Georgia Conflict

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GEORGIA CONFLICT: AN OVERVIEW UNDER A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

SUBMITTED TO:MD.TOUHIDUL ISLAM

LECTURER

DEPT .OF PEACE AND CONFLICT

STUDIES

UNIVERSITY OF DHAKA.

Prepared By:

HABIBUR RAHAMAN

SAHIDUZZAMAN SOHEL

FATEMA ALOM SUROVEE

SALMA SONIA

SANJIDA SHARMIN

ANAMUL HAQUE

A.M MONIRUDDIN

MAZEDUR RAHMAN

Date :03.05.2010


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Sl.no Contents Page no.

1 Introduction

2 Geographical location of Georgia:

3 Georgia conflict

3.1 Background information: history of conflict:

3.2 Major conflicts in Georgia:

3.3The conflicts of independence, 19891993

3.4 The south Ossetia conflict The conflicts of independence, 19891993

3.5The Abkhaz conflict

3.6The Georgian civil war

3.72008 south Ossetia

4 Causes of conflict:

5 Different environmental issues facing Georgia.

6 An analysis of the Russia-Georgia conflict from a geopolitical point of view

6.1 A new geopolitical balance post-conflict

7 Analysis: energy pipeline that supplies west threatened by war Georgia conflict

8 The role of the Russian federation in the Abkhazia conflict9 United states policy toward the Abkhaz conflict

10 Role of United States in Georgia

11 Analysis: why the Russia-Georgia conflict matters to the west

12 Russia-Georgia conflict: why both sides have valid points

12.1 What is Georgias view?

12.2The separatists' case?

12.3What is the Russian position?

13 Concern of European Union

14 Role of UN in Georgia conflict:

14.1 UN role in Georgia unclear as conflict is unresolved15 Initiatives of civil society for Georgian peace

16 Analysis of Georgian conflict under a theoretical framework

17 Recommendations

18 Concluding remarks

19 References

Figures: content Page

1 Map of Georgia

2 Map of Georgias conflicting areas

3 chronology of Georgian conflict

4 Major conflicts in Georgia

5 Georgia vs. South Ossetia conflict at a glance:6 Georgia vs. Abkhazia conflict at a glance:

7 Location of Georgia (including Abkhazia and South Ossetia) and the Russian part of NorthCaucasus

8 Georgia vs. South Ossetia or Georgia vs. Russia

9 major causes of Georgian conflict

10 Different environmental issues facing Georgia

11 A section of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline 30 miles south Tbilisi, Georgia, underconstruction in 2003.

12 USA Military Assistance in Georgia

13 military aid to Georgia

14 A Framework for Conflict Analysis CR SIPABIO


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Abstract:

The autonomous areas of South Ossetia and Abkhazia added to the problems of Georgia's post-Soviet governments. By 1993, separatist movements in those regions threatened to tear therepublic into several sections. Intimations of Russian interference in the ethnic crises alsocomplicated Georgia's relations with its giant neighbor. The intra-state conflict of Georgia ishighly considerable in international politics because of its geo-political situations. It is the onlyconflict prone area which is situated at the juncture of Eastern Europe and Western Asia . The

conflict that has erupted in the Caucasus has set alarm bells ringing because of Georgia's pivotarole in the global energy market. Georgia has no significant oil or gas reserves of its own but it isa key transit point for oil from the Caspian and central Asia destined for Europe and the US.Currently the Georgia-South Ossetia and Georgia-Abkhazia conflicts are stalemate. The SouthOssetians and Abkhazians still desire to break away from Georgia and establish their own state,and likewise, Georgia still wants to retain its territorial integrity and keep the regions of SouthOssetia and Abkhazia as parts of the state.

The main purpose of this paper is to analyze the conflicts in Georgia and it covers all the issues,contexts, actors, level of strategic interests, implications of conflicts and the outcome of theseconflicts in Georgia, South Ossetia and Abkhazia.

Firstly, this paper pays attention on the historical background of Georgian conflicts, Changing

pattern of the conflicts at different region in different periods, major conflicts, and the causes ofthese conflicts. Secondly, the paper analyses Georgian conflict under a theoretical framework.

This paper also focuses on the geopolitical situation of Georgia , responses of the United Statesin Georgian conflict, role of Russia, peace initiatives by the United Nations and the concern of theEuropean Union. Finally, this paper ends up with offering some recommendations.

Introduction:

The collapse of the Soviet Union generated instability throughout the Caucasus and rapidly undermined theestablished political structures and economic practices. Long suppressed aspirations were unleashed and, morethan any other of the newly independent states that arose from the debris of the Soviet Union, Georgia becamethe location of a series of violent conflicts. The conflicts over South Ossetia and Abkhazia have proved the mostintractable of these. Abkhazia and South Ossetia are two disputed regions in the Caucasus with de factoindependence[1] as the Republic of Abkhazia and the Republic of South Ossetia, respectively. The two republicseach claim to be sovereign states deserving of full international recognition and recognize each other asindependent states. Georgia and the vast majority of other countries of the world, however, reject the legitimacyof the two republics and consider both Abkhazia and South Ossetia to be occupied territory that, de jureremains part of GeorgiaThe autonomous areas of South Ossetia and Abkhazia added to the problems of

Georgia's post-Soviet governments. By 1993 separatist movements in those regions threatened to tear therepublic into several sections. Intimations of Russian interference in the ethnic crises also complicated Georgia'srelations with its giant neighbor.

The basic domestic and international issues surrounding the conflicts are the South Ossetians' and Abkhazianclaim of unequal treatment under Georgian rule and subsequent demands for cultural, social, economic andpolitical protections as a minority group, Russias desire to punish Georgia for its increasingly pro-Westernpolitical orientation, and outside concerns about the stability and accessibility of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhanpipeline running partly through Georgia. However, at the conflicts most basic level, it is a conflict over landand territory. Georgia wants to maintain its territorial integrity and thus prevent the region of South Ossetia andAbkhazia from seceding, while South Ossetia and Abkhazia want to establish independence.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eastern_Europehttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Western_Asiahttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Abkhaziahttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/South_Ossetiahttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Caucasushttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/De_factohttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Independencehttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_recognition_of_Abkhazia_and_South_Ossetia#cite_note-ap_defacto-0http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sovereigntyhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Georgia_(country)http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Occupied_territoryhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/De_jurehttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eastern_Europehttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Western_Asiahttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Abkhaziahttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/South_Ossetiahttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Caucasushttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/De_factohttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Independencehttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_recognition_of_Abkhazia_and_South_Ossetia#cite_note-ap_defacto-0http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sovereigntyhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Georgia_(country)http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Occupied_territoryhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/De_jure


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Geographical location of Georgia:

Georgia is a sovereign state in the Caucasus region of Eurasia. Situated at the juncture of Eastern Europe andWestern Asia, it is bounded to the west by the Black Sea, to the north by Russia, to the south by Turkey andArmenia, and to the east by Azerbaijan. Georgia covers a territory of 69,700 km and its population is 4.385million.

