Getting a grip: Critical systems for corporate responsibility

& ResearchPaper

Getting a Grip: Critical Systemsfor Corporate Responsibility

Martin Reynolds*

Department of Communication and Systems, Open Systems Research Group, The Open University, WaltonHall, Milton Keynes, MK7 6AA, UK

Three dilemmas of corporate social responsibility (CSR) are described in relation to aproposed triadic critical systems framework based on boundary critique. First, the holisticdilemma of addressing triple bottom line interests in economic, social and environmentalissues. This speaks to a ‘framework for understanding’ in making sense of interrelation-ships between entities in a complex reality (‘getting real’). Second, the dilemma ofnurturing cooperation amongst stakeholders having diverse viewpoints. This speaks toa ‘framework for practice’ in fostering engagement between multiple perspectives basedon different boundaries (‘getting it right’). A third dilemma of CSR is presented in terms of‘getting a grip’—a concern that speaks to a ‘framework for responsibility’ in addressingthe moral dilemma that any methodology, approach, system or framework can neither beentirely holistic nor appropriately conversant with all perspectives. With this caveat inmind, the paper examines one particularly significant systems tool for addressing CSRdilemmas—critical systems heuristics (CSH). Applying the triadic framework, the poten-tial value of CSH for CSR is surfaced from two contrasting perspectives—the CSRadvocate and the CSR adversary. Copyright # 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Keywords boundary critique; critical systems; CSH; CSR; systems thinking

INTRODUCTION

Corporate social responsibility (CSR) hasacquired considerable currency as a moralimperative since its inception in the early1970s, particularly with the extension of moralconcern from ‘shareholders’ to ‘stakeholders’ as

an accepted lingua-franca of business languagesince the late 1980s (Tepper Marlin and TepperMarlin, 2003). In more recent years the moralcommunity has extended further still to includenon-human nature, exemplified with the fre-quent dropping of the ‘social’ from CSR (exem-plified in the title of this paper). With thiswidening of the moral community to whichcorporate bodies claim responsibility, particulardilemmas around CSR have come intoprominence.

SystemsResearch andBehavioral ScienceSyst. Res.25, 383^395 (2008)Published online inWiley InterScience(www.interscience.wiley.com)DOI:10.1002/sres.901

*Correspondence to: Martin Reynolds, Department of Communi-cation and Systems, Open Systems Research Group, The Open Uni-versity, Walton Hall, Milton Keynes, MK7 6AA, UK.E-mail: [email protected]

Copyright # 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Three central dilemmas of CSR aremapped outand explored in relation to traditions of systemsthinking. A critical systems framework is thenproposed to help identify what CSR mightrealistically promise. Significantly, the frameworkalso reveals what CSR simply cannot deliver or,more importantly, be allowed to pretend todeliver. This is illustrated with reference to aproposed systems tool for CSR—critical systemsheuristics (CSH)—and its value in framing CSRfrom two contrasting perspectives.

CSR DILEMMAS AND SYSTEMSTHINKING

‘CSR is a company’s commitment to operate in aneconomically, socially and environmentally sus-tainable manner whilst balancing the interests ofdiverse stakeholders’.1

This succinct definition provided by CSR Asia,one of the most active and extensive networks ofits kind, speaks of twowidely accepted dilemmasof CSR. First, the extensive range of responsi-bilities to which a corporate organisation mustaddress, encapsulated in what Elkington (1998)calls the triple bottom line—companies beingresponsive not just to financial/economic inter-ests, but to society, and ‘the environment’. For thepurpose of this discussion I shall use theterm ‘ecology’ referring specifically to naturalbiophysical factors rather than ‘the environment’.This avoids confusion with the systems traditionin referring ‘environment’ to all factors—social,economic and ecological—outside the control of aspecified system. The dilemma is how might anysystem like an organization possibly take intoaccount and be responsible for the infinite scopeof complex interrelationships? In short, to whatmight CSR be responsible?

A second dilemma concerns the multitude ofperspectives on these interrelationships and therole of corporate activity. Different stakeholderswill have different perspectives on what thereality of corporate activity is about (Sen andBhattacharya, 2001; Doh and Guay, 2006).

