Georghiou 1998

Ž .Research Policy 27 1998 611–626

Global cooperation in research

Luke Georghiou( )Policy Research in Engineering, Science and Technology PREST , UniÕersity of Manchester, Oxford Road, Manchester M13 9PL, UK

Abstract

This article examines the emerging phenomenon of global cooperation in research between industrialised countries,manifested in large increases in copublication between Europe and other regions, increasing focus on single global facilitiesin big science and the emergence of global cooperative programmes. Motivations for cooperation are examined, distinguish-ing between direct benefits to the research and indirect strategic, economic or political benefits. Barriers include the growingsignificance of competitiveness issues and a mismatch of institutions. It is concluded that formal arrangements are beginningto catch up with the very substantial extent of ‘bottom-up’ global cooperation. Issues are raised for European programmesincluding the nature of a European platform within global alliances, the strategic position of Europe in the broader pattern ofscientific relations and the impracticability of maintaining programmes with restricted access to foreign participants. q 1998Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.

Keywords: Global cooperation; Research; Barrier

1. Introduction

Cooperation in science and technology in industri-alised countries in policy terms has largely been

Žperceived as a national or regional particularly Eu-.ropean phenomenon. The past decade has seen a

substantial growth in cooperation with a wider scope,between continents and often on a global scale. Theearlier regional perspective was founded upon theapparent predominance of such cooperations, particu-larly in publicly funded activities. Hence Europe hasits Framework and EUREKA programmes, each withits principal rationale being support for the competi-tiveness of European industry. Long-standing Euro-pean institutions include CERN, the European Space

Ž .Agency and its predecessors and the EuropeanScience Foundation. In the USA, after a somewhatbelated conversion to the merits of collaborationwith the passage of the National Cooperative Re-

search Act of 1984, institutions such as MCC andSematech represented early manifestations before theestablishment of the Advanced Technology Pro-gramme. Japan has long been noted for its collabora-tive programmes, which in many ways formed therole model for subsequent efforts in the West, albeitwith a degree of misperception. 1 This policy focuswas supported by data which showed coauthoredscientific papers to be primarily national or intrare-gional, with for example intra-EU coauthorship be-ing almost six times more frequent than coauthorship

Ž .with other countries European Commission, 1994 .

1 MITI sponsored programmes such as the VLSI Project wereperceived as demonstrating the benefits of precompetitive researchbut Western observers underestimated the amount of highly com-petitive R&D being pursued in parallel within the companies

Žconcerned and the dislike among Japanese companies shared with.their Western counterparts for working with competitors.

0048-7333r98r$19.00 q 1998 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.Ž .PII: S0048-7333 98 00054-7

( )L. GeorghiourResearch Policy 27 1998 611–626612

A similar, though less-marked, picture existed forR&D cooperative agreements between firms whereit has been rare for international strategic technologypartnerships to exceed the number of domestic or

Ž .regional partnerships Hagedoorn, 1994 .In this paper, the focus will be on the phe-

nomenon of global cooperation in science and tech-nology, defined here as international cooperationacross two or more continents between researchersfrom advanced industrial countries. This will beexamined from the perspective of the cooperation ofresearchers from the EUrEEA 2 with their counter-parts in North America, Japan, the Republic of Ko-rea and Australasia. The focus is mainly upon scien-tific cooperation; industrial collaboration will onlybe addressed peripherally. It will be argued thatdespite the existence of long-standing relationshipsbetween the regions concerned, there have been sig-nificant changes in the past decade in the scale andcomposition of those relationships. The second partof the paper examines the motivations which aredriving these developments and the barriers to therealisation of global cooperation. Finally conclusionsare drawn on the implications and potential futuredevelopments.

2. Global cooperation—the evidence

In attempting to measure the nature and extent ofglobal cooperation several dimensions need to beaddressed, covering both formal activities as repre-sented by large facilities, specific programmes ofsupport and activity governed by scientific agree-ments, and the informal cooperation undertaken byscientists as they travel, communicate and exchangeideas and materials without embodying the relation-ship in a contract. Since both formal and informalcooperation may lead to joint production of outputs,the principal distinction between the two types forthe purposes of this paper will be the existence of acontract or agreement at national or institutionallevel governing the relationship where the prime

2 EUrEEA refers to member states of the European Union plusŽthe members of the European Economic Area Iceland, Liechten-

.stein and Norway .

purpose is to promote cooperation. The existence offunding does not automatically lead to a classifica-tion of cooperation as formal, since scientists mayuse national project funding to pay for travel abroadduring which cooperation takes place. The two typesoften operate in a complementary manner, wherebyresearch which is substantially funded at a nationallevel is enhanced by additional marginal fundingallowing some form of international exchange. Infor-mal cooperation may also be the antecedent of amore formalised relationship—evaluations of travelassistance schemes have shown that a frequent out-

Žcome is a joint application for project funding Cun-.ningham and Reeve, 1994 .

The principal modalities of international coopera-Ž .tion are researcher exchange including fellowships ;

workshops or other meetings; cooperative projects orŽnetworks ranging from exchange of results through

to fully interactive partnerships with a division of.labour between participants ; the offering of access

to, or sharing the cost of scientific instruments orlarge-scale facilities; longer term relationships be-

Ž .tween laboratories involving any of the above ;participation in national programmes of the collabo-rating country; establishment of subsidiary laborato-ries in the partner country; and sponsorship or partic-ipation in national programmes. Within Europe thecooperative project has been the dominant mode,largely due to the funding impetus of the Frameworkand other programmes, but on a global scale re-searcher exchange and big science predominate.However, the global project has also begun toemerge. Some evidence of the growth in differenttypes of activity is given below.