Figure 1 : Map of Georgia

Form of state: Georgia was an independent republic between 1918 and 1921, but in 1922 it was incorporated

into the Soviet Union, from which it declared its independence in April 1991. The Abkhazian and South

Ossetian autonomous territories, created in 1922, have both declared their independence from Georgia. Russia

recognized the independence of the two territories in August 2008. A new constitution was approved in Georgia

in August 1995, which reinforced the presidential-democratic form of government, providing for a strong

executive branch and a unicameral 235-seat parliament. A constitutional court met for the first time in late


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1996. The constitution does not address the status of Abkhazia or South Ossetia, but grants autonomous status

to Adjara, another separatist region until its reintegration in May 2004

Georgian conflict:

Figure2: Map of Georgias conflicting areas

Background information: history of conflict:


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Figure 3: chronology of Georgian conflict

Major conflicts in Georgia:

Year Events

Late18th century Ossetia was incorporated into the Russian Empire and divided into northern andsouthern regions

1918-1921 Georgian independence from Russian Empire

1921 Georgia was annexed by the Soviet Union

1922 South Ossetia was established as an autonomous region of the Soviet Republic ofGeorgia

1989-1990 South Ossetia tried to gain independence from Georgia

April 1991 Georgia received independence

1991-1992 brutal clashes between South Ossetians and Georgians, 1,000 dead*

1992 The conflict involved a 13-month long Abkhazian war

1992 Ceasefire agreement brokered by Russia

1998 the conflict escalated once again in the Gali District in Abkhazia

2001, Around 400 Chechen fighters and 80 Georgian guerrillas appeared in theKodori Valleyin extremely controversial conditions. The Chechen-Georgian paramilitaries advancedas far as Sukhumi, but finally were repelled by Abkhaz and Gudauta based Russianpeacekeepers.

2003 Rose Revolution in Georgia

2004 fighting broke out in South Ossetia

2007 Georgia calls for internationalization of peacekeeping force in the region

2008 Georgia attacks Tskhinvali followed by a Russian counter-offensive.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kodori_Valleyhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kodori_Valleyhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kodori_Valley


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Figure 4 : Major conflicts in Georgia

The conflicts of independence, 19891993

In Georgia, the easing of restrictions on expression and political organization in the late 1980s led tospontaneous and large-scale nationalist demonstrations for greater autonomy and independence, which led toindependence in April 1991. Institutionalized legacies of Soviet nationalities policy, however, engendered bitterethnic tensions and political fragmentation, creating a climate of instability as non-Georgian populationsincreasingly regarded Georgian aspirations as a precursor to more oppressive political control. Subsequentlythe Abkhazian ASSR and South Ossetia AO countered Georgian demands for independence with demands forgreater autonomy within the Soviet federal system. In this context, armed violence was not inevitable, but arosedue to the conjunction of two interrelated factors: the progressive militarization of politics, and the decision byformer Soviet military officers to intervene in the political rivalries. During 199194, two secessionist warswere fought, in South Ossetia and Abkhazia respectively, and in Georgia proper a civil war pitted supporters of

the first post-independence president against the actors who overthrew him.


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The South Ossetian conflict

Duration The conflict began with the fall of the Soviet Union in the early 1990's and the

last conflict in 7-8 august in 2008.

Location The location of most of the fighting has been within the South Ossetian territoryitself.

Actor Georgia, South Ossetia, Russia, North Ossetia

Type of Habitat The natural environment of Georgia and in particular, South Ossetia ismountainous with a temperate climate.

Type of Conflict The conflict is civil in nature.

Level of Conflict It is an intrastate conflict and is currently at a low threat level. Between 1991 and1992, the violence was more severe and last in 2008 conflict was high threat level.

Fatality Level of Dispute (military and

civilian fatalities)

June 8, 1992 over 1,000 civilian and military deaths. During the violence in 2004,at least 22 people died. in 1991, causing thousands of casualties and creating tensof thousands of refugees on both sides of the Georgian-Russian border. In 2008,Civilian casualties:South Ossetia: 162 according to Russia, 365 according toSouth Ossetia.Georgia: Georgian government says 228 civilians dead or missing.One foreign civilian killed and 3 wounded.At least 158,000 civilians displaced.

Environment-Conflict

Link and Dynamics:

The conflict has had a negative impact on the environment with issues of

deforestation, soil degradation, and pollution from unmanaged hazardous wastesites becoming a problem throughout Georgia and the South Ossetia region inparticular.

Level of Strategic

Interest

The conflict between Georgia and South Ossetia is state v. sub-state. Therefore, theconflict is within one state; Georgia.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stan_Storimanshttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stan_Storimans


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Outcome of Dispute: Currently the Georgia-South Ossetia conflict is a stalemate. The South Ossetiansstill desire to break away from Georgia and establish their own state, and likewise,Georgia still wants to retain its territorial integrity and keep the region of SouthOssetia as a part of the state.

Figure 5: Georgia vs. South Ossetia conflict at a glance:

The Abkhaz conflict:

Georgia vs. Abkhazia conflict at a glance:

Type of conflict The GeorgianAbkhazian conflict refers to the ethnic conflict betweenGeorgians and Abkhazians in Abkhazia

Main actors of conflict Georgia and Abkhazia

Location Abkhazia in Georgia

Duration The conflict involved a 13-month long Abkhazian war, beginning inAugust 1992, with Georgian government forces and militia made of ethnicGeorgians who lived in Abkhazia on one side and Russian-backedseparatist forces made of ethnic Abkhazians, Armenians and Russians whoalso lived in Abkhazia on the other side

Level of conflict It is an intrastate conflict and is currently at a low threat levelsLevel of strategic interest The conflict between Georgia and Abkhazia is state v. sub-state. Therefore,

the conflict is within one state; Georgia.

Casualities During the war, the Abkhaz separatist side carried out full scale ethniccleansing campaign which resulted in the expulsion of up to 250,000 ethnicGeorgians and more than 15,000 killed

Resumption of hostilities In AprilMay, 1998, the conflict escalated once again in the Gali District.Aceasefire was negotiated on May 20. The hostilities resulted in hundredsof casualties from both sides and an additional 20,000 Georgian refugees.In

September 2001, around 400 Chechen fighters and 80 Georgian guerrillasappeared in the Kodori Valley in extremely controversial conditions. OnAugust 10, 2008, the war in South Ossetia spread to Abkhazia.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ethnic_conflicthttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Georgianshttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Abkhazianshttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Abkhaziahttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Abkhaziahttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Abkhaz_peoplehttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Armenianshttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Russianshttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ethnic_cleansing_of_Georgians_in_Abkhaziahttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ethnic_cleansing_of_Georgians_in_Abkhaziahttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ceasefirehttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ceasefirehttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kodori_Valleyhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2008_War_in_South_Ossetiahttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ethnic_conflicthttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Georgianshttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Abkhazianshttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Abkhaziahttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Abkhaziahttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Abkhaz_peoplehttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Armenianshttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Russianshttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ethnic_cleansing_of_Georgians_in_Abkhaziahttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ethnic_cleansing_of_Georgians_in_Abkhaziahttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ceasefirehttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kodori_Valleyhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2008_War_in_South_Ossetia


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Outcome of dispute Relations between Georgia and Abkhazia have remained tense after thewar. Georgia has moved to increase Abkhazia's isolation by imposing a seablockade of Abkhazia. The Abkhazian still desire to breakaway fromGeorgia and establish their own state, and likewise, Georgia still wants toretain its territorial integrity and keep the region of South Ossetia as a partof the state.