Customers, shareholders and corporate workersmay have very different views on the corporateenterprise in which they are involved, let alonethe multiple views of other stakeholders whomay otherwise be affected by corporate activity(Achterkamp and Vos, 2007). This seconddilemma raises the question of how respectmight be given tomultiple perspectives? In short,to whom is CSR responsible and how is itenacted?

A third dilemma can be brutally stated. Inshort—given the clear difficulties associatedwith the first two dilemmas—why do it? Is it agenuine attempt to be responsible or to be seen tobe responsible? Joel Bakan in a debate with TomBurke makes the point that companies by theirvery nature have a prime responsibility to makemoney for its shareholders (Burke and Baken,2005). Any other declared responsibilities—whether to society or the environment—mustbe viewed as subservient to profit. Thus Bakenquotes a high profile corporate chief executivesaying that CSR is ‘not [an] act of charity but whatcould be called enlightened self-interest’ (ibid.p. 28). CSR might be helpful, claims Baken, ifconsidered transparently as part of an overallstrategic plan of the company showing priority ofinterest to their shareholders. But Baken furthersuggests that when reports are considered asproviding some benevolent sense of a priori socialresponsibility as an end in itself they are actuallyproviding a false sense of legitimacy for corpor-ate deregulation; arguing that companies beultimately trusted to regulate themselves. Thedilemma here is therefore one of legitimacy; whyshould CSR be taken as a legitimate activity?

The three dilemmas of CSR can be paraphrasedsuccessively in terms of ‘getting real’, ‘getting itright’ and ‘getting a grip’. They relate to threeprinciples of contemporary systems thinking.The first two can be associated with a simpledistinction made by Jake Chapman:

‘The core aspects of systems thinking aregaining a bigger picture (going up a level ofabstraction) and appreciating other people’sperspectives’ (Chapman, 2004, p. 14).

Chapman builds on a distinction made byRichard Bawden (1998) in identifying two1http://www.csr-asia.com/index.php accessed 3 April 2008.

Copyright � 2008 JohnWiley & Sons,Ltd. Syst. Res.25, 383^395 (2008)DOI:10.1002/sres

384 Martin Reynolds

RESEARCHPAPER Syst. Res.

transitions in systems thinking: one, towardsholism, and another towards pluralism. First isthe principle of holistic interconnectedness—everything relates to each other—hence the needfor ‘joined-up-thinking’. Systems ideas in thistradition include expressions of first-order cyber-netics such as the viable systems model under-pinning The Brain of the Firm (Beer, 1972), andsystems dynamics underpinning Limits to Growth(Meadows et al., 1972), and ‘systems thinking’ inThe Fifth Discipline (Senge, 1990). The holisticprinciple is ontological; a statement about realworld interconnectedness and feedback.

Second, is the constructivist principle based onthe epistemological notion of systems as concep-tual constructs used for developing knowledgeabout reality as well as guiding our activities inreshaping reality—serving the need for makingnew realities. Systems ideas in this traditioninclude second-order cybernetics such as autop-oeisis (Maturana and Varela, 1980) and a rangeof problem-structuring methods including softsystems methodology, cognitive mapping andothers (Rosenhead and Mingers, 2001). Suchworks raise important questions regarding howto respond to multiple stakeholder perspectivesor, as Maturana puts it, how to practice beingepistemologically ‘multiverse’, as distinct fromassuming access to some ontological ‘universe’(or multiple ontological universes, as with ascientific meaning of multiverse) (Maturana andPoerksen, 2004, p. 38).

The relative emphases of ontological andepistemological traditions can be appreciatedin the distinction made by Cabrera et al. (2008)between ‘thinking about systems’ (e.g. ecosys-tems, health systems, legal systems etc.) and‘systems thinking’. Systems thinking is an activecognitive endeavour, with systems conceived asconceptual epistemological constructs, mostclosely aligned with a soft systems tradition. Athird critical systems tradition deals with themethodological limitations and inevitable pro-blems of selectivity in thinking holistically andinterconnectedly, and being pluralistically multi-verse. This relates to the third dilemma of CSR—that is, CSR legitimacy—prompting questionsconcerning the boundaries of any activity.Critical systems thinking (CST) is an umbrella

term used in association with this third tradition.Whilst CST has several contested expressions(Jackson, 2003; Ulrich, 2003) for the purposes ofthis paper, and building on earlier work(Reynolds, 2006; 2007a; 2008), I offer my owndefinition of CST based more on Ulrich’s work interms of a critical systems framework.

