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Bus Rapid Transit: Is Transmilenio a Miracle Cure?Alan Gilbertaa Department of Geography, University College London, London, UK

To cite this Article Gilbert, Alan(2008) 'Bus Rapid Transit: Is Transmilenioa Miracle Cure?', Transport Reviews, 28: 4, 439 467

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0144-1647 print/1464-5327 online/08/040439-29 2008 Taylor & FrancisDOI: 10.1080/01441640701785733

Transport Reviews, Vol. 28, No. 4, 439467, July 2008

Bus Rapid Transit: Is Transmilenio a Miracle Cure?

ALAN GILBERT

Department of Geography, University College London, London, UKTaylorandFrancisTTRV_A_278602.sgm

(Received 6 March 2007; revised 24 September 2007; accepted 2 November 2007)10.1080/01441640701785733Transport Reviews0144-1647 (print)/1464-5327 (online)OriginalArticle2007Taylor&[email protected]

ABSTRACT Successful mass transit solutions are rare in poor cities. When they appear

they are lauded across the globe and too often copied uncritically. The latest exemplar ofsuch best practice is the Transmilenio rapid bus system in Bogot. The article describesits main characteristics and applauds the improvements that it has already brought tourban transport in Bogot. Naturally, the system is not without its flaws and these needto be drawn to the attention of those who might copy the Bogot example. This is particu-larly important at the present time when the jewel of Bogot has come under surprisinglystrong local criticism over its cost, its ownership structure, its decreasing effectivenessand, fundamentally, because it has failed to solve the transport chaos of Bogot. There is areal danger that Transmilenio will stagnate as its popularity declines and as demands fora metro increase. Given the strengths of the system that would be something of a disasterand, most certainly, not in the interests of the poor.

Introduction

Transport is a critical element in determining the quality of peoples lives, plays asignificant role in urban politics and influences both the pace of economic growthand the distribution of the benefits from that growth. In poor cities, a key mode oftransport is the humble bus, both because car ownership rates are low and

because few poor cities have metro systems.1

Unfortunately, few public bus companies in poor cities have ever operated verywell and their mismanagement leads to inefficiency, service unreliability,crossed vehicles, passenger discomfort and underused equipment (Vasconcellos,2001, p. 130). Private bus provision, especially when it is poorly regulated, doeslittle better, as evidence from Delhi, India (Tiwari, 2002; Pucher et al., 2005) andSantiago, Chile, reveals (Figueroa, 1990, 1996; Estache and Gmez-Lobo, 2005).These failings mean that bus ridership is often in relative decline, with more andmore people either resorting to private transportation or using their feet (Wrightand Fulton, 2005, p. 697).

In the absence of good public transport, and with per capita incomes rising,more people are opting to travel in their own vehicles. However, as experience in

Correspondence Address: Alan Gilbert, Department of Geography, University College London, PearsonBuilding, Gower Street, London WC1E 6BT, UK. Email: [email protected]


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440 A. Gilbert

most developed countries shows the private car offers little in the way of long-term answers. Rather, as Kennedy et al. (2005, p. 394) argues, more cars on theroads produce increasingly dysfunctional cities, involving ever-increasingcongestion, loss of quality of life, and, most likely as a result, decreasing economicproductivity and competitiveness. Rising car ownership has produced similar

problems in Latin America: during rush hour, every traveller by car causeseleven times more congestion than a bus passenger (Bull, 2003, p. 13).2

The solution in virtually every city across the world is often thought to be amodern metro. Unfortunately, the cost of construction is almost always beyondthe means of any city in low- and middle-income countries, something that themetros political supporters all too frequently deny. In any case, metro linescover only a limited geographical area, a particularly problematic issue in citieswhich spread outwards in most directions. Metros are best suited to compact orlinear cities where passenger flows are directed along particular corridors (e.g.Caracas or Medelln) and even there only a minority of the population can use

the system.If neither private car ownership nor the metro is a viable option, the most obvi-ous answer is an improved and more efficient bus system. Currently, one of thefavoured systems is bus rapid transit (BRT) or dedicated busways. Such systemscan accommodate substantial passenger flows and are also relatively cheap to

build (Wright, n.d.).3 According to the World Bank (2002, p. xiv) exclusivebusways in developing countries have proved to be capable, except in very hightraffic volume corridors, of performance nearly equivalent to rail-based systems

but at much lower cost.The pioneer BRT system commenced in Curitiba in 1963, although dedicated bus

lanes were not operating until 1974 (Rabinovitch and Leitman, 1996; Ardila-Gmez,2004; Friberg, n.d.; Wright, n.d.). This much praised system has since been copied,to one degree or another, in a number of Latin American cities, including Quito,Porto Alegre and So Paulo, and was clearly the inspiration behind the newTransmilenio bus system in Bogot (Gmez, 2004). Like the system in Curitiba,Transmilenio is a good example of what Estache and Gmez-Lobo (2005, p. 139) calla hybrid model: one in which the public and private sectors share responsibilitiesfor the delivery of the service. They suggest that this model avoids the chaos oftenunleashed by market competition with only limited state regulation. It also reducesthe incompetence manifest by so many public bus companies. So successful are

busways, it seems, that they are now sweeping across the world (Diaz and Schneck,

2000; World Bank, 2002; Vasconcellos, 2005; Hidalgo et al., 2007; Wikipedia, 2007;Wright, n.d.).

The Latin American busway . has inspired the imaginations of trans-port planners world-wide and is quickly becoming an option of choice.From North America to Europe to Oceania, the busway will most likely

be coming to a neighbourhood near you very soon. (Wright, 2001, p. 21)

The aim of this article is to provide a partial evaluation ofTransmilenios first sixyears of operation. This is important insofar as so many imitative systems are

being based on that citys experience, prompted in part because the team thatdeveloped the system has been touring the world offering their advice. Whileindependent studies ofTransmilenios operation exist, they are relatively few innumber and most are either limited in their coverage or are based on only a


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Bus Rapid Transit 441

couple of years of operation (Montezuma, 2003, 2005; Ardila-Gmez, 2004, 2005;Echeverry et al., 2005; UN-CID, 2005; Hidalgo et al., 2007).

And, although I am a great admirer of the new system, the Bogot experiencehas not been without its problems. Indeed, recently it has come under a great dealof local criticism, and in the last year there have been frequent reports that the

number of passengers using the system has fallen because some of its formerpassengers have switched back to old-style buses (see below). Rising criticism hasalso been levelled at the system because fares have increased, relative both to wagesand to the cost of travelling on other kinds of buses, and because certain aspects ofthe third-phase expansion have proved controversial.4 This criticism was a signif-icant issue in the selection campaign for mayor.5 As such, it seems an appropriatemoment to consider both the virtues and the problems that face Transmilenio.

First, who uses the system and how does it impact the general interests of poorpeople? The social impact of Transmilenio needs to be studied because publictransport is critical to the welfare of the urban poor and a crucial element in any

poverty-oriented city development strategy (World Bank, 2002, p. 106). DoesTransmilenio satisfy Vasconcellos (2001, p. 300) criterion of a satisfactory alterna-tive transport strategy, which aims at equity as the prime objective, provided aminimum efficiency, socially accorded, is ensured?

Second, does the system provide a flexible framework within which the lesspoor as well as the very poor can use public transport with confidence andcomfort (World Bank, 2002, p. xiv). This question is significant because unlessthe better off can be lured away from their cars, automobile dependency willgrow and the private car will block the roads of Bogot in the same way as it doesin so many other cities across the globe (Newman and Kenworthy, 1999; Gorham,2002; Whitelegg and Haq, 2003; Shoup, 2005).

Third, does Bogots experience support the argument of World Bank (2002,p. xiv) that giving priority to public transport in the use of road space makespublic transport faster and more financially viable? Have travel times improvedand has the system proved as financially viable as its defenders claim?

Finally, and most importantly, what does Transmilenio reveal about the need forcomplementary transport policies? What other measures are required to ensurethat the BRT systems function properly? How robust is the operation of buswaysto external pressures: political, economic and social? In short, to what extent is theoperation of even the best designed BRT system in danger of being undermined

by the external environment and the citys population losing the benefits gener-

ated by its investment?This article is based on information collected as part of a research project on

urban governance in Bogot.6 The project is centrally concerned with the extent towhich better urban governance has brought benefits to the poor of the city (Gilbert,2006). Since Transmilenio is regarded as one of the showpiece achievements of theimproved government performance in that city since 1993, examination of the new

bus system formed an important ingredient in the research project.The data used in this article come from a range of sources. Transmilenio SA (the

public controller and regulator of the system) provided data on passenger numbersand their social composition, fare levels and the financial position of the company.

