Giovanni Sartori

7/16/2019 Giovanni Sartori

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/giovanni-sartori-56338952a1c52 1/16

Politics, Ideology, and Belief Systems

Giovanni Sartori

The American Political Science Review, Vol. 63, No. 2. (Jun., 1969), pp. 398-411.

Stable URL:

http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0003-0554%28196906%2963%3A2%3C398%3APIABS%3E2.0.CO%3B2-Y

The American Political Science Review is currently published by American Political Science Association.

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available athttp://www.jstor.org/about/terms.html. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtainedprior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content inthe JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use.

Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained athttp://www.jstor.org/journals/apsa.html.

Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printedpage of such transmission.

The JSTOR Archive is a trusted digital repository providing for long-term preservation and access to leading academic journals and scholarly literature from around the world. The Archive is supported by libraries, scholarly societies, publishers,and foundations. It is an initiative of JSTOR, a not-for-profit organization with a mission to help the scholarly community takeadvantage of advances in technology. For more information regarding JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

http://www.jstor.orgMon Sep 3 00:31:02 2007


http://www.jstor.org/about/terms.html

http://www.jstor.org/journals/apsa.html

http://www.jstor.org/journals/apsa.html

http://www.jstor.org/about/terms.html




POLITICS, IDEOLOGY, AND BELIEF S,YS'TEMS"

GIOVANNIARTORIUniversity of Florence

The word ideology points to a black box. Asa philosopher pu ts it , ideology "signifies a t th esame t ime t ru th a nd error , universa l ity and par-ticularity, wisdom an d ignorance."l Likewise, forth e polit ical scientis t t h e te rm ideology points t oa cluster concept, i.e., belongs to the conceptsth at bracket a variety of complex phenomenaabout which one tries to generalize; and thegrowing popular ity of t h e term has been

the second area of enquiry the question iswheth er ideology is a n essential fea ture of poli-t ics and , if so, wh at does i t explain. In the firs tcase "ideology" is contrasted wit h (( tru th ," sci-ence and valid knowledge in general5; whereasin the second case we are not concerned withthe t ru th-value bu t w i th the functional va lue, soto s peak, of ideology. I n th e firs t sense b y sayingideology we actually mean ideological doctrine

matched, if anyth ing, b y i ts growing o b s c ~ r i t y . ~ and equivalents), whereas in the second senseAll in all, one is entitled to wonder whetherther e is an y point in using "ideology" for schol-ar ly purpose^.^ And my specific question will bewhether there is a technical meaning, or mean-ings, of "ideology" which co nstit ute a necessarytool of enquiry for a science of politics.

Discussions about ideology generally fall intotwo broad domains, namely, ideology in knowl-edge and/or ideology in poli tics . W ith respect toth e firs t area of inquiry th e question is whether,and to what extent, man's knowledge is ideologi-cally conditioned or distortede4With respect to

(*) This is an abridged draft of a paper preparedfor the meeting on "Ideology and Politics" of theInstitut International de Philosophie Politique,Chatillon, June 1967.'Rem o Can toni, Illusione e Pregiudizio (M ilano :

Mond adori, 1967), p. 103.'Concerning the popularity it is symptomatic

that while the 1930-1935 Encyclopaediu of the So-cial Sciences did not include the item ideology, itssuccessor, the 1968 International Encyclopedia ofthe Social Sciences, contains two articles on ideol-ogy. For the bibliography see Norman Birnbaum,"The Sociological Study of Ideology 1940-1960: ATrend R epo rt and Bibliography," Cur rent Sociology(Oxford : Blackwell, 1962) ; and K ur t Link, "Biblio-graphische Einfiirung," in Ideologie, Ideologiekritikund Wissensoziologie (Neuwied: Luchterhand,1961).

'See th e conjecture of Arne Naess tha t "themovement of the term 'ideology' into social science,social psychology a nd p olitical science will, within ageneration, be followed by a mo veme nt in the ot herdirection. It will continue to be used in headlines,

in summaries and popularieations, but scarcely instatements intended to express . . . theories, hy-potheses or classifications of obse~ations."Democ-racy, Ideology and Objectivity-Studies in the Se-mantics an d C ognitive Analysis of Ideological Con-

we ultimate ly p oin t to a n ideological men tality(also called, hereinafter, ideologism) .

The distinction between ideology in knowl-edge and ideology in politics is not necessarilyneat, for a num ber of issues dra w from bo th do-mains. Fo r instance, if one asks whether th evar ious "isms" of politics-e.g., liber alism , so-

Blackwell, 19561, p. 171. The book also reviewsm an y cu rren t definitions of ideology, esp. pp. 141-198.'Marx and M annheim are the obvious references,

and the literature is extensive. See esp. I. L. Horo-witz, Philosophy, Science and the Sociology ofKnowledge (Springfield: Thomas, 1961); andJacques J. Maquet, Sociologie de la Connaissance-Etude Critique des Systkmes de K . Mannheimet de P. A. Sorokin (Louvain: Nauwelaerts, 1949).A particularly brilliant criticism is Robert K . Mer-ton, Social Theory and Social Structure (Glencoe:Free Press, rev. ed. 1957) chaps 12 and 13. See alsoRaymond Aron, La Sociologie Allemande Contem-poraine (Paris: P.U.F., 2nd ed., 1950) pp. 74-94.M y own position (Democratic Theory, New Yo rk:Praeger, 1965, pp. 455-4601 is that the Mannheimtype of sociology of knowledge attacks the con-sumer's end of t he problem, thereby explaining thesuccess, th e spread of menta l products. How mentalproducts are produced is, however, an entirely dif-ferent matter.

'This is actually the major and more persistentcontroversy. The th eme has been especially pursuedby analytical philosophy. See Theodore Geiger,Ideologie und Warheit: Ein e Soziologische Kr itikdes Denkens (Stuttgart: Humboldt Verlag, 1953) ;

Gustav Bergmann, "Ideology," now in The Meta-physics of Logical Positivism (New Yo rk: Long-mans Green , 1954) ;E. Topitsch, "Begriff und Funk-tion der Ideologie,'' in Sozialphilosoph ie zwischenIdeologie und Wissenschaft (Neuwied: Luchter-



1969 POLITICS, IDEOLOGY,

cialism, nat ion alism , etc.-are only ideologies(there is no quarrel that in some sense of theword they also are ideologies), it can be readilyconceded that our treatment of the "isms" ofpolitics will be more per ceptive if i t presup pose s

a stand vis i vis th e sociology of knowledge.But the distinction is neat when one is exclu-sively concerned with the question: what doesideology explain ab ou t the n atu re of po litics?

For the sake of brevity a number of prelimi-nary points will have to be laid down axiomati-cally.

First, there is no object in adopting newterms unless they are employed to cover newphenom ena or new sets of o bservations. I takeit, therefore, th at the word ideology has been in-creasingly adopted in response to, and as a poin-

te r of, th e deve lopm ent of politics-if no t th edevelopment of an unprecedented aspect of poli-tics. To b e sure , one ma y choose to app ly "ideol-ogy" to any time and place; but not withoutloss of conc eptua l subs tance.