CRITICAL SYSTEMS FRAMEWORKFOR CSR

A critical systems framework constitutes threedistinct though interrelated (sub)frameworks:firstly, a framework for understanding (fwU)complex interrelationships and interdependen-cies; secondly, a framework for practice (fwP)when engaging with different perspectives; andthirdly, a composite framework for responsibility(fwR) in dealing ethically with inevitablelimitations on being holistically ‘universe’ andpluralistically ‘multiverse’. The triadic criticalsystems framework is an expression of boundarycritique (Ulrich, 2003)—an eternal triangle ofinterplay between judgements of ‘fact’, valuejudgements and boundary judgements:

‘Thinking through the triangle means toconsider each of its corners in the light ofthe other two. For example, what new factsbecome relevant if we expand the boundariesof the reference system or modify our valuejudgments? How do our valuations look if weconsider new facts that refer to a modifiedreference system? In what way may ourreference system fail to do justice to theperspective of different stakeholder groups?Any claim that does not reflect on the under-pinning ‘triangle’ of boundary judgments,judgments of facts, and value judgments, risksclaiming too much, by not disclosing itsbuilt-in selectivity’ (Ulrich, 2003, p. 334).

Each corner of the triangle might itself beassociated with a type of reference system: fwUfor the ontological world of ‘facts’; fwP for theepistemological world of perspectives; and fwRfor the methodological world of ethics—doing‘good’, doing ‘right’ and being responsible.


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Syst. Res. RESEARCHPAPER

Figure 1 illustrates the critical systems frame-work. The triadicity signals both the dynamicinterplay between the three systems traditions,and a corresponding interplay between threedimensions of a systems intervention: theontological, epistemological andmethodological.

The three frameworks can be regarded assystems for addressing CSR dilemmas. The fwUprovides a system for ‘getting real’—translatingcomplex realities into manageable systems. ThefwP provides a system for ‘getting it right’—enabling multiple perspectives to engage withconstructing better systems. The fwR provides asystem for ‘getting a grip’—responsibly comingto terms with inevitable incomplete understand-ing and inadequate practice.

CSR AND CRITICAL SYSTEMS:RESPONSIBILITY AS ‘CONVERSATION’

A critical systems framework is in itself not amethodology but rather a guide to interventioncouched in terms of three (sub)frameworks.Figure 2 translates the triadic framework from

Figure 1 into a cycle of intervention supportingCSR. The illustration here is helpful in emphasis-ing the constructivist notion of system andappreciating CSR as itself a system for guidinga process of continual conversation. The con-versation is between systems—conceptual con-structs (boundary judgements or frameworks) forunderstanding and practice—and situations—real world sites of transformation (requiringjudgements of ‘fact’), mediated by stakeholders(embodying the space for value judgements).

Two sets of tensions are evident in theconversation. One tension is between systemsand situations; that is, not confusing the ‘map’ forthe ‘territory’—to use an important adage fromKorzybski (1933). The other tension is betweenpractice and understanding; a tension that else-where is referred to in terms of ‘social learning’ (cf.Blackmore et al., 2007). The two dimensions oftension resonate with two dialectical processesconstituent of the experiential learning cycle (Kolb,1984): (i) between ‘abstract conceptualisation’[systems] and ‘concrete experience’ [situations];and (ii) between ‘active experimentation’ [practice]and ‘reflective observation’ [understanding].

