Giving Coalitions a Good Name

Politics (1994) 14(3) pp. 109-115

Giving Coalitions a Good Name Michael Temple

Opponents of electoral reform believe that proportional representation (PR) will mean the end of stable and responsible government in Britain. Coalitions between political parties (the likely result of PR;) are portrayed as essentially alien to our political culture, lead- ing to unstable government and an aban- donment of political princ@les by deals in ‘smoke @led rooms: 7bis article challenges such perceptions. 7be example of hung local government provides power-1 support to those who argue electoral reform need not be a recipe for sordid and unstable government.

Introduction: no future for Labour?

In the 1992 general election an unpopular Conservative government, dogged by allega- tions of incompetence and in the middle of the longest economic recession this century, still managed to win a majority in the House of Commons. Given the almost universal pre- dictions of a hung parliament, the initial response of psephologists and pundits was to search for reasons the opinion polls got it so wrong (see W n g s & Thrasher, 1993, for an overview of that debate). However, worries about the veracity of the polls have been replaced by a more important concern which the election result has generated - the thesis

that Britain is heading towards, or has already reached, a state of single-party government (Marr, 1993). The argument is that however badly they rule, the Conservatives are now established as the permanent party of government.

Even if the Conservatives fail to win an out- right majority in a future election, a number of factors, including demographic and social trends, are against Labour regaining political power on their own (Crewe, 1993). There is a growing body of opinion which believes Labour cannot win a majority while the present electoral system is in operation. So, there appears to be a real possibility of either (i) permanent majority government by a party holding a minority of popular support, or (ii) a future hung parliament. Contemplation of either possibility has renewed the vigour of those campaigning for electoral reform, a campaign that has been gathering momentum since the 1983 general election clearly demonstrated the discrepancy between the popular vote and the number of seats gained by each party. Electoral reform is back at the centre of British politics for the first time since 1931, when the House of Lords rejected the Electoral Reform Bill which would have introduced the Alternative Vote electoral system; Ramsay MacDonald’s government fell before that decision could be over-ruled by the Commons. Over sixty years later, some experienced observers believe that the pro-

Michael Temple, Staffordshire University.

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Ghring Coalitions a Good Name a Michael Temple Politics (1994) 14(3) pp. 109-115

spects for electoral reform are greater than any time since then (Butler, 1984, p.229). However, the two main political parties remain unconvinced of the need for change.

Party attitudes to electoral reform

Kenneth Baker’s view that PR involves ‘a pact with the devil’, because minority parties would call the tune (Tbe Independent, 15 October, 1991 1, certainly represents main- stream Conservative thinking. For Con- servatives, the legitimacy of the current electoral system is clearly shown by the high participation rates and the lack of a broad popular movement for reform. Indeed, why should this supremely successful party want to abolish an electoral system which has given them so much power? Despite this, not all Conservatives oppose electoral reform; groups such as Conservative Action for Elec- toral Reform have put forward many argu- ments on the merits of PR (Wigram, 1987,

The attitudes of Labour politicians are undoubtedly coloured by memories of the Lib-Lab pact of 1977-78, although electoral reform has more support among Labour supporters than it does in the Conservative ranks. This may be more for pragmatic reasons than for concern with ‘fairness’, although the belief that a proportional system would be invariably beneficial to Labour is not universal (see Hain, 1986; Macrae, 1993). According to one survey (New Statesman, 8 January, 1993, p.231, a majority of new Labour MPs favour electoral reform, and Dent argues that ‘opinion in the Labour party is moving fairly swiftly towards proportional representation’ (1993, p.244). The Plant Commission’s proposal that Labour should champion the supplementary vote system will bring further pressure for change. Following on those pro- posals, the late Labour leader John Smith announced that Labour would support a

p.5).

referendum on electoral reform. However, even after the 1992 defeat, the belief that Labour can still gain power under the present system is probably too deeply ingrained within the party (Townsend, 1994) for them to support electoral reform before the next election. The strategy of ‘one last heave’ will surely not sunive a further electoral defeat in 1996/7.

