gergen socioconstruct approach

7/25/2019 gergen socioconstruct approach

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T he Soc ia l ons t r uc tion is t M ove m e nt

in Mode r n P syc ho logy

K e n n e t h J . G e r g e n

AB STRA CT. Soc ia l cons t ruc t ion i sm v i ews d i scourse

abou t t he wor ld no t a s a ref lec tion or ma p o f t he

wor ld bu t a s an ar t i f ac t o f com mu na l i nt erchange .

B o t h a s a n o r i e n t a t i o n t o k n o w l e d g e a n d t o t h e

chara cter o f psychological constructs, cons tructionism

forms a s igni f icant chal lenge to convent ional under-

standings. Al tho ugh the roots o f construct ionist

t hough t may be t raced to l ong- s tand ing deba tes

be tween empi r i c i s t and ra t iona l is t schoo l s o f though t,

cons t ruc t ion i sm a t t emp t s t o m ove beyond the dua l i sm

to wh ich bo th o f t hese trad i t ions are com mi t t ed and

to p lace knowledge wi th in the process o f soc ia l

in terchange. Al tho ugh the role o f psychological ex-

p lana t ion i s rendered prob lemat i c , a f u l l y deve loped

cons t ruc t ion i sm cou ld fu rn i s h a m eans fo r under-

s tand ing the process o f sc i ence an d inv it e s t he deve l-

opm en t o f a l te rna t ive c r i t er ia f o r t he eva lua t ion o f

psychological inquiry.

T h i s a r ti c le a t t e m p t s t o b r i n g i n t o f o c u s t h e c e n t r a l

c o n t o u r s o f a c o n t e m p o r a r y m o v e m e n t o f c h a ll e ng i ng

i m p l i c a t i o n . I t w o u l d b e m i s l e a d i n g t o s a y e i t h e r

t h a t t h e m o v e m e n t i s o f r e c e n t o r ig i n o r t h a t i ts

p r o p o n e n t s a r e l eg io n . T h e r o o t s o f t h e m o v e m e n t

m a y p r o p e r l y b e t r a c e d t o e a r l i e r e r a s , a n d o n e

m i g h t p r e f e r t o s p e a k o f a s h a r e d c o n s c i o u s n e s s

r a t h e r t h a n a m o v e m e n t . H o w e v e r , i n i ts c u r r e n t

m e t a m o r p h o s i s t h is e m e r g i n g b o d y o f th o u g h t c o n -

t a i n s i m p l i c a t i o n s o f s u b s t a n t i a l s i g n if i ca n c e . N o t

o n l y a r e b r o a d v i s ta s o f i n q u i r y o p e n e d f o r s t ud y ,

b u t t h e f o u n d a t i o n s o f p sy c h o l og i c a l k n o w l e d g e a ls o

a r e t h r o w n i n t o c r i ti c a l re l ie f . W h e n t h e i m p l i c a t i o n s

a r e f u l ly e l a b o ra t e d , i t b e c o m e s a p p a r e n t t h a t t h e

s t u d y o f s oc i a l p r o c e s s c o u l d b e c o m e g e n e r ic f o r

u n d e r s t a n d i n g t h e n a t u r e o f k n o w l e d g e i ts e lf . S o c i a l

p s y c h o l o g y w o u l d n o t s t a n d , i n t h i s c a se , a s a

d e r i v a t i v e o f g e n e r a l p s y c h o l o g y . R a t h e r , t h e l a t t e r

w o u l d b e v i e w e d a s a f o r m o f s o c i a l p r o c e s s , b o t h

t h e g r o u n d s a n d o u t c o m e s o f w h i c h s t a n d t o b e

e l u c i d a t e d b y s o c i a l i n q u i r y . I n s i m i l a r f a s h i o n ,

e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l i n q u i r y a l o n g w i t h t h e p h i l o s o p h y

o f s c ie n c e c o u l d b o t h g i v e w a y, o r b e c o m e s u b s u m e d

b y , so c i a l i n q u i r y . T h e s e a r e i n d e e d b o l d c o n j e c t u r e s ,

a n d a s w e s h a l l s e e , t o m a k e g o o d o n t h e m m a y

r e q u i r e r e l i n q u i s h i n g m u c h t h a t i s s a c r e d . H o w e v e r ,

Swar thmore Co l l ege

i t is t h e p l a u s i b i l it y o f t h e s e c o n j e c t u r e s t h a t I h o p e

t o d e m o n s t r a t e i n t h i s a r t i c l e w h i l e s i m u l t a n e o u s l y

c l a r i fy i n g t h e c o n t o u r s a n d o r i g i n s o f t h e s o c i a l

c o n s t r u c ti o n i s t m o v e m e n t . 1

The Social onstructionist Orientation

S o c i a l c o n s t r u c t i o n i s t i n q u i r y i s p r i n c i p a l l y c o n -

c e r n e d w i t h e x p l i c a t in g t h e p r o c e s s e s b y w h i c h p e o p l e

c o m e t o d e s c r i b e , e x p l a i n , o r o t h e r w i s e a c c o u n t f o r

t h e w o r l d ( i n c l u d i n g t h e m s e l v e s ) i n w h i c h t h e y l i v e .

I t a t t e m p t s t o a rt i c u la t e c o m m o n f o r m s o f u n d e r -

s t a n d i n g a s t h e y n o w e x i s t , a s t h e y h a v e e x i s t e d i n

p r i o r h i s t o r i c a l p e r i o d s , a n d a s t h e y m i g h t e x i s t

s h o u l d c r e a t i v e a t t e n t i o n b e s o d i r e c t e d . A t t h e

m e t a t h e o r e t i c a l l e v e l m o s t s u c h w o r k m a n i f e s t s o n e

o r m o r e o f t h e f o l lo w i ng a s s u m p t i o n s .

