1NC1

They read the resolution not the plan- must specify beyond legalize

Vote Neg

a. Makes the plan void for vagueness- undermines policy analysis Kleiman and Saiger 90 lecturer public policy Harvard, consultant drug policy Rand, 1990, A SYMPOSIUM ON DRUG DECRIMINALIZATION: DRUG LEGALIZATION: THE IMPORTANCE OF ASKING THE RIGHT QUESTION, 18 Hofstra L. Rev. 527

Defining Legalization Legalization, like prohibition, does not name a unique strategy. Perhaps the most prominent inadequacy of current legalization arguments is their failure to specify what is meant by "legalization." Current drug policy provides an illustration of this diversity. Heroin and marijuana are completely prohibited, 74 and cocaine can only be used in rigidly specified medical contexts, not including any where the drug's psychoactive properties are exercised. 75 On the other hand, a wide range of pain-killers, sleep-inducers, stimulants, tranquilizers and sedatives can be obtained with a doctor's prescription. 76 Alcohol is available for recreational use, but is subject to an array of controls including excise taxation, 77 limits on drinking ages, 78 limits on TV and radio advertising, 79 and retail licensing. 80 Nicotine is subject to age minimums, warning label requirements, 81 taxation, 82 and bans on smoking in some public places. 83 [*541] Drug legalization can therefore be thought of as moving drugs along a spectrum of regulated statuses in the direction of increased availability. However, while legalization advocates do not deny that some sort of controls will be required, their proposals rarely address the question of how far on the spectrum a given drug should be moved, or how to accomplish such a movement. Instead, such details are dismissed as easily determined, or postponed as a problem requiring future thought. 84 But the consequences of legalization depend almost entirely on the details of the remaining regulatory regime. The price and conditions of the availability of a newly legal drug will be more powerful in shaping its consumption than the fact that the drug is "legal." Rules about advertising, place and time of sale, and availability to minors help determine whether important aspects of the drug problem get better or worse. The amount of regulatory apparatus required and the way in which it is organized and enforced will determine how much budget reduction can be realized from dismantling current enforcement efforts. 85 Moreover, currently illicit drugs, because they are so varied pharmacologically, would not all pose the same range of the problems if they were to be made legally available for non-medical use. They would therefore require different control regimes. These regimes might need to be as diverse as the drugs themselves.What the United States means is a prerequisite to policy debates. Family Guardian Fellowship 9 AN INVESTIGATION INTO THE MEANING OF THE TERM "UNITED STATES", http://famguardian.org/subjects/Taxes/ChallJurisdiction/Definitions/freemaninvestigation.htmI doubt if many Americans have ever given a second thought to the meaning of the term United States, or would believe that it could be a perplexing question. It would have my vote, however, as being by far the most important and controversial word (or term) of art, vocabula artis also referred to as a statute term, leading word (or term), or what the French call parol de ley, technical word of law in all American legal writings as well as the most dangerous. For it is ambivalent, equivocal, and ambiguous. Indeed, as you will see, its use in the law exemplifies patent ambiguity, which is defined as: An ambiguity apparent on face of instrument [sic] and arising by reason of any inconsistency or inherent uncertainty of language used so that effect is either to convey no definite meaning or confused meaning. (Black's Law Dictionary, 6th edition. Emphasis added.) Reading Hamlet in the park this afternoon, I chanced on to an intriguing way to put it. In the words of King Claudius: The harlot's cheek, beautified with plast ring art, Is not more ugly to the thing that helps it Than is my deed to my most painted word. O heavy burden! (III, I, 51-54. Emphasis added.) The editor, Harold Jenkins, in his notes on painted says: " fair but false in appearance, like the beauty of the painted cheek." What serendipity to find this, just as I am on my final proofing of this paper. It is so appropriate, to describe how 'United States' usually is used by the government. And it has indeed imposed on us all a heavy burden ! With dogged determination and perseverance, however, one can succeed in seeing through this meticulous and painstakingly contrived duplicity. For, fortunately, Congress must define all terms that it uses in a particular and special way. For example, in the Internal Revenue Code (IRC), chapter 79 Definitions, Section 7701 Definitions, it states: "(a) When used in this title, where not otherwise distinctly expressed or manifestly incompatible with the intent thereof " It goes on, then, to define many terms of art. These definitions apply throughout the code, "where not otherwise distinctly expressed" which will sometimes be done for a single chapter, section, subsection, or even sentence which, you will later see, can be very instructive. I fear that such analysis can be tedious, and for this I apologize. I will try to be as pithy and compendious as possible, but I am not writing merely to express opinions; I am writing to prove the points I discuss. And I will worry a question like a bull dog, until I am satisfied that I have presented enough hard data to conclusively establish my particular contention, especially in the eyes of those of a different persuasion. For there are intelligent and respected researchers, for whom I have the greatest regard, who do not agree, for example, with my interpretation of the meaning of 'United States' in Title 26, as well as in all the other titles. The history of the usage of United States, from the time of the American colonies to the present, is remarkably complex. This is thoroughly investigated in an easy-reading yet scholarly book that I highly recommend, by Sebastian de Gracia, A Country With No Name, Pantheon, 1997. Herein, however, I will have occasion to avail myself of virtually nothing from this wonderful tome. When I think of this, it astonishes even me. But my focus is primarily on the relevance of this term as it relates to the law, especially tax law, to which he simply doesn t allude at least in the way I do. Before getting started, let me give you just a hint as to why it is so extremely important to have an absolutely correct interpretation of the term United States, but also, in the two quotes below, nonresident alien, and gross income. This preview is an important section from the IRC, which is Title 26, also written in cites as 26 United States Code or 26 USC, Section (the symbol or, often, as in this paper, these are omitted) 872 Gross income: (a) General rule. In the case of a nonresident alien individual gross income includes only (1) gross income which is derived from sources within the United States and which is not effectively connected with the conduct of a trade or business within the United States, and (2) gross income which is effectively connected with the conduct of a trade or business within the United States Add to this 26 USC 7701(b)(1)(B): An individual is a nonresident alien if such individual is neither a citizen of the United States nor a resident of the United States and I think you will agree that the cardinal conundrum here indeed the very crux is the determination as to what is meant by the term "United States" and, above, nonresident alien. For, under certain circumstances we see that the nonresident alien is not subject to any federal income tax if his relationship to the United States is of a certain nature. The United States is an abstraction given substantiality when delegated duties began to be performed, and when 1:8:17 of the Constitution was implemented, which provided for land for the seat of government, as well as forts, magazines, arsenals, dockyards, and other needful buildings. b. Neg ground- makes the 2AC a moving target.