Sec ond , either we dispose of a n otion of ideol-ogy th at lends itself to falsification, o r we do no tdispose of an empirically usable ter m . We a relogically required, the n, to declare w hat ideologyis not, i .e., to qualify the notion a contrario. I nother terms, we are required to conceive ideol-ogy as a dimension or an aspect of politics

which may, or may not , be found to apply tothe real world. Fo r this purpose "ideological pol-itics" will be opposed here to "pragmatic poli-tics," i.e., pragmatism will be used as a designa-tion for non-ideology. To be sure, I am not say-ing tha t we m ust oppose ideological to non-ideo-logical politics. My argument is, rather, that ifno such opposition is justified. then the notionof ideology loses mu ch of its int ere st an d has lit-tle explanatory value.

Thi rd , I take the methodological view thatawaiting contrary proof (subsequently called the

a.c.p. clause) no concept should be used as asynonym for an y other concept. Ideology is gen-erally qualified by how it relates to idea, belief,opinion, creed, myth, utopia, ethos, and similaror derivative concepts. However, I shall not becontent with implying that the aforementionedconcepts are largely interchangeable and tend tooverlap. This way of handling conceptual prob-lems I call "superfluous coextensiveness," andrepresents a n intolerable waste for th e economyof language and clarity of thought. The more aset of concepts is closely interlink ed, th e mo re

their meanings need to be specified and distin-guished. And the point is that under the a.c.p.(awaiting contrary proof) clause, it is the equi-valence between two concepts, not their differ-

A N D BELIEF SYSTEMS 399

nothing other than x,"6 I shall aim a t using ide-ology to signify something that no other neigh-boring concept signifies.

Fourth, the relation between ideology and"idea" (i.e., conceptual thinking ) bea rs on the

genesis of ideological doctrin es, on how the yoriginate and are bor n, and is eventually condu-cive to an epistemological discussion. I t will suf-fice to note here that ideologies are no longerideas, in the sense that ideological doctrines nolonger fall under the jurisdiction of logic andverification. When we pass on to consider ideolo-gies we are confronted with "the conversion ofideas into social lever^,"^ i.e., with a persuasivetreatm ent (no t a logical trea tm en t) of ideasleading to action-oriented ideals.8 However, forthe p resent enq uiry ideological doctrines ar e giv-

ens-they exist in the ir distinctiv enes s, wh atevertheir genesis in relation to "idea." I propose,therefore, to investigate a different relationship,nam ely, th e relation of ideology to "belief" an dbelief systems, under the assumption that this isthe pertinent focus for discussing the structureand function of ideologism. By saying struc ture Irefer to how one believes; and by speaking offunction I shall be concerned with the eficacy,or effectiveness , of belief sys tem s.

A final clarification is in order. Given the factthat we are confronted with a black box, it will

be necessary to begin with a pure and simple se-mantic explanation? My first assignment IS,the n, to clarify th e various meanings of theterm ideology as they s tand in actual usage.

A term may have a "notational use," i.e., itmay be a useful shorthand, an economizing de-vice, and yet explain nothing.lo This is notably

'This is called by Abraham Kaplan the ('patternmodel of explanation," as against the "deductivemodel of explanation": The Conduct of Inquiry(San Francisco: Chandler, 1964), esp. pp. 332-341.

The pattern m odel of ex planation does no t neces-sarily coincide with Hempel's "reduction to the fa-miliar": Aspects of Scien tific Ezplanation (NewYork: Free Press , 1965), pp. 430-433,

'Daniel Bell, The End of Ideology, Se w York :Collier Books, 2nd rev. ed., 1962, p. 400.

'See C. J. Friedrich: "It is confusing . . . o callany system of ideas an ideology . . . Ideologies areaction-re lated system s of ideas . . .": Man and hb

Government (New York: McGraw-Hill, 19631, p.89. In a sim ilar vein Z. B. Brzezinski qualifies ideol-ogy as "essentially an action-program suitable for

mass consumption" : Ideology and Power in SovietPolitics (New Y ork: Praeger, 1962), pp. 5-6.

Abraham Ka plan, op. cit., p. 327.InKaplan contrasts notational and substantive



400 THE A M E R I C A N POLITICAL S C I E N C E REVIEW VOL. 63

the case with the authors that are satisfied withsaying that ideology amounts to the views ofany and all social groups, or tha t everybody haspolitical beliefs which amount to everyman'sideology. To abridge "social views" or "political

beliefs" into "ideology" is perhaps convenient,but we are simply left to describe what peoplebelieve or have to say in political matters. If theterm ideology were not employed, no loss ofconceptual content would follow. Moreover, theforegoing definitions are not falsifiable: theysimply lead to the conclusion that everything(or, conversely, nothing) is ideology.

This is not to say that the notational use ofthe term ideology is necessarily trivial. Not onlydo we need notations, but we equally need "ex-planation stoppers," i.e., term s defined in such a

way a s to avoid endless regression of enq uiry.Ideology is, however, an ambitious term ; it doesbelong to the concepts tha t ar e supposed to havebroad and farreaching causative significance.Hence, if the eminence attr ibu ted to the notionof ideology is justified, it m us t be justified be-cause the term explains, not merely because itabridges and/or provides a regression stopper.Therefore, as the discussion proceeds the focuswill be progressively shifted to the explamtoryvalue of the various meanings of ideology, formy ultimate purpose is to probe and single out

the conceptualizations that are cognitive instru-ments, that do have explanatory-causativepotency.ll

I. THE IDEOLOGICAL MENTALITY

If ideology is linked to "belief," it is readilyap pa ren t th at t he general class is "belief sys-tems" an d th at ideology is the narrower concep-tualization. Properly speaking, "a person's be-lief-disbelief system is really a political-reli-gious-philosophic-scientific-etcetera system,"12i.e., a total and diffuse framew ork; whereas ide-

notational terms are fundamentally abbreviations,and could be replaced": op. cit., p. 49.

I purposely avoid saying "explication" on ac-count of the technical meaning attributed to theterm by Carnap followed by Carl K. Hempel, Fun-damentals of Concept Formation in Empirical Sci-ence (Chicago: T he U niversity of Chicago Press,1952), pp. 11-12. For the sake of simplicity I

equally neglect the more sophisticated test sug-gested by K. R . Popper with regard to the "infor-mati>-e ontent" of scientific statements: The Logicof Sczentific Discovery




t h a t I propose to search for structural elementsof differentiation bearing on how one believes.

Speaking of belief systems, both the notionsof "belief" an d "system" m ust be taken seri-ously. Un der th e awaiting-contrary-proof clause

a belief is neither an opinion nor an idea.Opinions include and characterize the moreephemeral a nd superficial level of discourse, andcan be safely set aside, therefore, with referenceto belief systems. On the other hand, in thestrict sense ideas are thought of, they typicallybelong to the more self-conscious dimension ofdiscourse, to reasoning and theorizing. If thesentence is understood cum grano salis, beliefscan be defined as "ideas that are no longerthought,"l6 to signify th at beliefs ar e idea-clus-ters that routinize the cost of decisions precisely

because they are taken for granted. Beliefs arebelieved-not explo red, tes ted an d held und erthe searchlight of cons~iousness.~~

As for the notion of system, a first obviouscaution is that the system may have propertieswhich are not exhibited by its parts. But it ismore important to un de rl ie th at a "belief sys-tem" points to a state of boundedness, to thefact that beliefs hang together. This belief-link-age is presumably what a number of authorshave in mind when they define ideology as amore or less cohere nt set of ideas. Now, logical

