Global Deterrence, The Role of the F-22

8/7/2019 Global Deterrence, The Role of the F-22

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FINDINGS IN BRIEF

According to Chairman o the Joint Chies o Sta Admiral Michael Mullen, Its way past time to re-examine our strategic thinking about deterrence.

Conventional deterrence is all about how to posture Americas air and naval orces, in particular, to saeguardallies and national interests without resorting to war. Make adversaries aware they ll pay a price or actionand it will boost the chance or peace.

Te last ew years have brought orth a wider set o goals or conventional deterrence against rising powersand rogue states. Our goal is, in part, to reduce their ability to hold other nations hostage, and to deny themthe ability to project power, explained Secretary o Deense Robert Gates. 1

Military orces or conventional deterrence range rom missile deense to airstrike options. However, tai-lored, proportional conventional airstrikes are a tool central to conventional deterrence.

Only one aircrat was designed to guarantee that option by staying ahead o evolving threats: the F-22.

For example, commanders need intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) at the start o a crisis.Formidable adversary air deenses could keep ISR platorms out. Teyd also make it tough to interveneagainst states like Iran i called on to do so by the international community. Even NAO is acing renewedchallenges. Te F-22s abilities will be critical when US orces are outnumbered or sent on extremely di-cult tasks, such as hunting and tracking mobile missile launchers.

Whats o concern is whether America is shaping the orce to meet the demands o conventional deterrencein the next 20 years. Decisions made now aect the health o the conventional deterrent because competi-tors are moving ahead with sophisticated systems at a pace not seen since the Cold War. I the F-22 eetremains stuck at 183 aircrat, it will put uture conventional deterrence abilities at risk. Commanders maynot have enough o these specially-designed aircrat to deeat threats with condence, and the overall eetlie will be used up years beore it should be, due to heavy tasking.

Right now the US has the ability to stay ahead in the conventional deterrence game by upgrading its air-power with the unique capabilities o the F-22. When production ceases, the door will close. It would takemany years and billions o dollars to begin a new program to surpass the F-22. Long beore then, the UScould see its policy options cramped by the limits o its own military power.

Shoring up a prime element o US conventional deterrence its ability to conduct precise airstrikes any-where will take not less than 250 F-22s, or the good o the nation and the world.

Tis report was written by Dr. Rebecca Grant or the Lexington Institute.


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INTRODUCTION

Deterrence isnt in the daily headlines when Aghanistanand Iraq loom large, but behind the scenes, its become abig pre-occupation or the US national security leadersin the last ew years.

Chances are deterrence will put much more emphasison Americas airpower and the F-22, which is the oneghter designed to make sure US orces can always dotheir appointed tasks rom surveillance to strike.

Deterrence is all about inuencing a potential aggressors

cost-benet calculation. Make your rival think theyllpay too high a price or action, and they may rerain.

In the Cold War, nuclear deterrence was called thebalance o terror. O course, the threat levels havechanged and arms control agreements allow smallernumbers o nuclear warheads. However, the US keepsnuclear-armed bombers and submarines ready or alert,and several hundred nuclear-armed intercontinentalballistic missiles.

But todays challenges are dierent. What s emergingis howconventionaldeterrence may dominate Americashard and sot power options in the years ahead.

Just look at the landscape. Russia has been engaging inCold War-style antics. Chinas peaceul rise policyis buttressed by its military build-up. Many nationsare pursuing sophisticated technologies rom stealthyunmanned systems to advanced air deenses capable onding and destroying targets 100 miles away. Roguestates are getting closer to nuclear weapons arsenalso their own, and most already have signiicant

conventional orces.

As Chairman o the Joint Chies o Sta AdmiralMichael G. Mullen put it: It is way past time toreexamine our strategic thinking about deterrence. 2

Defning Conventional DeterrenceConventional deterrence is the ability o one nation(or a group o allies) to show they have and willuse stronger orces to make sure an aggressor state cantachieve its ends. Calculation is everything, soconventional deterrence works only when an aggressoris certain that they cant get away with what they arecontemplating because they will be stopped cold bysuperior orce.

Airpower is one o the important tools or conventional

deterrence. Its certainly a credible instrument. TeUS put on displays o air mastery in Iraq (1991), Kosovo(1999), Aghanistan (2001) and again in Iraq (2003).