1. W h a t w e ta k e t o b e e x p e r i e n c e o f t h e w o r l d

d o e s n o t i n i t s e l f d i c t a t e t h e t e r m s b y w h i c h t h e

w o r l d i s u n d e r s t o o d . W h a t w e t a k e t o b e k n o w l e d g e

o f th e w o r l d i s n o t a p r o d u c t o f in d u c t i o n , o r o f t h e

b u i l d i n g a n d t e s t in g o f g e n er a l h y p o t h e s e s . T h e

m o u n t i n g c r i ti c i sm o f t he p o s i t iv i s t - e m p i r i c i st c o n -

c e p t io n o f k n o w l e d g e h a s s e v er e ly d a m a g e d t h e

t r a d i t i o n a l v i e w t h a t s c i e n t i f i c t h e o r y s e r v e s t o r e f l e c t

o r m a p r e a l i t y i n a n y d i r e c t o r d e c o n t e x t u a l i z e d

m a n n e r ( c f. F e y e r a b e n d , 1 97 6 ; H a n s o n , 1 95 8 ; K u h n ,

1 9 6 2 / 1 9 7 0 ; Q u i n e , 1 9 6 0 ; T a y l o r , 1 9 7 1 ). H o w c a n

t h e o r e t i c a l c a t e g o r i e s b e i n d u c e d o r d e r i v e d f r o m

o b s e r v a t i o n , i t is a s k e d , i f t h e p r o c e s s o f i d e n t i fy i n g

o b s e r v a t i o n a l a t t r i b u t e s i t s e lf r e l ie s o n o n e s p o s s e s s -

i n g c a t e g o r i e s ? H o w c a n t h e o r e t i c a l c a t e g o r i e s m a p

o r r e f l e c t t h e w o r l d i f e a c h d e f i n i t i o n u s e d t O l i n k

This article is an elaboration of an invited address to Divisions 8

and 24 delivered at the annual meeting of the Am erican Psycho-

logical Association, Anaheim , California, Septembe r 1983.

Requests for reprints should be sent to K enneth J. G ergen,

Departm ent of Psychology, Swa rthmore College, Swarthmore,

Pennsylvania 19081.

J Although the term constructivism is also used in referring

to the sam e movem ent (cf. Watzlawick, 1984), this term is also

used in reference to Piagetian theory, to a form of perceptual

theory, and to a significant mov emen t in 20th century art. The

term constructionismavoids these v arious confusions and enables

a linkage to be retained to Bergerand L uckm ann s (1966) seminal

volume, The Soc ial Construction of Reality.

2 6 6

M a r c h 1 9 8 5 A m e r i c a n P s y c h ol o g is t

Copyright 1985 by the Am erican Psychologica l Associa tion, Inc . 0003-066X/85/ 00.75

VoL 40, No. 3, 266-275


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category and observation itself requires a definition?

How can words map reality when the major con-

straints over word usage are furnished by linguistic

context? How is it possible to determine whether

competing theories refer to the same entities, without

reference to some other theory not contained in

those under comparison? If each theoretical propo-

sition depends for its intelligibility on an array of

related propositions, what aspect of the propositional

network would be challenged by a disconfirmation

of any single proposition? These and other telling

questions have largely gone unanswered, and the

lack of answers has left the empirical sciences without

a viable logic of justif icat ion (Weimer, 1979).

Running counterpoint with this developing

doubt has been a steadily intensifying concern with

the constraints over understanding engendered by

linguistic convention. Wittgenstein's (1963) Phi l o

s o p h i c a l I n v e s t i g a t i o n s must be viewed as seminal

in this regard. By asking such questions as where

does an individual feel grief or happiness, could a

person have a profound feeling in one second, and

can ~the features of hope be described, Wittgenstein

brought into poignant clarity the extent to which

the use of mental predicates is convention bound.

His work has served to inspire an impressive array

of philosophic studies into the linguistic constraints

governing the use of such concepts as mind (Ryle,

1949), intention (Anscombe, 1976), sense data (Aus-

tin, 1962b), and motivation (Peters, 1958). Such

inquiry has also elucidated a variety of important

problems created through the reification of the

language. In effect, many classic problems both in

psychology and philosophy appear to be products of

linguistic entanglement; with clarity concerning the

nature and functions of the language the problems

may often be decomposed.

Social constructionism has been nurtured by

the soil of such discontent. It begins with radical

doubt in the taken-for-granted world--whether in

the sciences or daily lif e--and in a specialized way

acts as a form of social criticism. Constructionism

asks one to suspend belief that commonly accepted

categories or understandings receive their warrant

through observation. Thus, it invites one to challenge

the objectivebasis of conventional knowledge. For

example, in Kessler and McKenna's (1978) investi-

gation of the social construction of gender, the

attempt is made to break down the seemingly in-

corrigible fact that there are two genders. By exam-

ining the variations in the way differing cultures and

subcultural groups understand gender, the referents

for the terms m a n and w o m a n are obscured. Possi-

bilities are opened for alternative means of under-

standing gender differences or of abandoning such

distinctions altogether. In Averill's (1982) extensive

work on emotion one is forced to question the

assumption that anger is a biological state of the

omdmism and is invited to confider it as a historically

contingent social performance. Sarbin (1984) ex-

tended this line of thinking to the entire array of

emotional terms. Emotions are not objects out

there to be studied, ventured Sarbin; emotion

terms acquire their meaning not from real-world

referents but from their context of usage.

Similar kinds of critiques have been launched

against the taken-for-granted character of suicide

(Atkinson, 1977), beliefs (Needham, 1972), schizo-

phrenia (Sarbin & Mancuso, 1980), altruism (Gergen

& Gergen, 1983), psychological disorder (Garfinkel,

1967), childhood (Kessen, 1979), domestic violence

(Greenblat, 1983), menopause (McCrea, 1983), and

situational causes (Gergen & Gergen, 1982). In each

case, the objective criteria for identifying such be-

haviors, events, or entitie s are shown to be

either highly circumscribed by culture, history, or

social context or altogether nonexistent.

