Global Populism: A Lineage of Filipino Strongmen from

7MCCOY GLOBAL POPULISM AND FILIPINO STRONGMEN

Kasarinlan Philippine Journal of Third World Studies 2017 32 (1ndash2) 7ndash54

Global PopulismA Lineage of Filipino Strongmen

from Quezon to Marcos and Duterte

ALFRED W MCCOY

ABSTRACT The rising global phenomenon of populism has been framed as a reactionto the unmet promises of globalization in nominally democratic nations RodrigoDuterte has similarly been positioned along this trend This article traces the lineage ofFilipino strongmen from Quezon to Marcos and Duterte and shows that they emergedthrough juxtaposition of skilled diplomacy and local controls This situates Duterte atan intersection of global trends and local political tradition beyond the flat applicationof the term populism to the Philippines Studying these Filipino strongmen reveals therole of performative violence in projecting domestic strength and a complementary needfor diplomatic success to demonstrate international influence These overlooked aspectsof global populism can be used to speculate about the political fate of populist strongmenin disparate corners of the globe

KEYWORDS Manuel Quezon middot Ferdinand Marcos middot Rodrigo Duterte middot populism middotstrongmen

INTRODUCTION

In the last years of his martial law dictatorship President FerdinandMarcos sanctioned some 2500 extrajudicial killings and during hisfirst months in power President Rodrigo Duterte has presided over7000 such executions for his drug war Are these simply senselessmurders or do they have some larger significance that can help usunderstand the sudden proliferation of populist leaders in nominallydemocratic nations around the globe

The rise of Duterte as a populist strongman not only resonatesdeeply with his countryrsquos political culture but also reflects broaderglobal trends that make his blunt rhetoric and iconoclastic diplomacyseem unexceptional After a quarter century of globalization thatfollowed the Cold War displaced workers around the world beganmobilizing politically to oppose an economic order that privileged

8 KASARINLAN VOL 32 NO 1ndash2 2017

corporations and economic elites Emerging with a surprising speedand simultaneity from the margins of their respective societies ageneration of populist leaders gained influence by giving voice oftenwith violent or virulent inflections to public concerns about the socialcosts of globalization Whether the politics were leftist like theKirchners in Argentina or deeply conservative like Erdogan in Turkeythe resulting populist regimes often shared a ldquoserious backlashrdquo againstthe ldquohighly inegalitarianrdquo impact of neoliberal economic policy markedby deregulation and open markets (Aytaccedil and Oumlni 2014 41ndash59)

Reflecting these global trends just 19 percent of Americans polledin July 2016 believed that trade creates more jobs despite numerouseconomics studies showing otherwise while an earlier survey of publicopinion in forty-four countries found that only 26 percent ofrespondents felt trade lowers prices Adding to this skepticism aboutthe benefits of trade Chinese imports eliminated 24 million Americanjobs between 1999 and 2011 closing plants for furniture in NorthCarolina glass in Ohio and auto parts and steel across the Midwest(Goodman 2016) As nations worldwide imposed a combined 2100restrictions on imports to staunch a similar loss of jobs world tradestarted slowing and actually fell during the second quarter of 2016 forthe first time during a period of economic growth since World War II(New York Times October 30 2016)

Across Europe hypernationalistic parties like the Danish PeoplersquosParty French National Front Greecersquos Golden Dawn Alternative forGermany Sweden Democrats UK Independence Party and otherswon voters by cultivating nativist reaction to these global trends Andin the most visible rejection of global integration the British publicvoted in June 2016 to quit the European Union Simultaneously ageneration of populist demagogues gained popularity or power innominally democratic nations around the worldmdashnotably NorbertHofer (Austria) Marine Le Pen (France) Miloš Zeman (Czech Republic)Viktor Orbaacuten (Hungary) Geert Wilders (Netherlands) Vladimir Putin(Russia) Recep Erdogan (Turkey) Donald Trump (United States)Narendra Modi (India) Prabowo Subianto (Indonesia) ThaksinShinawatra (Thailand) and Rodrigo Duterte (Philippines) (Ashkenasand Aisch 2016 Lyman 2016)

ldquoDemagogues are still emerging in the West and outside itrdquoobserved Indian essayist Pankaj Mishra ldquoas the promise of prosperitycollides with massive disparities of wealth power education andstatusrdquo (2016 46ndash54) Giving weight to those words the Philippineeconomy grew by a sustained 6 percent per annum from 2010 to 2016


but the number of the poor remained largely unchanged Just forty eliteFilipino families on the Forbesrsquos wealth ranking controlled 76 percentof this growth while a staggering 26 million poor struggled to surviveon a dollar a day as development projects accelerated by this economicexpansion were evicting many from their squatter shacks and subsistencefarms (Agence France-Presse 2013 Sicat 2016 Yap 2016)

To explore the ideology that underlies the appeal of thesedemagogues rhetoric scholar Michael J Lee analyzes populism as amovement that above all defines the national community by bothldquoshared characteristicsrdquo and a common ldquoenemyrdquo much like the Nazisexcluded certain groups by race Just as American prairie populists ofthe 1890s once demonized banking so their contemporary counterpartsare ldquosystemic revolutionaries battling present perversions on behalf ofpast principlesrdquo Finally populist movements exhibit Lee argues adesire for ldquoapocalyptic confrontation as the vehicle to revolutionarychangerdquo through ldquoa mythic battlerdquo (2006 357ndash64)

With a similar emphasis on inclusion and exclusion politicalscientist Jan-Werner Muumlller argues that ldquothe tell-tale sign of populismrdquois leaders who ldquoclaim that they and only they represent the peoplerdquoThat claim is ldquoalways distinctly moralrdquo with the result that populistsonce in office purport to act in the name of the ldquoreal peoplerdquo and ldquowillnot recognize anything such as a legitimate oppositionrdquo (Muumlller 2016)Somewhat more succinctly Cas Mudde defines current populism asldquoan ideology that separates society into two homogeneous andantagonistic groups lsquothe pure peoplersquo and lsquothe corrupt elitersquo and thatholds that politics should be an expression of lsquothe general willrsquo of thepeoplerdquo (2016) Taking that division further Ronald Inglehart andPippa Norris argue that populism ldquoemphasizes faith in the wisdom andvirtue of ordinary people (the silent majority) over the lsquocorruptrsquoestablishmentrdquo while defining those ordinary people through ldquonativismor xenophobic nationalism which assumes that the lsquopeoplersquo are auniform wholerdquo (2016 6ndash7)

Although seemingly universal in depicting the way populistdemagogues often rely on violent rhetoric this literature omits theiractual violence and its potent political symbolism that frequentlyaccompanies contemporary populism For over a decade RussiarsquosVladimir Putin the likely progenitor of this recent resurgence ofpopulism has demonstrated his bare-chested power by murderingopponentsmdashmemorably a lethal spritz of polonium 210 for KGBdefector Alexander Litvinenko in London in 2006 shooting journalistAnna Politkovskaya outside her Moscow apartment that same year a


fusillade for opposition leader Boris Nemtsov in downtown Moscowin 2015 and four fatal bullets for defector Denis Voronenkov on a Kievsidewalk in March 2017 that Ukraine called ldquoan act of state terrorismrdquoWhile some killings exhibited clever attempts at concealment severalprominent victimsmdashthe politician Nemtsov and the journalistPolitkovskayamdashwere gunned down right in Moscow apparently toamplify Putinrsquos aura and silence any would-be opponents (Kramer2016 2017)

In Turkey the Islamic populist Recep Erdogan has projected hispersonal power by staging a bloody repression of the Kurds in 2015ndash2016 that displaced five hundred thousand people and by purging inthe aftermath of an abortive military coup in mid-2016 fifty thousandofficials including academics teachers and military In Erdoganrsquosvision of his national community the Kurds are a cancer within thebody politic whose identity must be extinguished much as hisforebears excised the Armenians (Cumming-Bruce 2017 MacKinnon2017)

In 2014 retired general Prabowo Subianto came close to capturingIndonesiarsquos presidency with a campaign theme of strength and orderthat resonated with some of the most luridly visible violence in thatcountryrsquos fraught political history Back in 1998 when the regime of histhen father-in-law Suharto was trembling at the brink General Prabowoas commander of the elite Kopassus rangers reportedly staged thekidnapping-disappearance of a dozen student activists the lurid rapesof 168 Chinese women to incite racial violence and the burning ofover five thousand buildings in Jakarta that left more than a thousanddead (McIntyre 2005 187 Fabi and Kapoor 2014 Richburg 1998Liljas 2014)

In the closest parallel to Dutertersquos drug war the Thai primeminister Thaksin Shinawatra launched his ldquored shirtrdquo populism in2003 with a campaign against methamphetamine abuse that promptedthe police to carry out 2275 extrajudicial killings in just three months(Human Rights Watch 2004 9ndash12 Mydans 2003)

In America President Trumprsquos populism has directed its violenceoutward with a drone blitz of unprecedented intensity on Yemen inMarch 2017 against what he called a ldquonetwork of lawless savagesrdquo andits virulence inward by branding Mexicans as rapists by demanding thedeath penalty for drug dealers and by branding Black inner cities as aldquocatastropherdquo of spreading violencemdashresonating with the white fears ofeclipse that sparked in earlier generations mob violence and lynchings(Blake 2017 Reuters Staff 2017 Ferdinando 2017 BBC 2018)


Even a cursory review of these cases from around the worldindicates that we cannot understand populism solely by lookingskyward into the ether of ideology but should also look down toponder the meaning of all this blood on the pavement Offering arevealing instance of this global phenomenon violence has long beena defining attribute of Philippine populismmdashin particular through theway that Filipino leaders combine the high politics of great-powerdiplomacy and the low politics of performative violence with corpseswritten upon and read as texts

Among this contemporary generation of global populists PresidentDuterte seems somewhat exceptional in both his blunt defiance of theworld order and the unalloyed brutality of his social policy Yet nomatter how extreme he might seem Duterte like any national leaderstill lies at the intersection of global trends and local political traditionsin ways that invite exploration of both his historical antecedents andcontemporary politics To schematize this analysis we will thusexplore two intersecting political axes seeking to understand howwithin a single synchronous moment in world history global forcesproduced this cohort of generally similar populist leaders yet probingthrough diachronic depth to see how one of them has arisen withina particular historical tradition that gives resonance to this virulentrhetoric and political violence

In the eighty-year history of the modern Philippine state just threepresidentsmdashManuel Quezon Ferdinand Marcos and Rodrigo Dutertemdashhave been adept enough to juxtapose geopolitical calculus withmanipulations of local power to gain extraordinary authority All threewere men of their respective eras shaped by global political currentsLike others who led anti-colonial liberation struggles Quezon wasboth a statesman and would-be president-for-life Marcos was in hisgreed and brutality similar to the autocrats who emerged across theThird World in the succeeding authoritarian age and Dutertersquos mix ofmachismo and narrow nationalism seems typical of this current cropof anti-globalization populists

Yet while practicing a domestic politics with deep cultural rootsall three were equally skilled in manipulating the dominant worldpowers of their day using the consequent international imprimatur toreinforce their domestic authority As the world lurched toward warduring the 1930s Quezonrsquos leadership of the independence movementcomplemented Washingtonrsquos decision to shed its strategic responsibilityfor the defense of the Philippines During the Cold War decade of the1970s Marcos won Washingtonrsquos support for his authoritarian rule


by posing as a mediator who could contain nationalist opposition tothe US military bases Amid rising superpower tensions over the SouthChina Sea Duterte played upon subliminal popular resentmentstoward America to distance himself from this historic alliance allowinghim to extract resources from both Beijing and Washington

Apart from a shared ability to navigate the great power politics oftheir eras these successful Filipino strongmen also offered a promiseof order projecting an aura of personal power that appealed to theircountryrsquos impoverished masses Focusing on this element of theirideological appeal cuts against the grain of the dominant themes ortropes in modern Philippine historiography and highlights an issuelong overlooked in the countryrsquos study the popular need for orderWith its inherently conservative view of the people as willing to acceptalmost any governmentmdashcolonial or national authoritarian ordemocraticmdashthat offers peace and prosperity the study of ordercontradicts the thrust of nationalist studies which tends to view themasses as innately revolutionary yearning for liberation and strugglingagainst oppression (Agoncillo 1956 Ileto 1979)

These strongmen also gained support by their ability to mediatethe contradictions the structural flaws if you will in the Philippinepolity Since its emergence as a Commonwealth under US colonialrule in the 1930s the Philippine state has faced a recurring tensionbetween a nominally strong central government headed by anempowered executive and local elites who control their provincialperipheries through economic assets political office and extralegalviolence

To control the centripetal pull of its provincial peripheries Manilahas developedmdashin addition to conventional electoral and economicmaneuversmdashsome extraordinary political mechanisms that bothamplified the violence and paradoxically provided mechanisms ofstate control Reaching out from the countryrsquos epicenter Manila hasexercised a supple strength over the sprawling archipelago and itsvolatile peripheries particularly the Muslim south by deputizing apanoply of parastatal elementsmdashbandits warlords smugglers gamblingbosses militia chiefs special agents forest concessionaires plantersindustrialists and vigilantes (Sidel 1999 146ndash47 Hedman and Sidel2000 108 172ndash73)

Though many are at best quasi-legal and some are outright outlawsthese fragments of the state are not mere aberrations but are integralfacets of the Philippine polity Instead of fulfilling Max Weberrsquosrequirement that it claim ldquothe monopoly of the legitimate use of


physical force within a given territoryrdquo the Philippine state seems tosanction a virtual oligopoly on armed violence This informal devolutionof coercive authority has also allowed these Philippine variants of whatWeber called ldquoautonomous functionariesrdquo to privatize police powerproducing recurring incidents of spectacular abuse that have periodicallyweakened legitimacy of executives implicated in these excesses (Gerthand Mills 1946 81ndash83)