Figure 6:Georgia vs. Abkhazia conflict at a glance:

The Georgian civil war

The conflicts in South Ossetia and Abkhazia took place in a context of civil war in Georgia proper. In contrastto other former republics in the Soviet Union, the holding of free elections in 1990 plunged Georgia into aprotracted political crisis that eventually turned into armed violence in late 1991. The victory of the oppositionleader, Zviad Gamsakhurdia, over Communist Party incumbents in 1990 alienated large segments of thefragmented opposition, as Gamsakhurdia denied them access to power. In an increasing climate of instability,ethnic conflict, and uncertainty, Gamsakhurdias policies were considered by many to be adding to the troublesof an already beleaguered transition. The failed August 1991 coup against Gorbachev in Moscow, andGamsakhurdias alleged support of the military putschists, served as a pretext for his opponents to demand hisresignation.Between September and December 1991, massive street demonstrations gradually escalated intoviolence and culminated in the attack on and seizure of Parliament House by armed paramilitary groupsFollowing the routing of Gamsakhurdia, his followers (including a faction of the National Guardone of themain paramilitary groupsthat did not defect to the opposition) redeployed to western Georgia, where theywaged an insurgency that lasted until late 1993. This fighting, which overlapped in complex ways with theconflict in Abkhazia, led Eduard Shevardnadze (the Georgian head of state under the new government) to seekRussian military assistance, culminating in the accession of Georgia to the Commonwealth of IndependentStates (CIS). In addition to thousands of casualties, the Georgian civil war also resulted in the political andeconomic supremacy of Georgian paramilitary groupsthus completing the militarization of politicsuntil1995 at the earliest.

2008 South Ossetia war or

RussiaGeorgia War :

Figure 7: Location of Georgia(including Abkhazia and SouthOssetia) and the Russian part ofNorth Caucasus
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Georgian_sea_blockade_of_Abkhaziahttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Georgian_sea_blockade_of_Abkhaziahttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Georgian_sea_blockade_of_Abkhaziahttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Georgian_sea_blockade_of_Abkhazia


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Figure 8: Georgia vs. South Ossetia or Georgia vs. Russia

According to Human Rights Watch:Violence has escalated in South Ossetia, a breakaway province of Georgiaand one of the frozen conflicts of the former Soviet Union. The conflict heated up dramatically in the earlymorning of August 8, 2008. Georgia declared that it intended to restore constitutional order and launched alarge-scale military offensive. Russia sent additional troops to South Ossetia, saying they were reinforcementsto Russian peacekeepers who are in the area to monitor a 1992 ceasefire between Georgian and South Ossetianforces.(Human Rights' Watch. 2008. "Q & A: Violence in South Ossetia." August 15. (source http://hrw.org/english/docs/2008/08/08/georgi19577.htm )

Causes of

conflict:

Figure 9: major causes of Georgian conflict

Actors Georgia vs. South Ossetia or Georgia vs. Russia

Date 7 August 2008 16 August 2008

Location South Ossetia, uncontested Georgia, Abkhazia

Result 1. Decisive Russian/South Ossetia/Abkhazian victory2. Recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia asindependent republics by Nicaragua, the RussianFederation, Venezuela, and Nauru.3. Expulsion of most ethnic Georgians from SouthOssetia and from the Kodori Gorge.

Territorial Georgia loses control over parts of Abkhazia and South Ossetia

Changes Previously held.
http://opt/scribd/conversion/tmp/scratch1208/(source%20:%20http://hrw.org/english/docs/2008/08/08/georgi19577.htmhttp://opt/scribd/conversion/tmp/scratch1208/(source%20:%20http://hrw.org/english/docs/2008/08/08/georgi19577.htmhttp://opt/scribd/conversion/tmp/scratch1208/(source%20:%20http://hrw.org/english/docs/2008/08/08/georgi19577.htmhttp://opt/scribd/conversion/tmp/scratch1208/(source%20:%20http://hrw.org/english/docs/2008/08/08/georgi19577.htm


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Grievances and Opportunities:

Almost 70 years of Soviet socialism has left a mixed legacy of substantial economic and social modernization coupledwith structural problems and grievances across the former USSR. These problems are particularly acute in Georgia due toconflicts and civil war that marred its early years of independence and severe deterioration of the economy and social

conditions.

Ethnicity and Religion:

Georgia is a mosaic of ethnic and religious communities whose differences have been and can be manipulated by politicaleaders. Ethnic and religious cleavages are created and malleable rather than primordial and unchangeable. But ethnicgroups provide a framework for the organization and aggregation of common interests and have been the public face oftwo separatist conflicts in Georgia.

Economic Deterioration

A devastating decline in the Georgian economy has accompanied independence. Between 1990 and 1995, economicoutput fell by more than 70 percent. Areas that were prosperous industrial bastions in Soviet times like Kvemo-Kartli, are

still reeling from the factory closures that left most of the local population out of work. Agriculture presents a similarlydismal picture.

Deteriorating Social Conditions

As a consequence of economic decline, the overwhelming majority of the population has suffered a disastrousdeterioration in economic and social conditions since the implosion of the Soviet Union. High unemployment andunderemployment have eroded the standard of living for the vast majority of the population. This has precipitated amassive migration of youths in search of opportunities elsewhere in and outside Georgia.

Political Disaffection

Attitudes towards politics and political engagement have changed dramatically over a decade of independence. WhileGeorgia struggled for independence, political activism and participation was high. The failure of this period to transformthe lives of many citizens bred disgust with the politics of the past decade that has now led to a deep disengagement of thecitizenry with politics.

Lack of Confidence in Institutions:s

Georgia inherited the shells of Soviet institutions, though little substance actually remains within these shells. Mostpervasive is the lack of a rule of law. The population is keenly aware that legislation has little relationship with the waylaws are enforced. Corruption, bribes, and reliance on informal clan structures are the keys to daily life.

Corruption:

Corruption is a common grievance among Georgians, though most Georgians are also involved in one way or another inrent-seeking opportunities that supplement their meager salaries. Transparency Internationals 1999 ranking of corruptionranked Georgia 84 of 99 countries examined.

History:

Georgians have little history of violent reaction to social and economic hardship. Tolerance for dismal living conditionscan serve as a conflict inhibitor. The substantial progress that the Soviet Union brought in terms of economic


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development, upward mobility and social modernization was accompanied by broad compliance with authority on thesurface.ss

Fear of Instability:s

Many Georgians suggested that the tumultuous experiences of the 1990s created a fear of instability that restrains elite andmass behavior. Civil war in Tbilisi and the disastrous South Ossetian and Abkhazian conflicts remain fresh memories.

Weakness of Civil Society:

The weakness of civil society in Georgia may inhibit conflict by making mobilization of discontent difficult.

Georgian Nationalism:

While nationalism has been divisive for ethnic minorities, there is a shared sense of Georgian identity that provides somedegree of national cohesion among ethnic Georgians. This sense of identity is weaker in some regions and may benonexistent in others, particularly minority regions in which the state maintains a low profile and Georgian is not thelanguage of most of the inhabitants.

Trade Networks

Countries that rely on trade and maintain open commercial ties with other states tend to be less conflict-prone. Georgia isa transit country, trade with neighboring countries is much of the economic activity in the country, and much of staterevenue comes from customs duties. But corrupt elites share a strong interest in maintaining some level of economicstability and trade relations smuggling.

Political Parties

Political parties formally dominate the political process. Although there are over 100 parties in Georgia, Thus, theircohesion and durability is tenuous, as shown by the recent fragmentation of the CUG, once the broadest and mostinstitutionalized Georgian political party.