In the last two decades, the US has used airstrikes tocontain dictators, punish aggression, turn aroundinternational violations o sovereignty and stop regime-inicted humanitarian disasters. No-y zones squelchedIraqi military activity or a decade.

Teres no reason to think the US will depend less onairpower or conventional deterrence in the uture. Itremains just the type o exible, proportionate toolessential to credible, conventional deterrence. Gatesexplained the need or options well. A conventionalstrike orce means that more targets are vulnerable withoutour having to resort to nuclear weapons, he said. 3

So its reasonable to ask: is the US keeping ar enoughahead to make its conventional deterrence eective? Teanswer depends, in part, on US airpower in general, andthe F-22 in particular.

Tis paper examines one vital aspect o conventionaldeterrence: how to assure that the US can open upthe airspace and execute a conventional strike. rendsnow suggest that America cant take that advantage orgranted, or rely on airpowers conventional deterrenceor much longer. Potential adversaries are moving waytoo ast on aircrat, weapons and tactics and the gap isnarrowing. Instead o nuclear warhead throw-weight

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and survivable second strike, the technical details o the

balance or conventional deterrence in the 21stCentury may come down to stealth and supersonicspeed without a terburner.

Conventional Deterrence Ten And NowAmericas deense ofcials once ollowed the relativestandings o conventional orces very closely.

Conventional deterrence came into vogue in the 1980swhen Cold War tensions with the Soviet Union revivedinterest in strong conventional orces as deterrents intheir own right. Back then, scholars researched casestudies on historical and regional conlicts andre-examined how military might on each side inuencedthe causes o wars. Keen interest developed in whetherNAO (North Atlantic reaty Organization) and the

Warsaw Pact could restrain themselves and ght aconventional war in Europe without resorting to nuclear

weapons and i so, who would prevail. Major improvementsin air and land orces ollowed.

All that preparation or Europe turned out to be

unnecessary but highly useul elsewhere. Nochallengers arose to test the ability o the US to employairpower as it chose.

However, the balance may be shiting again. In the lasttwo years, Russia, India and China have all announced orclaried major deense programs that include everythingrom the development o advanced ghters to upgradingaircrat carriers. urns out, adversaries took careul noteo the way America and its allies used air dominance inall its operations. Tey reshaped their deense plans tomake inroads on that asymmetric advantage. Tey arebuilding advanced missiles, aircrat and subsystems andtheres also a world market or their best wares.

For all these reasons, conventional deterrence ismoving up the list o jobs or Americas military.According to Mullen:

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A big part o credibility, o course, lies in ourconventional capability. Te capability to projectU.S. military power globall y and conducteective theater-level operations across thedomains o land, sea, air, space, cyberspace, andinormation including the capability to windecisively remains essential to deterrenceeectiveness. We must thereore address ourconventional orce structure and its readiness asa deterrent actor, especially ater 7 years at war.

No one is suggesting that deterrence in this multi-polarworld will be the same as the Cold War. Far rom it.For one thing, America will not have the same economic

dominance it once enjoyed. Americas economy will stillprobably be the biggest or a time, but economic andnancial peers are already on the scene. Some orecastChinas economy may grow ast enough to overtake the US.

With China, and other nations, military deterrence willbe one part o a much wider relationship encompassingtrade agreements, nancial deals, diplomacy, and yes,other competition or global inuence as China navigatesits peaceul rise. Instead o spies and the Berlin Wall,the deterrence o the 21st Century will include gala state

dinners, toasts with strong liquor, and a shiting series ointernational consortia and negotiations on everythingrom trade to climate change.

However, low-level military riction is likely to be aconstant. Russia will be active on its borders andChina will continue to build global ties. Expect thespheres o inuence o the major world powers to colliderom time to time.

THE NEW

DETERRENCE METRICS

Conventional deterrence will have a big role in shapingthose collisions and whether they turn out to beoccasional jostling or more serious ace-os.

What type o military orces will be most in demand?elling signs are already evident.

In2007,RussianTu-95BearbombersandIL-78tankers resumed patrols in the Pacic, Atlantic andnear the Arctic Circle ater a 15-year absence

Chinasactivespaceprogramhastestedsatellitedestruction and manned orbital capabilities

RussiamayhavehadahandincyberattacksonEstonia in 2007 and Georgia in 2008

ChinahasbeenadmonishedbyGermany,GreatBritain and the US or attempted penetrations ogovernment networks

Russiaconductedacombined-armsincursionintoGeorgia in August 2008, complete with mechanized

vehicles, airstrikes and mobile missile orces

In this environment, conventional deterrence will relyheavily on superior air, space and cyberspacecapabilities. Te USs big advantage comes rom theability to threaten a successul and persistent airstrikeagainst key targets. Calibrating the exible deterrentoptions requires real-time inormation on threats andoptions. Job one is to survey and assess the situation.