Such delegated authority comes with high costsmdashpolitical violenceenvironmental degradation and systemic illegality Such endemicviolence by politiciansrsquo private armies can grind on unnoticed for yearsuntil it erupts in iconic incidents such as the burning of Ora EsteIlocos Sur by a private army in 1970 or the Maguindanao massacre offifty-seven victims by the provincial governorrsquos militia in 20091

Whether charismatic like Quezon authoritarian like Marcos oracquisitive like Estrada most successful Philippine presidents over thepast eighty years have found ways to manipulate this substrate ofprovincial violence for either election or effective administrationThose with a military background (Quezon Magsaysay and Ramos)have relied on the armed forces to control provincial violence thosewith more exclusively electoral experience (Quirino and CorazonAquino) allied with provincial power holders to exercise an extralegalcoercion and control while both Marcos and Gloria MacapagalArroyo used the military for extrajudicial killings and local warlords forelectoral violence As governments from Quezon to Marcos andDuterte indicate control over this localized violence is a definingattribute of Philippine executive power and a requisite for any would-be Filipino strongman

QUEZONrsquoS COMMONWEALTH

As leader of the Senate (1916ndash1935) and Commonwealth president(1935ndash1942) Manuel Quezon was the first Filipino politician tointegrate all levels of politics into a synergy of power To control the

_________________1 Supreme Court Republic of the Philippines People of the Philippines petitioner

v Hon Mario J Gutierrez Judge of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos SurCamilo Pilotin Francisco Piano Delfin Piano Pedro Patao Vicent CrisologoCamillo Plano Camilo Patao Pedring Plano Isidro Pugal Antonio TabuldoLorenzo Peralta Veneracion Pacleb Antonio Plano Fermin Pugal Carlito PugalFlor Plano Erning Abano and eighty two (82) John Does respondents En BancGR Nos L-32282-83 (1970) Accessed January 22 2017 httpswwwlawphilnetjudjurisjuri1970nov1970gr_32282_83_1970html Tran2009


local vote banks that determined legislative elections Quezon devotedconsiderable energies to the mastery of provincial rivalries seekingalways to maintain two equally balanced factions at a peak of conflictthat would allow his intervention and manipulation Quezon onceconfessed to an aide that ldquo90 percentrdquo of his dealings with politiciansinvolved the disposition of patronage for such manipulations (Gwekoh1971 385)

One of Quezonrsquos close allies Senator Claro Recto once describedhim as ldquoa master of political intriguerdquo who could ldquoexcite envy distrustambition jealousy even among his own loyal followers He playedRoxas against Osmentildea Yulo and Paredes against Roxas the Alunangroup and the plantadores [sugar farmers] against the Yulo group and thecentralistas [millers] in the sugar industry dominating both by meansof the loan-giving and loan-denying power of the Philippine NationalBankrdquo (1971 394) Since most Manila politicians based their poweron provincial vote banks these manipulations of local leaders allowedhim the means to control national politics and both elements in turnstrengthened his hand against the US High Commissioner or hissuperiors in Washington DC

During the independence debates of the early 1930s Quezon usedhis growing dominance over Philippine partisan politics to manipulatethese colonial superiors a success that in turn reinforced his authorityover Filipino politicians To reduce Philippine agricultural importsduring the Depression and meet the US militaryrsquos concern about thearchipelagorsquos vulnerability to Japanese attack Washington playedupon the persistent Filipino agitation for independence to translatethese domestic concerns into colonial policy By negotiating terms ofindependence that both pleased his nationalist constituency andAmerican patrons Quezon marginalized his political rivals and emergedas the countryrsquos unchallenged leader (Berry 1981 50ndash60 Friend1965 100ndash101 126ndash48)

In the 1935 elections for a transitional Commonwealth executiveQuezon triumphed through a synergy of US support bureaucraticmanipulation and local interventions conducted via the colonialpolice the Philippine Constabulary (PC) As leader of the entrenchedNacionalista Party Quezonrsquos main opposition came from GeneralEmilio Aguinaldo the former president of the defeated revolutionaryrepublic After his surrender to the US authorities in 1901 Aguinaldohad returned to his native Cavite Province where he became a localpolitical boss through large landholdings and leadership of therevolutionary war veterans Although his national campaign was weak


Aguinaldorsquos command of a local constituency capable of violenceposed a serious threat (Sidel 1999 56ndash61)

With the presidential campaign on the horizon Quezonrsquos firstmove was an attack on Aguinaldorsquos provincial power base In late1934 as the general prepared his presidential campaign agriculturesecretary Eulogio Rodriguez Sr a close Quezon ally suddenlydiscovered the generalrsquos arrears on a twenty-year-old government loanfor the acquisition of a former friar estate in Cavite Province In one ofthe very few instances of prewar land reform Secretary Rodriguezsummarily stripped Aguinaldo of all but 344 hectares and thendistributed the bulk of his lands to the tenants (Soriano del Castilloand Alfonso 1982 257ndash61)

During the campaign constabulary officers provided Quezon withpersonal security public order and covert controls over volatileprovinces Just a month before the elections PC headquarters sentQuezon a report detailing ldquopolitical undercurrentsrdquo with data culledfrom units across the archipelago that were conducting partisanoperations to support his candidacy (MLQ unsigned letter to ManuelQuezon)

After the campaign began in June Aguinaldo the candidate for theNational Socialist Party soon realized he would be crushed byQuezonrsquos formidable machine and reacted angrily publicly chargingfraud and privately threatening murder Just days before the voting onSeptember 15 the Quezon-controlled Philippines Herald denouncedAguinaldo and the other leading opposition candidate Bishop GregorioAglipay declaring that ldquotheir very breaths smell of assassinationrdquoWhen Quezon won a crushing 69 percent of the vote against Aguinaldorsquos17 percent and Bishop Gregorio Aglipayrsquos 14 percent the generalattacked his rivalrsquos ldquoabuse of powerrdquo and refused to concede (Hayden1955 387ndash92 409ndash18 426ndash29 Gleeck 1998b 36)

In the electionrsquos bitter aftermath Aguinaldo threatenedassassination armed uprising or both In a confidential report to itssuperintendent the Constabularyrsquos Intelligence Division describedthe ldquohigh tensionrdquo at a September 21 meeting of the generalrsquos NationalSocialist Party in Manila with speakers ldquolambasting the entiregovernment machinery in having coordinated smoothly to defeat GEA[General Emilio Aguinaldo]rdquo When Aguinaldo spoke claiming thatthe government had stolen fifty thousand votes from his final tally theldquoirresponsible elements present murmured rsquoAyan ang mabutirevolucion nardquo [Thatrsquos good itrsquos time for revolution] (MLQ confidentialmemorandum)


Just two days later the Constabularyrsquos confidential Agent 110called on the deputy intelligence chief Capt Jose P Guido to warnthat Aguinaldo was plotting an assassination attempt against Quezon(MLQ Capt Jose Guido) A week after that the Constabularyrsquos Cavitecommander reached a similar conclusion during an otherwise ldquocordialrdquovisit to Aguinaldo at his home in Kawit Speaking with great indignationthe general said ldquothe only way to free the government of undesirableofficials and save the people from suffering hardships and miseries isto put down President Quezonrdquo By the end of this visit withAguinaldo the captain reported ldquoI could infer or read that he isnursing a sinister or evil design to assassinate President Quezonrdquo (MLQCapt Severo C Cruz)

The main threat came from the hundreds sometimes thousandsof General Aguinaldorsquos supporters many members of his Veteranos dela Revolucion who met nightly in the yard of his Kawit mansion justsouth of Manila Addressing five hundred supporters who gatheredthere on October 1 the speakers were according to Constabularyspies particularly incendiary leading the crowd in shouting ldquoMagrevolucion nardquo [Itrsquos time to rebel] (MLQ memorandum formdashsuperintendent) At another meeting a prominent Aguinaldo followerswore to kill Quezon and asked the crowd ldquoWho else will volunteerto give his life away if I failrdquo According to a PC spy over five hundredagreed to a roar of approval Although the general disavowed thesedeath threats he moved ahead with plans to mobilize fifty thousandangry followers to protest Quezonrsquos inauguration on November 15(Hayden 1955 429ndash30 433ndash34 Gleeck 1998b 36)

Under constant threat of assassination president-elect Quezonsurrounded himself day and night with Constabulary security Hislimousine moved in an armed cavalcade The palace grounds swarmedwith guards He slept aboard the presidential yacht anchored in ManilaBay To quiet the violent bombast at Aguinaldorsquos house a Constabularydetachment occupied the generalrsquos hometown checking buses for gunsand taking the names of those who attended the nightly meetings AfterQuezon pleaded with Governor-General Frank Murphy to intervenejust three weeks before the inauguration the American met privatelywith Aguinaldo and through a mix of blunt threats and his famousIrish charm persuaded him not to disrupt the inaugural proceedings(Hayden 1955 429ndash35 Gleeck 1998b 36ndash41 Gleeck 1998a 3377ndash80 491ndash92 MLQ letter from E Aguinaldo MLQ Major MN Castantildeeda)


After a peaceful inauguration President Quezon assumed astatesmanlike posture toward the Constabulary but could not escapethe executiversquos habit of using this force as the strong arm of centralauthority The contradiction between the Constabularyrsquos role as anapolitical national police force and its partisan uses as an extension ofexecutive authority would deepen as the attenuation of colonialauthority left this unsheathed sword in the hands of successivePhilippine presidents (McCoy 2009 362ndash66)

Politics under the Commonwealth was truly a system in symbiosisoperating whether by inclination or design with a political economythat allowed Quezonrsquos every move to reinforce his ultimate goal theaccumulation and perpetuation of power It was not a system builtwithout effort or free from restraints By 1940 Quezon had destroyedall elite opposition within and without the Nacionalista Party andmarginalized Pedro Abad Santos of the radical Frente Popular inCentral Luzon

Quezonrsquos greatest triumph the 1941 elections demonstrated theextent of his control over the legislature and its base in provincialpolitics At the Nacionalista Partyrsquos convention in August despitesome grumbling ldquoin private over their emasculationrdquo the delegatesaccepted Quezonrsquos list of the twenty-four senatorial candidates withouta single dissenting vote Under Quezonrsquos earlier constitutionalamendment the senators now ran at-large on a national ticket thatuprooted them from independent regional bases and thus made thembeholden to executive patronage (McCoy 1989 122ndash25) AlthoughQuezon had thus made the Senate an extension of his executiveauthority he still used local loyalties to ensure election of hand-pickedcandidates The strategy was successful and all twenty-four of hisnominees were elected to the Senate in November 1941 (US StateDepartment ldquoConvention of the Nacionalista Partyrdquo)

In these same elections the Nacionalistas also won ninety-five ofthe ninety-eight Assembly seats Party control was stricter and localfactionalism less pronounced than in the 1940 gubernatorial electionssince only seven ran as ldquorebel candidatesrdquo in defiance of Quezon TheState Department explained that ldquothe degree of victory is due to theimpregnability of the party machine achieved by various devices suchas that of block votingrdquo for a party ticket an innovation in the 1941elections (US State Department ldquoThe Elections of November 111941rdquo)

Unfortunately for Quezon the US independence legislation thathad established the Commonwealth also provided an American High


Commissioner to serve as the US presidentrsquos personal representativein Manila Since the commissioner was the only real barrier to thePhilippine presidentrsquos unchecked authority the most intense politicalbattles of the Commonwealth period revolved around Quezonrsquosefforts to obviate his imperial watchdogrsquos ill-defined authority

Whether the High Commissioner was friend or enemy Quezonwas relentless in undercutting his authority In defense matters wherelines of authority were muddled Quezon played his military adviserGeneral Douglas MacArthur against Commissioner Frank Murphyusing the generalrsquos extensive Washington contacts to deal directly withthe US Army In matters of trade Quezon avoided negotiating withCommissioner Paul McNutt by winning President Rooseveltrsquos supportfor a joint executive commission the Joint Preparatory Committee onPhilippine Affairs Finally Quezon neutralized Commissioner FrancisSayrersquos opposition to his domestic legislation by dragging him intopublic debate and outmaneuvering him in bureaucratic infighting withhis superiors (McCoy 1989 140ndash55)

By controlling both external relations with Washington and thecountryrsquos volatile provincial politics Quezon emerged as the firstpowerful Filipino leader creating a template that other would-bestrongmen would eventually follow

PROVINCIAL WARLORDS

Only three years after independence the 1949 presidential electionsmarked the first appearance of armed violence as a defining feature ofthe countryrsquos politics Before the Second World War the Constabularyhad enforced strict controls that restricted politicians to registeredhandguns During the Second World War however both conventionalcombat and anti-Japanese guerrilla operations littered the archipelagowith loose firearms that provincial politicians amassed after the war toform private armies

To check the Constabulary and thereby allow their provincialparamilitaries free rein during elections these nascent warlords pressuredMalacantildeang Palace to restrain its Constabulary commanders Sincelocal leaders could deliver blocs of votes whose sum was often themargin of victory in national contests presidential candidates had tocourt these provincial warlords and incur compromising politicaldebts From the perspective of a healthy democracy several of thepresidents who followed Quezon did not handle the Constabularyrsquos


unsheathed sword wisely or well But from a less normative analyticalperspective a president who could not manage this provincial violencedeftly like Elpidio Quirino would fail and a presidential aspirantwho apparently could like Ramon Magsaysay would succeed2

In the first years of this new regime Governor Rafael Lacson ofNegros Occidental was one of the first provincial politicians to discernthe republicrsquos structural flaw and played upon it to win a de factopolitical autonomy from the central government The resulting politicalviolence soon became a national scandal under President Quirino anelite politician of Quezonrsquos generation who lacked the military experienceto control provincial violence and suffered a consequent loss ofpolitical authority By 1948 Governor Lacson had accumulated theiconic elements of postwar Philippine politics ldquoguns goons andgoldrdquo On the pretext of checking communist infiltration Lacsonformed one of the first private armies which soon expanded into aforce of 130 special police (SP) and 59 provincial guards To fund thisad hoc force Lacson drew upon diverse sourcesmdashmunicipal taxesformal provincial appropriations and national pork barrel from thePresidential Action Commission on Social Amelioration (PACSA)(Negros Occidental Provincial Board 1950b Abueva 1971 140ndash41)Significantly all the soldiers in Lacsonrsquos private army were in someway agents of the state