(or rational) attributes such as "coherence,""consistency," and the like, are hardly applica-ble to a belief-linkage. Indeed the single belief-elements can be logically contradictory. Butthere is no question that beliefs are "bound to-gether by some form of cons traint or functionalinterdependence."ls Beliefs, then, cluster in sys-

other side of the coin by Ben Ha lpern: "The func-tion of ideologies . . . is . . . to segregate and con-solidate competing groups around rival ideas":"Myth and Ideology in Modern Usage," in Historyand Theory, 1 (1967).p. 136."I paraphrase from Wladimir Weidlk, "Sur le

Concept d'Ideologie," Le Contrat Social, (March1959), p. 77. The autho r speaks of ideology, butthe sentence applies more directly to beliefs." Contra, among others, Clyde Kluckhohn,"Values and Value-Orientations in the Theory ofAction," in T. Parsons and E. Shils (eds.), Towarda General Theory of Actwn (Cambridge, Mass.:Harvard University Press, 1951), p. 432: "Beliefrefers primarily to the categories, 'true' and 'false,''correct' and 'incorrect'." This intellectualistic con-ceptualization overlooks the difference betweenidea and belief.ISPhilip E. Converse, "The Na ture of Belief

Systems in Mass Publics," in D. Apter (ed.), Ideol-

AXD BELIEF SYSTEMS 401

tems, though not in rationally congruent and or-ganized systems.

Having issued the caveat that the systemshould be taken seriously, no harm follows ifone decomposes belief systems in a number of

ways. Following Rokeach, one may distinguishbetween 1) primitive beliefs, 2) intermediate,and 3 ) peripheral regions of belief.lS I proposeto dwell briefly on the intermediate region, andthen to decompose the more peripheral regionsof belief into single belief-elements.

The first problem is to pinpoint the discrimi-nating element, the mentality (forma mentis)th at qualifies an ideological str uct ure of belief inits difference from a pragmatic structure of be-lief. Following Rokeach again, it appears thatthe crucial single factor resides in so-called "au-

tho rity beliefs," a nd m ore precisely in th e beliefsconcerning cognitive authority: the beliefs thattip us off to what is true or false about theworld an d its events.20 M ore concretely one ma ysay that the crucial factor is "the authorities,"those on whom we rely for information.

Since nobody can avoid reliance on cognitiveauthorities, the difference must reside in howauthorities are chosen and how the instructionsemanating from these authorities are assessed. Itis on this basis, in effect, that Rokeach drawsthe distinction between the closed and open

mind. His initial basic definition is as follows:"A person's [belief] sys tem is open or closed . . .[to] th e extent to which th e person can receive,evaluate and a ct on relevant information . . .onits own intrinsic merits.JJ21The closed mind isdefined, accordingly, as a cognitive state inwhich a person does not discriminate substan-tive information from information about thesource. Hence the more closed one's belief sys-tem, the more he is unable to evaluate relevantinformation on its own intrinsic merits. In sub-stance, the closed mind relies on, indeed yieldsto, absolute authority, and is hardly in a posi-tion to select and to check its authorities.

Doubtless the association of the ideologicalmentality with the closed mind can be accusedof representing an anti-ideological bias. How-ever, ideological closedness is bad an d p ragm aticopenness is good only according to an intellec-tua l yardstick-and one could well say a n intel-lectualistic prejudice. If we are reminded thatthe pertinent yardstick is "efficacy" the evalua-tion could be reversed, for reliance on absoluteautho rities does obtain the kind of efficacypraised by th e m an of action an d is surely inkeeping ~ vi th he purpose served by id~ologies.

'' O p. cit., pp. 39-51.



402 THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW VOL. 63

In short, the ideologist cannot have it bothways, he cannot claim a t the same time a n intel-lectual and a practical primacy.

The foregoing underpins nicely the commonopinion according to which the ideological men-

tality represents a typically dogmatic, i.e., rigidand impermeable, approach to politics. On theother hand, it should be noted that a cognitiveclosed struc tur e fails to justify th e oth er charac-teristic generally imputed to the ideologicalmentality, namely, its typically doctrinaire bent.Should this characterization be dropped? Ordoes it draw from another source? I shall abideby the latter suggestion, thereby shifting thefocus to the no tion of ideological culture .

When we speak of ideology as a "cul-ture"-or a cultur al pattern-we ar e mo re or

less implicitly referred to the anthropologicalnotion of culture. Perh aps we may say th at weare referred once again to the intermediate re-gions of belief, though no longer to th e "authori-ty-beliefs" but to the "processing-coding-be-liefs." The simplest and closest analogy appearsto be, however, the Gestalt analogy: a culturalpattern is characterized by the forms, or thematrixes, with and within w hich ou r mind storesand orders whatever it apprehen ds. Fo r our pur-poses these processing-coding Gestalten will belabelled "rationalism" an d "empiricism," an d the

assumption will be that these cultural matrixeshelp explain why only certain polities character-istically display, over time , an ideological pa tter n-ing.

What strikes me in this connection is the ex-tent to which the typically ideological isms ofpolitics-marxism being th e outsta ndin g curre ntex am pl ew er e born and have developed (beforebeing exported) in the cultural area qualified bythe notion of rationalism, hardly in other cul-tural contexts, and surely not in the culturalarea of e m p i r i ~ i s m . ~ z find it equally striking

th a t only the "rational ideologies"-I me an , theideologies drawn from rationalistic philosophiesand nu rtu re d in a rationa listic soil-travel easilythroughout the world.23 Hence my hypothesis is

=If "liberalism" is conceived as an ideology, Isuggest that it represents the ideological apexattained by the empirical mind; and surely liberal-ism has been a poor competitor, ideologicallyspeaking, of socialism, comm unism , equa litarian-ism and the like.

"In this connection it should be noted that theideologies of t he deve loping nations and, in gen-eral, of the th ird world have been hardly nurtu redand taught in London and Oxford, and even lessin the United States. A perusal of Paul E. Sig-

that ideology and pragmatism qua "political cul-tures" are related, respectively, to the "culturalmatrixes" rationalism and empiricism.

Rationalism and empiricism are generally as-sociated, respectively, with a "coherence" th eory

of t ru th as against a "correspondence" theor y oftruth. Oakeshott equally makes a good pointwhen he writes that "Rationalism is the asser-t ion that . . . practical knowledge is not knowl-edge a t all."24 B ut , however sweepingly, let usattempt to qualify rationalism and empiricismin more detail, with the understanding that thefollowing characterizations represent a syn-drome, so that the full enumeration is requiredto appreciate th e meaning of th e se para te asser-tions.

T he rationalistic processing-coding tends to

approach problems as follows: i) deductive ar-gumentation prevails over evidence and testin g;ii) doctrine prevails over practice; iii) principleprevails over precedent; iv) ends prevail overmeans; and v) perceptions tend to be "coveredup," doctrine-loaded, typically indirect. Hegel'sfamous sentence "the rational is real" goes tothe very heart of the rationalistic mind,2j forthe rationalistic attitude is to argue that if thepractice goes astray, there must be somethingwrong with the p ractice, not with t he theory.

Conversely, and symmetrically, the empirical

processing-coding can be described as follows: i)evidence and testing prevail over deductive ar-gumentation; ii) practice prevails over doc-trine; iii) precedent prevails over principle; iv)means prevail over ends, and, therefore; v ) its

perceptions tend to be mo re "direct." Conse-quently the empirical attitude is to argue that ifthe practice goes astray, something is likely tobe wrong wi th th e theory, not ~ vi th he practice.

mund (ed.), The Ideologies of the DevelopingNations (New York: Praeger, 19631, suffices toconfirm, in spite of nebu lous and bizarre melanges,their unmistakably rationalistic Western source.

