, Functions, and Forces of Rules in Global Strategy 19
5. Conclusions 27
6. Words of thanks 29
7. References 31
Erasmus Research Institute of Management - ERIM 33
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1. Introduction
Dear Rector Magnificus,Dear Dean,Dear colleagues,Lieve vrienden en familie,Dear distinguished guests.
Why then the world’s mine oyster,
which I with sword will open.
~William Shakespeare,The Merry Wives of Windsor Act 2, scene 2, 2–5
(c. 1600)
What differentiates today’s executives from previous generations is theirelevated global scope. In the times we live, exploring and exploiting opportu -nities occur increasingly across dispersed geographic markets. Many of thelargest companies have most of their assets and sales abroad – an increasingnumber upwards of 90 percent. And the global scope is not limited to the largestcompanies. Start-ups may be able to sell to only a few hundred buyers locally,which give them little chance of survival, but across borders, tens of thousandsof potential buyers can make their business sustainable overnight. Indeed,today, the world truly is our oyster, the world is ours to enjoy.
Yet, global positioning and expansion is not easy. Having a world wide web ofactivities involves navigating through a widely, and at times wildly, scatteredterrain, which often comes with many pitfalls and great uncertainty. Moreover,the global reach of competition also looms large and creates immense pressureto succeed. In this context, forming and implementing strategies for a globallandscape have become inevitable.
How do strategists make decisions in a global landscape? What factors arecore to implementing these cross-border schemes? How are firms influenced bytheir backgrounds in their attempts to expand abroad? And how are globaldynamics, such as regional and worldwide integration and tensions, globalenvironmental challenges, the rise of emerging markets, and the expansivereach of multinationals from emerging markets changing the competitivelandscape for firms? Why can some firms maneuver so effectively across the wildglobal landscape, while others seem to falter and fail in their attempts? These
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2. Domain of the Global Strategy Field
The Strategic Management Society describes the domain of Global Strategyas “the study of any and all aspects of the environment, organizations, institutions,systems, individuals, actions, and decisions that are a part of, or impinge on, thepractice of strategy and strategic management of business and non-businessorganizations in the global context.”1 The “global” focus of the field emphasizesthe domain’s interest in the study of cross-border business activities and in thecomparative analysis of business activities to the extent that they materializedifferently in different national contexts. As such, the term “global” captures allforms of “cross-border activities [commonly] described as global, international,transnational, multinational, regional, multi-regional or by any other term thatsubstantially implies that activities take place in multiple countries and areintegrated across borders.”2 The “strategy” focus of the field alludes to organi -zations’ expansive worldviews, plans, and decisions to consider foreign locationsas potential financial, factor, and product markets, and as sources of knowledge,learning, and competitive advantage in their own right. The field addresses theglobal aspects of the four central questions in strategic management: How dofirms behave in a global context? Why do firms differ in a global context? What isthe function of the head office in a globally diversified firm? And what determinessuccess or failure in global competition?
The roots of Global Strategy can be traced back to the strategic moves andglobal location decisions made by the very first multinational companies, suchas the Dutch East India Company. However, the academic roots of the field aremuch younger. With the advent of increased internationalization of companiesfollowing WWII, scholars began to consider the Multinational Company (MNC)as an important research object. Many seminal contributors have developed thefield since. For example, Bartlett and Ghoshal (1989) considered the intermingledchallenges of local responsiveness, global efficiency, and continued learning ofMNCs in a global environment, and Michael Porter (1990) emphasized the role ofMNCs in shaping the competitive advantage of nations.
1 Except from the vision statement of the Global Strategy Journal(http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/10.1002/(ISSN)2042-5805).
2 With this use of the term global I follow the vision statement of the Global StrategyJournal.
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are some of the highly important and current questions that the field of globalstrategy aims to address.
In my talk today, I would like to describe the domain of this still emergingresearch field, and its disciplinary background. I will also briefly situate this TrustFund Chair in Global Strategy in its local context – the Netherlands and theRotterdam School of Management. Then, I will outline what may be the dominantframework of understanding how global strategy works and what determinesits success. In a nutshell, forming and implementing global strategies involvesintricate connections between – and savvy decision-making about – resources,relations, and rules. While this triplex of Rs (or R3) seems simple, it actuallyreflects the core dimensions of a highly complex, dynamic, and ambiguousglobal strategy process. While resources and relations are clearly crucial forglobal strategies, what comes into play particularly in the international contextis the role of rules. Discussing these rules with colleagues and executivesgenerated more questions than answers. One important reason for this is thatthe forms, functions, and forces of rules seem to be more diverse and intricatethen we are generally able to grasp. So, one of my aims today is to trigger yourinterest in the diverse roles of rules. I hope to do so by giving you an example ofthe roles of rules in the international acquisition process.
As a prelude to this discussion, I would like to emphasize three conundrumsthat every global strategist seems to face: 1. Value added from foreign endeavors comes with added, and quite often
exponentially more, uncertainty. 2. Local strategies are not really local, and global strategies are not really global.3. Analyses to determine global strategies can be very thorough and diligent
but are often fraught with shortcuts, biases, stereotypes, and emotion.
Moreover, if the world is our oyster, then opening the shell (or “shucking theoyster” as Americans like to say), requires not just identifying the obviouslyincreasing potential all around the world, but also fostering a global sense andcuriosity in the diverse roles of rules. Too often it seems that while we all spot theoyster, we have a hard time shucking it without crushing at least some of thetreasures inside. With that let me start by outlining the domain of the globalstrategy field.
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Strategy teaching. With these connections and our own research programs andcourse curricula, the quality of research and teaching in Global Strategy is veryimpressive at the Rotterdam School of Management.
Now that I have sketched the domain and context of this professorship, letme discuss what may be the dominant framework to understand Global Strategy.