2

Obamas position on treaties is a wait and see approach- the plan shatters treaty cred Bennett and Walsh 10/14 Wells C. Bennett is a Fellow in National Security Law at the Brookings Institution and Managing Editor of Lawfare AND John Walsh is a Senior Associate at the Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA), focused on drug policy reforms that protect human rights, public health and public safety. His work has contributed to the recent opening of the hemispheric debate on drug policy Marijuana Legalization is an Opportunity to Modernize International Drug Treaties October, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/reports/2014/10/15-marijuana-legalization-modernize-drug-treaties-bennett-walsh/cepmmjlegalizationv4.pdf

Wherever the limits of the United States enforcement discretion under the drug treaties might be drawn precisely, we know that such discretion by definition cannot be an across-the-board, categorical affair, when the issue is federal tolerance of regulated, comprehensive marijuana markets established by state law. And thats just it: if more states take a legalize-and-regulate approach, a federal-level decision not to prosecute similarly situated persons could start to look like blanket non-enforcement of implementing legislationsomething that, in our view, the drug treaties do not contemplate. The prospect of future marijuana regulation raises a second, more fundamental reason to rethink things: the nations experiment with legalizing and regulating marijuana might actually go well. Suppose Colorado and Washington both operate their regulated marijuana markets smartly, without offending federal enforcement prerogatives, andmost importantly without compromising public health and safety. We dont think this is a fanciful or improbable scenario. Our Brookings colleague John Hudak was the first to examine Colorados implementation effort up close. And he tentatively concluded that so far, the states initial rollout has been imperfect but quite effective.39 If this path continues or even bends towards improvement, then other states may soon elect to follow Washington and Colorados lead. And that, in turn, stands to exacerbate an already visible tension between obligations imposed by the drug treaties, and the federal governments enforcement posture towards legalizing states. To put the point another way, if Colorado and Washington augur a real trend, then the costs to the United States of treaty breach could be swiftly ratcheted upwards. The INCB could raise the volume and severity of its criticisms; we wouldnt be surprised to hear protests from more prohibitionist countries about the United States treaty compliance, or to see other nations start pushing the limits of other no less important treaties to which the United States is party. When some or all of this happens, the United States wont get very far in emphasizing the CSAs theoretical application nationwide, subject to enforcement priorities enunciated in the Cole Memo; or in appealing to larger objectives woven throughout the drug treaties, and their conferral of policy flexibility. What if twenty or thirty states successfully establish, and police, regulated markets for marijuana production and sale? Having that scenario in mind, we lastly emphasize the United States unique relationship both to the drug treaties and to the wider international community. The United States was aif not thekey protagonist in developing the 1961, 1971, and 1988 Conventions, as well as the 1972 protocol amending the 1961 Convention; the United States has for decades been widely and correctly viewed as the treaties chief champion and defender.40 That fact feeds back onto this one: The United States also occupies a singular place in international relations. It can summon powers no other nation can summon, but it also confronts risks no other nation confronts.41 For that oft-cited reason, the United States has a profound interest in ensuring that counterparties perform their treaty obligations. Reciprocity is always a big deal for any nation that trades promises with other onesbut it is perhaps uniquely so for ours. These factors mean that caution is in order regarding international law and the viability of the Cole Memo in the longer run. If the United States can flexibly interpret the drug treaties with regard to marijuana, then Mexico is entitled to no lessthough it might view the limits of its flexibility differently, or apply it to another controlled substance within the treaties purview. Or imagine that a foreign nations controversial policy butts up against seemingly contrary language, in a treaty covering an extremely important global issue other than drug control. Likely the United States will have a tougher time objecting when, rather than conceding the problem or changing course, that nations foreign ministry invokes the need to tolera[te] different national approaches; or recasts the relevant treaty as a living document subject to periodic, unilateral reinterpretation. This is not to suggest that compliance challenges or complexity should always trigger a call to reshape the United States treaty commitments. Practice and prudence both support a more nuanced, case-specific approach than that. Sometimes the United States has sought to make significant adjustments to multilateral frameworks or even quit them; other times, the United States has weighed costs and benefits, and pressed on within the treaty despite consequential breachesin situations much more obvious (and less open to reasonable contention) than that regarding marijuana. But in those instances, the United States compliance failures often have come despite some hard striving by the federal government. The State Department, to name one well known example, tries mightily to make state law enforcement officers aware of the United States obligations under the Vienna Convention on Consular Relationsnotwithstanding some repeated and well-known violations of that treaty by the likes of Texas, Virginia, and Arizona.42 In this case, though, no external factorsfederalism, say, or a contrary ruling from the U.S. Supreme Courthave frustrated a strong push by the executive branch to vindicate the drug treaties; the decision not to assert federal supremacy was in fact taken unilaterally by the Obama administration. Given the circumstances, we believe it was the correct decision. The Cole Memo nevertheless establishes at least some friction with a treaty obligation, by holding back on CSA enforcement, so as to accommodate state-level regulation of marijuana. Again, the reasons why are entirely understandable: given the incipient nature of the changes to which the Cole Memo was reacting, the United States essentially opted to take a wait-and-see approach as to how problematic the treaty questions might become. So far as we are aware, this strategy is without precedent in U.S. treaty practice. The United States should approach it carefully and deliberatively, given the countrys outsized interest in reciprocal performance of treaty obligations. That depends in part on being able to credibly call out other nations for treaty failingssomething which in turn depends on strictly performing our own obligations, or at least making a good show of trying hard to do so before coming up short. Again, we think the United States can sustain the status quo in the short term. But todays model likely wont hold up year in and year out, for the reasons we describe above. The government therefore ought to start thinking about some of the fundamental treaty reforms that its public statements seemingly have downplayed. Better to have weighed such options early on, should existing policys downsides start to overtake its upsidesas we predict they could.

Key to manage existential threats Graeme P. Herd 10, Head of the International Security Programme, Co-Director of the International Training Course in Security Policy, Geneva Centre for Security Policy, 2010, Great Powers: Towards a cooperative competitive future world order paradigm?, in Great Powers and Strategic Stability in the 21st Century, p. 197-198

Given the absence of immediate hegemonic challengers to the US (or a global strategic catastrophe that could trigger US precipitous decline), and the need to cooperate to address pressing strategic threats - the real question is what will be the nature of relations between these Great Powers? Will global order be characterized as a predictable interdependent one-world system, in which shared strategic threats create interest-based incentives and functional benefits which drive cooperation between Great Powers? This pathway would be evidenced by the emergence of a global security agenda based on nascent similarity across national policy agendas. In addition. Great Powers would seek to cooperate by strengthening multilateral partnerships in institutions (such as the UN, G20 and regional variants), regimes (e.g., arms control, climate and trade), and shared global norms, including international law. Alternatively, Great Powers may rely less on institutions, regimes and shared norms, and more on increasing their order-producing managerial role through geopolitical-bloc formation within their near neighborhoods. Under such circumstances, a re-division of the world into a competing mercantilist nineteenth-century regional order emerges 17 World order would be characterized more by hierarchy and balance of power and zero-sum principles than by interdependence. Relative power shifts that allow a return to multipolarity - with three or more evenly matched powers - occur gradually. The transition from a bipolar in the Cold War to a unipolar moment in the post-Cold War has been crowned, according to Haass, by an era of non-polarity, where power is diffuse "a world dominated not by one or two or even several states but rather by dozens of actors possessing and exercising various kinds of power"18 Multilateralism is on the rise, characterized by a combination of stales and international organizations, both influential and talking shops, formal and informal ("multilateralism light"). A dual system of global governance has evolved. An embryonic division of labor emerges, as groups with no formal rules or permanent structures coordinate policies and immediate reactions to crises, while formal treaty-based institutions then legitimize the results.'9 As powerfully advocated by Wolfgang Schauble: Global cooperation is the only way to master the new, asymmetric global challenges of the twenty-first century. No nation can manage these tasks on its own, nor can the entire international community do so without the help of non-state, civil society actors. We must work together to find appropriate security policy responses to the realities of the twenty-first century.20 Highlighting the emergence of what he terms an "interpolar" world - defined as "multipolarity in an age of interdependence" Grevi suggests that managing existential interdependence in an unstable multipolar world is the key.21 Such complex interdependence generates shared interest in cooperative solutions, meanwhile driving convergence, consensus and accommodation between Great Powers.22 As a result, the multilateral system is being adjusted to reflect the realities of a global age - the rise of emerging powers and relative decline of the West: "The new priority is to maintain a complex balance between multiple states."23 The G20 meeting in London in April 2009 suggested that great and rising powers will reform global financial architecture so that it regulates and supervises global markets in a more participative, transparent and responsive manner: all countries have contributed to the crisis; all will be involved in the solution.24