Figure 1. Critical systems framework


386 Martin Reynolds


Responsibility as conversation provides anoverall guiding ethic which might helpfully beappreciated in terms of response-ability (cf. Ison,2002). Response-ability relates to how wellsystems converse with situations, and howpractice converses with understanding. Morespecifically, it relates to two overarching concernsin moral philosophy. One is the consequentialist(utilitarian) concern of ‘doing what’s good (notharm)’. This is addressed principally throughfwU in ‘getting real’, a framework that invokesmore the tension between system and situation.The other is the deontological (rights-based)concern of ‘doing what’s right (not wrong)’.This is addressed principally through fwP in‘getting it right’, a framework that invokesmore the tension between practice and under-standing. The fwR guiding these moral concernsin terms of ‘getting a grip’ might be consideredin terms of the simple virtue ethic of beingresponsible.

To summarise, from a critical systems frame-work perspective a system has three purposeswith respect to conversing with reality: to supportunderstanding of reality, to support practice with

engaging multiple perspectives on reality, and toguide responsibility in changing reality. Theremainder of this paper discusses one significanttool derived from the critical systems tradition—critical systems heuristics (CSH)—developed byWerner Ulrich (1983) with the influence of WestChurchman (1979). I examine its value for CSRfrom two perspectives using a critical systemsframework. One, an optimistic perspective exem-plified by Jonathan Porritt, a CSR advocate andadvisor to corporate bodies. The other, anadversarial perspective, exemplified by ClaireFauset, a CSR sceptic who supports direct actionagainst corporate activity. The paper draws on anexchange about CSR between the two protagonists(Fauset and Porritt, 2007).

CSR AND CSH: THE ROLE OF THEADVOCATE AND THE ADVERSARY

CSH as a general framework offers 12 boundedcategories (Table 1). Ulrich presents CSHcategories in four groups of three according tosources of influence—(1) motivation, (2) control,

Figure 2. Conversing between system of CSR and situational context




(3) expertise and (4) legitimacy. They are alsogrouped by Ulrich as three category-sets ofquestions—social role, role-concerns and keyproblems. In practice I have found it useful torephrase these category sets in terms of (i)stakeholders, (ii) stakes and (iii) stakeholdings,respectively (Reynolds, 2007b). Stakes are the coreinterests or concerns associated with a particularstakeholder group relevant to a system. Stakehold-ing conveys the idea that stakes are not residualentities but relational attributes that can beactively constructed by stakeholders as well asdefended and promoted. In CSH terms stake-holding conveys a problematic tension whichholds promise of development as well as the riskof intransigence for particular stakeholdergroups. The phrasing of each of the fourstakeholding categories in Table 1 differs fromUlrich to emphasise the tension held in eachcategory.

Detailed descriptions of the CSH categoriesdepicted in Table 1 and practical examples oftheir use in different contexts can be sought fromUlrich himself (e.g. 1983; 1987; 1996) and,amongst many others, Flood and Jackson(1991) and Reynolds (1998; 2007b). Here Iwant to focus more generically on the CSHcategories (referred to hereafter as CSHc1,CSHc2. . .CSHc12) and their relation to CSR. Ibegin with distinguishing CSR as a system andthe stakeholder roles of the two protagonistsassociated with CSR—the advocate and theadversary.

CSR as a System of Interest

From a systems viewpoint, purpose (CSHc2)might be considered the prime stake from whichis derived all the stakeholder groups and their

Table 1. Critical systems heuristic questions as stakeholders, stakes and stakeholdings (adapted from Ulrich, 1996)

Constituents to a genericpurposeful system (S)

Sources ofinfluence

Stakeholders(social roles)

Stakes(specific concerns)

Stakeholdings(key problems)

Sources ofmotivation

1. Beneficiarywho is the clientor beneficiaryof the system (S)

2. Purposewhat is the purposeof S in terms ofsome improvementbeing sought?

3. Measure of successwhat is S’s measureof, as distinct fromactual, improvement?

The involved

Sources ofcontrol

4. Decision makerwho is in commandof resourcesnecessary toenable S?

5. Resourceswhat are necessaryrelevant components(‘capital’) to secureimprovement?

6. Decision environmentwhat conditions arerelevant but outsidethe control of thedecision maker?

Sources ofknowledge

7. Expert who isproviding expertsupport for S?

8. Expertisewhat are therelevant skills andknowledge supporting S?

9. Guarantorwhat are regardedas assurances andfalse assurances ofsuccessfulimplementation?

Sources oflegitimacy

10. Witness who isrepresenting theinterests of thosenegatively affected by,but not involvedwith, S?

11. Emancipationwhat are the opportunitiesfor the interests of thosenegatively affected tohave expression andfreedom fromworldview of S?