Such a small force of 190 men could not have been effective hadit faced serious opposition from any of three possible rivals themunicipal police the security forces attached to the provincersquos manysugar mills and of course the Constabulary With a mix of deftmaneuver and brute force the governor subjugated each in successionIn the 1947 local elections Lacson had won de facto control of themunicipal police by manipulating the mayoral elections Two yearslater after terrorizing the rival political faction that owned theprovincersquos sugar mills Lacson raided several factory compounds andconfiscated their arms effectively neutralizing this industrial securityforce (El Civismo May 23 1948 Liberator October 29 1949)

To maintain his local monopoly on violence Governor Lacsonrequired above all else the acquiescence of the national governmentand the neutralization of its Constabulary During the first two yearsof his local terror the local Constabulary command had opposed thegovernorrsquos excesses producing a succession of dramatic clashes In theclosing weeks of the presidential campaign of October 1949 however_________________2 For a fuller discussion of this period see McCoy (2009 379ndash85)


Lacsonrsquos SP arrested twenty members of the Constabularyrsquos eliteNenita Unit at the hacienda of an opposition senatorial candidate andbrutally tortured these troopers and their captain before locking themin the provincial prison for the next three years on spurious charges ofpossessing illegal firearms3

These incidents epitomized the systematic violence that made the1949 presidential elections in the words of foreign and Filipinoobservers ldquoa national disgracerdquo and ldquothe most fraudulent and violentin democratic historyrdquo (Liang 1971 311) From the outset thecampaign was a tight contest between the wartime president Jose PLaurel who still commanded a strong following and the incumbentElpidio Quirino whose unpopularity and unlikely election was

Figure 1 ldquoEasier said than donerdquo Source Philippines Free Press September 17 1949

_________________3 Rafael Lacson v Hon Luis R Torres Philippine Supreme Court GR L-5543

Annex B Philippines Free Press July 12 1952


captured in a cartoon from the Philippines Free Press (September 171949 1)

In eight key provinces across the country armed goons harassed theoppositionrsquos political rallies So intense was the intimidation in twoprovinces Lanao and Lacsonrsquos Negros Occidental that the Commissionon Elections recommended in the weeks before election day suspensionof voting and imposition of Constabulary controlmdashsuggestions thepresident ignored Among the 37 million votes cast nationwide some41 percent of Quirinorsquos 485000-vote margin of victory came fromNegros Occidental (200000) and another 28 percent from Lanao(140000) Though Quirino won only 51 percent of the ballots castnationwide Lacson delivered an incredible 92 percent of his provincersquosvote for the president thus producing the winning majority In itssubsequent investigation the House Electoral Tribunal found evidenceof systematic terrorism in Negros Occidental and voided the results intwo of its congressional districts (Philippines Free Press January 271951 Abueva 1971 140ndash42 Agpalo 1992 245ndash47 Landeacute 196566 Sidel 1999 109)

Figure 2 ldquoPeaceful electionrdquo Source Philippines Free Press November 12 1949


After single-handedly assuring Quirinorsquos election Governor Lacsoncould have asked the president for almost anything whether timberconcessions lucrative import concessions or a radio broadcast licenseBut instead the governor demanded and the president conceded hima veto over Constabulary assignments to Negros Occidental retainingthose officers who supported him and transferring any who did notWith the statersquos monopoly on violence thus neutralized by thisseemingly modest concession Governor Lacson unleashed an uncheckedviolence against his local rivals (Landeacute 1965 66 Elpidio QuirinoPapers)

Through such blatant politicization the local Constabularycommand soon backed Governor Lacsonrsquos bid to take control overotherwise autonomous municipal police (Negros Occidental ProvincialBoard 1950a 1950c) In its formal ldquoPlan to Check the Spread ofSubversive Activitiesrdquo the Constabulary detachment in Negros requiredthat ldquothe supervision of all police agencies will be undertaken by theProvincial Governor with the [Constabulary] Provincial Commanderassisting himrdquo and authorized the formation of neighborhood vigilantesunder local police chiefs ldquodirectly responsible to the ProvincialGovernorrdquo4 Under such pressure the Provincial Board voted to mergeall municipal police into a unified provincial command under Lacsonrsquosdirect authority (Negros Occidental Provincial Board 1950c)

With both the Constabulary and the municipal police neutralizedGovernor Lacson used his private army to attack his local politicalenemies the Yulo-Araneta group Aside from its personal and purelyfactional aspects this rivalry was in large part a continuation of theprewar planter miller conflictmdashwith Lacson himself a sugar farmerleading the Negros planters against the Araneta milling interestsThrough his alliance with President Manuel Roxas (1946ndash1948)Negros financier J Amado Araneta had maneuvered the postwarreconstruction of the sugar industry to take control directly orindirectly of six of the provincersquos ten sugar millsmdashunprecedentedpower over the local economy Increased concentration of millownership intensified the planter-miller conflict and provided GovernorLacson a broad base of support among sugar farmers for a ldquoreign ofterrorrdquo against his factional rivals which included machine-gunningthe house of a municipal mayor5_________________4 People v Lacson Criminal Case 3220 Bacolod Negros Occidental Lieutenant

Colonel Nicolas Jabutina5 Interview with Inocencio Ferrer (Negros Occidental second district congressman

1957ndash1965) buried alive by Governor Lacsonrsquos Special Police Manila December10 1974 interview with Marino Rubin (mayor of Pontevedra 1947ndash1951) whosehouse was machine-gunned by the SP Pontevedra August 2 1975


To break the Yulo-Araneta factionrsquos mass base among the provincersquosworking class Lacson formed a tactical alliance with the regionrsquosmilitant union the Federacion Obrera de Filipinas (FOF) first usingit to challenge the Yulo-Araneta factionrsquos company unions and thenwhen that work was done banning it from the province (Tejida 1975Nacion 1975 Valera 1975)6 With his monopoly on violence nowcomplete the governor grew even more violent In February 1950 hisSP arrested prominent opposition politician Inocencio Ferrer beathim badly and buried his still breathing body in a shallow grave onLacsonrsquos own plantation7

At the start of the 1951 local and legislative elections DefenseSecretary Ramon Magsaysay dispatched over a thousand troops twohundred Marines and nine hundred Reserve Officersrsquo Training Corps(ROTC) cadets to prevent another round of violence in NegrosOccidental (El Civismo October 7 1951 November 11 1951)Despite their presence investigators later found fifty-one instances ofintimidation by the SPmdashincluding beatings random gunfire andmost disturbingly the murder of Moises Padilla candidate for mayorin the town of Magallon8 Taking Padillarsquos candidacy as a personalaffront Governor Lacson insisted that the Constabulary absent itselffrom Magallon during the elections and the provincial commanderCaptain Marcial Enriquez complied Two days before the votingLacson denounced Padilla as a communist at a public rally in Magallonand on election day November 13 ordered his arrest For the nextthree days the SP tortured him publicly on the plazas of four nearbymunicipalities On November 16 the SP shot him fourteen timesbefore dumping his body in a shed near the town of La Castellanamaking no attempt to conceal the crime9

But this time the governor had gone too far The next day DefenseSecretary Magsaysay flew to Negros accompanied by the publisher ofthe Manila Times Joaquin Roces and his star reporter Benigno

_________________6 Interviews with Guillermo Tejida Central La Carlota June 2728 1975 Crisanto

Nacion (president FOF Central La Carlota) Bo Crossing La Carlota City July26 1975 and Loreto Valera (factory manager Central La Carlota) La CarlotaCity October 23 1975

7 Lacson v Torres GR L-5543 Annex B interview with Inocencio Ferrer August2 1975

8 Lacson v Torres GR L-5543 Annex A9 People v Lacson Criminal Case 3220


ldquoNinoyrdquo Aquino Jr Arriving at Magallon after dark Magsaysay climbedthe stairs to a wake where Padillarsquos body lay face down to expose thecongealed blood bullet holes and wounds of torture One photo ofthe clothed body showed the left hand upturned toward the camera toreveal a raised wound in the palm akin to Christrsquos stigmata from thenails that held him to the cross When local doctors refused to do anautopsy Magsaysay flew the body back to Manila for a military funeralwith full honors At each step in this political calvary publisher Rocesclicked his camera and reporter Aquino jotted down quotesmdashproducinga sensational story for the front page of the Manila Times that stirredpublic condemnation Despite the outpouring of anger PresidentQuirino seemed reluctant to suspend Governor Lacson ldquoMrPresidentrdquo Magsaysay advised ldquothe people are so outraged by the deathof Moises Padilla that they are ready to stone Malacantildeang Palacerdquo Afteran embarrassing delay government prosecutors filed murder chargesagainst Lacson and the president finally suspended him (PhilippinesFree Press August 28 1954 Abueva 1971 201ndash3 Quirino 1958 79ndash80 Merritt 1953 33ndash34 Joaquin 1986 221ndash23)

At Lacsonrsquos trial a close associate of the martyred Moises Padillatestified to the central role that Captain Enriquez had played in the

Figure 3 The body of Moises Padilla November 1951


governorrsquos reign of terror Asked why he did not complain to theConstabulary the witness replied ldquoThe law was being handled andexercised by the SPs in their hands alonerdquo Asked if the Constabularyhad refused to enforce the law the witnesses stated ldquoYes in allinstances the Provincial Commander never pays attention [to] anycomplaint of aggrieved persons during the time of CaptainEnriquezrdquo10

Realization that the president had compromised the Constabularya force synonymous with the statersquos integrity dismayed the Filipinopublic Two years later in the 1953 presidential elections Magsaysaynow running as the opposition candidate brought campaign rallies intowns across the Philippines to an emotional peak by stretching out hisarms as if bearing an invisible corpse and saying ldquoI held in my arms thebleeding symbol of democracy the body of Moises Padillardquo (Abueva1971 202ndash3 254ndash55 Quirino 1958 116 Merritt 1953 34Joaquin 1986 224) After Magsaysayrsquos triumph in the November

Figure 4 ldquoEqual justicerdquo Source Philippines Free Press October 4 1952

_________________10 People v Lacson Criminal Case 3220 testimony of Narciso Dalumpines November

26 1951


balloting the courts suddenly accelerated the Lacson case In August1954 the governor was sentenced to death for the murder of MoisesPadilla a penalty later reduced to life imprisonment (Philippines FreePress August 28 1954)11

Despite some significant reforms under Magsaysay the politicizationof the Constabulary that had fostered these provincial warlordscontinued and the potential for political violence thus remainedIndeed during the 1960s many provinces would again witness thefusion of public office with private militia indicating that the tensionbetween central authority and provincial violence had persisted as adefining attribute of Philippine politics

MARCOS REGIME

After a twenty-year career as a conventional party politician PresidentFerdinand Marcos combined national resources and provincial violence

Figure 5 ldquoElection violencerdquo Source Philippines Free Press October 10 1959

_________________11 In the mid-1960s Lacson was released from prison and returned home to Negros

where he retired into obscurity


to accomplish something unprecedented in the history of the PhilippineRepublic reelection During the 1969 campaign Marcos stumpedvigorously reaching even remote villages to personally place a check forPHP 2000 in the hands of each barrio captain obligating them withinthe countryrsquos political culture to use every possible means to delivera winning margin This strategy cost the Marcos campaign an estimatedUSD 50 million far more than the USD 34 million Richard Nixonhad spent to win the US presidency just a year earlier (Bonner 198776ndash77) In the aftermath of this costly flood of cash the Philippinepeso lost half its value government services were slashed and theeconomy contracted (Thompson 1995 34ndash35 Noble 1986 79ndash80)

The 1969 campaign also produced incidents of political terror ofthe sort not seen since the 1951 elections With the Constabulary nowunder the command of Marcos loyalist Vicente Raval the PC SpecialForces orchestrated violence in four swing provinces that left forty-sixdead (Thompson 1995 35ndash37 192ndash93 Wolters 1983 166ndash67 de

Figure 6 ldquoPortraits of senator and congressman as warlordsrdquo Source Philippines Free Press November 14 1970


Quiros 1997 46 66ndash67 Seagrave 1988 218ndash19) In its ruling onthese violations the Supreme Court was particularly critical of whatit called the ldquorape of democracy in Batanesrdquo a remote island where theSpecial Forces allowed motorcycle-riding goons dubbed the ldquoSuzukiboysrdquo to coerce a winning margin in the congressional race for a closeMarcos ally (de Quiros 1997 66ndash67) Bolstered by force and fraudMarcos scored a crushing victory of the kind not seen since Quezonrsquos1941 landslidemdashspecifically winning 74 percent of the presidentialvote eighty-six of one hundred House seats and eleven of twelve Senateseats being contested (Seagrave 1988 218)

In the aftermath of these elections a family dynasty in Ilocos Surpursued a political vendetta against local enemies producing anincident iconic for both its brutality and its executive complicity Sincethis troubled province was adjacent to Marcosrsquos own Ilocos Norte andits local warlord was his political ally the presidentrsquos victory may haveencouraged these events As Marcos rose through the Senate to thepresidency his close friend Representative Floro Crisologo had tightenedhis grip over Ilocos Surmdashbuilding a private army of three hundred mena monopoly on the provincersquos electoral offices and a vice grip on itsmain cash crop tobacco To ensure payment of an informal tax to hispolitical machine Crisologorsquos private army maintained a ldquotobaccoblockaderdquo on the national highway stopping every southbound truckto check for receipts The Constabulary could have easily swept awaythe Crisologo roadblock were it not for the reputed intervention ofGeneral Fabian Crisologo Ver chief of presidential security and thecongressmanrsquos relative (Mijares 1976 151 Luis Chavit Singsoninterview by the author June 1974)