Different members of staff explained how the system functioned and the variousproblems that the company faced. The annual surveys ofBogot Como Vamos (includ-ing some data purchased specially by the author) provided information on how thepublic viewed the effectiveness of the Transmilenio system and how its image has


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442 A. Gilbert

changed over time.7 These surveys also provided data on perceptions of the systemby social class. Numerous interviews with planners, operators and politicians in thecity in 2005 and 2007 provided further insights into the strengths and weaknessesof the system. Because of the sensitivity of the local population to transport issues,articles on Transmilenio appear in the press virtually every day. As such, the many

articles, editorials and invited columns provided a vital source of information.8

Finally, because Transmilenio and the traffic problems of the city featured promi-nently in the mayoral campaign of 2007, the author was able to attend several ofthe debates between the candidates who were concerned with this issue.9

Any evaluation of a complicated public transport system is bound to be partialand this is particularly true for a system like Transmilenio that is still at an earlystage of development. Since only 84 km of what is eventually intended to be asystem of 387 km were actually in operation September 2007, this article can only

be regarded as a preliminary assessment of the systems effectiveness. What itattempts to measure is the impact that such a partial system has already had on

transport in the city, whether any faults that have developed are the responsibil-ity of the designers or operators ofTransmilenio, and to what extent any difficul-ties are a consequence of the general political and urban environment in whichthe system is forced to operate.

The Transmilenio System

Transmileniobegan operations on 18 December 2000. Its key features are as follows:

The system is being built in stages (Figures 1 and 2) and will eventually cover80% of urban transport needs of the city (Gmez, 2004, p. 48).

Red articulated buses operate along reserved corridors, with two exclusivelanes each way on most of the routes; a feeder system takes passengers to themain stations.

Each articulated bus can carry 160 passengers, 112 standing and the rest sitting.At the end of September 2007, 1029 articulated buses were operating on the84 km of corridor routes.

The red buses belong to seven modern, private companies which havecontracts with the city; the green feeder buses to another eleven companies

Each corridor is built along the citys major roads and construction of the busstations, garages, bridges and other infrastructure is financed from public

funds. Passengers board the buses at special stations many of which can be reached

by pedestrian bridges to avoid accidents and to speed up loading. Passengers purchase travel cards before boarding. A fixed fare is charged

whatever the length of the journey. Use of the feeder bus system is free,passengers being charged only when they board the articulated buses.

Some buses stop at every station, while others are express services. The fares are collected by a separate private company. The system is run by a special agency of the city, called Transmilenio SA, which

operated originally on a commission of 3% of the fares collected, a percentage

that has risen over time and in 2006 amounted to 6.95% of the total fares.10

Transmilenio SA monitors and controls the system through a satellite trackingsystem and communicates with the drivers through a wireless telecommunica-tions system.


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There is no operating subsidy. The buses have to be replaced on a regular basis, approximately every ten

years, although this can be extended to fifteen years if the buses have notcompleted an agreed mileage.

The drivers are salaried employees of the bus companies.

In 2005, 19% of people questioned by Bogot Como Vamos said that their princi-pal means of transportation was Transmilenio, in 2006 18%, and in 2007 14%. Onan average working day during 2007, the system was carrying 1.3 million passen-gers.11 The current routes are shown in Figure 1 and the timetable for networkexpansion is shown in Table 1 and Figure 2.Figure1a. The Transmilenio networkin August2007.

How well has Transmilenio Functioned?

Transmilenio has received many accolades. An Italian transport specialisthas declared it to be the worlds most important urban transport project(McCormick, 2005). It was awarded the Stockholm Partnership Prize in 2002, andtransport authorities from 37 different countries visited it during its first fiveyears of operation. Ex-Mayor Pealosa and different members of his team travelthe world to extol its virtues and to explain its basic functioning to other govern-ments (Gmez, 2004, p. 77). The system has been so effective that every subse-

quent mayor has agreed to continue investing in the project. It has also becomeone of the favourite transport projects of the World Bank (Perea, 2001; WorldBank, 2004), which is now helping to finance clones in several other Colombiancities: Cali, Cartagena, Medelln and Pereira (Jaramillo, 2004). Transmilenio-typeprojects have been set up in Beijing, Guayaquil, Len, Lima, Mexico City andSantiago (Hidalgo et al., 2007) and are being planned in a series of others.12

Colombia has also been selling articulated buses to other cities in Latin America(Dinero, 14/9/2001).

Transmilenios impact on the city can only be properly understood when itsoperations are compared with the many failings of the traditional bus system. The

bus has been the bogotanos prime mode of transport since the ending of the tramservice in 1948. Most of the buses have been operated by private companies,although a state company did operate some bus and trolley services until 1991.13

The key feature of the traditional system is that the companies have never owned

Table 1. The construction plan for Transmilenio

Phase Corridors Length (km) Programme

I 3 42.4 19992002

II 3 42 20032004

III 3 61.3 20052009IV 4 51.3 20122015

V 4 45.6 20162019

VI 3 40.9 20202023

VII 4 39.6 20242027

VIII 1 63.5 20282031

Total 25 386.6

Source: Gmez (2004, p. 48)


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444 A. Gilbert

many of the buses operating on their routes; most of the buses belong to largenumbers of small operators and individual drivers. The bus companys incomedepends on the number of buses affiliated to it, which can be maximized throughobtaining a licence to operate the most profitable routes. The critical importanceof the route licence has led to widespread suspicion of corruption and influence inthe allocation of licences (Bonilla, 1997, p. 16; Ardila-Gmez, 2004; Gmez, 2004,p. 13). Too many buses operate in the city, most of which run through the citycentre. This leads to congestion along the main roads, and too few buses operatealong the more peripheral and less profitable routes.

Having obtained its routes, the bus company finds operators to work for them.The owner pays a monthly fee to the company and is then free to maximize reve-nue from the route. The drivers are paid according to the number of passengersthey carry which leads to competition between drivers to pick up passengersthe so-called war of the centavo. The competition for passengers encourages aculture of dangerous driving, stopping to pick up passengers with little or noregard for bus stops or other road users, and long working hours, as drivers try tomaximize their income. It also leads to poor bus maintenance because the opera-tors tend to run their buses most of the day.

Few experts have ever been heard to praise the bus system. A study of theUN-CID (1969, p. 106) described the route allocation system as absurd andLlewelyn Davies Associates (1974, p. 123) criticized the way that all but one ofthe citys 240 routes passed through the city centre. The study also noted thatdrivers were working 15-hour days, were employing unsafe driving practicesand regretted that there were no bus stops. In 1987, the citys own developmentplan declared the bus system to be slow, uncomfortable, of poor quality, scarcein the poor barrios and with too many long routes that nearly all pass throughthe centre of the city (Alcalda/CCB, 1987). Andrade (1993) suggested that theordinary citizen

has been made into an everyday victim of a technological, managementand labour model, which shows that the state cannot plan. The anarchiccompetition between thousands of small owners, each one with a few

Figure 1. The Transmilenio network in August 2007.


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buses affiliated to a number of companies, is reflected in the 450 differentroutes of which 268 cross the city centre and almost none serve the poorerdistricts after 9.00 pm.

Gmez (2004, p. 39) accused the model of being inherently exploitative: the

owners of the companies exploit the bus owners, the latter exploit the drivers andthe conductors exploit and maltreat the passengers.14 And, an editorial in thecountrys most influential newspaper bemoaned the chaotic public transportsystem of the city, a headache for mayors and passengers for decades (ElTiempo, 30/11/2003).

Ordinary people have long suffered from the way the system has been orga-nized, a major problem if the JICA Study of 1996 was correct in claiming that 72%of the citys people spent more than ten years of their lives on a bus or colectivo(Semana, 14/12/1998).15 Today, the authorities claim that bogotanos spend 15%of their time getting from one side of the city to the other compared with 7% in a

typical city in the world (STT webpage, 2006).For years, the basic defects of the system were never rectified because officialcontrol over bus routes gave the authorities a certain political leverage and, forsome officials, seemingly a source of illicit income. In any event it was difficult tochange the system because the bus operators have always wielded so mucheconomic and political power. Today, the transport lobby employs 25 000 peoplein the city and generates US$2.9 million a day in fares alone (Semana, 16/9/2006).This economic clout was long ago translated into political influence: the transport-ers regularly finance campaigns of all political colours, which gives them controlover politicians who work in their favour on any matter (Flores, 2006b). The buscompanies also have the power to call a strike and block the main roads of the city,something that they have done quite frequently. Despite regular changes in itsstructure and leadership, the government agency in charge of managing transportin Bogot has often been accused of being either corrupt or incompetent.16

Despite this catalogue of problems, Former-Mayor Mockus was correct whenhe once commented that public transport in Bogot is a chaos that works.17 The

bus network extends virtually everywhere and along the main routes it is rarelynecessary to wait long for a bus. The results of a Gallup poll in 1998 showed thateven if the 69% ofbogotanos who used public transport every day disliked thedelays, the insecurity, the inconvenience, the poor state of the vehicles and theunpleasantness of the drivers, they appreciated the diversity of routes and a

reasonable fare (El Espectador, 23/8/1998).Arguably, Bogots transport system matched the city perfectly. Its fleet of

poorly maintained buses, driven by lowly paid, semi-formal drivers was a mirrorimage of the citys lack of effective planning, its poverty and inequality, and thegeneral neglect of most peoples quality of life (Beccassino, 2000, p. 19). It wasorganized both formally and informally and, like most aspects of life in the city,was in essence a politically mediated, market-led solution. Insofar as the govern-ment intervened, its efforts were usually ineffective, politically suspect and,sometimes, clearly corrupt. Change was badly needed.