2. The terms in which the world is understood

are social artifacts, products of historically situated

interchanges among people. From the constructionist

position the process of understanding is not auto,

matically driven by the forces of nature, but is the

result of an active, cooperative enterprise of persons

in relationship. In this light, inquiry is invited into

the historical and cultural bases of various forms o f

world construction. For example, historical investi-

gation has revealed broad historical variations in the

concept o f the child (Aries, 1962), of romantic love

(Averill, 1985), of mother 's love (Badinter, 1980),

and of self (Verhave & van Hoorne, 1984). In each

case constructions of the person or relationships

have undergone significant change across time. In

certain periods childhood was not considered a

specialized phase of development, romantic and

maternal love were not components of human

makeup, and the self was not viewed as isolated and

autonomous. Such changes in conception do not

appear to reflect alterations in the objects or entities

of concern but seem lodged in historically contingent

factors. Ethnographic study yields much the same

conclusion. Conceptions of psychological process

differ markedly from one culture to another (see

Heelas & Lock 's 1981 edited volume). Accounts of

emotion among the Ifaluk (Lutz, 1982), of identity

among the Trobrianders (Lee, 1959), of knowledge

among the Illongot (Rosaldo, 1980), and of the self

among the Maori (Smith, 198 l)al l serve as challenges

to the ontology of mind in contemporary Western

culture. They invite us to consider the social origins

of taken-for-granted assumptions about the mi nd --

such as the bifurcation between reason and emotion,

the existence of motives and memories, and the

symbol system believed to underlie language. They

direct our attention to the social, moral, political,

March 1985 American Psychologist 267


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gainers in social relat ions (Wexler, 1983). Attacks

have also been levied against the damaging effects

on children of the prevailing constructions of the

child's mind (Walkerdine, 1984), the sexism implicit

in investigation that assumes the superiority of

universal principles in moral decision making (Gil-

ligan, 1982), the effects of theories of cognitive

mechanism in their implicit unconcern with material

circumstances in society (Sampson, 1981), and the

anomic effects of psychological assessment in orga-

nizations (Hollway, 1984).

S o c i a l o n s t r u c t io n i s m i n H i s t o r i c a l

Pers l~ect ive

The significance of the constructionist movement is

more fully appreciated against the backdrop of

history. Although a full treatment of the relevant

background is beyond the scope of this article, it

does prove useful to understand constructionism in

relation to two major and competing intellectual

traditions. These traditions can largely be distin-

guished in terms of basic epistemological orientations

or models of knowledge. On the one hand, thinkers

such as Locke, Hume, the Mills, and various logical

empiricists in the present century have traced the

source of knowledge (as mental representation) to

events in the real world. Knowledge copies (or

should ideally copy) the contours of the world. This

exogenic perspective

(Gergen, 1982) thus tends to

view knowledge as a pawn to nature. Proper knowl-

edge maps or mirrors the actualities of the real

world. In contrast, philosophers such as Spinoza,

Kant, Nietzsche, and various phenomenologists have

tended to adopt an

endogenic perspectivereg rding

the origins of knowledge. In this case, knowledge

depends on processes (sometimes viewed as innate)

endemic to the organism. Humans harbor inherent

tendencies, it is said, to think, categorize, or process

information, and it is these tendencies (rather than

features of the world in itself) that are of paramount

importance in fashioning knowledge.

The exogenic-endogenic antinomy has also

played a major role in the history of psychological

theory. As I have outlined elsewhere (Gergen, 1982),

early German theorists often wrestled in vain with

means of cementing the two perspectives. The at-

tempt of classical psychophysical research to plot

the precise relationship between external and internal

worlds is but one case in point. As psychology

developed in the United States, guided as it was by

both pragmatis t and positivist philosophy, it took on

a strong exogenic character. Behaviorism (along with

neobehaviorism) placed (and continues to place) the

major determinants of human activity in the envi-

ronment. If the organism is to adapt successfully, it

is claimed, its knowledge must adequately represent

or reflect that environment. Until recently the en-

dogenic perspective failed to flourish on American

soil. A handful of Gestalt psychologists, with their

emphasis on autochthonous tendencies of perceptual

organization, and a stalwart band of phenomenolo-

gists virtually prevented the or ientation from other-

wise perishing.

Yet, within the past two decades we have wit-

nessed what appears to b e a major reversal in

emphasis. The endogenic perspective has returned

in full force in the guise of cognitive psychology.

The seeds for this evolution in social psychology

were planted by Kurt Lewin, whose central concern

with the psychological field was essentially a holdover

from continental rationalism. In the hands of his

students this emphasis reinstituted itself in such

concepts as social (as opposed to physical)reality

(Festinger, 1954), the social comparison process

(Festinger, 1954), motivated perception (Pepitone,

1949), emotions as perceived (Schachter, 1964), and

cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1957). The centrality

of this work in social psychology also served to hone

the sensibilities of subsequent generations o f re-

searchers. Concerns with logical inference, cognitive

schemata, information storage and retrieval, and

cognitive heuristics have all extended the Lewinian

premise: Human action is critically dependent on

the cognitive processing of information, that is, on

the world as cognized rather than the world as it is.

Of course, much the same shift in explanatory

emphasis has taken place within psychology more

generally. The contours of the cognitive revolution

are widely recognized.

Yet, it is my view that in spite of the richness

of conceptualization and the profundity of its heri-

tage, the endogenic perspective has not yet achieved

full ascendencywnor can it in principle. There is

much to be said on this account, but again a brief

sketch is necessitated. First, cognitivism has not

yet- -ne ither in social psychology nor in psychology

more generally--overturned the exogenic perspective

because the exogenic perspective forms the metathe-

oretical basis of the science itself. That is, the

contemporary concept ion of psychological science is

a by-product o f empiricist or exogenic philosophym

committed as it has been to rendering an account

of objective knowledge of the world. The experimen-

tal psychologist thus sets out to employ methods for

establishing objective knowledge about cognitive

processes. To the extent that the investigator claims

to achieve an accurate representation of the world

(thus rendering support for exogenics), it threatens

the view that it is the world as represented (cognized)

rather than the world in itself which is of importance.

