Ghettoization, Negatively Impacted Livelihoods, and Service and Maintenance Shortfalls

Following Upon the Relocation and Rehabilitation of Railway Slum Dwellers Under

the Mumbai Urban Transport Project

A Report Submitted to the Society for the Preservation of Area Resource Centers (SPARC)

By

Development Planning Unit, University College London

Haidong Chen, Lu Feng, Jie Li, Eve Leonard, Karen Magnuson, Marylyn Mavaza, Giulia Mininni, Suchitra Muangnil,

Anna Walnycki, and Tom Wolf

June 1, 2007

1

PREFACE

The DPU Railways Group would like to express its sincerest thanks to all those who have

supported our work in both London and Mumbai: Nigel Harris, David Satterthwaite, and

Homeless International for enriching our understanding of Mumbai and the methods

necessary to approach it; Sundar Burra and the staff of SPARC for providing guidance,

meals, and meeting space throughout the duration of our time in Mumbai; Sharmilla,

Neha, and Jina for arranging our field interviews and providing their invaluable

interpretative skills; the staff of the Sahil Hotel, Mumbai; Caren Levy, Eleni Kyrou, Chris

Jasko, and Michael Safier for valuable feedback on our work; and our fellow students in

UDP and ESD, as well as the whole DPU master�s cohort, for their contributions to our

work throughout the year. Last, but surely not least, our thanks go to Pascale Hofmann

who directed us throughout the process.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

List of Abbreviations������������������������ 3

Executive Summary������������������������. 4

Background����������������������������.. 5

Methodology���������������������������� 7

Findings������������������������������. 9

Positive Impacts����������������������. 10

Negative Impacts����������������������. 10

Ghettoization��������������������� 10

Negatively Impacted Livelihoods�����������. 12

Service and Maintenance Shortfalls���������.. 13

Strategies����������������������������� 15

Immediate Strategic Proposals���������������. 15

Long-term Strategic Vision����������������� 20

Conclusion����������������������������. 22

References����������������������������. 24 APPENDICES I. Preemptive Organization��������������������.

27

II. List of Criteria������������������������� 29

III. Schedule of Meetings, Presentations, and Interviews

Conducted�������������������������.. 31

IV. Transect Walk������������������������� 34

V. Maps������������������������������ 35

VI. Findings Chart������������������������.. 36

VII. Interviews with Mr. Sundar Burra��������������.. 37

VIII. Interviews with Mr. Joshi������������������. 42

IX. The Web of Institutionalisation���������������� 45

X. Monitoring and Impact Assessment Indicator Chart�����.. 46

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XI. Interview Transcripts������������� (separate booklet) List of Abbreviations

CBO Community-based organization

FSI Floor Space Index

GoM Government of Maharashtra

IHSDP Integrated Housing and Slum Development Programme

IR Indian Rail

LIG Lower Income Groups

MCGM Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai

MHADA Maharashtra Housing and Area Development Authority

MIG Middle Income Groups

MM Mahila Milan

MMR Mumbai Metropolitan Region

MMRDA Mumbai Metropolitan Regional Development Authority

MUTP Mumbai Urban Transport Project

NGO Non-governmental Organization

NSDF National Slum Dwellers Federation

PAH Project Affected Households

PAP Project Affected Persons

R&R Resettlement and Rehabilitation

RSDF Railway Slum Dwellers Federation

RSDs Railway Slum Dwellers

SRA Slum Rehabilitation Authority

SPARC Society for the Promotion of Area Resource Centers

TDR Transferable Development Right

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Ghettoization, Negatively Impacted Livelihoods, and Service and Maintenance Shortfalls Following Upon the Relocation and Rehabilitation of Railway Slum Dwellers under the

Mumbai Urban Transport Project

Since its inception in 2002, the Mumbai Urban Transport Project (MUTP) has

seen the transfer of roughly 20,000 households from central-city railway slums to transit

camps and permanent settlements in northern Mumbai. As phase one of MUTP

approaches its projected 2009 close, a ten-person team from the University College

London�s Development Planning Unit (DPU) has convened to analyze the rehabilitation

and relocation (R&R) of these project affected railway slum households. The following

report fulfils a commission by SPARC, an NGO centrally involved in R&R under MUTP.

The Alliance has requested that the team explore the impact of R&R on the livelihoods of

railway slum dwellers (RSDs), identify the strengths and weaknesses of the strategies

pursued by actors involved in R&R, and present strategic proposals to enhance the

transformative potential of R&R. In order to complete the requested analysis, the DPU

team was asked to develop a definition of �transformation� that could be used to examine

the processes and outcomes of R&R, as well as the power relations impacting upon R&R.

Guided by this definition and its associated criteria, the team undertook a four-

month research program. The first stage of this program, extending from January to April,

included secondary source and gray material research, as well as a number of panels with

development experts. For the second stage, the team traveled to Mumbai, where it

interviewed prominent stakeholders, including policymakers, NGO and CBO

representatives, and bank representatives. These interviews complemented a series of

visits to the northern reaches of Mumbai, where the team undertook focus groups and

conversations with the residents of Transit Camp 138-B, Mankhurd, and Lallobhai.

As the team�s findings suggest, R&R has secured many improvements for RSDs.

As a result of R&R, former RSDs have secured legal tenure, moved into more

structurally sound homes, improved their self-esteem, and enhanced their self-governance

capacities. Moreover, key stakeholders have revealed an increased appreciation for the

value of R&R. Nevertheless, the team concludes that the R&R process, as undertaken

5

under MUTP, has not succeeded overall in securing transformation. R&R has contributed

to ghettoization of RSDs (spatial, social, and economic isolation from outside

communities), negatively impacted livelihoods of relocated individuals, and failed to

address maintenance and service shortfalls in resettlement and transit sites. Further, R&R

will continue to fall short of transformation if its future iterations are not adjusted to

respond to complications arising from R&R�s interaction with overarching city, regional,

and national circumstances. In the short-term, measures can be undertaken to improve

conditions in existing permanent and transit settlements. To this end, the team

recommends immediate initiation of market research for the establishment of business

cooperatives, along with household budget management training for RSDs and

participatory monitoring and evaluation of maintenance and services in the permanent

and transit settlements. Over the long-term, R&R should be integrated into a strategic

vision for Mumbai that emphasizes mixed-income and mixed-use housing above the

single-income housing projects that are currently linked to railway R&R.

BACKGROUND

The Mumbai Urban Transport Project (MUTP)

Indian Rail (IR) and the Government of Maharashtra (GoM) initiated the Mumbai

Urban Transport Project (MUTP) in 2002 to address long-standing complications with

Mumbai�s railway system. After decades of overuse and underinvestment in tracks and

trains, rail service quality had declined dramatically. The presence of roughly 24,000

households who had settled into slum housing along both sides of the tracks further

contributed to efficiency losses. To ensure the safety of these railway slum dwellers

(RSDs), the Commissioner of Railway Safety ruled that trains had to travel at 15 km/h, as

opposed to the normal 40 km/h; this decrease in speed was estimated to have reduced the

productivity of Mumbai by up to 40 percent (Burra, 1999). As a comprehensive response

to these various impacts upon rail efficiency, MUTP not only sought railway-, road-, and

pedestrian-oriented infrastructure upgrades (MMRDA, n.p.), but also sought the removal

of slum settlements impeding traffic.

6

The estimated cost for MUTP was US $943 million, with the World Bank

supplying a loan for US $542 million toward the project (57 percent of the total cost).

Given the size of its loan, the Bank was able to exert strong controls over the consortium

of organisations responsible for implementing the project, which included GoM, IR, and

MMRDA, the Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai (MCGM), and Bombay

Electric Supply and Transport Undertaking (BEST). To its substantial loan, the World

Bank attached two mandates. First, the Bank required Indian Rail to transfer control over

the Mumbai urban rail system to a specially created subsidiary, the Mumbai Rail Vikas

Corporation (MRVC), in preparation for a separation of the existing rail network into

distinct national and urban lines. Second, the Bank required GoM to resettle all

households affected by MUTP, regardless of the year in which they had settled along the

railway. This was in contrast to the terms of the Slum Rehabilitation Act, which

mandated resettlement only for RSDs who had resided in given slum prior to January 1,

1995. Initially, MUTP was expected to affect 14,479 families; this number grew to

18,000 (in 1995), reaching 20,000 by 2007 (MMRDA, n.p.; SPARC Annual Report 2005,

pp.22; World Bank, 2007, p. 3).