A proportional system would certainly favour the Liberal Democrats (LibDems), who have long campaigned for electoral reform. The Plant Commission’s supplementary vote proposal could have given them between 45- 48 seats in the 1992 election, while the Lib- Dems preferred solution of the single trans- ferable vote (STV) might have given them 130-140 seats.‘ Like Labour’s gradudst con- version to the case for reform, the electoral interests of the IibDems, rather than a com- mitment to fairness, may lie behind their support for STV.

Coalition politics - the consequence of electoral reform

Whatever the reasons for their support of reform, there is a need for the proponents of change to be more open and positive about the likely effect of proportional representation (PR) and less defensive about what such an electoral system would entail - that is, c o d - tion government of some sort. Within the British political system, coalition government is overwhelmingly seen as contributing to shady practices and instability by defenders of the first-past-the-post system. The experience of post-war Italian governments, rather than the West German example, is usually dragged out to ‘prove’ the thesis (see for example, ‘Giving coahtions a bad name’, 7be Indepen- dent, second leader, 16 November, 1987).

Historically, most political scientists have also seen coalition governments as weak and lacking in principle. Lowell (1896) believed

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Politics (1994) 14(3) pp. 109-115 Giving Coalitions a Good Name 0 Michael Temple

that strong and efficient government in a par- liamentary system was impossible if more than one party ruled, Harold Laski (1938) argued that coalition government was liable to be weak and lacking in principles, and Duverger (1951) maintained that coahtion or minority governments were symptomised by frequent cabinet collapses (see Dodd, 1976, pp. G9). Further supporting this negative view, Reeve & Ware posit that, while stable coalition governments exist in many countries with PR systems:

quite how British parties would respond faced with the need to bargain with potential coahtion partners in government is a matter on which there is likely to be dis- agreement; it might be that a system of unstable coalition governments would emerge (1992, p.122).

However, whether coalition politics con- tribute to instability depends on the nature of the political system and the way in which deals are made. German coalitions are nor- mally ‘stable and long-lived, largely because they ‘rest on a shared policy outlook and enjoy a secure electoral base’ (Pulzer, 1987, p.149). Just those conditions could exist in British national politics. Labour and the Lib- Dems are now as close as any two major parties have been in Britain. Bogdanor argues that ‘the main policy differences between the two parties now lie in the area of constitu- tional reform ... from the electoral point of view, [they] are perfectly compatible’ ( The Guardian, 3 March 1992). Pimlott agrees that, ‘Labour and the Liberal Democrats have policies which are so similar it requires a PhD in political science to tell them apart, plus a talent for hair-splitting’ ( 7he Independent, 11 May 1993).

The LibDems have the most to gain from electoral reform, but even they tend to shy away from talking about coalitions; Paddy Ashdown’s bid before the last general election for four cabinet posts in any coalition government with Labour was notable for its rare directness (The Times, 6 April, 1992). Euphemisms such as ‘working arrangement’

are sometimes used (see Temple, 1993a), perhaps because of bad memories of the Lib/ Lab pact and the ’AUlance’ with the Social Democratic Party in 1983 and 1987. LibDem local strategy documents evidence a dislike of formal long-term arrangements, arguing that formal across-the-board coalitions (the norm in most European countries) are ‘unlikely to be worthwhile, not least because of the potential political damage of being seen as Tory or Labour shadows’. Local groups are also advised to end formal arrangements ’as soon as it is no longer worthwhile . . . choosing an appropriate issue and moment’ (Stu- nell, 1991, p.14). If they can, groups are recommended not to ‘vote consistently with one side’ (Stunell, 1991, p.19). Thus, the party with the most to gain nationally from demonstrating that hung legislatures can provide stable and responsible government is engaged in promulgating the opposite impression in its advice to local politicians.

The supporters of electoral reform need to show that hung legislatures can produce efficient government in this countty. There is no need to refer to wartime or emergency national governments to demonstrate that British politicians can co-operate. Despite the negative advice often offered by their national party organisations, local politicians and bureaucrats in hung councils are already demonstrating an ability to work together to produce good government.