In mid-September 1969 the Crisologo goons gunned down aformer Bantay municipal mayor and a month later prosecutorsindicted the congressmanrsquos son Vincent Crisologo chief of thefamilyrsquos private militia for ordering the crime (Daily Mirror October15 1969) In the electionsrsquo aftermath political reprisals continued inthe town of Bantay as the Crisologos retaliated against two villages OraEste and Ora Centro for supporting the oppositionrsquos candidates InMay 1970 Vicente Crisologo led a hundred armed men into thesevillages and burned both to the ground killing an elderly woman whowas caught in the flames During the attack residents pleaded with theprovincial PC commander but he ldquoignored appeals to stop thearsonrdquo In its front-page coverage the Manila press carried movingphotos of survivors sorting through the ashes of their devastated homes


(Manila Times June 3 1970 Daily Mirror June 7 1972 Robson 20028ndash12)

Outraged by such a blatant display of warlord power forty-twocivic religious and youth organizations formed Operation Bantay todemand an impartial investigation (Manila Times June 13 1970)Despite his alliance with Congressman Crisologo President Marcosordered charges filed against his son Vincent for arson (Manila TimesJune 3 1970) Such unrestrained brutality by a private militiaapparently operating with the presidentrsquos tacit approval challengedthe republicrsquos legitimacy among both student activists and Manilarsquosmiddle class

Only five months after the Bantay burning Ilocos Sur offered arevealing coda to this political violence Reportedly angry over hisunsatisfactory share of the spoils from the presidentrsquos victoryRepresentative Crisologo stormed into the palace where he ldquoberatedboth Marcos and Ver for grabbing the lionrsquos share of the proceeds ofthe tobacco monopolyrdquo and ldquothreatened to expose the entire operationrdquoJust a few weeks later in October 1970 as Crisologo knelt duringSunday Mass at Viganrsquos baroque cathedral two unidentified menemerged from a confessional booth shot him point-blank in the backof the head and then disappeared out of the cathedral door (Mijares1976 151 Manila Times October 19 1970)

In September 1972 as this hard-won second term came to an endMarcos used a mix of US support central power and provincialcontrols to suspend Congress and declare martial law The militaryquickly disbanded 145 private armies two for each of the countryrsquossixty-seven provinces and confiscated 523616 firearms one for everyfifteen adult males leaving the president with a momentary monopolyon violence (Marcos 1977 222) Three months later on January 151973 a Constabulary firing squad executed Chinese drug dealer LimSeng with photos splashed across front pages and footage shown ontelevision and movie theaters (de Quiros 1997 437ndash38 Ocampo2016) Indicating Marcosrsquos simultaneous appeal to the moral crisisover drug abuse and his use of the Manila Chinese as a unifying populistenemy Lim Seng was the first and last person publicly executed duringthe fourteen years of martial rule

On the external side of the political equation Marcos used theissue of military bases to win support for his authoritarian regime fromthree successive US administrations When President Jimmy Cartertook office in 1977 however his emphasis on human rights roiled an


already fraught bilateral relationship Complicating matters furtherMarcos pressed so hard for increased US payments that GeorgeKennan a senior strategist advised ldquoimmediate complete resoluteand wordless withdrawalrdquo (Bonner 1987 205ndash11) While his daughterImee publicly denounced the bases as ldquoclear evidence of our beingAmerican stoogesrdquo and his wife Imelda visited the Soviet Union to seekan alternative to US aid Marcos played the statesman and broke theimpasse after three years of negotiations by agreeing to annual UScompensation of USD 500 million (Berry 1989 163ndash217 236ndash37Paez 1985 71ndash73) ldquoWe had to choose between using our bilateralrelationship for human rights objectivesrdquo US negotiator RichardHolbrooke told Congress ldquoand using it first for putting our militaryfacilities on a stable basisrdquo (Bonner 1987 23)

President Reaganrsquos administration embraced the dictator invitinghim to Washington for a formal state visit in September 1982 Evenas the regime plunged into crisis after the 1983 assassination of ex-senator Benigno ldquoNinoyrdquo Aquino Jr Washington refused tocontemplate alternatives US military aid to the Philippines doubledto USD 70 million in 1985 a signal seen in Manila as support for theregimersquos limitless lien on power Most importantly through theWorld Bank and private banks the United States led the First Worldin granting Marcos loans that eventually totaled USD 26 billion Thelargesse extended the life of the regime by providing it with a steadyinflow of cash to offset the funds wasted by its erratic plunder of thenationrsquos economy

With Washington generally silent about his regimersquos excessesMarcos could pursue two mutually reinforcing strategies to transformhis dictatorship into a dynastymdashthe destruction of any potentialopposition and the construction of a ruling coalition At the outset ofmartial law in 1972 for example political power in Iloilo City thenthe nationrsquos fourth largest was divided among three contenders VicePresident Fernando Lopez Congressman Fermin Caram Jr andMayor Rodolfo Ganzon Through deft maneuvers reminiscent ofQuezon Marcos was skillful in the use of dictatorial powers to forcethe submission of these volatile provincial elites

Originally Marcosrsquos key patrons in his successful 1965 and 1969presidential campaigns the wealthy Lopez brothers had a falling outwith Marcos in 1970ndash1971 and began using their media empire in anattempt to break the president After declaring martial law howeverMarcos used his extraordinary powers to break the Lopez family As a


self-appointed dictator Marcos had no need for a vice president andeffectively abolished the office stripping Fernando Lopez of hisauthority To preempt any counter moves Marcos arrested the heirapparent to the familyrsquos corporate crown Eugenio Lopez Jr on capitalcharges of plotting to assassinate the president The martial law regimethen stripped the Lopez companies of their media licenses andallocated their facilities to Marcos relatives and cronies Marcosclassmate Roberto Benedicto occupied the Alto Broadcasting Station- Central Broadcasting Network (ABS-CBN) and Imeldarsquos brotherBenjamin ldquoKokoyrdquo Romualdez expropriated the presses of the ManilaChronicle to publish his own Times Journal

From exile in the United States the familyrsquos leader Eugenio LopezSr resisted the sale of his leading asset the Manila Electric Company(MERALCO) until he could no longer withstand Marcosrsquos multifacetedpressures By slashing an electricity rate increase from 365 percent to209 percent Marcos reduced the companyrsquos profits and hence itsvalue After a mysterious explosion erupted in one of MERALCOrsquossubstations the Marcos press charged that Lopez himself was responsiblefor the sabotage With a tacit assurance that his son would be releasedfrom death row in a military stockade Eugenio Sr signed over a USD300 million corporation to a Marcos-controlled foundation for anominal payment of USD 1500 But once the papers were signedMarcos broke his promise and refused to release the hostage (Mijares1976 184ndash81 191ndash92 197ndash204)

Marcos used similar tactics to crush Iloilo City congressmanFermin Caram Jr a lawyer whose main asset was the countryrsquos thirddomestic airline Filipinas Orient first licensed to fly in 1964 over theopposition of the flag carrier Philippine Airlines (PAL)12 AlthoughCaram himself was a Marcos ally he or his wife had somehow offendedthe First Lady In a move that was supposed to rationalize the airlineindustry as part of his martial law reforms Marcos granted PhilippineAirlines a domestic monopoly and abolished Filipinas Orient AfterPAL expropriated Filipinas Orientrsquos aircraft the government chargedCaram with plundering the firm and won a court order freezing all hisassets

_________________12 Philippine Air Lines Inc v Civil Aeronautics Board and Filipinas Orient Airways

Philippine Supreme Court GR No L-24219 June 13 1968 accessed January 302017 httpwwwasianliiorgphcasesPHSC1968338html


Mayor Rodolfo Ganzon Iloilo Cityrsquos ldquohero of the massesrdquo was amore elusive target As former jeepney driver and professional machinepolitician Ganzonrsquos only capital was his charisma In the monthsbefore the declaration of martial law Iloilo City was the scene of aspectacular gunbattle for control of the docks between two rival clansof waterfront toughs who were allied with Caram and Ganzon InMarch 1972 Mayor Ganzonrsquos car was ambushed and riddled withbullets on Iloilorsquos main street killing four of his bodyguards (Leichter1975 55ndash59) After the declaration of martial law Marcosrsquos militaryintervened in this waterfront war and arbitrarily charged Ganzon withmurder Convicted of a capital crime by a regional military tribunalGanzon was allowed to appeal to the commander-in-chief PresidentMarcos who proved remarkably slow in deciding the case Over thenext few years Ganzon was allowed to leave the military stockadeperiodically to circulate among his followers urging their support forthe president

Apart from thus breaking established provincial elites Marcos alsoworked to change the composition of the countryrsquos regional andnational leadership He damned the provincial politicians as ldquowarlordsrdquoand used his martial law powers to strip them of their arms and officesHe denounced Manilarsquos wealthy families as ldquoold society oligarchsrdquowhose privileges and power stood as a barrier to economic progress Atthe very outset of martial law Marcos destroyed the fortunes of theprominent entrepreneurs like the Lopez and Jacinto families therebysilencing ldquoManilarsquos 400rdquo and facilitating plunder of their corporationsone by one over the next decade Assets confiscated from erring oldsociety oligarchs were quietly transferred to a new economic elite offamily relations and Palace retainers By the end of the decade Fortunemagazine would describe the new Philippine economy as ldquocronycapitalismrdquo (Kraar 1981)

A 1980 study of 453 Philippine corporations by Fr John FDoherty SJ found that the Marcos reforms had produced an enormousconcentration of wealth Since over 98 percent of all sectors had ldquofouror fewer companies controlling 35 percent of total salesrdquo profits wereexcessive For example the coconut industry dominated by cronyEduardo Cojuangco Jr and Defense Minister Juan Ponce Enrile hada profit ratio of 111 percent Significantly these 453 companies werecontrolled by only eighty-one individuals who could be divided intothree groups previous unknowns close to the First Family who ldquohadexpanded their corporate empires at a fantastic raterdquo a pre-martial law


elite closely allied to the regime and another pre-martial law elite whohad to ldquoendure periodic harassmentsrdquo and were forced to ldquokeep thesemblance of loyaltyrdquo (Doherty 1982 12ndash33)

The impact of crony capitalism upon the Philippines should notbe underestimated Through manipulation of finance and regulatoryagencies Marcos transferred control of the countryrsquos major primaryindustries to individual croniesmdashcoconuts to Eduardo Cojuangco Jrand Defense Minister Juan Ponce Enrile sugar to Roberto S Benedictoand bananas among others to Antonio Floirendo Sr Many used thislargesse to build up fragile conglomerates involving control overbanking primary industry (agribusiness logging and mining)manufacturing transport and service industries notably tourist hotelsWhenever possible crony capitalists reinforced their economic powerwith control over the government agency charged with regulating theirindustry Several also acquired political dominion over the provinceswhere their industry operated producing a high concentration ofpower There were therefore two countervailing thrusts to the Marcoscentralizing reformsmdasha relentless repression of local power holders anda simultaneous devolution of regional control to regime allies whooften controlled armed militia

The former ambassador to Japan Roberto S Benedicto is an aptexample of a crony capitalist A close Marcos friend from their lawschool days at the University of the Philippines in the late 1930sBenedicto became the regimersquos plenipotentiary for sugar then thecountryrsquos leading export industry By the late 1970s Benedicto hadenormous power over the industry through a combination of privateand public agencies As owner of two major private banks hedominated nongovernment sugar finance As chairman of twogovernment regulatory agenciesmdashthe National Sugar Trading Associationand the Philippine Sugar Commissionmdashhe controlled all sugar marketingall research most bulk warehousing and the operations of several largesugar mills (Sugarland 1977 no 1 26ndash27 Sugarland 1977 no 3 15Sugar News August 1974 271 Sugar News April 1976 124 SugarNews July 1977 163 Sugar News September 1977 248) In additionto his nominal ownership of the nationrsquos largest television network anda leading Manila newspaper Benedicto became the palacersquosplenipotentiary for the sugar region Negros and Panay islands wherehe appointed mayors and parliamentariansmdashwho were in turn alliedwith resurgent warlords invested with command of anti-communistmilitia During the first decade of martial law Marcosrsquos cronies thus


integrated national economic assets with regional political powereliminating most legal opposition to his regime in the provinces

Shaken by major political and economic crises between 1981 and1984 the Marcos coalition quickly lost its dominion over theprovinces as once powerful cronies began losing the fortunes theyneeded to finance electoral mobilization In May 1984 oppositioncandidates captured one-third of the seats in Marcosrsquos new parliamentAfter all his candidates lost in the Western Visayas Benedicto wasousted from the ruling circle Instead of the broad coalition of thedictatorshiprsquos early years Marcos now depended upon the FirstFamily particularly First Lady Imelda a reduced coterie of croniesmost importantly Eduardo Cojuangco Jr and his Armed Forces chiefof staff General Fabian Ver

The 1984 elections thus marked a turning point in Marcosrsquosrelations with the provinces Marcosrsquos popular support had largelyeroded leaving a mass base comprising his native Ilocos region theindigenous cult Iglesia ni Cristo a demoralized Kilusang BagongLipunan (KBL) party machine and rearmed regional warlordsmdashincludingArmando Gustilo (Negros Occidental) Ramon Durano (Cebu) andAli Dimaporo (Lanao) (McCoy 1987 9ndash33)

Shaken by major political and economic crises of the early 1980sa Marcos regime once proud of its ldquoconstitutional authoritarianismrdquostaged a spectacle of extralegal violence In the last years of martial lawMarcos unleashed his internal security forces to subdue the populationwith terror producing about 77 percent or 2520 of the 3257extrajudicial killings under martial law These ldquosalvagingsrdquo dumped thevictimrsquos remains scarred by stigmata of torture in public places sopassers-by could read a transcript of terror in the wounds In thecapital with only four thousand police for six million residents themetro government deputized hundreds of ldquosecret marshalsrdquo to shootpetty criminals on sight producing over thirty fatalities during theprogramrsquos first month May 1985 In the countryside the Constabularytried to check communist insurgency by arming 110000 local militiaas of 1982 flooding Mindanao with Civilian Home Defense Forces(CHDF) that soon degenerated into what their chief later calledldquoprivate armies for the personal aggrandizement of the localwarlordrdquo (quoted in McCoy 2009 405n38 for a detailed discussionsee McCoy 2009 397ndash416)