2.1. Informal cooperation

One of the difficulties in estimating the scale ofscientific cooperation between industrialised coun-tries is that it is dominated by informal cooperationbetween scientists as defined above. In consequence,frequently there is no accessible budgetary or otherinput record of its existence. This is in contrast tocooperation with less-developed or transitioneconomies which is frequently supported by a formalframework and budget, if only because the scientistsin those countries are unable to respond without such

( )L. GeorghiourResearch Policy 27 1998 611–626 613

resources. Informal cooperation is probably as old asscience itself, with remote communication graduallybeing supplemented by various forms of mobilityincluding training and visiting fellowships and emi-gration of scientists who subsequently maintainedlinks with colleagues in their country of origin. 3

Other forms of such cooperation include the ex-change of experimental materials or the combinationof results.

Apart from the funding records of formal fellow-ship and travel schemes, such cooperation is largelyunrecorded, often being funded out of normal projectresources. Some indication of the scale of suchactivity comes from a recent report by the Critical

Ž .Technologies Institute Wagner, 1997 which esti-mated that the USA spent more than US$3.3 billionin 1995 on international R&D cooperation. This wascalculated on the basis of an examination of refer-ences to cooperation in a database on Federal fund-ing for scientific projects of any kind. Though rang-ing into mission-oriented fields, this sum far exceedsany ‘dedicated’ cooperation budgets.

As indicated above, a well-established measure ofscientific cooperation comes from the pattern of

Žinternational scientific copublication Frame andCarpenter, 1979; Luukkonen et al., 1993; Lewison

.and Cunningham, 1991 . While this encompasses theoutputs of both formal and informal cooperation, thescale of outputs generally far exceeds that whichwould be expected on the basis of formal schemes.The residual may be assumed to result from informallinks. The limitations of this approach have been

Ž .thoroughly examined by Katz and Martin 1997 butit remains a valid, if partial indicator. There isevidence to show that this approach underestimatesthe effect on publication. The evaluation of theInternational Human Frontier Science ProgramŽ .ARArPREST, 1996a showed that 91.5% of papersin key journals acknowledging support from theProgram did not have more than one grantee as an

3 The role of expatriate scientists is an interesting topic, withsome European countries having explicit policies to make use ofthem as an independent source of peer reviewers who nonethelesshave the appropriate linguistic skills and cultural background.Expatriates also act as contact points around which internationalcollaborative projects can coalesce.

author. Questioned about this the scientists indicatedthat all teams had benefited from the cooperation buthad chosen to publish separately.

Table 1 shows a dramatic increase in both theabsolute number and relative share of all EUrEEApapers accounted for by coauthorship with the se-lected countries over the decade 1985–95. 4 Dis-counting Korea, which began from a very low baseof activity, the number of internationally coauthoredpapers has broadly trebled while the percentage ofall EUrEEA papers they account for has doubled.Despite the advance of the Asian countries, the USAremains by far the most frequent partner country forcoauthorship.

Table 2 shows for 1985 the absolute number ofeach EUrEEA country’s coauthored papers in allfields with each of the listed non-European countries.In the lower part of the table the percentage of thatEUrEEA country’s total publications which is ac-counted for by the coauthored papers shown above isgiven. Table 3 repeats this for 1995. The position ofthe UK is worthy of particular comment, with abso-lute numbers presumably raised by the shared nativeEnglish language with the USA, Canada, Australiaand New Zealand, and its common usage for scien-tific publication for Japan and Korea. On the otherhand, the share of collaborative papers for the UK islowered by its high production of papers overall.Comparing the two tables, it may be seen that thetraditional relationship between the UK and Aus-tralia led to the UK accounting for around half of allEUrEEA coauthorships in 1985 but that this fell tounder 40% by 1995. A similar pattern applies forNew Zealand. The UK is also the most frequentcoauthorship country with the USA in 1985. Ger-many, second in 1985, draws level by 1995. Spain,emerging from a period of political isolation, showsa significant increase.

4 Results were based upon cleaned data extracted from theScience Citation Index of the Institute for Scientific Informationcovering all fields. Country assignment was based on the locationof the research institution and not on the nationality of the

Ž .author s . The assignment was made using all recorded addresses.Thus a copublication link between two countries was establishedwhenever the two given countries cooccurred in the corporateaddress field of a publication.


Table 1Increase in number and proportion of EUrEEA collaborative papers with industrialised countries

1985 1995 % increase

No. of co- % of all No. of co- % of all No. Proportionauthored EUrEEA authored EUrEEApapers with papers papers with papersEUrEEA EUrEEA

Australia 676 0.45 2040 0.88 302 196Canada 1372 0.91 3739 1.61 273 177Japan 775 0.52 3100 1.33 400 256New Zealand 138 0.09 435 0.19 315 211Korea 30 0.02 536 0.23 1787 1150USA 8860 5.89 22132 9.52 250 162

Source: RASCI to PREST specification from ISI data.