Hung local government - coalitions in action

During the past decade the British political system, with little tradition of the phenom- enon at either national or local level, has had to accommodate an increasing number of local authorities where no political party has an overall majority. Since 1993 a majority of county councils have been hung, and following the 1994 district council elections more than a quarter of all local authorities are now hung.2

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Giving Coalitions a Good Name 0 Michael Temple Politics (1994) 14(3) p p . 10!3-115

The evidence suggests that coalition politics need not be a recipe for policy vacillation or shady dealing. In fact, the overall picture pre- sented by academic studies of ‘life in the balance’ is positive (see for example, Leach & Game, 1989; Leach & Stewart, 1992). This is not to deny that local authorities characterised by stalemate exist. Traditional rulers (predominantly Conservative) are the most reluctant to change, often attempting to rule alone in (usually short lasting) minority governments and refusing to co-operate with any other party. However, Conservative politicians are noted for pragmatism, and they usually come to terms with the revised situation. Local Conservatives can be extremely adept at getting what they want, be it chaos or policy deals (see Temple, 1993a).

The majority of hung local councils continue to operate smoothly, despite the diffi- culties of being faced with an unexpected situation. New conventions are often introduced to cope with the changed circumstances (Leach & Stewart, 1992, p.174). Shortly after Cheshire became hung, its far- seeing chief executive introduced, with the co-operation of group leaders, a conventions document concerning the relations between the political parties and officers which has become a model for other hung councils3 (see Wendt, 1983, for a first hand account of their development). Leach and Game note the spread of such ‘conventions documents’ in the hung counties, although they report that there is little evidence of majority control councils adopting such convention documents (1989, pp.44-46).

One criticism levelled against hung systems is that of policy ‘drift and impasse’ (Blowers, 1987, p.32). In addition, some observers have argued that officer power can increase in hung councils (Mellors, 1989, p.96; Blowers, 1987, p.45). However, research indicates that neither officers nor councillors see the decision making process as characterised by policy drift and impasse. While a minority of both political and bureaucratic actors do feel that the policy process has deteriorated, a

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majority believe that both the quality of decision making and the quality of policies has either improved or remained the same since their council became hung (Rallings, Temple & Thrasher, 1994, pp.lG17). The general enthusiasm displayed by local politicians does not indicate that hung councils become mor- ibund, and nor does it indicate a policy process dominated by officers.

There appears to be a more open decision making process in hung councils. Many politicians are enthusiastic about the increased importance of debate, and this is reflected in the greater influence that political groups in hung councils feel they possess. Even those groups outside of the ruling administration report greater influence in hung councils. The influence of elected party elites appears to be dramatically decreased by hungness, and the full council meeting and council committees become more important, suggesting that the power of the individual councillor increases (Temple, 1991a; 1993b).

The possible lessons for students of national politics

The increased importance of the council meeting suggests that the power of back- benchers might also increase in a hung West- minster parliament. Just as in the Minister- Mandarin relationship, there is an inevitable closeness between controlling party leaders and chief officers in a majority controlled council. Equally inevitably, hungness must affect this hegemony. Chief officers and a single party elite can no longer control the operations of the council without regard to other party groups, and access to officers becomes far more open (Temple, 1991b, p.238). A permanently hung House of Com- mons could not continue to operate in its present elitist and adversarial way, and the role of the Civil Service would also have to change. New rules of conduct for political- bureaucratic relations would have to be for- mulated, and the example of local govern-

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ment (admittedly different in its underlying assumptions about the respective roles) provides an indication that greater openness might be one consequence of coalition politics.

