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Getting It Just Right: Strategic Culture,Cybernetics, and Canada's GoldilocksGrand StrategyDavid S. McDonough aa Department of Political Science , University of British Columbia ,Vancouver , CanadaPublished online: 09 Jul 2013.

To cite this article: David S. McDonough (2013) Getting It Just Right: Strategic Culture,Cybernetics, and Canada's Goldilocks Grand Strategy, Comparative Strategy, 32:3, 224-244, DOI:10.1080/01495933.2013.805999

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Getting It Just Right: Strategic Culture, Cybernetics,and Canada’s Goldilocks Grand Strategy

DAVID S. MCDONOUGHDepartment of Political ScienceUniversity of British ColumbiaVancouver, Canada

Strategic culture provides a good starting point to explain Canada’s goldilocks grandstrategy. But it also has important theoretical shortcomings. This article offers an im-portant reconceptualization of strategic culture. It synthesizes the insight from strategicculture and cybernetic theory to better account for Canadian strategic behavior. It in-troduces the notion of standing operational doctrines—continental soft-bandwagoningand defensive weak-multilateralism—through which Canada’s strategic cultural beliefs,attitudes, and inclinations are standardized and regularized. This theoretical synthesisprovides strategic culture with greater specificity, better use as a causal explanation,and can be potentially applied to other cases.

Introduction

Canada’s postwar strategic behavior combined two seemingly contradictory behavioraltendencies. On one hand, Canada has proven to be a loyal American ally since the onset ofthe Second World War, when security guarantees were verbally exchanged and an alliancecemented with the 1940 Ogdensburg Agreement. This security alliance took an even moreformal institutional expression in the context of the North American Aerospace DefenseCommand (NORAD) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). On the otherhand, this loyalty has been tempered by a degree of ambivalence with our superpowerally, reflecting the fact that Canadian and American strategic preferences on key politico-military issues—from missile defense to the 2003 Iraq War—occasionally diverge. In suchcases, Canada reverts to an arms-length approach toward the United States, often expressedwith reference to multilateral or internationalist principles that tend to resonate in Canadiansociety.

It is certainly easy to disparage this strategic ambiguity as being indecisive and vacillat-ing. Some in Canada will criticize bilateral relations as being overly intimate, irrespectiveof any disagreements that may arise, while other will see far too much distance almost re-gardless of how much cooperation actually exists.1 Yet such subjective assessments shouldnot obscure the fact that Canada’s position rarely embodies either proximity or distanceto an absolute degree. Instead, officials have often been very adroit in balancing thesecompeting inclinations, in which close cooperation often masks a subtle element of am-bivalence while explicit distancing is offset with low-key cooperative measures designedto allay any American ire. David Haglund has even labeled these competing inclinationsthe “iron law” in Canadian politics, in which Canada must “avoid drawing ‘too close’ tothe United States,” while always ensuring that relations do not deteriorate “to such a degreethat Canada’s prosperity and survival might be placed in jeopardy by American wrath.”2

This principle is best illustrated by how Canada has approached the question of strategicdefense.3 On one hand, while accepting air defense cooperation with the United States

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Comparative Strategy, 32:224–244, 2013Copyright © 2013 Taylor & Francis Group, LLC

0149-5933 print / 1521-0448 onlineDOI: 10.1080/01495933.2013.805999

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early in the Cold War, officials in Ottawa also consistently sought to attach reservationsand conditions designed to safeguard Canadian sovereignty or at least offer a semblance ofindependence. This can be seen in how Canada attached conditions on the construction andoperation of early—warning radar lines on its territory, attempted to limit (unsuccessfully)American requests for cross-border interceptions, and exchanged diplomatic notes thatretroactively approved NORAD, even as it created a nominal linkage with NATO that madethis binational air defense arrangement domestically palatable. On the other hand, whileconsistently refusing to officially participate on ballistic missile defense (BMD), Canadawas always careful to offset such explicit distancing with an often overlooked degree ofsupport—by accepting NORAD early warning use in Safeguard’s brief operational life,ensuring joint air defense cooperation was accelerated when participation in the StrategicDefense Initiative was rejected, or eschewing an official role in President George W.Bush’s BMD deployments but then assigning an early-warning role for NORAD whilesubstantially increasing national defense and domestic security funding. Such behaviordemonstrated Canada’s continued commitment to continental defense and security andtherefore helped make the requisite distancing action more palatable.4

By so successfully balancing proximity and distance, officials have proven adept atfollowing a strategic principle designed to safeguard Canada’s national security and ensurethat sovereignty and independence are maintained. Rather than merely accepting it as an ironlaw, it might be more appropriate to call this strategic principle the defining characteristicof a uniquely Canadian grand strategy—one that seeks to balance proximity and distancetoward the United States while avoiding the extremes of either inclination on a range ofdifferent strategic politico-military issues. As such, Canada has essentially pursued whatcan be termed a “goldilocks” grand strategy. Contrary to the claims of critics (and muchlike Goldilocks in the fairy tale), Canada is neither too close nor too far from the U.S., butrather pursues policy responses that are “just right.”

Undoubtedly, Canada’s unique structural position within North America representsan important underlying influence on its strategic behavior—one that could perhaps shedlight on how successive Canadian governments and political leaders, rarely seen as beingstrategically astute, have come to follow such a consistent grand strategy. As Patrick Lennoxnotes, with this “asymmetry in material capability,” Canada is placed “in a position ofdependency on the United States for its physical and economic security.”5 The differencesbetween these “Two Siamese Twins of North America” could not be starker.6 Americaremains a continental-sized superpower, with roughly ten times the number of people asCanada since the 1950s; an economy roughly thirteen times the size of the Canadianeconomy; and most notably, military spending at least thirty times higher.7

Yet material and otherwise “realist” conditions also retain an important degree ofindeterminacy. This can be partly attributed to the complex economic interdependence thatexists between Canada and the United States. After all, Canada represents “the leadingmarket for 38 American states,” while 80 percent of Canadian exports and two-thirds of itsimports flow across the border.8 One should also not discount the high degree of convergentinterests and values within North America, at least since the “slate cleaning” period at theturn of the last century resolved most of the outstanding issues between both countries.9

Rather than representing a threat to Canada, America’s presence has actually served tofurther alleviate Canada’s own sense of insecurity. R. J. Sutherland calls this an “involuntaryAmerican guarantee,” in which the United States is “bound to defend Canada from externalaggression almost regardless of whether or not Canadians wish to be defended.”10

Of course, there were also concerns that the United States could in extremis movetoward the unilateral implementation of its own security measures, with possibly negative

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consequences on Canadian sovereignty. To avoid such “unwanted” help, Canada had toensure it did not become a “strategic liability to the United States through military weaknessor otherwise,” in what has aptly been termed a “defense against help” approach to securitypolicy.11 Yet this should not obscure the fact that Canada still operates in an exceedinglybenign security environment—a “strategic backwater” that lacks some of the potentialfor interstate violence associated with what Christopher Twomey calls the “crucible ofconflict.”12 As a result, geopolitical factors “limit the likely success of certain Canadianpolicies” and provides “reactions or feedback that may prove decisive in the charting offuture policy courses.” But, as Colin Gray further explains, such factors “cannot ‘influence,’let alone ‘determine,’ the direction of Canadian defence and foreign policies.”13

Any explanation of Canada’s strategic behavior therefore needs to go beyond strictlyparsimonious structural-material models to incorporate domestic-level analysis. That beingsaid, the Canadian foreign policy literature has traditionally been weak at shedding light on“second-image” factors, often preferring atheoretical or descriptive accounts over explicitexplanations.14 One promising form of explanation is rooted in strategic culture, which hasbecome an increasingly popular mode of explanation for Canadian scholars eager to rectifythe explanatory deficit in the literature. However, much like the wider literature on strategicculture, even these accounts still have difficulty going beyond descriptive understanding tocausal explanation.

