Albert-Ludwigs-Universität FreiburgSeminar für Wissenschaftliche PolitikProseminar „German Foreign Policy today"Dozent: Eric R. SchülerModul: Internationale BeziehungenSommersemester 2015

Values and InterestsThe German reaction to the crisis in Ukraine

vorgelegt von:Stephen Schilter903 West ViejoFriendswood TX, 77546Stephen_Schilter@baylor.eduMatrikelnummer: 4050597

1

The dissolution of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s largely removed much of Eastern

Europe from the influence of Russian leaders, allowing former Warsaw-Pact and Soviet satellite

states the opportunity to forge closer ties with the West. Seeking to expand the European Union

eastward, the European Commission began drafting European Union Association Agreements

for the states of Central and Eastern Europe (Sajdik, Schwarzinger). These agreements

established membership criteria, which included the adoption of western values regarding civil

liberties, and provided the support that would pave the way for the eventual inclusion of former

communist countries into the European Union. The end result of these agreements was the

expansion of the EU toward the Russian boarder. Many of the states that realigned to the West

also joined the NATO military alliance, a development that deeply disturbed Russian leaders and

would shape their approach in dealing with the growing Western influence in the former Soviet

sphere of influence. President Vladimir Putin’s confrontational approach to Western

encroachment was made clear in his response to the proposed association agreement between the

EU and Ukraine. Assuming the role of Europe’s principal nation, Germany would play a vital

part in mediating the de-escalation of the developing situation. The desires to champion western

democratic values and peacefully maintain the post-Cold War international order in competition

with the necessity of securing economic and strategic national interests constitute the key

components in shaping the German response to Russia during the Ukrainian crisis.

After the Second World War, Germany found itself at the epicenter of the developing

Cold War between the Western Democracies and the Soviet Union in the east. The ensuing

tensions promptly tore the nation into two separate states, a condition that would persist for more

than 40 years. For the new West German state, the initial national interests were the achievement

of security and autonomy from the occupying powers. Chancellor Konrad Adenauer set out to

achieve these goals by fully integrating Germany with the Western powers, a process known as

Westbindung. By fully embracing its relationship with the West and instilling democratic values

in German society, Adenauer secured the benefits of collective defense in the face of potential

Soviet aggression. Earnestly adopting values of democracy, human rights, and civil liberties also

began the process of building trust and rehabilitating the image of Germany in the eyes of its

Western allies (Wegner). This trust would play an important role in the reestablishment of

German sovereignty and rearmament of the German military. Western integration also set up

Germany to reemerge as one of the leading economies in the world through trade. The strong

2

sense of commitment to these values that cultivated in German society would continue to shape

the development of Germany’s foreign policy goals and strategies over time.

In the 1970s, under the leadership of Willy Brandt, a key German foreign policy

approach that has also maintained relevance in the Ukraine crisis developed out of the desire for

the eventual reincorporation of the German Democratic Republic into the Federal Republic of

Germany. West Germany increased efforts to achieve reunification by adopting “Ostpolitik,” a

strategy of normalizing relations with the GDR and other eastern bloc states. In contrast to

former chancellor Adenauer’s commitment to the Hallstein Doctrine, that attempted to isolate the

GDR by refusing to recognize its statehood and threatening governments that maintained

diplomatic relations with the East German state, Brandt’s Ostpolitik sought to increase

interaction between the two German states in an effort to undermine the communist regime

(Gray). In December of 1972 both German states signed the Basic Treaty (Grundlagenvertrag) in

which the FRG and GDR officially recognized each other as sovereign states. Increased

interaction between citizens of the two German states served a significant role in maintaining a

sense of common national identity among all Germans. The easing tensions also allowed travel

to the west and made western media more available, which further influenced people’s desires to

join with the west. Brandt’s use of this long-term tactic was essentially the investment of

political capital to build soft power that could impact German reunification (O’Brien). The goal

of Ostpolitik was to encourage democratization and peacefully bring about change without

directly interfering with the domestic policies of eastern states (Wegner).