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Strategic Management Society
This Trust Fund Chair stretches this sub-discipline in Strategic Management.Over the last two decades, Global Strategy has become an essential pillar withinthe Strategic Management field, and is recognized as such by the field’s leadingscholarly association, the Strategic Management Society, with the introductionof the Global Strategy Journal. This journal is quite unique as it is just one of twojournals (the other being the Strategic Entrepreneurship Journal) focusing onsub-disciplines within the broader field of strategic management. It is also atestimony of the strength of the academic community and practical relevance ofthe Global Strategy sub-field.
The Netherlands
The practical relevance of global strategy research and teaching is especiallystrong in countries like the Netherlands, which are highly dependent on theability of their firms to internationalize their business, adapt to local conditionsin a broad variety of host environments, and leverage knowledge and capabilitiesof local subsidiaries across all nodes in transnational networks. The Netherlands,in particular, has been a fertile ground for global businesses and for GlobalStrategy thinking. Dutch politicians and business men have long promoted andthrived on modern free trade. In particular, international experiences of Philipshave stood at the basis of much global strategy thinking, and global strategycases on companies such as Unilever and Shell have enriched our field ofresearch.
Rotterdam School of Management, Erasmus University
I am very proud to be part of the Rotterdam School of Management, ErasmusUniversity. It is not only one of Europe’s largest international business schoolswith a very international audience of future and current leaders, it also is one ofthe strongest research schools which provides a very stimulating environmentand is a great place to work. The founding fathers of its predecessor, theFoundation for Business Administration, were the biggest Dutch multinationals– Royal Dutch Shell, Akzo Nobel, ABN AMRO, Unilever, Philips, and Tata Steel. Assuch, the multinational company and an international orientation have beenpart and parcel to our school since the very beginning. The school provides anextremely resourceful platform to study and teach Global Strategy. Across theacademic field, we are connected with worldwide centers of gravity in GlobalStrategy research, and, particularly through our participation in CEMS, in Global
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3. The Global Strategy R3 – Resources, Relations & Rules
Following others, such as the highly pro -li fic scholars Tatiana Kostova and Mike Peng,I view the field of Global Strategy to beheavily influenced by resource-based,industry-based, and institution-based views.However, I like to refer to resources, relations,and rules, which together comprise theGlobal Strategy R3 – that is the Global Strate -gy Toolbox.
Global Strategy R1: Resources
Seminal researchers, such as Edith Penrose (1959), Birger Wernerfelt (1984),and Jay Barney (1991), have generated a tremendous stream of research thatfocuses on a resource-based view of the firm. This body of work emphasizes thatfirms differ both in DNA and in performance because of the unique resourcesthey hold, develop, or are able to acquire. However, with the increasing tur -bulence in the global landscape of firms, scholars began to argue that mostresources rapidly decay or, at least, are constantly at risk of becoming imitable orthreatened by substitutes, and as a result they can quickly lose their status assource for sustainable competitive advantage. You cannot outlast the competi -tion for long with static resources even if they seem uniquely superior. In thisdynamic global environment, competitive advantage mainly depends on thedevelopment of dynamic capabilities to integrate and reconfigure competenciesto deal with diverse and rapidly changing environments (e.g., Teece, Pisano, &Shuen, 1997). Many scholars (e.g., Bresman, Birkinshaw, & Nobel, 1999) havesuggested that knowledge – particularly know-how and expertise – may be themost important resource in this context, but even that could walk out of a firmany day because it resides in the heads of individuals or groups. Rather, it is theability to transfer, integrate, build, and at times destroy knowledge that is themost critical dynamic capability. This can be challenging in a global contextbecause when an activity crosses borders, it calls for the integration of widelydispersed bits of incomplete and frequently contradictory knowledge that allfight for attention (cf. Hayek, 1945).
Some firms seem to be very good at this challenging activity. For example,industry experts have richly described Nokia’s source of sustained competitive
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But if you go abroad – cross just one border – you will often quickly experiencehow different rules can be on the other side. The global strategy field is thereforedominated by research that considers this role of rules. This extraordinaryinterest in rules is what distinguishes global strategic management fromgeneral strategic management.
To give you a sense of the importance of rules, please recall this year’s FIFAWorld Cup in Brazil that brought together teams from 32 countries. The FIFA hasa clear rulebook in place. Some players may disagree with the rules, some maypurposefully violate them – which can have consequences – and some mayaccidentally violate them because they get a bit too worked up (again possiblywith consequences). However, in general, most players understand how thegame should be played and how to win within the confines of the rules.
Now consider if we could travel back in time to the pre-football era whennobody had heard of this peculiar game and we had invited the wisest Germanand Greek philosophers to play against each other. There is actually old footagethat provides insight into what would have happened…4 Monty Python revealedthat even the most resourceful, well-connected, wisest men are quite vulnerableif they do not know the rules of the game. They would not know how to play thegame, how to score, or even why to score. In such a context, a Eureka-momentmakes it easy to win the game.
Like the ancient philosophers in an unfamiliar football context, globalstrategists face complex foreign games, which can cause considerable uncer -tainty and ambiguity. What’s more, global strategists often have to play simul -taneous games, which are particularly challenging because they are not alwaysfamiliar with the rulebooks of all these different games.
As the role of rules is so important to global strategy, I would like to focus onthis part of the Global Strategy R3 a bit more.
4 Monty Python’s Flying Circus footage of Philosopher Football:http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-2gJamguN04
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advantage as its ability to attract clever people with unique experience andcreative skills not only from Finland or Scandinavia but from around the world.It was an important reason why the company was able to hold over half of theglobal smartphone market share in 2007. Yet, even these attractive dynamiccapabilities only seem to keep a company on top temporarily. Within just twodramatic years, Nokia lost much of its smartphone market share, and was largelyacquired by Microsoft.