Transmilenio: The Jewel of Bogot

The Transmilenio system was intended to transform public bus transport in thecity and was Ex-Mayor Pealosas eventual answer to the persistent demand for a


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metro in the nations capital. Even though the countrys president wanted to builda metro in Bogot, and had agreed the funds for that purpose, the cost of construc-tion had already led a Japanese transport study to suggest that it was a poorsolution for the city (Gmez, 2004, p. 105).

There is an interesting debate about whether Ex-Mayor Pealosa ever planned

to build a dedicated bus system rather than a metro (see Ardila-Gmez, 2004).He frequently quotes a newspaper article that he wrote in 1985 to show that hehad always believed in buses and that he knew that the country could notafford to build a metro in Bogot (Pealosa, 1985).18 He argues that in 1998 hehad no alternative but to go along with that idea, given that both the Counciland President Samper were convinced of the merits of a metro.19 Only whenPresident Pastrana took office and realized that there were insufficient resourcesto build it, did the Mayor announce that Bogot would build Transmilenio ratherthan a metro (Bermdez and Carvajal, 2000; Gmez, 2004, p. 85).20 And, despitethe reluctance of national officials, the agreement made between the city and

Bogot to build a metro was modified only few days before Transmilenio beganoperations.21

Whether or not Enrique Pealosa ever intended to build a metro is now irrele-vant. It is clear that a metro is far too expensive whereas the dedicated bus-lanesystem is able to improve public transport years before a metro could have beencompletely operational. The Transmilenio network will also eventually cover mostof the city, something that would have been impossible with a metro. UnlikeMedelln or Caracas, which are located in deep valleys and where one or twolines can serve a much larger proportion of the population, Bogot, like MexicoCity or Santiago, spreads out.22 If a metro were ever to be built in Bogot, it wouldrequire a lot of lines to cover most parts of the city.

The concept ofTransmilenio is not original and Enrique Pealosa accepts thatthe true antecedent is the system in Curitiba (Gmez, 2004, p. 100). The idea isnot wholly new even in Bogot, and certain elements of the new system weretried out in the 1980s, for example, the idea of dedicated bus lanes. What is clear isthat Transmilenio is a vastly more ambitious scheme than anything previouslytried in Bogot, or indeed in most cities of the world. Pealosas great achieve-ment is to have built the system in three years, effectively from scratch. It endedthe war of the centavo along the main corridors and along much of the feedernetwork, set up a new transport company structure and introduced a modernfleet of articulated buses with salaried drivers. In a city where transport plans are

seldom implemented properly and where even small improvements normallytake years, this was a hugely impressive achievement.

At first, all but the owners and drivers of the traditional bus system seemed toapprove of the new system. In the Bogot Como Vamos survey of 2001, Transmilenioreceived an approval rating of 4.64 (out of 5), and most people said it was savingthem time. Ex-Mayor Mockus argues that Transmilenio contributed greatly to thegeneral publics improved feeling about the city (Gilbert and Dvila, 2002;Gilbert, 2006), and Gmez (2004, p. 107) argues that Transmilenio has encouragedbogotanos to behave more considerately to one another, make them feel safer andlead them to believe that things can be transformed (Gmez, 2004, p. 107). The

World Bank strongly approves of the project, and one official commented that itfulfils many of the priorities of the Bank: increasing the dignity of transport, effi-ciency in its routing and investment, high impact on the poor and linking thepublic and private sectors (Perea, 2001).


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Transmilenio has speeded up journeys along the main corridors, alongAvenidaCaracas, from 18 kph before Transmilenio was built to 27 kph today (Hidalgo, 2001;Ardila-Gmez, 2004; Gmez, 2005). It has cut air pollution along the troncales byas much as 40% (Echeverry et al., 2005; Dinero, 12/5/2006), although the busesstill contaminate the air because of the poor quality of the diesel fuel they are

forced to use. Safety along the main corridors has improved greatly: after twoyears, traffic collisions and pedestrian accidents decreased by 94 percent, injuriesto passengers by 76 percent, and fatalities by 94 per cent (Echeverry et al., 2005,p. 171). Disabled people are also able to use Transmilenio, something that is notpossible on the ordinary buses because of the difficulty of boarding the latter(Gmez, 2004, p. 116). And, the general environment along the troncales hasgenerally improved.23

The cost of construction was considerable (see below) but compared withbuilding a metro it was quite cheap. Critically, too, Transmilenio was built more orless to budget, and any cost overrun was tiny compared to the scandalous over-

expenditure associated with the building of the Medelln metro or indeed mostunderground railway systems (Jaramillo, 1995; Figueroa, 1996; Rodrguez, 1998;Quevedo and Llorente, 2001; Gmez, 2004, p. 105). Mistakes were made but thatis normal in any major public works project. Despite the criticisms that followed,Transmilenio is a system that works rather well.24

Criticisms of Transmilenio

Although Transmilenio has been a general success, there has been mounting localcriticism of how the system operates. Some of this criticism concerns teethingproblems, some the difficulties caused by the gradual introduction of the systemand some to structural features of the system. The volume of local criticism rosewhen Phase II began in 2004 and become much louder as the campaign for mayorgot underway during 2007 (Sarmiento, 2007).

Apart from criticism of the traffic congestion caused by construction of thesystem (Semana, 11/10/1999, 1/12/2003), the first major complaint concernedthe decay of the road surface along the bus corridors. The main arteries werepaved with a kind of cement tile which, after a couple of years, began to deterio-rate alongAvenida Caracas, El Eje Ambiental andAutopista del Norte.25 This damagedelayed the buses and cost a great deal to rectify. Criticism of the design has beendirected at IDU (which managed the contract), at the Mexican company that

provided the cement and at Ex-Mayor Pealosa; although there is now somerecognition that local engineers knew that there might be problems with theliquid infill being used as foundation (Ardila-Gmez, 2004; Daz, 2004; Semana,29/6/2004; El Tiempo, 19/1/2005). The problem of the tiles caused a great deal ofembarrassment but in no sense can it be seen as a criticism of the structure of thesystem. Future corridors will simply not be built in the same way. More recently,criticism has been directed at the deteriorating condition of the bus stations(Crdenas, 2006), a problem that has been partially addressed by making theoperators responsible in future for maintaining the stations for five years.

A second set of complaints was prompted by the overcrowding and delays to

the buses that began to develop in 2004. Passengers using the main corridor,Avenida Caracas, began to protest that the buses were turning into sardine cans.On 9 March 2004 the users of Transmilenio spontaneously walked out of thestations and sat on the busways to protest against a decrease in the level of service


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448 A. Gilbert

(Ardila-Gmez, 2004, p. 370). During peak times, some passengers had to queue toenter the stations and wait 15 minutes, rather than the normal 3 minutes, before

boarding a bus. Black humour labelled the system TransmillenoTransmi-Full,and a poll in 2006 revealed that 91% of bogotanos thought that Transmilenio hadcapacity problems (Espejo, 2006). In May 2006, a demonstration protested against

the infrequency of buses on some routes (El Tiempo, 9/5/2006, 11/5/2006, 14/5/2006).26 More recent surveys record lower levels of dissatisfaction, responding tothe larger numbers of buses that have been operating. Nevertheless, 89% of thoseconsulted in 2007 thought that the main weakness ofTransmilenio was overcrowd-ing (BCV, 2007, p. 37).27

Third, one of the perpetual plagues of public transport in Bogot has spread toTransmilenio as pick-pockets are now working on the buses. Three quarters of asample in 2005 thought that Transmilenio was insecure, either because of the riskof robbery or because of the crowds (Flores, 2005).28 Although Transmilenio signedan agreement with the police to allocate 500 young police cadets and 110 officers

at the entrances to the bus stations, this has only helped partially. In a recent poll,only 27% thought that Transmilenio was safe (El Tiempo, 26/2/2007).Fourth, there are increasing complaints about the competence ofTransmilenio

SA, the central executive agency. Some complain that the technical nature of theagency has declined since 2005, others complain that as its income has risen, it has

become too bureaucratic. Flores (2006a) argues that the company now appearsincapable of managing the changes that are needed to improve the service: anew driver is needed.29

This combination of problems is undoubtedly responsible for the decreasingapproval ratings recorded in the annual Bogot Como Vamos surveys.30 WhenTransmilenio entered service, the public gave it a very high rating relative to othermodes of transport and it received a 93% approval rating in 2001. A former headof Transmilenio said in an interview that she would be happy so long as theapproval rating did not fall below 70%; unfortunately in by 2007 only 66% ofrespondents still thought the service was either good or very good (BCV, 2007)(see Table 2). That rating was towards the bottom of the range of approval forinstitutions in Bogot, alongside that of the normally highly unpopular Council.31