Neighboring States

A small state with few resources, Georgia depends heavily on relations with its neighbors. While technically at thecrossroads of Europe and Asia, the mountainous terrain of the Caucasus and underdeveloped transportation networkmakes physical interactions difficult. The particular and disparate interests of foreign actors vis--vis Georgia must,however, be noted.

Russias historical relationship with Georgia and physical proximity ensure that it plays a significant role in the

countrys politics and economics. The continuing presence of Russian military bases in Batumi and Akhalkalaki, as wellas CIS peacekeeping forces (under Russian command) in the Abkhaz and Ossetian zones of conflict are a source ofirritation for the vast majority of Georgians.

Armenia also figures prominently among the external actors important for Georgias future. The opportunities andincentives for Armenian involvement in Georgian affairs are multiple.


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Turkey and Georgian elites share common geo-political interests forged in no small part by their historic animositytoward Russia. Turkey is today Georgias largest trading partner and potential partner in the construction of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline.

This is a map of the different environmental issues facing Georgia.

Figure 10: Different environmental issues facing Georgia

Source :( South Ossetian Separatism in Georgiaby Rebecca Ratliff/gorgia/ossetia.htm)

The environmental aspects of the dispute are also an important part of the picture. According to a Pro-NaturalProposal, The long-lasting conflict in South Ossetia has had a significant impact on the environment, includingthe degradation, depletion and mismanagement of natural resources.( Pro-Natura USA, Caucasus Peace Parka Feasibility Study for Georgia and Russia, Project Summary, September 2005,) In addition, the territory ofSouth Ossetia, located in north central Georgia, holds two of the four major border crossings among themountains separating Russia and Georgia and has several of Georgias important roadways running through itfrom east to west and north to south. Retaining control over such roadways and border crossings is importantfor Georgia as they aid both inter and intra-state movement of people and goods. In addition, two important oilpipelines, the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan and Baku-Supsa (see map), run through Georgia on their way to Black Seaports. Separatist movements, such as the South Ossetian movement, pose security threats to the pipelines andthe flow of energy sources. (Energy Information Administration, Country Analysis Brief, Caspian Seahttp://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/Caspian/RegionalConflicts.html) So not only is the environmental aspecimportant in terms of pollution and degradation, but also in geo-political strategic terms as well. Conflict withSouth Ossetia and also Abkhazia, make it very difficult for Georgia, or anyone else, to address environmentalissues and establishing peace with conflict areas like South Ossetia may be nearly impossible withouconsidering the environmental factors involved. For example, a 2004 report by the United Nations EnvironmentProgramme says, Environmental degradation and the use of natural resources are identified as factors thatcould deepen contention in areas of existing conflicts as in Abkhazia, South Ossetia.(12. UNEP"Environment and Security-Transforming Risks into Cooperation the Case of the Southern Caucasus", 2004)


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Acquiring accurate data about the environmental situation in South Ossetia is very difficult, which is a problemin of itself, however problems such as the exploitation of natural resources and soil contamination are known toexist in South Ossetia. Unfortunately

An analysis of the Russia-Georgia conflict from a geopolitical point of view

An analysis of the Russia-Georgia conflict from a geopolitical point of view brings out the strategic gainspocketed by Russia. They have put a brake on NATOs enlargement, which is responsible for Russiaperception of encirclement. On a wider scale, the conflict represents the arrival of a multipolar world. TheEuropean Union is directly concerned by this clash between Russia and the United States over the forming ofspheres of influence on the Eurasian landmass. From the perspective of a political Europe, the securityinterests of the Union are dictated by geography. Renunciation of the enlargement of the EU and the AtlanticAlliance would be a response to the imperatives governing the stability of the continent and would open the wayto a new Eurasian security system.

A new geopolitical balance post-conflict

The new situation on the ground enables Russia to strengthen its own security.

Russia has firm control of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Whether incorporated or not in the Russian Federation,these are strategic territorial gains. Russias presence in Abkhazia enables it to improve its access to the BlackSea and, in the event of a conflict with a hostile force establishing itself on Georgian territory, would enable itto neutralize the Georgian deepwater port of Poti more quickly. Its presence in South Ossetia, close to theterritorial heart of Georgia, enables Russia to reach the capital Tbilisi very rapidly, to cut the countrys maineast-west communications corridor, and to neutralize the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline, which supplies theworld markets and passes south of the Georgian capital.

Russia could also exercise more influence on the Eurasian continents balance by making more difficult the useof Georgian territory by Israeli and American aircraft for refueling in the event of a bombardment of Iraniannuclear installations.

The desire of the United States and some European countries to reduce their dependence on Russia, in order todiversify world and European energy supplies, is compromised if they try to avoid negotiating with Russia. Theenergy and commercial links between Europe and Central Asia passing through Russia have been strengthenedand the alternative route through the South Caucasus has been rendered less certain.

Georgias strategic value to the Atlantic Alliance has been diminished by the de facto loss of a third of itsterritory.

Analysis: energy pipeline that supplies west threatened by war Georgia conflict

Figure 11: A section of theBaku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline30 miles south TbilisiGeorgia, under constructionin 2003.


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The conflict that has erupted in the Caucasus has set alarm bells ringing because of Georgia's pivotal role in theglobal energy market. Georgia has no significant oil or gas reserves of its own but it is a key transit point for oilfrom the Caspian and central Asia destined for Europe and the US. Crucially, it is the only practical route fromthis increasingly important producer region that avoids both Russia and Iran. The threat of another attack byseparatists in Georgia itself is very real. The latest eruption of violence could easily spur fresh attacks. The BTCpipeline, which is buried throughout most of its length to make sabotage more difficult, was a politically highlycharged project. It was firmly opposed by Russia, which views the Caucasus as its own sphere of influence andwants central Asian oil to be exported via its own territory

. Russia also backs the South Ossetian and Abkhazian separatists in Georgia and relations between Moscow andTbilisi have curdled into outright hostility in recent months. The BTC pipeline, which cost $3 billion to build, isa key plank of US foreign policy because it reduces Western reliance on oil from both the Middle East andRussia.

THE ROLE OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION IN THE ABKHAZIA CONFLICT

The conflict in Abkhazia was heightened by the involvement of Russia, mostly on the Abkhaz side, especiallyduring the war's initial stages. Whereas Russia has endorsed the territorial integrity of the Republic of Georgia,Russian arms found their way into Abkhaz hands, Russian planes bombed civilian targets in Georgian-

controlled territory, Russian military vessels, manned by supporters of the Abkhaz side, were made available toshell Georgian-held Sukhumi, and at least a handful of Russian-trained and Russian-paid fighters defendedAbkhaz territory in Tkvarcheli. Russia has played a decisive role in determining the course and outcome of thewar in Abkhazia, both positive and negative. Throughout the conflict, Moscow maintained official neutralitycondemned human rights violations, and imposed sanctions on both Georgia and Abkhazia in response to theirmisconduct. It is this scenario more than any other that may explain why Russia has neither acknowledged itsown responsibility, nor condemned the acts of others when Russian weapons found their way into the hands ofGeorgia's enemy and Russian planes and ships were used to attack Georgian-controlled territory.

UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD THE ABKHAZ CONFLICT

In the post-Cold War world, the influence of the United States in the former Soviet republics has growntremendously. U.S. policy toward the conflict in Abkhazia therefore also merits scrutiny. American policyappears to have been guided by three overall principles: first, support for the independence of Georgia; second,support for the territorial integrity of Georgia with respect to Abkhazia; and third, support for Shevardnadze personally. Although these three policies are themselves political matters beyond Human Rights Watch'mandate, they have led the U.S. to be, in Human Rights Watch's view, less demanding on matters ohumanrights from the Georgian government than it might have been. They have also led the U.S. to pursue apolicy of engagement with the Georgian government that appears to Human Rights Watch, from the standpointof human rights protection, unjustifiably credulous. The U.S. has, however, been sensitive to the humanitariancrisis in Abkhazia. Shevardnadze stated during his March 1994 visit to Washington that the U.S. had providedsome $200 million in humanitarian aid, principally for the support of refugees from the Abkhaz war.

(source : Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1994), p. 62.

Role of United States in Georgia

Institutionally, US participation in the peace process is limited to its membership of the Friends of theSecretary-General and the UN Security Council. However, the emergence of the Caucasus as a crucialgeostrategic region has increased US interest in the energy routes that will transport potentially vast supplies ofoil, gas and metal ores from central Asia and Azerbaijan to the West. To ensure that the USA and its Westernallies secure this EastWest corridor across the Caucasus it needs politically stable and independent Caucasian


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states. The USA views Georgia as a vital military, strategic and commercial ally in the region. Failure inGeorgia would unravel US strategy and permit greater Russian and Iranian influence. The USA therefore rejectsthe unilateral secession of Abkhazia and urges its integration into Georgia as an autonomous unit. In 1998 theUSA announced its readiness to allocate up to $15 million for rehabilitation of infrastructure in the Gali regionif substantial progress is made in the peace process. USAID has already funded some humanitarian initiativesfor Abkhazia. The USA has in recent years significantly increased its military support to the Georgian armedforces but has stated that it would not condone any moves towards peace enforcement in Abkhazia.

On 29 April 2002 the Department of Defense announced the beginning of the Georgia Train and Equip program(GTEP). This program implements President Bush's decision to respond to Government of Georgia's request forassistance to enhance its counter-terrorism capabilities and address the situation in the Pankisi Gorge. Thiseffort will complement other counter-terrorism efforts around the globe and will increase stability in theCaucasus. The 20-month, $64-million plan, involving a maximum of 150 US soldiers, is expected to beduplicated in 20 other countries. A flexible, time-phased training initiative, GTEP built upon the strongmilitary-to-military relationship developed between the two countries since the end of the Cold War, and furtherunderscores U.S. support for Georgia's sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity. Under the GeorgiaBorder Security and Law Enforcement (GBSLE) program, the US provided the Georgian border guardcustoms, MOD, and other border security and law enforcement agencies with communications equipmentvehicles and helicopters with spares/repair parts for transport and patrol, surveillance and detection equipment,

computers for automation of applications, licensing and regulatory systems, and forensics laboratory assistance.In mid-2002 the US Army Corps of Engineers' Europe District helped the Georgian State Frontier DefenseDepartment celebrate its 10th anniversary in grand style

(Source: www.global security .org)

USA Military Assistance in Georgia

Figure12: USA Military Assistance inGeorgia

This figure shows the USA militaryassistance and military sales toGeorgia pre September11 Vs.postSeptember11. We can easilyunderstand the increasing level of

arms dealing of USA to Georgia.

Following the war between Georgiaand Russia, both Europe and the United States have largely stopped selling lethal military equipment toGeorgia. The United States has nonetheless continued training Georgian forces for operations in Afghanistanand Iraq under a program titled the International Military Education and Training Program (IMET), andfunding appears to have increased for this training. Relatively speaking, military equipment sales to Georgiawere much higher than training funding up to 2008, but have dropped to zero in 2009 (see charts based on datafrom the Lugar report).
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Figure 13military aid to Georgia

Georgia has embraced the report while Russiaand the breakaway territories of South Ossetiaand Abkhazia argue arms sales to Georgiacould lead to another outbreak of violence inthe region.

Analysis: why the Russia-

Georgia conflict matters to the

West

It would be a serious mistake for the international community to regard the dramatic escalation of violence inGeorgia as just another flare-up in the Caucasus. The names of the flashpoints may be unfamiliar, the territoryremote and the dispute parochial, but the battle under way will have important repercussions beyond the regionThe outcome of the struggle will determine the course of Russias relations with its neighbours, will shapeDmitri Medvedevs presidency, could alter the relationship between the Kremlin and the West and crucially

could decide the fate of Caspian basin energy supplies. Quite what triggered the Georgian offensive, on the daythat the world was supposed to gather in peace for the start of the Beijing Olympics, is not yet clear.

(source : Times Online August 8, 2008 )

Russia-Georgia conflict: Why both sides have valid points

What is Georgia's view?

When the USSR broke up in 1991, Georgia won its independence and was admitted to the United Nations as asovereign state within its Soviet-era borders. Under international law, therefore, the breakaway territories of

South Ossetia and Abkhazia belong to Georgia. Tbilisi alleges, with considerable evidence, that Russianmeddling during the bitter civil wars that followed helped the two statelets win their de facto independence andthat Moscow's support has been crucial to keeping them going ever since. (www.global security.org)

In 2003, the pro-democracy "Rose Revolution" brought Mr. Saakashvili to power on pledges to reunite thecountry and lead it into the premier Western military alliance, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).Georgia claims that Russia, which brutally suppressed its own separatist uprising in Chechnya, backed theOssetian and Abkhazian rebels in order to keep Georgia weak and dependent upon Moscow.

After Saakashvili was elected, Russia began upgrading its relations with the two rebel statelets and issuedRussian passports to the majority of its citizens in preparation, Tbilisi says, for a showdown. It contends that

this year, as NATO considered Georgia's application for entry, the Russian 58th Army which roared intoSouth Ossetia 10 days ago to blunt the Georgian assault massed provocatively near Georgia's border.

The separatists' case?

Abkhazians and Ossetians are both distinct ethnic groups with a long history of tense relations with theirGeorgian neighbors. Both groups claim that they were folded into the Soviet Republic of Georgia against theirwill by dictator Joseph Stalin (an ethnic Georgian), who also ordered Georgian settlers to flood into theirterritories. Abkhazia and Ossetia argue that their citizens were Soviet citizens, never Georgians, and therefore


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they had a right to declare independence as Soviet Union was collapsing. Tbilisi's reaction, which was toattempt to suppress both rebellions with military force, invalidated Georgia's rights to sovereignty, they say.

Abkhazian Deputy Foreign Minister Maxim Gunjia says that Tbilisi's latest attempt at reconquest settles theissue. "Neither Abkhazia nor South Ossetia will ever be part of that country; Georgia has shown us its trueface," he says in a telephone conversation from Sukhumi, Abkhazia.

Georgia has traditionally responded to such claims by saying that any independence referendum in the

breakaway territories must take into account the views of the Georgian population displaced by the wars of theearly 1990s. Nearly a quarter of a million Georgians were driven out of Abkhazia in 1993 and workers from theNew York-based Human Rights Watch have found evidence that ethnic Georgian civilians were targeted in thelatest fighting in South Ossetia, where nearly a third of the population was Georgian.

The UN refugee agency says more than 150,000 have been displaced by fighting in Georgia, including 30,000in South Ossetia. (www.global security.org)

What is the Russian position?

Many Russians bristle defensively in the face of Western accusations of "aggression" against Georgia

maintaining that the Kremlin was left with few choices when the Georgians began bombarding Tskhinvali thecapital of South Ossetia, where 9 in 10 residents carry a Russian passport.