So, continuously developing, acquiring, managing, and particularly trans -forming resources is a very complex part of formulating and implementingGlobal Strategies.
Global Strategy R2: Resources and Relations
Apart from resources, global strategists also smartly have to shape industryrelations with other firms, organizations, and governments. The work by MichaelPorter (e.g.,1980, 1990) has been particularly influential in this regard. Heemphasized that firms need to consider their position in relation to suppliers,buyers, rivals, and firms from related industries in such a way that they can reapthe highest returns. In a global context, this positioning within a networkofrelations becomes exponentially more complex and dynamic. Consider againNokia’s set of relations. The former CEO, Kallasvuo, underlined that “nowhere inbusiness history has a competitive environment changed so much as it did withthe converging of several industries – to the point that no-one knows what tocall the industry anymore. Mobile telephony converged with the mobilecomputer, the internet industry, the media industry and the applicationsindustry – to mention a few… and today they’re all rolled into one.” 3 The networkof relations in a global landscape is developing constantly and can create radicalshifts in opportunities and threats that are often extremely difficult to anti -cipate.
Global Strategy R3: Resources, Relations and Rules
As I already mentioned, while resources and relations are clearly crucial forglobal strategies, in the international context, rules in particular play animportant role. In the academic world, we call these rules institutions but I willnot use this word here. I like to stick with the term rules, not just because it is theterm that most people on the street would use, but also because I think it helpsto consider their forms, functions, and forces from more diverse angles. In a localcontext, rules are often in the background; everybody takes them for granted.
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3 From an interview of Quy Huy and Timo Vuori. Read more athttp://knowledge.insead.edu/strategy/what-could-have-saved-nokia-and-what-can-other-companies-learn-3220#cS02tJuHRPTZQEOc.99
4. The Many Forms, Functions, and Forces of Rulesin Global Strategy
Nobel Prize winner, Professor Douglas North, explained that rules are“humanly devised constraints that structure political, economic and socialinteraction.” It is important to note that the term “constraint” does not meanthat rules just limit interactions, but rather that rules limit some behaviors andpractices, and facilitate, even enforce, other behaviors and practices. They deter -mine what is or what is not allowed, accepted, and valued. Clearly, there aremany kinds of rules that we, and the organizations we work for, follow. Just toillustrate, consider traffic light rules. They facilitate the flow of traffic andenforce certain driving behaviors, but they also constrain us by limiting ourability to go really fast. And, think about the cyclists that rule our streets, andsurprise foreigners when they visit. Or, consider measurement rules that helpsus understand and communicate the geographic distance between two points.We accept these rules but others may not. We can distinguish between formalrules that are explicit, such as laws, regulations, and other formal agreementsthat can be written down, and informal rules that relate to more tacit under -standings, habits, cultural norms, routines, broadly shared expectations, anddeeply ingrained viewpoints. All these forms of formal and informal rules limitsome and facilitate other behaviors and practices.
You could say that Global Strategy scholars (including myself) are a bit overlyintrigued by differences in informal cultural rules. Interestingly, there is quite adiverse collection of arguments about their influence on cross-border success.The most dominant view adopts a culture clash argument emphasizing thatcultural differences lead to misunderstandings, conflict, and distrust betweengroups of people that are used to a different set of informal rules. Contradictingthis argument, some scholars advance a cultural enrichment argument stressingthat experiences with differences in rules lead to opportunities to learn how toapproach tasks, activities, and practices in a different way, fostering successthrough enhanced creativity and learning from cross-border activities. A culturalcomplementarity argument combines the culture clash and enrichment argu -ments, and states that it is better for firms to expand into regions with culturesthat are neither too similar because there would not be many learning opportu -nities, nor too different because it would be too difficult to understand theforeign context. A cultural adaptation argument is a mirror image of thecultural complementarity argument. It argues that firms perform cross-borderactivities better when cultures are very similar because fewer misunderstan -dings will occur, but also when cultures are very different because the people
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too many misunderstandings about the rules. Perhaps we will ignore the rules,like we ignore them at home. On the palette of differences, we will notice thatmany rules actually also do not matter at all or do not have to matter, forexample, eating habits and transportation rules. Even seemingly importantformal rules such as differences in forms of capitalism, or cultural norms aboutapproaches to hierarchy may not matter at all in a particular cross-bordersetting. Many formal and informal rules may differ between countries but theydo not influence our tasks. Only some differences matter, and some of these willmatter negatively and some positively. Since our research predominantly takesa broad-brush approach toward national differences, we have little insight intowhat and how differences really matter. This is an important gap becausedecision-makers in distant countries experience high levels of uncertainty notjust because there are more differences, but because it is increasingly difficult todetermine which of these differences matter and how they matter.
Much of the Global Strategy research emphasizes rules and differences inrules at the national level, and indeed, due to legal and socialization processes,many formal and informal rules are created and sustained at the national level.However, rulebooks are created and sustained at many different levels ofanalysis. With the acceleration of regional integration and the need for world -wide coordination, we have an expansive rulebook at the highest supranationallevel. Consider how politicians from all across the world are trying to rewriterules following the financial crisis. On the other hand, our own personality givesus a kind of personalized rulebook on how we prefer to behave and how wedevelop our own routines. When it comes to CEO personalities, or more broadly
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involved expect and more readily accept the differences, and will prepare forthem more carefully in advance. This argument suggests that when cultures aremoderately different, people expect similarities while facing unexpecteddifferences.