How significant is this decline in popularity? One problem with BCV polls isthat although only 14% of respondents in 2007 said that they used the system,everyone in the sample was asked to comment on its effectiveness. For thisreason, in 2005, I asked Bogot Como Vamos to supplement their questions in order

to separate out the answers of those who used Transmilenio as their main means oftransport from those who did not. Among regular users, 63% thought that itoffered a good or very good service compared with only 11% who thought it was

Table 2. Evaluation of modes of transport in Bogot (20012007)

Mode 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007

Transmilenio 4.6 4.1 4.1 3.3 3.7 3.6 3.4

Bus/Ejecutivo 3.1 3.3 3.3 3.2 3.5 n.a. 3.5

Buseta 3.3 3.2 3.5 3.6 3.5 n.a. 3.6

Colectivo 3.8 3.4 3.8 3.5 3.6 n.a. 3.3

Taxi 3.8 3.9 3.8 4.1 4.0 n.a. 3.5

Source: Bogot Como Vamos


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bad or very bad. Replies to another question in the 2005 survey also partiallydiscredited the earlier negativity; 69% of all interviewees thought that the qualityof life in Bogot had improved as a result ofTransmilenio compared with 15% whothought it had worsened. By 2007, although the general image ofTransmilenio haddeclined among the general public, 72% of users thought that introduction of the

service had improved public transport in Bogot (BCV, 2007). As Flores (2006a)has argued: Today the traveller recognises [Transmilenios] virtues but at thesame time wants a better service.

Concentration of Ownership

A regular concern about Transmilenio relates to its pattern of ownership. Thesystem was intended to create a new kind of bus operator and to rid the systemof the old bus system. The new companies would own and maintain their busesrather than merely sub-contract routes out to the bus operators as previously.

The aim was to end the war of the centavo by establishing modern enterpriseswhich would employ professional drivers. In the process, Transmilenio wouldimprove road safety and end the exploitation of drivers and passengers (Gmez,2004).

Ex-Mayor Pealosa was convinced by experience in Curitiba and Quito that theprivate sector should own and operate the Transmilenio buses. He wanted thesystem to operate without an operating subsidy, something that the public buscompany in Quito had failed to achieve at that time. He also had to ensure thatthe local bus companies in Bogot would participate in the project. He was afraidof repeating the experience of Quito where the armys tanks had had to inter-vene to crush a strike by the bus owners who did not want to let the new systemopen (Ardila-Gmez, 2004, p. 343).

A key problem was that the existing bus companies were reluctant to sign up.They did not have the capital with which to buy the new articulated buses, didnot like the centralized fare-collection system and worried about the obligation onthem to renew the fleet on a regular basis (Ardila-Gmez, 2004). As such, theyhad to be convinced that the rewards would be sufficient to compensate them forthe risks that they would face in transforming the nature of their business.

In overcoming these barriers Transmilenios designers implicitly favouredlarge investors. And, by negotiating with the bus companies rather than the

bus owners, it was left to the companies to decide whether or not to include

the owners. In the first stage, one new company, SI99, did include over 500owners and Expreso del Futuro a couple of hundred, but two other companieshad none (Ardila-Gmez, 2004, pp. 364365). The second-phase companieswere much more inclusive insofar as the three new concessionaires have 1850

bus owners among the shareholders, including members of Apetrans and busowners have provided between 20% and 30% of the capital (ibid., p. 367).32

However, Ardila-Gmez (2004, p. 363) fears that large capitalist investors inExpreso del Futuro and Metrobs have bought out their smaller partners. Onerecent report claims that Transmilenio is in the hands of a small group of ninefamilies (Dinero, 12/5/2006). There are also suggestions that the sanitation

companies have bought into the bus operating companies because of the highprofitability of the system (Trujillo, 2003).33 According to a recent studyconducted by Transmilenio SA, 88% of the shares in the first two phases

belonged to 21% of the investors (El Tiempo, 26/5/2006).


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450 A. Gilbert

Most politicians in the city, and even Colombias president, now accept thatthe system favoured the bus companies over the bus owners and that moreshould be done to help the main victims of Transmilenio, i.e. the small busowners. Strikes by the transport companies and protests by university studentsin 2006 helped alert the authorities to the problem but criticism has become

particularly fierce since Mayor Garzn came to power, partly because muchof the political support and finance for his party, Polo Democrtico, came from

bus companies and owners who did not participate in the first two phases ofTransmilenio (Semana, 15/9/2007).34

Recently, it seems as if every influential politician agrees that something mustbe done to democratize ownership in the third phase ofTransmilenios develop-ment (El Espectador, 30/7/2005; El Tiempo, 30/7/2005; Gutirrez, 2006;Quevedo, 2006).35 Since the owners and drivers seem to earn very little and thecity continues to suffer from high rates of unemployment, many feel that it issocially irresponsible not to involve them in the new system. Some in Congress

feel the same way and have been trying to guarantee that all the new Transmile-nio clones have a democratic form of ownership (Jaramillo, 2004). The onlydissenting voice that I have heard comes from one of the bus companies, whosemanaging director argues that the small drivers and owners deserve to get noth-ing as a result of having brought chaos to the streets of the city over so manyyears.36

The main question, therefore, is how to involve more owners and drivers in theownership structure when, as Vctor Ral Martnez, the largest shareholder in theTransmilenio operating companies, points out: the small owners dont haveenough money to invest and wait five years before receiving the profits (ElTiempo, 26/5/2006). One suggestion is that when buses are scrapped theirowners should be given preferential shares in a new company (El Tiempo, 30/7/2005). This and other ideas are currently being explored (Dinero, 12/5/2006; ElTiempo, 15/6/2006; Martnez and Jimeno, 2007).37

Construction Cost and Subsidy

Transmilenio was designed to run without an operating subsidy. Both the privateoperators and Transmilenio SA are expected to cover their costs out of their shareof the revenues. Most of the operators have made a profit (see below) althoughthe management company made a loss during the first five years.38

In practice, the system has received a degree of indirect subsidy. For example,the system does not pay for the police cadets who now guard the system nor forthe heavy security arrangements that were put in place after the two bombs wentoff on the feeder system in 2004. Transmilenio operators, like all bus operators inthe country, have also benefited from the cheap diesel they receive from the StatePetrol Company.39

What is rarely mentioned in Bogot is the large subsidy that Transmilenioreceived up front, insofar as public funds provided the road space, the busstations, the bridges, and the parks where the buses are kept at night. It istrue that no public transport company in the world operates without a

subsidy but, in many cities around the world, the extent of the overallsubsidy is explicit. In Bogot, everyone is proud to argue that there is nooperating subsidy and omit to mention the capital subsidy. The estimatesmade when planning the system calculated that the state contribution would


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be 36% of the total cost in the first three routes, and 63% in the next ten(CONPES, 2000, p. 4) (see Table 3).

Of course, the cost to the state of constructing Transmilenio was very much lessthan that of building a metro: the factor that eventually swayed the nationalgovernments decision in Transmilenios favour at a time when Colombia had justentered a serious economic recession (El Tiempo, 30/7/2000). One estimate is thatthe cost building the infrastructure for Transmilenio was US$5 million per kilome-tre, approximately one twentieth of the estimated cost per kilometre of the firstline of the metro (Ardila-Gmez, 2004, p. 369). Ex-Mayor Pealosa provides ahigher figure of US$6.9 million per kilometre, but asserts that it is still ten timescheaper than a metro (Gmez, 2004, p. 98).40

More recent estimates suggest that the average Phase II cost was US$13.3million, although some have estimated the cost of the NQS corridor at US$26million per kilometre (El Tiempo, 16/1/2007, 3/2/2007). The third-phase exten-sion along Avenida Sptima is estimated at US$22 million per kilometre (at 2007prices) (El Tiempo, 3/2/2007), although most admit that the cost of this route islikely to be higher than that on the other routes.

Of course, compared with a metro, there is no question that Transmilenio ischeap but the recent campaign for mayor threw up some strange comparativefigures (El Tiempo, 3/2/2007). Samuel Moreno, who wants to build a metro,claimed that Transmilenio is not that much cheaper than a metro, which in anycase will be a better investment for the city over the long term (Semana, 15/9/2007).41 Enrique Pealosa emphasized just how expensive a metro would be.

Excess Profits?