Rehabilitation and Relocation (R&R)

GoM assigned the sole-source contract for relocating and rehabilitating RSDs, to

the Society for the Preservation of Area Resource Centers (SPARC), a Mumbai-based

NGO. To complete its R&R assignment, SPARC coordinated with two CBOs, the

Railway Slum Dwellers Federation (RSDF) and Mahila Milan (MM). RSDF is a wing of

the National Slum Dwellers Federation, a national network of community-based

organisations (CBOs). The groups that make up NSDF are organised in a �federal

model,� according to the ownership of the land which slum dwellers occupy. In keeping

with this federal method of organizing, RSDF was formed to facilitate negotiation

between RSDs and IR. MM, meanwhile, is a women�s savings cooperative and social

capital building CBO, which has long worked closely with RSDF to enhance the

organization and coherence of slum communities. Over the course of the 1980s, RSDF,

with the help of SPARC, began to survey, map, and organize railway slum communities.

7

Following the announcement of MUTP, SPARC used this body of data to convince GoM

of the feasibility of a community-led enumeration and R&R process. While much of the

work of preparing families for relocation has been undertaken by RSDF and MM,

SPARC has facilitated this process throughout, coordinating their activities, lending

technical expertise, and cultivating negotiating relationships with government agencies

(ibid.) (Patel and Mitlin, 2004).

Through R&R, RSDs have been relocated from their dangerous railway slums to

a series of transit camps and permanent settlements scattered throughout the north of

Mumbai. While, currently, three transit camps are still in operation, the majority of RSDs

have been successfully relocated to permanent housing. SPARC continues to provide

post-resettlement support to both transit and permanent settlements (extending beyond its

contract with GoM) which include, among other things, water to transit camps

experiencing shortages.

METHODOLOGY

TERMS OF REFERENCE. With MUTP nearing its close and its follow-up rail

project, MUTP-II, about to begin, the Alliance requested that the DPU team undertake an

analysis of the R&R process. The terms of reference presented to the team requested a

report that would explore the impact of R&R on the livelihoods of RSDs, identifying the

strengths and weaknesses of the strategies pursued by actors involved in R&R and

presenting strategic proposals to enhance the transformative potential of R&R.

DEFINING TRANSFORMATION. The team first had to define the concept of

transformation that would frame its analysis of R&R. The team collaborated to define

transformation as such:

This definition implies that transformation is fundamentally oriented to improving

not only the material quality of life, but also the structures of power and systems of social

interaction that shape lives (�conditions of life�). Subsequently, transformation should be

�The process of enhancing existing conditions of life in a just and sustainableway for railway slum dwellers�.

8

a process of holistic changes in material, social/interpersonal, and institutional relations

in pursuit of sustainable transformation goals. �Sustainability,� in turn, implies that

transformation must address the five dimensions of life (physical, environmental,

economic, social and political) in way that supports their linkages, and in a way that will

be effective over the long-term. Similarly, transformation pursues problem-solution rather

than problem-displacement (shifting a given problem from one location to another),

which involves not only solving existing problems, but also, ideally, dealing with existing

problems in ways that do not create new problems.

CRITERIA. From this definition of transformation, the team developed its criteria for

analysis. The criteria presented below reflect a two-fold rationale: first, the team sought

criteria that described the conditions on the ground that required change and could be

altered by R&R; and second, the team sought to outline factors that would have to be in

place for the new settlements to survive over the long-term. The criteria included

enhanced security of tenure, improved access to basic services, protected employability,

cushioned increases in cost of living, enhanced participation in all aspects of relocation,

social and spatial inclusion, and altered perceptions of RSDs and R&R on behalf of all

stakeholders (including the slum dwellers themselves).1 These criteria are both

quantitative and qualitative. Additionally, they are directed toward determining both the

material outcomes of R&R and the important social and psychological dimensions that

impact on RSDs� quality of life (in transit camps and permanent settlements) and the

interactions between stakeholders.

METHODS. In order to make an all-encompassing analysis of the case, the team

consulted the broadest range of information available. The team undertook a literature

review of secondary and grey material and attended lectures to obtain primary

information from development specialists.2 The team shared information and ideas

through regular group meetings and preliminary presentations. After several months of

preparatory research, the team undertook fieldwork in Mumbai. There, the team not only

1 See Appendix II for a full list of criteria with definitions 2 Grey material = non-refereed literature provided by actors (such as reports)

9

attended specialist lectures, but also undertook semi-structured, informal interviews and

�question and answer� sessions with relevant actors from the NGO, CBO, governmental,

media, and financial sectors.3 Complementing this work, the team conducted community

research in the transit and permanent housing; 7 interviews in the permanent and 4 in the

transit, where the team collected qualitative and quantitative data.4 While in the field, the

team undertook a transect walk,5 and two focus groups with 25 women each, and a

children�s group separately.6

LIMITATIONS. Despite the team�s efforts to compile as wide a range of literature on

Mumbai as possible, the preliminary research period was limited to four months. Once in

Mumbai, the team�s time on the ground was short. The resulting sample is not

representative of the community as a whole; furthermore, the team�s strategic proposals

are based on preliminary impressions. As none of the team spoke Hindi or any local

dialects, the team relied on our translators for community interviews; some information

was inevitably lost in translation. Those same translators arranged the team�s interviews,

so there was a potential for source bias. Meanwhile, despite their importance to this

project, not all stakeholders were available to be interviewed and to field the team�s

strategy suggestions, resulting in some gaps of information. Finally, by the time of the

team�s arrival in Mumbai, all those railway slum-dwellers affected by MUTP had been

moved off the tracks; thus, in order to reconstruct life on the tracks, the team had to rely

on secondary information and people�s recollections.

FINDINGS

Railway communities have been moved to several different sites built at different

points during the MUTP project. These sites include Majas, Anik, Antop Hill, Asgaonkar,

Kanjur Marg, Ghatkopar, Wadala, and Nahur (World Bank, 2007, p. 18). In order to get a

varied understanding of the relocation process, the team undertook research at Transit

3 See Appendix III 4 See Appendix III 5 See Appendix IV for a detailed explanation of transect walk 6 See Appendix IX

10

Camp 138-B and at two permanent housing sites. All of the sites studied are located in

Mumbai�s Eastern Ward.7 The first permanent settlement, Mankhurd, was built seven

years ago as one of the initial sites of relocation. The second, Lallobhai, was built two

years ago, and is an example of more recent housing that has been adapted in light of

issues that affected previous resettlement projects.

POSITIVE IMPACTS

Across the three sites it is possible to identify several positive impacts of

relocation. Above all, security of tenure has been achieved for a population of slum

dwellers who were vulnerable to forced evictions. Along with more secure housing,

relocated RSDs have moved into more structurally sound homes. The relocation has also

removed the danger of living alongside and crossing the tracks for families, while

providing a safer, improved public space than was found along the tracks. Throughout the

interviews, the team observed how women in particular had an increased sense of self-

worth, took pride in their new homes, felt they were more respected by men, and received

better offers of marriage. Finally, the participation of RSDs that had started along the

tracks8 has continued with the formulation of co-operative societies for each building

dealing with issues of maintenance and service provision.9

NEGATIVE IMPACTS

Despite these evident, and considerable, positive changes, R&R has produced

three significant negative effects, which are as follows: ghettoization; negatively

impacted livelihoods (manifested in debt and job loss); and maintenance and service

shortfalls. Each of these impacts shall be explained and analyzed in turn.