To control the five provinces of the Western Visayas region forexample crony Benedicto had during his ascendancy worked throughintermediaries like the north Negros warlord Armando Gustilo As a


reward for his dominion over the seven towns along the islandrsquos northcoast Gustilo was allowed to revive his private army as an officialCHDF unit When Benedicto fell from favor after his humiliation inthe May 1984 elections Marcos became increasingly dependent uponGustilo to control Negros Occidental and was forced over a two-yearperiod to grant him a de facto immunity from outside interference Asshown at Escalante in September 1985 when they massacred twenty-eight demonstrators without provocation Gustilorsquos three hundredmilitia many of them CHDF used their formidable arsenal to terrorizethe civilian population without Constabulary interference As theFebruary 1986 elections approached Gustilo dictated the terms of hissupport to the presidentmdashspecifically exoneration for the Escalantemassacre new automatic weapons for his militia and in the finalpreelection session of the parliament a legislation making his northNegros fiefdom a separate province Moreover Gustilo challengedBenedictorsquos control over the sugar industry using his new influence tocapture key regulatory agencies Thus Marcos had come full circlebeginning as a centralizer and ending dependent upon resurgentprovincial warlords the equal of those he had destroyed at the outsetof martial law

Yet such performative violence was capricious and highlycontextualized proving effective at the start of martial law when peoplehad yearned for order and ineffective at its close when Filipinos wantedto recover their freedom By the time the critical presidential electionsarrived in February 1986 Marcos lacked sufficient provincial supportto win by a convincing majority Moreover the Cold War was waningand Washingtonrsquos interests were quietly shifting to support emergingdemocracies worldwide creating an opening for antiauthoritarianmovements around the globe Reversing the dynamic that had drivenhis political ascent a combination of Marcosrsquos attenuated localcontrols and Washingtonrsquos fading support would prove a fatalcombination for the regime which famously collapsed in February1986

DAVAO CITY AND DUTERTE

Like his predecessors Quezon and Marcos Rodrigo Duterte gained hisextraordinary power through the juxtaposition of internationalpatronage and local power Yet unlike any of his predecessors Dutertepursued his entire political career in local governmentmdashin his case


Davao City which was a site of exceptional violence that left a lastingimprint on his political persona

Davaorsquos descent into extreme violence began in the early 1980swhen the communist New Peoplersquos Army (NPA) made it the site of anew urban guerrilla warfare strategy Starting in the late 1970s theNPA experienced a sustained expansion that by 1985 had built anational army of fifteen thousand regulars with a mass base of onemillion and armed presence in sixty-three out of seventy-three provincesIn 1977 there were only seventy NPA encounters with the ArmedForces of the Philippines (AFP) but in 1984 there were some 3500with 75 percent of those initiated by the guerrillas who were in theview of the US Defense Department just three or four years away fromwinning a ldquostrategic stalematerdquo from government forces (US House ofRepresentatives 1985 557ndash77 593ndash637) Moving beyond its fifty-eight rural ldquofrontsrdquo or local operation commands the NPA establisheda laboratory for urban guerrilla warfare in Davao City on southernMindanao Island As NPA ldquosparrow unitsrdquo or liquidation squadsmoved into this city of one million Davaorsquos murder rate doubled toeight hundred in 1984 including 150 police The rebel presence in thecity was so strong that they considered it ldquoa liberated zonerdquo and theircontrol over its sprawling Agdao district so complete it was known asldquoNicaragdaordquo (Asiaweek September 13 1985 6ndash18 LawyersCommittee for Human Rights 1988 23ndash25)

While the NPA was spreading into the suburbs of Davao City in1983ndash1984 military intelligence units seeded deep penetration agents(DPAs) or ldquozombiesrdquo inside anticipated recruitment zones SinceNPA strength in Davao grew rapidly from an estimated 1000 in 1983to 2680 in 1984 (Asiaweek September 13 1985 6) the screening ofrecruits became perfunctory and the local NPA began to suspect thatmilitary agents were penetrating their ranks Whether the infiltrationconstituted a real threat or was inflated by military disinformation theNPA overreacted and slaughtered hundreds of its own membersIndeed one informed Western military observer stated that accordingto his contacts in the AFP there had been few if any DPAs inMindanaomdashjust clever disinformation to prompt internal liquidations13

By the time the Communist Party could restrain the cycle of accusationstrials and executions that had spun out of control the Davao fronthad collapsed Many genuine cadre sought refuge from the slaughter_________________13 Interview with a Western military attacheacute Manila January 9 1988


with local military units14 ldquoBy April 1986rdquo reported one group offoreign observers ldquoDavao was a counter-revolution waiting to happenrdquo(Lawyers Committee for Human Rights 1988 25)

Once the Marcos regime fell in February of that year the AFPencouraged by both US advisors and Filipino elites announced arhetorical reemphasis on counterinsurgency Denied support fromgeneral headquarters in the capital local military commanders largelyin the Visayas and Mindanao devised their own ad hoc tactics thatdrew upon AFP counterguerrilla doctrines dating back to the anti-Hukcampaign of the 1950s

Starting in July 1986 the Davao Metropolitan District Commandchief PC Colonel Francisco Calida recruited NPA returnees and localcriminals to transform a small group called Alsa Masa into massvigilante organization With financial support from the cityrsquos businesscommunity led by presidential adviser Jesus ldquoChitordquo Ayala andfirearms from the military these vigilantes who soon numbered in thethousands coerced countless residents in outlying slums to affiliateand conducted numerous extrajudicial killings of suspected communistsLending a lurid quality to this violence their spokesman Juan ldquoJunrdquoPala Jr broadcast anti-communist rants almost daily on local radiosaying ldquoJust one order to our anti-Communist forces your head willbe cut off Damn you your brains will be scattered in the streetsrdquo(Lawyers Committee for Human Rights 1988 23ndash38) When I visitedDavao in 1987 to interview Jun Pala and investigate his death squadthis remote southern city had an air of utter hopelessness

It was in this fraught conjuncture of national regime change andlocalized violence that Rodrigo Duterte the son of a local elite familylaunched his political career first as appointive vice mayor of DavaoCity in 1986 and then in 1988 as the elected mayor the first of seventerms that would keep him in office on and off for another twenty-one years until 2016 His first campaign in 1988 was hotly contestedand Duterte won with only 257 percent of vote barely beating hisrivals including the presidentrsquos anointed favorite Zafiro Respicio with24 percent and the vigilante radio host Jun Pala who captured 183percent The city that Duterte inherited was then in remarkably poorshapemdasha million poor squeezed into squatter slums capital flightrampant kidnapping and endemic violence between the NPA sparrowunits and the Alsa Masa death squad With rival assassins roaming thestreets doing one-bullet kills in broad daylight the city had an aura of_________________14 Interview with Luis Jalandoni (foreign representative of the National Democratic

Front) telephone interview from Sydney to Utrecht May 30 1987


utter desolation (Gutierrez Torrente and Narca 1992 146 Mydans1987 Curato 2017b 9ndash10)

As the nationrsquos economy slowly recovered from the drag ofMarcosrsquos mismanagement Mayor Duterte proved an apt local boosterwhose tax breaks and pro-business policy produced growth for DavaoCity that reached 94 percent in 2014 the highest for any Philippineregion Violence also played a central role in his campaign to restoreorder to this sprawling city whose population was growing toward twomillion After he announced a crackdown on petty crime in the mid-1990s there were 1424 documented killings in the city from 1998 to2015 most attributed to the Davao Death Squad (DDS) whichreportedly operated under his patronage Taking a leaf from Jun Palarsquosplaybook Mayor Duterte used his weekly television show to read offthe names of reputed malefactors some of whom became victims of theDDS (When a Populist Demagogue Takes Power Chen November21 2016 Quimpo 2017 152ndash56 Reyes 2016 114ndash15 124)According to the Philippine Senate testimony by a former death squadmember the group numbered five hundred and apart from liquidatingdrug dealers also eliminated the mayorrsquos political rivals notably thebroadcaster Jun Pala who had parlayed his notoriety into a city councilseat For years leading up his assassination in 2003 Pala began his dailyradio broadcast by saying ldquoThis is Jun Porras Pala who remains thevoice of democracy in [Mayor Rodrigo] Dutertersquos reign of terrorMaayong buntag [good morning]rdquo (Villamor 2017cde Jesus 2016Labiste 2005 Pulumbarit 2016)

Campaigning for president in 2016 on a law-and-order themeDuterte sparked a surge of populist support that as Walden Bello putit was ldquobubbling up from belowrdquo and won by a wide margin of sixmillion votes ldquoIf by chance that God will place me thererdquo he promisedat the start of his presidential campaign ldquowatch out because the 1000[people allegedly executed while Duterte was mayor of Davao City] willbecome 100000 You will see the fish in Manila Bay getting fat Thatis where I will dump yourdquo But there was also historical resonance tothis violent rhetoric that lent political depth to his campaign Bypraising Marcos promising to bury his body in the Heroesrsquo Cemeteryand supporting the candidacy of Ferdinand Marcos Jr as vice presidentDuterte identified himself with a lineage of populist strongmenepitomized by the old dictator Accordingly on his first day in officeDutertersquos handpicked police director Roland dela Rosa ordered hisforce to unleash an aggressive attack on drug trafficking In the hundred


days that followed the Philippine National Police and allied vigilanteskilled over 1400 alleged drug users frequently leaving the bodies oncity streets (Chen 2016 Curato 2017b 6ndash8 Gonzales 2016 Coronel2017 170ndash73)

During his first six months before the police murder of a SouthKorean prompted a brief suspension the tally for Dutertersquos drug warreached seven thousand bodies dumped on the streetsmdashsometimeswith a crude cardboard sign reading ldquoPusher akordquo (I am a pusher)Frequently the victimsrsquo faces were wrapped bizarrely in the brownpackaging tape that had been the signature of the DDS much asMarcosrsquos salvaging victims showed the stigmata of torture Afterordering a resumption of the antidrug campaign in March 2017Duterte brushed aside complaints about human rights abuse tellingpolice that if they killed their accusers ldquoI will pardon yourdquo (Berehulak2016 Villamor 2017d 2017a Human Rights Watch 2017 3 4 1517 55 61 90 Mogato 2016 Chen 2016 Reyes 2016 121) Tojustify these extreme measures Duterte issued inflated claims that thecountry was becoming a ldquonarco-staterdquo with 37 million drug addictsAlthough official figures showed only 18 million users for a modestdrug abuse rate of 169 percent (compared to a global average of 52percent) Filipino voters still identified illegal drugs along with poorwages as their top concerns (Curato 2017b 21 Quimpo 2017 148ndash51)

Human Rights Watch declared this drug war a ldquocalamityrdquo buteven after six months and thousands of killings a resounding 85percent of Filipinos surveyed were still ldquosatisfiedrdquo with the policyUrban sociologist Nicole Curato finds an explanation for thiscontradiction in the elusive duality of Dutertersquos rhetoric By demonizingthe drug menace both users and pushers he employed what Curatocalled a ldquopopulist logic of painting a lsquodangerous otherrsquordquo who areldquoconsidered enemies that should be eradicatedrdquo Indeed in a speechjust five days before his inauguration Duterte said ldquoThe problem isonce yoursquore addicted to shabu rehabilitation is no longer a viableoption If I couldnrsquot convince you to stop Irsquoll have you killedrdquoSimultaneously however he offered people hope for ldquothe future assomething that is within realm of their controlrdquo by quickly fostering asemblance of social order (Curato 2016 100-107 Macaserto 2016)ldquoAn ordinary worker goes home every night and for the first timewhen he passes through the narrow streets of his shantyrdquo Curatoexplains ldquohe does not see any more drunkards or people smoking on


the streets or children just left there abandoned He sees clean streetspeaceful at nightrdquo (Villamor 2017e Chen 2016 Reyes 2016) Forcitizens troubled by petty criminals and addicts Dutertersquos tough talkCurato argues offers a ldquopromise of justicerdquo and ldquostability in anotherwise fragile contextrdquo (Curato 2016 101ndash2) If we move beyondthe rational realm of policy to the emotions of performative politicseach bullet-ridden body left sprawled on a city street seemed afulfillment of the presidentrsquos promises of order and progress

Just as he has used the spectacle of violence to consolidate hisdomestic base so Duterte has proven equally skilled in playing upongreat power rivalries to strengthen his international position In themidst of rising tensions over the South China Sea between Beijing andWashington Duterte improved his countryrsquos bargaining position bymoving away from the close strategic alliance with America toward amore neutral position

At the ASEAN conference in Laos in September 2016 Dutertereacted profanely to President Obamarsquos oblique criticism of thethousands of extrajudicial killings under his ongoing drug war sayingldquoWho does he think he is I am no American puppet I am the presidentof a sovereign country and I am not answerable to anyone except theFilipino people lsquoPutang ina morsquo [Your motherrsquos a whore] I will swearat yourdquo That outburst led Obama to cancel their bilateral meetingopening a breach between the leaders that resisted repair (McKenzieand Liptak 2016)

In challenging Obama Duterte was playing upon an underlyingFilipino ambiguity toward America Filipinos have an abiding affectionfor the United States with 92 percent expressing approval in the 2015Pew pollmdashby far the highest of any country in the world includingAmerica itself (Pew Research Center 2016) But Filipino admirationcoexists with layers of antagonism even resentment arising from thiscentury-long alliance The relentless US colonial pacification duringthe Philippine-American War (1899ndash1902) killed two hundredthousand in a population of just seven million leaving a ldquopostmemoryrdquomdashthat is a ldquotrans-generational transmission of traumatic knowledgerdquomdashmarked by strong nationalism inflected with resentments ready tosurface at any slight (Wolf 1961 360 Hirsch 2008 103ndash28) AsAmericarsquos bastion in the Western Pacific on the eve of World War IIthe Philippines became a twice-fought battleground suffering the utterdevastation of its capital Manila and a million deaths in a populationof just sixteen million (Rottman 2002 318 Steinberg 1967 113ndash