Another issue that seems to be surrounded by some mystery is the profitability

of the bus operators. The four companies that were set up to run the Phase Ibuses were expected to earn a return of 14.17% per annum (Ardila-Gmez, 2004,p. 302). The return had to be attractive in order to convince the old bus ownersand companies to establish the modern enterprises required to operate under the

Table 3. Public and private contribution to capital costs

Corridor Kilometres

Infrastructurecost (US$million)

Total cost(US$

million)

Buses andfare

collectionInfrastructurecost per km

Infrastructurecost/totalcost (%)

Phase ICalle 80 10 42.6 84.6 42 4.26 50.35

Caracas 21 69 245.8 176.8 3.29 28.07

Autopista Norte 10 42.3 97.2 54.9 4.23 43.52

Sub-total 41.0 153.9 427.6 273.7 3.75 35.99

Phase II

Las Americas 16.7 94.8 159.1 64.3 5.68 59.59

Av. Suba 11.0 43.2 96.2 53 3.93 44.91

NQS 35.5 134.2 198.3 64.1 3.78 67.68

Sub-total 63.2 272.2 453.6 181.4 4.31 60.01

Total 104.2 426.1 881.2 455.1 4.09 48.35

Source: CONPES (2000)


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452 A. Gilbert

new contracts. Ardila-Gmez (2004) describes the long and difficult process thatwas undertaken to convince the bus companies to participate in Transmilenio.The scheme devised offered a return on the estimated operating and capital costsof running the buses, calculated on the number of kilometres of bus journeysrecorded. The formula established for Phase I was generous to the operators

because of the high perceived risks, especially given that the country hadentered a severe economic recession (Ardila-Gmez, 2004, p. 290; UN-CID, 2005,p. 13). The safeguard against excessive profits was thought to be the competitive

bidding process used to select the companies.42 However, in Phase I, the biddingprocess was somewhat contrived in the sense that the terms had been discussedextensively with potential bidders and made palatable in order to attract theminto the new scheme. Big advantages were also given to local companies in the

bidding process and even then only three bids were received for the first fourroutes.

As such, it is important to consider whether the first set of contracts proved to

be profitable. Unfortunately, despite the fact that the companies deposit theiraccounts with the Superintendency for Societies every year, there appears to bevery little public discussion about the profitability of their operations.43 The onlypoint of consensus is that the profits of these companies during Phase I weremuch higher than expected. UN-CID (2005, p. 38) shows that all four companiesmade a net profit after taxes every year between 2001 and 2003 even though thefeasibility studies had suggested that they would not make money in the first fiveyears (Dinero, 12/5/2006). In 2003, the less-than-objective head of the ordinary

bus companies association referred to the millionaire profits of the Transmileniooperators (Gonzlez, 2005a), and two independent sources have estimatedthe annual return on revenues in Phase I at between 18% and 22% (Nieto, 2003,pp. 110111; Ardila-Gmez, 2005, p. 43).44 One representative of a bus companyinterviewed did not deny that operating Transmilenio buses was a good business,although he pointed out that Phase I companies did not make a profit on thefeeder system.

The higher than expected profits in Phase I were due to a miscalculation in thetechnical tariff which meant that between 2001 and 2004 the operators received11.5% more than they expected on the number of kilometres they operated (UN-CID, 2005, p. 20). Payment to the companies operating the troncales was, and contin-ues to be, made on the basis of the number of kilometres run by their buses (thefeeder system companies are paid per passenger). These payments are intended to

cover the running costs and depreciation. The rate per kilometre on the troncales isbased on an estimate of the average number of passengers carried by each busevery kilometre. When the number of passengers is above that number, Transmile-nio tells the operators to increase the number of buses and vice versa. In principle,this means that there is always enough capacity and the operators are making onlythe expected level of profit. The rate in Phase I was based on the 672 000 passengerswho were expected to use the three corridors but, because actual usage was muchhigher, payments were actually 12% higher which naturally raised the level of prof-its (Ardila-Gmez, 2004, pp. 362363; UN-CID, 2005, p. 26).

Of course, most operators tend to express a different view and they have

warned that during Phase II they run the risk of making losses of possible duringPhase II, (El Tiempo, 15/11/2005).45 Certainly, the technical fare was establishedon the basis of 1.4 million passengers per working day, whereas the averagenumber of passengers is currently only 1.3 million. Combined with the rapidly


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rising cost of diesel fuel, the lower number of passengers has been the main justi-fication for raising the fare three times between January 2006 and July 2007.

Transmilenio and the Shape of the City

One of the age-old debates within the planning literature is about the role of land-use planning in cutting average journey times (Cameron et al., 2004; Kennedyet al., 2005) and was the logic underpinning Lauchlin Curries city-within-thecity model (UN-CID, 1969; Gilbert, 1978; Alonso, 1999). One of the criticisms ofTransmilenio is that it is effectively consolidating the existing shape and land useof the city, with all of its associated problems. Certainly, the citys planningdepartment is concerned that, in Mario Noriegas words, Transmilenio is helpingto stick development to the mountain rather than trying to encourage the devel-opment of new sub-centres. Ex-Mayor Pealosa sees this as a virtue and is argu-ing that Bogot must remain a densely populated city and points out the dangers

of urban sprawl, Houston style.There is also concern that Transmilenio is disrupting urban life in and aroundthe corridors. It is cutting off access across the trunk routes and causing a certainamount of disruption and pollution as rat runs develop. Such a fear recently ledthe citizens of Ciudad Salitre to oppose the development of the Calle 26 whichpasses close to their area. The new system, they claimed, would lead to a monu-mental collapse in road traffic and considerable deterioration in the roads in thedistrictTransmilenio buses would also pollute the air (El Tiempo, 9/6/2006).

Is the System Socially Equitable?

Ex-Mayor Pealosa, and the principal designer of the system, Ignacio de Gzman,have consistently argued that Transmilenio is designed to help the poor (deGzman, 2003; Pealosa, 2003; Gmez, 2004, p. 101). This is a view shared by theWorld Bank in justifying the financial support that it is offering to help buildclones in other Colombian cities (Gmez, 2004; World Bank, 2004).

Ex-Mayor Mockus accepts this argument and claims that every social class inBogot is using Transmilenio, which helps the harmony of the city, internal soli-darity and the feeling of belonging to the city. Although both he and Pealosa

believe that it is used by higher income groups, thereby helping to reduce depen-dence on the private car, the vast bulk of Transmilenios passengers are ordinarypeople. Transmilenio SA user surveys in 2006 found that 86% of the passengerscame from the poorest three social groups. However, Table 4 suggests that at

Table 4. Usage ofTransmilenio by social class (2006)

Socialstratum

Transmileniopassengers (%)

Total population inthat social stratum (%)

Ratio of users to populationby stratum (=Col. 2/Col. 3)

1 and 2 38 47.1 80.7

3 48 40.4 119.0

4 11 7.5 146.7

5 and 6 3 5.1 58.8

Source: Passenger data provided by Transmilenio SA in August 2007 and data on distribution of popu-lation from DAPD (2004, p. 81)


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454 A. Gilbert

present it is middle-income groups who use the system most. Proportionate totheir numbers, it is Classes 3 and 4 who are the most regular usersa fair reflec-tion of where the corridors currently go.46

Of course, as the Transmilenio network expands, it will reach more areas of poorsettlement. However, there is one unresolved problem: how to construct trunk

routes into the mountain areas to the southeast of the city where a substantialproportion of the poor live. Plans are in hand to try to design a corridor with alower specification but if this proves impossible, these areas are likely to continueto be dependent on the feeder service, increasing journey times accordingly.47

Another problem is that the next stage of expansion will develop routes alongthe citys most famous street, Carrera Sptima, and along the road to the airport(see Figure 2). Some argue that Sptima is too narrow to accommodate the systemwithout substantial demolition or tunnelling. Others are concerned that this is thewrong place to expand, and early studies suggested that the next priority routeought to be further west alongAvenida Boyac (El Tiempo, 15/2/2007). A corridor

along the latter road would certainly reach more poor people, even if there arepoor areas at the northern end ofSptima and many poor people do work alongthe road.48Figure1b. Transmilenio :existingandphasethreeroutes.

With respect to the cost of travel, the system helps poor people in two criticalways. First, the fares are fixed whatever the length of the journey, and insofar asmany of the poor live in the outskirts, most travel longer distances than themiddle class.49 As such, their journeys are being subsidized by those who makeshort journeys, essentially the better off. Second, passengers using the feedernetwork, which operates mainly in poor neighbourhoods, do not have to pay; thecost is covered through purchase of the through ticket. Hence, those who only usethe corridor buses are subsidizing those in the periphery (Gmez, 2004, p. 101).50

Nonetheless, there is a major problem. The fare for the combined Transmileniojourney is higher than that for a single journey on the traditional buses, and inJuly 2007, the difference amounted to 300 pesos or 27% during normal daytimeworking.51 Of course, travelling conditions on Transmilenio, crowding apart, aregenerally far superior to those on the old buses and still cheaper if a passenger hasto make a journey on two traditional buses (Hidalgo, 2001). But, while the fares in

Figure 2. Transmilenio: existing and phase three routes.