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PC is effectively preventing sanctions, but its closeTrita Parsi 2/4, Trita Parsi is the author of A Single Roll of the Dice: Obamas Diplomacy with Iran, and president of the National Iranian American Council. The opinions expressed here are those of the author, "Tehran shouldn't underestimate Obama's abilities," Japan Times, http://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2015/02/04/commentary/world-commentary/tehran-shouldnt-underestimate-obamas-abilities/#.VNUcXfnF8Xg, DOA: 2-6-2015, y2kBut the doubters in Tehran should take note. Some extraordinary changes to the political landscape in the U.S. have occurred that should prompt Iran to reevaluate Obamas abilities. A few weeks ago, new sanctions on Iran were on the fast track in the new Republican Senate. The measure would, at a minimum, undermine the nuclear talks, at most cause their collapse. On paper, Obama was heavily outgunned. Historically, no piece of legislation passes as easily in Congress as an Iran sanctions bill. The Republican-controlled Congress has no time or patience for either Obama or his chats with Iranian nuclear negotiators, so sabotaging the talks and depriving the president of a much needed foreign policy success was a no-brainer. And mindful of Israeli pressure in favor of sanctions, many Democratic lawmakers would likely abandon the president and side with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu instead, it was predicted. But Obama stood firm. Rather than seek a compromise with the Senate, he threatened a veto and warned it about the consequences of sabotaging the talks. The American people expect us to only go to war as a last resort, and I intend to stay true to that wisdom, he said. The threat worked. So far only two Democratic senators have co-sponsored the new sanctions bill. Unless sanctions supporters manage to get at least 14 Democrats to commit to the measure, they cannot override Obamas veto and will only embarrass themselves trying. Perhaps more importantly, senators who supported a similar measure last year and who have historically been very close to the American Israel Public Affairs Committees position on Iran, such as Kirsten Gillibrand (a New York Democrat) and Cory Booker (a New Jersey Democrat), have refrained from sponsoring the bill. The president strongly believes it would gravely harm negotiations, and therefore, I am willing to give him more time before supporting this bill, Gillibrand told CNN. Even more shocking, perhaps, was Hillary Clintons backing of Obama in this contest. In the midst of preparations for her presumed 2016 presidential run, Clinton came out against both AIPAC and Netanyahu and called the sanctions bill a very serious strategic error. Undoubtedly, the issue took on an even greater partisan dimension when House Speaker John Boehner secretly invited Netanyahu to address Congress on this matter, which in turn added pressure on Clinton to close ranks with Obama. But for Clinton to come out and so strongly back Obama at a time when she has sought to distance herself from his foreign policy cannot be explained solely by partisan solidarity. Rather, Obama has succeeded in changing the underlying politics of the matter. The debate over Iran sanctions is no longer about Iran, but about war with Iran. Diplomacy with Iran is the best way of avoiding both a nuclear Iran, and bombing Iran. Any measure that undermines diplomacy, such as new sanctions, automatically enhances the risk of war. Passing sanctions on Iran used to be the safest political move in Congress. But today, imposing sanctions means supporting war, which is a move that carries a tremendous political cost. So high that Clinton chose to come out against AIPAC and Netanyahu instead. This is not to suggest that Obama has taken control over the process of lifting sanctions. That authority remains in the hands of Congress. But what the recent wrangling in Congress shows is that Obama can redefine what is politically feasible and unfeasible. Two years ago, anyone who suggested that Congress would fail to impose new sanctions on Iran would be lucky not to be committed to a mental institution. Those advocating diplomacy over sanctions were in the political margins. Today, diplomacy is the policy, while sanctions proponents are considered extremists. Tehran should be careful not to base its negotiation calculations on yesteryears political realities.

Plan wrecks PC with the dems---destroys democratic unityJohn Hudak 14, Senior Fellow @ Brookings, Harry Reid Should Love Marijuana: How Legalization Could Keep the Senate Blue, 8-20-14, http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/fixgov/posts/2014/08/20-harry-reid-marijuana-keep-the-senate-blue-hudak, DOA: 1-23-15, y2kNevertheless, marijuana legalization efforts are quite different than 2004 same sex marriage initiativeseven beyond the nature of the issues themselves. Same sex marriage initiatives were pushed by the Republican Party in 2004. Efforts in the White House, Congress, and in statehouses drove such initiatives and the political planning around them. On the other hand, the Democratic Party is not spearheading legalization efforts. In fact, there are many factions of the Democratic Party still quite resistant to legalization. Instead, legalization supporters are the ones pushing legalization initiatives. They compose an odd combination of liberal Democrats, libertarian and conservative Republicans, and apathetic moderates. In many ways, Democratic Party institutions are still not ready or too timid to spearhead legalization movements. And frankly, legalization supporters would likely resist such party control of the movementand for good reason. Including legalization initiatives on midterm ballots would almost certainly change the composition of the electorate, but they do not guarantee a win. In fact, the standard composition of midterm electorateswhich favors older, wealthier, and more conservative voterswill likely discourage initiatives in many states because of the risk of failure. When a state rejects an initiative, it serves as a blow to the momentum of that movement within the statesomething legalization supporters would prefer to avoid.Interim deal solves prolif- sanctions wreck itRawan Alkhatib 12/8, WAND staff, Womens Action for New Directions, "New Sanctions on Iran Would Undermine Diplomacy," 12-8-14, www.wand.org/2014/12/08/new-sanctions-on-iran-would-undermine-diplomacy/, DOA: 1-23-15, y2kNew Sanctions on Iran Would Undermine Diplomacy On November 24, the deadline for the nuclear negotiations between Iran and the P5+1 the permanent members of the UN Security Council plus Germany -- was extended for another seven months. Reacting to the extension, a number of members of Congress are demanding harsher sanctions on Iran to, in their view, increase pressure on the Iranians to make greater concessions. Imposing new sanctions on Iran would violate the terms of the Joint Plan of Action -- the interim agreement from November 2013 -- and undermine the United States role at the negotiating table. The Iranians must believe the United States is negotiating in good faith. Otherwise, U.S. credibility will diminish and reaching a nuclear deal with Iran that lessens the threat of nuclear proliferation will be near impossible. Republican Senators John McCain (AZ), Lindsey Graham (SC), and Kelly Ayotte (NH) are among those voicing the most significant opposition to the continuation of the nuclear negotiations without additional demands on the Iranians. They argue that the failure to impose more sanctions will diminish Irans incentive to maintain a nuclear program solely for energy rather than weapons and, in turn, set off an unbridled nuclear arms race in the Middle East. It is hard to take their intentions at face value. Indeed, in an interview with ABC News Radio, Senator-elect Tom Cotton (R-AR) revealed what he believes would result from this course of action: Cotton said the way to accomplish [an end to the negotiations] would be to reimpose the economic sanctions that were relaxed as part of an interim deal with Iran so that negotiations could continue. (As part of the JPOA, the P5+1 provided modest sanctions relief to Iran in exchange for Iran freezing and rolling back aspects of its nuclear program.) One thing seems clear: McCain, Graham, and Ayotte are not considering the political impact that renewed sanctions could have on Irans citizens and how this might subsequently play into the negotiations. We cannot risk losing the support of ordinary Iranians who will benefit from economic improvements once a deal is done and who would be most adversely impacted by new sanctions. Conversely, renewing sanctions on Iran will empower Iranian hard-liners that find ways around the economic pain while loudly calling for more aggression against the United States and for unchecked nuclear proliferation. While it was disappointing that the sides could not come to an agreement on the self-imposed November 24 deadline, the extension to the nuclear negotiations nonetheless represents progress. The obligations established by the JPOA are still in effect and as experts note, nothing in the extension weakens the hands of the P5+1 to secure a final agreement. That is, Iran continues to have curbs on its ability to produce materials for nuclear weapons and its facilities continue to be scrutinized by international inspectors. In fact, the extension requires heightened scrutiny. Iran must expand IAEA access to centrifuge production facilities to double the current frequency and allow for no-notice or "snap" inspections. If Congress were to impose renewed sanctions on Iran, the progress made up to this point would likely unravel. As Democratic Senator Dianne Feinstein (CA) argued, "A collapse of the talks is counter to U.S. interests and would further destabilize an already volatile region." In this way, Congress needs to present a united front to crystallize the United States negotiating position. Splintering causes the Iranians to doubt American intentions. In a highly volatile region, diplomacy with Iran is the only good option. Moreover, engaging in meaningful dialogue with Iran is only possible when we demonstrate our own commitment to the process by making good on our commitments under the JPOA and holding off on actions that would undermine our position.