"Rationalism in Politics (New York: BasicBooks, 1962), p. 11. I cannot follow Oakeshott,however, in his positive identification of rational-ism with technical knowledge. ("The sovereigntyof 'reason,' for the rationalist, means the sovereign-ty of technique," ibid.) I t seems to me, rather,that technical knowledge represents the point atwhich ra tionalism and empiricism converge. On ite

own premises, rationalism looks down at technicalknowledge as an inferior knowledge.

"To be sure, Hegel's sentence had a dialecticalcircular formulation. But "the rational" is the sub-ject: it is rationality tha t qualifies reality, not thereverse. Hegel's philosophy was a realistic ration-alism,hardly a rationalistic realism.




The ad hoc implications for our subject arethat the rationalistic Gestalt is characterized(relatively speak ing, of course) by openness todeductive axiomatization and deafness to empir-ical evidence, by low practical problem-solving

flexibility and by high theoretical problem solv-ing ability. Also, and consequently, the rational-istic mind soars a t a higher level of explicitnessand especially of abstraction th an the em piricalmind. This implies, in turn, that rationalism isable to embrace an d to cover in terms of Wel-tanschauung a comparatively broader "space,"either with long deductive chains or with acro-batic leaps-a quality th at I shall call compre-hensiveness.

The foregoing can be easily translated into a"cultural" characte rization of th e ideological

mentality. If we assume ideologism to resultfrom a rationalistic cultural matrix, it followsth at to the extent tha t the ideological mentalityis "open," it is open to rational, deductive argu-ment, hardly to evidence: the sentence "experi-ence proves" proves nothing to an ideologically-minded actor. An ulterior implication is that theideological mentality identifies par ezcellencewith highly "abstract" and "comprehensive" be-lief systems. In particular an important featureof t he ideological me ntali ty th at ne atly flowsfrom its rationalistic matrix is that the central

elemen ts of an ideological belief s ystem ar e nec-essarily "ends," not "means."I shall revert to these characteristics later.

For the moment let us simply retain that to theextent that the ideological mentality is charac-terized by the rationalistic cultural matrix, tothe same extent it can be legitimately qualifiedas a typically principled and doctrinaire way ofperceiving political problem s and of constructingtheir solution.2~ t should be clear that I am notsaying: given a rationalistic cultural matrix, theideological mentality necessarily follows. I a m

simply saying that a rationalistic culture is par-ticularly vulnerable on this score. It should beequally clear tha t a num ber of indiv iduals reactto the culture to which they belong. Therefore,an ideological culture will contain non-ideologi-cal minority groups, just as a n empirical culturewill breed ideological minorities.

Bringing our two threads together, the ideo-

"T he rationalist matrix also explains the "logi-cality of ideological thinking" fo rcefully high-

lighted-perhaps in an overly speculative vein-by Hannah Arendt, "Ideology and Terror: ANovel Form of Government," in The Review of

Politics (July 1953) 303-327.

A N D BELIEF SYSTEMS

logical menta lity now results in bot h a personal-ity trait and a cultural. trait, and the followingconclusion appears reasonably warranted: ideol-ogism can be legitimately understood to meannot only a rigid and dogmatic approach to poli-

tics, but also a principled and doctrinaire per-ception of politics. Needless to say, the twocharacterizations reinforce one another but canexist disjointly. However, for the simplicity ofthe argument in the following section, the ideo-logical mentality will be reduced to a "closed"cognitive structure, and cognitive closedness willbe defined as a state of dogmatic imperm eabilityboth to evidence and to argument. Converselythe pragmatic mentality will be simplisticallyidentified with an "open" cognitive structure,and cognitive openness will be defined a state of

men tal permeability.

11. A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS

Thus far the analysis has been confined to asingle dimension-cognition. B ut beliefs an d be-lief systems vary not only along a cognitive butalso along an emotive dimension. Along the for-mer a belief system can be, as we know, closedor open. Along the emotive dimension beliefscan be intense or feeble, passionately or weaklyfelt. Possibly, in each individual cognition andaffe ct ar e tightly interlinked, bu t with reference

to mass phenomena-e.g., ab ru pt tran sition sfr om "hot politics" to "cool politics," a nd viceversa-cognition an d affect seem to va ry inde-pendently. Assuming cognition to be constant,we can still have form idab le oscillations of emo-tional intensity.

The difference between cognitive structureand emotive status underpins two different con-ceptions of ideology: ideologism, i.e., the me ntal -it y on the one han d, an d ideological. passion onthe other hand. Per se the ideological mentalityis not necessarily conducive to an active in-

volvement and thereby to "ideological activism."Thus whenever we find a mobilized polity dis-play ing a high degree of political activism , refe r-ence should be made to the emotional compo-nent, and thereby to th e notion of ideological af-fect, or passion. This is also to say that the ef-fectiveness of ideology, its cap ac ity of ac tiva-tion, of arousing a nd unleashing energies, doesnot reside in the ideological mentality as suchbut requires, in addition, "ideological heating."Likewise, whenever politics is depicted as a mat-te r of f ait h, as a religion or even as a mystique,

reference is made more often than not to a par-ticular intensity of feeling, of emotional involve-ment, and we should speak, therefore, of ideo-logical passion.



L

THE A M E RI CA N P O L I T ICA L S CI E N CE RE V I E W

FIG.1. Scheme of Analyeie.

Closed(Neither subjected1o evidence nor

COG NITIVE STATUS argument)

(Subq:~Fedoevidence and /or

argument)

T he overall scheme of analysis is thus th e onerecapitulated in Figure 1.27

Let us now enter the peripheral regions of be-lief and decompose belief systems into distin-guishable belief-elements which are generally ex-pressed in a slogan form. As Dahl introduces theargument, "it is convenient to think of the con-te nt of a belief sys tem as mad e up of identifiableelements or components (e.g. beliefs expressedby propositions like "Democracy is the bestform of government," "Bourgeois democracymust be replaced by a dictato rship of the prole-tariat," "A capitalist economy is more efficient

tha n a soc ia l i s t e c on~ m y. " ) ~ ~ith reference tothe four combinations afforded by the scheme ofFigure 1, the belief-elements can be brokendown, following th e roman num erals of th e pre-vious table, a s follows.

(I) Closed and strongly felt. These elementswill be called fixed.

"The scheme is largely inspired by Robert E.

Dahl, Ideology, ConfEict and Co nsensus: N ote s for

a Theory (mimeographed), a paper prepared forthe panel on "Consensus and Dissent," VII IPSA

World Congress, Bruxelles, September 18-23, 1967,p. 2. This essay is particularly indebted to Dahl'sintellectual stimulation." bid.

EMOTIVE STATUS/ \

Strong -e a k

I I1

I11 IV

(11) Closed but weakly held. These elementsmay be called inelastic.

(111) Open bu t strongly felt. T hese ele-ments will be called f irm.

(IV) Open and weakly felt. These elementswill be called flexible.

The scheme of Figure 1 can thus be filledwith the typology of belief-elements representedin Figure 2.