12. Worldviews whatspace is availablefor reconcilingworldview ofaffected withworldview of S?

The ‘affected’


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respective concerns and problems. If the system’spurpose is first defined as ‘to fulfil CSR’, therespective roles of the advocate and the adver-sary might be as follows:

(1) Role of the CSR advocate: The CSR advocate/adviser would ideally play the role of expert(CSHc7) expected to provide expertise(CSHc8) to ensure the success of such asystem and to avoid generating false assur-ances (CSHc9).

(2) Role of the CSR adversary: The CSR adversarywould be considered as witness to theconcerns of those affected by CSR (CSHc10).Their role is to provide a voice to thosesubjugated stakeholders and stakes silencedby the dominating rhetoric of CSR (CSHc11)thereby challenging the prevalent economicworldview underpinning CSR (CSHc12).

The following three sections examine theusefulness of CSH for CSR in relation to eachof the three frameworks associated with a criticalsystems framework. Statements from the twoprotagonists—Jonathon Porritt (JP) as the advo-cate and Claire Fauset (CF) as the adversary—aredrawn from Fauset and Porritt (2007).

(fwU) GETTING REAL WITH THE TRIPLEBOTTOM LINE?

There are two issues relating to CSH as aneffective fwU for CSR. First, does the framework

enable insight to the variables of a triple bottomline—social, economic and ecological? Second,does CSH enable insight to the interrelationsbetween the three variables?

The CSR variables of social, economic andecological can be associated with sources ofinfluence—motivation, control and legitimacy—respectively. Concern for the interrelationsbetween the three variables can be associatedwith expertise and knowledge as a source ofinfluence. In Tables 2–5 below, I align thevariables with sources of influence as they mightbe envisioned from each of the two perspectives.

Social Variables

Since CSH maps out all social ‘factors’—fourstakeholder groups—and associated social ‘fac-tors’—the stakes and stakeholdings associatedwith each social group—the ‘social’ might beconsidered as constituent of the whole CSHframework. But sources of motivation might beregarded as being the main social driver of CSR.

‘If I have learned anything from my 15 yearsworking with companies it is that people carepassionately about these issues and believethat if they get their company responding theyare making a very big contribution’ (JP).

‘[CSR] tries to convince people that their bestway of getting change is as a consumer,

Table 2. Social variables of CSR and CSH

Sources of motivation CSR perspective

Advocate Adversary

CSHc1 (intendedbeneficiary)

Citizens of presentand future society andnon-human nature

Shareholders primarily

CSHc2 (purpose) Benign intent: promotegenuine accountabilityto society and nature,as well as to shareholders

Malign intent: strategic endeavour toserve profit maximisation through payinglip-service to social and ecological concernsto preclude the need for outside regulation

CSHc3 (measureof success)

Change in activities ofcorporate agency to servesocio-ecological welfare

Output of glossy reports with persuasivedata presentation




Table 3. Economic variables of CSR and CSH

Sources of control CSR perspective

Advocate Adversary

CSHc4 (decision maker) Society through customerbuying-power

Shareholders primarily, through CEO

CSHc5 (resources) Need to make economicsubservient to human,social and natural capital

CSR is attempt to widen sphere ofresource control to include human,social and natural capital

CSHc6 (decisionenvironment)

CSR recognises limitationson control over differentresources, particularly socialand natural capital

Diminishing regulation: increasinglimitations on what corporatesdo not have control over

