Georgia Institute Of Technology Daniel Guggenheim School of Aerospace Engineering Assessing the Options of the Augustine Committee and What Remains to

Georgia Institute Of Technology

Daniel Guggenheim School of Aerospace Engineering

Assessing the Options of the Augustine Committee and What Remains to be Done:

An Independent Perspective

Dr. Douglas StanleyGA Tech / National Institute of Aerospace

November 2, 2009



FY2006 FY2007 FY2008 FY2009 FY2010 FY2011 FY2012 FY2013 FY2014 FY2015 FY2016 FY2017 FY2018 FY2019 FY2020 FY2021 FY2022 FY2023 FY2024 FY2025 TotalFY05 Carry Over 500

ESMD Avail Budget 3468 4152 4366 5418 6311 8610 9442 9833 10128 10530 11141 12714 13041 13376 13719 14062 14414 14774 15143 15522 210163Ref Arch 1202 2733 4333 4893 5069 5685 7327 9502 11205 12565 12675 13239 13441 13916 14115 14049 13585 13674 14043 14422 201675

2337 3909 5504 6109 6346 7022 8775 11011 12775 14147 14269 14846 15060 15548 15761 15149 14685 14774 15143 15522 228694Avail - Total 1631 243 -1138 -691 -35 1588 667 -1178 -2647 -3617 -3128 -2132 -2019 -2172 -2042 -1088 -272 0 0 0 -18030

Cum Delta 1631 1874 736 44 9 1598 2264 1086 -1561 -5177 -8306 -10438 -12456 -14628 -16671 -17758 -18030 -18030 -18030 -18030

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FY2006 FY2007 FY2008 FY2009 FY2010 FY2011 FY2012 FY2013 FY2014 FY2015 FY2016 FY2017 FY2018 FY2019 FY2020 FY2021 FY2022 FY2023 FY2024 FY2025

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M

Lunar LV

Lander

SEI

R & T

RLEP

Other

CEV

EDS

Lunar Outpost

CLV

Mars R & T

5.5M CEVFirst ISS Flight 2012First Lunar Landing 2018Minimal Lunar OutpostFocused R & TLOX/H2 Lunar Descent Engine1.5 Launch Solution

2005 Planned ESMD Budget Used During ESAS

Actual and Planned ESMD Budget Based on FY10 President’s Budget

Projected ESMD Budget Post-2013 based on 1.4% Inflation Increase (Augustine Baseline)

Augustine Proposed Augmentation ($3B More per Year, 2.4% Inflation Increase)

ESAS Recommendation4 Seg SRB SSME US/ 5 Seg Inline Heavy (EOR-LOR)



What if ESAS Requirements Were Different in 2005?

• If the CEV had not been required to go to ISS, a Shuttle-derived two-launch lunar solution would have been selected

–Two identical vehicles reduce annual operating costs, only have fixed cost on a single configuration and spread them over more launches

–Shuttle-derived vehicles provide least expensive and safest heavy-lift capability–But not cost-effective or timely solution for servicing ISS

• If the architecture was focused solely on ISS servicing a EELV-based architecture (Delta-IV) would likely have been selected

–Decreased CEV mass would allow use of existing upper stage–Lower cost and risk to initial operation than ESAS baseline–Worse crew safety than ESAS baseline, but still sufficient–Slightly quicker schedule to initial operation than ESAS baseline–But not cost-effective path to lunar heavy-lift

• Mixed-fleet approaches considered but require “keep alive” costs for Shuttle components and infrastructure

–For Example, use of SRBs on EELV-derived core requires keeping SRB production and processing capabilities in place or many years if EELV-based CLV used

• Baseline Shuttle- derived ESAS architecture provided feasible near-optimum compromise solution to meet all requirements/missions



Augustine Commission Options



Selected Issues with the Augustine Report

• The relative safety of options was not even examined. – They said all had sufficient safety, but cannot even to point to a specific

"commercial" vehicle for which this is true -- or how they verified it was true. – It may be sufficient for some vehicles, but it would be irresponsible to make

decisions until this is done. – The reliability/safety of human-rated NASA vehicles (Atlas, Titan, Saturn, Shuttle)

far exceeds the record of commercial industry, particularly in the infant mortality phase (Falcon lost 3 of first 3, Pegasus lost 3 of first 9, Taurus lost 2 of first 7)

• The "estimated" cost of $5B for development of two human rated launch vehicles and two human rated entry vehicles is an order of magnitude less than historical experience

– It was derived in an arbitrary manner inconsistent with other costs to which it is being compared.