European political unity and multilateralism, which are still foundational aspects of

German foreign policy, can also be traced back to this time period. The rationale and processes

for the realization of a common European foreign policy was outlined in the Davignon Report

released in 1970. According to this report, European leaders envisioned “a united Europe capable

of assuming its responsibilities in the world of tomorrow and of making a contribution

commensurate with its traditions and its mission,” emphasizing that, “Europe must prepare itself

to discharge the imperative world duties entailed by its greater cohesion and increasing role.”

The basis for this union consisted of a “common conviction that a Europe composed of States

which, in spite of their different national characteristics, are united in their essential interests,

assured of its internal cohesion, true to its friendly relations with outside countries, conscious of

3

the role it has to play in promoting the relaxation of international tension and the rapprochement

among all peoples, and first and foremost among those of the entire European continent, is

indispensable if a mainspring of development, progress and culture, world equilibrium and peace

is to be preserved.” The significant role of the post-war values that Western Germany adopted as

it integrated with the West are reflected in the report as well. A European political union would

be guided by “a common heritage of respect for the liberty and rights of man and bring together

democratic States with freely elected parliaments” (Davignon). This relative cohesion provided

the collective political resolve that made it possible for the six Western European countries to set

the agenda for the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe in the middle 1970s,

despite the fact that the USA and USSR largely dominated international politics at the time

(O’Brien). For German foreign policy, the key development was the concept that individual

European nations have the potential to be significant in international politics only through the

collective multilateral European political community with a common foreign policy.

After successful reunification and the collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s,

which many Germans primarily attributed to the policies of Ostpolitik, the foreign policy of

Germany and the EU continued to focus on efforts to integrate and modernize the countries of

Eastern Europe (Meister, “Reframing”). German leaders strongly supported the extension of EU

membership, initially through association agreements, to eastern countries like Poland, Hungary,

Slovakia, and the Czech Republic. There are several reasons why eastern expansion was

beneficial for Germany. One reason stems from Germany’s desire to promote values of liberal

democracy in the eastern states. The horrific German experience with authoritarian ideology in

the Second World War instilled the mentality of peace and unity in its foreign policy. These

values were codified in the German Constitution of 1949 (Cordell,Wolff). Continuing with the

rationale behind Ostpolitik, enlargement of the European Union to the east would help establish

Western norms in the newly incorporated territories. Failure to do so, as Czech president Vaclav

Havel put it, “would be a return to the times when European order was not a work of consensus

but of violence... For if the future European order does not emerge from a broadening European

Union, based on the best European values and willing to defend and transmit them, the

organization of the future could well fall into the hands of a cast of fools, fanatics, populists, and

4

demagogues waiting for their chance and determined to promote the worst European traditions”

(Schimmelfennig).

While normative values undoubtedly played a primary role in Germany’s support of

eastern enlargement, the importance of German national interest cannot be ignored. Cordell and

Wolff point out that “The end of the Cold War enabled a very different approach to European

integration—from the mere rhetoric of a united Europe toward concrete opportunities to extend

existing (Western) economic, political and military cooperation structure to include countries of

the former Soviet bloc.” Professor Frank Schimmelfennig saw the clear economic benefits of

increased association with the east as driving forces behind German foreign policy.

Schimmelfennig argues that “the German government sought to de-emphasize its self-interest in

enlargement” and only used rhetorical appeals to European values to achieve their economic

goals. Such suspicions concerning Germany’s real intentions have influenced perceptions of the

German role in the development of the 2014 crisis in Ukraine.

Expanding influence eastward was only part of Germany’s post-Cold War Ostpolitik.

Arguably more important was its significance for the relationship between Germany and the

Russian Federation. German leaders like Helmut Kohl and Gerhard Schröder desired to see the

modernization of Russia with German as its main partner (Rahr). The motto of Ostpolitik shifted

from “change through rapprochement” to “change through interweavement” (Meister,

“Reframing”). Attempts by Germany to interweave with Russian society took several forms.