GHETTOISATION. By placing large groups of low-income RSDs in single-income

settlements on the periphery of the city, R&R under MUTP has created a large population

7 Appendix V 8 Appendix VI 9 Appendix VI

11

that is spatially, socially, and economically isolated from the life of Mumbai. In other

words, the relocated RSDs have been �ghettoized.� In this position, the relocated

households are isolated from amenities and basic services; for instance, schools and

hospitals are located between 30 minutes and an hour away.

The isolation of RSDs in single-income settlements must be seen as a product of

many interlocking factors. Most immediately, the policy and planning dimensions of

R&R interact with existing resource bases to promote ghettoization. The land occupied

by RSDs has been defined as unavailable for in situ upgrading (Burra, 2001). Moreover,

land pressure is highest at those points where settlements have spilled onto the railways.

Under these circumstances, RSDs inevitably are relocated much further away from their

original homes.

Once RSDs have been �picked-up� from the rails, the interaction between policy

and resources further complicates creating new, permanent settlements. Mumbai

currently lacks a comprehensive urban planning system. This, combined with harsh rent

controls, rapid population growth, and geographic obstacles to eastward, westward, and

southward expansion, has led Mumbai to extend haphazardly northward, resulting in land

shortages while promoting real estate speculation (Das, 1980, p. 105; Grant and Nijman,

2002, pp. 327 � 338; Mitlin, 2003, p. 183; Ruet, 2005, pp. 65, 74; Vira & Vira, 2005, p.

29).

Mumbai�s politicians, meanwhile, have long supported rent control in order to

attract votes from the cities poorest. Similarly, politicians typically resist community-led

upgrading schemes, which make slum dwellers more self-sufficient and less susceptible

to patronage (Mitlin, 2003). Instead, politicians support the SRA, given the popularity of

free housing among slum dwellers. Mainstreamed support for free, single-income

housing has blocked MMRDA from taking advantage of existing government funds for

mixed-income housing.10

Despite these issues, several levers for change exist. First, various tiers of Indian

10 For its part, the Alliance�s �federal� method of organizing railway communities predisposes

railway slum dwellers to relocation. Under this method, railway communities are organized as groups distinct from other slum dwelling groups, reflecting the different land owners with whom railway slum dwellers must negotiate. Nevertheless, by organizing railway dwellers federally, instead of geographically, the Alliance effectively creates �placeless� communities defined more by their internal social networks than by their tie to a specific place.

12

government have traditionally been receptive to solutions that improve efficiency and

appeal to voters. Second, various funds for community-led development (such as CLIFF),

mixed-income development (NSDP, IAY), and private development (TDRs) are

available. Finally, RSDs, through cooperation with the Alliance, have developed self-

governance mechanisms, negotiating capacities, and savings schemes that could be used

for community-led projects.

NEGATIVELY IMPACTED LIVELIHOODS. The impact of the relocation has

been difficult for many households to manage. Throughout Mankhurd, Lallobhai, and

Transit Camp 138-B, relocated RSDs reported debt and job loss. Diagnosing these

incidences of negatively impacted livelihoods requires a slight separation between these

two concerns. Ultimately, however, incidences of debt and job loss should be seen as

interlocked problems arising from a combination of factors both internal and external to

the relocated populations.

At the most basic level, incidents of debt can be attributed to characteristics of the

relocated populations. Relocated RSDs generally stand on the razor�s edge of poverty;

any slight increase in the cost of living endangers their household finances. Many

families incurred debt from these increased costs of living.11 Nevertheless, while poverty

does contribute to debt, it is not the sole cause. Increased expenses have combined with a

lack of clarity among resettled people regarding the basic functioning of the respective

sites� maintenance funds, the benefits of maintaining a high balance in those funds, and

the agents responsible for administering those funds. Crucially, MM should be engaging

in such capacity building as part of its normal savings activities. This might in fact be the

case; evidence from the field, however, suggests that MM is either not performing such

tasks, or that they have been performed inadequately.

Debt arises not only from increased expenditures, but also from decreased

income. Ghettoization has created �closed� or �constricted� economies. Whereas low-

income RSDs could transact with commuters of higher economic classes, business people

relocated to the permanent settlements would interact with a uniformly lower-class

clientele with less expendable income. Potential for employment and business growth is

11 See Appendix X

13

limited in this context.

The Alliance�s ability and/or willingness to promote income-generation schemes

and provide direct financial support to relocated peoples are limited. As SPARC

representatives have noted, MM routinely grants loans to indebted people under

extremely generous terms.12 Even so, interviews with relocated RSDs suggested a

reluctance to draw upon MM funds, thereby constricting the effectiveness of MM as a

safety net for relocated people. Meanwhile, while MM will routinely provide funds for

individual income-generating activities, it does not envision itself as a funder of

community-wide income-generation schemes.

Despite these constraints, several strong opportunities exist. First and most

fundamental, relocated people have experience with savings schemes, and MM supports

savings collection and education. Second, with developments in community organization

and microfinance, banks have become more open to lending to self-help groups. Third,

despite the Alliance�s lack of a livelihoods scheme, other NGOs exist that are dedicated

specifically to nurturing small enterprises in developing economies. Finally, as the World

Bank has noted, the Government of Maharashtra has recently recognized the importance

of a livelihoods component to complement the basic R&R process pursued under MUTP.

SERVICE AND MAINTENANCE SHORTFALLS. In both Mankhurd and Transit

Camp 138-B, the supply of piped water was severely limited. Whereas the residents of

Mankhurd received piped water twenty-four hours a day when first arriving in the

settlement, water is now available for roughly fifteen minutes a day. The problem is even

more dire in the camp, where residents are dependent upon twice-weekly tanker

deliveries for domestic water needs, and informal water sellers for daily drinking water.

As we noted on our visit to Mankhurd, certain basic services, such as street lighting, road

maintenance, water provision, and garbage collection and disposal, were either wholly

lacking or inadequately executed.13 For instance, a first floor toilet in Building 98

overflowed on a daily basis, shutting off one of the building�s two entrances and making

the toilets more or less unusable; meanwhile, garbage from the site had been dumped in

12 So generous, that failure to repay a first loan does not impact households� eligibility for

additional loans. See Appendix VII 13 See Appendix VI

14

an adjoining river and drainage ditch. Mankhurd, as a result, was effectively surrounded

by an open-air dump.

Formally speaking, MCGM and the societies are meant to split maintenance

responsibilities, with the societies taking care of matters internal to the buildings and their

immediately surrounding plot of land (among their responsibilities include lifts, water

pumps, and security), with MCGM taking-up public services and spaces (such as roads,

drainage, sewerage, electricity, lighting, and solid waste removal).14 The existing

�compartmentalised� maintenance system, however, appears to have decayed,

particularly in Mankhurd. In attempting to restore service and maintenance capacities, an

intervention must address, both macro-level dynamics of resource-sharing and planning,

and residents� compromised ability to fund, monitor, and control maintenance and service

provision.

Several overarching circumstances constrain MCGM�s ability to deliver services

and maintenance. Throughout India, municipal actors are heavily dependent upon state

and national tax revenues, the majority of which are retained at the highest level of the

government (Vira & Vira, 2005; Ruet, 2005). As a result, MCGM and other similar

municipal bodies receive minimal tax receipts to undertake a wide variety of tasks.

MCGM faces not only funding issues, but also capacity issues, which can be traced to

city- and regional-level planning, or the lack thereof. As noted above, Mumbai has been

growing rapidly in a highly unplanned way (ibid). Unplanned growth has had a direct

impact on MCGM�s capacity to deliver water to Mankhurd and Transit Camp 138-B;

indeed, the sudden explosion of population in the Eastern Ward (where Mankhurd is

located) has outpaced the ward�s water supply infrastructure, and created massive water

shortages.