14) During the forty years of the Cold War the presence of the massiveUS bases at Subic Bay and Clark Field produced recurring incidentswith poor Filipinos shootings and sexual assaults that highlighted thecountryrsquos compromised sovereignty leading the Philippine Senate toreject a renewal of the bases agreement in 1991 (Bengzon and Rodrigo1997 19ndash21)

A month after this diplomatic contretemps in Laos as US andPhilippine marines landed on a rain-swept Luzon beach in one of thetwenty-eight joint military maneuvers held every year Duterte statedldquoThis year would be the last For as long as I am there do not treat uslike a doormat because yoursquoll be sorry for it I will not speak with youI can always go to Chinardquo Within days Philippine defense secretaryDelfin Lorenzana announced that joint naval exercises in the SouthChina Sea were henceforth suspended Ever optimistic the US StateDepartment noted that there still was no formal abrogation of mutualdefense agreements and critically no suspension of American access tofive Philippine bases proximate to the South China Sea (AssociatedPress 2016)

In October 2016 Duterte used his state visit to Beijing for arapprochement with China ldquoYour honors in this venue I announcemy separation from the United States both in military buteconomics alsordquo he announced to a burst of applause from anaudience of officials in Beijingrsquos Great Hall of the People the symbolicseat of Chinarsquos ruling Communist Party Evoking the populist tropesof inclusion and exclusion at the Philippine-Chinese trade forum thatsame day October 20 Duterte opened his speech by asking ldquoWhat isreally wrong with an American characterrdquo Americans are he continuedldquoloud sometimes rowdy and they have this volume of their voice not adjusted to civility They are the more forward commandingvoice befitting obediencerdquo Evoking some deep Filipino racialisttropes Duterte then mocked the flat nasal American accent and ruedthe time he was questioned at Los Angeles Airport by a ldquoBlackrdquo officerwith ldquoblackrdquo uniform ldquoblack shoesrdquo and ldquoblackrdquo gun Moving fromrhetoric to substance Duterte quietly capitulated to Beijingrsquos relentlesspressure for bilateral talks to settle the South China Sea disputevirtually abrogating Manilarsquos recent slam-dunk win on that issue beforean international court (Demick and Wilkinson 2016 DU30 News2016)

China reciprocated Between Beijingrsquos usual rituals of smiling girlswith flowers and marching soldiers with bayonets President Xi Jinping


proclaimed ldquoChina and the Philippines are neighbors across the seaand the two peoples are blood brothersrdquo Sealing that bond with cashBeijing signed deals giving Manila USD 225 billion in trade and low-interest loans (Demick and Wilkinson October 20 2016)

After US elections in November 2016 Duterte tilted back a bittoward Washington quickly congratulating president-elect DonaldTrump on his victory Struggling to contain North Korearsquos nuclearthreat President Trump reciprocated telephoning Duterte in April2017 to praise his ldquounbelievable job on the drug problemrdquo and dismissObamarsquos concerns about the thousands killed As talk turned to KimJong-unrsquos missile tests however the transcript reveals Trump flexinghis nuclear muscles in a vain effort to shake Dutertersquos reliance on China(Paddock 2016 Department of Foreign Affairs 2017 The Intercept2017) Despite Trumprsquos aggressive courtship Duterte still downscaledjoint military maneuvers sharply that May cutting the forces mobilizedby half (VOA News 2017) His fulsome love-song serenade of Trumpduring a November 2017 state visit to Manila notwithstandingDuterte did not change his apparent decision that Chinarsquos economicpower not Americarsquos military might was the key to his countryrsquossecurity (Timm 2017)

By his unprecedented affront to one US president and his sedulouscourtship of another Duterte gained freedom of maneuver to maximizeconcessions from rival superpowers Without strong popular supportfrom his populist rhetoric and the intimidating spectacle of thisextraordinary violence his de facto abrogation of the countryrsquosmaritime claims and defiance of a close ally would have risked apolitical backlash a military coup or both For the time beinghowever his deft juxtaposition of international maneuvering and localbloodletting has made him a latter-day Philippine strongman with noapparent check on his power (Bello 2017 81ndash87)

CONCLUSION

As these historical cases indicate application of the term populism tothe Philippines seems flat lacking in analytic resonance withoutadaptation to local context By balancing great power patronage withperformative violence executed in ways that seemed to promise orderand progress both Marcos and Duterte gained for a time strongcontrol over their disparate polity


Yet for Marcos and his successors this recurring balance wouldprove a delicate one As his power weakened in the last years of martialrule Marcosrsquos attempt at control by violence stripped of any promisefor a better future backfired coinciding with a shift in Washingtonrsquospriorities that accelerated his decline In like manner Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo tried to placate Washington by becoming a resolute ally in theGlobal War on Terror while using paramilitary death squads to crippleleft-wing activism by over a thousand extrajudicial killings But thesedeaths were simple assassinations devoid of any populist promise thatwould appeal to the masses bringing both UN condemnation andrising domestic opposition that crippled her authority

While Dutertersquos antidrug campaign and its killings continuedbeyond its first six months the New York Times reported that ldquofear anddistrust gripped many neighborhoods of Manilardquo as residents grewldquowary of talking to each other unsure who among them are the policeinformersrdquo With local officials compiling ldquowatch lists of drug usersrdquofrom anonymous informants including police and surrendered suspects73 percent of those surveyed in March 2017 were ldquoworriedrdquo that theyor someone they knew would be killed For the first time there wasslippage in popular support for the drug war as its net approvaldeclined to 66 percent Simultaneously a network of CatholicChurch safehouses sprang up for those fleeing this crude surveillanceldquoWith just a name and a photo theyrsquoll kill yourdquo Rosario Perez themother of two sons who had gone into hiding told the New York Times(Almendral 2017 SWS 2017)

Shifting to the international level Dutertersquos emergence as the latestin the lineage of Filipino strongmen reveals two long-term globaltrendsmdashone political and the other geopolitical When examined in ageopolitical context the rise of Duterte and by inference that of hispopulist counterparts around the globe is a manifestation of anepochal change the unraveling of the world order that the UnitedStates has maintained for the past seventy years

In the decades following World War II the United Statesexercised its global hegemony through a network of presidents andprime ministers that served as Washingtonrsquos loyal ldquosubordinate elitesrdquoAs the Third World decolonized during these same years politicalpower moved upward from countless colonial districts where localelites like tribal chiefs or maharajas had long served as instruments ofimperial rule to the executive mansions of a hundred emergingnations During the Cold War obeisance was the order of the day and


those leaders who harbored nationalist or anti-American sentimentsoften became the target of CIA-sponsored coups electoralmanipulation or when required assassination plots (Reilly 2009344ndash59)

But now as bipolar power becomes multipolar and developingnations develop Americarsquos hegemony has proved like Britainrsquos beforeit to be a ldquoself-liquidating concernrdquo allowing once subordinate eliteslike Duterte to become unimaginably insubordinate and weakeningone of Washingtonrsquos key means of control on the Pacific littoral andbeyond (Brendon 2010 xviiindashxx 660ndash62) Thus Duterte unlikeMarcos could defy US human rights policy with impunity to litter citystreets with corpses that offer mute testimony to his power andpromise of order

More immediately this study of Filipino strongmen past andpresent reveals two overlooked aspects of this ill-defined phenomenonof global populism the role of performative violence in projectingdomestic strength and a complementary need for diplomatic success todemonstrate international influence By seeing how skillfully theybalance these critical poles of power we can speculate about thepolitical fate of populist strongmen in disparate corners of the globe

In Russiarsquos case Putinrsquos projection of strength by the murder of hisdomestic opponents is matched by unchecked aggression in Georgiaand Ukrainemdasha successful balancing act likely to extend his hold onpower for the foreseeable future (The Economist 2016) In TurkeyErdoganrsquos wholesale repression of ethnic and political enemies hascomplicated his bid for entry into the European Union and his alliancewith the United States against Islamic fundamentalismmdashdiplomaticbarriers that could ultimately slow down his bid for uncheckeddomestic power (Aydintasbas 2016 Kingsley 2017) In Indonesia ex-general Prabowo Subianto failed in the critical first step of building adomestic base because his call for order resonated discordantly with apublic who could recall his earlier bid for power through an eerieviolence that had once roiled Jakarta with hundreds of rapes fires anddeaths (Bachelard 2014 Croft-Cusworth 2014) In Thailand PrimeMinister Thaksinrsquos play for exceptional authority through violence andpopulist development collided with two rival power centers themonarchy and the military prompting a coup in 2006 that ended histerm after just five years and sent him into an endless exile (Walker2006) In America President Trumprsquos populist fusion of militaryviolence against Islamic enemies abroad and rhetorical virulence


against a racial other at home runs the risk of military reverse and massopposition that could limit his bid for exceptional executive powers

In the Philippines President Dutertersquos great power diplomacy hasthe potential to weaken his domestic authority Although a simpleclash of executive egos sparked the diplomatic rupture betweenDuterte and Obama the geopolitical consequences are potentiallyprofound Along the four thousand miles of the Pacific littoral thePhilippines alone sits astride the South China Sea providing theoptimal strategic position to check Chinarsquos claim to those internationalwaters President Duterte lacks the authority and probably even theambition to completely abrogate the strong ties to America built sopainstakingly and painfully over the past century

Just six months after his dramatic tilt toward Beijing Dutertemade a sharp correction in an apparent bid to placate a restive militarynot shy about intervening in the political arena In March 2017 hisdefense minister Delfin Lorenzana a career officer who had played a keyrole in developing the current military alliance with America soundedthe alarm about Chinese naval explorations on Benham Rise aresource-rich area inside Philippine waters (Department of NationalDefense nd Magosing 2017) When Duterte insisted he had grantedBeijing permission both his defense and foreign secretaries objectedopenly prompting one legislator to file an impeachment petition(Viray 2017 Cepeda 2017 Heydarian 2017) Seeking to still thedamaging controversy Duterte soon surprised critics by ordering hismilitary to strengthen their forces on islands in the South China Seaclaimed by the Philippines ldquoDuterte has faced massive backlash overhis appeasement-sounding remarks over Benham Rise and ScarboroughShoalrdquo explained one Filipino analyst (Villamor 2017b) Furtherweakening the Philippine position and augmenting the aura of crisisfrom Manilarsquos perspective the Trump administration reduced andthen for months at a time curtailed all US naval patrols within twelvemiles of Chinese-occupied islands in the South China Sea includingthe politically sensitive Scarborough Shoal (Cooper 2017)

But should Manilarsquos balancing act fail to rebuild working relationswith Washington in ways that will defend its maritime zone then a six-year hiatus in the alliance would allow China to consolidate its militaryposition in the regionrsquos waters and make its de facto claim to thePhilippinesrsquo exclusive zone in the South China Sea an undeniablereality If public opinion tires of his spectacle of violence and itspervasive sense of threat as it once did of Marcos then Dutertersquos de


facto abrogation of his countryrsquos claims to the South China Searsquos richfishing grounds and oil reserves could risk a popular backlash a militarycoup or both (Heydarian 2017)

By studying the Philippines as a manifestation of this worldwidetrend toward populist leadership we gain a sharper sense of therecurring juxtaposition of skilled diplomacy and local controls requiredfor the emergence of a Filipino strongman And by tracing the potentsymbolism of mangled bodiesmdashoutrage over Moises Padillarsquos corpsesatisfaction at Lim Sengrsquos execution anger at Marcosrsquos salvagings andapproval of Dutertersquos many deadmdashwe can grasp something of theshifting significance of raw physical violence within the complex ever-changing currents of Philippine politics

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Agence France-Presse 2013 ldquoPhilippinesrsquo Elite Swallow New Wealthrdquo InquirernetMarch 3 2013 httpbusinessinquirernet110413philippines-elite-swallow-countrys-new-wealth

Agoncillo Teodoro 1956 Revolt of the Masses Quezon City University of the PhilippinesAgpalo Remigio E 1992 Jose Laurel National Leader and Political Philosopher Quezon

City Jose P Laurel MemorialAlmendral Aurora 2017 ldquoOn the Run from Dutertersquos Drug Crackdownrdquo New York

Times June 5 2017Appelbaum Binyamin 2016 ldquoA Little-Noticed Fact about Trade Itrsquos No Longer

Risingrdquo New York Times October 30 2016Ashkenas Jeremy and Gregor Aisch 2016 ldquoEuropean Populism in the Age of Donald

Trumprdquo New York Times December 5 2016Asli Aydintasbas 2016 ldquoTurkeyrsquos Unwinnable Warrdquo Politico January 5 2016

httpwwwpoliticoeuarticleturkey-unwinnable-war-pkk-protests-media-erdogan-kurds-nato

Associated Press 2016 ldquoPhilippines to Suspend Joint Exercises and Patrols with USMilitaryrdquo The Guardian October 7 2016 Accessed October 25 2016 httpswwwtheguardiancomworld2016oct07philippines-suspend-joint-exercises-duterte-anti-us-rhetoric

Aytaccedil S Erdem and Ziya Oumlni 2014 ldquoVarieties of Populism in a Changing GlobalContext The Divergent Paths of Erdoethan and Kirchnerismordquo Comparative Politics47 (1) 41ndash59

Bachelard Michael 2014 ldquoPrabowo Subianto lsquoWithdrawsrsquo from IndonesianPresidential Election on Day Vote Was to Be Declaredrdquo Sydney Morning Herald July22 2014 httpwwwsmhcomauworldprabowo-subianto-withdraws-from-indonesian-presidential-election-on-day-vote-was-to-be-declared-20140722-zvte5html

BBC 2018 ldquoTrump Urges Death Penalty for Drug Dealersrdquo March 19 2018 httpwwwbbccomnewsworld-us-canada-43465229


Bello Walden 2017 ldquoRodrigo Duterte A Fascist Originalrdquo In A Duterte ReaderCritical Essays on Dutertersquos Early Presidency 81-87 edited by Nicole Curato QuezonCity Bughaw

