Give CTR to Russia | Negative

Matthew Hamilton Eveready

Give CTR to Russia | Negative 11/07/10

Give CTR to Russia | NegativeTable of Contents Definitions/Notes.......................................................................................................................................1 -Office of Cooperative Threat Reduction (ISN/CTR) Mission Statement............................................1 1. Inherency................................................................................................................................................2 1.1 Accomplishments of the Nunn-Lugar Program(CTR)....................................................................2 1.2 Progress Has Been Made, But There is Still More to Do................................................................2 1.3 It's Sensitive Nature Requires Sustained Political and Financial Attention....................................2 1.4 Nunn-Lugar is Expanding...............................................................................................................3 2. Benefits of CTR.................................................................................................................................3 2.1 Unique Advantages Have Resulted From the Program...................................................................3 2.2 Nunn-Lugar Program(CTR) Has Been Beneficial..........................................................................3 3. Solvency.................................................................................................................................................4 3.1 Russia Focuses on Other Forms of Terrorism.................................................................................4 4. Disadvantages........................................................................................................................................4 DA 1: Vital Working Relationships Lost...............................................................................................4 DA 2: Security Threat............................................................................................................................4 Credentials/Info..........................................................................................................................................5

Definitions/Notes-Office of Cooperative Threat Reduction (ISN/CTR) Mission Statement The Office of Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) is funded by the Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism, De-mining and Related Programs (NADR) Account. CTR programs, also known as Global Threat Reduction (GTR) programs, are aimed at reducing the threat posed by terrorist organizations or states of concern seeking to acquire weapons of mass destruction (WMD) expertise, materials and equipment. In addition to continued efforts in Iraq, the former Soviet Union, and Libya to engage former WMD experts, the GTR programs are working to reduce the rapidly growing worldwide WMD threat posed by terrorists, non-state actors, and proliferant states. Note: Nunn-Lugar = CTR Analogy Note: Alright, so the case about CTR that is in The Source is, in short, giving Russia the responsibility of dealing with the dismantlement of IT'S OWN aged weapons of mass destruction. In other words, there's no way of telling if Russia is really taking care of the problem. They may issue reports saying that they are, when the truth may be that they are in fact keeping the stockpiles that they have for the future. Essentially, we would be: Analogy 1: Putting the wolf in charge of the hen house. Analogy 2: Giving the prisoner the key to his own cell.

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1. Inherency1.1 Accomplishments of the Nunn-Lugar Program(CTR) NTI(Site info at end of brief), January 28, 2010, Cooperative Threat Reduction Program to Expand Mission, http://www.globalsecuritynewswire.org/gsn/nw_20100128_7901.php Since being established in 1991 to secure and eliminate weapons of mass destruction in one-time Soviet states, the Nunn-Lugar program has deactivated 7,519 strategic nuclear warheads and destroyed 768 ICBMs, 498 ICBM silos, 148 mobile ICBM launchers, 651 submarine-launched ballistic missiles, 476 SLBM launchers, 32 ballistic missile-capable submarines, 155 strategic bombers, 906 nuclear airto-surface missiles and 194 nuclear test tunnels. 1.2 Progress Has Been Made, But There is Still More to Do Dmitry Kovchegin[is a former fellow of the Managing the Atom Program at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs who now works as a researcher at Moscow.s PIR Center.] The dangerously low level of security of WMD materials in Russia exacerbates the threat of nuclear terrorism on Russian soil. Fortunately, terrorists have not yet carried out an attack using nuclear weapons or materials stolen from Russian stockpiles, or against Russian nuclear facilities. It would be a mistake, however, to take the security of weapons and materials of mass destruction in Russia for granted. In the early 1990s, the United States and Russia demonstrated their awareness of the danger posed by inadequately secured Russian weapons and materials by initiating bilateral cooperation for nuclear threat reduction. While significant success has been achieved and nuclear materials and weapons in Russia are much more secure than before, there is still a lot of work to do. The latest in a series of authoritative reports analyzing U.S. nuclear security assistance to Russia concluded that .the on-the-ground progress in securing, consolidating, and eliminating nuclear stockpiles in the last year remained slow, when compared to the urgency of the threat. 1.3 It's Sensitive Nature Requires Sustained Political and Financial Attention By Kenneth N. Luongo and William E. Hoehn III[are Executive Director and Washington Office Director, respectively, of the Russian-American Nuclear Security Advisory Council (RANSAC), a private nonpartisan research organization.], The Arms Control Association(Site info at end of brief), Reform and Expansion of Cooperative Threat Reduction, http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2003_06/luongohoehn_june03 Because of its sensitive nature and the need for cooperation by all parties, the threat reduction agenda requires sustained political attention and the expenditure of political capital. Truly robust political support for threat reduction, however, is very rarely demonstrated and often is more rhetorical than real. For example, the Russian government has rarely spearheaded efforts to eliminate the internal security and bureaucratic problems that plague implementation in Russia. In the United States, 2/7