Resettled communities, for their part, face several challenges in attempting to

secure sound, consistent services and well maintained sites. First and foremost, residents

are largely powerless to demand accountability from MCGM since municipal officials are

isolated from direct electoral influence. More pressingly, however, the

compartmentalization of responsibilities for the sites has created confusion among

residents regarding who is accountable for specific shortfalls. This lack of clarity

14 See Appendix VIII

15

regarding responsibilities hampers their ability to check the activities of MCGM and the

housing societies. Finally, many households have experienced difficulties paying the

monthly expenses associated with their new formal services; in certain cases, services,

such as lifts, have been cut given residents� inability or unwillingness to pay.15

Lastly, MCGM�s internal organization potentially complicates an integrated

approach to site management.16 Maintenance responsibilities within MCGM are

delegated from a central office downward to a series of Maintenance Engineer�s Offices,

with each office claiming one distinct service.17 This arrangement is meant to enhance the

efficiency of maintenance by channeling complaints to highly specialized experts;

however, MCGM�s bureaucratic fragmentation can promote scattered and individualized

responses to systemic, site-wide problems.

STRATEGIES

IMMEDIATE STRATEGIC PROPOSALS

The conditions of RSDs, relocated to the camps and resettlement sites cannot be

transformed instantaneously. Nevertheless, the existing situation can be ameliorated in

the short-term. Accordingly, the team recommends immediate initiation of market

research for the establishment of business cooperatives, participatory monitoring and

evaluation (PM&E) of maintenance and services in the permanent settlements and transit

sites, and household budget management training for individuals both resettled and facing

resettlement. These interventions are intended to enhance quality of life in the short-term

in a mutually supporting way, tackling in tandem the issues arising from ghettoization

15 See Appendix VIII 16 Officials for MCGM were not available for interview, and little has been written on the agency.

Studies of the general characteristics of municipal corporations in contemporary India, however, point to recurrent flaws internal to such corporations that should also considered when evaluating MCGM�s performance. A commonly cited flaw that should not be discounted when evaluating MCGM�s performance is that although the management of the permanent settlements as coherent sites requires cooperation between MCGM and housing societies, municipal officials in India are generally not trained to work with community groups. B. Vira and S. Vira, 2005, �Governing India�s Urban Environment: Problems, Policies, and Politics,� in E. Hust and M. Mann (eds), Urbanization and Governance in India (New Delhi: Manohar), p. 46.

17 See Appendix VIII

16

(local business cooperatives), negatively impacted livelihoods (local business

cooperatives, household budget management), and maintenance and service shortfalls

(PM&E).

First Proposal: Initiate Marketing Research Aimed toward Establishing Local Businesses Cooperatives

The resettlement sites are far removed from the core economic and social

activities of the city and from the previous homes of RSDs. Those who have been

resettled have to commute long and costly distances or take up new employment nearby.

Our concern for ghettoization has extended to the economic marginalisation of the

resettlement sites. Their lack of social and spatial integration with the rest of the city has

been accompanied by relatively small, closed economies, where LIGs transact only with

each other. The team is proposing a two phase strategy for a pilot project in Mankhurd

that could be a starting point for future implementations in other resettlement sites, such

as Lallobhai. The initial phase is characterised by market research into gaps which

currently exist, identifying the products which could be produced in response to market

demands, as well as possible trading links with other parts of Mumbai. The second phase

is to set up appropriate businesses according to the results of the market research along

with training to complement the project.

The market research should be undertaken by experts or NGOs beyond the

Alliance as the Alliance does not have experience in market research and explicitly states

that they do not fund livelihoods projects. The task must be undertaken by an NGO or

expert who is experienced in market research and income-generating activities.

Identifying organizations or individuals capable of doing such work would require further

research. Financial resources for its implementation could come from ICICI small finance

schemes (ICICI have a track record of funding community based self help groups). There

may also be the potential for financial or technical assistance from GOM, who have

recognised that there should be a component to protect livelihoods as part of their R&R

projects (World Bank, 2007, p. 7).

Human resources would come from skilled community members who are keen to

gain employment after relocation. The impact of our proposal would be monitored and

17

evaluated by community cooperatives on a monthly basis and biannually by the

financiers. The indicators supporting the proposal would include: new revenue streams

for individuals participating in the scheme, increased numbers of business start-ups, and

increased knowledge of management and entrepreneurial skills among participants.18

Second Proposal: Initiate a Household Budget Management Scheme

To cope with reported difficulties slum dwellers have had managing expenses and

avoiding debt, as well as to respond to relocated peoples� lack of clarity regarding

elements of site finance, the team recommends that a household budget management

scheme be initiated for current RSDs, transit camp residents, and occupants of permanent

housing.19 Initially, the team formulated this strategy to raise awareness about how the

interest generated from the R 20,000 invested in site maintenance funds could be used to

cushion increased maintenance fees. Over the course of its time in the field interviews,

however, the team noted that this education alone would not be sufficient to cushion

shocks from increased costs of living and unexpected expenses. It appears that relocated

people could produce their own cushion by gaining a more sophisticated knowledge of

how to manage household budgets with many new expenses. This strategy will build

upon existing structures of MM women�s savings schemes by adding training in

expenditure reporting and household bookkeeping (collectively �household budget

management�) alongside the savings education currently being undertaken by MM.

It is understood that the daily community savings schemes MM conducts are meant to

familiarize people with household financial management. However, our field findings

suggest that people still do not have a clear understanding of household budget

management. Furthermore, those families who have experienced increased costs of living

have stopped daily savings with MM. The aim of the strategy is not to increase savings

but to train people to spend their income wisely, through keeping a balance sheet of their

18 For more details regarding monitoring and impact assessment for this strategy, please see Appendix X

19 As noted in our findings, approximately half of the people that were interviewed in the transit camps and at Mankhurd resettlement have experienced increased costs of living and expenses from utility bills. For some among this group, these heightened costs have increased household debt. At the same time, 3 interview sessions expressed ambiguity in the R 20,000 savings for maintenance cost and a lack of understanding about how that money and the interest gain used.

18

household expenditures. Such practices would allow each family member to be aware of

the expenses and income of the family in order to manage their expenses and enhance

savings. To spread this training, MM should conduct monthly budgeting workshops. This

formal mechanism could be complemented by informal education: MM can use the daily

savings routine to train as well as raise awareness about household budget management

scheme. In the early stages of implementation, this strategy might require the

involvement of SPARC for capacity building training. Once MM has been trained, there

would be dissemination to members of the community through the monthly workshops

and daily savings routine.20

Third Proposal: Implement On-Going Participatory Monitoring and

Evaluation of Maintenance and Services in Permanent Settlements

To address maintenance and service (M&S) shortfalls in all existing permanent

settlements and transit camps, a participatory monitoring and evaluation (PM&E) scheme

should be initiated immediately. Under this PM&E scheme, a multi-actor monitoring

group would be created in each settlement to identify and catalog necessary M&S

improvements. As noted before, responsibilities for M&S have already been formally

divided between MCGM and housing societies. The object of PM&E is to alter a

compartmentalised process (as it currently stands) into a cooperative process, particularly

in Mankhurd. Moreover, it seeks to revive this monitoring process in a way that builds

upon existing governance structures while enhancing the capacities of � and partnerships

among � the parties involved, despite evident financial and political constraints.

Under this scheme, a monitoring group comprised of representatives from

housing societies, settlement and camp residents, and MCGM�s maintenance corps,

would undertake site evaluations on a half-yearly basis. A participatorily determined

20 The effectiveness of this strategy could be measured within 6 months of implementation by Mahila

Milan through quantitative measures like decreased debt, increased savings and qualitative measures such as increased understanding of how household budget management is conducted. See Appendix XXX for full details of monitoring and impact assessment for this strategy.

19

checklist, created in initial meetings of the group members, would guide the process.21

The evaluation process itself would involve members of the monitoring group reviewing

the listed items, giving each a grade of adequate or inadequate. In any case where an item

is declared inadequate, the monitoring team would note the actor responsible for

addressing the failure (in accordance with existing standards) and the steps to be taken to

resolve it. Ideally, representatives from each party would undertake this evaluation

together, covering the entire site. After the evaluation is completed, a representative of

each party would sign the list, thereby notarizing it. Copies of the signed form would be

distributed among the actors, with additional copies being posted in communal spaces

around the site for public review.22

If fully effective, PM&E will heighten the quality of M&S in the permanent

settlements. PM&E, however, would be useful even in those cases where it failed to

secure material improvements. PM&E would help coordinate the objectives of MCGM�s

various maintenance bodies by promoting a concept of integrated site management.