This article seeks to refine and bring greater clarity to the concept of strategic culture.To do so, it introduces a model of behavior that combines strategic culture with cyber-netic theory, with particular reference to the Canadian case. By including cybernetic theoryalongside strategic culture, this account will be able to provide a more accurate and so-phisticated portrayal of Canadian strategic culture, while also creating synergistic dialoguewith a mid-range foreign policy theory. In so doing, it helps resolve some of the theoreticalshortcomings often associated with strategic culture. Geostrategic and structural factorscannot be ignored. But, at least in the Canadian case, they do not actually determine theactual substance and direction of a country’s behavior. Instead, one needs an explanationrooted in domestic-level analysis, but still capable of showing how geopolitical factors actas an “operational milieu” for Canadian decision makers.15

Strategic Culture and Cybernetic Theory

Strategic culture consists of a distinct subset of a commonly held sociopolitical culture.It is rooted in the constructivist notion that state preferences and interests are largelygenerated and shaped by its identity and should not be treated exogenously.16 Indeed,strategic culture gives a sense of hierarchy and priority to those preferences/interests and canbe distinguished from other cultural traits by its focus on politico-military security matters.While indirectly shaped by larger geopolitical-structural forces, it remains a domestic-ideational form of explanation, in which the society’s cultural inclinations are manifestthrough the beliefs and consequent actions of policymakers. While a national, societywidephenomenon, strategic culture is inextricably linked to elites of its so-called “strategiccommunity.” As Beatrice Heuser notes, policymakers “carry within themselves all these[broad cultural] ideas, convictions, beliefs and points of reference.”17

The concept was first introduced by Jack Snyder to examine the Soviet Union’s cul-tural inclination for nuclear war-fighting, and achieved a new prominence with Colin Gray’saccount of America’s national style on strategic nuclear matters.18 According to AlastairIain Johnston, however, Gray offers such a broad aggregate of variables that it is potentiallyunfalsifiable and even tautological, and leads to the “sweepingly simple conclusion that

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there is one US strategic culture” that leads to one type of behavior.19 He also outlined twosubsequent “generations” of scholarship—one offering a more critical perspective concern-ing the instrumentality of strategic culture, and the other providing a narrower conception ofboth culture and the behavior to be explained.20 Johnston’s own work constitutes a method-ologically rigorous addition to the third generation, in which culture is largely defined inideational terms and used to explain grand strategy.21

Yet strategic culture has never officially moved beyond this three-fold typologicaldivision. And an unresolved ontological and epistemological debate emerged on the properdelineation of strategic culture. On one hand, Colin Gray provided a defense of the firstgeneration’s “strategic culture as context” approach, in which culture is “both a shapingcontext for behaviour and itself as a constituent of that behaviour.”22 On the other hand,Johnston was quick to challenge Gray by arguing that any interpretive description entailedimplicit explanation, which required a methodology open to the possibility that culture didnot matter.23 Yet few have chosen to adopt Johnston’s methodologically rigorous approachto strategic culture. Notably, Gray largely sidestepped the debate with more policy-relevantresearch into strategic culture, while even Johnston soon turned his attention to issues ofsocial and institutional identity.24

Canadian scholars have begun to offer their own accounts of strategic culture. Forexample, Stephane Roussel and Jean-Christophe Boucher offered a significantly differentperspective by exploring the possibility of a substate regional strategic culture in the formof Quebec, while Justin Massie proffered the existence of multiple strategic cultures inCanada, even if the adoption of one culture over another remains underexplored.25 Someof the more theoretically ambitious have even sought to bridge the Gray–Johnston dividewith the concept of explicative understanding, which sees the gulf between interpretive“understanding” and scientifically “explaining” reality as overdrawn.26 Even then, however,one cannot help but sense that this methodology tends to be more successful at descriptiveunderstanding rather than explicative explanation.

Strategic culture might have a distinguished lineage in the political culture literature.Even so, political culture has since fallen out of favor with many scholars as a type ofexplanation, in so far as such cultural factors tend to guide or predispose actors to certainkinds of behavior rather than directly causes such action.27 A similar problem also plaguesthe concept of strategic culture, which is evident in both Canadian accounts and the widerliterature. For instance, strategic culture has so far been less than convincing in garneringscientifically valid explanatory inferences. Indeed, Christopher Twomey concludes thatstrategic culture lacks the specificity required for use as causal factors, fails to explain thepredominance of one culture over another, and often makes an intellectual leap from beliefto behavior with insufficient attention on the domestic policy process itself.28 Other astuteobservers also comment that strategic culture “lacks a falsifiable middle range theory”and still has “substantial room for refinement.”29 Yet such theoretical qualms should beplaced in their proper context—not as a reason to dismiss strategic culture, but rather asa raison d’etre to better refine it. Scholars have already begun to sharpen the concept byincorporating other theoretical approaches to the analysis, most recently with Jeffrey Lantisand Andrew Charlton’s account of strategic cultural change that includes geopolitical factorsand discourse analysis.30 This article represents another attempt to bring greater analyticalprecision to the concept, though by an altogether different route.

To rectify some of these theoretical shortcomings, I suggest two noteworthy changes tothe analytical concept of strategic culture. First, two competing strategic subcultures will beidentified in the Canadian case—continentalism, which posits that Canada should maintaina close identification with the country’s role as an American ally in North America, and the

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independence subculture that recommends greater distancing from the United States. Ratherthan relying on a descriptive typology, both subcultures will be further conceptualized alonga single continuum onto which a range of different strategic inclinations can be identifiedand plotted, including unrealized inclinations that might be embedded in society but arerarely discussed as realistic policy choices or evident in actual behavior. This would permitgreater differentiation between strategic culture and the behavior it is meant to explain, whilebetter reflecting the “plethora of different national cultural themes that compete and interactthroughout different elements of society.”31 In this case, the most important strategic issueby far is Canada-U.S. relations. As such, the continuum encompasses strategic inclinationsthat underpin the country’s adaptive behavior and push it toward closer proximity or greaterdistance towards the United States.

Second, I incorporate elements of John Steinbruner’s cybernetic theory or “paradigm”into what can be called a cultural-cybernetic model of behavior. Cybernetics posits thatgovernment behavior does not reflect analytical or rational outcome calculations, but is in-stead reliant on a “minimally articulated” notion of purpose, objective, or value—the centralvalue being “simply survival as directly reflected in the internal state of the decision-makingmechanism, and whatever actions are performed are motivated by that basic value.”32 Thisprocess envisions a reasonably simple (albeit successful) decision mechanism with a partic-ularly short-term frame of reference. The goal of this theoretical synthesis is to add greaterspecificity to the concept of strategic culture, further attenuate culture from the behavior itis meant to explain, and show how cultural beliefs and inclinations are standardized andregularized in the policymaking process.

Cybernetics also recognizes that Canadian policymakers must deal with what hasbeen termed the complexity problem. This involves the uncertainty condition, such as anenvironment in which there is “limited time and information” for optimal decisions and“uncertainty over exactly how to pursue national interests,”33 and the challenges of a dis-aggregated policy process, in which “separate, disagreeing actors” must “jointly determinethe decision and jointly affect the outcome.”34 As a result, policymakers largely coalesce inthe implementation of standard operating procedures (SOPs) and show extreme sensitivityto those environmental factors—termed critical or feedback variables—that could threatenthis value. If the feedback variables begin to endanger the value, cybernetic decision makingwould involve the application of incremental changes within a given SOP’s parameters,and if this is not sufficient, “the discarding of the [SOP] in use and taking up the next itemin the response repertory.”35

Cybernetic theory is largely neutral on the origins and content of the value in questionand the type of behavioral response that the government pursues. It is precisely on these areasthat strategic culture offers important insight. First, strategic culture can provide context andadditional content to the value that concerns policymakers. As mentioned earlier, a strategicculture continuum involves plotting ideas, attitudes, and attendant behavioral inclinationstoward strategic issues. This involves an implicit assessment of key national interests, whichprovides an important element of context to the goal or value being pursued by a cyberneticorganization within the rubric of survival. As Robin Marra reminds us, “Survival can anddoes encompass many different dimensions, e.g., national survival, political survival, fiscalsurvival, survival in a bureaucratic sense,” and one can certainly add culturally derivednotions of survival to this list.36

Second, a collective cybernetic decision process also requires that “the separate activi-ties of the individuals involved in the process must be directly coordinated to some degree,”whereby the “established routines . . . [are] rendered consistent.”37 To be sure, David Sylvanand Stephen Majeski question how multiple actors from diverse bureaucratic departments

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Canada’s Strategic Culture 229

and agencies can communicate and agree upon beliefs and patterns of thought on somepotentially novel situation. However, strategic culture represents a broader intersubjectiveconcept capable of both informing the beliefs and behavioral inclinations in a polity andsetting the basic parameters of the strategic debate. By uniting disparate individuals withinsuch a framework, strategic culture facilitates the sort of implicit coordination required forsuccessful adaptive responses while also reducing the level of uncertainty of an otherwisecomplex environment. This point is reiterated by Douglas Ross, who accepts that a cyber-netic analysis of Canadian behavior involves the examination of the “fundamental clustersof attitudes concerning the nature of Canadian foreign policy, the threats, problems, andchallenges confronting it, and the dominant interests and values that must be served inactually formulating and executing policy.”38

Third, cybernetic theory entails a cognitive and organizational reliance on pre-programmed SOPs that are implemented as responses to shifts in the feedback variables andensure the continued maintenance or achievement of the value. This provides a simple wayto operationalize and test cultural inclinations, which otherwise would be too ill-definedto be of much use as an explanation. As such, it seems prudent to expand upon Ross’notion of Standing Operational Doctrines (SODs). SODs refer to “tendency groupings” or“SOP policy aggregates”39—in other words, implicit strategic doctrines that are derivedfrom societal norms and used as heuristics or cognitive shortcuts to help ensure a relativelyconsistent and coordinated policy output.