Iranian prolif causes regional nuclear conflictEdelman et al 11 The Dangers of a Nuclear Iran, The Limits of Containment, Eric S. Edelman, Andrew F. Krepinevich Jr, and Evan Braden Montgomery JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2011, ERIC S. EDELMAN is a Distinguished Fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments; he was U.S. Undersecretary of Defense for Policy in 2005-9. ANDREW F. KREPINEVICH is President of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. EVAN BRADEN MONTGOMERY is a Research Fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/67162/eric-s-edelman-andrew-f-krepinevich-jr-and-evan-braden-montgomer/the-dangers-of-a-nuclear-iran

Yet this view is far too sanguine. Above all, it rests on the questionable assumptions that possessing nuclear weapons induces caution and restraint, that other nations in the Middle East would balance against Iran rather than bandwagon with it, that a nuclear-armed Iran would respect new redlines even though a conventionally armed Iran has failed to comply with similar warnings, and that further proliferation in the region could be avoided. It seems more likely that Iran would become increasingly aggressive once it acquired a nuclear capability, that the United States' allies in the Middle East would feel greatly threatened and so would increasingly accommodate Tehran, that the United States' ability to promote and defend its interests in the region would be diminished, and that further nuclear proliferation, with all the dangers that entails, would occur. The greatest concern in the near term would be that an unstable Iranian-Israeli nuclear contest could emerge, with a significant risk that either side would launch a first strike on the other despite the enormous risks and costs involved. Over the longer term, Saudi Arabia and other states in the Middle East might pursue their own nuclear capabilities, raising the possibility of a highly unstable regional nuclear arms race.

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Legalized marijuana tanks pharmaceutical industry Fang 14 Lee Fang, Investigative journalist and contributor to The Nation and Salon and others and is a reporting fellow with The Investigative Fund at The Nation Institute and has had his work result in multiple calls for hearings in Congress and the Federal Election Commission, 9/7/14, Leading Anti-Marijuana Academics Are Paid By Painkiller Drug Companies https://news.vice.com/article/leading-anti-marijuana-academics-are-paid-by-painkiller-drug-companiesVICE has found that many of the researchers who have advocated against legalizing pot have also been on the payroll of leading pharmaceutical firms with products that could be easily replaced by using marijuana. When these individuals have been quoted in the media, their drug-industry ties have not been revealed. Take, for example, Dr. Herbert Kleber of Columbia University. Kleber has impeccable academic credentials, and has been quoted in the press and in academic publicationswarning against the use of marijuana, which he stresses may cause wide-ranging addiction and public health issues. But when he's writing anti-pot opinion pieces for CBS News, or being quoted by NPR and CNBC, what's left unsaid is that Kleber has served as a paid consultant to leading prescription drug companies, including Purdue Pharma (the maker of OxyContin), Reckitt Benckiser (the producer of a painkiller called Nurofen), and Alkermes (the producer of a powerful new opioid called Zohydro). Kleber, who did not respond to a request for comment, maintains important influence over the pot debate. For instance, his writing has been cited by the New York State Association of Chiefs of Police in its opposition to marijuana legalization, and has been published by the American Psychiatric Association in the organization's statement warning against marijuana for medicinal uses. Could Kleber's long-term financial relationship with drug firms be viewed as a conflict of interest? Studies have found that pot can be used for pain relief as a substitute for major prescription painkillers. The opioid painkiller industry is a multibillion business that has faced rising criticism from experts because painkillers now cause about 16,000 deaths a year, more than heroin and cocaine combined. Researchers view marijuana as a safe alternative to opioid products like OxyContin, and there are no known overdose deaths from pot. Other leading academic opponents of pot have ties to the painkiller industry. Dr. A. Eden Evins, an associate professor of psychiatry at Harvard Medical School, is a frequent critic of efforts to legalize marijuana. She is on the board of an anti-marijuana advocacy group, Project SAM, and has been quoted by leading media outlets criticizing the wave of new pot-related reforms. "When people can go to a 'clinic' or 'cafe' and buy pot, that creates the perception that it's safe," she told the Times last year. These academic revelations add fodder to the argument that drug firms maintain quiet ties to the marijuana prohibition lobby. Notably, when Evins participated in a commentary on marijuana legalization for the Journal of Clinical Psychiatry, the publication found that her financial relationships required a disclosure statement, which noted that as of November 2012, she was a "consultant for Pfizer and DLA Piper and has received grant/research support from Envivo, GlaxoSmithKline, and Pfizer." Pfizer has moved aggressively into the $7.3 billion painkiller market. In 2011, the company acquired King Pharmaceuticals (the makers of several opioid products) and is currently working to introduce Remoxy, an OxyContin competitor. Dr. Mark L. Kraus, who runs a private practice and is a board member to the American Society of Addiction Medicine, submitted testimony in 2012 in opposition to a medical marijuana law in Connecticut. According to financial disclosures, Kraus served on the scientific advisory panel for painkiller companies such as Pfizer and Reckitt Benckiser in the year prior to his activism against the medical pot bill. Neither Kraus or Evins responded to a request for comment. These academic revelations add fodder to the argument that drug firms maintain quiet ties to the marijuana prohibition lobby. In July, I reported for the Nation that many of the largest anti-pot advocacy groups, including the Community Anti-Drug Coalitions for America, which has organized opposition to reform through its network of activists and through handing out advocacy material (sample op-eds against medical pot along with Reefer Madness-style videos, for example), has relied on significant funding from painkiller companies, including Purdue Pharma and Alkermes. Pharmaceutical-funded anti-drug groups like the Partnership for Drug-Free Kids and CADCA use their budget to obsess over weed while paying lip-service to the much bigger drug problem in America of over-prescribed opioids. As ProPublica reported, painkiller-funded researchers helped fuel America's deadly addiction to opioids such as OxyContin and Vicodin. These academics, with quiet funding from major pain pill firms, encouraged doctors to over-prescribe these drugs for a range of pain relief issues, leading to where we stand today as the world's biggest consumer of painkillers and the overdose capital of the planet. What does it say about medical academia today that many of that painkiller-funded researchers are now standing in the way of a safer alternative: smoking a joint.