Alexander Rahr writes that “German leadership had been the strongest supporter for Moscow’s

inclusion in the debt negotiations with the Paris and London Clubs as well as in formal arenas

such as the Group of Seven and the World Trade Organization. When post-Soviet Russia began

to experience severe economic problems in the 1990s, Germany jumped in as a financial

creditor.” Rahr goes on to mention Germany’s creation of French-German-Russian summits

“designed to make Moscow feel that although it is not an EU or NATO member, it is not

excluded from decision making in Europe.” In addition to international organizations, Germany

has bilaterally engaged Russia on the societal level. Matthes Buhbe describes “platforms for the

discussion of civil society in both countries such as the “Petersburg Dialogue” (which led to the

establishment of the German-Russian youth exchange programme), the “German-Russian

Forum”, the six German political foundations with their Russian counterparts, over 500

university partnerships, the liaison offices of the German Academic Exchange Service, the

5

German Research Society, the “Heimholtzgesellschaft” Centre for applied and technical science,

and other scientific establishments, the German-Russian Historical Commission, the joint

museum in Karlshorst, the German Historical Institute in Moscow, numerous town links and

places to go to in the Russian regions to study German language and culture. After English,

German is the most taught foreign language in Russia” (Buhbe). The prevalence of these

contacts demonstrates the scope of German leaders’ efforts to integrate Russia with European

values and avoid its isolation.

However, it is from the economic sphere that Germany draws most of its power. This is

particularly true for its relationship with Russia. The emergence of Germany as a geo-economic

power relied heavily on the production and export of manufactured goods. Germany, however,

lack the abundance of natural resources and sources of energy required to maintain its

production. Russia, on the other hand, controls a vast territory, rich in raw materials, oil, and

natural gas. In 2011, bilateral trade between the two countries exceeds $75 billion a year. In that

same year, 226,000 jobs were created by the over 6,000 German firms in Russia. Private German

industry has invested over $19.5 billion in Russia (Szabo). Because of this, maintaining good

relations with Moscow is a top priority for German foreign policy. German leaders have opposed

the expansion of NATO out of concern that the Kremlin would interrupt the flow of energy and

are perceived by other Western leaders as being soft on Russia. In 2010, former foreign minister

Joschka Fischer commented that Germany foreign policy was “essentially foreign economic

policy and follows almost exclusively domestic political considerations. What is useful in the

election campaign? What brings consent and what brings rejection? Where is the domestic

political risk, can I take that, what does it cost me? I would call this “refusal to lead.” Thereby

we lose more and more of what used to be at the core of German foreign policy in the future; and

what should also be at the core in the future” (Szabo). Remarks like this further highlight

suspicions that Germany is primarily focused on its own national interests rather than promoting

its values.

The relationship between values and interests shaped the European approach to foreign

policy. With Germany as a driving member, the EU saw the promotion of its values as a means

to furthering its national interests. The European Security Strategy published in 2003 stated that

“the best protection for our security is a world of well-governed democratic states,” adding that

“spreading good governance, supporting social and political reform, dealing with corruption and

6

abuse of power, establishing the rule of law and protecting human rights are the best means of

strengthening the international order” (Dias). This was the general thinking behind the initiation

of the EU’s Eastern Partnership program. By integrating their economies and values through

association agreements and financial incentives, European leaders hoped to induce change in

countries like Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia. The consequences

of expanding EU influence farther east proved to have major implications for the Russo-

European relationship. Growing apprehension on the part of Russia’s ruling elite to growing

Western influence came to a head in the case of Ukraine in 2014.

Russia’s confrontational behavior is the result of its leader’s conception of international

politics as a zero-sum game. The EU’s Eastern Partnership was perceived by Russian leaders as

an aggressive encroachment on the Russian sphere of influence. Furthermore, the goals of the

partnership to stabilize and instill liberal democratic values in eastern countries were also in

conflict with the interests of Russian elites. Maintaining its dominance in its neighboring

countries is one of Russia’s primary foreign policy objectives. In this sense, the Eastern

Partnership was seen as an anti-Russia policy. Russian foreign policy became increasingly more

defensive in the wake of the Orange Revolution in Ukraine. This incident “demonstrated the

vulnerability and limited appeal of the Russian model of integration and, in fact, formalized the

abandonment by a number of the former Soviet Republics the strategy of balancing between

Russia and the EU, giving way to a closer political and economic integration with the Euro-

Atlantic structures” (Gretskiy). Russian leaders’ perception of the EU as a threat to their national

interests is an integral factor for the development of the 2014 crisis in Ukraine.