Moreover, SODs can be conceptualized as the dominant “patterns of strategicbehavior,”40 a concept that has caused so much consternation among positivist studentsof strategic culture. It should be noted that patterns of behavior should not be confusedwith behavior itself—that would violate the social scientific requirement that independentand dependent variables be separated in order for a hypothesized causal relationship toexist and tautology avoided. The emphasis should instead be placed on the notion of “pat-terns,” in reference to how one has previously acted (e.g., the pattern) having an effect oncurrent behavior. The concept of “doctrine,” by referring to an ideational-heuristic roadmapexplicitly meant to guide action, nicely encapsulates this pattern effect.

Policymaking remains a fragmented process involving shifting (and sometimes com-peting) coalitions of actors with differing policy preferences. In a cybernetic policy process,SODs provide the culturally derived heuristic framework through which preferences ofcoalitions of actors within the policy process itself, rather than fully integrated, are looselyand implicitly coordinated—this is done by structuring and affecting the particular balanceamong these coalitions, which ultimately changes the policy outputs that emerge out of thisprocess in accordance to a given SOD. As such, shifts between SODs would entail changesin the relative balance between coalitions, and would do so in accordance with a cyberneticpattern. For example, when confronted by significant environmental pressure (e.g., changesin the feedback variable), decision makers discard the current strategic doctrine for the SODnext in the response repertoire, and the political fortunes of the coalitions change as a result.

A cybernetic approach is clearly amenable for use in conjunction with ideational andcultural theories. At its core, cybernetic theory posits that “human beings lack the analyticalcapacities to scan over a wide range of alternatives and make fine-grain optimizationdecisions.” As Sylvan and Majeski go on to note, this opens the door to psychologicaland satisficing processes capable of leading “policymakers to focus on, or at least stronglyprefer, certain types of policy instruments over others.”41 For the purposes of this study,policymakers use heuristic shortcuts that lead them to focus on a higher-order priority (e.g.,the value) and to rely upon SODs to achieve that objective. This results in long-standingpatterns of behavior and a consistent and strategically informed Canadian grand strategy.

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A cybernetic organization implements SODs to achieve a minimally articulated notionof survival. In the Canadian case, the central values for policymakers are to maintainsecurity against domestic and international threats and sense of sovereignty, whether definedinternally as the state’s authority within its borders or externally in reference to the state’scapacity for independent action abroad.42 Canada is only able to safeguard its territorial andeconomic security in close cooperation with the United States, though such a partnershipcan ultimately detract from the country’s internal sovereignty and external independence.The reverse is also true: Canadian efforts to safeguard its political interest in sovereigntyin North America by maximizing distance could prove equally problematic. Ottawa couldfind itself facing possible security threats alone or dealing with U.S. unilateral securitymeasures capable of curtailing its capacity to act independently abroad. Clearly, securityand sovereignty are closely connected to one another, with the pursuit of one possiblyresulting in the failure to achieve the other, in what amounts to a situation of trade-offcomplexity.43

This dilemma was on display at the onset of the Second World War, when Canadacemented a security alliance with the Americans but also had to deal with their wartimepresence in its sparsely populated northern territory.44 This presence was only a tempo-rary aberration, but it certainly contributed to “the Canadian aversion to the presence ofAmerican forces in Canada and extreme sensitivity to the potential derogation of Canadiansovereignty.”45 As such, the successful pursuit of both values is dependent on ensuring thatCanada is neither too close to the Americas, nor too distant. Indeed, since movement ineither direction could endanger both values, decision makers seek to maintain security-sovereignty values within a limited range along the continental-independence continuum.

Any given SOD is rooted in past behavior and remains “in the doctrinal repertoire ofan organization so long as its operational record remains—or appears to remain—failure-free.”46 In a complex and fragmented organization, SODs create some basic unity amongthe competing coalitions of actors involved in a country’s foreign, defense, and securitypolicies. This conceptual distinction between a strategic culture continuum and culturallyderived SODs also helps disentangle some of the potentially problematic elements ofstrategic culture, which can result in forms of explanation that verge on tautology. Yetit also keeps intact the inclusion of behavior within the definitional confines of strategicculture, which aside from being in accordance to standard linguistic usage of culture alsomakes the concept so conceptually interesting.47 Canada’s two strategic subcultures, thecontinental-independence continuum and attendant SODs, will be further explicated in theremaining two sections.

Canadian Strategic Culture: Beliefs, Attitudes, and Inclinations

Canada’s two strategic subcultures not only have distinct interpretations of geopoliticalreality, but also sharply different answers to how Canada can and should relate to theUnited States. On one hand, continentalism reflects the positive attitude that historicallydeveloped in Canada toward the United States. This subculture is a product of the twentiethcentury, and harkens back to the interwar “doctrine of the two spheres” that distinguishedthe “morally righteous New World from a debased Old one.”48 This state of “peacefulcoexistence” has developed the normative affinity, mutual identification, and shared threatperception that mark a “security community,”49 to the extent that it verges on being atransnational collective identity. As David Haglund notes, the Canadian reaction to the9/11 attacks displayed all “the hallmarks of in-group solidarity at a moment of crisis.”50

This is clearly related to that curious Canadian tendency to have an expansive and flexible

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Canada’s Strategic Culture 231

definition of what needs to be defended beyond the country’s immediate territory, whetherin the form of an Anglosphere, North Atlantic community, or North America.51 However,there is no doubt that Canada’s collective identification or “we-ness” with the Americansremains sui generis. Both share a liberal democratic approach to domestic governance, anAnglo-Saxon heritage based on a common ancestry, a dense network of cultural, economic,and family ties, and a shared sense of belonging that has at the very least facilitated a verystrong “in-group” dynamic within North America.52

This subculture entails a relatively benign, even familial attitude toward the UnitedStates. Canada might have little choice other than to accept its geopolitical destiny inNorth America, but continentalism also recognizes the fortunate happenstance and indeedprivilege of being situated next to a friendly superpower. As then Minister of ExternalAffairs Louis St. Laurent noted in his 1947 Gray Lecture, Canada and the United Stateswere “[l]ike farmers whose lands have a common concession line,” who were able to settle“from day to day, questions that arise between us, without dignifying the process by the word‘policy.’ ”53 To be sure, this subculture implicitly warns that a refusal to be closely alignedto the United States on certain key issues could result in potential consequences, fromeconomic retaliation to a reduced Canadian voice on bilateral matters. St. Laurent wouldgo on to admonish his audience on the need for “constant watchfulness” and “imaginativeattention” on this relationship. Yet this warning was normatively framed as a matter ofCanada’s obligation to “accept our responsibility as a North American nation.”54

Continentalism propagates the belief that Canada’s foremost concern should be theUnited States. Other interests exist and undoubtedly will be pursued, but preference shouldalways be given to relations with our superpower patron. This is partly the result of agenerally pessimistic view of Canada’s ability, in the absence of American cooperation,to unilaterally safeguard its territory, play a significant role on the international stage, orachieve its political and economic interests alone. The subculture also has a relatively opti-mistic view of Canada’s position in North America. Political control over Canadian territorymight be modestly curtailed, but the potential benefits arising from closer Canada–U.S.alignment, such as having greater say on issues that might affect the country, are seen toeasily outweigh such inconveniences.55 In sum, it essentially agrees with the notion, oncesaid by head of the American Section of the Permanent Joint Board of Defense FiorelloLaGuardia, that “it is far better to trust to the honour of the United States, than to the mercyof the enemy.”56

Not surprisingly, the strategic inclinations encapsulated within this subculture are pri-marily directed at facilitating more expansive cooperation and integration with the UnitedStates. Perhaps the most robust expression of this integrationist impulse can be found inthe discussions over the idea of a “grand bargain,” in which Canada would trade significantdefense integration and border security harmonization in return for secure access to Amer-ican markets. Notably, such arguments have so far failed to gain much traction.57 However,proposals for limited “sectoral” integration have proven to be much more resilient, whetherin the form of missile defense, maritime integration, or a limited continental securityperimeter. Yet Canada has historically preferred loose bilateral arrangements, with even thebinational “NORAD anomaly” still largely limited to narrow issue-areas (e.g., air defense,early warning and attack assessment, and maritime warning).58 Indeed, Canada has oftenfound itself keen to balance existing bilateral ties with other multilateral arrangements,which continentalism is not necessarily adverse to provided that close strategic relationswith the Americans are maintained.