The UK and France are the most frequent coau-thors with Canada throughout the period but declinein their share as Germany rises. Germany has thehighest share with Korea, followed by the UK, whilethe UK draws level as lead coauthorship countrywith Japan by 1995. Over the decade Italy has asubstantial increase in its share of coauthorships withboth countries. Norway and Spain also show someadvances with Japan. For Korea, the situation evolvesfrom one of cooperation with only a few countries toa more general involvement, with notable increasesby Austria, France, the Netherlands and Spain.

In summary, the analysis of coauthorships showsa very substantial increase in activity between Eu-rope and the other industrialised countries. There is acontinuing preeminence of Europe’s larger scientificnations but an erosion of traditional relationshipswithin the former colonial spheres of the UK andFrance and a growing involvement for some otherEUrEEA nations.

2.2. Formalised cooperation

By contrast with the activities described above,patterns of cooperation may also be examined intheir formal dimension as captured in internationalscientific agreements. While some would argue thatthese are more a measure of bureaucratic than ofscientific activity, they nonetheless embody the pri-orities of their time of inception. The data on theseare far from perfect but the USA and Canada areunusually assiduous in maintaining inventories. Ta-bles 4 and 5 show the evolution by subject area of

these agreements for each country by comparingcurrent agreements signed before 1990 with thosecommencing after that year. In the case of the USA

Žsome traditional areas such as nuclear energy mainly.safety , earth sciences and space remain prominent

while defence cooperation agreements increase. Onereason for the predominance of these areas is thatthey are generally executed by national agencieswhich are more likely to require the framework of aformal agreement. Transport declines significantly as

Ždoes biomedical and health though it may be thatthe rise of multilateral activity in this area compen-

.sates .ŽThe pattern for agreements with Canada which

uses a slightly different classification to reflect dif-.ferences in the databases shows a predominance of

agreements covering multiple areas of science andŽ .technology listed as ‘All’ in Table 5 . Compared

with the USA, defence, nuclear and space are rela-tively less important. Over time the greatest relativegrowth is in agreements covering scientific and tech-nological information, and in biomedical and health.

For both countries the lack of dramatic change ismore notable than such changes as have taken place.This may partly be accounted for by the self-per-petuating nature of agreements where, without realbudgetary implications, the exit costs of a failure torenew may exceed any gain in efficiency. It is notuncommon for those involved in an area even at anadministrative level to be unaware of the full rangeof agreements to which technically they are parties.However, one increasing phenomenon is that of the‘scientific umbrella agreement’ concluded between


Tab

le2

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all

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1985

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TB

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KD

EF

IF

RG

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IEIT

LI

LU

NL

NO

PT

ES

SE

UK

All

AU

512

2311

125

622

06

160

033

102

333

333

676

CA

1359

4015

921

363

141

2272

10

8029

521

6041

213

72JP

1238

1822

89

138

50

135

00

513

26

4218

777

5N

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58

222

41

01

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10

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112

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20

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1329

132

1247

823

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563

199

3817

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Tab

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TB

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IF

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LI

LU

NL

NO

PT

ES

SE

UK

All

AU

4659

7138

320

226

71

912

10

012

824

751

141

746

2040

CA

5811

911

458

293

762

518

3934

20

026

062

2114

921

786

237

39JP

5689

8872

785

429

293

2030

01

021

655

1182

184

725

3100

NZ

915

1682

631

51

116

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621

104

1675

160

078

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454

154

1581

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449

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825

100

115

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215

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Table 4Evolution of bilateral scientific agreements between the USA and EUrEEA countries

Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž .Pre-1990 No. Post-1990 No. Pre-1990 % Post-1990 %

Agricultural sciences 3 0 3 0Biomedical and health 11 1 9 2

Ž .General cultural including S&T 1 0 1 0Environment 3 2 3 3Earthrgeo and natural resources 14 7 12 12Energy 4 1 3 2Marine science 1 0 1 0Nuclear energy 32 16 27 27Space and atmospheric 18 7 15 12Scientific and technical information 2 3 2 5Transport 11 1 9 2

Ž .Technical R&D defence 17 19 14 32Umbrella agreement 1 2 1 3Total 118 59 100 100

Ž . ŽSource: Based on data in Clinton 1995 excludes multilateral agreements, and environmental education. The report includes agreements.which had formally lapsed but where activity continued pending renewal .

nations to facilitate cooperation across a range ofactivities and fields through provision of a broadframework. Despite difficulties over agreeing an an-nex on intellectual property, several European coun-tries and the European Commission are in the pro-cess of concluding agreements of this type with theUSA. Two explanations may be tendered, one thatthe agreement provides a background for more bot-tom-up cooperation and the second that the presenceof an agreement legitimates the participation of gov-

ernment agencies who therefore may find it easier toget funding for cooperative work. The growing sig-nificance attached to intellectual property aspects isindicative that economically significant research inbiotechnology, IT and other non-traditional areas forcooperation are included.