Considering all these different arguments together, perhaps not surprisingly,most studies actually find the relationship between cultural differences andcross-border success to be insignificant. Together we get rather a confusingpicture … something like a cat. Yet, I do not think we should conclude that noneof these arguments matter. It may be best to conclude that it all depends. Mycolleagues in the Global Strategy corner of our department have discussed thisin highly cited articles: René Olie (1994) spoke of shades of culture and that theirforces depend on the nature of cross-border relationships, and Arjen Slangen(2006) argued that culture clashes are likely only when cross-border activitiesare characterized by high levels of integration, and that more positive outcomescan be expected when autonomy is retained. In one my own studies, we foundthat the effect of cultural differences in international acquisitions depends onthe extent to which firms develop integration capabilities, such as fostering richcommunication ties and mutual understanding (Reus & Lamont, 2009). Whilecultural differences can constrain these integration capabilities, fortunatelythere are plenty of other forces that can also create them.
We tend to use the concept of cultural differences in very broad, abstractways. But what does it really mean when we say “these cultures are different,” orwhen we say “the cultural distance between the Netherlands and China is largerthan between the Netherlands and Belgium”? I think that when we comparetwo countries, they are likely to have many rules that are quite similar, and manyrules that are likely to be more or less different. So, when organizations expandin a distant country, we have a palette of similarities and a palette of differencesin rules. On the palette of similarities, we can easily build relationships without
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The flow chart depicts the international acquisition process with several key
events or characteristics in the merger time line. Roughly speaking, we can
distinguish a pre-merger and a post-merger phase, with a holding period
when firms have to wait for regulatory approval. But please note that we
could think of different phases as well as different moments. I have been a bit
selective, just to be able to selfishly highlight some of our own research. For
example, in this flow chart I have not included the ways in which firms prepare
for an acquisition to wade through rules effectively. Interesting recent
research found that firms in the U.S. make substantially more campaign
contributions to political parties one year prior to making an acquisition
(Holburn & Vanden Bergh, 2014). They seem to realize that they have to abide
by strict rules, and perhaps hope to get some help from the politicians in
anticipation of their pending acquisition decision.
Pre-Merger Phase
In our own work, we have looked at the role of prior experience. Firmsgenerally enter a new acquisition event with some baggage – they have more orless prior experience in making acquisitions and form organizational rulesabout how to take over a company – i.e., they form acquisition routines. Suchexperience could help when the routines fit the new acquisition context well;however they may misfit the context. We looked at large acquisitions, and sawthat many acquirers involved had substantial experience but predominantly inmaking small acquisitions. In other words, the organizational rules on how totake over a company were shaped through a series of small acquisitions. This canbe a problem when making a large acquisition because the rules are differentand they affect firms in a very different way (Ellis, Reus, Lamont, & Ranft, 2011). Forexample, small deals only affect small pockets of the firms involved, whereaslarge deals can impact many departments and business units throughout thefirm. We saw that prior experience in making small deals was not beneficial butrather hurt the performance of subsequent large deals. Fortunately, there areways to prevent these mishaps. We saw that when acquirers retained topmanagers of the acquired firms, performance effects of experience were not asbad; these acquired top managers could help to challenge the organizationalrules of the acquirers, and adapt their organizational rules to better fit theunique conditions of large acquisitions.
In the pre-merger phase, negotiations generally occur with a small set ofplayers – secrecy rules the game. The CEOs of the firms involved may hold secretmeetings during which they get to know each other and develop trust – they
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their individual rulebook, this can actually have a tremendous influence on theorganizational rulebook. Although, there are many other forces that influenceorganizational rulebook. Firms have formal and informal routines that mayemerge over time to replace time-consuming decision-making processes. Thesecould become dynamic capabilities that help organize the firm’s critical resources,but they also could become core rigidities that restrain organizations fromformulating and implementing novel practices that are needed to respond to newenvironmental demands. At the industry-level, groups of companies can createindustry rulebooks, setting self-imposed formal standards of environmentalperformance to industry members as well as formulating more informal rules ofconduct, and following popular fads.
Part of the challenge for Global Strategy and for understanding how firmsbehave and succeed in a cross-border setting is that these rules at differentlevels influence each other in supporting and conflicting ways. A wide variety ofnational, supranational, industry, organizational as well as individual rulebooksinteract to influence the formulation and implementation of global strategies. Iwould like to illustrate the variety of ways in which rules play a role in criticalstrategic events by discussing some of my own research. I have been fortunate towork in a great team of researchers. With the benefit of hindsight, and looking atthe work we are currently doing, I think we are predominantly trying to under -stand these diverse roles of rules. We often focus on the internationalacquisition context, or merger and acquisition (M&A) context more generally.These strategic events are rare and consequential for the firms involved, soresearch can be particularly practically relevant. They are also important andmemorable to the people involved, which explains why executives are oftenwilling and able to participate in the research we do.
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and if the acquirer comes from a country that has starkly different rules, theacquirer may be viewed as illegitimate because it would be guilty by association.The 2006 acquisition of a port management business in the United States byDubai Ports World was a particularly controversial case that illustrates thatnational differences in deeply ingrained rulebooks, or supranational tensionsdue to these differences, can delay and even block foreign activities. Althoughshareholders approved the acquisition and President George Bush evenvigorously argued in favor of the deal, it received so many legitimacy challengesthat Dubai Ports decided to turn over the acquired units to an Americancompetitor.
Post-Merger Phase
When acquirers do survive the time surrounding the announcement, andreceive approval from shareholders and regulators, the deal can be completedand the post-merger phase begins. Often the team that managed the pre-merger phase is different from the team that manages the post-merger phase,and they may follow quite different rulebooks. Synergy potential and actualsynergy realization greatly depend on the extent to which pre-merger and post-merger rulebooks are written in line, and are at least understood by everyoneinvolved.