In seeking objective truth (that which is true inde-

pendent of subjective appraisal) the cognitive re-

searcher thus denigrates the importance of the very

processes he or she seeks to elucidate. The exogenic



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b a s is o f t h e s c i e n ti f ic a c t i v i ty u n d e r m i n e s t h e v a l i d i t y

o f t h e e n d o g e n i c t h e o ri e s u n d e r e x a m i n a t i o n .

N o r , w o u l d i t s e e m , c a n c o g n i t i v i s m u l t i m a t e l y

a c h i e v e h e g e m o n y i n p s y c h o l o g i c a l d i s c o u rs e . T h i s

m a y b e a n t i c ip a t e d i n p a r t b y t h e e x a m p l e f u r n is h e d

b y t h e h i s t o ry o f th e p h i l o s o p h y o f k n o w l ed g e . T h i s

h i s t o r y h a s b e e n o n e o f c o n t i n u o u s a n d u n r e s o lv e d

d i s p u t a t i o n b e t w e e n e x o g e n i c ( o r e m p i r i c i s t , i n t h i s

c o n t e x t ) a n d e n d o g e n i c ( r a t i o n a l i s t , i d e a l i s t , p h e -

n o m e n o l o g i c a l ) th i n k e r s . E s s e n t i al l y, t h e h i s t o r y o f

t h e p h i l o s o p h y o f k n o w l e d g e c a n l a r ge l y b e w r i t t e n

i n t e r m s o f a c o n t i n u o u s s e ri es o f p e n d u l u m s w in g s.

W e h a v e w i t n e s s e d t h e c o n f l i c t b e t w e e n P l a t o ' s p u r e

f o r m s o f k n o w l e d g e v e r su s A r i s t o t le ' s c o n c e r n w i t h

t h e r o l e o f s e n s o r y e x p e r i en c e ; b e t w e e n t h e a u t h o r i t y

g r a n t e d t o e x p e r i e n c e b y B a c o n , L o c k e , a n d H u m e

v e r s u s t h e r a t i o n a l c a p a c i t i e s g r a n t e d t o t h e m i n d

b y D e s c a r t e s , S p i n o z a , a n d K a n t ; b e t w e e n t h e e m -

p h a s is p l a c e d b y S c h o p e n h a u e r a n d N i e t z c h e o n w i ll

a n d p a s s io n i n t h e g e n e r a t i o n o f k n ow l e d g e , a n d t h e

a t t e m pts o f log ica l pos i t iv i s ts to g ro und a l l know ledge

in obs e rvab les. W ha t i s to p r ev en t the s am e h i s to r i ca l

t r a j e c t o r y i n p s y c h o l o g y ? W e h a v e m o s t r e c e n t l y

w i t n e s s e d i n t h e c o g n i t iv e r e v o l u t i o n a s h i f t f r o m a n

exogen ic to an endogen ic pe r s pec t ive . A s the inhe ren t

f l aw s o f c o g n i t iv i s m a r e o n c e a g a i n r e v e a l e d i n

f u t u r e p s y c h o l o g i c a l w o r k , a r e w e a g a i n t o a n t i c i p a t e

a r e t u r n t o s o m e f o r m o f ( su i t ab l y e n li g h t en e d )

e n v i r o n m e n t a l i s m ? ( G i b s o n i a n a f f o r d a n c e t h e o r y

[ G i b s o n , 1 97 9] m a y a l r e a d y b e f o r e s h a d o w i n g th e

n e w s w i n g . ) A n d s u c h p r o b l e m s a r e s u r e t o e m e r g e .

F o r e x a m p l e , w h e n c o g n i t i v i s m i s e x t e n d e d t o i t s

n a t u r a l c o n c l u s i o n i t r e v e r t s i n t o a n u n h a p p y a n d

t a n a c c e p t a b l e s o l i p s i s m . A n d , c o g n i t i v i s m r e m a i n s

p e r e n n i a l ly u n a b l e t o r e s o lv e s u c h t h o r n y p r o b l e m s

a s t h e o r ig i n o f id e a s o r c o n c e p t s a n d t h e m a n n e r

i n w h i c h c o g n i t i o n s i n f l u e n c e b e h a v i o r ( c f . G e r g e n ,

1 9 8 5 ) . C o m p e l l i n g e x p l a n a t i o n s f o r h o w c o g n i t i o n s

c o u l d e i t h e r b e b u i l t u p f r o m e x p e r i e n c e o r g e -

n e t i ca l l y p r o g r a m m e d r e m a i n t o b e f a s h io n e d . N o r

h a v e t h e o r i s t s b e e n a b l e t o s o l v e t h e C a r t e s i a n

d i l e m m a o f e x p la i n in g h o w m i n d s t u f f c a n i nf lu -

e n c e o r d i c t a t e d i s c r e t e b o d i l y m o v e m e n t s .