2.3. Big science cooperation

The provision of large-scale scientific facilitieshas long been an area of international cooperation. In

Table 5Evolution of bilateral scientific agreements between Canada and EUrEEA countries

Ž . Ž .Subject Pre-1990 Post-1990 Pre-1990 % Post-1990 %

All 20 12 33 27Agricultural Sciences 1 1 2 2Biomedical and health 5 6 8 13Defence 6 3 10 7Nuclear energy 3 1 5 2Environment 7 4 12 9Earthrgeo and natural resources 8 5 13 11Marine science 3 1 5 2Space and atmospheric 3 2 5 4Scientific and technological information 4 6 7 13Other 0 4 0 9Total 60 45 100 100

Source: Inventory of Federal and Provincial Science and Technology Arrangements, Science and Technology Division, Department ofForeign Affairs and International Trade, Canada, July 1997.


some cases, notably astronomy, cooperation was ne-cessitated by geography, whereby countries with sci-entific and monetary resources would cooperate withthose providing a premium location. However, for

Žother types of facility, provision though not neces-.sarily access was seen as a matter of national or

regional pride, leading to separate and often compet-ing activity in space and nuclear physics. Here too,there have been changes in the past decade, drivenprincipally by the high cost of such activities andtheir increasingly precarious position in national pri-orities. Two European scientific organisations, ESAand CERN, are particularly important vectors forcooperation between Europe and other industrialcountries. Each one is discussed briefly in turn.

( )2.3.1. European Space Agency ESAESA is an intergovernmental organisation whose

main task is to provide for and promote cooperationamong European states in space research, technologyand applications. 5 It accounts for all of the spaceactivities of its members with the exceptions ofFrance, Germany, Italy and the UK, which also have

Žnational programmes and agencies and have their.own bilateral agreements with third countries .

International cooperation with the USA dates fromthe period of ESA’s formation in the 1970s when theUS proposed participation in its Space Shuttle Pro-gramme through provision of a laboratory that wouldbe flown in the shuttle’s cargo bay. A series ofspacelabs have flown since 1983 investigating areassuch as microgravity and the atmosphere. These areconsidered to have laid the foundation for ESA’smost important agreement with its international part-

Ž .ners, the International Space Station ISS . This isgoverned by an overall Intergovernmental Agree-

Ž .ment IGA involving the USA, Russia, Canada,Japan and ESA, supplemented by bilateral agree-ments between ESA and the agencies concerned.European participation was approved by the ESACouncil in October 1995, heralding an eight-yeardevelopment programme beginning on 1 January1996. The principal contribution, a pressurised labo-ratory, the Columbus Orbital Facility, is being devel-

5 ESA Convention Article 2.

oped under the biggest single contract ever issued byESA. There has been some evidence of discomfortwith the degree to which ESA is involved with theUSA from France, Europe’s leading space nation,where the new Minister for Education, Research andTechnology has described Europe’s attitude as beingreactive to American policies when they should be

Žcollaborative but not subordinate Outlook on Sci-.ence Policy, 1997 .

ESA has also been a vehicle for cooperation withCanada and Japan outside the ISS framework. Canadahas special status as the only non-European countryparticipating directly in ESA programmes as an ESACooperating State since 1979.

2.3.2. CERNFounded in 1954, CERN now has 19 European

member states combing their resources in experimen-tal particle physics. The high performance of CERNhas long been a source of attraction for scientistsfrom non-member countries. Since 1974, 114 organi-sations from the USA, 40 from Japan, 17 fromCanada, six from Korea and three from Australiahave participated in CERN experiments or R&Dprojects. There are approximately 800 US scientistsworking at CERN out of a total of 6500 users and300 staff.

However, once more the nature of the relationshipis being transformed as CERN’s new facility, theLarge Hadron Collider is built. Designed to collidestrongly interacting particles, this experiment is ex-pected to be commissioned at a cost of ECU 1595million. In this case, very substantial contributionsare being made to the cost by nonmembers, with theUS Department of Energy and NSF contributingECU 417 million in equipment construction andpurchase of equipment in the US; ECU 63 millionfrom Japan to date, and Can$30 million fromCanada’s TRIUMF laboratory in equipment con-struction.

In general, scientific activities requiring a highcapital threshold are likely to become increasinglyglobal and engender a certain division of labour. Thearguments for and against hosting facilities of this

Ž .type have been well-rehearsed Barker, 1995 but theincreasing cost of facilities coupled with a high levelof mobility for scientists makes the likelihood ofsuch establishments operating on a global basis ever


greater. The activities of the OECD MegascienceForum provide evidence of this trend.

Clearly the driver here is the need to share costs,which have escalated first beyond national abilityand then beyond regional capacity to sustain. Whilethe nobility of the goals of these organisations isbeyond doubt, it is clear that global cooperation isthe end of the trajectory. Henceforth, the rationalefor supporting areas of research not in tune with thecurrent trend towards socio-economic relevance willhave to be argued at the national level without theprospect of significant further savings from coopera-tion. The risks in such an approach are discussed inthe conclusion to this paper.

2.4. Global collaboratiÕe programmes

A new phenomenon has been the development ofcollaborative programmes whose raison d’etre is toˆfoster global collaboration in research through pro-ject support. It is not coincidental that the initiativefor two of the most prominent of these, the HumanFrontier Science Program and the Intelligent Ma-chine Systems project, has come from Japan, as apart of its strategy of bringing itself to up to the frontof knowledge creation and putting more back intoresearch.

The concept of the Human Frontier Science Pro-Ž .gram HFSP was proposed by then Japanese Prime

Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone at the Venice EconomicSummit in June of 1987. In this proposal, Japannoted its desire to increase its contribution to interna-tional basic research. Following development of theconcept by international committees representing theseven Economic Summit countries and the EuropeanCommission, an agreement was reached in July 1989at an intergovernmental meeting in Berlin as to thegoals and structure of the programme. The mainintent of the HFSP is to foster intercontinental col-laboration in fundamental research on biologicalfunctions, through a program based on internationalpeer review. In addition, there are a number ofsubsidiary goals, primarily to promote interdisci-plinary research, to promote intercontinental re-search, and to involve younger researchers.