Some additional but in no way exhaustivequalifications are as follows. (I) The fixed ele-ments are rigid, dogmatic, impermeable to argu-ment and evidence. One may also call them

"adamant" elements. As such, they ar e subjectonly to traumatic change under conditions ofgreat stress. Given the fact that they are emo-tively participated in, the dynamic, activisticpotential of the adamant elements is high. (11)T he inelastic elements are still impermeable toargumen t and to evidence, bu t display a low dy-namic potential, for they are not passionatelyfelt. Furthermore, even though they tend to bepersistent over time, they can fade away, or bedismissed, without traumatic consequences.(111) The firmelements are firmly held, but are

open to evidence and/or to argument. Eve nthough they tend to be persistent, they are notimpermeable a nd a re, therefore, changeable, a tleast in principle. On the other hand, firm ele-

FIG.. Typology of Belief-Elements (*) .AF F EC T,/

trong Weak

Closed Fixed .L?k&&elements element,^

COGNITIVESTATUS

Open F i r m Flexibleelements elements



A N D BELIEF SI'STE~IS 40 6

FIG.3. Patternsof Belief Systems.

I I1

Adamant Resilient"fixed-strong" "fixed-feeble"

elements prevail elements prevail

I11 I V

Firm Flexible"flexible-strong" "flexible-feeble"

- elements prevail elements prevall

ments have a stronger dynamic potential thanthe inelastic elements. (IV) The flexible ele-ments a re feebly held, open to argum ent and/orto evidence and, further mo re, to convenience.Th ey are changeable by definition. On th eother han d, their dynam ic potential is very low.

I t can be easily seen tha t th e foregoing ty-pology of belief-elements can be tur ne d into atypology of belie f-sys tem tentatively labelled asin Figure3.

Conceivab ly, th e simplest way of establishingthe n atu re of a pa tter n is provided by th e fol-lowing criterion : which typ e of element prevailsin te rms of inten sity. How ever, we a re also re-minded by Converse th at "the idea-elementswithin a belief system va ry in a p rop erty weshall call ~entrality."~9Whenever possible,therefore, one should use centrality as a crite-rion.

Th e individuals imbued with an adam ant be-lief system ar e impen etrable vis & vis externalinfluence and are strongly motivated towardoutwardexpansion,either in t he form of prosely-tism or of over t aggression. T he individualsimbued with a resilient belief system resistchange and supp ort the internal statu s quo, b utlack dynamism and outwardorientation.The in-

29"TheNature of Belief System s in Mass Pub-lics," loc. cit., p. 08.

FIG.. deologynd ragm

Closed

COGNITION

dividualsharing firm eliefystem re othopen o change nd otivatedoward utwardexpansion.inally,he individualsharingflexibleeliefystem asilyccept hanges utlack utwardynamism.

Be th at s t ay, e are ow in positionto erceivelearlyhe lacementf the deologi-cal nd pragmaticarietiesf beliefystems,and to definehem accordinglyregardlessfwhat ne elieves).Having eferenceo ur nitialcheme Fig-

ure ),ua dealypes r, etter,ua olar p-posites,"perfectlydeological"eliefystemfallsn quadrant,hereas "perfectlyrag-matic" eliefystem allsn quadrantV-asshown n igure.Definition:henever deologynd pragma-

tism re onfrontedichotomously,nd herebyconceptualizeds olar ypes,deologys be-lief ystem ased n i) ixed lements,harac-terizedy ii) trongffectnd ii)losedogni-tive tructure.ragmatisms, onversely,be-lief system based on i) flexible elements charac -terized by ii) weak affect and iii) open cogni-tive structure.

Gra nted th at pure types seldom, if ever, ar eapproxim ated in th e real world, this m eans onlyth at we are also required to define ideology an dpragma tism as "concrete" systems. I t does not

follow th at it is logically erroneous, an d evenless th at i t is logically superfluous, to define con-cepts ex adverso. I would argue, on the con-trary, that the logical error is to hold that ifideology and pragmatism are conceived asblends of a same continuu m, they should not bedefined as opposites. A continuum of w h at ? Un-less t he ends of a continuum ar e defined, thecon tinuu m itself remains undefined. Hence, evenif one abides by th e "con tinuum language,"polar definitions remain the sine qua non condi-tion for having a co ntinuum a t all.

T he usefulness of these mapp ings, an d the ex-tent to which crucial distinctions are often by-passed, can be illustrated with reference to the

atism as Po lar Opposites.

A F F E C Ta trong Weak

I

Ideology

Iv

7



406 THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW VOL. 63

FIG.5. Decline of Ideology Hypothesis.

I I1

IDEOLOGY --The fixed elementsbecome weakly held

tI11

The closed elements become open

decline or end of ideology deba te.30 If the ques-tion is, What do we mean by decline of ideology,Figure 5 shows that we are liable to confuse, inthis connection, two very different processes.

A shift from box I to box I1merely reflects adecline of emotive intensity an d amou nts to arelatively easy and easily predictable transfor-mation. On the other hand, this shift does notnecessarily indicate a poin t of no re tur n. Atleast in short run terms (from one to two gener-ations), returns from box I1 to box I, i.e., fromcooler to warmer politics, are only to be ex-pected and not difficult to obtain. Moreover, inthis respect the argument largely hinges on thepoint in time chosen as parameter. E.g., with re-spect to the base 1918-20 the thirties repre-

sented a decline of ideology, but the 1946-50 pe-riod represented an increase of ideology with re-spect to a pre-war base; and it seems to methat the late sixties reveal no decline, but resur-gence, with respect to the late fifties. A real de-cline of ideology is safely indica ted, then, by th epassage from box I to box 111. However, atransfo rma tion of fixed into firm belief-elementsis not an easy transformation, for it involves aradical change in the mental posture, a shiftf rom closedness to op e n n e s ~ . ~ ~

"J ean Meynaud's book on the Destin. des Zdeol-ogies is actually a review and a discussion of thedecline of ideology literature. See it. transl.Destino delle Zdeologie, (Cappelli ed., 1964), esp.pp. 37-112. Raymond Aron, Daniel Bell and S. M.Lipset are the standard references on the subject.

"Another possibility is that the decline of ideol-ogy amounts--all other conditions remaining equal-to a convergence among differen t ideologies,either in the sense that the opposed "disbelievers"come to share a greate r number of beliefs in com-mon, or in the sense that the distinctive elements

which oppose the various belief systems becomefeebly or more feebly held. This is the suggestionperceptively set forth by Dahl (op. cit., pp. 5-8).However, in this case the "decline" would be an

The expression end of ideology pushes thematter further, at least in forecasting terms. If"end" is meant seriously, it calls for an overalltran sfo rm atio n of a n ideological belief s ysteminto a pragmatic belief system. If so, Figure 6

underpins how many conditions need to be satis-fied and, by implication, the hazardous natur e ofthe prediction.