Even German Chancellor Angela Merkel, while calling some of Russia's actions "disproportionate" aftermeeting with President Medvedev, said that "it is rare that all the blame is on one side. In fact, both sides areprobably to blame. That is very important to understand."

Many Russian officials here argue that it's not so strange that, as the successor state to the Russian Empire andthe USSR, post-Soviet Russia should have ongoing obligations to former subjects such as the Ossetians and theAbkhazians. Russia was a key party to the accords that ended the cycle of conflicts in the early '90s, which leftRussian peacekeeping troops holding the tripwire position in both South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Under a 1992

law that entitled any former Soviet citizen to apply for a Russian passport, most inhabitants of the two breakaway republics have since acquired Russian citizenship. Alexei Mukhin, director of the independenCenter for Political Information in Moscow, says that Americans ought to be more understanding, since the UShas guaranteed the security of at least one breakaway statelet, Taiwan, with its own military force for over half acentury.

More recently, Russian officials point out, NATO fought a 1999 war that was labeled a humanitarianintervention, which wrested the Albanian-populated province of Kosovo away from Serbia. Despite the fact thatSerbia, a member of the UN, includes Kosovo within its sovereign territory, most Western powers recognizedKosovo's self-declared independence earlier this year. Russia opposed the Kosovo war and later argued that theWest should preserve Serbia's territorial integrity by convincing the Kosovars to accept Serbian offers of

sweeping autonomy instead of independence. Now that Kosovo's independence has been effectively granted though it has not been admitted to the UN the Kremlin warns the West has upset the rules that formerlycovered separatist movements around the world.

Some extreme nationalist politicians in Moscow, jubilant about this Kosovo precedent, say it's only a matter oftime before Russia follows suit, and unilaterally recognizes Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and perhaps otherbreakaway statelets in the post-Soviet region as well.

Concern of European Union


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South Caucasus: EU must play greater role in stabilizing the region, say MEPs

The EU must steer a strategy for stability, prosperity and conflict-resolution in the South Caucasus.

MEPs wish the EU strategy for the South Caucasus to concentrate on three domains: conflict resolution,promotion of democracy, human rights and the rule of law; and economic cooperation and sociadevelopment.

Free and fair elections needed in Georgia: MEPs insist that measures be taken to ensure internationalelectoral norms are respected.

The EP's Foreign Affairs Committee plans to send an ad-hoc delegation of seven MEPs to observe theMay elections in Georgia.

Concern for freedom of the press :MEPs also expressed concern over the lack of media pluralism inthe South Caucasus

Energy security, conflict resolution and economic cooperation:The current situation of conflict in theregion is neither acceptable nor viable, states the resolution, which expresses concern over the recentincreases in military spending. "Frozen conflicts" are an obstacle to economic and social developmentwarn MEPs.

MEPs call on Catherine Ashton, the EU's High-Representative for Foreign Affairs, to play an active partin promoting conflict resolution in the region.

Finally, recognising the importance of the region for the EU's energy security and supply, MEPs expresstheir support for the strengthening of EU-South Caucasus cooperation in energy projects, in particularfor the successful realization of the Nabucco pipeline.

The Six Points of the European Union-sponsored "Sarkozy Plan"

Not to resort to force;

To end hostilities definitively;

To provide free access for humanitarian aid;

Georgian military forces will have to withdraw to their usual bases;

Russian military forces will have to withdraw to the lines held prior to the outbreak of hostilities.

Pending an international mechanism, Russian peace-keeping forces will implement additional securitymeasures;

Opening of international talks on the security and stability arrangements in Abkhazia and South Ossetia

Source :http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/gena/102338.pdf)

Role of UN in Georgia conflict:

UNOMIG's Mandate: After UNOMIG's original mandate had been invalidated by the resumed fighting inAbkhazia in September 1993, the Mission was given an interim mandate, by Security Council resolution 881(1993) of 4 November 1993.to maintain contacts with both sides to the conflict and with Russian militarycontingent, and to monitor and report on the situation, with particular reference to developments relevant toUnited Nations efforts to promote a comprehensive political settlement.

To observe the operation of the peacekeeping force of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) To verify, through observation and patrolling, that troops of the parties do not remain in or re-enter the

security zone. To monitor the storage areas for heavy military equipment withdrawn from the security zone. To monitor the withdrawal of troops of the Republic of Georgia from the Kodori Valley to places

beyond the boundaries of Abkhazia, Republic of Georgia; To patrol regularly the Kodori Valley;
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To investigate, at the request of either party or the CIS peacekeeping force To report regularly to the Secretary-General within its mandate, in particular on the implementation of

the Agreement, any violations and their investigation by UNOMIG, as well as other relevandevelopments;

To maintain close contacts with both parties to the conflict and to cooperate with the CIS peacekeepingforce

(source : www.unomig.org )

UN role in Georgia unclear as conflict is unresolved

UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon said Monday the small UN military observer force in Georgia cannot be given a clearmandate because of the unsettled Russia-Georgia conflict that erupted in August.

The 134-strong UN force known as UNOMIG was pulled out of the strategic Kodori Valley in Georgia whenfighting between Russian and Georgian troops spread from South Ossetia to Abkhazia in the first half of August.UNOMIG was monitoring the valley that separated Tbilisi and Abkhaz separatists.

Ban asked the UN Security Council to extend the presence of UNOMIG until mid-February pending negotiationsin Geneva beginning on October 15 to resolve the conflict. He said UNOMIG cannot be given a clear mandate

unless the conflict is resolved.

(Source: http://unomig.org/glance/mandate/)

Initiatives of civil society for Georgian peace

Some peacemaking interventions have been instigated by local academics, teachers or journalists affected bythe conflict and searching for ways to address its consequences. In some cases such people in both Georgia andAbkhazia have formed NGOs to pursue their goals. Other initiatives have come from international NGOs orindividuals outside the region. Activities and roles have changed over time, reflecting the dynamics of thepolitical and security Some conflict resolution initiatives undertaken by Western European, American and

Russian organizations began before the 1994 ceasefire, when the introduction of UNOMIG and the CISPKF provided sufficient security for international NGOs to begin exploring their potential contribution. Thdevelopment of a United Nations Volunteers (UNV) programme, combined with greater stability on the groundfrom 1995 encouraged civic initiatives by providing information and analysis and by facilitating numerousINGO visits to Abkhazia.

A Framework for Conflict Analysis C.R SIPABIO
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Figure 14: A Framework for Conflict Analysis CR SIPABIO

(From:Say Peace:Conflict Resolution TrainingManual ForMuslim Communities.Amr Abdalla,et al, 2002 )

Context:

Context is the sociological, economical and political settings in which a conflict takes place.

Context

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In order to illustrate how context factors operate in conflict situations, we will discuss the following contextfactors: ethnicity, religion and geography, as they emerged within conflicts in Georgia.

Ethnicity, Religion and Geography: The case of Georgia conflict.

Most conflicts are influenced by more than one contextual factor, and it is this combination that can contributeto the complexity of conflict situations. Abkhazians and Ossetians are both distinct ethnic groups with a longhistory of tense relations with their Georgian neighbors. Ethnicity In south Ossetia according to 2007 census67.1% Ossetians25.0% Georgians,3.0% Russians,1.3% Armenians 0.9% Jews and 2.6%others. In Abkhaziaethnic groups: Georgian 70%, Armenian,Russian, Azeri, Ossetian, Abkhaz Religion: Georgian Orthodox 65%Muslim 11%, Russian Orthodox 10%.Georgia is a mosaic of ethnic and religious communities whosedifferences have been and can be manipulated by political leaders. (www.wikipedia.com) Ethnic and religiouscleavages are created and malleable rather than primordial and unchangeable. But ethnic groups provide aframework for the organization and aggregation of common interests and have been the public face of twoseparatist conflicts in Georgia.