I t i s a g a i n s t t h i s b a c k d r o p t h a t o n e c a n a p p r e -

c i a te t h e e m e r g e n c e o f s o ci a l c o n s t r u c t i o n i s m . R a t h e r

t h a n r e c a p i tu l a t i n g y e t a g a in t h e m o v e m e n t o f t h e

p e n d u l u m , t h e c h a ll e n g e ( f o r m a n y ) h a s b e e n t o

t r a n s c e n d t h e t r a d i t i o n a l s u b j e c t -o b j e c t d u a l i s m a n d

a l l i t s a t t e n d a n t p r o b l e m s ( c f . R o r t y , 1 9 7 9 ) a n d t o

d e v e l o p a n e w f r a m e w o r k o f a n a ly s i s b a s e d o n a n

a l t e rn a t i ve ( n o n e m p i r i c is t ) t h e o r y o f t h e f u n c t i o n i n g

a n d p o t e n t i a l s o f s c ie n c e . T h i s m o v e m e n t b e g i n s i n

e a r n e s t w h e n o n e c h a l l e n g e s t h e c o n c e p t o f k n o w l -

e d g e a s m e n t a l r e p r e s e n t a ti o n . G i v e n t h e m y r i a d o f

i n s o l u b l e s t o w h i c h s u c h a c o n c e p t g i v es ri se , o n e i s

m o v e d t o c o n s i d e r w h a t p a s s e s a s k n o w l e d g e i n

h u m a n a f f a i r s . A t l e a s t o n e m a j o r c a n d i d a t e i s t h a t

o f l i n g u is t ic r e n d e r i n g . W e g e n e r a l ly c o u n t a s k n o w l -

e d g e t h a t w h i c h i s r e p r e s e n t e d i n l i n g u i s t i c p r o p o -

s i t i o n s - s t o r e d i n b o o k s , j o u r n a l s, f lo p p y d is ks , a n d

t h e l i k e . T h e s e r e n d e r i n g s , t o c o n t i n u e a n e a r l i e r

t h e m e , a r e c o n s t i t u e n t s o f s oc i a l p r a c ti c e s. F r o m

t h i s p e r sp e c ti v e , k n o w l e d g e i s n o t s o m e t h i n g p e o p l e

p o s se s s s o m e w h e r e i n t h e i r h e a d s , b u t r a th e r , s o m e -

t h i n g p e o p l e d o t o g e th e r . L a n g u a g e s a r e e s s e n t ia l l y

s ha red ac t iv it i e s. I ndeed , un t i l t he s ound s o r mark ing s

c o m e t o b e s h a r e d w i t h i n a c o m m u n i t y , it is i n ap -

p rop r i a t e t o s pe ak o f l anguag e a t a ll . I n e f f ec t , w e

m a y c e a s e i n q u i r y i n t o t h e p s y c h o l o g i c a l b a s is o f

l a n g ua g e ( w h i c h a c c o u n t w o u l d i n e v i t ab l y f o r m b u t

a s u b t e x t o r m i n i a t u r e l a n g u a g e ) a n d f o c u s o n t h e

p e r f o r m a t i v e u s e o f la n g u a g e i n h u m a n a f fa i rs .2

A s w e h a v e s e e n , a n a l y s e s o f t h e s o c i a l c o n -

s t r u c t i o n i s t v a r i e t y h a v e b e e n d e v o t e d t o s u c h b r o a d

top ics a s gender, agg res s ion , m ind , caus a l i ty , pe r s on ,

s e l f , c h i l d , m o t i v a t i o n , e m o t i o n , m o r a l i t y , a n d s o

o n . T y p i c a l l y t h e c o n c e r n h a s b e e n w i t h t h e l a n g u a g e

f o r m s t h a t p e r v a d e t h e s o c i e t y , t h e m e a n s b y w h i c h

t h e y a r e n e g o t i a t e d , a n d t h e i r i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r o t h e r

r anges o f s oc ia l ac t iv ity . I n s uch endea vor s s oc ia l

p s ycho log i s t s beg in to jo in hand s , a s w e l l, w i th a

n e w r a n g e o f d i s ci p li n e s. R a t h e r t h a n l o o k i n g t o w a r d

t h e n a t u r a l s c i e n c e s a n d e x p e r i m e n t a l p s y c h o l o g y

fo r k in s h ip , a n a f f in i ty i s r ap id ly s ens ed w i th a r an ge

o f w h a t m a y b e t e rm e d interpretive disciplines t h a t

i s, d i s c i p li n e s c h i e f l y c o n c e r n e d w i t h r e n d e r i n g a c -

c o u n t s o f h u m a n m e a n i n g s y s te m s (c f. R a b i n o w &

S ul l ivan , 1979). O n the m os t im m ed ia te l eve l, s oc ia l

c o n s t r u c t i o n i s t i n q u i r y i s c o n j o i n e d w i t h e t h n o -

me thodo log ica l w o rk ( cf . G ar f ink e l , 1967 ; P s a thas ,

1 9 7 9 ) w i t h i t s e m p h a s i s o n t h e m e t h o d s e m p l o y e d

b y p e r s o n s t o r e n d e r t h e w o r l d s e n s i b l e , a n d w i t h

m u c h d r a m a t u r g i c a l a n a l y s i s ( c f . G o f f m a n , 1 9 5 9 ;

Sarbin & Scheibe, 1983) and i ts focus on the s t ra tegic

d e p l o y m e n t o f s oc i a l c o n d u c t . S i m i l a rl y , t r e a t m e n t s

o f the s oc ia l bas i s o f s c i en t i f i c know ledge , inc lud ing

t h e h i s t o r y a n d s o c i o l o g y o f k n o w l e d g e , b e c o m e

r e l e v a n t ( K n o r r , K r o h n , & W h i t l e y , 1 9 8 1 ; K n o r r -

C e t i n a & M u l k a y , 1 98 3). A n t h r o p o l o g i c a l i n q u i r y

acqu i r es a r enew ed in te r es t f o r p s ycho logy . O f s pecia l

i n t e r e s t i s t h e w o r k o f s y m b o l i c a n t h r o p o l o g i s t s

c o n c e r n e d w i t h t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n o f th e w o r l d , i n -

c l u d i n g p e r s o n s , d e v e l o p e d i n n o n - W e s t e r n c u l t u r e s

(cf. Gee r tz , 1973; Shw eder & Mil ler , 1985) . S imilar ly ,

p s y c h o l og y g a i n s a t e m p o r a l d i m e n s i o n a s i t s a n a l y se s

b e c o m e a r t i c u l a t e d w i t h h i s t o r i c a l r e s e a r c h i n t h e

2 If the emphasis s shifted,mu ch cognitive esearch becomes

relevant to constructionistpursuits. Research on social prototypes,

implied personality heory,attributionalschemata, h e concept of

intelligence, and the like do no t, fro m the p resent standpoint,

inform u s abou t another world--namely, an internal, cognitive

one. R ather the y might elucidate the nature of social discourse

and thu s raise interesting questions about the function of such

terms in scientificand social life.