In order to ensure a timely start, Japan agreed tocontribute significant funding to the HFSP during an

initial three-year phase, with the remaining supportcoming from other partner countries termed the

Ž .management supporting parties MSPs . The pro-gramme’s Secretariat was incorporated as a nonprofitassociation in October 1989 in Strasbourg, France,and the first annual awards were made in March1990. Current MSP members are Canada, France,Germany, Italy, Japan, Switzerland, the United King-dom, the United States and the European Commis-

Žsion representing the smaller member states of the.EU . The annual budget of the HFSP from 1990 to

1994 has varied from about 26 million ECUs to 36million ECUs, with Japan contributing roughly 80%,Canada and the US providing about 10%, and theEuropean countries giving about 10%. In response toJapanese pressure and the perceived success of theprogramme, the other MSPs are increasing theircontributions. HFSP operates through grants and fel-lowships. For the research grants programme, 92.7%

Žare intercontinental in character with the largestŽ .links between North America and Europe 36.6%

Ž .and over a third 35.8% involve all three participat-ing continents.

The Intelligent Manufacturing Systems ProjectŽ .IMS was proposed by Japan in 1989 with the broadaim of being a trilateral research programme involv-ing the USA, Europe and Japan in developing tech-nology for future automated factories. The initialproposal provoked concerns about the equity of thebenefits, and hence, after extensive negotiationsamong the governments concerned and potential pri-vate sector participants, terms of reference for atwo-year feasibility study were agreed in 1991. Sixparticipants—Australia, Canada, the European Com-munity, five EFTA countries, Japan and the UnitedStates—took part in five test cases and one studyproject aimed at gaining practical experience of col-laboration. Each participant funded its own participa-tion with no financial resources crossing borders.Technical topics covered included enterprise integra-tion and global manufacturing, systemisation of man-ufacturing knowledge, the control of distributed in-telligent systems, techniques for rapid product dis-tributed intelligent systems, and ‘clean’ manufactur-ing in the process industries.

The research was carried out by consortia whichwere interregional, geographically distributed anddecentralised. These involved a total of 140 public


and private entities, consisting of 73 companies and67 universities or research institutes, from 21 coun-

Ž .tries. European contributions public and private forthis phase amounted to 40% of the total cost of over3 million ECUs, of which 62% was publicly funded.In addition, three international committees oversawthe development and evaluation of a framework andmodalities for international cooperation.

The final report of the International SteeringCommittee concluded that the feasibility study hadclearly demonstrated the workability of the frame-work, and that this enhanced global manufacturingcooperation. A recommendation was made for thelaunch of a 10-year full-scale programme to beoperated by a single international management com-mittee, regional secretariats and a small interregionalsecretariat.

ŽFive of the original participants Australia,.Canada, Japan, Switzerland and USA have now

ratified the terms of reference of IMS and fourmeetings of the International IMS Steering Commit-

Ž .tee ISC have taken place. The remaining originalparticipant, the European Union, joined the schemeon 1 May 1997. The Republic of Korea has appliedto become a new participant. A framework of techni-cal themes has been developed to encourage possibleproject partners to develop proposals for global co-operation.

The most interesting point about these globalprogrammes is that they provide, for the first time, asystematic framework for supporting projects, in ad-dition to the types of mobility already well-supportedin the international arena. As such they allow closerforms of collaborative working and appear to haveprovided the participants with new types of synergieswhich have extended those available from regionalprogrammes. For example, the evaluation of theInternational Human Frontier Science Program foundthat researchers saw the greatest value of doingintercontinental research as being the exposure itoffers to different traditions and methods of ap-proaching problems; as one researcher put it ‘‘Sci-

Ž .ence isn’t just science’’ ARArPREST, 1996b .While it may be assumed that European and Japanesescientists would in general benefit from closer con-tact with the USA, which has a leading position inthe fields covered by the program, it was less pre-dictable that the reverse has also turned out to be

true. The IMS programme extends these activities tothe academic–industrial sphere. A question for thefuture is whether the ad hoc organisations whichhave successfully managed these first global pro-grammes offer a superior approach to the simplerexpedient of opening national or regional pro-grammes to global participation.

3. Motivations for global cooperation

The motivations for research collaboration involv-Žing industry have been analysed many times Katz,

1986; Chesnais, 1988; Cameron and Georghiou,.1988 but it is worth rehearsing the arguments as

they apply in the specific context of global coopera-tion in science and technology.

Broadly speaking, such motivations may be seenŽ .as falling into two categories: 1 direct benefits to

the S&T concerned, allowing the research to beperformed or applied at a higher quality, with abroader scope, more quickly or more economically

Ž .than would be the case without cooperation; 2indirect benefits arising from the existence of thecooperation. These may accrue directly to the partici-

Žpants for example through enhancement of reputa-.tion, access to further research funds or more gener-

ally to the countries involved in terms of politicaleconomic or social benefits.

ŽA recent study of such relationships Georghiou.and Hinder, 1998 showed six groupings to be of

particular significance.