– It was derived from a Committee review of "proprietary business plans"; whereas, Aerospace's own independent analysis (provided to the Committee) estimated the cost of human rating a single Ares-1-class EELV cost more than that

• The cost margins added to the mature Ares 1 PMR 9 costs through first flight significantly exceeded the 50 percent margin added to the “commercial” crew vehicle costs described above in violation of stated margin policy



Selected Issues with the Augustine Report (Cont.)

• The estimated availability date of 2016 for an ISS "commercial" crew capability also comes from the companies rather than a bottoms-up independent estimate, unlike that used for Ares 1.

– Again, Aerospace's own independent analysis (provided to the Committee) estimated that it would take longer than this just to procure and human rate an EELV-based system.

– Just initiating a procurement and selection process would take at least a year. – The Committee also added two years to the Ares 1 program (2015 IOC moved to

2017) mostly because of the additional cost they added to a very mature program– They did not even acknowledge that, if additional budget were added, the Ares 1

could be accelerated back to 2015, so no other system could be available sooner.

• Even using a very conservative Ares 1 budget assumptions, the cost of extending the ISS to 2020 can be accommodated together with Ares 1, even under the worst case Augustine budget scenario.

– The fact that no Augustine options considered this option is an extreme oversight – No choice has to be made between ISS extension and Ares 1, especially as

additional budget is added – Keeping Ares 1 also enables the development of Ares 5 or other SDV later when

the budget becomes available, and a refueled Ares1 upper stage can deliver as much payload as an Ares 5 for exploration purposes (see later charts)



Selected Issues with the Augustine Report (Cont.)

• Augustine-defined options that include Shuttle-derived heavy lift, a new technology program, and “commercial” crew (e.g., 4a) do not fit within most optimistic budget wedge, even when $5B commercial crew costs are used

– Options were made to fit by stretching out Ares 5 lite and Orion development over 15 or more years without accounting for full carrying costs

– 9 years is longest they can reasonable be extended without significant penalties – Use of a smaller Shuttle-derived vehicle with re-fueling should be examined– May have to choose between Shuttle-derived heavy lift and “commercial” crew

and/or a new technology program– Could rely on international partners (Soyuz) until Shuttle-derived heavy-lift (e.g.,

Ares 5 lite is available to launch crew to ISS/LEO



Families of Options

• Eliminate all Shuttle-based elements– Eliminate significant fixed costs (and jobs) from NASA budget (political feasibility?)– Stimulate (different) commercial industrial base– Rely on smaller commercial vehicles and depots for exploration (volume?)– Higher risk path to US ISS crew access– Pay Shuttle remediation costs immediately

• Cancel Ares-1 and accelerate Shuttle-derived heavy-lift (e.g., Ares 5 lite)– Cannot fund “commercial” crew and technology together with SDV in near-term– Could rely on international partners (Soyuz) until Shuttle-derived heavy-lift (e.g.,

Ares 5 lite is available to launch crew to ISS/LEO (over-sized?)– Dual-launch solution provides quicker and cheaper exploration operations than 1.5

launch approach, but lower crew safety– Preserves NASA workforce continuity and fixed costs

• Keep Ares 1 for assured US access to ISS– Keeps government in LEO launch business longer– Can develop Ares 5 lite vehicle at later date as budget becomes available– Likely provides quickest path to first US ISS crew flight – Preserves NASA workforce and programmatic continuity and fixed costs– Re-fueled Ares 1 upper stage could deliver as much payload as Ares 5



What Should Happen Next?

• White House/Congress should immediately decide on: – ISS extension through 2020,

– Shuttle extension into 2011 and/or beyond 2011,

– Beyond-LEO human mission destination(s) and time-frame,

– Out-year available budget, and

– General policy towards commercial and international ISS crew transport.