Table 4. Ecological variables of CSR and CSH

Sources of legitimacy CSR perspective

Advocate Adversary

CSHc10 (witness) CSR advisor in alliance withradical environmentalists

CSR advisor and co-optedenvironmental groups

CSHc11 (emancipation) CSR provides opportunity forecocentric values

CSR effectively restricts opportunityfor truly dissenting ecocentric viewpoint

CSHc12 (worldviews) The ecocentric voice can challengeand shape existing econo(my)-centricworldview through the CSR advisor orother ‘experts’ involved in theenterprise

Space denied for meaningful dialoguebecause of cooption and convergenceof shallow ecocentric views to doctrineof environmental economicsin CSR practice

Table 5. Interrelating variables of CSR and CSH

Sources of knowledge CSR perspective

Advocate Adversary

CSHc7 (expert) Independent consultants Consultants significantly paidfor by shareholders

CSHc8 (expertise) Multidisciplinary, interdisciplinaryand transdisciplinary

Expertise circumscribed throughcontract with decision makers andbounded traditional disciplinary cultures

CSHc9 (guarantor) Professionally transparent andhonest with levels of uncertainty

Professional false assurances of supposedvalue-free knowledge and consensusamongst experts


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buying things and voting with their tillreceipts’ (CF).

Tables 3, 4 and 5 summarise the economic,ecological and interrelating (expertise) variablesrespectively.

Economic Variables

All three CSR variables might be consideredcomponent resources—forms of ‘capital’—forthe corporate agency (CSHc5). Questions regard-ing sources of control may help surface therelationship between traditional economiccapital with other forms of capital.

‘Aren’t you in danger of patronizing mostpeople? I don’t think people have been seducedinto this passive, consumerist mindset.Some. . . try and ward off regulation, noquestion about that. But some companieswelcome increased regulation. . . to see offthe free-riders, the cowboys. . .’ (JP).

‘. . . [W]e can’t change this through reform,through engaging with governments andcorporations. . . You have to have a processthat devolves power to people rather thansupports the existing power structures’ (CF).

Ecological Variables

Ecological factors can be prominent in sources ofcontrol, but are given further significancethrough CSH questions on legitimacy sincenon-human nature in particular cannot speakfor itself.

‘Well I don’t want to destroy companies’legitimacy. We are going to need them, toensure that wealth creators comply with thelaws, have a proper relationship with govern-ment, consumers and so on. I want to trans-form the way government mandates theirlegitimacy’ (JP).

‘It’s not government that gives legitimacy, it ispeople. . . In that multinationals exist toconcentrate wealth and power—no, they have

no place in a just world. . . To assume that theonly way of distributing goods and services tomeet people’s needs is through capitalism—that you need the profit motive to do that—ignores the idea that you could have anothersystem. . .’ (CF).

Interrelating Variables

Attention here might be given to sources ofexpertise—practitioners who may secure ‘joinedup thinking’. Whereas the advocate may trust inCSR expertise, the adversary is likely to doubtespoused levels of joined-up-thinking coupledwith professed levels of independence.

‘The difficulty is persuading government to bemore proactive. . . we have this huge discon-nect between a rhetorical understanding ofwhat the problem is and a policy deliveryprocess which is pathetically inadequate. . .[T]here is no difference between stakeholdersof a company, including its shareholders, andsociety. Ultimately companies cannot work insocieties that are imploding. They can’t makemoney!’ (JP).

‘. . . [T]ruly good people get trained up insustainable development, then go and workfor the corporations and get sucked up. . .Increasing the number of people working onthe inside is not going to create change. Themost effective thing is to be out there talkingwith people, increasing mistrust of corpor-ations and government, making people angry,making people want to take action’(CF).

(fwP) GETTING IT RIGHT WITHCONTRASTING PERSPECTIVES?

From contrasting perspectives of the advocateand the adversary it is clear that judgements on‘fact’ regarding the triple bottom line are clearlyshaped by value judgements. CSH provides threeways of surfacing the difference between valuejudgements amongst stakeholders: (i) contrasting‘ought’ with ‘is’, (ii) contrasting ‘involved’ with‘affected’ and (iii) contrasting perceived stakes




with stakeholding development from each sta-keholder perspective.