Revenue key to research and development CBO, Congressional Budget Office, 2006, ("Research and Development in the Pharmaceutical Industry," CBO, October, Pg. 9-10, PAS) www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/76xx/doc7615/10-02-drugr-d.pdf 9-13-14The pharmaceutical industry is one of the most research-intensive industries in the United States. Pharmaceutical firms invest as much as five times more in research and development, relative to their sales, than the average U.S. manufacturing firm. Because increases in spending on drug R&D have been nearly matched by increases in revenue from drug sales, the industrys R&D intensitythe ratio of research and development spending to total sales revenuehas not risen to the extent that R&D expenditures have. Over the past 25 years, R&D intensity has grown by about 50 percent. Most of that growth occurred in the 1980s; since then, the industrys R&D intensity has hovered around 19 percent, according to PhRMA (see Figure 2-2).10 A relatively close relationship exists between drug firms current R&D spending and current sales revenue for two reasons. First, successful new drugs generate large cash flows that can be invested in R&D (their manufacturing costs are usually very low relative to their price). Second, alternative sources of investment capitalfrom the bond and stock marketsare not perfect substitutes for cash flow financing. Those alternative sources of capital are more expensive because lenders and prospective new shareholders require compensation (in the form of higher returns) for the additional risk they bear compared with the firm, which has more information about the drug under development, its current status, and its ultimate chance of success.11 The National Science Foundation also estimates that the R&D intensity of the pharmaceutical industry has been fairly stable in recent years, ranging between about 8 percent and 10 percent since 1985. That estimate is less than half of PhRMA's, in part because NSF includes less-R&D-intensive products not related prescription pharmaceuticals (such as vitamins, over-the-counter drugs, reference chemicals sold to researchers for experiments, and consumer and animal care products). Even at that lower estimate, pharmaceuticals ranked as the most R&D-intensive industry in the U.S. manufacturing sector for most of the 1990s, according to NSF (until it was overtaken by communications equipment, whose R&D-intensity was 12.7 percent in 2003).

Prevents disease outbreak Lo, Progressive Media Reporter, 2014, (Chris, "Drug prices: profits before patients?" Progressive Media, 6-9, PAS) Accessed on LexisNexis 9-10-14

A new UCL report questioning the use of off-label drugs to save money has been criticised for propping up an unfair status quo in the pharma industry. Pharma companies charge high premiums for patented medications to recover costs, maximise profits and help fund new R&D, but is there another way of funding high-risk research while avoiding budget-busting prices at the other end of the pipeline? The pharmaceutical industry has been responsible for a host of medical miracles over the past century, from disease-eradicating vaccines to revolutionary new treatments for a wide range of cancers and long-term chronic conditions like diabetes. Research undertaken by private pharmaceutical companies and bio-tech firms, alongside public research institutions, has improved the length and quality of millions of lives. In light of the industry's achievements, it's natural to think of it as something of a sacred cow, a special case that should, to a certain extent, be given extra leeway to ensure it can continue bankrolling life-saving medical innovations. That status also makes it easy to forget the price tag that comes with many of these innovations - a price tag that has been rising steadily over time. In the US, for example, annual cancer care costs are expected to rise from $104bn in 2006 to $173bn in 2020, according to the American Society of Clinical Oncology. A major component of that increase is the rising number of cancer diagnoses along with other factors, but with data from the Memorial Sloan Kettering Cancer Center showing that 15 cancer treatments launched in the last five years cost more than $10,000 a month, and many existing drugs getting pricier every year, the fact remains that the cost of innovative, patent-protected drugs is becoming increasingly difficult for patients and cash-strapped health systems to cover.

ExtinctionGreger 6 The Humane Society of the United States Director of Public Health and Animal Agriculture, 2006, Dr. Michael, graduate of the Cornell University School of Agriculture and the Tufts University School of Medicine, Bird Flu, http://birdflubook.com/g.php?id=5

Senate Majority Leader Frist describes the recent slew of emerging diseases in almost biblical terms: All of these [new diseases] were advance patrols of a great army that is preparing way out of sight.3146 Scientists like Joshua Lederberg dont think this is mere rhetoric. He should know. Lederberg won the Nobel Prize in medicine at age 33 for his discoveries in bacterial evolution. Lederberg went on to become president of Rockefeller University. Some people think I am being hysterical, he said, referring to pandemic influenza, but there are catastrophes ahead. We live in evolutionary competition with microbesbacteria and viruses. There is no guarantee that we will be the survivors.3147 There is a concept in host-parasite evolutionary dynamics called the Red Queen hypothesis, which attempts to describe the unremitting struggle between immune systems and the pathogens against which they fight, each constantly evolving to try to outsmart the other.3148 The name is taken from Lewis Carrolls Through the Looking Glass in which the Red Queen instructs Alice, Now, here, you see, it takes all the running you can do to keep in the same place.3149 Because the pathogens keep evolving, our immune systems have to keep adapting as well just to keep up. According to the theory, animals who stop running go extinct. So far our immune systems have largely retained the upper hand, but the fear is that given the current rate of disease emergence, the human race is losing the race.3150 In a Scientific American article titled, Will We Survive?, one of the worlds leading immunologists writes: Has the immune system, then, reached its apogee after the few hundred million years it had taken to develop? Can it respond in time to the new evolutionary challenges? These perfectly proper questions lack sure answers because we are in an utterly unprecedented situation [given the number of newly emerging infections].3151 The research team who wrote Beasts of the Earth conclude, Considering that bacteria, viruses, and protozoa had a more than two-billion-year head start in this war, a victory by recently arrived Homo sapiens would be remarkable.3152 Lederberg ardently believes that emerging viruses may imperil human society itself. Says NIH medical epidemiologist David Morens, When you look at the relationship between bugs and humans, the more important thing to look at is the bug. When an enterovirus like polio goes through the human gastrointestinal tract in three days, its genome mutates about two percent. That level of mutationtwo percent of the genomehas taken the human species eight million years to accomplish. So whos going to adapt to whom? Pitted against that kind of competition, Lederberg concludes that the human evolutionary capacity to keep up may be dismissed as almost totally inconsequential.3153 To help prevent the evolution of viruses as threatening as H5N1, the least we can do is take away a few billion feathered test tubes in which viruses can experiment, a few billion fewer spins at pandemic roulette.

5

The United States should legalize industrial hemp production and the importation of hemp seeds and should cease all enforcement activities against industrial hemp.

The United States should shift drug interdiction resources toward financial institutions and bank officials.