2 7 0 M a r c h 1 98 5 A m e r i c a n P s y c h o l o g is t


6/10

constructionist mode (Nowell-Smith, 1977; White,

1978). And, psychology stands to gain much by

opening consideration on literary theory, including

accounts of metaphor (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980),

narratology (Genette, 1980), and the decons truction

of meaning (Culler, 1982). Such work informs as to

the means by which various linguistic figures or

tropes serve to organize or guide the attempt to

describe reality.

o n s t r u c t i o n i s m a n d t h e P r o b l e m a t i c s o f

P s y c h o l o g i c a l E x p l a n a t i o n

Thus far we have considered grounding assumptions

of the constructionist orientation, along with its

historical roots and contemporary emergence. It

remains now to touch upon the implications of

constructionism both for the character o f psycholog-

ical inquiry and for the nature of science more

generaUy. With regard to psychology the implications

are far reaching, and many years will be required

before they are fully explored. To appreciate the

arguments at issue consider the typical constructionist

analysis of psychological processes or mechanisms.

In Averill's (1982) hands the concept of anger is

largely cut away from a deterministic physiology and

becomes a form of social role; anger as a term thus

does not refer to a mental state but constitutes part

of the role itself. In a related analysis (Mills, 1940),

doubt is cast on the concept of motivation as a

primal power capable of moving people to action,

and the focus shifts to people's talk about their

motives and its social implications. The mind (Coul-

ter, 1979) becomes a form of social myth; the self-

concept (Gergen, 1985) is removed from the head

and placed within the sphere of social discourse. In

each case, then, what have been taken by one

segment of the profession or another as facts about

the nature o f the psychological realm are suspended;

each concept (emotion, motive, etc.) is cut away

from an ontological base within the head and is

made a constituent of social process. In agreement

with Wittgenstein's (1963) later analyses, one ceases

to view mental predicates as possessing a syntactic

relationship with a world of mental events; rather,

as Austin (1962a) and other post-Wittgensteinians

have proposed, such terms are cashed out in terms

of the social practices in which they function.

From this perspective, then, all psychological

theorizing and the full range of concepts that form

the grounds for research become problematic as

potential reflectors of an in ternal reality and become

themselves matters of analytic interest. Professional

agreements become suspect; normalized beliefs be-

come targets of demystification; the truth about

mental life is rendered curious. Or, in a slightly

different light, the contemporary views of the profes-

sion on matters of cognition, motivation, perception,

information processing, and the like become candi-

dates for historical and cross-cultural comparison.

From the constructionist perspective they often con-

stitute a form of ethnopsychology, historically and

culturally situated, institutionally useful, normatively

sustained, and subject to deterioration and decay as

Social history unfolds.

As is clear, constructionism will inevitably con-

front strong resistance within psychology more gen-

erally. It forms a potential challenge to traditional

knowledge claims; psychological research itself is

placed in the uncomfortable position of a research

object. Yet for social analysts the shift is one of

heady proportion. No longer would social inquiry

confront the threat of becoming a derivative enter-

prise--merely elaborating the social implications of

more fundamental psychological processes. Rather,

what is taken to be psychological process at the very

outset becomes a derivative of social interchange.

The explanatory locus of human action shifts from

the interior region of the mind to the processes and

structure of human interaction. The question why

is answered not with a psychological state or process

but with consideration of persons in relationship.

Few are prepared for such a wrenching, conceptual

dislocation. However, for the innovative, adventurous

and resilient, the horizons are exciting indeed.

o n s t r u c t i o n i s m a n d t h e h a r a c t e r

o f S c i e n c e

Although ma ny will find it difficult to relinquish the

use of psychological mechanisms, structures, and

processes as major explanatory vehicles, this loss

may be coupled with a challenge of no small con-

sequence. The challenge is essentially that of grap-

pling with a new conception of knowledge. To

appreciate the point it should be realized that prob-

lems inherent in both the endo- and exogenic ori-

entations are also deeply engrained in the contem-

porary conception of scientific knowledge and its

acquisition. In particular, the empiricist assumptions

that form the undergirding rationale for research in

psychology (and virtually all contemporary science)

are drawn chiefly from the exogenic, intellectual

tradition. This orientation, with its emphasis on

knowledge as an internal representation o f the state

of nature, is manifestly apparent in the traditional

attempt to establish scientific knowledge through

processes o f empirical verification and falsification.

However, if constructionism is to transcend the

exogenic-endogenic antinomy, and the interminable

conflict it has thus far spawned, then it must also

eschew the empiricist account of scientific knowledge.

As it abandons the subject-object dichotomy central

to disciplinary debate, so must it challenge dualism

as the basis for a theory o f scientific knowledge.

What is confronted, then, is the traditional,



7/10

Western concept ion of objective, individualistic,

ahistoric knowledge--a conception that has insin-

uated itself into virtually all aspects of modern

institutional life. As this view is increasingly chal-

lenged one must entertain the possibility of molding

an alternative scientific metatheory based on con-

structionist assumptions. Such a metatheory would

remove knowledge from the data-driven and/or the

cognitively necessitated domains and place it in the

hands of people in relationship. Scientific formula-

tions would not on this account be the result of an

impersonal application of decontextualized, meth-

odological rules, but the responsibility of persons in

active, communal interchange.