Individual, organizational, and national rulebooks also influence howacquirers approach integration and what requires specific attention duringintegration. For example, Monin and colleagues (2013) presented an in-depthcase of a large, international merger in which the firms started with the normsof justice based on equality – the rule was equal distribution of power, status,and work. Over time, the norm of justice shifted to emphasizing equity on thebasis of meritocratic performance – the rule became the work goes to the unitthat performs best. In one of our own studies, we also looked at justice rulesduring the post-merger phase, and found that informational justice rules – i.e.,providing justification for difficult but critical integration decisions – isimportant for acquisition performance in the short run, while procedural justicerules – i.e., providing an actual voice in these decisions – is important for long-term acquisition performance (Ellis, Reus, & Lamont, 2009).
National rules also can influence how firms approach integration. Forexample, we found that when US firms make acquisitions in countries with verydifferent cultures, they find it more difficult to attend to emotions of newlyacquired members, but when they make acquisitions in more humane-oriented
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develop certain inter-personal rules of the game. Actually, often the consultantsof the firms involved do all the talking, not the CEOs, so then an indirectconversation with all kinds of communication rules and barriers takes place.
The ultimate outcome of the pre-merger phase is to buy or not to buy thetarget, and what to pay beyond what the market would pay for it – theacquisition premium. Although firms initiate thorough analyses and duediligence before determining these key outcomes, much uncertainty remains,particularly in the international acquisition context. Psychological research,heavily influenced by the prolific scholars Tversky & Kahneman (e.g., 1974),suggests that under such heavy uncertainty, people tend to use simplificationrules or “heuristics.” Anchoring, for example, refers to a simplification rule ofrelying heavily on information (the anchor) that appears early on in a decision-making process. Decision-makers tend to come back to that anchor frequentlyand new information that is consistent with the anchor receives more weight,while inconsistent information is discarded. In the context of acquisitionpremium decisions, we found that indeed international acquirers were morelikely to anchor their decisions on the premium that another acquirer paid in alocal market’s preceding acquisition than domestic acquirers (Malhotra, Zhu, &Reus, 2014). This anchoring can be a good thing as it clearly simplifies thedecision and it does so on the basis of some relevant information. Yet, it may alsodownplay important information unique to the focal acquisition. In theiranchoring, we found that international acquirers gave more weight to decisionsby reference groups – i.e., they tended to follow other international acquirers.This is revealing particularly considering that this reference group generallypays higher premiums. We found that US firms on average paid 11% more forinternational deals than they did for domestic deals. At least in part, this foreign-domestic divide in what firms pay for their international acquisitions maypersist because international acquirers anchor their decisions on the relativelyhigher preceding international acquisition premiums. It is like buying a newhome and anchoring your decision on someone close to you that unfortunatelypaid quite a bit more for his new home than the person next door.
Once the decision is made, and firms announce their intention to acquire,the international acquisition process transforms from being highly secretive tobeing staged in front of a large audience. At that point, many stakeholders,including shareholders, employees, competitors, regulators, politicians, journa -lists, and the general public, consider the acquisition and determine whether itfits their rulebooks. In the context of international acquisitions, localconstituencies may view the acquisition as an invasion by a foreign intruder,
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5. Conclusions
So there can be this darker side due to rulebook challenges or threats, but Iwould argue that we can turn the light back on if we consider the multitude anddiversity of roles of rules more carefully. Rulebooks matter, and differences do aswell, but most important is to know how people and organizations recognize,understand, and deal with them. It requires not just insight in foreign rules butalso and perhaps even more importantly in local rulebooks and our own indivi -dual rulebooks. From an academic and practical point, we still have very limitedinsight into why some firms are able to forge ties across distant regions, increasetheir ability to understand diverse groups of people, and motivate their orga -nization members to work across the widely and wildly scattered global land -scape. Foreign and local rulebooks are important sources to increase our insight.
A better understanding of distant rulebooks can help firms adapt their ownlocal rulebooks. Firms, such as Tata Steel and Philips already seem to haveadopted this approach when developing products to serve the Base of thePyramid. They adapt to the rules that are set in less developed markets todevelop products and engineering processes that are both more cost-efficientand energy-efficient. They adopt Base of the Pyramid rules to become morecompetitive under the rules of the Rest of the Pyramid.
To come back to the conundrums I mentioned in the introduction of this talk.Venturing into foreign markets can create added value, but can also come withadded, and quite often exponentially more, uncertainty. Rules will be different,awkward, and surprising, and mishaps will be more likely, but some rules willalso be intriguing, unique, and possibly valuable. The high uncertainty in globaldecision-making makes global strategies quite local. Indeed, global strategies areinfluenced by very local and individual preferences, personality, simplificationrules, as well as organizational routines and practices. While firms generallyconduct thorough analyses and prepare diligently for global endeavors, it isimportant to remember that global strategy decisions, and the tools used toderive them, are often highly influenced by individual, home-grown, local rules.Therefore, I think we can only shuck the oyster if we have a good understandingof foreign, local, and our own individual rulebooks. This requires a curiosity abouthow rules – both our own and others, both local and foreign – influence who weand others are as individuals and as organizations; what we and they do, how weand they behave, and how this all influences ensuing opportunities andconstraints in the global context. Having such a curiosity in distant and nearby
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cultures that “encourage and reward individuals for being fair, altruistic,friendly, generous, caring, and kind to others” (House, Hanges, Javidan, Dorfman,& Gupta, 2004, p569), they, in fact, attend to emotions more (Reus, 2012).