ISR LockoutOne o the most important aspects o deterrence (bothconventional and nuclear) is correctly characterizingcrises and the actions and posture o adversarymilitary orces.

Real-time intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance(ISR) is in high demand by the international communityas they take their rst steps in considering action duringa crisis. Decision-makers want to know what riendlyand adversary orces are really doing, where key units arepositioned, and how the situation is changing. Reecting

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this, US joint doctrine explicitly lists positioning o ISRassets as part o exible deterrent operations. In theBalkans in the early 1990s, NAO set up surveillanceand no-y zones long beore committing to urther action.Operations against terrorism consume ISR.

With current orces, it is easy to picture orce optionssuch as a deployment o the Global Hawk unmannedaerial system and other ISR assets along with ghterorces to signal resolve and shape a crisis.

In Iraq and Aghanistan, the US and its partners have

grown accustomed to a level o ISR unprecedentedin warare. It began with the early use o unmannedaerial systems Predator and Global Hawk in Aghanistan,and has spiraled to the point where a combination osystems can track terrorist movements visually andelectronically. ISR is not perect, but it provides an addictivelevel o inormation.

Space platorms play a role but the most sophisticated,sensitive ISR depends on near-complete control othe airspace so that aircrat o all types may operate

with impunity.

However, or some adversaries, the solution is near athand. Positioning o advanced surace-to-air missilesalong border regions can put all current unmanned ISRplatorms at risk o being unable to survey crisis areas.

Russias actions in Georgia in August 2008 lasted briey butthey were enough to create a prototype lock-out scenario.

Te Russian Northern Caucasus military district hadnearly 300 ghter aircrat: 105 MiG-29s, 30 Su-24s, 59Su-27s, and 100 Su-25s. Add in the now-common SA-20

with its re-control range o 75 miles and it would havebeen possible to layer enough air deenses to makereconnaissance nearly impossible. Even the high-yingGlobal Hawk might not be able to evade top-lineRussian air deenses every time.

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Airborne ISR lock-out would put the US and theinternational community in a very uncomortable position.One potential solution is deployment o the F-22 tosignal the potential to hold surace-to-air missilesystems at risk.

ISR lockout is also imminent over Iran. Reports romsummer 2008 suggested that Iran was awaiting deliveryo the SA-20, and could have operational systems by theend o 2009. US Deense Secretary Robert Gatesremarked on July 9, 2008 that Iran would not get the SA-20sany time soon but a senior deense ofcial quickly clariedthat the time period indicated was months. 4

Beyond this, several scenarios are possible, andall show the need or the F-22s contribution toconventional deterrence.

InterventionOne o the most vexing, near-term scenarios would beF-22 deployment to support action over Iran. wo actorsare at work. First is the strengthening o Irans airdeenses which threaten lock-out. Second, recentintelligence reports have estimated that the period o

vulnerability or Iran to develop nuclear weapons would

be around 2015.

Stern words have had little impact to date. heinternational community cannot allow Iran to developnuclear weapons, wrote US Ambassador to the UnitedNations Zalmay Khalilzad in March 2008. 5 Hal a yearlater, nothing had changed. Iran is determined todevelop nuclear weapons at this point, said Secretary oDeense Robert Gates in October 2008. 6

Denitive signs o weapons deployment by a bellicoseregime in Iran might lead to a decision in avor opre-emptive, multinational action. While none wouldbe eager or this kind o scenario, the act remains that it

would task F-22s heavily.

A combat scenario would most likely involve careulstrikes on selected Iranian military installations and

weapons acilities. Irans air deenses will be clusteredclose together. By 2015, Irans air deenses will include

ully deployed SA-10s and SA-20s. Te minimumranges o these surace-to-air missiles exceed 75 miles.Laced together along the coast, they will provide eectivelock-out o aluminum aircrat such as the F-15 andF-16 and the Navy F/A-18EF.

Beyond the coastal surace-to-air missile belt, IslamicRepublic o Iran air orces will be on the lookout or strikers thatmake it through. Published sources indicate that Irans airorce has about 100 modern ghter and attack aircrat.