Elsewhere, the contours of this emerging meta-

theory have been referred to as

socior t ion l ist

(Gergen, 1982; Gergen & Morawski, 1980). In this

view the locus o f scientific rationality lies not within

the minds of independent persons but within the

social aggregate. That which is rational is the result

of negotiated intelligibility. For social thinkers the

further development of the metathory should be of

especially high priority. For, if the character of

sociorationalist process is among the focal concerns

of the social investigator, then the critical task of

understanding the generation and evolution of

knowledge falls centrally to scholars with in the social

sphere. Much philosophic inqu iry--including the

philosophy of science--thus falls subject to social

constructionist analysis. To a certain degree philos-

ophers of science are already aware of this prospect.

In recent years philosophic inquiry into foundations

of scientific knowledge has waned. Confidence in

empiricist assumptions has largely been eroded, and

there is no obvious contender on the horizon (Bern-

stein, 1978). 3 Such inquiry has become increasingly

replaced by historical analysis. Kuhn 's (1962/1970)

seminal treatise on revolutions in scientific knowledge

is essentially a historical account, and much subse-

quent discussion of rationality and progress in science

has largely proceeded on historical as opposed to

philosophic grounds. Such history is essentially social,

and its elaboration requires close attention to pro-

cesses of human interchange. It remains, however,

for social analysts more generally to become aware

of the pivotal position that they might legitimately

occupy.

Thus far feminist thinkers have been among

those most acutely aware of such possibilities. For

feminists, the empiricist orientation to knowledge

3Recent interest has been generated n a realist alternative

to empiricist metatheory (Bhaskar, 1978; Manicas & Secord,

1983). However, although opposed to the Humean basis of

scientific explanation, realist philosophy of science shares with

empiricism a range of fundamental assumptions. It thus suffers

from most of the criticisms odgedagainst empiricism.

has not generally been a congenial perspective--

advocating as it does manipulation, suppression,

and alienation of those one wishes to understand

(Jaeger, 1983). Further, from the feminist perspective,

empiricist science seems to have been oft employed

by males to construct views of women that contribute

to their subjugation (Bleier, 1984; Weisstein, 1971).

Both the process and the products of empiricist

science have thus come under attack, As a result

many feminists have searched for alternative forms

of understanding--both of science and of other

human beings. Constructionism, because o f its em-

phasis on the communal basis of knowledge, pro-

cesses of interpretation, and concern with the val.

uational underpinnings of scientific accounts, has

been an attractive alternative. Thus, feminists have

been frontrunners in employing interpretive research

strategies (Acker, Barry, & Esseveld, 1983; Bowles,

1984), documenting the scientific construction of

gender (Morawski, in press), demonstrat ing the prag-

matic uses of constructionist inquiry (Sassen, 1980),

and exploring the foundations for constructionist

metatheory (Unger, 1983).

Yet, the possibility of an alternative theory of

knowledge can hardly demand broad appeal. The

investments in and sense of security fostered by the

enduring traditions are profound. Acute misgivings

can be anticipated within these circles regarding

criteria of knowledge and the companionate problem

of appropriate methodology. Traditional empiricism

holds experience to be the touchstone o f objectivity;

hypotheses are said to be confirmed or challenged

by virtue of sense data. Yet, from the constructionist

viewpoint, both the concepts of experience and sense

data are placed in question. From what grounds do

they derive their truth warrants? Are the so-called

reports o f one's experience not linguistic con-

structions guided and shaped by historically contin-

gent convent ions of discourse? Yet, although casting

doubt on the process of objective warranting, con-

structionism offers no alternative truth criteria. Ac-

counts of social construction cannot themselves be

warranted empirically. If properly executed, such

accounts can enable one to escape the confines of

the taken for granted. They may emancipate one

from the demands of convention. However, the

success of such accounts depends primarily on the

analyst's capacity to invite, compel, stimulate, or

delight the audience, and not on criteria of veracity.

Required, then, are alternative criteria for evaluating

knowledge claims--criteria that might reasonably

take into account existing needs for systems of

intelligibility, limitations inherent in existing con-

structions, along with a range of political, moral,

aesthetic, and practical considerations.

By the same token, social constructionism offers

no truth through method. In large degree the

272 March 1985 American Psychologist


8/10

s c i e n c e s h a v e b e e n e n c h a n t e d b y t h e m y t h t h a t t h e

a s s i d u o u s a p p l i c a t i o n o f r i g o r o u s m e t h o d w i ll y i el d

s o u n d f a c t - - a s i f e m p i r i c a l m e t h o d o l o g y w e r e s om e

f o r m o f m e a t g r i n de r f r o m w h i c h t r u t h c o u l d b e

t u r n e d o u t l i k e s o m a n y s a u s a g e s . Y e t , a s a n a l y s t s

s u c h a s Q u i n e , T a y l o r, H a n s o n , a n d F e y e r a b e n d h a v e

s h o w n , s u c h e n c h a n t m e n t i s o f d o u b t f u l m e r i t .

P r e v i o u s s e c u r i t y i s w i t h o u t f i r m f o u n d a t i o n . F o r

o n e s e e k i n g s u c h s e c u r i t y s o c i a l c o n s t r u c t i o n i s m

w i l l s c a r c e l y b e p a l a t a b l e . Y e t t h i s i s n o t t o i m p l y

t h a t c o n s t r u c t i o n i s m e s c h ew s i n v e s ti g a ti v e m e t h o d s .