On the other hand, the independence subculture is representative of Canada’s rela-tive isolation within North America. The overwhelming American presence, magnified

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by the rapid growth of economic linkages in the postwar period, has no doubt fostereda certain amount of concern and even distrust toward our ally. This has its origins in theoften turbulent early history between Canada and the United States, when fears of manifestdestiny—whether conceived as military encroachment or an inevitable union—dominatedCanadian strategic concerns. Even today, the thought that the Canadian “mouse” could beeasily crushed by the American “elephant” has continued to linger. This subculture doesnot deny the existence of today’s close cultural affinity or economic ties between both coun-tries, but offers an alternative interpretation. Simply put, a transnational collective identitycan generate suspicion that is counter-hegemonic or unabashedly nationalist in character.In some sense, this reaction shows that collective identities can be held hostage to whatSigmund Freud has termed the “narcissism of minor differences.”59 Even the growth of eco-nomic ties can be viewed as further evidence of American economic encroachment. At thevery least, it makes Canada more vulnerable to economic retaliation and linkage politics.60

At its most extreme, it raises questions on whether the country gained independence fromGreat Britain only to become a “satellite” of the United States.61

The independence subculture does not necessarily entail hostility, as the neighborlinessin Canada–U.S. relations helps counterbalance any lingering sense of historic grievance. Butit does involve a very strong awareness of the power imbalance that marks the Canada–U.S.relationship. As such, the subculture’s general attitude is that of suspicion—that closeralignment would only give the United States additional leverage and means of pressure.It also believes that the best way to avoid such consequences is to keep the United Statesat a distance. As such, the tighter embrace prescribed by continentalism would only beself-defeating. Canada should not necessarily discard its relationship with Washingtonaltogether, but it would only be one among a diverse array of interests, some of which couldtake precedence. Canada’s ability to take an independent stand apart from our superpowerpatron, to pursue its own interests irrespective how it might affect its relationship with theAmericans, and to tell our ally “when their breath is bad,”62 to use John Holmes’ memorablephrase; all are founded on a generally optimistic view of Canada’s material capability toundertake independent action.

True, the independentist subculture shares with continentalism the belief that secu-rity is abundant within North America. It is, however, more skeptical on the role of theCanada–U.S. alliance in underpinning this situation, even as it is much more optimisticthat security is prevalent (if not exactly plentiful) outside of North America. In any event,it retains a high degree of confidence in Canada’s ability to navigate whatever securitychallenges might arise, and to do so without relying on the United States. At the same time,despite this general optimism, this subculture retains a very strong “realist” caution in itsassessment of Canada’s relationship with America, and is considerably less sanguine onthe possible consequences that close alignment might have on Canadian sovereignty, policyautonomy, and independence.

The strategic inclinations embedded within this subculture are geared toward maxi-mizing the distance between Canada and the United States. It entails at least an elementof what can be best described as isolationism or nonalignment, insofar as this subcultureis inclined to minimize international commitments that could possibly infringe on Cana-dian independence. On that level, it certainly harkens back to the interwar period, whenCanada keenly avoided substantial commitments to the League of Nations.63 More re-cently, it is more often equated with Thomas Hockin’s notion of voluntarism, which refersto Canada’s patient effort to “supplement, even transform, balance-of-power politics” by itscommitment to multilateralism.64 The argument for a multilateral counterweight is perhapsmost clearly made with reference to NATO. As a Minister of National Defence reportedly

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quipped, “with fifteen people in the bed you are less likely to get raped!”65 A more idealistargument focuses on the United Nations as an organization that embodies the opinion ofthe international community and is less beholden to the United States.

That being said, proponents of this argument rarely specify the process by whichmultilateralism can actually offset American preponderance. NATO never did develop intothe sort of broader political and economic “community” that could institutionally constrainthe United States.66 And the United Nations remains an even more problematic avenuefor Canada to achieve independence from the Americans. It remains to be seen whethersuch a change would actually entail an increase in independence or an illusionary facadebehind which Canada could further reduce its commitments. Indeed, these inclinationshave often been expressed in terms of rhetoric rather than substantive commitments—an“illusion of independence” that would shatter if Canada ever did “break more forcefully withthe direction of American foreign policy.”67 In that sense, the independentist subcultureis inclined toward “dishonest multilateralism,” which ignores the deficiencies of suchmeasures, often relies on them to avoid significant international contributions altogether, andexhibits the “uninspiring purpose of seeing how low Canadian expenditures on internationalaffairs can be kept without forfeiting Canada’s position in international forums.”68

This continental–independence divide within Canadian strategic culture bears morethan a passing resemblance to the Canadian foreign policy debate between quiet diplomacyand the independent approach that emerged several decades ago.69 Quiet diplomacy, cen-trally concerned with leveraging Canada’s “special relationship” with the United States,reflects elements within continentalism.70 The independent approach, suspicious of quietdiplomacy and keen to loosen ties with the Americans, can also be compared to the inde-pendentist subculture.71 This debate has done much to illustrate a fundamental feature thatunderpins Canada’s approach to dealing with the United States.72 Yet it would also be amistake to assume that this conceptualization of strategic culture can be equated or reducedto this earlier work. The identification of cultural tendencies within a broader cyberneticframework promises greater analytical substance that can go beyond prescriptive advocacy.Meanwhile, quiet diplomacy and independence themselves represent a dichotomy that“compressed and simplified a much more subtly varied landscape of ideas.”73 In contrast,this article avoids this problem by plotting the predispositions and inclinations along acontinuum, which can illustrate the full range of policy responses at play and debated inthe Canadian polity.

Standing Operational Doctrines in the Canadian Policy Process

Canada’s two subcultures display a significant amount of variation based on the relativeintensity of these attitudes and beliefs. For example, the continentalist attitude can rangefrom mild affection to a level of attachment in which Canadian and American interests arevirtually indistinguishable. The independentist subculture, in turn, can range from cautiousdetachment to a degree of suspicion that can only be described as anti-American. In theirmore modest formulations, the differences between the two subcultures are more in degreethan in kind, though in extremis can reflect different and indeed polar ways of relating tothe United States. Beliefs are certainly closely related to attitudes, insofar as the intensityof the general attitude of attachment or disenchantment would likely be strongly correlatedto the relative strength of the belief—e.g., the relative importance of relations with ourally, the belief in the feasibility and benefits of pursuing a more nonaligned approach,etc. Yet the relationship between these two factors retains some amount of attenuation.For example, beliefs can involve strategic calculations that complement certain attitudes

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234 D. S. McDonough

toward the United States, but cannot be broken down or simplified as reflecting suchattitudes.

For the sake of analytical simplicity, however, beliefs and attitudes will be collapsed intoan overarching conceptual category. Both factors are clearly related to one another, albeit notperfectly, while the most important elements of both—attitudinal predisposition towards theU.S. and the relative importance of Canada–U.S. relations—can together be distinguishedacross the two subcultures according to their relative intensity. To achieve a modicum ofparsimony, the intensity of this predisposition can be gauged based on the degree to whichrelations with the U.S. are prioritized. This belief seems to best encapsulate the strategiccultural element in how Canada relates to the United States, while reflecting core nationalinterests that are more closely related to behavioral inclinations than attitude alone.