Tese range rom the highly capable MiG-29 to olderaircrat such as the Mirage F-1 and F-14, which maybe too old to be eective due to limited maintenance.Su-24 attack aircrat are also in the inventory. While

only the MiG-29 would pose a credible challenge,other aircrat armed with air-to-air missiles couldsignicantly complicate matters or attacking aircrat.

Te aim o a US-led strike would be to achieve objectivesand be both surgical and survivable. F-22s would todaybe the only ghter aircrat capable o the mission.

What would happen i the deployment order or such astrike was issued? F-22s would be required or two missions.First, packages o F-22s would most likely lead strikes to

disable surace-to-air missiles. Some F-22s would alsostrike ground targets, and others might support the B-2on missions to drop heavier, penetrating weapons.

Second, the Coalition orce would have to ensureair supremacy over the Persian Gul in case ocounterattacks by Iran on nations supporting theactivity. Deense against cruise missiles would be a largepart o the task. In Operation Desert Storm in 1991,a major concern o Gul state allies was to make sureno bombs ell on their territory. Preventing even nuisanceattacks rom cruise missiles or Iranian ghters will requireextensive combat air patrols over several nations. Whileother aircrat will assist, the cruise missile deense rolein particular will require the F-22s radar search volume andquick dash capacity to engage missiles in ight. Needlessto say, positioning these orces will be a deterrent initsel, but only i the orce deployed is credible or boththe strike mission and the Gul state deense missions.

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NAOTe return o Russia as a world power comes ater a brie,economically-driven absence in the late 1990s. Russiahas been through periods o inward retrenchment beore.However, with control over massive oil and gas reserves,

Russia has re-emerged as a powerhouse. Now that nationis causing riction around its borders on issues romenergy supplies to missile deense. New NAO membershave been particular targets.

A series o Cold War antics is enough to worry Europeand the world. Te F-22 squadrons at Elmendor AirForce Base already have pictures o their F-22s yingalongside the Russian Bear bombers. Russian bombersalso buzzed the USSNimitz.

All Russian Air Force ights are perormedin strictaccordance with international rules on the use o airspaceover neutral waters without violating the borders oother states, insisted Colonel Alexander Drobyshevsky,a Russian Air Force spokesman. 7

Russias ambitions are global. Rumblings about deploymento bombers to Venezuela coincided with a sale o 24

Su-30 ghters to President Hugo Chavez. We do whatwe can to deend ourselves, said Chavez, who also over-

saw a purchase o air deense rom Russia via Belarusjust in case the Americans were thinking o doinganything similar to Venezuela reerring to what the aircampaign did to Iraq in 2003. 8

Its hard to say what the uture direction o Russianactivity will be. Many analysts have noted a certainrustiness in Russian military actions. However, at thisrate o activity, the Russian military will regain its ormquickly enough.

Either way, deterring Russian conventional activity is

once again a major task or NAO. NAO nationsneed credible air deenses and a collective ability tointervene in border regions i necessary.

Since 2004, NAO has been deploying ghters toLatvia or air deense patrols. Te Baltic air policinginitiative is part o NAOs quick reaction capability andis necessary since Latvia, or example, has an air orcenumbering less than 300 people and no air deensecapability o its own. ypically, detachments o ouraircrat guard airspace over all three Baltic nations.

Recently, F-15Es rom the US base at RAF Lakenheath,in Britain, have joined in the rotation. Te UnitedStates is committed to the air sovereignty o its NAOallies and to ensuring the regional peace and stability orthese countries, said Lieutenant Colonel Michael King,the units commander, in October 2008. 9

As threats shit, the ability o the F-22 to cover avolume o airspace against air and surace-to-air threatscould become a signicant edge. Tere are no plans to

base F-22s in Europe. Still, the time may come whenthey deploy there oten. Its not hard to picture asituation where Russian ghters overwhelm a our-air-crat NAO detachment. Being able to bring highlycapable orces to bear would be the essence o deterrenceover the Baltic region. Pair border probes with uturecapabilities and potential ISR degradation, and the caseor F-22 availability in a NAO scenario becomes clear.

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ChinaChina is a world power, a major trading partner, and

without question, a potential military competitor. WithChina there may be a decades-long balance betweenconrontation and cooperation. Conventional deterrence

will be a big part o calibrating the balance. For the US,relying on airpowers conventional deterrent will be aprime tool.