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international terms are derisorily low, the very low incomes most bogotanos ofmean that transportation often takes a considerable share of the household

budget. In July 2007, when the fare was raised to 1400 pesos (US$0.73), 20 returnjourneys a month cost 12.9% of the minimum wage in Bogot. Today, thecombined cost of those journeys exceeds the transport subsidy that is added to the

minimum wage of formal sector workers by 10%.52

The latest rise means thatTransmilenio fares have risen by 27% in 30 months, a period during which theminimum wage (plus the transport subsidy) has risen by less than 14%.

While it is essential that the Transmilenio system remains financially sustain-able, the frequency with which the fares have recently risen is a worrying devel-opment. According to the local press, recent fare rises have led to a fall in thenumber of passengers as increasing numbers of people choose to use the tradi-tional buses. Transmilenio SA deny this and their figures show that although the

July 2007 fare rise led to a decline in the number of passengers to 1.08 million perday during the first week, 1.28 million passengers a day used the system the week

after. For a 19-week period from the beginning of February 2007 until the middleof June, the number of journeys on an average working day was 1.26 million.53

This means that usage actually increased by 15% between 2006 and 2007.One commentator after another has argued in the press that passenger numbers

are in decline and, to the irritation ofTransmilenio, the newspapers have failed topublish its denials. The situation has not been helped by the frequent referencesmade to a study by the National University which estimated that passengernumbers would decline by 150 000 for every 100 peso rise in the Transmilenio fare(UN-CID, 2005). As a result, it is regularly claimed that current passengernumbers fall 100 000 short of the projected break-even figure of 1.4 million a day(Gonzlez del Ro, 2007).

While it is clear that the number of passengers using the system has not fallen,it is equally true that numbers have not risen as quickly as expected. This may bea consequence of the rise in fares, because of the overcrowding on the system or

because there are so many traditional buses still in operation. The difference of300 pesos between Transmilenio fares and those on the traditional system iswidely cited as an explanation, particularly as some passengers now negotiate adiscount with the drivers, particularly when they have their family in tow.Certainly, Transmilenio SA constantly complains about the unfair competitionoffered by the traditional system (see below), and passengers may be using theold buses for direct trips because they are now quicker than Transmilenio.54

If the number of passengers using Transmilenio has not actually declined, thenumber of passengers per bus kilometre fell from 5.6 in the first few weeks of oper-ation in 2001 to 5.1 in December 2006 (El Tiempo, 25/2/2007). There are severalexplanations for this decline. First, the number of articulated buses in service rosefrom 841 in June 2006 to 1018 in July 2007, which means that the number of passen-gers per bus fell by 9%.55 Second, the average length of journey has increased as aresult of the opening of new, lower density routes to areas like Suba.56 Third, fewer

journeys are made along the new routes at weekends.No doubt these explanations are thoroughly valid but I have little doubt that

recent fare rises also explain part of the decline in a key element in the formula

used to determine fares on the Transmilenio system: the index of passengers perkilometre (IPK). If the IPK falls then, ceteris paribus, the fare must rise. Passengernumbers may not have fallen as the papers claim but they have not increasednearly as quickly as had been anticipated, an expectation which determined how


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456 A. Gilbert

many buses would be purchased. And, since the number of Transmilenio busesnominally in service has risen faster than the number of passengers, this hastriggered higher fares according to the technical formula.57

If rising fares are discouraging people from using the new system, the numberof passengers per bus kilometre will fall, and automatically trigger new fare

rises. This could easily turn into a vicious downward circle for Transmilenio. Asfares rise, more people may use the traditional system and the numbers usingTransmilenio will not increase at the rate expected. The operators will insist on thehigher fare that the formula dictates, and a higher fare will lead to fewer passen-gers using the system. The only ways to prevent this are to reduce the operatingcosts ofTransmilenio, cut the number of rival buses (see below), or raise the fareson the traditional system.

Reducing the Number of Old Buses

One of the motives for setting up Transmilenio was to reduce the stock of oldbuses operating on the streets of Bogot. Fewer buses would reduce congestionand air pollution. For this reason, during Phase I the new companies wererequired to buy 2.7 old buses for every articulated bus that they wanted to run.This plan seemed to work reasonably well; the drivers were absorbed easily bysome of the new companies and there was an ample supply of old buses for sale.By November 2005, some 3000 buses had been scrapped (Gonzlez, 2005b).However, Phase II upped the requirement to 7.7 buses for every articulated busand this target has proved very difficult to reach.

First, administering the replacement process has proved to be more compli-cated than expecteda tortuous process as one commentator describes it(Gonzlez, 2005b). The operator buying the old bus has to make sure that it has

both an operating and an owners licence, that the owner does not owe fines ortaxes to the city and that the bus has not been stolen or cloned. By the end of 2005,the representative of two companies was complaining that although they had

bought 880 buses, the paperwork was holding up the destruction of 212 of them(El Tiempo, 12/12/2005).

Second, the scrapping of the buses could only be done by one company, Diaco,and this company lacked the capacity to destroy more than 50 vehicles a week(El Tiempo, 12/12/2005). This monopoly, with an international company audit-ing the process, was created to guarantee that the buses were actually destroyed,

but, at times, it seems to have slowed the scrapping programme.Third, during the second stage ofTransmilenio, the owners of old buses realized

that they had a commercial asset and started demanding more and more moneyfor the old buses. Officially they were to be paid 20 million pesos (at the timeUS$8333) but they have been demanding much more. In May 2005, the ownerswere demanding 35 million pesos per 20-year-old bus whereas the transit author-ity (STT) was offering a maximum of 25 million pesos (El Tiempo, 3/5/2006).58

The effect of these problems was to delay putting articulated buses on some ofthe new routes. At the end of 2005, the lack of buses meant that the second sectionof the new NQS corridor could not open (El Tiempo, 10/11/2005, 15/11/2005).59

By August 2006, the bus operators were expected to have arranged for 3700 busesto be scrapped but had not managed more than 3000.

In addition to scrapping buses in return for licences to run more articulatedbuses, the city authorities also wanted to cut the old routes. After Apetrans


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organized several strikes, Ex-Mayor Mockus decided to establish a fund tocompensate the bus owners for the loss of their routes and vehicles.60 The fundwas financed by a charge of 17 pesos on every 1000 pesos of fares collected by the

bus owners (Ardila-Gmez, 2004). Unfortunately, many companies did not passon the requisite sums to the fund. By November 2005, only 11 of the 66 bus

companies had put money into the fund, which then held only 11 billion pesosrather than 90 billion pesos that should have been collected. Lawyers claimed thatthe Mayor had no right to charge this sum as it constitute a tax, which could only

be levied by the Council (El Tiempo, 9/8/2006), and the matter had to be consid-ered by the courts.61 Whatever the rights and wrongs of the case, it delayed thescrapping programme. By November 2005, only 8 vehicles had been scrappedwith money from the fund, an insignificant figure compared to the goal of 5668(Gonzlez, 2005b; El Tiempo, 10/11/2006)62.

Over and above the problems of finding enough buses to scrap, there is theproblem of new buses entering service in the city. In 1993, Ex-Mayor Castro

ordered a freeze on the public transport stock in the city (Gutirrez, 2006). At thattime, 16 300 buses, busetas and collectives were on the roads (El Tiempo, 14/6/2006). By the middle of 2006, 20 847 were operating when, according to one esti-mate, there should only have been 10 000 (El Tiempo, 9/8/2006). One councillorhas claimed that if the 3000 buses from neighbouring Soacha are counted, thenthere are 12 500 pirate buses in operation (Semana, 16/9/2006)!

The continued presence of old buses and the entry of so many illegal buses isexplicable largely in terms of the influence of certain bus companies. In August2006, the Council refused to hold a debate to discuss the profits of the bus compa-nies or the excessive number of buses operating in the city (El Tiempo, 3/8/2006).One insider claimed that this showed the power of the transporters, operatingthrough the councillors who represent them (ibid.). Fifteen attempts were madeto get the debate through the Councils Government Commission, presided over

by Severo Correa, someone very close to the transporter Carlos Delgado, whoparticipated in the financing of Mayor Luis Eduardo Garzns campaign(Restrepo, 2006). Perhaps the same rationale explains the Councils extreme reluc-tance to discuss the Mayors efforts to reform the Secretariat of Transport(El Tiempo, 9/9/2006).63 Some bus companies have clearly been using their influ-ence over the local administration and the Ministry of Transport to sabotage theprogramme to scrap old buses.

Conclusion

The organization of transport in Bogot has been unsatisfactory for a long time,and each of the last four mayors is to be applauded for having taken major politi-cal risks to reform it. Each has taken on some formidable opponents and riskedthe effect that this would have on their rating in the opinion polls. They havetaken this risk because they all have accepted that transport is probably the mostimportant and controversial issue that a mayor has to deal with. Mayor Garznrecognized this when he declared on 14 August 2006 that his best gift to Bogotfor its next birthday would be to have sorted out transport (El Espectador, 15/

8/2006). Since then he has announced his mobility plan for the city and a waragainst the car.