Let us now turn to the problem of definingideology and pragmatism as concrete belief sys-tems. In the real world, an ideological patterncan be id en ts ed as such when the overall distri-bution of the belief-elements gravitates-withreference to the scheme utilized so far-aroundquadrants I and 11. Conversely, when the over-all distribution of the elements gravitatesaround quadrants' IV a nd 111, the polity can be

identified as being prag ma tic.This is not to deny the possibility of spill-ov-

ers in other boxes as well. Varieties and varia-tions within each concrete belief system can bevery great, as suggested by the following rule ofth um b: an ideological polity will be less ideolog-ical the lesser the elements contained in quad-ran t I ; conversely, a pragma tic polity will beless pragmatic, the lesser the elements containedin quadrant IV. The two patterns fall wideapart with reference to their respective centersof grav ity; bu t the feebler the gravitational at -

traction of each noyeau, the greater the diffu-sion, and therefore the overlaps. This is, admit-tedly, very vague. But one can hardly be morespecific un til a n additiona l set of distinction s isbrought to bear on the discussion.If belief systems are broken down into ele-

ments, they can be classified with respect to thefollowing properties: a) their relative articula-tion, or richness; b) their correlative constrain-ing power; c) their divisibility in belief stratacorresponding to belief publics.

a) With reference to the first property, a be-

lief system can be rich (articulate) or poor (in-articulate)?z A rich belief system is necessarilyexplicit and contains a relatively large numberof elements. Conversely, a poor belief systemhas a low degree of explicitness an d consists ofrelatively few elements. b) With regard to thesecond property, a belief system may bestrongly corntraining or feebly constraining: inthe former the elements are tightly related in a"quasi-logical" fashion, while in the latter theelements a re loosely connected an d follow, a tbest, an "idiosyncratic" ~ y n t a x . ~ 3) As for the

diminishing distance between two or more ideol-ogies.

"Dahl, op. cit., p. 3.



POLITICS , IDEOLOGY, AND BE LIEF SYST EMS

FIG.6. End of Ideology H ypothesis.

I II

IDEOLO GY Fixed elements Weakly held-become - and become

I11 I V E N I )

open-and become O Fiopel l jI flexible1 IDEOLOGY

stratification aspect, the various "belief strata"can be identified by th e amo un t of political in-formation received and absorbed by each be-lief-public.

These properties, or aspects, appear highlycorrelated. The correspondence between therichness of a belief sy stem a nd va rious levels ofbelief publics is hypothesized by Dahl as fol-lows: "In every country the number of identifi-able elements ('richness') in the political beliefsystem of different individuals is most highly re-lated to (1) the amount of political activity anindividual engages in; (2) the level or extent ofhis political interest, and (3 ) the amount of for-mal education he has had."34 T he h ypothesis ishighly plausible on the grou nd of its sheer logi-cal force, and is supported on empirical groundsby the factual evidence reviewed by Converse.Fu rtherm ore, if t he argum ent of D ahl is com-bined with the "constraint argument" of Con-verse, two conclusions appear reasonably war-ranted:

a ) A rich, arti cu late , quasi-logical-and there-fore constraining-belief syste m corresponds toan elite belief system.35

b) In comparison, mass publics are likely todisplay, in whatever country, a poorly explicated,inarticu late, disconnected-and therefo re rela-tively unconstraining-belief sys tem .If the foregoing is correct, a number of

consequences follow. First, investigations are re-warding only if t he public under investigation isclearly iden tified, if we deal with one beliefpublic at a time, and only if each stratu m ismeasured in accord with its standards. Second,the o rder of investigation suggests th at prece-dence should be given to th e rich e lite belief sys-tems. Th ird , mass belief publics appea r t o be de-

34 Dahl, o p . cit., p. 4 .

aVee Converse, loc. cit . , p. 248: "Ideologicalconstra ints in belief system s decline with decreasingpolitical information, which is to say tha t they arepresent among elites at the 'top' of political sys-

pend ent variab les of elite belief publics.The last suggestion is not only crucial, but

also appears, at first, hazardous. Yet the thesisis largely imp lied in th e basic finding of Con-

verse that at the lower levels individuals "lackthe contextual grasp of the [belief] system torecognize how they should respond to it withoutbeing told by elites who hold their c o n f i d e n ~ e . " ~ ~

On the one hand, belief systems are "dif-fused in 'packages' which consumers come to seeas 'natu ral' wholes"; i.e., they ar e constrainingin that they are presented in such terms: "Ifyou believe this, then you will also believe that,for it follows in such-and-such ways."S7 On theother hand, however, what "follows in such-and-such ways" is no t easy to follow-I me an,the argumentative chain is grasped only by theattentive, articulate citizen. The inarticulatepublic not only lacks, without guidance, thegrasp of what goes with what in the deductivechain of a highflown, ab stra ct argu m en t; itequally and especially lacks the information andth e induc tive capab ility of deciding on his ownhow a specific event relates to a general princi-ple, and specifically to which principle.

The thesis is, then, that a poorly articulatedbelief system becom es constraining if and w hen

subjected to "linkage-guidance." This meansthat elite rich belief systems tend to be self-con-straining, whereas poor and poorly articulatedbelief systems are basically hetero-constraining.The first provide a self-steering, inner-directedsystem of o rientati on; t he latter require, a tleast for dynamic purposes, other-direction. Theimplication is that elite publics are largely in aposition to manipulate mass publics. It shouldbe clear, in this latter connection, that "elites"also include so-called counter-elites; the termapplies to whichever authorities happen to be

recognized by a distinct belief-group.The argument can be recapitulated as in Fig-ure 7.

I propose to elaborate on the relevance of



THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW

F I ~ .. Breakdowns and Properties of Belief Systems.

r -elief System s Belief Strata Properties

Rich r Elite Pub lics -1Self-constrainingI I Quasi-logical

I II I I Intermediary II publics It

I i CPoor 0Mass Publics Unconstraining (or)

these points in the final section. Meanwhile I

only wish to m ake the point t ha t unless one dis-tinguishes among the various belief strata he ishardly in a position to discuss ideology andpragmatism qua concrete belief systems. IndeedI would go as far as to say that this discussionedges on meaninglessness unless the distinctionis sought a t the elite belief level.

My conjecture is, in fact, that under unex-posed "rest conditions" any mass public woulddisplay at best a latent political belief system. Ifso, and always assuming a hy pothetical "non-ex-posure," mass belief systems a re likely to belargely undifferentiated, largely amorphous withrespect to the ideology-pragmatism distinction.

This is to suggest, then, that the ideologic orprag ma tic qualification of mass publics-of th elatent beliefs-is largely decided by the forensicbeliefs, by t he elite belief systems to which masspublics are exposed.38

The argument should be placed, however, inperspective, in the sense th at the ideology-prag-matism bifurcation should be traced back to theoriginal impetus with which a belief system waslaunched by the founding fathers. Assuming

"The distinction between "latent" and "foren-sic" is borrowed from Robert E. Lase, Political

Ideology (New Y ork : Th e Free Press, 19621, p. 16.In line with my preoccupations, I would say thatLane's "laten t ideology)' can either become, at th eforensic level, an ideological or a pragmatic typeof political belief system.

F I ~ .. Mixes and Variations of E lite Belief Publics.

I I1

Mo re ideological--Less ideological elites elites

Hetero-constraining

th at the take-off poin t of an ideological elite islikely to be situated in quadrant I, whereas thetake-off point of a pragmatic elite is likely to bein quadrant 111, over time an ideological elitepublic is likely to var y acro ss a mix of "closed"strong-weak elements (boxes I and 11) ; whereasa pragmatic elite public is likely to vary acrossa mix of "open" strong-weak elements (boxesI11 and IV). Therefore, to the extent that eachelite remains as it is-either ideological or prag-matic-the respective area s of varia tion can berepresented as in Figure 8.