China has already demarcated the realms o air, space andcyberspace as arenas or competition and de-emphasized

its land orces. In 2004, Chinas Deense White Paperstated bluntly: Te Army is streamlined by reducingthe ordinary troops that are technologically backward

while the Navy, Air Force and Second Artillery Force[Chinas nuclear weapons unit] are strengthened.

Instead, current Chinese military doctrine ocuses on local (orregional) war under high technology conditions, whichthey deine as a limited war, ought in a restricted

geographic area or limited objectives with limited meansand a conscious eort to curtail destruction. Rapiddeeat o the enemy is the main objective and the preerredtool is to inict strategic and operational paralysis oreven deeat the enemy with one strike. Te Chinesedo not much worry about global power projection,stability operations or major land campaigns.

Deterring China will be all about providing persistence,to make clear US and allied orces wont back o until

goals are met. Credible deterrence will include the ability totarget mobile launches like the one China used to shoota missile into orbit to destroy its deunct weather satellite.

Tat launch brought home how difcult it could be totrack, target and kill mobile launchers.

Tose mobile launchers could threaten everything romanti-satellite attack to use o nuclear weapons. Mobilelaunchers are notoriously diicult to pin down.

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Scud-hunting in Iraq in 1991 soaked up resources. Adecade later, despite years o work, the Coalition stillencountered unlocated, mobile surace-to-air missiles asthe war with Iraq began in 2003.

Holding mobile missile launchers at risk o attack willprobably be the gold standard or conventional deterrence.Some analysts maintain that stand-o missiles are a

valid option against important targets deep in enemyairspace. While they have their uses, stand-o missilessuer rom a big drawback in attacking mobile targets.

o reach a target, the missile is launched, and then iesin to make the strike. Te time o ight may be several

minutes. Tats ample time or the target to move arenough to avoid being killed or even damaged. Harassmentis not deterrence.

Nor can all aircrat withstand the risks. Hunting ormobile targets could also take the F-22 deep into enemydeenses, where it will probably be outnumbered by enemyghters. In that scenario, F-22s may have to ght oenemy aircrat, then continue on to strike the assignedmobile target. Te superior internal carriage o F-22air-to-air and air-to-ground weapons will help it surviveand complete its mission.

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PACING DETERRENCE

Conventional deterrence is driven by the military weight ineach side o the balance and the calculation o interests whichgoes into the decision to act. Interests vary, but it is easier totrack over time the rise and all o the military power.

Will the US be deterred rom taking military actions insupport o international aims? Americans like to thinko their military orces deterring bad actions o others.

Yet as balances shit theres a real prospect that Americanorces might nd their options more constrained i theycannot establish that conventional overmatch so central

to cold, hard conventional deterrence. Based on the lastdecade o experience, the reedom to act may range romISR overwatch to use o special orces to limited strikes.None o these will be possible i US air dominance slipsto the point o sel-deterring action.

Te developments most likely to interrupt the ability othe US to carry out missions up to and includingconventional airstrikes and thus imperil deterrencecome rom a range o technologies. Developments inthese areas can be seen as pacesetters.

Fighters. Ater a long lull, the world ghter markethas seen new procurement plans, and research onadvanced types. First up are variants incorporatingadvanced tracking and targeting systems explicitlyintended to match current US ghters. In March2008, Russian President Vladimir Putin called onthe deense ministry to add more Su-35s andMiG-35s (an upgrade o the MiG-29) in theinterim beore Sukhois th-generation PAK-FAtype is developed. 10 ogether Russia and Chinahave 12 open military aircrat production lines.

Jammers. Digital Radio Frequency Memory is anelectronics countermeasure technology that samplesand digitally duplicates a waveorm. Te digitized

waveorm can be reconstructed at will and projectedback to give alse inormation on position, speed,heading, and more.

Inrared Search and rack. New systems like thatincorporated on the MiG-35 are capable o passive

detection o heat rom air resistance on a missilenose cone. Coupled with laser range-nding orother techniques, inrared search and track (IRS)oers a potential re control solution, too. WhileIRS has some operational disadvantages, it has thepotential to be a ormidable new weapon.

Ultra-long range missiles. According to the AirForce, new missiles are under development which

will cut into some AMRAAM (Advanced MediumRange Air-to-Air Missile) and stealth tactics.Longer-range adversary missiles will make ghter

aircrat speed crucial because it enables the F-22 toengage at longer ranges with the same eect.