There is no doubt that Transmilenio represents the jewel in the crown of recenttransport reforms. It is a well-designed system that is rightly being copied by


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458 A. Gilbert

many other cities. It has cut congestion and pollution along the main corridors; ithas also improved the quality of travelling on the buses, although rush hourtravel is rather slow and not very comfortable.

What is less certain is how much Transmilenio has so far helped the poor. Thisis a vital issue both because the poor constitute a majority of the citys popula-

tion and because construction of the system is highly subsidized. Currently,while the poor make up the bulk of the passengers, it is middle-income passen-gers who use the system most intensively. The explanation for this is simple:Transmilenios current routes do not reach large areas of poor settlement and thefares charged are more expensive than those on the traditional system. Althoughfuture corridors will cover a much broader socio-economic cross-section of thecity, the next phase of expansion does not give priority to routes that passthrough poor areas, particularly the route along Calle 26.64 With respect to fares,nothing much can be done until some of the unfair competition is removed. Inorder to do this, a political deal has to be struck with the small-scale owners and

drivers.For the first time, major questions are being asked about the future develop-ment of Transmilenio. Negotiations over the next two corridors are under way

but the newly elected mayor is more interested in building a metro than inextending Transmilenio. His preference is influenced by the fact that Transmile-nios image is now more than a little tarnished. This is partly because the spec-tacular early success of the system raised expectations and attracted largenumbers of passengers. This combination put pressure on the system, bothphysically and psychologically. Too many people started to use some routes andwhen people have to wait to get on to a crowded articulated bus, it increasestheir journey time. The image of Transmilenio was also damaged by the some-what problematic start of the new Phase II routes and the delays and confusionthat ensued. Recent fare rises have also hit peoples pockets, and many peoplehave continued to use the traditional bus system, particularly when a cheapertraditional bus provides a direct journey route to their destination.65Transmile-nios image has also been damaged by the rising incidence of petty crime on the

buses. If you are likely to be robbed then you choose another kind of way to getto work or to the shops.

But the essential difficulties facing Transmilenio have less to do with the designand operation of the system and much more to do with the deep seated issue ofpower in the city. Perhaps the critical problem is the difficulty that a mayor faces

in curbing the power of the transport lobby. The authorities recognize that thereare far too many old buses on the streets and have been trying to get many ofthem scrapped. However, certain traditional bus owners have countered byrunning large numbers of illegal buses and by failing to pass on the funds whichthey collect through the fare box for the purpose of compensating the owners ofscrapped buses. In response, the mayor recently refused to approve a fare hike forthese old buses although he soon did so. Currently, there are still far too manytraditional buses in operation.

Because of the unfair competition, Transmilenio is not carrying as manypassengers as the current number of articulated buses can handle. Buses have

remained in the garages and given that costs have increased and passengernumbers have not, the fares on Transmilenio have risen. If nothing is done tocontrol the illegal buses and to accelerate the scrapping programme, Transmileniomay face a dangerous downward circleit will fail to attract more passengers


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from the cheaper traditional system, will have to raise fares again to maintain thesystems revenue stream, which will lead to further stagnation in passengernumbers.

A second problem is also linked to the demands of the transport lobby.Transmilenio was intended to transform the whole structure of the bus system.

A new operating approach was needed together with a new kind of operatingcompany. But, in order to persuade the traditional bus owners to amalgamate andform new companies, arguably too much was offered in the way of incentives,particularly in Phase I when the profits proved to be greater than had been antici-pated. A modern private system should deliver profits to the operators but goodregulation should ensure that the profits are not excessive. It is true that the

bidding process is both competitive and transparent but that does not necessarilykeep profits within reasonable bounds.

Third, Transmilenio is widely praised because it runs without an operatingsubsidy. And, while that is largely true, a great deal of public money goes into

providing the infrastructure. Unfortunately, much of the cost of building thecorridors goes into providing space for private cars, taxis and traditional buses.If public policy could reduce the numbers of private vehicles operating onBogots streets, the infrastructure cost could be cut and the number of passen-gers would rise. This is critically important insofar as the recent campaign formayor focussed so much on the relative costs of building Transmilenio and ametro.

For all of its undoubted virtues, Transmilenio alone cannot resolve all of thecitys transport problems. Complementary changes have to be made in the rest ofthe sector ifTransmilenio is to function properly. It cannot compete with the tradi-tional bus system if it is subject to unfair competition from illegal buses. Nor can itdo anything to reduce traffic congestion when the number of cars, taxis and busesis allowed to expand as rapidly as at present.66 Despite faster journey speedsalong Transmilenio corridors, average journey speeds across the city are notimproving and air pollution is equally problematic. While emissions are loweralong Transmilenio routes, a recent survey by the World Bank concluded thatBogot was the third most polluted city in Latin America and that traffic caused78% of the pollution (El Tiempo, 26/11/2005).67

The essential problem is that the power of the transport lobby seems to havesurvived the surgery attempted by Transmilenio. There are still far too manyinstances of policies being undermined by legalistic tricks, by dubious decisions

of the Ministry of Transport, or by suspicious cases of poor local administration.The failure to control the growth of taxis and buses, the continued corruptionand/or incompetence of the citys traffic department, the power of the buscompanies and their relationship with the government (and particularly theCouncil), the bus and taxi lobbies ability to declare strikes, and the influence ofmajor commercial interests to undermine really effective urban planning are allconspiring to undermine ordinary peoples lives.

Earlier, I argued that transport in Bogot in the 1980s was a mirror image of thecity. Today, that would be less than fair because Transmilenio and several otherinnovative measures like Pico y Placa and the introduction of an extensive

network of bicycle lanes have changed the picture. Compared with the transportsituation in many other major Latin American cities, Bogot has done well andunlike the situation in terms of employment, health or even justice, transportmanagement is ahead of the game. Unfortunately, because of the expanding


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460 A. Gilbert

number of private cars and the continued power and influence of the transportlobby, progress is being delayed and future change threatened.

Transmileniomay be a minor miracle but Bogots transport problems need some-thing more than that. Perhaps this is the main lesson that other cities planning toinvest in busways should learn. BRT systems are far superior to traditional bus

systems and much cheaper than metros. Transmilenio-type systems really can workand should be encouraged. But unless parallel changes are made to the rest of thetransport sector, real progress will be slowed and, in the worst-case scenario, vestedinterests may actually undermine the viability of a new BRT system. Currently,Transmilenios image in Bogot has been so tarnished that its future expansion is ingenuine doubt. Much will depend on how Samuel Moreno, the winning mayoralcandidate, follows through with his campaign promise to build a metro. But, evenif he does proceed with this plan, he will still have to tackle the real political barriershampering Transmilenios future success and preventing any real solution to theserious transport problems facing Bogot.

Notes

1. UN-Habitat (2001) estimates that around 40% of all trips to and from work in low- and middle-income countries are by bus. In Delhi, buses cater for half of all passenger travel (Tiwari, 2002,p. 99) and in Santiago and Bogot most motorized trips are made by bus (Vasconcellos, 2001).

2. According to Perry (2000, p. 397): While a pedestrian needs 1.5 square metres to stand and 3 squaremetres to walk, a car requires on average 91 square metres standing, taking into account all thepassageways necessary for access to parking spaces, and 914 square metres while moving at 48 kph.

3. World Bank (2002, p. 113) suggests BRT systems can carry up to 35 000 passengers an houralthough Hidalgo et al. (2007, p. 11) cites figures from Bogot claiming that the Caracas corridorcarries 45 000 passengers per hour. The head ofTransmilenio recently claimed that the maximum

carried was 42 000 per hour (El Tiempo, 3/2/2007).4. Debate relates to the routes, particularly those along Carrera Sptima and Calle 26, about whether

Mayor Garzn should have postponed the decision on Carrera Sptima and whether the cityshould really be building a metro.

5. A significant issue insofar as Enrique Pealosa, the former mayor who introduced the system, wasa leading candidate. The election took place on 28 October 2007, and Samuel Moreno beatPealosa by a wide margin. He will take office on 1 January 2008.

6. Particular thanks are due to the Leverhulme Trust, which financed the project, to Mara TeresaGarcs who ran the local team in Bogot and to the people who were willing to discuss transportmatters with me in Bogot including: the current mayor, Luis Eduardo Garzn, and ex-MayorsPaul Bromberg, Antanas Mockus and Enrique Pealosa; planning and transport specialists ArturoArdila, Mario Noriega, and Ricardo Montezuma; but operators Estban Gmez, Gustavo Gmez,

Milena Martinez, Victor Ral Martnez and Andrs Ortiz; and Astrid Martnez and AnglicaCastro and their staffs at Transmilenio S.A.. The paper also benefited from help and additionalcomments from Ana Mara Angel Garcs and three anonymous referees.