Meanwhile, housing societies and residents can use PM&E to make MCGM more

accountable by making the municipality�s shortcomings more transparent. The actors,

however, need not be seen as antagonistically motivated. Indeed, as a cooperative data-

gathering project, PM&E would also knit together the various actor groups that have

responsibilities for site upkeep in a number of complementary ways. PM&E would

provide an opportunity for MCGM representatives to learn to work with communities, to

build the capacity of housing societies, and to clarify their responsibilities with residents,

all of which could decrease MCGM�s long-term workload. Second, by compiling city-

wide statistics on M&S needs and constructing matching budgets, the monitoring group

can communicate to the state and national governments the extent of the resources

(human, financial, and physical) required for permanent settlements to function properly

and thus perhaps secure additional funding for M&S in the long-term.23

21 The elements on the list would most likely include, among other things: lighting, drainage, garbage collection and removal, common/public toilets, elevators, and water pumps.

22 To help communicate the results of the evaluation to the public, forms (written in Hindi and/or relevant local dialects) could be paired with maps and/or pictures identifying the needed improvements.

23 Given that PM&E seeks both material and procedural gains, its success could be monitored not just in terms of material improvements, but also through qualitative indicators measuring enhanced cooperation between residents, housing societies, and MCGM. See Appendix X for full details of monitoring and impact assessment for this strategy.

20

LONG-TERM STRATEGIC VISION: MIXED-INCOME HOUSING

The three strategies outlined above have been designed to ameliorate conditions

in existing transit camps and permanent settlements. In order for future iterations of

railway R&R to more closely approximate transformation, however, future project-

affected RSDs should be channeled into housing schemes that emphasize both mixed-

income and mixed-use development, bypassing the types of single-income schemes

employed under MUTP that have been shown to create spatially, socially, and

economically isolated resettlement sites.24 Mixed-income/mixed-use housing, as a

response to current R&R housing practices, is a macro-level planning vision suitable for

implementation across Mumbai.

Several potential benefits accompany mixed-use/mixed-income. First, by

combining LIGs and MIGs in the same development, mixed-income housing encourages

social blending. Subsequently, by diversifying the income groups in a settlement, a more

heavily capitalized clientele is created for LIG business enterprises. This potential is

further enhanced when mixed-income development is combined with mixed-use, which

spatially diversifies the site to include residential, retail, commercial and communal units

and thus creates a site capable of supporting a broader variety of activities to draw MIG

revenue into the low-income community. Mixed-income/mixed-use thus would help to

recreate the type of cross-class economic relationships that once existed along the tracks.

In short, mixed-income/mixed-use has the potential to enhance the livelihood capacity of

the community in virtuous economic feedback loops. Finally, mixed-income development

seeks to exploit market logic to secure better services for relocated people. MIGs will be

attracted to mixed-income sites only if such sites are fully serviced, contain a range of

amenities, and are linked to existing road and rail networks (MHADA , 2007).

Ultimately, mixed-income/mixed-use suggests the possibility of creating semi-self

24 As noted earlier, MUTP relocates RSDs to sites like Mankhurd and Lallobhai that are spatially and

socially isolated along the city�s northern periphery, segregated from the central city, burdened by a lack of transport connectivity, plagued by limited economic opportunity, and prone to social problems(MHADA , Document 2007).

21

supporting communities that can flourish even in the city�s developing (but not fully

developed) northern reaches.

More research would be necessary to create a fully operational strategic plan for

Mumbai. At this time, however, it is possible to outline funding options and locational

opportunities. In terms of funding, mixed-income/mixed-use could draw either of two

already existing schemes currently operating in Indian housing circles, specifically,

central government subsidies and community-led development. GoI has implemented

various schemes throughout India, which are variously directed towards urban, rural, and

PUI poor housing schemes, slum improvement programs, sanitation and infrastructural

upgrading, and slum relocation. These GoI schemes receive government-subsidized loans

and grants, but also make use of beneficiary contributions (low-rate mortgages) that are

suited to LIGs repayment capacities. GoI�s VAMBAY, NSDP, and IAY25 schemes provide

opportunities to break with MUTP�s free housing policy (Buckley , R.M , 2005);

(MHADA , 2007). At the same time, however, NSDP and IAY preserve the �soft parts� of

MUTP R&R, emphasizing capacity-building in participating communities and

community participation in site selection, design, and construction.

On the community side, the growth of CLIFF also opens up avenues for

community-led development projects. As the World Bank notes, programs with greater

community participation are better at targeting specific community needs and achieving

more noticeable, sustainable, long-term improvements in housing projects. Schemes that

employ slum dweller-friendly payment scheme will also increase relocated slum

dwellers� sense of ownership in their homes. (Buckley, 2005; MHADA, 2007). At the

moment, as noted in the findings, these alternatives have been largely factored-out of

housing development in Maharashtra given politicians� support of free housing schemes

and resistance to community-led construction schemes and projects partly funded by

beneficiary contributions.26 The demonstrated popularity of VAMBAY, NSDP, and IAY

among slum dwellers in other parts of India might be leveraged to gain support from 25 Valmiki Ambedkar Awas Yojana (VAMBAY), introduced in 2001 , focuses on shelter for the urban poor, with 20% of total allocation for community sanitation facilities under the Nirmal Bharat Abhiyan (NBA) program. The National Slum Development Program (NSDP), launched in 1996, provides funds for physical and community infrastructure as well as shelter upgrading.India Awas Yojana (IAY) launched in 1985 as a sub-scheme of JRY, became an independent scheme in 1996. It provides full grants to the rural poor for construction of their homes. (R.M. Buckley, 2005).

26 Refer back to page XX

22

local politicians.

Land scarcity is the principal constraint on this strategic vision. At this stage,

however, three general locations could be considered for new mixed-income/mixed-use

development. First, land could be sought in the northern reaches of the city, within the

outer limit of Mumbai�s commuting radius. One of the biggest incentives for MIGs to

move into mixed-income/mixed-use would be a potential decrease in their daily

commuting time. As commuters travel from as far away as Virar (60 kilometers north of

Churchgate), this commuting radius is large. Second, the terms of the Housing Rental Act

would allow sites where previously rent-controlled housing has collapsed or been

demolished to be used for mixed-income/mixed-use housing. (Buckley, 2005). Finally, a

large swath of coastal land currently held by GoI is set to be released to the public in the

near future. In this case and others, GoI and GOM can release their holdings into mixed-

income/mixed-use schemes to generate greater revenue from Mumbai�s land. Since SRA

currently provides free land, GOM only recovers costs in the form of new property taxes

from settlement residents. Repayments on beneficiary contributions, however, could

allow for additional cost recovery.

CONCLUSION

Slum and housing policy in India has evolved over time. Nevertheless, as our

advocacy of a mixed-income/mixed-use vision for Mumbai�s future suggests, existing

methods of dealing with Mumbai�s six million slum dwellers, needs further innovation in

order to achieve truly transformative ends. Within the existing structural conditions,

railway R&R in particular has not been able to transform the lives of railway slum

dwellers. Undoubtedly, R&R under MUTP has achieved significant improvements for

RSDs. Through this process, RSDs have secured legal tenure, moved into more

structurally sound homes, improved their self-esteem, and enhanced their self-governance

abilities. These advances have been accompanied by increased appreciation for R&R by

key stakeholders who will be involved in subsequent railway projects. Along with these

advances, however, have come significant new problems. R&R has contributed to

ghettoization of railway slum dwellers, negatively impacted livelihoods of relocated

23

individuals, and failed to address prominent service and maintenance shortfalls in

resettlement sites and transit camps. The conditions of RSDs relocated to Mumbai�s

northern periphery cannot be transformed instantaneously; however, it is possible to

introduce a series of interventions that can improve their quality of life in the short-term

in a mutually supporting way. Accordingly, the team has recommended immediate

initiation of market research for the establishment of business cooperatives, participatory

monitoring and evaluation of maintenance and services in the permanent settlements and

transit sites, and household budget management training for individuals both resettled and

facing resettlement. In order to draw closer to a transformative solution over the long-

term, however, R&R must be de-linked from existing free, single-income housing

schemes and connected with mixed-income/mixed-use housing alternatives. Developing

these existing alternatives into coherent schemes will involve much further research, as

well as much greater collaboration between politicians, policymakers, NGOs, CBOs, and

private interests. Perhaps then the fate of millions in Mumbai will not just be changed,

but transformed in ways that benefit the city and its� citizens as a whole.