Bengzon Alfredo and Raul Rodrigo 1997 A Matter of Honor The Story of the 1990ndash91RP-US Bases Talks Manila Anvil Publishing

Berehulak Daniel 2016 ldquolsquoThey Are Slaughtering Us Like Animalsrsquordquo New York TimesDecember 7 2016 httpswwwnytimescominteractive20161207worldasiarodrigo-duterte-philippines-drugs-killingshtml_r=0

Berry William E Jr 1981 ldquoAmerican Military Bases in the Philippines BaseNegotiations and Philippine-American Relations Past Present and Futurerdquo PhDdiss Cornell University

mdashmdashmdash 1989 US Bases in the Philippines The Evolution of a Special Relationship BoulderWestview Press

Blake Aaron 2017 ldquoPresident Trumprsquos Surprisingly Presidential Speech to theNation Annotatedrdquo The Washington Post February 28 2017 httpswwwwashingtonpostcomnewsthe-fixwp20170228president-trumps-first-big-address-to-the-nation-annotatedutm_term=87e63e6d4d81

Bonner Raymond 1987 Waltzing with a Dictator The Marcoses and the Making ofAmerican Policy New York Times Books

Brendon Piers 2010 The Decline and Fall of the British Empire New York VintageBooks

Cepeda Mara 2017 ldquoAlejano Wants Duterte Impeached over Benham Rise West PHSea Rowrdquo Rappler March 30 2017 httpwwwrapplercomnation165588-supplementary-impeachment-complaint-duterte-benham-rise-south-china-sea

Chen Adrian 2016 ldquoWhen a Populist Demagogue Takes Powerrdquo The New YorkerNovember 21 2016 Accessed January 25 2017 httpwwwnewyorkercommagazine20161121when-a-populist-demagogue-takes-power

Cooper Helene 2017 ldquoTrumprsquos Turn toward China Curtails Navy Patrols in DisputedZonesrdquo New York Times May 3 2017

Coronel Sheila S 2017 ldquoMurder as Enterprise Police Profiteering in Dutertersquos Waron Drugsrdquo In Curato A Duterte Reader Critical Essays on Dutertersquos Early PresidencyQuezon City Bughaw 167ndash98

Croft-Cusworth Catriona 2014 ldquoIndonesia Dispelling the Ghosts of rsquo98rdquo TheInterpreter August 25 2014 Accessed May 11 2017 httpswwwlowyinstituteorgthe-interpreterindonesia-dispelling-ghosts-98

Cumming-Bruce Nick 2017 ldquoUN Accuses Turkey of Hundreds of Killings inCampaign against Kurdsrdquo New York Times March 11 2017

Curato Nicole 2016 ldquoPolitics of Anxiety Politics of Hope Penal Populism andDutertersquos Rise to Powerrdquo Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs 35 (3) 91ndash109

mdashmdashmdash ed 2017a A Duterte Reader Critical Essays on Dutertersquos Early Presidency QuezonCity Bughaw

mdashmdashmdash 2017b ldquoWe Need to Talk about Rodyrdquo In Curato A Duterte Reader 1ndash36de Jesus Julliane Love 2016 ldquoDuterte Ordered Killing of Journalist Pala Says lsquoDDS

Memberrsquordquo Inquirernet September 15 2016 httpnewsinfoinquirernet815498duterte-ordered-killing-of-journalist-jun-pala-says-dds-member

de Quiros Conrado 1997 Dead Aim How Marcos Ambushed Philippine Democracy PasigCity Foundation for Worldwide Peoplersquos Power


Demick Barbara and Tracy Wilkinson 2016 ldquoPhilippine President Duterte lsquoIAnnounce My Separation from the United Statesrsquordquo Los Angeles Times October 202016 httpwwwlatimescomworldasiala-fg-philippines-us-20161020-snap-storyhtml

Department of Foreign Affairs Republic of the Philippines 2017 ldquoSubject PhoneCall of the President with the POTUSrdquo Memorandum May 2 2017

Department of National Defense Republic of the Philippines nd ldquoThe Secretaryrdquohttpwwwdndgovphthe-secretary-2html

Doherty John SJ 1982 ldquoWho Controls the Philippine Economy Some Need NotTry as Hard as Othersrdquo In Cronies and Enemies The Current Philippine Scene editedby Belinda A Aquino 12ndash33 Honolulu Philippine Studies Program University ofHawaii

DU30News 2016 ldquoPresident Duterte Speech at Philippine China Trade andInvestment Forum Beijing Chinardquo YouTube video Posted October 20 2016Accessed October 24 2016 httpswwwyoutubecomwatchv=pKUHjTWnqaA

The Economist 2016 ldquoThe Threat from Russiardquo Posted October 22 2016 AccessedFebruary 12 2017 httpwwweconomistcomnewsleaders21709028-how-contain-vladimir-putins-deadly-dysfunctional-empire-threat-russia

Elpidio Quirino Papers 1950 Letters from Rafael Lacson to President Elpidio QuirinoJuly 31 1950 August 28 1950 September 28 1950 Syquia Mansion ViganIlocos Sur

Fabi Randy and Kanupriya Kapoor 2014 ldquoBehind Praboworsquos Campaign to BecomeIndonesiarsquos President a Questionable Crewrdquo Reuters July 5 2014 httpwwwreuterscomarticleuk-indonesia-election-prabowo-idUSKBN0FB03F20140706

Ferdinando Lisa 2017 ldquoUS Conducts Second Day of Strikes against Terrorists inYemenrdquo US Central Command March 3 2017 Accessed March 11 2017 httpwwwcentcommilMEDIANEWS-ARTICLESNews-Article-ViewArticle1103200us-conducts-second-day-of-strikes-against-terrorists-in-yemen

Friend Theodore 1965 Between Two Empires The Ordeal of the Philippines 1929ndash1946New Haven Yale University Press

Gerth H H and C Wright Mills 1946 From Max Weber Essays in Sociology NewYork The Free Press

Gleeck Lewis E Jr 1998a The American Half-Century (1898ndash1946) Quezon CityNew Day

mdashmdashmdash 1998b ldquoThe Putsch That Failedrdquo Bulletin of the American Historical Collection 26(3) 36ndash41

Gonzales Yuji Vincent 2016 ldquoDuterte Bongbong Marcos Could Be Our New VPrdquoInquirernet October 20 2016 Accessed March 22 2017 httpnewsinfoinquirernet828171duterte-bongbong-marcos-could-be-our-new-vp

Goodman Peter S 2016 ldquoMore Wealth More Jobs but Not for Everyonerdquo New YorkTimes September 28 2016

Gutierrez Eric U Ildefonso C Torrente and Noli G Narca 1992 All in the FamilyA Study of Elites and Power Relations in the Philippines Quezon City Institute forPopular Democracy

Gwekoh Sol H 1971 Manuel L Quezon His Life and Career Manila CommunityPublishers

Hayden Joseph Ralston 1955 The Philippines A Study in National Development NewYork Macmillan


Hedman Eva-Lotta E and John T Sidel 2000 Philippine Politics and Society in theTwentieth Century Colonial Legacies Post-colonial Trajectories London Routledge

Heydarian Richard Javad 2017 ldquoDutertersquos Dance with China Why the PhilippinesWonrsquot Abandon Washingtonrdquo Foreign Affairs April 26 2017 Accessed May 142017 httpswwwforeignaffairscomarticlesphilippines2017-04-26dutertes-dance-china

Hirsch Marianne 2008 ldquoThe Generation of Post Memoryrdquo Poetics Today 29 (1) 103ndash28

Human Rights Watch 2004 Not Enough Graves The War on Drugs HIVAIDS andViolations of Human Rights in Thailand New York Human Rights Watch httpswwwhrworgreports2004thailand0704thailand0704pdf

mdashmdashmdash 2017 License to Kill Philippine Police Killings in Dutertersquos War on Drugs New YorkHuman Rights Watch httpswwwhrworgsitesdefaultfilesreport_pdfphilippines0317_web_1pdf

Ileto Reynaldo C 1979 Pasyon and Revolution Popular Movements in the Philippines1840ndash1910 Quezon City Ateneo de Manila University Press

Inglehart Ronald F and Pippa Norris 2016 Trump Brexit and the Rise of PopulismEconomic Have-Nots and Cultural Backlash Cambridge MA Harvard Kennedy School

The Intercept 2017 ldquoRead the Full Transcript of Trumprsquos Call with PhilippinePresident Rodrigo Duterterdquo Posted May 23 2017 httpstheinterceptcom20170523read-the-full-transcript-of-trumps-call-with-philippine-president-rodrigo-duterte

Joaquin Nick 1986 The Aquinos of Tarlac An Essay on History as Three GenerationsManila Cacho Hermanos

Kingsley Patrick 2017 ldquoTurkey Facing Disunity under Erdogan Finds an Enemy inEuroperdquo New York Times March 13 2017 Accessed May 10 2017 httpswwwnytimescom20170313worldeuropeturkey-erdogan-disunity-europehtml

Kraar Louis 1981 ldquoThe Philippines Veers Towards Crisisrdquo Fortune July 27 1981Kramer Andrew E 2016 ldquoMore of Kremlinrsquos Opponents Are Ending Up Deadrdquo New

York Times August 20 2016 Accessed March 11 2017 httpswwwnytimescom20160821worldeuropemoscow-kremlin-silence-critics-poisonhtml

mdashmdashmdash ldquoRussian Critic of Putin Assassinated in Ukrainerdquo New York Times March 232017

Labiste Ma Diosa 2005 ldquoThe Jun Pala Dilemmardquo Newsbreak June 20 2005 httparchivesnewsbreak-knowledgeph20050620the-jun-pala-dilemma

Landeacute Carl H 1965 Leaders Factions and Parties The Structure of Philippine Politics NewHaven Southeast Asian Studies Yale University

Lawyers Committee for Human Rights 1988 Vigilantes in the Philippines A Threat toDemocratic Rule New York Lawyers Committee for Human Rights

Lee Michael J 2006 ldquoThe Populist Chameleon The Peoplersquos Party Huey LongGeorge Wallace and the Populist Argumentative Framerdquo Quarterly Journal of Speech92 (4) 357ndash64

Leichter Howard M 1975 Political Regime and Public Policy in the Philippines AComparison of Bacolod and Iloilo Cities DeKalb Center for Southeast Asian StudiesNorthern Illinois University

Liang Dapen 1971 Philippine Parties and Politics A Historical Study of National Experiencein Democracy San Francisco Gladstone


Liljas Per 2014 ldquoHerersquos Why Some Indonesians Are Spooked by This PresidentialContenderrdquo Time June 12 2014 Accessed March 11 2017 httptimecom2836510prabowo-subianto-human-rights-indonesia-elections

Macaserto Ryan 2016 ldquoDuterte in Cebu Drug Users Pushers Will lsquoSurely BeKilledrsquordquo Rappler June 26 2016 httpswwwrapplercomnation137654-duterte-cebu-drug-users-pushers-killed

MacKinnon Mark 2017 ldquoErdoganrsquos Purgerdquo The Globe and Mail (Toronto) January 52017 Accessed March 11 2017 httpwwwtheglobeandmailcomnewsworlderdogans-purge-50000-ousted-arrested-or-suspended-inturkeyarticle30987001

Magosing Frances 2017 ldquoLorenzana Chinese Survey Ship Spotted in Benham RiserdquoInquirernet March 9 2017 Accessed May 14 2017 httpglobalnationinquirernet153204lorenzana-chinese-survey-ship-spotted-benham-rise

Marcos Ferdinand E 1977 The Democratic Revolution in the Philippines ManilaFerdinand E Marcos

McCoy Alfred W 1987 ldquoAfter the Yellow Revolution Filipino Elite Factions andthe Struggle for Powerrdquo In The Philippines After Marcos edited by P Krinks and JConnell 9ndash33 Canberra Australian Development Studies Network

mdashmdashmdash 1989 ldquoQuezonrsquos Commonwealth The Emergence of PhilippineAuthoritarianismrdquo In Philippine Colonial Democracy edited by Ruby Paredes 114ndash60 New Haven Southeast Asian Studies Yale University

mdashmdashmdash 2009 Policing Americarsquos Empire The United States the Philippines and the Rise of theSurveillance State Madison University of Wisconsin Press

McIntyre Angus 2005 The Indonesian Presidency The Shift from Personal towardConstitutional Rule Lanham MD Rowman amp Littlefield

Merritt Jesus V 1953 Magsaysay Man of the People Manila Far Eastern PublishingMijares Primitivo 1976 The Conjugal Dictatorship of Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos I San

Francisco Union Square PublicationsMishra Pankaj 2016 ldquoThe Globalization of Ragerdquo Foreign Affairs 95 no 6 (November

December) 46ndash54MLQ (Manuel Quezon Papers) Captain Jose Guido Assistant Superintendent

Intelligence Division Confidential Memorandum formdashThe SuperintendentSeptember 23 1935 Series IV Box 44

mdashmdashmdash Captain Severo C Cruz Acting Provincial Commander ConfidentialMemorandum formdashAdjutant-General C September 29 1935 Series IV Box 44

mdashmdashmdash Confidential Memorandum formdashThe Superintendent Intelligence DivisionSeptember 21 1935 Series IV Box 44

mdashmdashmdashLetter from E Aguinaldo to Secretary of War November 3 1935 Reel 18Bentley Historical Library University of Michigan

mdashmdashmdash Major M N Castantildeeda Memorandum formdashThe Chief of Constabulary October28 1935 Series IV Box 44

mdashmdashmdash Memorandum formdashSuperintendent Intelligence Division C October 1 1935Series IV Box 44

mdashmdashmdash Unsigned Letter to Manuel Quezon File 1935 Elections August 29 Box 120Philippine National Library

Mogato Manuel 2016 ldquoPhilippine Hitman Says He Heard Duterte Order KillingsrdquoReuters September 15 2016 Accessed March 15 2017 httpwwwreuterscomarticleus-philippines-drugs-duterte-idUSKCN11L16K