Solves hemp without legalizing marihuanaCaulkins et al 12 Jonathan P Stever professor of operation research and public policy @ Carnegie Mellon, Angela Hawken Associate prof of public policy @ Pepperdine, Beau Kilmer, co-director of the RAND Drug Research Center, and Mark AR Kleiman Prof of public policy @ UCLA; Marijuana Legalization; Oxford University Press; p. 227-9Could the United States allow industrial hemp without legalizing marijuana? Certainly. Many nations legalized industrial hemp production in the 1990s while continuing prohibition of marijuana as a psychoactive drug. Different strains of cannabis-and different parts of any given plant-produce very different levels of the plant's psychoactive agents. Typically, laws allowing industrial hemp require the use of very-low-THC strains (less than 1 percent or even 0.3 percent THC, compared to the 4-18 percent characteristic of cannabis produced and sold as a drug). So there's a reasonably bold line between industrial hemp and intoxicating marijuana. But it's hard to imagine that the passionate advocacy of industrial hemp is unrelated to its link to drug policy. Groups such as the National Organization for the Reform of Marijuana Laws (NORML) have picked up the hemp crusade in order to claim the benefits of industrial hemp as an advantage of marijuana legalization. Politics makes strange bedfellows, and the politics of marijuana are no exception. Oddly, the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) and other advocates of continued prohibition agree with hemp advocates in linking the industrial hemp and drug-legalization questions. But they do so from the opposite perspective, arguing that industrial hemp should not be legalized because it would complicate efforts to enforce prohibition against use as an intoxicant. One DEA concern is that farmers could line the outside of their fields with low-THC (industrial) cannabis while growing high-THC (intoxicating) cannabis in the middle. Since relatively few acres would be needed to supply the intoxicant market, allowing free cultivation of industrial hemp could indeed pose an enforcement challenge. (Even the upper estimate of s,ooo metric tons of intoxicating cannabis consumed in the United States could be supplied by less than a third of the acreage Canada cultivates for industrial hemp.) However, unregulated, laissez-faire production is not the only alternative to complete prohibition. Authorities in other countries use stringent protocols for the licensure, seed selection, and inspection of hemp operations to monitor the hemp production process. Prospective growers have to submit substantial paperwork, complete a background check, and join a professional hemp association to become sanctioned producers. Governments also require farmers to grow specific approved hemp varieties that fall under the THC threshold. Farms are subject to annual visits by inspectors and sometimes to aerial surveillance. Farms are valuable assets that would be vulnerable to seizure and forfeiture if farmers were found to be producing illegal (intoxicating) forms of cannabis. There are also purely technical barriers to hiding pot plants in fields of industrial hemp. For example, fiber hemp plants are planted close together to encourage tall vertical stalks with few leaves. Moreover, hemp fiber is harvested early, before the intoxicant- bearing flowers are ready. Marijuana grown amid industrial hemp would probably have to be the low-value, relatively lowTHe commercial grade rather than higher-value sinsemilla, because the pollen produced by the hemp plants would pollinate the drug plants. (Sinsemilla comes from unfertilized female cannabis plants.) Indeed, some medical marijuana growers in California oppose a proposed law permitting an industrial hemp pilot project because they fear hemp pollen might ruin their harvest. Canadian industrial hemp farmers try to ensure that their crops are at least three miles from any wild or cultivated cannabis to ensure pedigreed hempseed production; studies show cannabis pollen can travel three to twelve miles. The really convincing evidence is negative. Like Sherlock Holmes's dog that did not bark in the night, the absence of any reports from Europe of diversion from industrial hemp farms into the drug market argues for the success of these regulations. In sum, while legal industrial hemp production could create a Trojan horse for the production of intoxicating marijuana, there is no real problem in creating regulations to limit diversion.

Targeting banks solves cartel revenueMorris 13 Evelyn Krache, Research Fellow, International Security Program, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs @ JFK School of Govt, Harvard, Think Again: Mexican Drug Cartels; Dec 3;www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/12/03/think_again_mexican_drug_cartels"We Need to Hit Them Where It Hurts: the Wallet." Exactly. Despite the ongoing arguments about drug legalization and border security, the most effective way to combat the scourge of the DTOs would be to interdict not drugs or people but money. As in any business, money is the fuel that keeps the cartels running. Even if Sinaloa, to give only one example, were to disappear tomorrow, other organizations would quickly rise to take its slice of the lucrative pie. One of the most basic tenets of business is that highly profitable markets attract lots of new entrants. This is true for legal and illegal enterprises alike. The staggering profits of illegal trade would be much less attractive if the DTOs could not launder, deposit, and ultimately spend their money. But shutting down the cartels' financial operations will be a formidable task, given the help they have had from multinational financial institutions, which have profited from the cartels' large-dollar deposits. In 2010, Wachovia bank (which was acquired by Wells Fargo in 2008) admitted that it had processed $378 billion of currency exchanges in Mexico -- an amount equal to about one-third of the country's GDP -- to which it had failed to apply anti-laundering restrictions. In 2012, British bank HSBC settled with the U.S. government for $1.9 billion to escape prosecution for, among other things, laundering hundreds of millions of dollars for the Sinaloa cartel. U.S. law enforcement has also implicated Bank of America and Western Union in DTO money laundering. Although illegal money transfers can happen without banks' knowledge, the volume and widespread occurrence of these transactions indicate just how easy it is for the cartels to clean their dirty money. Paying a fine to avoid prosecution is almost no punishment at all. The fines Wachovia paid amounted to less than 2 percent of its 2009 profit. Even the record fine assessed on HSBC amounted to only 12 percent of the bank's profits. Furthermore, banks can simply accrue funds to offset any possible fines, either by increasing what they charge cartels or by setting aside some of the earnings from laundering, even as they continue to do business with the DTOs. Prosecuting bank employees involved in money laundering, up through the highest levels of an institution, would be a better tack. Pictures of a chief compliance officer as he entered a courtroom for sentencing would have a far greater deterrent effect than any financial penalty. To that end, investigative techniques and legal precedents for going after global criminal networks are increasingly robust, and the political payoffs could be substantial. One of the more successful campaigns in the war on terrorism has been the financial one; experience gained in tracking the funds of al Qaeda could make it easier to similarly unravel Los Zetas' financing. Malfeasance in the financial industry is nothing new, but public sensitivity to banks' wrongdoing is arguably higher than it has been in decades. An enterprising prosecutor could make quite a reputation for herself by tracking DTO money through the financial system. The cartels, along with the violence and corruption they perpetrate, are threats to both Mexico and the United States. The problem is a complicated one and taps areas of profound policy disagreement. The way to make progress in combating the DTOs is to ignore issues like gun control and illegal immigration and follow the money. Stanching the cartels' profits will do more to end the bloodshed than any new fence or law.

6

The Supreme Court of the United States should that prohibitions on and federal Controlled Substances Act scheduling of marijuana unconstitutional.

No congress key warrant sufficient to solve

Politics is a net benefit Intoccia, practicing attorney specializing in telecommunications, 01 [Gregory Intoccia, practicing attorney specializing in telecommunications, 2001, Reassessing Judicial Capacity to Resolve Complex Questions of Social Policy, 11 USAFA J. Leg. Stud. 127, pg. np]Elected politicians appear to "pass the buck" to the judiciary when an issue divides the electorate in a manner that is not in keeping with conventional party divisions. As the judiciary is a non-partisan institution that has traditionally resolved specific controversies, the courts offer politicians the opportunity to deflect issues potentially disruptive to partisan debate. For example, judicial policy on abortion suggests that this principle is valid. For at least a decade prior to the Supreme Court's abortion decision in Roe v. Wade, many mainstream politicians generally sought to avoid the abortion issue. In the mid-1960s, the two major parties remained divided over New Deal economic issues, but voters were increasingly interested in other issues such as law and order, race, gender equity and social lifestyles. At that time, the majority Democratic Party was divided between liberals who were attracted to new views of social lifestyles and traditionalists who condemned them. The Republican Party was also divided internally over these issues, but to a lesser degree. While the two parties primarily debated economic issues, many mainstream politicians sought to avoid debate on a number of non-economic social issues. As the debate over such issues as abortion intensified, elected officials increasingly deferred to the judiciary for resolution. In the months prior to the Roe v. Wade decision, many politicians sought to remove themselves from the potential fall-out of a legislative solution to the abortion question, preferring instead that the judiciary decide whether to eliminate abortion restrictions.