Global strategy scholars and executives also have emphasized the importanceof knowledge transfer in the post-merger phase of international acquisitions.Yet, while numerous studies have considered antecedents to cross-borderknowledge transfer (e.g., Bresman et al., 1999; Lord & Ranft, 2000), its perfor -mance effects have rarely been studied empirically. In fact, esteemed colleaguesVan Wijk, Jansen and Lyles (2008) conducted a thorough meta-analysis of therelationship between knowledge transfer and performance but could notinclude a single M&A study. However, whether knowledge investments lead tovalue creation is not so self-evident as it may seem (Reus, Ranft, Lamont, &Adams, 2009). We considered the performance effects of a knowledge flow thatdominates the international acquisition context: i.e., the transfer of non-location-specific knowledge from acquirers to acquired firms; for example,transferring managerial knowledge from the acquirer to its acquired firm (Reus,Lamont, & Ellis, In Press). Such a knowledge flow maybe a way to extend theacquirer’s expertise and capabilities to the acquired firm, but it also haspotential negative implications which reveal a darker side of knowledgetransfer that is often ignored. In particular, such a knowledge flow can threatenthe pre-existing rulebook the acquired members have long cherished – thetransfer of knowledge to acquired firms is at the same time a call to change long-held routines. We find support for this adverse knowledge transfer effect.Performance effects improve only at very high levels of knowledge transfer,when acquirers extend their own knowledge and associated routines and powerstructures completely.
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6. Words of thanks
Dear Executive Board of the Erasmus University, Dear Dean of the RotterdamSchool of Management, Dear Vereniging Trustfonds EUR,I am very thankful for the opportunities you have given me to develop myresearch and teaching agenda. I see this Endowed Professorship in Global Strategynot as an accomplishment but rather as an anticipation of what is still to come.I greatly enjoy working at this university, and am very proud to be a part of oneof the top business schools of Europe.
Dear Professor Van Oosterhout,Hans, Ik denk nog vaak terug aan onze lunch in Philadelphia in 2007. Dat gesprekis de hoofdrede waarom ik hier nu sta. Je bent een geweldige collega en vriend.
Dear Professor Heugens,Pursey, het is ongelooflijk hoeveel jij betekent voor de universiteit, de school, deafdeling en de mensen die op jouw pad komen. Ik ben ontiegelijk blij dat ik ookop jouw pad terecht kwam!
Dear Professor Meijs, and all colleagues at the Business-Society ManagementDepartment,Lucas en alle andere collega’s van de BSM afdeling, ontzettend bedankt dat ikmijn eerste tijd terug in Nederland bij jullie heb mogen doorbrengen. Tijdensmijn sollicitatiegesprekken was ik al erg onder de indruk van het enthousiasmein onderzoek – vooral in thema’s die ontzettend van deze tijd zijn. Het was heelmooi om daar tussen te mogen zitten. Yolanda, jij vooral bedankt voor deassistentie en gezelligheid.
Dear Colleagues at the Department of Strategic Management & Entrepreneur -ship, It’s an honor to be part of this strong department. It is very special how muchresearch and strong teaching we are able to offer. Special thanks to the GlobalStrategy Corner – I apologize for having been a little preoccupied with thisinaugural address for the past months; very much looking forward to ourcontinued conversations! Other colleagues, friends, executives, it would be greatif you like to join our monthly Global Strategy conversations, please do let usknow.
Patricia en Carolien, bedankt dat jullie me op de rails houden; wat een goedteam zijn jullie!
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rules helps to determine the value and limitations of rulebooks, and to see whereour rulebooks might need some adjusting.
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7. References
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Bartlett CA, Ghoshal S. 1989. Managing across Borders: The TransnationalSolution. Harvard Business School Press: Boston, MA.
Bresman H, Birkinshaw JM, Nobel R. 1999. Knowledge transfer in interna -tional acquisitions. Journal of International Business Studies 30(3): 439-462.
Ellis KM, Reus TH, Lamont BT. 2009. The effects of procedural and informatio -nal justice in the integration of related acquisitions. Strategic ManagementJournal 30(2): 137-161.
Ellis KM, Reus TH, Lamont BT, Ranft AL. 2011. Transfer effects in large acquisi -tions: How size-specific experience matters. Academy of Management Journal54(6): 1261-1276.
Hayek FA. 1945. The use of knowledge in society. The American EconomicReview 35(4): 521-530.
Holburn GLF, Vanden Bergh RG. 2014. Integrated market and nonmarketstrategies: Political campaign contributions around merger and acquisitionevents in the energy sector. Strategic Management Journal 35(3): 450-460.
House RJ, Hanges PJ, Javidan M, Dorfman PW, Gupta V. 2004. Culture,leadership, and organizations. Sage Publications: Thousand Oaks, CA.
Lord MD, Ranft AL. 2000. Organizational learning about new internationalmarkets: Exploring the internal transfer of local market knowledge. Journal ofInternational Business Studies 31(4): 573-589.
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Dear Colleagues at Florida State University and Florida Atlantic University,Thank you for giving me such a supportive environment to help me find myacademic path. You really were one big family away from home!
Dear Professor Lamont, Dear Professor Ellis,Bruce, of course, I am particularly and extraordinarily grateful to you! You aresuch a great educator, guide, inspiration, and a great friend. Kim, thank you somuch for being a great team together with Bruce, and of course also a greatfriend! We are beginning to have quite an exceptional track record!
Dear co-authors, Thank you so much for teaming up to explore and make sense of the curiousdilemmas, challenges, practices, and processes of strategic management.
Dear students,Thank you for the great exchange of ideas!
Dear executives,Thank you for the great exchange of ideas!
Dear Andac,You have been a great travel companion during this academic journey. We are abit further apart now, and I often miss our talks, but fortunately we can continueour discussions on both sides of the Atlantic and in cyberspace. And, of course,thank you very much for the suggestions on the earlier version of this talk.
Lieve MaM en Daddyboy,Nu sta ik hier! – ontzettend bedankt dat jullie al mijn gekke beslissingen hebbengesteund. Dat die beslissingen uiteindelijk naar dit punt hebben geleid komtvooral door heel veel geluk die ik van jullie heb gekregen.
Lieve Christien, lieve Meis,Rufus en ik zijn de gelukkigste mannen op aarde met jou. Wat hebben wij eenmooie wereld samen en wat een mooie reizen – ben heel benieuwd naar onzevolgende plek. Ik hou zo veel van jou!