• NASA should be allowed/directed to then define design reference mission(s) and requirements and perform ESAS-like architecture study (with independent oversight) to:

– Perform apples-to-apples cost/safety/risk comparison of Augustine-defined options and selected other combinations of options

– Re-visit EELV/Shuttle-derived vehicle trades – including side-mount,

– Perform detailed definition and economic analysis of propellant depots,

– Determine true cost/risk of “commercial” crew transport,

– Examine workforce impacts of options, and

– Define more detailed budgets to support 2011 budget cycle.



Example Ares 1-Based Exploration Architecture with Re-Fueling

• With orbital refueling of the upper stage, an Ares 1 can deliver as much usable payload to the lunar surface or a near-Earth object as an Ares 5

• Two Ares 1 launches can perform “flexible path” missions with many advantages

– The development cost of a new heavy-lift vehicle, which could exceed $15 billion, could be delayed until it is required for future human Mars or other missions.

– Use of a single vehicle could significantly reduce operating costs by reducing the fixed costs associated with a second vehicle.

– Human safety would be improved through the use of a smaller, safer vehicle.

– Workforce and programmatic continuity would be preserved.– An extensive new commercial market would be created for

propellant delivery to orbit that far exceeds the number of launches required by the ISS commercial cargo or even crew market.



Example Ares 1-Based Exploration Architecture with Re-Fueling (Cont.)

• Two Ares 1 launches can perform “flexible path” missions with many advantages (cont.)

– The propellant depot could be commercially procured, owned, and even commercially operated.

– Once a true commercial crew capability to orbit is demonstrated to meet NASA’s safety requirements, the Ares 1 could relinquish that mission to commercial providers and be used exclusively for exploration missions, but it provides a back-up capability until the commercial crew capability is demonstrated.

– A portion of the budget saved by not developing Ares 5 in the near term could still be used for incentives to industry to develop commercial crew systems.

– The remainder of the budget saved by not developing Ares 5 in the near term could be applied to developing the additional systems required to perform “flexible path” solar system exploration on an accelerated pace.



Back-up



Propellant Depot Option Requirements

• EDS total propellant load ~ 235 MT• TLI Propellant load requirement for EDS ~ 100 MT• Altair DM prop 25 MT• Ares I Upper Stage Prop load: 140 MT• Ares I Upper Stage is the class stage needed for fully

loaded EDS – Meets EDS requirements with margin, allows for boil-off and

loading uncertainties

• Ares I upper stage can also be used as on-orbit depot– Address one of primary concerns with propellant depot

concepts: cost for launch and on-orbit assembly of depot itself

• Two Options to implement prop depot– Upper stage fueled on-orbit directly from COTS supply (2-6

months stay) – 10 MT additional weight for added power, CFM systems, and additional RCS

– Upper stage acts as dedicated prop depot – fuels flight stage and Altair

Ares I US is Sized to Support Propellant Depot Scenario – Can Serve as Both EDS and Depot

7764.13



What About Propellant Depots for Ares 5 Lunar Missions?

• Use of LEO cryogenic propellant depot could improve LOM of ESAS Baseline

• Can provide continuous propellant boil-off mitigation• Could save multi-$B EDS/Altair in case of significant launch delay or accident

• Cost-effectiveness depends on cost of depot and propellant transfer• Marginal cost of Ares V launch very low (cheaper delivery system than Falcon)• Recent studies show using either one could save several $B

• Enables “arms length” commercial involvement/market• Recommended for examination by ESAS, but little work done by NASA

• Use of LEO cryogenic propellant depot could improve cost-effectiveness of ESAS Baseline

• EDS half empty on orbit• Can triple cargo capacity to lunar

surface (volume limited)• Complete lunar campaign sooner

• Could allow EDS to do LOI• Smaller high-cost lander• Improved architecture performance



Why not Side-Mounted SDV’s for ESAS?

• Lower DDT&E costs and risk if Shuttle ET is used, but this limits payload capability

• Equivalent side-mount configurations tend to have 10mT less payload

• Over-powered for ISS servicing, not as cost-effective as medium-lift

• For current lunar requirements at least 3 launches required

• Increase in LOM due to more launches, stages, and on-orbit mating

• Two pad constraint implies weeks between first and last launch• On-orbit cryogenic propellant storage technology required to prevent boil-off

• Automated rendezvous, docking, and mating required

• Crew escape problematic due to ET proximity• Shock interactions from ET and proximity to potential fire or explosion

Altair+EDSOrion+CrewEDS 1 EDS 2 Altair+Orion+Crew



Why not EELVs for ESAS?