Cartels

*Cartels can sell their products cheaper to compete Korcherga 13 (Angela. 5/15. Angela Kocherga is the Belo KHOU 11 News Border Bureau Chief and covers the southwest border and interior of Mexico on television and online.Angela reports extensively on the drug war in Mexico and its impact on families on both sides of the border. she has brought viewers stories from Nuevo Laredo, Reynosa and Ciudad Juarez, Mexico's murder capital. Legalized marijuana increases competition for Mexican drug cartels http://www.khou.com/community/bios/68118027.html) 6/3/14 RK

Mexican drug cartels fighting each other for smuggling routes face increasing competition in the U.S. where legalization in some states has increased the amount of marijuana available. The drug war in Mexico may have helped U.S. growers gain a foothold in some regions. The majority of this weed is coming from California, a little bit of it is coming from Colorado, said a narcotics officer with the El Paso Police Department who works undercover. According to the DEA, the amount of marijuana from Mexico seized in the El Paso area declined by nearly half starting in 2009 as drug cartels clashed violently just across the border in Juarez. As they fought for control of smuggling routes, narcotics officers in El Paso began to see more U.S. grown pot, especially a variety known as Kush. Its more potent, but higher priced than Mexican marijuana. On a recent afternoon, officers arrested two people on drug charges in a quiet El Paso neighborhood. The woman is a soldier at Fort Bliss. Officers said her boyfriend was a dealer who sold Kush in the home they shared. This guy has a little bit more than the usual street dealer: half a pound of Kush. Youre looking at $3,000 to $4,000, said an undercover officer on the scene. A one-pound bundle of Kush known on the streets as a baby is worth $8,000. One medical marijuana patient in Las Cruces, who did not want his name used , said there are still plenty of people who can only afford the less expensive Mexican marijuana he referred to as gas tank pot because its often compressed and smuggled across international border crossings hidden in vehicles. Supporters of legalization, predict it will reduce the need to rely on marijuana smuggled across the border by criminal organizations. But others doubt drug cartels will give up on their No. 1 cash crop without a fight. I think theyll compete in an economic battle with American marijuana producers because it doesnt serve their interest to get into a violent clash with Americans on U.S. soil, said Howard Campbell, a professor at the University of Texas El Paso, and author of Drug War Zone. I think the Mexican cartels are rational business organizations. said Campbell. Even though theyre very violent in Mexico, what theyll do with the growing legalization in the U.S. is figure out ways to get their product to the American consumer. There are already signs that cartels in Mexico are adapting. Weve had one seizure that theyve told us that its Mexican Kush, not very good quality, but its coming. Experts expect the quality to improve as Mexican growers perfect their crop. The quantity smuggled across the border in the El Paso area is starting to increase now that violence has subsided in Juarez. Law enforcement officers do not expect cartels in Mexico to get out of the marijuana business once U.S. consumers can find a legal supply. If all the states legalized it the Mexicans would somehow snake their way into it because they can produce a cheaper product. They can produce more of it, said the undercover narcotics officer.

US not keyDTOs have access to global emerging markets Carpenter 11 Ted Galen Carpenter, senior fellow for defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute, Policy Analysis, November 15, 2011, Undermining Mexicos Dangerous Drug Cartels, No. 688, http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/PA688.pdf

Yet U.S. demand is only one part of the equation. Even a dedicated drug warrior like Robert Bonner concedes that point, noting that the major markets for the Mexican cartels are not just in the United States but also in Mexico itself and as far away as Europe.29 Bonner actually understates the breadth of the problem. The Mexican organizations are taking control of trafficking routes and gaining access to potential markets in portions of Sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East, as well as in Europe. Although the United States is the largest single retail market in the world, it is actually relatively mature, with overall consumption not substantially different from what it was a decade or two decades ago. The main areas of demand growth are in Eastern Europe, the successor states of the former Soviet Union, and some portions of the Middle East and Latin America. According to the United Nations, there has been a noticeable increase in the consumption of opiates throughout Eastern Europe and Central Asia, especially the former Soviet states. In Western Europe, the principal increase has been in the use of cocaine.30 In the Middle East, even such a politically authoritarian and religiously conservative society as Iran is witnessing a surge in both drug trafficking and drug use, especially of heroin. Several years ago, that problem had already reached the point that the Supreme Leaders representative in one province labeled drug abuse and trafficking as Iranian societys thorniest problem.31

Legalization wont collapse cartels- institutional problems Hope, Bloomberg, 14(Alejandro, Legal U.S. pot wont bring real peace to Mexico, accessed 6-9-14, http://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2014/01/24/commentary/world-commentary/legal-u-s-pot-wont-bring-real-peace-to-mexico-2/#.U5Zc_vldWSo, hec)

So does this creeping legalization of marijuana in the U.S. spell doom for the Mexican drug cartels? Not quite. The illegal marijuana trade provides Mexican organized crime with about $1.5 billion to $2 billion a year. Thats not chump change, but according to a number of estimates, it represents no more than a third of gross drug export revenue. Cocaine is still the cartels biggest money-maker and the revenue accruing from heroin and methamphetamine arent trivial. Moreover, Mexican gangs also obtain income from extortion, kidnapping, theft and various other types of illegal trafficking. Losing the marijuana trade would be a blow to their finances, but it certainly wouldnt put them out of business. But surely Mexico would experience less violence if marijuana was legal? Yes, to some extent, but the decline wouldnt be sufficient to radically alter the countrys security outlook. In all likelihood, marijuana production and marijuana-related violence are highly correlated geographically. Marijuana output is concentrated in five states (Chihuahua, Durango, Sinaloa, Michoacan and Guerrero) that accounted for approximately a third of all homicides committed in Mexico in 2012. Assuming improbably that half of all murders in those areas were marijuana-related, we can estimate that the full elimination of the illegal marijuana trade would reduce Mexicos homicide rate to 18 per 100,000 inhabitants from 22 still about four times the U.S. rate. Well, but couldnt the Mexican government gain a peace dividend by redirecting some resources from marijuana prohibition to other law enforcement objectives? Yes, but the effect would probably be modest. Only 4 percent of all Mexican prison inmates are serving time exclusively for marijuana-related crimes. In 2012, drug offenses represented less than 2 percent of all crime reports in the country. When it comes to only federal crimes (7 percent of the total), the share of drug offenses rises to 20 percent, but that percentage has been declining since 2007. So the legalization of marijuana wont free up a huge trove of resources to be redeployed against predatory crime. Whatever the legal status of marijuana, Mexico needs to tackle its many institutional malfunctions. Its police forces are underpaid, undertrained, under motivated and deeply vulnerable to corruption and intimidation. Its criminal justice system is painfully slow, notoriously inefficient and deeply unfair. Even with almost universal impunity, prisons are overflowing and mostly ruled by the inmates themselves. Changing that reality will take many years. Some reforms are under way, some are barely off the ground. As a result of a 2008 constitutional reform, criminal courts are being transformed, but progress across states has been uneven. With a couple of local exceptions, police reform has yet to find political traction. The federal Attorney Generals Office is set to become an independent body, but not before 2018. The reformist zeal that Mexican President Enrique Pena Nieto has shown in other policy areas (education, energy, telecommunications) is absent in security and justice. Security policy remains reactive, driven more by political considerations than by strategic design. And results have been mixed at best: Homicides declined moderately in 2013, but both kidnapping and extortion reached record levels. Marijuana legalization in the U.S. wont alter that dynamic. In the final analysis, Mexico doesnt have a drug problem, much less a marijuana problem: It has a state capacity problem. That is, its institutions are too weak to protect the life, liberty and property of its citizens. Even if drug trafficking might very well decline in the future, in the absence of stronger institutions, something equally nefarious will replace it.