( )3.1. a Direct benefits

Access to complementary expertise, knowledge orskills to enhance scientific or technological excel-lence provides the principal motivation for coopera-tion between industrial countries in virtually all cases.Furthermore, the wider the geographical coverage ofa programme, the greater the chance becomes offinding exactly the right partner. The motivation tofind external expertise is particularly strong forsmaller countries where national expertise may beabsent in more areas. Hence, in Finland the overallnational strategy for development of a knowledge-

Žbased society Science and Technology Policy Coun-


.cil of Finland, 1996 includes an explicit commit-ment to the development of international S&T coop-eration as a central development objective in theinnovation system.

The same can be true of larger countries whichconsider themselves to be deficient in certain areas,as evidenced by the growing Japanese commitment

Žto international collaboration Science and Technol-.ogy Agency, 1996a; Barker, 1996 . International col-

laboration was at a low level until 1987, since whenthe Japanese government has devoted significant andgrowing resources for such exchanges, using a bud-get known as Special Coordination Funds for Pro-moting Science and Technology. It is the promotionof international research exchange which has mostwidely penetrated the research community. There hasbeen a spectacular growth in the number of Japaneseresearchers and engineers leaving Japan for the pur-pose of scientific research or investigation, risingfrom 17,293 in 1985 to 104,430 in 1995. Of the

Žlatter, 28,552 went to Europe Japanese Ministry of.Justice, 1997 . Over the same period, the number of

foreign researchers and engineers entering Japan forthe purpose of research and technology rose from2419 in 1985 to 24,868 in 1995.

Ultimately the motivation of access to knowledgeholds for any research team which discovers a teamwith something it lacks but needs beyond nationalborders. Not only is there a wider choice of partnersbut there is also a greater possibility of avoidingscientific rivals in ever more competitive nationalsystems.

Access to unique sites, facilities or populationgroups is a second source of motivation. In this casecooperation stems from the desire to perform re-search on, for example, a natural phenomenon pre-sent in one of the countries. An example here isIceland which, though a very small country, attractsforeign collaborators and has developed strengths ingeology and geothermal energy arising form its geo-

Ž .graphical endowment Hinder, 1997 . Geosciences,climate and environment form the hub of German

Žcollaboration with Canada Advisory Council on Sci-.ence and Technology, 1997 .

Sharing costs and risks is also an important mo-tive and, in a particular case of the above motivation,may be operational, as noted above, where one coun-

Ž .try is the ‘host’ to a large and expensive scientific

instrument. Cooperation is then based on some formof joint use of that facility, either by sharing the costand ownership, as for example with the Anglo-Australian telescope, an optical instrument initiated

Žin 1970 to take advantage of Australia’s Southern.Hemisphere location and jointly funded with equal

Žaccess to astronomers from both countries Anglo-.Australian Observatory, 1994 . A new example is the

Neutrino Observatory being developed at Sudbury inCanada which is being constructed 6800 feet under-ground in a section of a mine owned by INCO. Costsare being shared with the USA and the UK. Theavailability of the mine greatly reduces the cost of

Žthis experiment Advisory Council on Science and.Technology, 1997 .

With Japan’s increasing investment in basic sci-ence, including large facilities, this is increasinglybecoming a basis for collaboration with Europeancountries. RIKEN, the Japanese Institute for Physicaland Chemical Research, has contributed to a Muonfacility in the UK and will be involved in furthercollaboration based upon its new SPring-8 facility in

Ž .Japan Science and Technology Agency, 1996b .Addressing transnational or global problems

forms another motivation and is exemplified by re-Žsearch on fisheries and medical cooperation notably

.epidemiology undertaken by several countries.Establishing standards has thus far not emerged

as a prominent activity in scientific collaborationbetween industrialised countries, although there aresome multilateral arrangements for laboratoriesworking on measurement standards. Much of thisactivity is likely to take place within industrial col-laborations.

( )3.2. b Indirect benefits

Indirect or strategic motiÕations describe the situ-ation where the collaboration is driven by externalgoals of a political, economic or cultural nature.These wider goals may apply directly to the partici-pants. For example, as noted above smaller projectsor exchange visits can provide the means to work upfurther, larger scale funding from other sources,perhaps more downstream or there may be reputa-tional benefits in the other country which attractscontracts or research students. Learning benefits mayalso occur, concerning working in the other country.


All of the above may be founded upon the long termfriendships which may form during a collaboration.

Several countries in Europe have historic scien-tific links with the USA, with an initial impetuscoming from large scale military assistance. In thePortuguese case a specific foundation exists to spon-sor research and other exchanges as a compensationpackage for use of military airbases. Other factorsbehind links with the USA include general fluency inthe English language, enabling movement of re-searchers and linkages with expatriate communitiesin the USA.

Arising at the national strategic level, a commonpolicy aim is to align international cooperation withdomestic priorities. With many countries trying tofocus their national research systems upon the contri-bution they can make to the prosperity and well-beingof their citizens, it is not surprising that there is asimilar desire to apply this logic to collaboration.This has been expressed through national researchpriorities which cluster around the generic group oftechnologies which emerge around the top of allcritical technologies lists and foresight programmesand are manifested in newer collaborations whichtend to address these familiar themes of IT,biomedicine, environment and new materials. Oneexample is the UK, which has an explicit policy ofaligning its international cooperative activities withnational priorities deriving from the Foresight Pro-

Ž .gramme Office of Science and Technology, 1996 .An aspect of cooperation is the need to identify

areas with some priority for both sides, meaning thata degree of compromise is needed. There is aninteresting trade-off here. While there is most to begained in terms of knowledge acquisition from col-laborating in an area of your own weakness and thepartner’s strength, strict adherence to this approachwould lead to a collaboration portfolio which wasthe opposite of national strengths and priorities. Toavoid this trap a balanced portfolio is needed. Forexample, if the collaborative activities between Ger-many and the USA are examined, areas of mutualinterest are energy research, laser technology, spaceand medicine. This represents a trade-off between aGerman lead in the first two and an American lead inthe latter two areas.