Strategic culture is not simply reflective of the attitude and beliefs that underpin acountry’s conception of interests; it is also equally about those strategic inclinations thatlead directly toward certain types of strategic behavior. While inextricably tied to Canada’sgeneral predisposition toward the United States, behavioral inclinations actually prescribeactual types of action for the country to follow, while proscribing others. By providingideational guidance of a country’s actions, these ideational factors represent more concreteand self-contained constructs that can be differentiated more in kind than degree. As such,rather than simplifying them based on their degree of intensity, these inclinations can beidentified and plotted along a continental–independence continuum (see Figure 1).

Some of these inclinations, generally located in the middle “goldilocks zone” of thespectrum, are clearly on display in the country’s strategic policy debate and its goldilocksgrand strategy. Others, however, are at best unrealized inclinations that can either belogically derived or identified in the country’s foreign policy debate. One example is totalnonalignment, which would entail Canada’s withdrawal from its key alliance commitmentsto NORAD and NATO. Another example is the notion that Canada should set aside itssovereignty concerns to join what amounts to a Fortress North America. True, some moremodest elements may go beyond simple debate to percolate into Canadian policies; forexample, the degree of integration undoubtedly evident in the binational cooperation andmilitary interoperability between both countries, or the hints of nonalignment in Canada’sparticipation in the United Nations. As a whole, however, these more extreme inclinationshave never been featured as feasible options in the Canadian policy process.

Canada’s strategic culture is broader than its grand strategy, encompassing as it doesa wider spectrum of attitudes, beliefs, and inclinations on strategic issues than is actuallyexpressed in its defense and security policies. Elements of both subcultures are certainlymeant to help solve Canada’s fundamental dilemma of achieving security and maintainingsovereignty. Canadian goldilocks grand strategy reflects those inclinations in the contin-uum’s midrange. It does not stray too far in either direction of the spectrum, and is thereforerepresentative of either shifts between subcultures or alternatively the incorporation of el-ements of both cultural inclinations. Whatever the interpretation used, it is clear that a keypart of the story is explaining why certain inclinations are reflected in behavior and othersremain hypothetical.

Yet strategic culture alone remains too conceptually broad to account for and makepredictions about Canada’s strategic choices. As noted by Colin Dueck, strategic culture “atthe national level tends to act as a constraint, and a filter, rather than a determinant ‘cause’of grand strategy in and of itself.”74 To add greater specificity to the analysis and showhow strategic culture leads to behavior, cybernetic theory offers some definite advantages.Fortunately, by reconceptualizing strategic culture as a continuum, cultural factors becomeamenable to be processed and operationalized within a cybernetic process. As noted earlier,

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236 D. S. McDonough

Canada’s traditional interest in security and sovereignty can be conceptualized as the centralvalues being maintained and balanced in the cybernetic process. This approach also hasan important and highly beneficial consequence—it nicely avoids the risk of either beingdrawn into financially exorbitant American projects or bearing the cost of Canadian defenseand sovereignty missions alone.

The ideal balance for the values is situated in the goldilocks zone of this continental–independence continuum. On one hand, Canada’s willingness to be closely aligned to theUnited States may prove detrimental to Canadian sovereignty if taken to its extreme. Strate-gic or even sectoral integration inevitably raises the specter of American infringement onCanada’s territorial control and sovereign autonomy, while perhaps tarnishing the Canadianclaim of an independent role abroad. But security may itself become endangered if such aclose association helps to generate and magnify external threats or results in an involun-tary Canadian commitment to American policies, the latter point surely helping to explainOttawa’s long-standing insistence on maintaining command over military deployments.75

On the other hand, an attempt to achieve some semblance of nonalignment, either alone orthrough the prioritization of NATO or the UN, would prove equally harmful. Canada haslong relied upon its close defense relations with the United States to provide more securitythan it was capable of achieving alone. Indeed, any effort to maximize distance from theAmericans could leave Canada vulnerable to external threat and force it to work twice ashard to satisfy its ally’s security concerns. Canadian officials would do well to rememberthe benefits of having a “friendly agreement in advance” with the United States, lest theybe forced to take unilateral action capable of threatening Canadian sovereignty and evenits economic security.76 With its highly favorable burden-sharing arrangements, Canada’spartnership with the United States has also surely alleviated the financial and material costof maintaining sovereignty over this large and sparsely populated territory.

Importantly, a cybernetic process keeps these security-sovereignty values in a state ofbalance that minimizes potential trade-offs between them, and does so through a processmarked by minimal or bounded rationality. Behavior is minimally purposeful, heavily incre-mental, and based on routines that—with their degree of concreteness and coherency—canbe conceptualized as SODs designed to keep these values within their tolerance range.While reflecting ideal types, Canada’s actual strategic behavior and security policies followthe basic dictums expressed by two SODs. It is through this process that strategic culturalinclinations in the middle of the spectrum become realized, while others at the margin donot.

Continental soft-bandwagoning, which serves as the default SOD in the Canadian pol-icy repertoire, is primarily meant to ensure the continued existence of a close relationshipwith the United States. Originating in the security bargain struck at Kingston and Ogdens-burg, it is extremely receptive to close bilateral cooperation and represents an example ofa bandwagoning with the Americans. It also places relatively greater weight on nationalsecurity requirements over political interest in ensuring sovereignty. Indeed, bilateral coop-eration is not only seen as being normatively valued, insofar as it fulfils that internal needto be a good neighbor to our ally, but also represents a necessary requirement to achievesecurity and sovereignty. This does not mean, absent such cooperation, Canadian securitywould be immediately endangered or its sovereignty revoked. Nevertheless, it does meanthat both values would be more difficult and costly to achieve alone and more at risk ofbeing occasionally trammeled by our American ally.

Multilateral alliances and institutions are not necessarily arrangements to be avoided,especially given America’s own postwar penchant for multilateral institution building. But

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the UN and even NATO are largely seen to supplement and reinforce the Canada–U.S.alliance. Indeed, any move to prioritize these institutions at the expense of this continen-tal relationship would be difficult and unwise. With the strategic decline of Great Britain,Canada lost what was arguably its only true counterweight to American continental prepon-derance. While policymakers may flirt with the idea that multilateral organizations couldserve as a substitute, nothing more serious is likely to result. However, continental soft-bandwagoning is not necessarily dismissive of the challenges posed by extreme proximity.Stronger cooperation must be tempered with some degree of prudence, lest the Canadianmouse find itself accidentally tied to the elephant’s foot. In that sense, while associatedwith bandwagoning behavior, this SOD can be considered “soft” or moderately distant innature. Bilateral cooperation might be embraced, but not necessarily at the expense of thesort of security and sovereign protection that such cooperation is meant to guarantee. Someforms of cooperation are clearly within the acceptable range, while others are consideredbeyond the purview of the Canada–U.S. alliance, at least as it is presently conceived.

The central criterion for accepting some forms of cooperation and rejecting others isa relatively simple one. Cybernetic theory posits a process in which only a few criticalenvironmental variables are monitored and assessed according to their ability to push thevalue beyond its tolerance point. In the Canadian case, the environmental factor that canunbalance and create trade-offs between the security-sovereignty values centers primarilyon American strategic preferences, as reflected in those initiatives, projects, or trends thatoften emanate from Washington. Canada often avoids taking the initiative on such matters,often preferring to instead follow its larger and more senior partner. While the United Statesrarely offers an open invitation, there is equally very little doubt when it wants a partner tojoin—to participate in, endorse, or simply acquiesce to a politico-security initiative.

Four criteria can be identified to judge whether the critical or feedback variable wouldendanger security and sovereignty. First, Canada’s participation, endorsement, or acquies-cence must be valued, if not absolutely required. Otherwise, there would be little incentivefor or pressure on Canada and even less in the way of environmental stress. Second, theUnited States must consider an initiative to be a strategic priority. This primarily stemsfrom the understanding that Canada has greater freedom of action when Washington hasminimal interest in an initiative. If low in priority, there would be few consequences to re-jecting American overtures and little stress on Canadian security-sovereignty values. Third,the initiative must be underpinned by a particular American threat perception significantlydifferent from that in Canada, in degree as well as in kind. A divergence of threat per-ception, as when the U.S. has a higher sense of threat, makes it more difficult for Canadato justify close cooperation and increases disagreement on appropriate policy measures.Fourth, any strategic initiative must itself have characteristics difficult for Ottawa to easilyaccept, based on a gauge of its relative controversy among international or domestic au-diences. This judgment can be based directly on the initiative itself or be the result of theAmerican administration promoting or implementing it. For example, poor relations withOttawa make it difficult to have the mutual understanding necessary for smooth bilateralcooperation, while an unpopular administration only increases the cost of cooperation fora government interested in subsequent reelection.