Mudde Cas 2016 ldquoEuropersquos Populist Surge A Long Time in the Makingrdquo ForeignAffairs 95 no 6 (NovemberDecember) Accessed March 15 2017 httpswwwforeignaffairscomarticleseurope2016-10-17europe-s-populist-surge

Muumlller Jan-Werner 2016 ldquoTrump Erdogan Farage The Attractions of Populism forPoliticians the Dangers for Democracyrdquo The Guardian September 2 2016 AccessedMay 16 2017 httpswwwtheguardiancombooks2016sep02trump-erdogan-farage-the-attractions-of-populism-for-politicians-the-dangers-for-democracy

Mydans Seth 1987 ldquoRight-Wing Vigilantes Spreading in Philippinesrdquo New YorkTimes April 4 1987 Accessed January 24 2017 httpwwwnytimescom19870404worldright-wing-vigilantes-spreading-in-philippineshtmlpagewanted=2

mdashmdashmdash 2003 ldquoA Wave of Drug Killings Is Linked to Thai Policerdquo New York Times April8 2003 Accessed March 11 2017 httpwwwnytimescom20030408worlda-wave-of-drug-killings-is-linked-to-thai-policehtml

Negros Occidental Provincial Board 1950a Minutes January 18 1950mdashmdashmdash 1950b Minutes General Fund-Chief Executive October 6 1950mdashmdashmdash 1950c Minutes November 15 1950Noble Lela Garner 1986 ldquoPolitics in the Marcos Erardquo In Crisis in the Philippines The

Marcos Era and Beyond edited by John Bresnan 70ndash113 Princeton PrincetonUniversity Press

Ocampo Ambeth 2016 ldquoLim Seng Rememberedrdquo Inquirernet July 13 2016 AccessedFebruary 5 2016 httpopinioninquirernet95625lim-seng-remembered

Paddock Richard C 2016 ldquoTrump Partner Is Philippinesrsquo New Trade Envoy to USrdquoNew York Times November 10 2016

Paez Patricia Ann 1985 The Bases Factor Realpolitik of RP-US Relations Manila CSIS-Dispatch

Pew Research Center 2016 ldquoGlobal Indicators Database Opinion of the UnitedStatesrdquo Accessed October 25 2016 httpwwwpewglobalorgdatabaseindicator1surveyall

Pulumbarit Veronica 2016 ldquoCalled an SOB by Duterte Who Was Davao CityJournalist Jun Palardquo GMA News Online June 2 2016 Accessed January 25 2017httpwwwgmanetworkcomnewsstory568566newsnationcalled-an-sob-by-duterte-who-was-davao-city-journalist-jun-pala

Quimpo Nathan Gilbert 2017 ldquoDutertersquos lsquoWar on Drugsrsquo The Securitization ofIllegal Drugs and the Return of National Boss Rulerdquo In Curato A Duterte Reader

Quirino Carlos 1958 Magsaysay of the Philippines Manila Ramon Magsaysay MemorialSociety

Recto Claro M 1971 ldquoThe Political Philosophy of Manuel L Quezonrdquo In QuezonPaladin of Philippine Freedom by Carlos Quirino 391ndash403 Manila CommunityPublishers

Reilly Brett 2009 ldquoCold War Transition Europersquos Decolonization and EisenhowerrsquosSystem of Subordinate Elitesrdquo In Colonial Crucible Empire in the Making of a ModernAmerican State edited by Alfred W McCoy Josep Ma Fradera and StephenJacobson 344ndash59 Madison University of Wisconsin Press

Reuters Staff 2017 ldquoAt Least Two Killed in New Drone Strikes on al Qaeda inYemenrdquo Reuters March 3 2017 httpwwwreuterscomarticleus-yemen-security-idUSKBN16B0QB

Reyes Danilo Andres 2016 ldquoThe Spectacle of Violence in Dutertersquos lsquoWar onDrugsrsquordquo Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs 35 (3) 111ndash37


Reyes Therese 2016 ldquoMaking Sense of Why Filipinos Fear Dutertersquos War on Drugsbut Approve of Him So Highlyrdquo Quartz Media December 20 2016 AccessedFebruary 5 2017 httpsqzcom867742social-weather-stations-survey-shows-filipinos-approve-of-duterte-but-worry-a-family-member-will-be-victim-of-his-war-on-drugs

Richburg Keith B 1998 ldquoIndonesia Sliding toward Economic Social ChaosrdquoWashington Post July 22 1998 httpswwwwashingtonpostcomarchivepolitics19980722indonesia-sliding-toward-economic-social-chaosd94b2234-4616-4b50-ba65-d6e982155b9cutm_term=7b73a3630acf

Robson Alan 2002 ldquoPatrimonial Politics in the Philippine Ilocosrdquo Pilipinas No 388ndash12 (March)

Rottman Gordon L 2002 World War II Pacific Island Guide A Geo-Military StudyWestport Greenwood Press

Seagrave Sterling 1988 The Marcos Dynasty New York Harper and RowMcKenzie Sheena and Kevin Liptak ldquoAfter Cursing Obama Duterte Expresses

Regretrdquo CNN Politics September 6 2016 httpwwwcnncom20160905politicsphilippines-president-rodrigo-duterte-barack-obama accessed October 242016

Sicat Gerardo P 2016 ldquoThe Philippine Economy and Benigno Aquino IIIrsquos Presidency2010ndash2016rdquo Philippine Star January 6 2016 httpwwwphilstarcombusiness201601061539645philippine-economy-and-benigno-aquino-iiis-presidency-2010-2016

Sidel John T 1999 Capital Coercion and Crime Bossism in the Philippines StanfordStanford University Press

Singson Luis ldquoChavitrdquo Interview by the Author Vigan June 1974Soriano D H Teofilo del Castillo and Luis L Alfonso 1982 Rodriguez Ang Dakilang

Amang Pasig Rodriguez Memorial FoundationSteinberg David Joel 1967 Philippine Collaboration in World War II Ann Arbor

University of Michigan PressSWS (Social Weather Stations) 2017 First Quarter Social Weather Survey April 18

2017 Accessed June 6 2017 httpswwwswsorgphswsmainartcldisppageartcsyscode=ART-20170418140131

Thompson Mark 1995 The Anti-Marcos Struggle Personalistic Rule and DemocraticTransition in the Philippines New Haven Yale University Press

Timm Jane C 2017 ldquoDuterte Serenades Trumprdquo NBC News November 13 2017httpswwwnbcnewscompoliticsdonald-trumpduterte-serenades-trump-you-are-light-my-world-n820201

Tran Mark 2009 ldquoPhilippines Massacre Police Charge Local Politician with MurderrdquoThe Guardian November 26 2009 Accessed September 26 2012 httpwwwguardiancoukworld2009nov26philippines-massacre-politician-charged

US House of Representatives 95th Congress 1st Session Subcommittee on Asianand Pacific Affairs Committee on Foreign Affairs 1985 Testimony by AssistantSecretary of Defense Richard Armitage March 12 1985 In Foreign AssistanceLegislation for Fiscal Years 1986ndash87 (Part 5) 557ndash77 593ndash637 WashingtonGovernment Printing Office

US State Department Manila ldquoConvention of the Nacionalista Partyrdquo 25 August1941 RG-59 Box 3548 811B00100ndash134 National Archives and RecordsAdministration


mdashmdashmdash ldquoThe Elections of November 11 1941rdquo RG-59 Box 3538 811B11100ndash134National Archives and Records Administration

Valera Loreto (factory manager Central La Carlota) 1975 La Carlota City October23 1975

Villamor Felipe 2017a ldquoDefiant Duterte Says Deadly Crackdown Continuesrdquo NewYork Times March 15 2017

mdashmdashmdash 2017b ldquoDuterte Orders Philippinesrsquo Military to the South China Seardquo New YorkTimes April 7 2017

mdashmdashmdash 2017c ldquoEx-Officer in Philippines Says He Led Death Squadrdquo New York TimesFebruary 21 2017

mdashmdashmdash 2017d ldquoPhilippine Police Are Accused of Killing South Korean BusinessmanrdquoNew York Times January 19 2017 httpswwwnytimescom20170119worldasiaphilippines-police-south-korean-killinghtml

mdashmdashmdash 2017e ldquoPresident Rodrigo Duterte of Philippines Criticized over Martial LawWarningrdquo New York Times January 16 2017

Viray Patricia Lourdes 2017 ldquoDFA Chief Duterte Misquoted on Benham RiseIssuerdquo Philstar Global March 30 2017 httpwwwphilstarcomheadlines201703301686047dfa-chief-duterte-misquoted-benham-rise-issue

VOA News 2017 ldquoUS Philippines Engage in Joint Military Exercisesrdquo Posted May 82017 httpswwwvoanewscomaus-philippines-engage-in-joint-military-exercises3842140html

Walker Peter 2006 ldquoThai Military Claims Control after Couprdquo The GuardianSeptember 19 2006 Accessed May 15 2017 httpswwwtheguardiancomworld2006sep19thailand

Wolf Leon 1961 Little Brown Brother New York DoubledayWolters Willem 1983 Politics Patronage and Class Conflict in Central Luzon The

Hague Institute of Social StudiesYap DJ 2016 ldquo12 Million Filipinos Living in Extreme Povertyrdquo Inquirernet March

18 2016 httpnewsinfoinquirernet77506212m-filipinos-living-in-extreme-poverty



corporations and economic elites Emerging with a surprising speedand simultaneity from the margins of their respective societies ageneration of populist leaders gained influence by giving voice oftenwith violent or virulent inflections to public concerns about the socialcosts of globalization Whether the politics were leftist like theKirchners in Argentina or deeply conservative like Erdogan in Turkeythe resulting populist regimes often shared a ldquoserious backlashrdquo againstthe ldquohighly inegalitarianrdquo impact of neoliberal economic policy markedby deregulation and open markets (Aytaccedil and Oumlni 2014 41ndash59)

Reflecting these global trends just 19 percent of Americans polledin July 2016 believed that trade creates more jobs despite numerouseconomics studies showing otherwise while an earlier survey of publicopinion in forty-four countries found that only 26 percent ofrespondents felt trade lowers prices Adding to this skepticism aboutthe benefits of trade Chinese imports eliminated 24 million Americanjobs between 1999 and 2011 closing plants for furniture in NorthCarolina glass in Ohio and auto parts and steel across the Midwest(Goodman 2016) As nations worldwide imposed a combined 2100restrictions on imports to staunch a similar loss of jobs world tradestarted slowing and actually fell during the second quarter of 2016 forthe first time during a period of economic growth since World War II(New York Times October 30 2016)

Across Europe hypernationalistic parties like the Danish PeoplersquosParty French National Front Greecersquos Golden Dawn Alternative forGermany Sweden Democrats UK Independence Party and otherswon voters by cultivating nativist reaction to these global trends Andin the most visible rejection of global integration the British publicvoted in June 2016 to quit the European Union Simultaneously ageneration of populist demagogues gained popularity or power innominally democratic nations around the worldmdashnotably NorbertHofer (Austria) Marine Le Pen (France) Miloš Zeman (Czech Republic)Viktor Orbaacuten (Hungary) Geert Wilders (Netherlands) Vladimir Putin(Russia) Recep Erdogan (Turkey) Donald Trump (United States)Narendra Modi (India) Prabowo Subianto (Indonesia) ThaksinShinawatra (Thailand) and Rodrigo Duterte (Philippines) (Ashkenasand Aisch 2016 Lyman 2016)

ldquoDemagogues are still emerging in the West and outside itrdquoobserved Indian essayist Pankaj Mishra ldquoas the promise of prosperitycollides with massive disparities of wealth power education andstatusrdquo (2016 46ndash54) Giving weight to those words the Philippineeconomy grew by a sustained 6 percent per annum from 2010 to 2016
























































PROVINCIAL WARLORDS









































26 1951




MARCOS REGIME


















































































CONCLUSION




















REFERENCES







































































































































































































PROVINCIAL WARLORDS









































26 1951




MARCOS REGIME


















































































CONCLUSION




















REFERENCES


































































































































































































PROVINCIAL WARLORDS









































26 1951




MARCOS REGIME


















































































CONCLUSION




















REFERENCES




























































































































































































PROVINCIAL WARLORDS









































26 1951




MARCOS REGIME


















































































CONCLUSION




















REFERENCES























































































































































































PROVINCIAL WARLORDS









































26 1951




MARCOS REGIME


















































































CONCLUSION




















REFERENCES

















































































































































































PROVINCIAL WARLORDS









































26 1951




MARCOS REGIME


















































































CONCLUSION




















REFERENCES









































































































































































PROVINCIAL WARLORDS









































26 1951




MARCOS REGIME


















































































CONCLUSION




















REFERENCES




































































































































































PROVINCIAL WARLORDS









































26 1951




MARCOS REGIME


















































































CONCLUSION




















REFERENCES






























































































































































PROVINCIAL WARLORDS









































26 1951




MARCOS REGIME


















































































CONCLUSION




















REFERENCES


























































































































































PROVINCIAL WARLORDS









































26 1951




MARCOS REGIME


















































































CONCLUSION




















REFERENCES




















































































































































PROVINCIAL WARLORDS









































26 1951




MARCOS REGIME


















































































CONCLUSION




















REFERENCES






















































































































































































26 1951




MARCOS REGIME


















































































CONCLUSION




















REFERENCES

















































































































































































26 1951




MARCOS REGIME


















































































CONCLUSION




















REFERENCES











































































































































































26 1951




MARCOS REGIME


















































































CONCLUSION




















REFERENCES







































































































































































26 1951




MARCOS REGIME


















































































CONCLUSION




















REFERENCES

































































































































































26 1951




MARCOS REGIME


















































































CONCLUSION




















REFERENCES

























































































































































26 1951




MARCOS REGIME


















































































CONCLUSION




















REFERENCES





















































































































































26 1951




MARCOS REGIME


















































































CONCLUSION




















REFERENCES



















































































































































MARCOS REGIME


















































































CONCLUSION




















REFERENCES





























































































































































































































CONCLUSION




















REFERENCES
















































































































































Documents

Global Populism: A Lineage of Filipino Strongmen from