insufficient political support and attention has resulted in funding limitations and restrictions, bureaucratic battles, and delayed program implementation. 1.4 Nunn-Lugar is Expanding Friday, Oct. 16, 2009, Nunn-Lugar Reforms Included in Defense Budget Bill, http://www.globalsecuritynewswire.org/gsn/nw_20091016_8437.php In addition, language in the budget legislation would enable Congress to provide as much as $424 million for the program in the fiscal year that began Oct. 1, $20 million more than the Obama administration had requested. "This important increase in funding will permit Nunn-Lugar to take on new tasks in new countries, principally in the area of biological threat reduction," according to a Lugar press release.

2. Benefits of CTR 2.1 Unique Advantages Have Resulted From the Program By Kenneth N. Luongo and William E. Hoehn III[are Executive Director and Washington Office Director, respectively, of the Russian-American Nuclear Security Advisory Council (RANSAC), a private nonpartisan research organization.], The Arms Control Association(Site info at end of brief), Reform and Expansion of Cooperative Threat Reduction, http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2003_06/luongohoehn_june03 Beyond the measurable rewards, these cooperative programs also have created equally important but less tangible benefits, including an improved Russian appreciation of nonproliferation; heightened levels of trust between U.S. and Russian officials, military officers, and scientists; and new political linkages and relationships not thought possible during the Cold War. These intangible benefits are hard to quantify in official reports, but they are a unique result of this work. 2.2 Nunn-Lugar Program(CTR) Has Been Beneficial NTI(Site info at end of brief), January 28, 2010, Cooperative Threat Reduction Program to Expand Mission, http://www.globalsecuritynewswire.org/gsn/nw_20100128_7901.php [Brackets added] In 2009, the Nunn-Lugar program continued to make us safer by achieving meaningful progress in the destruction and dismantlement of massive Soviet weapons systems and the facilities that developed them. There is much more work to do in combating biological, nuclear, and chemical threats through Nunn-Lugar cooperative threat reduction and the global expansion of the Nunn-Lugar program, he[U.S. Senator Richard Lugar] said in the release.

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3. Solvency3.1 Russia Focuses on Other Forms of Terrorism Dmitry Kovchegin[is a former fellow of the Managing the Atom Program at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs who now works as a researcher at Moscow.s PIR Center.], April 2007, A Russian Perspective on Cooperation Threat Reduction In Russia, terrorism has been most visible in the kidnapping of hostages, as in Beslan in September 2004 and the Dubrovka theater in Moscow in October 2002, as well as in suicide bombings and other explosions in major cities. But while the threat of terrorists using nuclear or radioactive materials or attacking nuclear facilities is clear, it has not yet found its way into public discussion and perceptions of terrorism. Therefore, Russian society does not yet see cooperative threat reduction programs as a means to mitigate the threat of terrorism.

4. DisadvantagesDA 1: Vital Working Relationships Lost Link: Relationships Have Been Built Because of CTR Forum on the Role of Science and Technology in Promoting National Security and Global Stability, List of participants at end of brief, Cooperative Threat Reduction, March 30, 1995, http://clinton1.nara.gov/White_House/EOP/OSTP/forum/html/ctr-draft.html Like the United States, Russia has a strong interest in preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction, and contacts at the working level assist the two governments in identifying common aims and possible areas for collaboration. In the context of the lab-to-tab program for example, the Russian government has now expressed an interest in jointly developing a global non-proliferation strategy. More generally, by nurturing good working level relationships with experts and officials in the Russian military-industrial complex, the United States lays the groundwork for future initiatives. Brink: Relationships Like These Take Years to develop Impact: Unique Advantage Lost Impact: Possible Inner Influence Lost DA 2: Security Threat Link: Affirmative Passes Baton to Russia Brink: If Relations Worsen, Dismantlement Will be Key 4/7