• Human-rated EELVs can provide cost-effective ISS servicing – Current lunar requirements require new upper stages– Similar cost and lower risk to ISS IOC than ESAS baseline– Worse LOC/LOM than ESAS baseline, but still sufficient– Similar schedule IOC than ESAS baseline

• EELVs do not provide very cost-effective growth to lunar heavy-lift capability

– Atlas options preferred due to boost performance of RD-180s– ESAS baseline provides somewhat better cost, risk, LOC/LOM,

and max performance, but reasonable decision makers could disagree

• Mixed-fleet approaches require “keep alive” costs for Shuttle components (e.g., SRBs) and infrastructure

• Baseline SDV ESAS architecture preferred, particularly when “tie-breakers” taken into account

– Shuttle remediation costs– Cost (political and monetary) of job losses– Common cause failures with critical DoD system– Higher ammonium perchlorate costs for DoD– Level of DoD/NASA cost sharing of fixed costs (off-sets)



Architecture Mods Since ESAS

• In December 2005 a number of mods were made to baseline ESAS architecture without any integrated analysis to examine impact

• 5.5-meter diameter CEV changed to 5-meter–“Right-sized” CEV, saving cost and adding margin with little mission impact

• CEV SM propellant changed to Hypergol from LOX-Methane–Reduce cost and risk to IOC–Reduced LEO payload margin by 1,400 lb–Did not consider impact on LSAM ascent stage

• Using Hypergols on ascent stage increases ascent stage gross mass by 1,650 lb, descent stage gross mass by 3,100 lb, EDS gross mass by 21,000 lb

• Significantly decreases initial reliability of ascent stage with LOX/Methane engine due to lack of heritage experience (and increases LOC probability)

• But would decrease DDT&E cost and risk of ascent stage if Hypergols selected

–Cost/risk vs. performance trade where reasonable decision makers can disagree

• Baseline 4-segment w/SSME CLV changed to 5-segment w/J-2X–Risk and architecture life-cycle costs assumed to be reduced by cost of developing

air-start SSME (several hundred $M) while providing similar payload capability–However, CLV IOC significantly delayed (at least a year) due to higher DDT&E costs,

since the available budget drove the critical path• Increasing gap reduced political support and increased dependence on Russia



Architecture Mods Since ESAS (Cont.)

–Subsequent reduction in J-2X Isp led to payload reduction –Reduced SRB longitudinal acoustic mode due to thrust oscillation from 15 Hz to

11Hz, causing interaction with first axial frequency of CLV (9 to 11 Hz)• This danger was specifically addressed in ESAS Appendix 6

• Increased cost and schedule to address

• Significantly reduced LEO payload (>1,300lb) to add systems to address

–Increased dynamic pressure and higher acoustic loads led to added LAS mass and complexity

–Reduced payload from J-2X and thrust oscillation problem led to change of CEV landing mode from land to water (costing >$2B in LCC)

• Elimination of SSME from CLV, led to elimination a few months later on CaLV due to prohibitive “keep alive” cost for SSME over several years

–Led to use of cheaper (>$30M/engine) RS-68 that had significantly lower performance (40 sec Isp)

–Led to increase in diameter (to 10m) and height of CaLV to maximum possible–Increased gross mass by > 1Mlb for same payload–Reduced propulsion cost partially offset by higher vehicle and ground infrastructure

cost, likely leading to marginally lower LCC–No margin left at Michoud and in VAB to grow vehicle if required–Cost vs. performance/risk trade where reasonable decision makers can disagree



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Advanced Capabilities

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Ares I

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FY10 President's Budget

Post-2014 w/ 1.4% Inflation

Augustine Proposed Augmentation *

ISS Extension and Orion/Ares 1 PMR 9 Budgets Fit Within Wedges

Documents

Georgia Institute Of Technology Daniel Guggenheim School of Aerospace Engineering Assessing the Options of the Augustine Committee and What Remains to