‘Ought’ Versus ‘Is’

A conventional way of contrasting viewpoints inCSH suggested by Ulrich is by addressing CSHquestions in the descriptive ‘is’ mode (as inTable 1) in ethical juxtaposition with thenormative ‘ought’ mode. So for example CSHc2in Table 1 would be expressed as ‘what ought tobe/is the purpose of S’. Similar ought/isformatting can be applied to each of the other11 questions. The contrast between the CSRadvocate and adversary discussed above mightbe considered in these ethical terms, with theadvocate being representative of the normative‘ought’ perspective, and the adversary beingrepresentative of the descriptive ‘is’ perspective.

‘Involved’ Versus ‘Affected’

CSH is a significant systems tool in demarcatingexplicitly the division between stakeholders‘involved’ in the system—beneficiaries, decisionmakers and experts—and stakeholders ‘affectedby’ the system-witnesses (as illustrated inTable 1). From a CSR-advocate perspective,Achterkamp and Vos (2007) using CSH suggestadopting the term ‘passively involved’ ratherthan ‘victims’ to identify the ‘affected’ in CSRactivities. The CSR adversary, however, mightprefer using the term ‘victims’! Whatever term isused, ultimately the legitimacy of a system canonly be granted from outside the system ofinterest—those affected by the system—hencethe need for a wider deliberation on valuejudgements between questions CSHc1–9 andCSHc10–12.

Stakes Versus Stakeholding Development

The stakeholding categories (CSHc3, CSHc6,CSHc9 and CSHc12) themselves invite consider-ation of the developmental idea of stakeholding,holding promise for change in juxtaposition to

what is perceived to be at stake. Often, thepossibilities of such development are overriddenby a narrow view of stakeholding as individualsprotecting their stakes. CSH surfaces suchtensions. In relation to CSR, particular stakehold-ings associatedwith different stakeholder groupsmight be conveyed in terms of a tension betweenunbounded situation-oriented issues andbounded systems-oriented imperatives. Table 6illustrates what each stakeholder group associ-atedwith a system needs in order to progress theirstakeholding.

The value of responsibility in CSR mighttherefore be judged from different stakeholders’perspectives in terms of:

(i) (beneficiaries) some measure, whilst notdiscounting the immeasurable domain, ofresponsibility;

(ii) (decision makers) some command over, butnot control of, responsibility;

(iii) (experts) some assurance towards, but notguarantee for, responsibility; and

(iv) (witnesses) some space for, but not cooptioninto, defined parameters of responsibility.

CSH thus suggests several ways in which theconversation of responsibility might be anticip-ated and enacted for CSR

(fwR) GETTING A GRIP WITHUNCERTAINTY AND CONFLICT

A fwR presents an opportunity to step back fromthe situation and reflect on the application offrameworks for understanding (given likelyuncertainty) and practice (given likely conflictin perspectives) in terms of an overall method-ology of intervention. This does not mean gettinga grip on the situation. Such an imperative ismore in common with typical project manage-ment cycles circumscribed by linear comman-d-and-control models of intervention as illus-trated in Figure 3(a). Rather it means getting agrip on the dynamics of CSR as a system ofinterest in the situation; specifically the dynamictensions between systems and situation, andbetween practice and understanding. So howdoes CSH measure up in terms of enabling an


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Figure 3. Comparing two models of intervention

Table 6. Stakeholding ‘needs’ and CSH

Stakeholder role Stakeholding issue (Situation-oriented)What’s at stake?

(System-oriented)stakeholding development

Intendedbeneficiaries

CSHc3: measuresof success

Need to have purpose andrationale translated to somemeasurable output(s)for evaluating

‘Measures’ of responsibilitymay not be appropriate forchanging situation. Need toadapt measures to changingcontexts

Decision makers CSHc6: decisionenvironment

Need to have somecommand and controlover real world entities

Command and control model isinappropriate for contemporarycomplex social and ecologicaldynamics. Need to let go ofcontrol whilst retaining somecommand

Experts CSHc9: guarantor Need to have someassurance towards meetingstated aims or purpose

Expertise is fallible andever-changing. Need tobuild in humility toexpert systems of supportto make clear where falseclaims of assurances arebeing made