Forum on the Role of Science and Technology in Promoting National Security and Global Stability, List of participants at end of brief, Cooperative Threat Reduction, March 30, 1995, http://clinton1.nara.gov/White_House/EOP/OSTP/forum/html/ctr-draft.htmlFollowing from Point 6, the panel believes that it would be unwise to cancel or curtail the Nunn-Lugar program and other cooperative threat reduction activities because of difficulties in the broader political relationship. These programs should not be treated as a source of "leverage" over Russia or the other newly independent countries. This would seriously undermine the business-like relationships that US officials have worked hard to establish with their Russian counterparts. More importantly, however, the panel believes that US cooperative threat reduction programs serve US national security interests independently of the overall tenor of Russian-American relations. Indeed, if relations with Russia do worsen, the

dismantlement of Russian strategic nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction will become more--not less--vital to US national security interests. Impact: Nuclear War Russia will have control of so many missiles that both countries will be DOOMED.

Credentials/Info-NTI is a place of common ground where people with different ideological views are working together to close the gap between the global threats from nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and the global response. Co-chaired by former U.S. Senator Sam Nunn and philanthropist and CNN founder Ted Turner, NTI is governed by an expert and influential Board of Directors with members from the United States, Russia, Japan, India, Pakistan, China, Jordan, Sweden, France and the United Kingdom. Board members include a former U.S. Secretary of Defense, members of the legislative branches of government from the United States, France, Russia and the United Kingdom; a member of the Jordanian royal family; a Nobel prize winning economist; a world renowned nuclear physicist; the former commander of U.S. nuclear strategic forces and other top experts in international security issues. The foundation's activities are directed by NTI Co-Chairman Sam Nunn and NTI President and Chief Operating Officer Joan Rohlfing. (Taken from the About NTI page) -The Arms Control Association(ACA) founded in 1971, is a national nonpartisan membership organization dedicated to promoting public understanding of and support for effective arms control policies. Through its public education and media programs and its magazine, Arms Control Today (ACT), ACA provides policy-makers, the press and the interested public with authoritative information, analysis and commentary on arms control proposals, negotiations and agreements, and related national security issues. In addition to the regular press briefings ACA holds on major arms control developments, the Association's staff provides commentary and analysis on a broad spectrum of issues for journalists and scholars both in the United States and abroad. 5/7



-Cooperative Threat Reduction --Summary of Drafting Panel Discussion-The history and scope of the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program is summarized in the White Paper prepared for the Forum. The CTR program, also known as the "Nunn-Lugar" program, is run by the Department of Defense and is directed primarily at the four former Soviet Republics that inherited the nuclear arsenal of the Soviet Union: Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia and Ukraine. The panel noted that there are other programs within the US Government that seek to reduce threats to the United States on a cooperative basis with our international partners, including those outside of the former Soviet Union. 1Cooperative threat reduction is a broad based official activity, so the panel did not confine its discussion to the DePartment of Defense's CTR program. 2 The panel reached Consensus on eight key points concerning U.S. cooperative threat reduction activities. The panel was unable to provide direct answers to the three "cross-cutting questions" posed by the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy, in part because the panelists did not believe that these questions were clearly relevant to the experience with cooperative threat reduction activities to date. The panel was also unable to reach consensus on the appropriate priorities for U.S. cooperative threat reduction activities. Drafter: Steve Miller, Harvard University Co-Chairs: Government Co-chair: Gloria Duffy, Department of Defense Nongovernment Co-chair: Steve Miller, Harvard University Rapporteur: Richard Falkenrath, National Research Council Participants: Sieg Hecker, Los Alamos National Laboratory Akihiro Aoki, Embassy of Japan Kennette Benedict, The MacArthur Foundation Tyrus Cobb, Defense Systems & Electronics Andrew Goodpaster, Atlantic Council of the United States David Jeremiah, Technologies Strategies & Alliances Leon M. Lederman, Fermi National Accelerator Laboratory Darrol Paiga, Semi/Sematec Ian M. Ross, AT&T Bell Laboratories Richard Solomon, United States Institute of Peace Charles A. Zraket, The Mitre Corporation Joseph Duffey, U.S. Information Agency Raymond Garthoff, Brookings Institution Inta Brikovskis, National Academy of Sciences 6/7

Matthew Hamilton Eveready Glenn Schweitzer, National Academy of Sciences Gary Horlick, O'Melveny & Myers Andrzej Rabczenko, Embassy of Poland


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Give CTR to Russia | Negative