Geography:

Georgia is a sovereign state in the Caucasus region of Eurasia. Situated at the juncture of Eastern Europe andWestern Asia, it is bounded to the west by the Black Sea, to the north by Russia, to the south by Turkey and

Armenia, and to the east by Azerbaijan. Georgia covers a territory of 69,700 km and its population is 4.385million. Georgia plays the role of a pivotal state in the Caucasus, since the control of its territory enablesdecisive influence to be exerted over geostrategic, energy and economic questions on the Eurasian continent.The conflict that has erupted in the Caucasus has set alarm bells ringing because of Georgia's pivotal role in theglobal energy market. Georgia has no significant oil or gas reserves of its own but it is a key transit point for oilfrom the Caspian and central Asia destined for Europe and the US.

Relationship:

There are different levels of conflict: inter-state and intra-state.

The conflict between Georgia and South Ossetia is state v. sub-state. Therefore, the conflict is withinone state; Georgia.

The conflict between Georgia and Abkhazia is state v. sub-state. Therefore, the conflict is within onestate; Georgia.

The conflict between Georgia and Russia is state vs. state .there for the conflict is inter-state conflict.

And also there prevails a strategic conflict between USA and USR.

Bond:

The significance of the relationship bond lies in its cultural meaning .The meaning of a bond therefore mayinfluence how people behave in given conflict situations.

To ensure that the USA and its Western allies secure this EastWest corridor across the Caucasus itneeds politically stable and independent Caucasian states. U.S. support for Georgia's sovereigntyindependence and territorial integrity. Under the Georgia Border Security and Law Enforcemen(GBSLE) program, the US provided the Georgian border guard, customs, MOD, and other bordersecurity and law enforcement agencies

The conflict in Abkhazia was heightened by the involvement of Russia, mostly on the Abkhaz side,especially during the war's initial stages. Whereas Russia has endorsed the territorial integrity of theRepublic of Georgia, Russian arms found their way into Abkhaz hands, Russian planes bombed civiliantargets in Georgian-controlled territory.
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The conflict in south Ossetia, Russia attacked Georgian territory because of strong bondage with south OssetiaHere is noted that maximum ossetians are citizen of Russia and they want to be a part of North Ossetia.

Power:

Power is a significant dynamic in any conflict situations. People derive their power in conflict situations usuallyfrom contextual factors.

Among the contextual factors ethnicity plays a vital role for acquiring power in conflict. if we analyze theAbkhazia and south Ossetia conflict with Georgia we can easily realize that both groups are majority accordingto their ethnicity in their own territory. From the general perceptions they gained power from the commonpeople. External power influenced them on the basis of their relationship with other neighboring states. Southoissetia and Abkhazia got power from Russia. Russia provided military assistance and political and economicalsupport to the Abkhazian and ossetian people.

On the other hand Georgia is a recognized independence state. It has alliances and relations with Europeanstates and also USA. United States have good relations with Georgia. USA military assistance to Georgia issignificantly increasing. USA has interests in Georgia for its transition for oil on the other hand Georgia wants

to increase power for its own safeguard especially from Russia. It is noted that Georgia wants its territoriaintegrity which indirectly derives power.

Patterns : often in conflict situations parties engage in patterns of behavior that are intended to advance theirpositions .patterns are certain behaviors that parties resort to frequently during conflict situation.

Patterns of conflict in Georgia are civil in nature. Firstly it was political in nature then it is tended to armsconflicts. South Ossetia and Abkhazia wants separation from Russia and they have already declared theirindependence but Georgia wants its territorial integrity.

Both parties are strong in their own position ant it creates conflicting situations. Both parties use arms and manycausalities were happened.

Some sources and causes of conflict according to Moore

Value conflicts are caused by

Different criteria for evaluating ideas or behavior

Exclusive intrinsically valuable goals

Different ways of life ,ideology or religion

Structural conflicts are caused by

Destructive patterns of behavior or interaction

Unequal control, ownership or distribution of resources

Unequal power and authority

Geographical, physical or environmental factors that hinder cooperation

time constraints

Interest conflicts are caused by


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perceived or actual competition over substantive interests

procedural interests

psychological interests

(source : Moore ,The Mediation Process,p.54)

On the basis of the theory of Moore

Georgia consists various ethnic groups such as osetians, Abkhazian, Armenian, Russian and Georgian .everygroups belong their own ideology, religion and values and they want to establish their own identity and wantrecognitions as a nation. . For this reason there are being occurred various value conflicts.

Destructive patterns of behavior of Georgia to south Ossetia and Abkhazia derives conflicts. Unequal control,ownership of natural resources, geographical and time constraints intended to structural conflicts in Georgia.

Perceived competitions over substantive interests and psychological interests of Russia and USA have triggeredconflicts in Georgia.

Issues:

the specific tangible interests or aspirations

issues refer to the inter-related goal incompatibilities of adversaries

The main issues of Georgian conflicts are aspirations of independence of south Ossetia and Abkhazia. InGeorgia there are inter related goal incompatibilities .south Ossetia and Abkhazia want their separation andGeorgia wants its territorial integrity.

Types of issues:

Issues that arise out the need for continued existence (survival conflict).south Ossetia, Abkhazia andGeorgia all parties are involved in survival conflict. South Ossetia and Abkhazia want separation fortheir own identity and territory but Georgia wants its territorial integrity.

Issues that arise over relationship dynamics (negative dynamics and power issues).

In Georgia conflicts there are many negative dynamics and power issues involved.

Russia and USA have an involvement in Georgian conflict. Russia wants to show his power in this

region and United States wants territorial stability in Georgia because of its own interests in case of oiltransition

Parties:

Participants in conflict. Parties can be individuals, groups, organizations, communities or nations.Parties maydivide into three categories:

primary : those who have a direct vested interests in conflict (Georgia, south Ossetia, Abkhazia )

secondary : those who have an indirect interests in conflict ( Russia ,USA)


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tertiary : those who have a distant interest in the conflict ( neighboring states of Georgia ,EU)

Attitudes:

the emotions and perception influencing parties

common patterns of expectations, emotional orientation and perception which accompany involvemenin a conflict situation

perceptions about conflict

The emotions and perceptions of Russia and USA as influencing parties to Georgia are different from their ownperspectives. Russian emotions to south Ossetia and Abkhazia is notable, Russia has sympathy of those states asthe member of former soviet republic.

United States has interests in Georgia and that indirectly creates observation of USA in Georgia.USA showsfriendly attitudes to Georgia and support Georgia.

Behavior:

parties actions in conflict And finally the behavior of the conflicting parties breaks out into actions.

As a result in Georgia, South Ossetia, Abkhazia were involved in war.

Actions undertaken by south Ossetia and Abkhazia party in any situation of conflict aimed at theopposing party Georgia with the intention of making that Georgia abandoned or modify its goals andestablish their independence and want recognition.

Intervention:

Intervention is the parties or third parties actions taken with the purpose of reaching a resolution orsatisfactory outcome.

Intervention usually takes one of the following approaches:

Conflict management

Conflict resolution

Conflict transformation

In Georgia conflicts United Nations, European Union, NATO, Russia and USA intervened in variousperspectives.