German foreign policy has often been criticized as being a key instigator in the

development of the crisis. Germany, in its pursuit of the Association Agreement between the EU

and Ukraine, failed to predict that Russia would push back (Meister, “Reframing”). The crisis

began after the former pro-Russian Ukrainian president Viktor Yanukovych opted to sign a deal

with Russian President Putin rather than the EU Association Agreement. Yanukovych was

deposed after protesters took to the streets in Kiev. After interim government signed the

Association Agreement, Russian leaders made efforts to further destabilize the country. Putin

annexed Crimea and supported pro-Russian separatists in the eastern region of Ukraine. The

Russian strategy was to secure its future hold on domestic Ukrainian politics by firmly

establishing its influence over the eastern provinces. From the perspectives of the US, Germany

7

and the EU, Putin’s policies were clearly in violation of international law and threatened the

stability of the region. Russia’s role in destabilizing Ukraine highlighted several elements of

Russia’s relationship with the West and changed how Germany approached its Russia policy.

Putin’s decision to escalate the level of his opposition to the West was influenced by his

perception of how the West would react. The divergent interests of European Union members

regarding Russia played a role in Putin’s perception that the EU lacked the unity to counter

Russian aggression. Stefan Meister commented on the lack of a unified EU policy on Russia,

claiming that “Germany’s bilateral relations with Russia have in the past undermined the

construction of a coherent European Russia policy… In fact, the EU is split on Russia because of

member states’ different priorities, divergent economic interests, and incompatible security and

risk assessments.” Putin played on the peaceful aims of German foreign policy and hoped that

the economically weaker EU members would oppose sanctions (Speck). Russia had confidence

that Europe’s demand for Russian energy and markets would prevent the formation of a united

front against Russia. These economic factors and its traditional policy position vis à vis Russia

also shaped the initial German response to the crisis.

The way in which Germany responded to Russia was partially shaped by German

economic interests. Economic considerations made German leaders hesitant about confronting

Putin. Hans Kundnani described in Foreign Affairs how “Merkel faced pressure from powerful

lobbyists for German industry, led by the Committee on Eastern European Economic Relations,

who argued that sanctions would badly undermine the German economy.” Kundnani also relates

the story of how, “In a show of support for Russian President Vladimir Putin, Joe Kaeser, the

CEO of Siemens, visited the Russian leader at his residence outside Moscow just after the

annexation of Crimea. Kaeser assured Putin that his company, which had conducted business in

Russia for roughly 160 years, would not let “short-term turbulence”—his characterization of the

crisis—affect its relationship with the country.” The fact that Russia supplied roughly 38% of

Germany’s oil and 36% of its gas in combination with Germany’s decision to phase out nuclear

energy made the option of antagonizing Russia even less appealing (Kundnani). As Green Party

politician Marieluise Beck put it, ““Our logic is we must be nice, good friends with the Kremlin

because we want their oil and gas. But the Putin show would be over if he couldn’t sell them to

his Western partners” (Szabo).

8

Germany’s values and the historical relationship between the two nations were also

significant to the way German leaders initially responded to Russia’s actions in Ukraine. During

World War Two, Russia was devastated and its people were subjected to terrible atrocities at the

hands of German army. Estimates of Soviet casualties range as high as over 25 million killed.

These memories have instilled a feeling of guilt, or “historical responsibility,” on the German

people. Supporting more hawkish approaches against Russia would fly in the face of

Vergangenheitsbewältigung. Additionally, as mentioned previously, the success of Ostpolitik

during the Cold War made a confrontational foreign policy less appealing. History has also made

Germans particularly aware of the dangers of economic and political isolation. Many German

leaders share the ideas that “isolation of Russia is unacceptable and must be avoided at all costs”

and that “policies that strengthen the hawks in the Kremlin should be avoided” (Chivvis, Rid).

Germany’s early refusal to heed the call of the United States to react swiftly and strongly to

Russia was also a sign of another historical development. After the Cold War, Germany became

less dependent on its Trans-Atlantic partnership. Germany took the lead, but it did so in its own

way. Its value-based aspiration to be a force for peace would continue to be a significant element

of how Germany handled the crisis.