By contrast, the independent area of varia-tion of ma ss belief publics is mor e likely to bethe one suggested in Figure 9. According to the

hypothesis, at the lower belief stratum there isno reason to assume that in response to a situa-tion of stress shifts from q uad rants I1 to I nec-essarily represent, in themselves, an increase ofideologism: they are more likely to signify asheer grow th of intole ranc e. Likewise, sh iftsfrom quadrants I1 to I11 do not necessarily in-dica te, in themselves, the acquisition of a prag -matic mentali ty: they may simply mean a lossof beliefs and thus increased apathy and in-difference. As for the blank of qu ad ran t 111,thesuggestion implicitly conveyed by the table is

th at an "open-firm" political belief syste m typ i-cally represents an elite achievement. For a la-tent sta te of belief left to itself, this appe ars tobe a very unlikely p attern .

111. IDEOLOGY AND CONFLICT

It should be acknowledged that so far wehave been explaining "ideology" more than

FIG.9 . Mixes and Variations of Mass Publics.

High

Intolerance - High conservatism'or traditionalism

I11 c--- I VI




using "ideology" to explain. Hopefully we havethrown light in a co mpartm ent of our black box.Yet the question remains: having explained theterm, what does the term explain? I suggestth at t he question can be squarely met a t least in

two respects. First, I shall argue th at ideology isan imp orta nt variable in explaining conflict, con-sensus and cohesion. Second, I shall argue thatideology is the decisive variable in explainingmass mobilization a nd manipulation.

With regard to the problem of conflict an dconsensus the question is: how do two or morebelief systems relate to one another? If beliefsystems are compared among themselves, somebelief-elements may be shared, and they are thecommon elements; whereas the elements thatdifferentiate one belief system from another are

the distinctive elements.39 I t is also convenientto assume that the belief-elements that reallymatter are the "central" ones. On these prem-ises our earlier distinctions between fixed, firmand flexible belief-elements40 immediately out-line three typical patterns of interrelation be-tween different belief systems and belief groups.

i) If the distinctive elements are fixed (i.e.,closed and strongly held) two belief systems areincompatible or mutually exclusive, and the re-lations between the corresponding belief groupswill definitely be conflictual: conciliation is im-

possible. However the intensity and scope ofconflict may vary greatly, for the more numer-ous the (central) distinctive elements, thegreater the hostility; the less numerous, thelesser th e occasions of conflict.

ii ) If the distinctive elements are flexible(i.e., open a nd weakly held) two belief system sare coalescent or fusible, and the relations be-tween the corresponding belief groups will beconsensual: coopera tion is likely. Of course,the fewer the distinctive elements, the greaterthe amalgamation and the convergence.

* Dahl, op. cit., p. 2.

Supra, Figure 2 : "Typology of belief-ele-ments." For the present discussion the "inelastic

elements" will be neglected.

FIG.0. Conflictual versus Consensual Politics.

A F F E C T

High

jzzGqI S T I N C T I V E E L E M E N T S M a n y Few

A N D BELIEF SYSTEMS 409

iii) If the distinctive elements are firm (i.e.,open but strongly held) two belief systems arecompatible, that is, capable of peaceful coexist-ence, and the relations between the correspond-ing belief groups will be of th e bargaining type:

mutual adjustment is possible. Of course, thefewer the (central) distinctive elements, the eas-ier the coexistence.

In essence, then, political conflict (in its au-tonomy vis B. vis economic conflict, or conflictsof interest) largely depends on which distinctiveelements are distributed how within a nationalcommunity or across nations. With regard tothe pure and simple distribution-i.e., disregard-ing for the moment the nature of the ele-ments-political conflict reflects th e rise of acontroversy which taps the distinctive elements

of two (o r mo re) belief sy stems. Conversely, th esha ring of common belief-elements indicates th earea in which we obtain political consensus. Thispreliminary argument can be reformulated alsoalong the lines suggested in Figure 10.

However, Figure 10 accounts for two vari-ables-the numerical mag nitude and the emo-tional intensity of the elements-but fails to ac-count for a third, crucial variable: the nature ofthe distinctive elements. We are thus referred tothe question: which is the distribution of whichelements? If the central distinctive elements are

"closed," the controversy will be ideological; ifthey are "open" it will be pragmatic. In eithercase controversy is inevitable, but the chancesan d the ways of conflict resolution ar e conspicu-ously different.

At one end, if t he distinctive elements are no tonly closed but also passionately held we shallhave "ideological warfare," the relation is in-compatibility and conflict is unmanageable. Atthe other end, the more the distinctive elementsare open and feebly felt, the more we shall ob-tain "pragmatic transactions" and relations of

mutual adjustment.The same applies to the shared elements. At

one end, a belief group whose common elementsare closed and strongly held will display "ideo-logical cohesion," t ha t is, strong and lasting soli-darity ties, discipline and active dedication tothe whole. At the other end, a belief groupwhose common elements are open and feeblyheld will display "pragmatic consensus," whichmeans low cohesion, ephemeral and feeble soli-darity ties, and a tendency to dissolve into mul-tiple loyalties.

Thus far we have hypothesized relationsamong homogeneous belief systems, i.e., betweentwo belief systems which are both ideological orb ~ t h ragmatic. We can also obtain, however,



410 THE A M E R I C A N POLIT 'ICAL SCIENCE REVIEW VOL. 63

additional complication is a serious communica-tion lag. The two mentalities simply do not fit:their very logic, their Gestalten, are different.On the other hand, each belief group is inevi-tably prompted to project its own forma mentis

on the opposing group. A blind game results inwhich misinterpretation, misperception, frustra-tion and a spiral of distrust play the majorroles.

For instance, the pragmatic actor tends to as-sume that interests and conflicts of interests-along a continuum ranging from total coinci-dence of inte rest to zero-sum conflict-suffice toexplain a nd to predic t political behavior.41 Bu tin the ideological actor the "logic of interest"combines with a "logic of principles." I n fact ,ideological politics represents a situation in

which the utility scale of each acto r is alteredby an ideological scale. Hence, and much to thebewilderment of the pragmatist, in this case thelogic of interest no longer suffices to expla in, an deven less to predict, political behavior.

In conclusion, unless we are sensitized to theexistence of distinctly ideological publics a nd be-lief systems we are likely to miss the very na-tu re of "big conflict." For insta nce, we ar e easilymisled into believing that ideological conflictscan be reduced to underlying economic conflictswhich can be cured with economic medicines.

Likewise, we are likely to miss the fact that thedialogue of politics may well be a dialogueamong deaf men. On the other hand, the fore-going equally alerts us to the fact that ideologi-cal consensus is not the same as pragmatic con-sensus, an d th at the in-group cohesion of a nideological community is a far cry from the in-group solidarity of a pragmatic community.

IV . IDEOLOGY .iND MASS MANIPULATION

Before turning to the explanatory value of"ideology" vis & vis the unprecedented scale of

contem porary mass manipulation-which is alsomy major and most comprehensive point-itwill be necessary to recapitulate, howeversweepingly, the route travelled thus far.

Having reference to the more basic features,belief systems vary, as we know, along the fol-lowing dimensions: i) closed and open cognition,ii) emotive intensity, iii) rich-poor articula tion,and iv) constraining power.

With respect to their cultural matrixes beliefsystems vary, in addition, with respect to thefollowing characteristics: i) accessibility eitherto argumentative demonstration or to factual

"Interest is understood here as the utility scaleof each individual, as perceived by the interes ted

evidence; ii) centrality of the belief-elements;iii) level of abstraction; and iv) comprehen-siveness.