24

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27

APPENDIX I: Pre-emptive Organization

This strategy involves the scaling up of the type of community work already

undertaken by the Alliance with the communities along the railway tracks prior to the

MUTP relocation. The aim is to promote the organization of slum communities still

located along the railway corridors throughout Mumbai. This might eventually strengthen

communities particularly threatened with future relocation.

The idea for pre-emptive organization came about after observing that Indian

Railways has yet to develop an R&R policy for its future projects (MUTP II & MUTP

III). Furthermore, this strategy is a response to the fact that community organization

requires a long period of time, which is evident from the differences in the relative

success of the MUTP compared to the MUIP project. When enumerations and

community cohesion have not been accomplished before a project begins, the project is

more likely to have negative impacts of the people, as well as the efficiency and speed

with which a project is able to be implemented. Such a case has been seen in MUIP,

where a lot of problems have occurred due to lack of community organization in the R&R

process. An observation at the Mankhurd Transit Camp also showed complications that

have developed in the R&R process27; these problems in the transit camp seem to have

resulted from a lack of advanced planning.

In order to scale up this strategy to cover more communities and mitigate the

possible negative effects of future projects, SPARC, RSDF, and MM should continue to

build on the work they are already doing successfully in this area. If the Alliance can

expand their current work, the largest benefit would accrue to the communities currently

living alongside the railways. A key element that will be necessary for this strategy to be

implemented successfully, is improved transparency of IR�s future plans. The Alliance

needs to pressure IR to disclose more information regarding possible future projects

before they are finalised, in order to carry out preemptive organization in areas most

likely to be affected in the near future.

An anticipated positive outcome of this strategy would be the rendering of transit

27 See Appendix VI

28

camps unnecessarily. If all actors embrace, and understand the benefits of community

organization, transit camps will be bypassed, hence reducing pressure on these key actors

as well as avoiding premature relocations that create yet another wave of problems in

another location (i.e. specifically when residents of transit camps are promised a short

duration in this sub-standard housing, but in reality spend years beyond the originally

predicted time period)28. If IR is in possession of all of the important information

regarding the communities along the railway, they could use this as leverage when

seeking funding from donors for future upgrading projects. The most prominent incentive

for the Alliance to participate is to maximise its investments in communities

The Alliance, the communities, and IR should be involved in monitoring and

evaluating the progress and success of this strategy. On IR�s side, this would be done by

processing and keeping logs of the amount of quantitative and qualitative information

received from the Alliance; this information should be assessed quarterly. For the

Alliance�s part, the strategy would be assessed based on the adequacy and frequency of

incoming information from IR regarding projected projects. Information from both

organisations should be disseminated through reports distributed to leaders of SPARC,

MMRDA, Central Committee, RSDF and MM, and IR.

28 See Appendix VI

29

APPENDIX II: List of Criteria

30

Criteria Explanation

Structural integrity From a construction aspect, the houses for slum dwellers should be solid and include a toilet, kitchen, etc.

Improved Housing Conditions

Security of tenure

When slum dwellers move to the permanent housing, every family should have the documents need to guarantee the right of tenure

Safe public space Must have child-friendly recreational areas, crime-free public areas

Hygienic public space

Must have regular garbage collection, and satisfactory drainage

Improved Perception of Public Space

Public amenities ! Street Lighting ! Recreational Areas ! Communal/unstructured space

Water Must have sufficient water supply

Sanitation Toilet should be satisfactory and be well maintained

Waste disposal Waste must be collected regularly (weekly)

Improved Basic Services

Electricity Must have fixed electricity Improved Health Care

Hospital or clinic should be close by the community and also the fees should be affordable to the service users

Improved Education

School should be close by the community, with affordable fees, English should be offered

Enhanced/Protected Employability

Opportunities for income generation should be available

Cushioned Increases in Costs of Living:

There is a need to make life at the new settlement affordable and comfortable

Improved Social Condition

Residents should experience fewer social problems than alongside the tracks (reduced dependence on neighbors, etc.)

In rehabilitation and relocation process

! Logistics of relocation: The residents decide which community members get priority of housing ! Design of housing: Lay-out of rooms

In post-resettlement processes

! Management of housing ! Monitoring and Evaluation of Site People do the work of maintenance, monitoring the quality of life in the area, and evaluating what the positive and negative aspects/issues are in new housing

Fostered Participation

In political process People should be heard and involved

31

Social blending Heightened Inclusion

Spatial blending

To avoid ghettoization and to increase the economic opportunities in communities through mixing people of different income levels as well as other commercial building

Railway dwellers� perceptions of themselves and their environment

! Safety (physical): safe and clean public space ! Security (land tenure): housing guaranteed ! Self-esteem improved

Major actors� perceptions of railway dwellers

A change the way others regard slum dwellers

Altered Perceptions

Major actors� perceptions of the rehabilitation and relocation process

! R&R as a valuable/positive option ! R&R as necessary for dealing with development issues in Mumbai

Increased communication between all actors involved

Improved Organization and Interaction

Increased cooperation among actors

To clarify the responsibility of each actors (communities, local authority and NGOs) and create good working relationships.

32

APPENDIX III: Schedule of Meetings, Presentations, and Interviews Conducted 4/05 Friday 10:00am: Lecture at SPARC office 5/05 Saturday 10:00am: Lecture by Patel d� Cruz at SPARC office 7/05 Monday 9:30am: Presentation by Senior Government Officials and discussion at all India

Institute of Local Self-Government 1) Swadheen Kshatriya, Principal Secretary of Government of Maharashtra 2) Milind Mhaiskar, Joint Metropolitan Community MMRDA, Project Director

MUTP 1:00pm: Informal Interview with one of our translators: Sharmilla (SPARC) 2:00pm: RSDF Board Member Meeting with Mahila Milan at the Mankhurd

Permanent Housing Settlement: Speakers from RSDF:

Vice President: Shankar H. Parab General Secretary of the District Congress Committee (local representative): S. Soundara Pandian

RSDF Board Members: President: Mohan S. Devkule Vice President: C.B. Yetam General Secretary: R.M. Patil Assistant Secretary: Vijay S. Chavan Assistant Secretary: Shankar Nangare Work. President: D.G. Gaonkar Treasurer: N.H. Wadekar Internal Auditor: A.K.B. Shaikh

Mahila Milan Members: Shanti Sinde Laxmi Pagare Mangal Kamble Ranjita Rohidas Pednika (Others whose names we unfortunately did not get) 8/05 Tuesday 9:45am: Presentation by Shirish Patel: �Housing Policy�

33

11:15am: Presentation by V. K. Phatak, Director of the National Housing Bank:

�Metropolitan Planning in Mumbai and Slum Policy�, Former MMRDA 12:30pm: Interview with Shirish B. Patel (after his presentation); Conducted by Sam

Muangnil and Tom Wolf 2:00pm: Meeting with the Central Committee at the Mankhurd Permanent Housing Settlement: Members Present: S. Soundara Pandian Shanti Sinde Laxmi Pagande Mangal Kamble Shankar H. Parab

Household Interviews at the Mankhurd Permanent Housing Settlement: Interview 1, 2: Conducted by Marylyn Mavaza, Karen Magnuson, Eve

Leonard, Lu Feng Interview 3: Anna Walnycki, Tom Wolf Interview 4: Jie Li, Anna Walnycki Interview 5, 6, 7: Haidong Chen, Giulia Minini, Sam Muangnil 9/05 Wednesday 9:00-9:45am: Reflections on field visits 9:45-11:00am: Presentation by S. K. Joshi: �Principels of Slum Rehabitation and