Scientific cooperation can be seen as the key tobroader political or economic opportunities. Beyond

the cliche of the scientific agreement being produced´during a state visit when there has been failure toagree on more substantial matters, there is a newcompetitive atmosphere developing in terms of sign-ing such agreements with newly industrialising coun-tries, including Korea. Documents urging increase insuch relations cite examples of scientists who havebenefited from exchange fellowships placing sub-stantial orders for equipment in the host countryupon their return, or providing a contact point for

Žpotential inward investors Office of Science and.Technology, 1995 . Needless to say, such collabora-

tions are pointed in the direction of economic priori-ties rather than less obviously exploitable areas.

The USA sets out its rationale for internationalscientific cooperation in terms of the contributionS&T make to the five major tenets of US post-ColdWar foreign policy: building democracy, promotingand maintaining peace, promoting economic growthand sustainable development, addressing global prob-lems, and providing humanitarian assistance. Ofthese, promoting economic growth is the most im-portant for cooperation with industrialised countries,raising issues such as ‘‘assuring continued access toforeign programmes, and contributing to a fairer andmore transparent marketplace in areas such as stan-dards development and the protection of intellectual

Ž .property rights’’ Clinton, 1995 .

4. Barriers to international collaboration

A discussion of the motivations for collaborationneeds to be balanced by a consideration of the

Žbarriers which need to be overcome Georghiou,.1993 . Underpinning many barriers is the question of

competitiveness. As noted above, there is a trendtowards collaboration in areas of science which areconsidered to be of industrial significance. At theheart of any competitiveness rationale is some formof relative analysis; an increase in market share is by

Ždefinition at someone else’s expense Georghiou and.Metcalfe, 1993 Approaches to collaboration in areas

of research which are potentially exploitable by in-dustry are thus prone to concerns about whetherfirms in the rival trading block will gain a greateradvantage. While an individual firm or research or-


ganisation may see advantage for itself in a particu-lar collaboration, this may be at the expense ofanother firm in the same region. Arguments of thisnature have carried considerable weight in govern-mental circles. In the face of competitiveness con-cerns there has been a focus on arrangements forintellectual property rights, which seek to regulatethe basis on which collaboration is conductedŽ .Cameron, 1997 . An important question is whetherthe arguments about exploitation by foreign firmsremain sustainable in the face of globalised industrywhere many large firms have an R&D presence inregions other than their home base, in some cases

Žexplicitly to link with the local science base Turner.et al., 1997 .

Closely related are barriers arising from ‘institu-tional mismatch’. Different regions or nations havevery different structures and priorities for researchsupport. This can mean that governmental involve-ment is manifested through support for differenttypes of institution. Hence, what is fundamentallythe same research could be supported by grants toindividual academics in the USA, through researchin a governmental laboratory in Japan and by supportfor an international consortium in Europe. Concernsabout mismatch arise not only because of potentialconfusion in identifying the right partner but becauseone party may feel that the other’s institutional set-ting gives it an advantageous position in terms ofexploiting the results. In addition, an inappropriateattempt to pair apparent institutional counterpartsmay combine higher quality teams from one sidewith lower quality ones from the other. There maybe an even greater mismatch between the agenciesresponsible for supporting such work. ‘Who’s incharge?’ is a frequent refrain in both directions, asnon-Europeans try to identify whether it is appropri-ate in given circumstances to deal with the EuropeanCommission or individual member states, while Eu-ropeans find it equally difficult to navigate the plu-ralistic and overlapping responsibilities of US agen-cies, or the delineations between federal and provin-cial institutions in other countries.

With the growing research involvement of inter-national organisations a new set of subsidiarity is-sues is developing around the question of whether tolocate a particular collaborative project in a bilateral,multilateral or international context. The situation is

further complicated by the complex European posi-tion whereby the European Commission operates itsown programmes, acts as the secretariat for COSTwithout being a member, represents the interests ofsome but not all of its member states in the Human

ŽFrontier Science Program, while others have indi-.vidual membership and represents all member states

in the Intelligent Machine Systems Programme.Governmental activity may obstruct R&D collab-

oration by direct and indirect means. In the formercategory are standard intellectual property terms, andrestrictions on foreign access to national pro-grammes. Broader policies which impinge upon re-search collaboration include nuclear nonproliferationterms, trade friction, regulation policies, fair-trading,antitrust legislation and other controls on export oftechnology.

Collaboration may also be difficult to sustain inthe environment of public finance. The long termnature of some collaborative projects requires com-mitments which are of a longer duration than gov-ernments are able to deliver. Under these circum-stances, collaborators run the risk that the other partywill change priorities and withdraw support, leavingthe project nonviable. On the other hand, there is apolitical cost to withdrawal from collaboration whichcan result in government becoming ‘locked-in’ to aproject which it does not wish to continue.