It is unnecessary to elaborate further on thefirst set of basic characteristics. As for the addi-

tional underpinnings, attention should be calledto the following hypotheses.

With regard to accessibility, the hypothesis isthat to the extent that the ideological mentalityreceives external communications, it is receptiveto rational dem onstration, hardly t o em piricalproofs. Conversely, the pragmatic mentality isopen to evidence far more than to the "reasonsof reason."

With regard to the centrality of the belief-elements, the hypothesis is that in ideologicalbelief systems the "ends" cons titute the central

elements; whereas in pragmatic belief systemsthe "means" tend to be more central.

With regard to the abstraction ladder, ideo-logical belief systems soar on a far mo re rem ote,abs trus e an d highflown level of discourse th anthe pragmatic belief systems.

Correlatively, and finally, with regard tocomprehensivenes8, the coverage, or the spacefor e xpan sion, of ideological belief sy stem s is farmore universal and "totalistic" than the cover-age of the pragmatic belief systems.

The import of these qualifications is readily

apparent in the light of the most crucial aspectof belief systems, namely, their constrainingpower. It was suggested earlier that mass pub-lics are, in general, easily hetero-constrained, inthe sense that poorly articulated believers needguidance not only for the horizontal inter-belieflinkage, but also for the vertical event-principlelinkage.42 But now the argument can be pinneddown, according to t he following three points.

First: The greater the centrality of the beliefelements designating ends, the more a belief sys-tem will elicit nor ma tive , goal-oriented, if n ot

futuristic or even chiliastic responses an d behav-ior.

Second: The more abstract a belief system,the more "what follows from what" (inter-belieflinkage), and "which event goes with whichprinciple" (event-principle linkage) escape thegrasp of mass publics and require elite guidance.Hence, the more abstract a belief system, themore it allows for elite manipulation and ma-neuvering.

Third and correlatively: The more a belief

"The need, if not the inevitability of guidanceis also the conclusion implicitly conveyed by theliterature on the closed and open mind. In par-ticular Rokeach brings out neatly the extent to




system transcends common sense spatial andtemporal boundaries, th at is, the more it obtainsa totalistic comprehensiveness, the more it callsfor elite interpretation and facilitates elite con-trol.

The foregoing forcibly suggests, then, thatthe hetero-constraining potentiality of belief sys-tems increases the more the system is ideologi-cal, and diminishes the more the system is prag-matic. In short, ideologies are the hetero-con-straining belief system s par excellence. And th isis the same as saying tha t ideologies are th e cru-cial lever a t the disposal of elites for ob tainingpolitical mobilization and for maximizing thepossibilities of mass manipulation. This is, itseems to me, the single major reason that ideol-ogy is so important to us. We are concerned

about ideologies because we are concerned, inthe final analysis, with the power of man overman, with how populations and nations can bemobilized and manipulated all along the waythat leads to political messianism and fanati-cism.

Th e focus on ideology as a lever of politicalmobilization, as an instrum ent of mass manipu -lation, satisfies the requirement of causal expla-nation. At this stage we are not merely saying,"this is what the term indicates;" we are alsosaying "this is why we have ideological politics."

Yet the reader may feel that this is a too nar-row conclusion, and surely a conclusion that re-quires som e justification.

At the outset of this exploration I had twoqueries in mind. One was: What should weseek to explain? The other one was: What is ittha t remains unexplained? Clearly these are thetwo sides of a same que stion. B ut th e first queryis virtually limitless, whereas the second narrowsthe problem, thereby providing the guidelinethat I have resolved to follow. By now we knowa great deal about w hy individuals act an d react

A N D BELIEF S Y S ~ M S

in politics the way they do. Kevertheless we arestill at a loss when we come to macro-phe-nomena and try to understand why the distribu-tion of the "open" and "closed" minds, of highor low affect, does not follow any statistical logic

and varies as it does. If so, the concept of ideol-ogy still has an important explanatory role toplay-under the condition, however, th at wesharp en i t for the purpose of explaining whatother convergent conceptualizations and disci-plines leave unexplained. My view is, then, thatideology is crucial to a n emp irical theory of poli-tics because, an d to t he extent th at , it is condu-cive to the understanding of v ariations and vari-eties.

Politics is not a monotonic phenomenon. Attimes it is a m ystique, a matt er of fai th, a secu-

lar religion; at other times the logic of politics isno less practical, no less "matter of fact," thanth e logic of economics. Some political systemsdisplay a high extractive capability and succeedin eliciting enthusiastic, passionate and trustfulallegiance; other political systems display a lowmobilizational and extractive capability. In cer-tain instances we ar e confronted w ith monolithicpolitical units characterized by extraordinarycohesiveness; but in other instances we findequivalent political units characterized by ahopeless lack of s olidarity ties. Fin ally , th e dia-

logue of politics is confronted w ith very differ-ent types of "deafness."

Does political science need the variable ideol-ogy to explain, at least in part, these varietiesand variations? My reply has been in the affir-mative, provided we do not overload the conceptin pursuing ambitious attempts to explain(worse) that which other disciplines or concep-tualizations explain bette r; an d provided, there-fore, th a t the use of "ideology" is restricted t othe meanings that appear to have a unique ex-planatory value.



You have printed the following article:

Politics, Ideology, and Belief Systems

Giovanni Sartori

The American Political Science Review, Vol. 63, No. 2. (Jun., 1969), pp. 398-411.

Stable URL:


This article references the following linked citations. If you are trying to access articles from anoff-campus location, you may be required to first logon via your library web site to access JSTOR. Pleasevisit your library's website or contact a librarian to learn about options for remote access to JSTOR.

[Footnotes]

15 "Myth" and "Ideology" in Modern Usage

Ben Halpern

History and Theory, Vol. 1, No. 2. (1961), pp. 129-149.

Stable URL:http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0018-2656%281961%291%3A2%3C129%3A%22A%22IMU%3E2.0.CO%3B2-T

26Ideology and Terror: A Novel Form of Government

Hannah Arendt

The Review of Politics, Vol. 15, No. 3. (Jul., 1953), pp. 303-327.

Stable URL:

http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0034-6705%28195307%2915%3A3%3C303%3AIATANF%3E2.0.CO%3B2-P

http://www.jstor.org

LINKED CITATIONS- Page 1 of 1 -

NOTE: The reference numbering from the original has been maintained in this citation list.

http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0003-0554%28196906%2963%3A2%3C398%3APIABS%3E2.0.CO%3B2-Y&origin=JSTOR-pdf

http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0018-2656%281961%291%3A2%3C129%3A%22A%22IMU%3E2.0.CO%3B2-T&origin=JSTOR-pdf

http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0034-6705%28195307%2915%3A3%3C303%3AIATANF%3E2.0.CO%3B2-P&origin=JSTOR-pdf

http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0034-6705%28195307%2915%3A3%3C303%3AIATANF%3E2.0.CO%3B2-P&origin=JSTOR-pdf

http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0018-2656%281961%291%3A2%3C129%3A%22A%22IMU%3E2.0.CO%3B2-T&origin=JSTOR-pdf

http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0003-0554%28196906%2963%3A2%3C398%3APIABS%3E2.0.CO%3B2-Y&origin=JSTOR-pdf

Documents

Giovanni Sartori