Tese are just some o the technical trends relevant toconventional deterrence as it relates to the ability toconduct airstrikes. Many o these technologies debutedin rudimentary orm years ago, and most are in the inventoryor well within reach o the US and Western partners.

ogether, they open tactical possibilities that present anear-even match with current US ghters.

Te F-22 and Deterrence Te F-22 was designed to combat developments likethese. Much o its edge is built into the aerodynamicso the platorm. Te whole intent o the F-22 wasto create one ghter with the perormance to ensuresuperiority against upgraded and new adversary ghters,even as they add advanced capabilities. No other ghterying today has that mission.

Why is a combination o legacy ghters and the F-35not sufcient to provide conventional deterrence orthe US Air Force? Like many other systems, aircrat are

all about trade-os. Yet its been understood or a long timethat at least one ghter platorm had to reach or uncompro-mised design in order to provide a deterrent stretching overseveral decades.

Tat aircrat is the F-22. One o its top characteristics isspeed. ests with derivative F-16s in the years between1982 and 1985 demonstrated the possibility o brie

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periods o supersonic ight without aterburner. Te AirForce added the requirement or supercruise ying at Mach1 to Mach 1.6 or more without aterburner because it

would give the F-22 signicant advantages against otherghters or surace-to-air missiles. No one had attemptedto build supersonic speed with stealth beore, but theF-22 did it, and remains the only aircrat in the world

with this ability.

Te other advantage waiting to be claimed was altitude.Stealth designers avored altitudes above 40,000 eetbecause enemy radar might be less eective in thosereaches. However, the F-22 would have to operate withexceptional maneuverability, which required another

technology known as thrust vectoring.

Knowing the F-22 would take care o the toughest threats,the F-35 was designed as a single-engine attack aircrat tosuit a wide range o customers and operating environments.Beyond this, the whole design o the F-35 was predicated

on having the F-22, which was ahead o it by about tenyears, in the orce.

oday the F-35 is beginning rigorous ight testing andinitial results are promising. However, there are several

years to go beore the F-35 reaches its initial operatingcapability. (Te F-22 reached that status in 2005.)

Whats clear already is that the decision to optimize F-22and F-35 or dierent missions was wise. Tere will bechallenges ahead, and some o the specic, high-perormanceeatures o the F-22 will be extremely important.

Te best place to be or evading surace-to-air missiles

and moving through enemy ghters is at high altitudeand high speed. Just how high and how ast depends onthe threats.

Against todays ghters, airspeeds o .8 Mach or greaterand altitudes above 35,000 eet are usually sufcient.

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Te problem emerges about 5-7 years out, as advancedmodications to adversary ghters, missiles and on-boardsystems begin to change the equation.

Fighters need stealth to get around surace-to-air missiles. Te F-22 brings a unique advantage because it wasdesigned to claim the ultimate sweet spot or air combat.

Tat is the zone centering on an altitude o 50,000 eetand a sustained speed o 1.6 Mach.

Analysis suggests that the F-22 operating at 1.6 Machand 50,000 eet or higher is twice as successul at deeatingair-to-air threats in 2015 and beyond.

Tis is the prime operating regime or the F-22. Inactual operations, an aircrat using aterburner can reachthe sweet spot. However, the F-22s unique advantageis that it can operate in the sweet spot without ater-burner. Tat allows the F-22 to stay there longer and atless risk.

Against advanced threats, lying ast delivers manyadvantages. Te F-22 can engage other ghters romlonger distances and still expect the same probabilityo kill. his ability becomes vital when F-22s are

outnumbered and must contend with two, our or eightadversaries en route to striking a surace-to-air missiletarget, or example. O course, the F-22 will rely heavilyon shared inormation available to other platorms likeF-35, but executing combined air and surace strikes willcall or all the stealth, speed and maneuverabilityadvantages which belong to the F-22.

Deterrence or LieTe F-22s deterrence qualities will be even more importantabout a decade rom now.

However, thats when eet size will begin to show aserious impact on the orce. Te F-22 has a design lieo 8,000 hours, a typical mark or a land-based ghter.(Carrier-based ghters oten have shorter design liedue to the stresses o catapults and arrested landings.)Design lie is the set o engineering trades that balancessturdy structure with aerodynamic qualities. Over time,the airrame will accumulate atigue and stress, and

enter a red zone where the risk o major structural ailurebecomes unacceptable. Fighters typically have a shorterdesign lie than cargo or other mobility aircrat becauseo the g-orces imposed during training and wartimeghter maneuvers. A ghter executing a routine 3-gclimb-out on take-o is enduring stress unknown toother types o aircrat.