7. Several questions were modified in the 2005 survey.8. Using the local press is justified in the sense that it is frequently reporting information that has been

derived from local experts or from Transmilenio itself. And, when it is reporting criticisms of thesystem, it is a perfectly reasonable measure of the frequency and strength of local opinion. In anycase, several different press sources have been used and wherever possible every statement madein the press has been checked against other sources. It should also be noted that while Transmileniowas an important issue in the 2007 campaign for mayor, debates about the system have alwaysfigured prominently in newspaper coverage of the city.

9. Presentations by Enrique Pealosa and Samuel Moreno at Club El Nogal on 27 August and

10 September 2007, respectively, presentations on mobility in the city by five mayoral candidatesat the University of Rosario on 4 September 2007, and a television debate on 29 September 2007.10. It remains an independent agency but since January 2007 reports to the new Secretariat of Mobility.

Arguably this gives it less direct access to the Mayor.11. During strikes the system has carried up to 1.6 million passengers in a day.


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12. McCormick (2005) claimed that Lima, Mexico City, Quito, Panama City had projects underway andBeijing, Dakar, Delhi, Djakarta, Johannesburg and Cape Town were showing strong signs of interest.

13. Bogots long history of running its own bus or tram company did not provide much in the wayof improvement. The last of a series of public companies, EDTU, was established in 1959, partlyas a means of avoiding total paralysis in the event of a strike organized by 36 private operators(Rodriguez and Nuez, 2003, p. 258). At its peak, in the 1960s, it carried around one-tenth of the

citys bus passengers. Gradually, the private sector began to operate more routes and EDTUpassengers fell dramatically. In 1989, the company was carrying only 4.4 million passengers ayear, ten times that number when compared with a decade earlier. In 1990, it was operating only5 of the citys 430 routes and its fares covered only three and a half months of the annual salarybill (Caicedo, 1992, p. 223). The company was described by Mayor Prieto Ocampo, in 1996, asshowing all the ills bought about by mistaken and improvised management (Prieto Ocampo,1976, p. 36).

14. For examples of the difficulties faced by the drivers, see Perea (2002).15. The average passenger in the middle 1990s was spending 123 minutes each day on the bus (JICA

et al., 1996).16. The transport secretariat has been reorganized many times over the years, most recently in

January 2007.17. Mentioned by Paul Bromberg during interview.18. Like others I was given a copy of the article during my first interview with him.19. Seemingly he was still talking about the contract 100 days into his period of office (La Rebeca,

1998).20. In recent debates with the pro-metro candidate, Samuel Moreno, Enrique Pealosa has repeated

that he had little choice but to build Transmilenio, given the new presidents reluctance to approvespending on a metro. It is important to note that both Pealosa and Andrs Pastrana took office ata time of increasing economic recession.

21. Crdenas (2005, p. 191) offers a different explanation: The economic technocracy of the nationalgovernment ruled out the metro and opted for Transmilenio because it was the only fiscally feasi-ble alternative. In fact, the national government actually chose the TM solution while the cityadministration was still considering the metro as an option.

22. Even in Caracas, only 15% of passengers are carried on the metro and in Medelln a BRT system is

being constructed to complement the metro.23. Even if some rat runs have developed along nearby streets and some of the bridges, that were

built to provide pedestrians with safe routes to and across Transmilenio, are extremely ugly.24. And, in the light of the chaos associated with the opening ofTransSantiago, it operates spectacu-

larly well.25. They are actually more like a tile because they are made of cement but to English speakers the tile

tends to be used for roofs and walls rather than for roads and paving stones for pavements orsidewalks.

26. Some claim that these protests were organized by the bus companies, i.e. the drivers beingdisplaced by the system or even by the FARC guerrillas.

27. The articulated buses are 17.5 metres long and 2.6 metres wide. Reducing that length by 3 metresto allow for the driver and entrances, this gives a theoretical average amount of space of

0.24 square metres per passenger if the bus is carrying a full complement of 160 passengers. Infact, the space available to the 112 standing passengers will be less than that because the seatstake up proportionately more room. Similar length bendy buses in London have a maximumcapacity of 140 passengers and one consulting company suggests that it is undesirable for stand-ing passengers to have less than 0.55 square metres of space (http://www.crowddynamics.com/Egress/Overcrowding%20on%20public%20transport.htm). According to Martinez and Jimeno(2007, p. 189) an ideal measure is more than 0.4 square metres per person, a normal measure isbetween 0.2 and 0.4, and below 0.2 is bad. But it is not just overcrowding on the Transmileniobuses that is a problem. During rush hours, queues are sometimes formed to enter the stationsand there is frequent crowding on the stations themselves.

28. The element of danger was emphasized after two bombs were placed on the feeder system in2004.

29. No doubt much of the criticism was associated with the 2007 mayoral campaign; Juan Carlos Floreswas one of the candidates. As noted above a new Secretariat of Mobility began operating in 2007.30. Every director of a government agency that I have consulted, including the current mayor himself,

attests to taking these surveys very seriously indeed. The heads celebrate news of good ratingsand worry about bad results.


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462 A. Gilbert

31. At the top came the Botanic Gardens with an approval rating of 97%; at the bottom, the Defenderof Public Space with 50%.

32. Martnez and Jimeno (2007: 158) note that: During Phase II, bidding requirements demanded thatat least 10% of the concessionary companys property be in the hands of transporters owning atleast two buses.

33. A recent interviewee told me that several big investors bought share in the Phase I operators but

this ceased in Phase II because of the lower profits.34. Garzn was accused of receiving around US$100,000 million of campaign finance from a well-

known transport operator, Carlos Delgado, who is based in the neighbouring municipality ofSoacha. The mayor said that the money was a loan to finance the campaign, not a gift, and returnedthe money but the news did take a little of the gloss off his image of political independence. Mostimportantly, it exemplified how the bus companies attempt to influence the authorities.

35. Ciudad Mvil SA has very few shareholders but its feeder company Conexin Mvil has 780 smallowners who own 15% of the company. The latter helped them obtain the credit to buy theirshares.

36. Although one of the referees believes that this is an irrelevant issue and that the only importantissue is whether the system is well run. While the question of efficiency is critical, some concessionto the former drivers and owners ought to be made in Bogot for both social and political reasons.It is difficult to ignore the poverty of many of the former drivers, and Transmilenio will have diffi-culty in operating effectively if it is being opposed by such a powerful lobby as the transporters.Wider participation in the ownership of the Transmilenio companies represents one way, but notthe only way, of addressing these problems.

37. Incidentally, some drivers of the old buses are recruited by the operating companies either asdrivers or as cleaners or mechanics. However, one operator is extremely reluctant to use them asdrivers.

38. Although it was in surplus in 2006 and should break even now that its share of the receipts hasrisen from 3% to its current level of 6.95% (data from Transmilenio SA).

39. All bus companies were buying diesel from Ecopetrol in August 2005 at 4000 pesos (cUS$1.72) pergallon compared with the international price of US$2.3. Decree 2988 of 2003 ordered the phasingout of that subsidy from 1 January 2005. It is important to note however that all consumers ofdiesel benefit from this subsidy not just the bus companies.

40. The original estimate for building 25 corridors was U$2.94 billion, of which US$1.97 billion wouldbe for infrastructure (CONPES, 2000, p. 4); a total cost of US$7.57 million per kilometre at 2000prices for the whole 387.9 kilometre system or US$5.08 million per kilometre for the infrastructurealone (Table 3). Hidalgo (2007, p. 15) estimates the combined infrastructure and equipmentcosts at US$8.2 million per kilometre. Martnez and Jimeno (2007, p. 156) cite an estimate made byJorge Acevedo that infrastructure costs during Phase I were US$7 million per km and reachedUS$25 million during Phase II. The internal rate of return calculated for the metro and forTransmilenio was extremely favourable to Transmilenio: 61% calculated by UNECLAC (Gmez,2004, p. 101) compared with 15.8% for the metro (calculated by CONPES and cited in Ardila-Gmez, 2004, p. 316). Even the World Bank does not seem to have calculated the full subsidy,although it did calculate the internal return on the investment, which again proved much higherthan that on a metro. Nevertheless, the construction subsidy is certainly not insignificant. An early

estimate of the cost of building 24 bus lanes across the whole city was US$2.387 billion, about thesame as building a single metro line. This does not cover the cost of the road space dedicated to thebus lanes. Later estimates of the infrastructure cost of the first three bus routes lanes, 41 kilometresin length, was US$213 million. This included about US$80 million for the rehabilitation ofthe mixed traffic lanes adjacent to the busways but not US$38.8 million for property takings.Including them, the total cost of the civil works is approximately US$254 million (Ardila-Gmez,2004, pp. 368369).

41. In September 2007, Enrique Pealosa was claiming that Transmilenio cost US$5 million a kilometrewhile Samuel Moreno was claiming US$20 million. According to the former, a metro would costUS$100 million a kilometre, and the latter, a maximum of US$50 million (El Tiempo, 5/9/2007). InJanuary, 2007, the Minister for Transport claimed tha

Documents

Gilbert, Alan(2008) 'Bus Rapid Transit