If all four criteria are present, Canada would confront environmental pressures thatcould potentially disrupt the balance between security and sovereignty. As a result, Canadawould face definite incentives and pressure to be even more closely aligned with theAmericans. In such circumstances, while continental soft-bandwagoning could potentiallyincreasing security, this SOD would also threaten Canadian political interest in sovereignty

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and independence, and therefore serve as an ill-suited policy response. Instead, officialsturn to the alternative SOD in its policy repertoire—defensive weak-multilateralism—tofacilitate further distancing from the United States and re-balance the values back withintheir tolerance range.

That being said, the actual differences between the two SODs should not be exag-gerated. Cybernetic theory envisions largely incremental and conservative policy changescapable of compensating for the critical feedback variable and bringing the values backinto balance. As such, defensive weak-multilateralism is neither dismissive of the otherdoctrine’s penchant for bilateral cooperation with the Americans, nor necessarily naiveconcerning the potential benefits provided by international institutions. Yet it does entailgreater sensitivity on threats to sovereignty, greater inclination to being openly critical ofthe United States, and greater normative affinity toward multilateralism and institution-building—not only to seek refuge from its great power patrons and avoid internationalcommitments, but also to fulfill that idealist vision of being a “good international citizen.”77

By situating Canada–U.S. cooperation within a larger multilateral framework, Canadawould gain a useful semblance of independence and an opportunity to assert its own dis-tinct identity and status as a middle power. These two goals are certainly related. As AdamChapnick reminds us, the functional principle was often invoked as idealistic rhetoric toprovide “the appearance of Canadian independence” and to “justify the pursuit of Cana-dian global interests.”78 Importantly, the United States has shown itself equally willing to“absorb a great deal of rhetoric about divergences because it sees the Canadian governmentas being able to go only so far in its disengagement.”79

This also touches upon an important element of this SOD. On one hand, it offers adistinctively Canadian commitment to “middlepowermanship,” in which dependence uponthe United States is lessened and multilateral policies with a “defensive” bent are advanced.There might even be attempts at influencing or constraining some of the bellicosity inAmerica’s strategic behavior, in what has been termed the “diplomacy of constraint.”80 Onthe other hand, it also entails a superficial or “weak” commitment to such idealist goals.True, Canada must inculcate greater distance from the U.S. in order to rebalance security andsovereignty, and minimize any trade-off between them. However, a more radical departurewould only further disrupt these values and risk a more serious breach to the relationship. Itwould also violate a core tenet of cybernetic theory—minimal changes in policy responsesthat are only sufficient to compensate for feedback variables and preserve the value(s).Instead, defensive weak-multilateralism pursues a more modest approach, in which anydistancing from the United States is largely rhetorical and the pretence of independenceis balanced by continued, less visible forms of cooperation—a “two-track approach” thatmay be contradictory and ambiguous but has also proven remarkably resilient and evensuccessful.81

The modest changes within and between these two SODs provides much of the scopeto Canada’s goldilocks grand strategy and accounts for the continuity and consistencyevident in its strategic behavior. To be sure, a state may face a significant environmentalthreat to this value. For example, in the event of another catastrophic terrorist attack on theUnited States, Canada may be forced to make more fundamental compromises in how itdeals with American homeland insecurity, including perhaps a more extreme and untestedSOD. As Steinbruner acknowledges, “a cybernetic decision maker might well take strong,aggressive, radical action under certain kinds of environmental provocation.”82 However,even after 9/11, it remains to be seen whether Canada has fundamentally departed fromits balanced strategic approach toward the United States—the absence of dramatic policychanges in the last decade hints that the answer is negative.

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Canada’s Strategic Culture 239

Conclusion

The purpose of this article has been to offer a more refined account of Canadian strategicculture. By combining strategic cultural analysis with cybernetic theory, it is better ableto rectify some of the theoretical and methodological shortcomings of cultural analysis,while keeping the broad conceptual content many proponents of strategic culture havesought to retain. It is this cybernetic process, by which certain SODs are selected andothers are not, that provides a direct counter to Alastair Iain Johnston’s criticism that aholistic definition of strategic culture cannot explain “why particular tendencies or modesof strategic behavior are prominent in particular times.”83 Importantly, it does so without theoverly strict methodological and conceptual limitations recommended by Johnston, whichfew scholars have been willing to embrace in their own research.

The cultural-cybernetic model outlined here provides a potentially novel explanationto make sense of Canada’s “goldilocks” approach to grand strategy. More extreme strategic-doctrinal shifts toward proximity or distance are largely avoided, while modest SODs thattend to balance such competing inclinations are selected according to a consistent cyberneticpattern and result in policy choices marked by greater continuity than discontinuity. Assuch, there is reason to believe that elements of both subcultures—continentalism andindependence—are at play in the Canadian context and guide strategic choices in thiscountry. But these subcultures also include a wide array of differing inclinations, not allof which are readily apparent in the country’s behavior. Indeed, when plotted along acontinental-independence continuum, it becomes clear that only those tendencies in thenarrow goldilocks zone—coalescing in the form of the two dominant SODs—are realizedin Canada’s grand strategy.

This article has largely been focused on reconceptualizing strategic culture and ex-plicating a cultural-cybernetic model. It has given some thought on the role that culturaland cybernetic factors might have in underpinning Canadian strategic behavior, but it haslargely eschewed a direct test of this explanation on the Canadian case—if only for reasonsof space. Clearly, these factors might carry explanatory potential in understanding not onlythe ebb and flow of Canada’s grand strategy, but that of other countries as well. But furtherresearch needs to be done to confirm the utility of this explanation. On one hand, to providefurther evidentiary support for the cultural-cybernetic model, we need to fully probe thecultural and cybernetic determinants of Canada’s grand strategy. Ideally, it would not onlyinclude cases of Canada’s strategic behavior, but also a structured comparison with otherpossible explanations, such as Patrick Lennox’s “structural specialization” theory.84 Onthe other hand, it is equally logical to expand the theoretical inquiry to include not onlysmaller powers like Canada but also great powers. By expanding the case selection, thecultural-cybernetic explanation can be tested against states that come close to being crucialcases, insofar as it is among these great powers that one normally expects to see strategiccultural inclinations and grand strategy.

Notes

1. My thanks to Frank Harvey for bringing this point to my attention.2. David Haglund, “The US-Canada Relationship: How ‘Special’ is America’s Oldest Unbro-

ken Alliance?” in John Dumbrell and Axel R. Schafer, eds., America’s “Special Relationships”:Foreign and Domestic Aspects of the Politics of Alliance (London: Routledge, 2009), 72.

3. It is also visible in other areas, from how Canada approached NATO defence strategy duringthe Cold War to America’s military interventions in Korea and Vietnam. See David S. McDonough,

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“Canada, Grand Strategy, and the Asia-Pacific: Past Lessons, Future Directions,” Canadian ForeignPolicy Journal, vol. 18, no. 3 (2012): 273–286. For a full exposition of this grand strategy principle,see David S. McDonough, “Ambivalent Ally: Culture, Cybernetics, and the Evolution of CanadianGrand Strategy” (PhD dissertation, Dalhousie University, 2011).

4. See David S. McDonough, “Canada, NORAD, and the Evolution of Strategic Defence,”International Journal, vol. 67, no. 3 (2012): 755–769.

5. Patrick Lennox, At Home and Abroad: The Canada-US Relationship and Canada’s Placein the World (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2009), 5.

6. John Barlet Brebner, North Atlantic Triangle: The Interplay of Canada, the United Statesand Great Britain (Toronto: Ryerson Press 1945, reprinted by McClelland and Stewart Limited,1966), xxv.

7. Lennox, At Home and Abroad, 5, 7. On homeland security issues like intelligence, thedifference becomes closer to the 10:1 ratio one would expect from their respective populations. SeeDavid Haglund, “North American Cooperation in an Era of Homeland Security,” Orbis, vol. 47, no. 4(2003): 690.