How long ghters stay in service depends primarily onhow ast pilots use up the design lie hours and what

they do during those sorties.

A small eet uses up service lie more quickly than theAir Force planned.

Te oldest F-22s delivered in the late 1990s would beginretiring just as the 2015 to 2020 threat ully emerges. Amajor block o about 50 F-22s which were delivered tothe Air Force beore 2005 would retire by 2025 to 2030.

Teres yet another dilemma. Te smaller the eet, the

less time the Air Force has to research and develop aollow-on or the F-22. At some point, the Air Forcewill have to develop an F-22 replacement. A boutiqueeet will burn through the F-22s service lie at a ratethat orces premature decisions on investment or aollow-on orce. A eet o no less than 250 F-22s

would provide orces or conventional deterrence, andallow more time to mature technologies beore makinga huge new investment.

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CONCLUSION

A strong conventional deterrent with airpower remainsessential to international security. As Secretary Gatessaid lets not orget the deterrent valueo our conventionalmilitary orces. 11

Yet this is exactly the risk the nation is taking withconventional deterrence. Unless the F-22 is bought insufcient numbers, the risks to all joint orces go up andup in the years ahead. Right now the US has the abilityto stay ahead in the conventional deterrence game byupgrading its airpower with the unique capabilities o

the F-22. When production ceases, the door will close.It would take many years and billions o dollars to begina new program to surpass the F-22. Long beore then,the US could see its policy options cramped by the limitso its own military power.

I believe we are going to need a nuclear deterrent inthis country or the remainder o this century, the21st century, General Kevin P. Chilton, Commander,United States Strategic Command. So long as thereare other countries in the world that possess enoughnuclear weapons to destroy the United States o Americaand our way o lie ... we will have to deter those typeso countries. 12

Tats just as true or conventional deterrence. No one wants America locked out o surveying a developingcrisis or orced to escalate when a strong, conventionalairstrike option would have done the job.

o ail to provide air dominance would allow othernations to deter US orces and international coalitions.

Within a hal decade, by some counts, other nations will

build up enough lock-out capability to oreclose all butvery costly action. Te door is already swinging shut orISR and other types o early crisis response.

Te F-22 is a key ingredient in ensuring the kind oconventional deterrence that leaves the US and its allies

with access when they need it. Its a capability that canmake other nations think twice about their antics andambitions. o cut it short with a truncated eet unableto cover multiple theaters or sustain its service lie wouldstrike a blow to US military power or all joint orces.

1

Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, Speech to the CarnegieEndowment, October 28, 2008.

2 Admiral Michael Mullen, From the Chairman: Its Time for a New

Deterrence Model, Joint Forces Quarterly, Fall 2008.

3 Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, Speech to the Carnegie

Endowment, October 28, 2008.

4 Dan Williams, Iran to Get new Russian Air Defense By 09: Israel,

Reuters, July 23, 2008.

5 Zalmay Khalilzad, Irans Nuclear Threat, Wall Street Journal,

March 4, 2008.

6 Walter Pincus, Gates Suggests New Arms Deal with Russia,

Washington Post, October 29, 2008, p. A9.

7 Russian Bombers Patrol Over Atlantic Ocean, Moscow News,

April 24, 2008.

8 Jon Lee Anderson, Fidels Heir, The New Yorker, June 23, 2008, p. 48.

9 J. Lavoie, US Forces Begin Air Policing Missions in Baltic, Air Force

News Service, October 2, 2008.

10 Alexey Komarov, Bear Market, Aviation Week and Space Technology,

March 3, 2008, p. 41.

11 Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, Speech to the Carnegie

Endowment, October 28, 2008.

12 Remarks by General Kevin P. Chilton, Defense Writers Group,

March 4, 2008.

12


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Printed in the United States of AmericaFebruary 2009

Related Lexington Institute Studies:

Why Raptor?: The Logic of Buying the Worlds Best Fighter, Loren Thompson, July 2004.

Powering JSF: One Engine Is Enough, Loren Thompson, January 2008.

Provide for the Common Defense: The 4% Solution, Daniel Goure, July 2008.


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Documents

Global Deterrence, The Role of the F-22