As the crisis in Ukraine evolved, so did Germany’s response. Despite the disagreements

between those in German society that were concerned with civil society in Russia and those that

had more economic interests in mind, Chancellor Merkel took the lead in establishing a more

critical approach to Putin’s initiatives. In an unusual development, Germany stepped up to be the

primary mediator between Russia and the West. The German response has taken advantage of its

diplomatic and economic power. Merkel focused on a multilateral strategy to create a unified

with the United States and other EU members (Speck). This strategy included bringing the

various groups involved in the conflict to the table to discuss a peaceful solution. The Minsk

agreements were the result of these attempts to decrease tensions through dialogue. Sanctions

were a major tool for Merkel’s multilateral strategy to create a unified response to Putin. Ulrich

Speck described the effect of sanctions, writing that “at the beginning of the conflict, there was

considerable disagreement among the 28 EU member states on the character of a joint response.

Each time European leaders agreed on a new round of sanctions, the EU was forced to reach an

internal consensus to develop a common approach.” In addition to using sanctions to build unity,

German leaders also had the more obvious intention of limiting Putin’s options in Ukraine

9

(Speck). From the very beginning, Merkel asserted her view that a military solution to Russian

aggression was out of the question. While this opposition to violence is typical for German

politicians, it was seen as appeasement by some Americans and eastern EU member states.

German leaders were able to adopt these policies and remain at the head of negotiations

for a variety of reasons. The first factor is the position of Germany to take the leadership role in

the first place. As previously mentioned, Germany has a considerable connection with Russia

through economic investment and the partnership for modernization. No other country was in the

position to take the driver seat. Given the proximity of Germany to Ukraine, national security

was a particularly pressing concern that drove Germany to take action. Additionally, German

leadership had already proven itself as a capable political force within the European Union. This

caused the US and EU members to view the leading role of Germany as legitimate. Furthermore,

American leaders were seeking to reduce its involvement in foreign issues and were eager to

pass the burden of maintaining the international order to its great European ally. Finally, the

importance of Merkel herself should not be ignored. She maintained a high level of contact with

Putin. British Foreign Secretary Philip Hammond was quoted, calling Merkel one of the greatest

“weapons” of the West and praising her access to Putin as “the best chance we have of

negotiating an effective solution to the problem in the Ukraine” (Speck).

A second factor that contributed to the German resolve in taking a stronger stance was

the apparent failure of Russia to modernize and adopt Western values. President Putin’s behavior

has made German politicians and individuals adopt more realist views about Ostpolitik. Hannes

Adomeit claimed that “The ‘strategic partnership’ has proven never to have existed; the

‘modernization partnership’ did not get off the ground; the – in the positive sense – political

‘special relationship’ has come to an end; trade, after a tremendous expansion, is shrinking; the

German government has taken the lead in confronting Russia over Ukraine.” As Adomite

mentions, economic incentives for maintaining good relations with Russia began to wane. Stefan

Meister German businesses still find profit in Russia, but frustration about the ongoing lack of

domestic reforms and the lack of progress in establishing rule of law and transparency is

growing” (Meister, “Germany's Russia Policy”). The level of corruption and lack of transparency

in Russia makes it particularly difficult for small to medium size businesses to operate in Russia.

Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index ranks Russia at 117th out of 177 (177

indicating the highest level of corruption) (Meister, “Reframing”). Some estimate that Russia is

10

losing at least $300 billion in foreign investment each year due to corruption (Szabo). The

significant influence of Russian oil and gas is also being undermined by the German

government’s efforts reduce dependence on Russian energy (Meister, “Reframing”). These

factors no doubt contributed to the observation that “German industry, by and large, has

acknowledged the primacy of politics over economics” (Adomeit). These developments indicate

that German foreign policy regarding Russia is not dictated by solely economic interests.