W h e t h e r r e n d e r i n g t h e c o n d u c t o f o r g a n i s m s i n te l -

l ig ib le o r d e m y s t i f y in g e x i s ti n g f o r m s o f u n d e r s t a n d -

i ng , r e s e a rc h m e t h o d s c a n b e us e d to p r o d u c e o b -

j e c t i f i c a t i o n s o r i l l u s tr a t i o n s u s e f u l i n a d v a n c i n g

t h e p r a g m a t i c c o n s e q u e n c e s o f o n e 's w o r k . I n t h i s

s e n s e i t w o u l d s e e m t h a t v i r t u a l l y a n y m e t h o d o l o g y

c a n b e e m p l o y e d s o l o n g a s it e n a b l e s t h e a n a l y s t to

d e v e l o p a m o r e c o m p e l l i n g c as e . A l t h o u g h s o m e

m e t h o d s m a y h o l d t h e a l l u r e o f la r g e s a m p l e s o t h e r s

c a n a t t r a c t b e c a u s e o f t h e i r p u r i t y , t h e i r s e n s it i v it y

t o n u a n c e , o r t h e i r a b i l i t y t o p r o b e i n d e p t h . S u c h

a s s et s d o n o t th e r e b y in c r e a s e t h e o b j e c t i v e v a l i d i t y

o f t h e r e s u l t i n g c o n s t r u c t i o n s . H o w e v e r , l ik e v i v i d

p h o t o g r a p h s o r s t a r tl in g v i g n e t te s d r a w n f r o m d a i ly

l i f e , w h e n w e l l w r o u g h t t h e y m a y a d d v i t a l p o w e r

t o t h e p e n .

O t h e r s m a y e s c h e w t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n i s t o r i e n -

t a t i o n f o r w h a t a p p e a r s t o b e i t s r a m p a n t r e la t iv i s m .

Y e t , a s w e h a v e s e e n , t h e a t t e m p t s t o j u s t i f y o b j e c t i v e

f o u n d a t i o n s f o r k n o w l e d g e h a v e y e t t o f u r n is h r e a s o n

f o r o p ti m i s m . O n e m i g h t w e l l a r g u e t h a t t h e s c i e n-

f i s t' s c la i m s t o p r i v i l e g e d k n o w l e d g e h a v e s e r v e d a s

m y s t i f y i n g d e v i c e s w i t h i n t h e s o c i e t y m o r e g e n e r a l ly .

C o n s t r u c t i o n i s m o f fe r s n o f o u n d a t i o n a l r u l e s o f

w a r r a n t a n d i n t h i s s e n s e i s r e l a t i v i s t i c . H o w e v e r ,

t h i s d o e s n o t m e a n t h a t a n y t h i n g g o e s . B e c a u s e

o f t h e i n h e r e n t d e p e n d e n c y o f k n o w l ed g e s y s te m s

o n c o m m u n i t i e s o f s h a r e d i n te l li g ib i li t y , s c i e n ti f ic

a c t i v i t y w i l l a l w a y s b e g o v e r n e d i n l a r g e m e a s u r e b y

n o r m a t i v e r u l e s. H o w e v e r , c o n s t r u c t i o n i s m d o e s i n -

v i t e t he p rac t i t i one r s t o v i ew t hes e ru l e s a s h i s t o r i ca l l y

a n d c u l t u r a ll y s i t u a t e d - - t h u s s u b j e c t t o c r i ti q u e a n d

t r a n s f o r m a t i o n . T h e r e i s st a b il it y o f u n d e r s t a n d i n g

w i t h o u t t h e s t u l ti f ic a t i o n o f f o u n d a t i o n a l i s m . F u r t h e r ,

u n l i k e t h e m o r a l r e l a ti v i sm o f th e e m p i r i c i s t t ra d i -

t i o n , c o n s t r u c t i o n i s m r e a s s e rt s t h e r e l e v a n c e o f m o r a l

c r i t e r i a f o r s c i e n t if i c p r a c t i c e . T o t h e e x t e n t t h a t

p s y c h o l o g i c a l t h e o r y ( a n d r e l a t e d p r a c t i c e s ) e n t e r

i n t o t h e l if e o f th e c u l t u r e , s u s t a i n in g c e r t a i n p a t t e r n s

o f c o n d u c t a n d d e s t r o y i n g o t h e rs , s u c h w o r k m u s t

b e e v a l u a t e d i n t e r m s o f g o o d a n d ill. T h e p r a c t i t i o n e r

c a n n o l o n g e r j u s t if y a n y s o c ia l ly r e p r e h e n s i b l e

c o n c l u si o n o n t h e g r o u n d s o f b e i ng a v i c t i m o f t h e

f a c t s ; h e o r s h e m u s t c o n f r o n t t h e p r a g m a t i c i m -

p l i c a ti o n s o f s u c h c o n c l u s i o n s w i t h i n s o c i e t y m o r e

genera l l y .

S h o u l d t h e c h a l le n g e o f d e v e lo p i n g a n a l t e r n a t i v e

m e t a t h e o r y b e a c c e p t e d , a v a r i e t y o f i n t e r e st i n g

c h a n g e s m a y b e a n t i c i p a t e d i n t h e c h a r a c t e r o f

p r o f e s s io n a l li fe . T h e p r o b l e m o f f o r g in g a c o m p e l l i n g

a c c o u n t o f t h e s o c i a l g e ne s is o f k n o w l e d g e i s n o t

i n c o n se q u e n t ia l . N e w t h e o r e ti c a l t o o ls a r e r e q u i r e d - -

c o n c e p t s th a t l ie b e tw e e n t h e p r o b l e m a t i c e x p l a n a t o r y

d o m a i n s o f p s y c h o lo g y a n d s o ci o lo g y . T h e f u n c t i o n s

o f la n g u a ge , b o t h a s a s y s t e m o f r e f e r e n c e a n d a s a

f o r m o f so c ia l p a r t ic i p a t i o n m u s t b e e l a b o r a t e d . A

g e n e r al a c c o u n t m u s t b e f u r n i s h e d o f th e s o c i a l

d i m e n s i o n s o f n a t u r a l s c i e n c e , s o c ia l sc i e n c e , a n d

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e x t e n t t o w h i c h s c ie n t if ic a c c o u n t s m a y b e ( i f e v e r )

c o r r e c t e d o r m o d i f i e d t h r o u g h o b s e r v a t i o n m u s t b e

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a n e w c o n c e p t i o n o f s c ie n c e , a n d a g e n e r a l r e f u r -

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