Witness CSHc12:worldviews

Need to show recognitionand appreciation of otheropposing worldviews

Contrasting worldviews cannotbe co-opted into an existingworldview underpinning asystem. Need to acknowledgepossible legitimacy of otherworldviews




ethic of ‘doing what’s good’—contrasting sys-tems with situations with the aim to transformsituations, and an ethic of ‘doing what’s right’—contrasting practice with understanding?Figure 3(b) provides a CSH-informed model ofintervention to compare with a typical projectmanagement cycle. The CSH dialogical modelillustrates an emphasis on (i) using systems forinterrogating situations and (ii) enabling stake-holding development through practice andunderstanding.

Systems and Situations

CSH as a heuristic system provides a persuasivelens through which to explore and transformessential issues of value (CSHc1–3), power(CSHc4–6), knowledge (CSHc7–9) and politicallegitimacy (CSHc10–12) regarding corporate activity.Together they provide a composite ideologicalframing of CSR. But what value might this have forthe advocate and adversary, respectively?

The CSR advocate might see relatively littlevalue in surfacing ideological constructs: ‘it iswith great difficulty that I can get any of thesecompanies to talk about capitalism. Most of whatthey are doing is being done by default. . .Nobody has it in their power to stop them doingwhat they do because people want to buy what theyproduce!’ (JP).

The adversary is more ready to recognise CSRas an ideological construct: ‘[CSR is part of] acapitalist system. . . [of] neoliberal free-marketideology. . .Capitalism sucks up the collectivegenius around it into its own project. That is whathas happened to the Green Movement. . . Ibelieve a more co-operative system could meetpeoples’ needs in a more egalitarian way’ (CF).

Practice and Understanding

CSH prompts questions, not just on who therelevant stakeholders are to look out for in CSR,but the kinds of stakeholding development thatmight be anticipated for each stakeholder group.Thus CSH potentially moves away from intran-sigent defending of stakes that often debilitatesintervention.

The advocate would likely endorse this CSHattribute, arguing for a responsibility based on apragmatic ethic: ‘I am often criticized for sellingout. But I am doing what I believe works. . .Thereis a sense that you are demonising companies.But. . . you are really demonising the people whowork for them. . . The interests of society and theinterests of corporations must converge even-tually. I think you have to allow the oil, transportand aviation companies the possibility of ajourney’ (JP).

The adversary suspects that any engagement istantamount to co-option, serving only an agendaof profit-maximization: ‘the idea that is comingstrongly through the media and through CR[corporate responsibility] is that you don’t haveto think about these things—corporations shareyour values and your principles. And that reallyfrustrates efforts to empower people. . . [Onelarge corporate company] ran a million-poundPR [public relations] campaign: ‘get people toengage’, ‘we want to hear’, ‘say whatever youwant to about us’. . . This is how CR evolved. . .The structure is the problem, and so we need tofind alternative ways of structuring things’ (CF).

SUMMARY

The promise of CSR can be likened to the promiseof systems thinking. Enlightened corporate CSRadvocate advisors aspire to be holistic—triplebottom line adherents—as well as appreciativeof alternative perspectives on corporate activity.A CSR adversary might likewise claim privilegeto amore holistic overview and engagement withopposing perspectives. However, like the sys-tems practitioner, the CSR advocate and adver-sary might also need to get a grip with thechallenges and limitations of framing. The criticalsystems framework presented here providessome way forward in recognising the differencesbetween, and respective challenges in, frame-works for understanding-fwU and frameworksfor practice-fwP, both shaped by an ethical-fwR.Responsibility here is understood in terms ofkeeping alive the tensions between (i) systemsand situations—not confusing the map for theterritory—and (ii) practice and understanding—


394 Martin Reynolds


enabling stakeholding development rather thanintransigence.

In this paper, CSH has been explored as aparticularly rich source of interrelated categoriesfor helping to frame understanding, practice andresponsibility for interventions associated withCSR. A critical systems framework might behelpful in assessing other tools used for CSR aswell as getting to grip with arguments for andagainst CSR more generally.

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Getting a grip: Critical systems for corporate responsibility