Understanding whether Germany is acting as an honest broker or is primarily concerned

with its own national interests has been made difficult by the lack of dialogue between the

human rights group and the Russlandversteher. Stefan Meister observed that “Russia is

becoming more and more a matter of lobbying “for or against” one approach or another—either

you are for economic cooperation or against human right violations. As a result there is a clear

separation between an interest-oriented and a values-oriented approach. But the conclusion that

these are two sides of one coin is pushed into the background” (Meister, “Germany's Russia

Policy”). Jana Kobzova, a policy fellow and coordinator of the European Council on Foreign

Relations’ Wider Europe program, emphasizes the idea that “the EU’s values-based approach

remains the best way to secure its interests.” Kobzova specifically mentions that promoting

standards of stability and transparence is a good way for the EU to boost its economic interests.

She writes that “Western businesses and investments also stand to suffer when courts are corrupt

and officials capricious;” concluding that “the EU’s emphasis on observance of laws and

diplomatic conventions is simply also a good business strategy” (Kobzova). As mentioned

previously, The EU’s national security interests also benefits from the expansion of its values to

other countries.

Modern Germany has benefited immensely from the international order established after

the Cold War. According to the CIA, Germany is the fifth largest economy in the world with an

estimated export value of $1.547 trillion in 2014 (CIA). This economic prosperity has been

achieved peacefully despite the country’s relative lack of natural resources. Maintaining the

international status quo is therefore a critical national interest for the Federal Republic of

Germany. The German foreign policy strategy for securing stability has been to incorporate other

countries into its economic structure and thereby promote its democratic values in an effort to

integrate those countries in the international order. While Germany is currently in a fortunate

situation where its national interests are complimented by its core values, the recent experience

11

with the setbacks regarding Russia’s integration could potentially upset the harmonious

relationship between German values and national interests.

Works Cited

12

Étienne Davignon. "Davignon Report." Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of, 27 October 1970. Web.

Adomeit, Hannes. "German-Russian Relations: Change of Paradigm versus ‘Business as Usual’." Notes du Cerfa. Institut français des relations internationales, Feb 2015. Web.

Buhbe, Matthes. "The Main Features of a German Strategy towards Russia." Compass 2020. Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, March 2007. Web.

CIA. CIA World Facebook: Germany. 15 September 2015. Web. 20 September 2015.

Dias, Vanda. "The EU and Russia: Competing Discourses, Practices and Interests in the Shared Neighbourhood." Perspectives on European Politics and Society (2013): 256-271. Web.

Gray, Glenn. The Hallstein Doctrine: West Germany's global campaign to isolate East Germany, 1949--1969. Ann Arbor: Yale, 1999. Web.

Gretskiy, Igor. "Russia's perceptions and misperceptions of the EU Eastern Partnership." Communist and Post-Communist Studies (2014): 375-383. Web.

Karl Cordell and Stefan Wolff. "A Foreign Policy Analysis of the “German Question”: Ostpolitik Revisited." Foreign Policy Analysis (2007): 255-271. Web.

Kobzova, Jana. "Can the Eastern Partnership work?" European View (2012): 209-214. Web.

Kundnani, Hans. "Leaving the West Behind." 2015. Foreign Affairs. Web. 20 September 2015.

Meister, Stefan. "Germany's Russia Policy under Angela Merkel: A Balance Sheet." The Polish Quarterly of International Affairs 2013: 28-42. Web.

—. Reframing Germany's Russia Policy - An Oppertunity for the EU. Policy Brief. London: European Council on Foreign Relations, 2014. Web.

O‟Brien, Andrew. "Opening the Iron Curtain: The Ostpolitik of Willy Brandt". Dublin, 2010. Web.

Rahr, Alexander. "Germany and Russia: A Special Relationship." The Washington Quarterly 2007: 137-145. Web.

Schimmelfennig, Frank. "The Community Trap: Liberal Norms, Rhetorical Action, and the Eastern Enlargement of the European Union." International Organization (2001): 47-80. Web.

Schwarzinger, Martin Sajdik and Michael. European Union Enlargement : Background, Developments, Facts. Piscataway: Transaction Publishers, 2008. Web.

13

Speck, Ulrich. "German Power and the Ukraine Conflict." March 2015. Carnegie Europe. Web. 20 September 2015.

Szabo, Stephen. Germany, Russia, and the Rise of Geo-Economics. London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2014. Web.

Wegner, Helmut. "West German Ostpolitik." The RUSI Journal (1990): 36-38. Web.

14