Of course, the experiences of local government may hold few lessons for national politics. While the customs and procedures of local government may be admirably suited to making the hung situation work, as Leach i3 Stewart maintain (1992, p.2201, perhaps the more openly adversarial nature of Westmin- ster politics will work against more con- sensual practices. However, in non-hung councils the practices closely follow the West- minster model. There is often an unofficial ‘cabinet’ (Mellors, 1989, p.741, and the ruling party controls policy making and maintains a tight hold on access to chief officers, despite the fiction that officers are available to all members of the council (Stoker, 1988, p.85). This changes when the council becomes hung, and there is no reason to suppose that Westminster - Whitehall cannot change their practices if circumstances dictate it. For Wendt, the experiences of local government will be invaluable to central government

to take no account at all of the working practices developed in local government would be unwise . . . styles of relationship between politicians and officials have much in common whatever the setting in which they are carried out’ (Wendt, 1986, p.387).

On one point the critics of PR systems are correct; on average, administrations in hung councils do not last as long as those in majority controlled councils, which invariably last the full term of four years. While many hung councils produce extremely stable administrations which can last the whole term of four years, some experience yearly ~ h a n g e . ~ However, coalition politics in English local government is still in its infancy. Local politicians are involved in a learning process and, over time, ‘there is a tendency for the authorities, even some high conflict ones, to settle down’ (Leach & Stewart, 1992, p.189). Most find new ways of working together, and

mechanisms for compromise usually emerge (ibid., pp.1849). Faced with the permanently hung parliament that PR would probably bring, it is likely that national politicians will adapt and seek coherent and long-term agree- ments to share power for the length of a parliament.

One final observation might make Labour supporters of PR pause, and cause opponents of change to chorus ‘we told you so’. Liberal Democrats are extremely influential in hung councils. The LibDems are more likely to achieve their budgetary aims than either of the two main parties (Mellors, 1989, pp .104 5). At first sight, this appears to support the concern that small central parties might wield power beyond their size. However, the suc- cess of the LibDems may not be solely because of their ideological position in the middle of the two main parties - they are far more enthusiastic about the changes hungness brings and far more likely to be willing to negotiate a share of control.

Conclusion Martin Dent has called political scientists to arms concerning the nature of the debate on electoral reform, arguing we must ‘have the courage to challenge ancient taboos’ (1993, p.251). This article, challenging the received wisdom that coahtion politics are alien to the nature of British politics, is offered as a con- tribution to the debate. The evidence from hung councils suggests that British politicians and bureaucrats are capable of changing the practices of a lifetime to accommodate hung legislatures, and that policy making, far from becoming characterised by deals in smoke- filled rooms, becomes more open and con- sensual. Decision making becomes closer to the ’official’ description of local democracy, with the full council assuming new importance and officers moving closer to their formal roles as servants of the whole council. Hung councils are more likely to experience changes of administration than noii-hung


GMng Coalitions a Good Name 0 Michael Temple Politics (1994) 14(3) pp. 109-115

councils, but this is not inevitable. Coalition politics works, and local politicians have shown themselves adept at co-operating with their political rivals when necessary. It is unlikely that national politicians will fail to learn the same lessons in the event of a hung Par- liament.

Such calculations are based on the suspect pre- mise that the party votes would have been the same whatever the electoral system. It is acknowledged that if another voting system had been in place the election results would have been very different. Completely reliable data on council composi- tions is difficult to obtain, as there is no statu- tory requirement for British local councils to provide detailed election results. The results supplied often fail to identify political parties, and by-elections occur more frequently than at national level. In addition, changes of political allegiance by councillors are not uncommon.

3 Indeed, the.‘Cheshire Conventions’ were singled out by the Widdicombe Report as the model for alI counciIs to adopt, whether they were hung or not (Widdicombe, 1986, Report Appendix H, pp.

4 This can be because of the different electoral cycles. Some councils hold elecitions every four years, while others hold annual elections for one-third of the council with the fourth year free of elections. Therefore, the pressures to come to permanent agreement are greater in councils with a four yearly cycle, as ‘with annual elections there is always the possibility that at the next election the local authority will resume “nor- mality”’ (Leach & Stewart, 1992, p. 45).

292-297).

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Giving Coalitions a Good Name