Beste vrienden,Ik hoop dat mijn verhaal vandaag wat meer inzicht geeft over wat ik noueigenlijk doe. Er zit zeker een kip en ei bij, maar ook een oester!
Ik heb gezegd.
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Erasmus Research Institute of Management - ERIM
Inaugural Addresses Research in Management SeriesERIM Electronic Series Portal: http://hdl.handle.net/1765/1
Balk, B.M., The residual: On monitoring and Benchmarking Firms, Industries andEconomies with respect to Productivity, 9 November 2001, EIA-07-MKT, ISBN 90-5892-018-6, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/300
Benink, H.A., Financial Regulation; Emerging from the Shadows, 15 June 2001,EIA-02-ORG, ISBN 90-5892-007-0, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/339
Bleichrodt, H., The Value of Health, 19 September 2008, EIA-2008-36-MKT, ISBN/EAN 978-90-5892-196-3, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/13282
Boons, A.N.A.M., Nieuwe Ronde, Nieuwe Kansen: Ontwikkeling in ManagementAccounting & Control, 29 September 2006, EIA-2006-029-F&A, ISBN 90-5892-126-3, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/8057
Brounen, D., The Boom and Gloom of Real Estate Markets, 12 December 2008, EIA-2008-035-F&A, ISBN/EAN 978-90-5892-194-9,http://hdl.handle.net/1765/14001
Bruggen, G.H. van, Marketing Informatie en besluitvorming: een inter-organisationeel perspec tief, 12 October 2001, EIA-06-MKT, ISBN 90-5892-016-X, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/341
Commandeur, H.R., De betekenis van marktstructuren voor de scope van deonderneming. 05 June 2003, EIA-022-MKT, ISBN 90-5892-046-1,http://hdl.handle.net/1765/427
Dale, B.G., Quality Management Research: Standing the Test of Time; Richardson,R., Performance Related Pay – Another Management Fad?; Wright, D.M., FromDownsize to Enterprise: Management Buyouts and Restructuring Industry.Triple inaugural address for the Rotating Chair for Research in Organisationand Management. March 28, 2001, EIA-01-ORG, ISBN 90-5892-006-2,http://hdl.handle.net/1765/338
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Reus TH, Lamont BT. 2009. The double-edged sword of cultural distance ininternational acquisitions. Journal of International Business Studies 40(8): 1298-1316.
Reus TH, Lamont BT, Ellis KM. In Press. A darker side of knowledge transferfollowing international acquisitions. Strategic Management Journal.
Reus TH, Ranft AL, Lamont BT, Adams G. 2009. An interpretive systems view ofknowledge investments. Academy of Management Review 34(4): 382-400.
Slangen A. 2006. National cultural distance and initial foreign acquisitionperformance: The moderating effect of integration. Journal of World Business41(2): 161-170.
Teece DJ, Pisano G, Shuen A. 1997. Dynamic capabilities and strategic mana -ge ment. Strategic Management Journal 18(7): 509-533.
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Heck, E. van, Waarde en Winnaar; over het ontwerpen van electronischeveilingen, 28 June 2002, EIA-10-LIS, ISBN 90-5892-027-5,http://hdl.handle.net/1765/346
Heugens, Pursey P.M.A.R., Organization Theory: Bright Prospects for aPermanently Failing Field, 12 September 2008, EIA-2007-032 ORG, ISBN/EAN 978-90-5892-175-8, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/13129
Jansen, J.J.P., Corporate Entrepreneurship: Sensing and Seizing Opportunities fora Prosperous Research Agenda, April 14, 2011, ISBN 978-90-5892-276-2,http://hdl.handle.net/1765/22999
Jong, A. de, De Ratio van Corporate Governance, 6 October 2006, EIA-2006-028-F&A, ISBN 90-5892-128-X, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/8046
Jong, M. de, New Survey Methods: Tools to Dig for Gold, May 31, 2013, ISBN 978-90-5892-337-7, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/40379
Kaptein, M., De Open Onderneming, Een bedrijfsethisch vraagstuk, and Wempe,J., Een maatschappelijk vraagstuk, Double inaugural address, 31 March2003, EIA-16-ORG, ISBN 90-5892-037-2, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/305
Ketter, W., Envisioning Sustainable Smart Markets, June 20, 2014, ISBN 978-90-5892-369-1, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/51584
Knippenberg, D.L. van, Understanding Diversity, 12 October 2007, EIA-2007-030-ORG, ISBN 90-5892-149-9, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/10595
Kroon, L.G., Opsporen van sneller en beter. Modelling through, 21 September2001, EIA-03-LIS, ISBN 90-5892-010-0, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/340
Maas, Victor S., De controller als choice architect, October 5, 2012, ISBN 90-5892-314-1, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/37373
Magala, S.J., East, West, Best: Cross cultural encounters and measures, 28 September2001, EIA-04-ORG, ISBN 90-5892-013-5, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/284
Meijs, L.C.P.M., The resilient society: On volunteering, civil society and corporatecommunity involvement in transition, 17 September 2004, EIA-2004-024-ORG, ISBN 90-5892-000-3, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/1908
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De Cremer, D., On Understanding the Human Nature of Good and Bad Behaviorin Business: A Behavioral Ethics Approach, 23 October 2009, ISBN 978-90-5892-223-6, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/17694
Dekimpe, M.G., Veranderende datasets binnen de marketing: puur zegen ofbron van frustratie?, 7 March 2003, EIA-17-MKT, ISBN 90-5892-038-0,http://hdl.handle.net/1765/342