8. Fen Osler Hampson, “Negotiating with Uncle Sam: Plus ca Change, Plus C’est la MemeChoise,” International Journal, vol. 65, no. 2 (2010): 306.

9. J. L. Granatstein and Norman Hillmer, For Better or for Worse: Canadian-American Re-lations: The Promise and the Challenge (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1983), 40. Previously,the United States still represented a significant military threat to British North America and laterCanadian territory, as demonstrated by invasions (1775–76, 1812–14), Anglo-American crises dur-ing the Civil War (1861–65), cross-border raids by groups from both sides (1837, 1864, 1866), andU.S. attempts at coercive diplomacy during the Venezuelan crisis (1895–96) and Alaska Panhandleboundary dispute (1903).

10. R. J. Sutherland, “Canada’s Long-Term Strategic Situation,” International Journal, vol. 17,no 3 (1962): 202.

11. Donald Barry and Duane Bratt, “Defense against Help: Explaining Canada-US SecurityRelations,” American Review of Canadian Studies, vol. 38, no. 1 (2008): 64. The notion of “defenceagainst help” was first outlined in Nils Ørvik, “Defence Against Help—A Strategy for Small States?”Survival, vol. 15, no. 5 (1973): 228–231.

12. Christopher Twomey, “Lacunae in the Study of Culture in International Security,” Contem-porary Security Policy, vol. 29, no. 2 (2008): 338–357. The term “strategic backwater” is from JoelSokolsky and Joseph Jockel, “Continental Defence: ‘Like Farmers Whose Lands Have a CommonConcession Line,’ ” in David S. McDonough, ed., Canada’s National Security in the Post-9/11 World:Strategy, Interests, and Threats (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2012), 120.

13. Colin Gray, Canadian Defence Priorities: A Question of Relevance (Toronto: Clark, Irwin& Company, 1972), 15.

14. Brian Bow, “Paradigms and Paradoxes: Canadian Foreign Policy in Theory, Research andPractice,” International Journal, vol. 65, no. 2 (2010): 371–380.

15. Gray, Canadian Defence Priorities, 15.16. For more on the linkage between strategic culture and constructivism, see Jeffrey Lantis,

“Strategic Culture: From Clausewitz to Constructivism,” Strategic Insights, vol. 4, no. 10 (2005).17. Beatrice Heuser, “Foreword,” in Jeannie Johnson et al., eds., Strategic Culture and Weapons

of Mass Destruction: Culturally Based Insights into Comparative National Security Policymaking(New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), xi.

18. Jack Snyder, The Soviet Strategic Culture: Implications for Nuclear Options, R-2154-AF(Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, September 1977); Colin Gray, “National Style in Strategy:The American Example,” International Security, vol. 6, no. 2 (Autumn 1981): 21–47; and Colin Gray,Nuclear Strategy and National Style (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1986).

19. Alastair Iain Johnston, Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in ChineseHistory (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), 8, 12–14.

20. Alastair Iain Johnston, “Thinking about Strategic Culture,” International Security, vol. 19,no. 4 (Spring 1995): 32–64. For a more recent review of strategic culture scholarship, see David

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S. McDonough, “Grand Strategy, Culture, and Strategic Choice: A Review,” Journal of Military andStrategic Studies, vol. 13, no. 4 (2011): 1–33.

21. Johnston’s theory was meant to rectify what he saw as some of the conceptual and method-ological problems associated with the third generation of scholarship, such as its narrower and lesshistorically grounded definition of culture and its use of intervening variables. It is therefore curi-ous that Johnston is often considered “the quintessential third-generation work on strategic culture.”See Lantis, “Strategic Culture,” 4. In fact, it might be more accurate to describe him as a stand-alone example of a fourth generation of scholarship, which never really found much in the way ofadherents.

22. Colin Gray, “Strategic Culture as Context: The First Generation of Theory Strikes Back,”Review of International Studies, vol. 25 (1999): 50.

23. Alastair Iain Johnston, “Strategic Cultures Revisited: Reply to Colin Gray,” Review ofInternational Studies, vol. 25 (1999): 519–523.

24. On the former, see Colin Gray, “Out of the Wilderness: Prime-Time for Strategic Culture,”paper prepared for the Defense Threat Reduction Agency’s Advanced Systems and Concepts Office,31 October 2006. The later point is raised in Twomey, “Lacunae in the Study of Culture,” 348

25. Stephane Roussel and Jean-Christophe Boucher, “The Myth of the Pacific Society: Que-bec’s Contemporary Strategic Culture,” American Review of Canadian Studies, vol. 38, no. 2 (2008):165–187; and Justin Massie, “Making Sense of Canada’s “Irrational” International Security Policy:A Tale of Three Strategic Cultures,” International Journal, vol. 64, no. 3 (2009): 625–645.

26. Alan Bloomfield and Kim Richard Nossal, “Towards an Explicative Understanding ofStrategic Culture: The Cases of Australia and Canada,” Contemporary Security Policy, vol. 28, no.2 (2007): 286–307; and David Haglund, “What Good is Strategic Culture?” International Journal,vol. 59, no. 3 (2004): 479–502.

27. This criticism is noted in David Elkins and Richard Simeon, “A Cause in Search of itsEffects, Or What Does Political Culture Explain?” Comparative Politics, vol. 11 (1979), 127–145.

28. Twomey, “Lacunae in the Study of Culture,” 338–357.29. Jeannie Johnson, Kerry Kartchner, and Jeffrey Larsen, “Introduction,” in Johnson et al.,

eds., Strategic Culture, 5.30. Jeffrey Lantis and Andrew Charlton, “Continuity or Change: The Strategic Culture of

Australia,” Comparative Strategy, vol. 30, no. 4 (2011): 291–315.31. Twomey, “Lacunae in the Study of Culture,” 350.32. John Steinbruner, The Cybernetic Theory of Decision: New Dimensions of Political Analysis

(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974), 64, 65.33. Colin Dueck, Reluctant Crusader: Power, Culture, and Change in American Grand Strategy

(Princeton; Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2006), 37.34. Steinbruner, The Cybernetic Theory of Decision, 1835. Ibid., 75.36. Robin Marra, “A Cybernetic Model of the US Defense Expenditure Policymaking Process,”

International Studies Quarterly, vol. 29, no. 4 (1985): 361.37. Steinbruner, The Cybernetic Theory of Decision, 77, 78.38. Douglas Ross, In the Interests of Peace: Canada and Vietnam 1954–1973 (Toronto:

University of Toronto Press, 1984), 26.39. Ibid.40. Nossal and Bloomfield, “Towards an Explicative Understanding,” 288.41. David Sylvan and Stephen Majeski, US Foreign Policy in Perspective: Clients, Enemies

and Empire (London; New York: Routledge, 2009), 10.42. Eric Lerhe, “Canada-US Military Interoperability: At What Cost Sovereignty?” (PhD

dissertation, Dalhousie University, 2012), 18–19.43. For more on trade-off complexity, see Steinbruner, The Cybernetic Theory of Decision,

16–17.44. For example, the U.S. Army had deployed a veritable “Army of Occupation” to work

on defence projects in the Far North, which led to a presence of 43,000 military and civilians on

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Canadian territory. Shelagh Grant, Sovereignty or Security? Government Policy in the CanadianNorth, 1936–1950 (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1988), chapter 5.

45. R. J. Sutherland, “The Strategic Significance of the Canadian Arctic,” in R. St. J. Macdonald,ed., The Arctic Frontier (Toronto: University of Toronto Press 1966), 261.

46. Ross, In the Interests of Peace, 31.47. Gray, “Strategic Culture as Context,” 69.48. David Haglund, “Are We the Isolationists? North American Isolationism in a Comparative

Context,” International Journal, vol. 58, no. 1 (2002–2003): 11.49. See Stephane Roussel, The North American Democratic Peace: Absence of War and Se-

curity Institution Building in Canada-US relations, 1867–1958 (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2004); and Justin Massie, “Canada’s (In)dependence in the North AmericanSecurity Community: The Asymmetrical Norm of Common Fate,” American Review of CanadianStudies, vol. 37, no. 4 (2007): 493–516.

50. Haglund, “The US-Canada Relationship,” 68.51. Kim Richard Nossal “Defending the ‘Realm’: Canadian Strategic Culture Revisited,” In-

ternational Journal, vol. 59, no. 3 (2004): 503–520.52. David Haglund, “And the Beat Goes On: ‘Identity’ and Canadian Foreign Policy,” in Robert

Bothwell and Jean Daudelin, eds., Canada Among Nations 2008: 100 Years of Canadian ForeignPolicy (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2009), 356.