Transfer of Development Rights (TDRs)� 11:00: Railway Group Interview with Mr. Sundar Burra 11:15-12:30pm: Presentation by Abhisek Khanna, chief manager of ICICI bank:

�Lending to the poor� 11:30am: Brief Lecture by Ms. Aseena Viccjee, SPARC Finance Manager 1:30pm: Household Interviews at the Mankhurd Transit Camp �138b�: Interview 1, 2, 3, 4: Conducted by Giulia Minini, Tom Wolf, Haidong

Focus group with children from the Mankhurd Permanent Housing Settlment (Ages 5-9, 10-15),

Conducted by: Eve Leonard, Jie Li and Suchitra Muangnil 6:00pm: Interview with Ms. Kalpana Sharma, conducted by Karen Magnuson

34

10/05 Thursday 9:45-11:00am: Presentation by Neera Adarkar: �Mill Lands in Mumbai-Past, Present,

Future; Exploring power relations across actors over land redevelopment�

10:00am: Interview with Mr. P. Joshi, conducted by Tom Wolf and Suchitra

Muangnil 11:00am: Interview with the Field Grievances Department, Mr. D.C. Patil,

Conducted by Marylyn Mavaza and Anna Walnycki 11:15-12:00pm: Presentation by Pankaj Joshi: �Situation Analysis of the Eastern Sea-

Front of Mumbai; Interplay of central and state government powers� 11:30: Interview with Sundar Burra, conducted by Tom Wolf and Suchitra Muangnil 1:30pm: Two Women�s Focus Groups (Each with 25 women) At Lallubhai

Compound Group 1: Conducted by Karen Magnuson, Marylyn Mavaza, Anna

Walnycki Group 2: Conducted by Jie Li, Eve Leonard, Giulia Minini 11/05 Friday 2:30pm: Presentation of Report

35

APPENDIX V: Transect Walk Available as separate document on CD-ROM

36

APPENDIX V: Maps Available as separate document on CD-ROM

37

APPENDIX VI: Findings Chart Available as separate document on CD-ROM

38

APPENDIX VII: Interviews with Mr. Sundar Burra

Location: SPARC Office Date: Wednesday, 9 May 2007 Time: 11.00 Mode: Bilateral Interviewer: Railways Group Observations:

- The interview was conducted in SPARC�s office with Sundar Burra and all the members of the railway slum dwellers group. We were all situated around a table in the �dining room� area. There were lots of activities in that room and people walking in and out of the room.

- The interview was set u after our first day in the field so that we could clarify some points with Sundar after the interview with the people. Some of the issues that needed clarification were the 20,000 rupees deposits. Sundar mainly answered the questions but occasionally Sharmina would help answer the questions about the 20,000 rupees.

Interview report: Clarification about the 20,000 rupees

- The rehabilitation package consists of 250 sq. ft. apartment + an additional 20,000 rupees. The interest from the 20,000 rupees is for the maintenance fees. The 20,000 is a policy that was created in 1995 to help with maintenance cost of resettlements and the money is held in a joint account where the interest would be collected and used by the housing cooperatives.

- Before the 20,000 policy was created in the SRA, SPARC considered the 20,000 as down payment for the construction of the people�s houses. It was a program created long before the SRA free housing scheme came about.

- The 20,000 that was collected by SPARC is not part of the government program but from SPARC�s experiences, some people have difficulty with the maintenance of the settlement so SPARC insist that each family should have their own separate account for an �incase of emergency� purpose.

- The 20,000 collected by the families are held in their name in a bank account but the bank book is with SPARC. Currently some families have withdrawn that amount to use.

Cost incurred upon resettlements

- Sundar had said that the move to Mankhurd from their original area was all free. - What the people are saying about the expenses incurred from moving could come

from the increase in expenditure cause by the move as a result of the change in life style.

* Sundar suggested that we look as the resettlement as a package and see how their lives have transformed. He gave an example of how the lives of the men have changed. The men use to say to him that everyday they would be worried when they go to work because they don�t know whether their families and homes will still be there when they

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come back from work or not. The danger of living so close to the tracks also makes them worried about their children. * He also asked us to consider the trade-off between living in the railway slums and those in permanent housing. Issues of lease

- Sundar said that according to the terms of lease the people are not allowed to transfer their property for 10 years. After 10 years, the people are allowed to transfer their property to other ownership but a portion of the sales revenue will go to the government.

- The ownership of the house is a joint ownership between husband and wide. - SPARC would like to see the people adjust and function on their own without aid

or external assistance as soon as possible but will continue with the resettlement process as long as they are still needed.

- SPARC does not have a formal action/program that deals with post resettlements but can assist the people with their need help in coordinating with the government on any particular issue

- Going back to the interest of the 20,000 rupees, the money was given by MMRDA to the cooperative. No training for the people on how to use the savings. MMRDA creates a community development officer to transfer the knowledge of how to use the savings.

Water issue in the transit camp

- SPARC with the knowledge of the Municipal Corporation has �illegally� connected water pipes in the initial stages to the transit camps because there was no water there. Now that there�s a shortage of water in the East ward, SPARC has hired water tankers (with SPARC�s own money) to provide water to the transit camps twice a week.

- The water issue is being resolved, as the Municipal Corporation is putting in bigger pipes to provide more water services but such infrastructural adjustments will take some time before it is fully functional.

Location: SPARC Office Date: Thursday 10 May 2007 Time: 11.30 Mode: Bilateral Interviewer: Tom Wolf, Suchitra Muangnil Observations:

- The interview was conducted in SPARC�s office with Sundar Burra and two members of the group (named above).

- The interview was an informal setting. The questions asked were mainly to check

the waters with Sundar on the possible strategies that we will propose for the Friday presentation. His overall response to our questions was positive. However throughout the interview Sundar�s body language and tonal changes seems to be

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adamant that SPARC does not want to expand their roles into other fields or areas and will remain focus on housing issues for the urban slum dwellers.

Interview Results: Role of SPARC in the MUTP

- Role of SPARC in the post resettlement of MUTP will end after 1-2 years after the MUTP program finishes. However SPARC will continue to be involved in the post resettlement project via the Federation and MM.

- As long as there are issues which requires SPARC�s involvements, SPARC will continue to play a role there. However SPARC would like to see the people manage their issues on their own.

- Basically SPARC does not have an exit strategy and will be there as long as it needs to be.

SPARC�s role beyond housing issues

- SPARC does not see an extended role of what it is now because of the limited staff capacity.

- It was said that most choices made by SPARC to be part of any particular intervention is not made at SPARC level but made at the MM and Federation level. An example was given in the Dharavi case where SPARC has become involved in the redevelopment of Dharavi because the Federation and MM had come said that SPARC should consider becoming involved in the project.

- Sundar did admit that perhaps it is right that SPARC could be more strategic in the issues that it should be involved in but for now SPARC would like to remain focus with MM and the federation.

- Sundar mentioned that there was still demolition of railway slum dwellers occurring yesterday (Wednesday, 8 May 2007) and its issues like this that SPARC will be involved with.

- Often SPARC is asked to intervene in various projects and therefore the strategic planning for SPARC�s roles seldom occurs because it does not have a long term goal/plan.

- Basically SPARC exist to help people and does not have one true vision. �What the people want is what SPARC will try to do�

Pitched the enumeration strategy

- Sundar had mentioned that the normal role and TOR of MM and the Federation is the enumeration process which initiates community mobilization and at the same time will kick start the saving schemes, new buildings etc.

- The original concept of SPARC is: people must organize themselves through collective savings for the purchase of their own home or at least save enough money to take out loans to buy housing.

- SPARC is no aware of any infrastructural planning in the city to kick start a pre-emptive enumeration process. Most of the time SPARC only hears of projects being implemented through the press therefore it does not know what the plans are.

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- In addition, community mobilization takes 1-2 decades to be fully effective therefore it is difficult to forecast future infrastructure project for that long. Even if SPARC was well aware of future projects 1-2 years in advance, community mobilization through pre-emptive enumeration would still stand a chance of being ineffective because of the lack of time and resources.