UNOMIG's Mandate: After UNOMIG's original mandate had been invalidated by the resumed fighting inAbkhazia in September 1993, the Mission was given an interim mandate, by Security Council resolution 881(1993) of 4 November 1993.to maintain contacts with both sides to the conflict and with Russian militarycontingent, and to monitor and report on the situation, with particular reference to developments relevant toUnited Nations efforts to promote a comprehensive political settlement.

Georgian and Ossetian sides began Russian and OSCE-mediated negotiations on peaceful resolution of theconflict on October 30, 1995. The major break through in negotiation happened in May 1996 when the two
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sides signed a 'Memorandum on measures for providing security and joint confidence' in which the two sidesrenounced the use of force in future.

The Six Points of the European Union-sponsored "Sarkozy Plan"

Not to resort to force;

To end hostilities definitively;

To provide free access for humanitarian aid;

Georgian military forces will have to withdraw to their usual bases;

Russian military forces will have to withdraw to the lines held prior to the outbreak of hostilities.Pending an international mechanism, Russian peace-keeping forces will implement additional securitymeasures;

Opening of international talks on the security and stability arrangements in Abkhazia and South Ossetia

Outcome:

Outcome is the effect of conflict behavior and intervention on the state of conflict these effects are not alwayspositive. An outcome may take the form of a temporary resolution that needs to be worked on.

During the war, the Abkhaz separatist side carried out full scale ethnic cleansing campaign which resulted in theexpulsion of up to 250,000 ethnic Georgians and more than 15,000 killed.

June 8, 1992 over 1,000 civilian and military deaths in Georgia south Ossetia conflict. During the violence in2004, at least 22 people died. in 1991, causing thousands of casualties and creating tens of thousands ofrefugees on both sides of the Georgian-Russian border. In 2008, Civilian casualties: South Ossetia: 162according to Russia, 365 according to South OssetiaGeorgia:Georgian government says 228 civilians dead or missingOne foreign civilian killed and 3 wounded. At least 158,000 civilians displaced.

Currently the Georgia-South Ossetia conflict is a stalemate. The South Ossetians still desire to break away fromGeorgia and establish their own state, and likewise, Georgia still wants to retain its territorial integrity and keepthe region of South Ossetia as a part of the state

Relations between Georgia and Abkhazia have remained tense after the war. Georgia has moved to increaseAbkhazia's isolation by imposing a sea blockade of Abkhazia. The Abkhazian still desire to breakaway fromGeorgia and establish their own state, and likewise, Georgia still wants to retain its territorial integrity and keepthe region of South Ossetia as a part of the state.

RECOMMENDATIONS

To All Sides (Georgian, South Ossetian, North Ossetian, Russian) in the Joint Control Commission:

Agree on changes to the negotiations format that emphasise direct Georgian-Ossetian dialogue and give theEU a role on a par with Russia and the OSCE.

Avoid inflammatory rhetoric.

Establish an OSCE/Joint Peacekeeping Forces observation point at Didi Gupta, agree on a mutuallyacceptable monitoring regime for the Roki tunnel and sign an agreement on non-use of force.

Set up joint policing, with an international civilian police component, including Russia, gradually scaledown the JPKF operation and replace it in time with a flexible crisis response mechanism.
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Further interethnic cooperation and confidence by implementing economic development and rehabilitationthrough the joint efforts of the OSCE-led Economic Rehabilitation Program (ERP), not competing unilateralprojects.

To the Georgian and South Ossetian Sides:

Dismantle fortifications, clear mines, fill in trenches and remove all unauthorised equipment andpersonnel from the zone of conflict.

Allow unhampered JPKF and/or OSCE patrolling throughout the entire JPKF area of responsibility.

Remove unauthorised law enforcement posts from the zone of conflict.

Reestablish the Special Coordinating Centre for law enforcement and enhance its operational capacity;organise joint police training programs and regional police chief meetings; and launch joint policepatrolling and a mechanism for joint criminal investigation.

To the Georgian Side:

Focus on restoring territorial integrity through gradual confidence building, not rapid statusdetermination.

Engage in substantive dialogue with the Tskhinvali de facto authorities, while allowing ample time forSanakoev to build credibility with South Ossetians.

Show respect for Ossetian self-determination aspirations and security fears; consider reconciliationstrategies and a statement regretting past injustice.

Implement the Law on Property Restitution and Compensation.

Allocate economic rehabilitation assistance to OSCE-led programs in at least equal measure to unilateralprograms.

To the Ossetian Side:

Build a pluralistic, open society and discuss amending negotiation and peacekeeping formats withTbilisi.

To the Russian Federation:

Encourage Tskhinvali to be more open-minded on changes to the negotiation and peacekeeping formats.

Encourage both sides to implement verifiable demilitarisation measures.

Halt unilateral economic rehabilitation programs benefiting the Ossetian side alone.

To the Wider International Community:

Set up an informal consultative group (with at least the EU, U.S. and Russia) to assist the sides,including by developing new ideas, and commit new economic funding in the zone of conflict only forjoint projects

Concluding remarks:

The basic domestic and international issues surrounding the conflicts are the South Ossetians' and Abkhazian

claim of unequal treatment under Georgian rule and subsequent demands for cultural, social, economic and


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political protections as a minority group, Russias desire to punish Georgia for its increasingly pro-Western

political orientation, and outside concerns about the stability and accessibility of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan

pipeline running partly through Georgia. However, at the conflicts most basic level, it is a conflict over land

and territory. The involvement of Russia and United states and concern of European Union added a new

dimension in these conflicts. The South Ossetians and Abkhazians still desire to break away from Georgia and

establish their own state, and likewise, Georgia still wants to retain its territorial integrity and keep the regionsof South Ossetia and Abkhazia as parts of the state.

References

Say Peace:Conflict Resolution TrainingManual ForMuslim Communities.Amr Abdalla,et al, 2002

Moore ,The Mediation Process,p.54

Times Online August 8, 2008

Council of the European Union. General Affairs and External Relations - PRESS RELEASEExtraordinary meeting - Brussels, 13 August 2008 - Council Conclusions on the situation in Georgia Brussels, 13 August 2008 -Council of the European Union.

Pro-Natura USA, Caucasus Peace Park, a Feasibility Study for Georgia and Russia, Project Summary

September 2005, Article

UNEP, "Environment and Security-Transforming Risks into Cooperation the Case of the SouthernCaucasus", 2004 Article

Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1994), p. 62.

Human Rights' Watch. 2008. "Q & A: Violence in South Ossetia." August 15.

South Ossetian Separatism in Georgia by Rebecca Ratliff /gorgia/ossetia.htm)

A Modern History of Georgia, pp. 2326. Lang, David Marshall (1962). London: Weidenfeld and

Nicolson.

America Abroad, TIME Magazine, June 10, 1991

Russia accuses Georgia of open aggression". The Globe and Mail. 2008-07-04.

South Ossetia threatens Georgia with retaliation".Russia Today. 2008-07-04.

S.Ossetia Claims it Holds Four Georgian Soldiers". Civil Georgia. 2008-07-08.

Georgia plans operation to free detained soldiers".Reuters. 2008-07-08..
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. BBC News. 2008-08-05. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7543099.stm. Retrieved 2010-03-29.

Roy Allison, Russia resurgent? Moscows campaign to force Georgia to peace, in InternationaAffairs, 84: 6 (2008) "Day-by-day: Georgia-Russia crisis". BBC

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Documents

Georgia Conflict