53. The Rt. Hon. Louis S. St. Laurent, “The Foundations of Canadian Policy in World Affairs,”Duncan and John Gray Memorial Lecture, January 13, 1947, in R. A. Mackey, ed., Canadian ForeignPolicy, 1945–1954: Selected Speeches and Documents (Toronto; Montreal: McClelland and StewartLimited, 1971), 388.

54. Ibid.55. Massie, “Canada’s (In)dependence,” 493–51656. Quoted in Galen Roger Perras, Franklin Roosevelt and the Origins of the Canadian–

American Security Alliance, 1933–1945: Necessary But Not Necessary Enough (Westport: Praeger,1998), 81.

57. These arguments seem to overstate the American interest in such a comprehensive perime-ter. See Joel Sokolsky and Philippe Lagasse, “Suspenders and a Belt: Perimeter and Border Securityin Canada-US Relations,” Canadian Foreign Policy, vol. 12, no. 3 (2005–06): 15–29.

58. James Fergusson, Beneath the Radar: Change and Transformation in the Canada-US NorthAmerican Defence Relationship (Calgary: Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute, 2009), 5.For more on the anomalous nature of NORAD in Canada-US relations, see Sokolsky and Jockel,“Continental Defence,” 114–137.

59. Haglund, “And the Beat Goes On,” 35660. For more on hard and soft forms of retaliation, see Brian Bow, The Politics of Linkage:

Power, Independence and Ideas in Canada-US Relations (Vancouver: University of British ColumbiaPress, 2009) and “Rethinking ‘Retaliation’ in Canada-US Relations,” in Brian Bow and PatrickLennox, eds., An Independence Foreign Policy for Canada? Challenges and Choices for the Future(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2009), 63–82.

61. Kenneth McNaught, “From Colony to Satellite,” in Stephen Clarkson, ed., An IndependentForeign Policy for Canada? (Toronto; Montreal: McClelland and Stewart for the University Leaguefor Social Reform, 1968), 173–183.

62. John Holmes, Life with Uncle: The Canadian-American Relationship (Toronto; Buffalo:University of Toronto Press, 1981), 137

63. This isolationist sentiment is perhaps most commonly associated with Mackenzie King’schief foreign policy advisor of the prewar period, O. D. Skelton. This might appear a curiousplacement, given that Skelton was a strong supporter of relations with the United States. However,Skelton’s views also took place during the interwar period, when isolationism was largely directed atGreat Britain and can be described as anti-imperial (and perhaps anti-British) in nature. For more onSkelton’s views, see Norman Hillmer, “O. D. Skelton and the North American Mind,” InternationalJournal, vol. 60, no. 1 (2004–05): 93–110.

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Canada’s Strategic Culture 243

64. Thomas Hockin, “The Foreign Policy Review of Decision Making in Canada,” in LewisHertzman et al., eds., Alliances and Illusions: Canada and the NATO-NORAD Question (Edmonton:M. G. Hurtig Ltd., 1969), 95, 99.

65. Quoted in Sutherland, “Canada’s Long-Term Strategic Situation,” 207.66. Instead, Canada had to settle for largely rhetorical commitment in the form of Article

2 of the North Atlantic Treaty. See David Haglund, “The NATO of Its Dreams? Canada and theCo-Operative Security Alliance,” International Journal, vol. 52, no. 3 (1997): 464–482.

67. Patrick Lennox, “The Illusion of Independence,” in Brian Bow and Patrick Lennox, eds., AnIndependent Foreign Policy for Canada? Challenges and Choices for the Future (Toronto: Universityof Toronto Press, 2009), 45.

68. Kim Richard Nossal, “Pinchpenny Diplomacy: The Decline of ‘Good International Citi-zenship’ in Canadian Foreign Policy,” International Journal, vol. 54, no. 1 (1998–99): 104. For moreon dishonest multilateralism, see Frank Harvey, “Dispelling the Myth of Multilateral Security after 11September and the Implications for Canada,” in David Carment et al., eds., Canada Among Nations2003: Coping with the American Colossus (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 2003), 200–218.

69. See Clarkson, An Independent Foreign Policy for Canada?70. Peter Lyon, “Quiet Diplomacy Revisited,” in Clarkson, ed., An Independent Foreign Policy

for Canada?, 29–41.71. See Stephen Clarkson, “The Choice to Be Made” in Clarkson, ed., An Independent Foreign

Policy for Canada?, 253–269. Elements of the independence approach are also reflected in the viewsof Jamie Minifie and John Warcock.

72. It has also been reiterated in the writings of others. See Allan Gotlieb, Romanticism andRealism in Canadian Foreign Policy, Benefactors Lecture 2004 (Ottawa: C.D. Howe Institute, 2004);Massie, “Canada’s (In)dependence,” 493–516; Erika Simpson, NATO and the Bomb: CanadianDefenders Confront Critics (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2001); andMichael Tucker, “Canada and Arms Control: Perspectives and Trends,” International Journal, vol. 36,no. 3 (1981): 635–656.

73. Brian Bow and Patrick Lennox, “Introduction: The Question of Independence, Then andNow,” in Clarkson, ed., An Independent Foreign Policy for Canada?, 4.

74. Dueck, Reluctant Crusader, 36.75. For a good account, see David Bercuson and J. L. Granatstein, “From Paardeberg to

Panjwai: Canadian National Interests in Expeditionary Operations,” in McDonough, ed., Canada’sNational Security, 193–208.

76. The term “friendly agreement in advance” was reportedly used by President Rooseveltin talks with Great Britain concerning American access to bases in British imperial West Indianterritories. While noting that it was the U.S. preference to have such an agreement, there was also animplicit threat that the US would—if deemed necessary—take the territories in any event. See Perras,Franklin Roosevelt, 76.

77. See Nossal, “Pinchpenny Diplomacy,” 88–105.78. Adam Chapnick, “Principle for Profit: The Functional Principle and the Development of

Canadian Foreign Policy, 1943–47,” Journal of Canadian Studies, vol. 37, no. 2 (2002): 78, 69.79. Roger Swanson, “Deterrence, Detente, and Canada?” Proceedings of the Academy of

Political Science, vol. 32, no. 2 (1976): 11180. See Denis Stairs, The Diplomacy of Constraint: Canada, the Korean War, and the United

States (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1974) and Ross, In the Interests of Peace. However,as later noted by Ross, this diplomacy has admittedly “yielded no visible record of success in eitherKorea or Vietnam.” See his “Canada’s International Security Strategy: Beyond Reason but Not Hope?”International Journal, vol. 65, no. 2 (2010): 351 (emphasis in original).

81. The two-track approach refers to how Canada sought to balance support for Americannuclear strategy with simultaneous advocacy for arms control and strategic stability. See PhilippeLagasse, “Canada, Strategic Defence and Strategic Stability: A Retrospective and Look Ahead,”International Journal, vol. 63, no. 4 (2008): 917–937.

82. Steinbruner, The Cybernetic Theory of Decision, 65.

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83. See Johnston, Cultural Realism, 13.84. Lennox, At Home and Abroad.

David S. McDonough (dsmcdonough@hotmail.com) is a SSHRC post-doctoral fellow inthe Department of Political Science, University of British Columbia. He completed a PhDin political science at Dalhousie University in 2011 and is a research fellow at Dalhousie’sCentre for Foreign Policy Studies. He is a recipient of the SSHRC Canadian GraduateScholarship (2006–09), the SDF Dr. Ronald Baker Doctoral Scholarship (2009–10), andHonorary Izaak Walton Killam Predoctoral Scholarship (2008–11). He held positions atthe Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, the Royal Canadian Military Institute, andthe International Institute for Strategic Studies. He has published widely on internationalsecurity in International Journal, RUSI Journal, Strategic Survey, On Track, Orbis, Journalof Military and Strategic Studies, Canadian Naval Review, SITREP, Strategic Datalink, andThird World Quarterly. He completed a monograph in the IISS Adelphi Paper series onNuclear Superiority: The New Triad and the Evolution of Nuclear Strategy (2006), and isthe editor of the University of Toronto Press volume, Canada’s National Security in thePost-9/11 World: Strategy, Interests, and Threats (2012).

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