Dijk, D.J.C. van, “Goed nieuws is geen nieuws”, 15 November 2007, EIA-2007-031-F&A, ISBN 90-5892-157-4, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/10857
Dijk, M.A. van, “The Social Value of Finance”, March 7, 2014, ISBN 978-90-5892-361-5, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/1
Dissel, H.G. van, “Nut en nog eens nut” Over retoriek, mythes en rituelenin informatie systeem onderzoek, 15 February 2002,EIA-08-LIS,ISBN 90-5892-018-6,http://hdl.handle.net/1765/301
Donkers, A.C.D., “The Customer Cannot Choose”, Apruil 12, 2013,ISBN 978-90-5892-334-9,http://hdl.handle.net/1765/39716
Dul, J., “De mens is de maat van alle dingen” Over mensgericht ontwerpen vanproducten en processen., 23 May 2003, EIA-19-LIS, ISBN 90-5892-038-X,http://hdl.handle.net/1765/348
Ende, J. van den, Organising Innovation, 18 September 2008, EIA-2008-034-ORG, ISBN 978-90-5892-189-5, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/13898
Fok, D., Stay ahead of competition, October 4, 2013, ISBN 978-90-5892-346-2,http://hdl.handle.net/1765/41515
Groenen, P.J.F., Dynamische Meerdimensionele Schaling: Statistiek Op De Kaart, 31 March 2003, EIA-15-MKT, ISBN 90-5892-035-6,http://hdl.handle.net/1765/304
Hartog, D.N. den, Leadership as a source of inspiration, 5 October 2001, EIA-05-ORG, ISBN 90-5892-015-1, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/285
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Roosenboom, P.G.J., On the real effects of private equity, 4 September 2009, ISBN 90-5892-221-2, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/16710
Rotmans, J., Societal Innovation: between dream and reality lies complexity, June 3, 2005, EIA-2005-026-ORG, ISBN 90-5892-105-0,http://hdl.handle.net/1765/7293
Smidts, A., Kijken in het brein, Over de mogelijkheden van neuromarketing,25 October 2002, EIA-12-MKT, ISBN 90-5892-036-4,http://hdl.handle.net/1765/308
Smit, H.T.J., The Economics of Private Equity, 31 March 2003, EIA-13-LIS, ISBN 90-5892-033-X, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/302
Stremersch, S., Op zoek naar een publiek…., April 15, 2005, EIA-2005-025-MKT,ISBN 90-5892-084-4, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/1945
Verbeek, M., Onweerlegbaar bewijs? Over het belang en de waarde van empirischonderzoek voor financierings- en beleggingsvraagstukken, 21 June 2002, EIA-09-F&A, ISBN 90-5892-026-7, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/343
Verwijmeren, P., Forensic Finance, September 19, 2014, ISBN 978-90-5892-377-6,http://hdl.handle.net/1765/76906
Waarts, E., Competition: an inspirational marketing tool, 12 March 2004, EIA-2003-022-MKT, ISBN 90-5892-068-2, http://ep.eur.nl/handle/1765/1519
Wagelmans, A.P.M., Moeilijk Doen Als Het Ook Makkelijk Kan, Over het nut vangrondige wiskundige analyse van beslissingsproblemen, 20 September 2002,EIA-11-LIS, ISBN 90-5892-032-1, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/309
Whiteman, G., Making Sense of Climate Change: How to Avoid the Next BigFlood. April 1, 2011, ISBN 90-5892-275-5, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/1
Wynstra, J.Y.F., Inkoop, Leveranciers en Innovatie: van VOC tot Space Shuttle,February 17 2006, EIA-2006-027-LIS, ISBN 90-5892-109-3,http://hdl.handle.net/1765/7439
Yip, G.S., Managing Global Customers, 19 June 2009, EIA-2009-038-STR, ISBN 90-5892-213-7, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/15827
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Meijs, L.C.P.M., Reinventing Strategic Philanthropy: the sustainable organizationof voluntary action for impact, February 19, 2010, ISBN 90-5892-230-4, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/17833
Oosterhout, J., Het disciplineringsmodel voorbij; over autoriteit en legitimiteit inCorporate Governance, 12 September 2008, EIA-2007-033-ORG, ISBN/EAN 978-90-5892-183-3, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/13229
Osselaer, S.M.J. van, Of Rats and Brands: A Learning-and-Memory Perspective onConsumer Decisions, 29 October 2004, EIA-2003-023-MKT, ISBN 90-5892-074-7, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/1794
Pau, L-F., The Business Challenges in Communicating, Mobile or Otherwise,31 March 2003, EIA-14-LIS, ISBN 90-5892-034-8,http://hdl.handle.net/1765/303
Peccei, R., Human Resource Management And The Search For The HappyWorkplace. January 15, 2004, EIA-021-ORG, ISBN 90-5892-059-3,http://hdl.handle.net/1765/1108
Peek, E., The Value of Accounting, October 21, 2011, ISBN 978-90-5892-301-1,http://hdl.handle.net/1765/32937
Pelsser, A.A.J., Risico en rendement in balans voor verzekeraars. May 2, 2003, EIA-18-F&A, ISBN 90-5892-041-0, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/872
Pennings, E., Does contract complexity limit oppoortunities? Verticalorganization and flexibility., September 17, 2010, ISBN 978-90-5892-255-7,http://hdl.handle.net/1765/20457
Pronk, M., Financial Accounting, te praktisch voor theorie en te theoretisch voorde praktijk?, June 29, 2012, ISBN 978-90-5892-312-7,http://hdl.handle.net/1765/1
Rodrigues, Suzana B., Towards a New Agenda for the Study of BusinessInternationalization: Integrating Markets, Institutions and Politics, June 17,2010, ISBN 978-90-5892-246-5, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/20068
Rohde, Kirsten, Planning or Doing, May 9, 2014, ISBN 978-90-5892-364-6,http://hdl.handle.net/1765/51322
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