To the range of policy barriers identified abovemay be added a list of project-level challenges to beovercome, these being in broadly ascending order ofimportance distance, language and culture.

5. Conclusions

To summarise the changes which have taken placeover the past decade, without doubt there has been avery substantial increase in global cooperation inscience and technology. This is at its most unam-biguous in ‘bottom-up’ individual cooperation be-tween scientists but the indications are that moreformalised institutional arrangements are beginningto catch-up. The implication of the broad base forglobal cooperation is that the phenomenon extendswell beyond the traditional big science areas of spaceand nuclear-related research. Nonetheless, big sci-


ence appears poised to enter a global era, in part as adefensive strategy by those communities, not only toachieve the benefits of cost-sharing but also to lock-ingovernments to international commitments which areharder to shed than their domestic counterparts. Sucha transformation carries its own risks as internationalcompetition in scientific achievement is sacrificed asa political rationale. This is partly being offset by afocus on the achievements of a particular country’sscientists ‘within’ an international facility—for ex-ample the UK’s Particle Physics and AstronomyResearch Council uses the number of British scien-tists achieving senior positions in CERN as a perfor-mance indicator sanctioned by the National Audit

Ž .Office 1995 .In considering what has been driving the process

of global cooperation several factors are likely to berelevant within the context of the motivations dis-cussed in this paper. The preeminence and rapidprogress of US science in key areas includingbiomedicine and electronics have made it imperativefor other nations to keep as closely in touch aspossible, while the competitive scientific environ-ment in the USA creates an incentive for Americanscientists to seek advantage from the additional in-sights available from high quality collaborators else-where. The development of cooperation with Japanreflects its emergence as significant scientific player,reinforced by a strong policy of encouraging re-searcher mobility and cooperation. A similar patternis developing for Korea. For Australasia and Canadaa historical endowment of cooperative links is gradu-ally being replaced by a more conventional set ofmotivations, with implications for the relative weightof bilateral relationships.

The growing industrial relevance of much of thescience involved in collaborations also significant. Inan era of globalisation of industry it is likely that anation’s science base will increasingly be seen as acompetitive asset in attracting and retaining inwardinvestment. Such rhetoric already enters the rationalefor international cooperation funds. One might alsospeculate that inward investors bring with them net-works in their own countries for which they act as avector in linking to networks in the new country.

At a policy level, important challenges are raised,not least for the operators of European programmes.Researchers are increasingly likely to demand access

to their counterparts in other continents. 6 In re-sponse there has been a progressive opening-up ofthe Framework Programme and more recently theEUREKA Initiative. What is not clear is whetherglobal collaboration is additional to European collab-oration or whether it is perceived as a substitutewhich ‘crowds out’ the scope for regional action. Ifstrategic actions involving large firms are not to belost to the European cause, an approach needs to bedeveloped which supports a European platform withinglobal alliances, taking the example of the IMSinitiative. Handled well, an extension to global coop-eration provides a means to inject new life intoexisting collaborative frameworks which are at bestasymptotic in the growth of the benefits they nowoffer.

Europe enters such collaborations with certainadvantages, not least among which is a widely-dif-fused and well-developed skill in the practice andmanagement of international collaboration derivedfrom decades of experience. For some of the otherindustrialised countries without the benefit of a natu-ral region well-populated with scientific equals, Eu-rope offers an attractive option for collaboration. ForJapan, Korea and Canada it is a useful counterweightto collaboration with the USA, though Australia andperhaps New Zealand apply this argument in reverse.

While global collaboration does not offer theadditional benefit of building a European scientificcommunity, it is not unreasonable to argue that thisgoal has been largely achieved and that maintenancerequires less effort than the original construction.The first step has already been taken with the partialopening of the Framework Programme and EurekaInitiative to participation by non-European countrieswith appropriate agreements. The next step is analtered mindset which sees cooperation as a meansof gaining absolute rather than relative advantage,that is to say that raising the quality of work donewith at least partial European participation is the keycriterion. The case for a closed programme collapses

6 In the UK Technology Foresight Programme Delphi SurveyŽ .Loveridge et al., 1996 respondents rated high technology areassuch as IT and life sciences being more suitable for global thanfor European collaboration, leaving for the latter defence andaerospace and transport.


in the face of the freedom of its beneficiaries tocollaborate in parallel with whoever they choose.

As a final point, the limits to the growth of globalcooperation in science and technology should also beconsidered. It should always be remembered that allinternational cooperation rests upon a much largerbase of domestic activity. Given the costs of cooper-

Žation and the existence of a considerable amount of.research for which no cooperation is necessary there

is only so much which a given national base cansupport, particularly as cooperation funds are largelyfor incremental costs only. Beyond these practicalconsiderations, so long as the nation-state is a com-petitive unit, it is likely that international cooperationwill be seen as a means of enhancing the position ofnational science base rather than replacing it.

Acknowledgements

The author would like to acknowledge the supportof several agencies over the years in assembling thedata and ideas for this paper, including the Economicand Social Research Council, the European Commis-sion, the EUREKA Secretariat and STOA. The bib-liometric data upon which Tables 1–3 are based wascompiled by the RASCI team under the direction ofWolfgang Glaenzel. Maria Nedeva made helpfulcomments upon an earlier draft. The author takes fullresponsibility for any remaining errors.

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