- Currently there have been talks with the Ministry of Railway, and there have been an oral commitment informing us that the country�s draft proposal will include a no-demolition policy for all slum dwellers that have settled along the railway tracks in the country. But Sundar said that such commitment might be lost in the process.

When asked about SPARC�s role in the NRSDF establishment.

- Sundar said that SPARC might be a key role in the NRSDF if it were to establish. However such conditions depend on a number of variables.

- Sundar informed that the reason why R&R works is because of participation of the community.

- The poor can become involved in the governance of the city only through their participation, which have allowed SPARC to relocate 17,000 families in the R&R process.

When asked about the Monitoring and Evaluation strategy

- Sundar said that the suggested M+E strategy might be useful for other sites but not the case of Mankhurd because it seems like in the case of Mankhurd people have been doing such things already and that there seems to be a sense of self-governance in place.

When asked about the financial status of the people in their relocated sites and a possible strategy to help with the financial situation

- Sundar said that the transit camp is a good place for people to begin coping with the financial burden that come with relocating into permanent housing.

- Sundar see the financial situation for the people living in the resettlement areas as issues related to poverty and not related to mismanagement.

- SPARC tries to encourage the kinship and support networks, which is one way of supporting the people with financial needs. Sundar then refers to a quote which Jockin once said �If suppose you�ve taken a loan with MM and you are unable to pay that loan back, our punishment to you would be to giver you another loan until you are able to support yourself�.

- SPARC is not involved and will not be interested in income generating activities, except for the saving schemes.

- NGOs must select which areas it wants to work in. A suggested program for handicrafts cooperatives works better in rural areas and has yet to be successful in urban areas. In addition setting up such programs are not in the area of SPARC�s interest. SPARC�s focus is on self-financing options such as running small shops etc.

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Date: May 11, 2007 Subject: Sundar Burra Location: Informal conversation during break following Railway Group�s presentation Conducted By: Tom Wolf Transcribed By: Tom Wolf In response to the notion of preemptive enumeration: Sometimes, enumeration prompts projects. But it�s hard to leverage these preemptive enumerations to produce outcomes you want � pressing button A doesn�t always produce project B. These processes are not very predictable. Mr. Mahdan�s Thoughts: Indian Rail could help make preemption work by sharing information regarding its future projects, attempting to enforce a stricter schedule for projects. Indian Rail, however, doesn�t have complete control over scheduling, as it is in many ways dependent upon funding bodies. Preemption must proceed with the understanding that the situation will never be entirely stable/predictable; in other words, it will not be possible to create a totally concrete, predictable schedule. If enumeration is to be retained as a strategy, it must be pitched more heavily toward Indian Rail than to SPARC � we know what SPARC thinks about this, and we now know that Indian Rail must play the scheduling/coordinating role.

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APPENDIX VIII: Interview with Mr. Joshi Date: May 10, 2007 Subject: Mr. Joshi Location: SPARC Headquarters, Khetwadi Conducted By: Suchitra Muangnil, Tom Wolf Transcribed By: Tom Wolf Key issues: site management, local authorities, complaint process, potential for mainstreaming of R&R into Indian Rail, SPARC�s role and its limits Who is responsible for building and maintaining Mankhurd? Allotment built by MMRDA. Each building contains 60 � 100 tenements. The inhabitants of each building are supposed to form a cooperative society for managing each building. Once the cooperative is registered under the Cooperative Societies Act, it is empowered to collect and spend money. The appointed officers of the society (Secretary, Chairman, etc.) are supposed to managed the day to day affairs of building management: management of the lift, maintaining the cleanliness of the building, payment of the electricity bill for formal electricity use (lifts, water pumps), payment of water tax, maintenance of water pump, appoint a watchman. How is the maintenance funded? The developer who constructs the building gets a TDR, invests 20,000 Rs per unit in a fund as a fixed deposit in joint name of MMRDA and a resident of the building. Interest should generate 180 � 200 Rs/month. This interest might not be sufficient to cover maintenance and property taxes. It is expected that people will pay 300 � 400 Rs a month on top of the 200 Rs kicked off by the fund. Thus, household expenditures should come to 500 � 600 Rs/month per family. If any additional work needs to be done in excess of this 500 � 600 Rs, the building cooperative collects necessary money from each unit. What does the property tax cover? Property tax is meant to take care of the drainage system, lights, water. These things are the total responsibility of the local authority. It is the prime responsibility of the local authority to keep the site clean. Every day, the streets should be cleaned, the solid waste should be moved by the local authority. Which agency is the local authority for Mankhurd? The local authority for Mankhurd is MCGM. After the site is prepared by the contractor, responsibility for the site passes from the contractor to MCGM. Have the building committees tried to curb the problem of selling-out?

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The committees have control over selling-out, but they tend not to exercise it. Usually, 5 � 10% of households sell-out before within 10 years of moving into the permanent housing. All of these transactions are illegal; the purchaser takes a risk, in that he will live in his unit informally. Because he is living informally, he can be evicted at any time. The apartment is the property of the government, not the tenant. How is the �building� defined? Is it just the space bounded by the structure? There is a difference between the building and the plot The plot is owned by the cooperative; the building is located on the plot. The cooperative is responsible for everything on the plot, not just the structure. Whatever is in situ on plot is to maintained and managed by the cooperative. Only roads and gutters are public land. Switching topics to the railways� Why were only families living within 30 ft./10 m of the tracks resettled? The 30 ft line of demarcation either side of the tracks was he declared �safety distance� for any electric train passing through. Sparks from electric trains can travel up to 30 ft. What will happen to the people living alongside the tracks beyond that 30 ft zone?

People still living on Indian Rail land on either side of the compound wall will be treated as slum dwellers under SRA. Since 1995, the Government of Maharashtra has been in negotiations with the central government to establish a uniform slum policy. Central government reluctant to take up SRA policy because then the central government would have to apply it throughout all of India. The central government has instead been emphasizing that the Government of Maharashtra clear Indian Rail land and return it to the control of Indian Rail. Is there any likelihood that Indian Rail will incorporate MUTP-style (Alliance-led) relocation into its official policy? Presently, there has been a movement with Indian Rail to do something of the sort. �The Railway Minister is very keen on the upliftment of poor people,� and so he is taking an interest in finding a solution for slum dwellers on railway lands. In the airport case, the Supreme Court has ruled that airport slum dwellers have to be resettled or upgraded in situ, but not demolished. Central government has supported this ruling. People will either be relocated and rehabilitated or upgraded. �This gives us hope for the railways. If it can happen for the airport, it can happen for the railways.� How would a resident of Mankhurd go about raising complaints about maintenance issues with the local authority?

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There is an MCGM Ward office, headed by an Assistant Municipal Commissioner (AMC). The Assistant Municipal Commissioner is empowered to deal with certain things. People affected by service shortages can lodge written complaints with the AMC�s office. The office takes immediate action is anything is wrong. Each ward has a Maintenance Engineer of Roads, of Electricity, of Solid Waste and Sweeping. If the job is getting done, the people can approach the higher authority, the Joint Municipal Commissioner. The problem with slum dwellers is that everything has been given to them without effort and with no formality. Slum dwellers who have been relocated want everything done by someone else. They expect NGOs to do it. Not ready to organize themselves to approach authorities as a unified group. SPARC sends their own social workers to teach and organize the people, and, if required, SPARC officers take them to AMC. But there is a limit to how long SPARC should do this. At some point, slum dwellers have to do this on their own. SPARC�s goals: as long as people live in slums, they should have better houses and better lives. After these two goals are achieved SPARC�s job is done. There are 4,000 other slum pockets. We need to go there and let others know what facilities they can access, what resources are available. Whenever anyone tells you, �SPARC should do this,� you should ask: �For how long?�

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APPENDIX IX: The Web of Institutionalisation

Available as separate documents on CD-ROM

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APPENDIX X: Monitoring and Impact Assessment Indicator Chart

Available as separate document on CD-ROM