*Current North America oil boom sufficient Weissman, Slate Senior Business and Econ Correspondent, 14(Mark, Iraqs Crisis Should Make Us Thankful for Americas Oil Boom, accessed 9-6-14, http://www.slate.com/blogs/moneybox/2014/06/21/iraq_and_oil_the_country_s_crisis_should_make_us_thankful_for_america_s.html, hec)

So far, oil markets have mostly shrugged off the turmoil in Iraq. The worlds seventh largest crude producer is tearing apart at the seams thanks to sectarian violence, yet the cost of a barrel is up just 5 percent this montha bump, sure, but not a crisis. Why the mere blip? The most important reason prices havent surged is straightforward enough: As of now, Iraqs oil production isnt in serious danger. Fighting has been contained to the countrys north, while drilling is concentrated in its south. Not a single barrel of crude exports has been lost since the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (known as Isis) routed Iraqi security forces, notes the Financial Times. But the quiet response is also a sign of something bigger. Its a subtle demonstration of how North Americas fracking-fueled oil boom is paying dividends by making the world market more resilient. Energy traders always add a fear premium onto oil. When instability (a raging civil war, for instance) hits a major petro-producer, prices race up, as buyers start to fret about potential nightmare scenarios that would cut off their supply. In the case of Iraq, that might mean attacks on pipelines or export facilities, since few expect Baghdad to actually fall.* Those sorts of worries are why prices have risen at all. But theyve been balanced out by the fact that, at the moment, the world has a decent cushion of oil. There are cargoes of Angolan and Nigerian crude that nobody wants, Edward Morse, head of commodities research at Citigroup, told CNBC. Iraqs conflict hasnt dealt a blow to the worlds oil supply yet, but we have a bit of protection if it does.

Violence is decreasing McVey 14 KKR Head of Global Macro & Asset Allocation, 2014, Henry, Mexico: Different Investment Lens Required, May, http://www.kkr.com/company/insights/global-macro-trends-24

While the presidency of Pea Nietos predecessor, Felipe Calderon became defined by its bloody and ultimately indecisive struggle with the cartels, Pea Nieto entered office inclined to deemphasize an overt security agenda, focusing instead on the governance and economic reforms described above. The government believes that its new low-key approach has yielded dividends as evidenced by an apparent nationwide reduction in intentional homicides in 2013. In addition, since January 2014, Mexican security forces have moved forcefully to restore security in Michoacan, where conditions badly deteriorated last year, and successfully carried out a succession of operations that have resulted in the killing or capture of high-level cartel leaders. Despite some high profile successes, however, we are less bullish. While security has improved significantly in some parts of the country (e.g., Ciudad Juarez and Monterrey)it has remained constant or deteriorated elsewhere, including not only Michoacan and neighboring Guerrero on the Pacific coast, but also Tamaulipas and Mexico State. What we appear to be seeing is, to some extent, a redistribution of violencefrom urban to rural areas, and from the north to the center and the south. In addition, we fear the calm in some places may be more illusory than real. Several Mexican geopolitical analysts with whom we spoke suspect the reduction in violence in some areas does not signify the defeat of the cartels there, but rather the domination of the area by a single criminal network and its tacit agreement not to wage open war. Perhaps most worrisome for investors should be the significant growth of kidnappingwhich has quadrupled since 200732 and of extortion, even as the number of murders may be decreasing. Ultimately, Mexicos criminality and security problems are inseparable from its under-resourced rule of law institutionscourts, police and prisons. There is no quick or easy solution for this. While there have been pockets of improvement, what is ultimately required is massive, long-term investment in these perennially under-resourced bodies. Although there are signs that some in the government grasp the scope of the problem and are pushing in the right direction, including passage of the long-delayed penal code this spring, we do not yet see a comprehensive national strategy commensurate with the challenge. Although inherently difficult to quantify, Mexicos violence carries a heavy economic cost. INEGI, the countrys national statistics office, estimates that direct material losses from violence are $16.6 billion per year, approximately 1.3% of GDP33. But indirect costsin lost productivity, investment and misdirected resourcesare clearly far higher; last year, for instance, Mexicos health minister estimated violent crime cost between 8-15% in annual economic output34. Does this mean that high hopes for Mexico are misplaced? Ultimately we dont think so. Although violence and weak rule of law in Mexico will remain a significant drag on growth and could cast a cloud over Pea Nietos reform accomplishments, we think the risk of the country being overwhelmed by these problems is exaggerated.

Plan causes a short term increase in violence Kilmer et al. 10 RAND senior policy researcher, 2010, Beau, Reducing Drug Trafficking Revenues and Violence in Mexico, www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/occasional_papers/2010/RAND_OP325.pdfGeneral Principles We consider here the consequences of a decline in the demand for Mexican drug exports from the perspective of economic and organizational principles. There is nothing about the analysis that is specific to marijuana or to its legalization. This analysis simply assesses the effects of a loss of revenue from one of the existing streams of the DTOs resulting from some event over which they have no control, be it a change in law or in U.S. customer tastes. Our principal focus is on violence.8 The DTOs can be defined as consisting of the following: (1) a set of hierarchical relationships that allow higher-level members to command their subordinates to commit violent and risky actions, (2) a reputation for providing above-market earning opportunities to low-skilled workers willing to take particular kinds of risks, (3) a network of relationships with corrupt law enforcement officials, (4) a network of suppliers and customers for various drugs, and (5) ready access to capital for illegal ventures. Presumably, the DTO demand for labor will decline, at least at the aggregate level. Given the lack of specialization, one would think almost all the individual DTOs will suffer some decline. One question is whether those reductions in force can be achieved through natural attrition or whether they will require layoffs, to use familiar industrial jargon. Large-scale dismissals might carry a peculiar risk, both for the organization and for society in general. Those who are fired may try to create their own organizations, so DTO managers may have to think strategically about whom to dismiss. Also, those leaving have probably become accustomed to earning levels they cannot attain in legal trade. Since the whole industry would be affected by the downturn, other DTOs will not be hiring. Thus, the fired agents might attempt to compete with their former employers. Hence, in the short run, there could be additional violence resulting from at least three sources: conflict between the current leaders and the dismissed labor within DTOs. Even after the firing of excess labor, the earnings of the leadership most likely will decline. One way the individual manager might compensate for this is to eliminate his or her superior, generating systemic internal violence from senior managers who become more suspicious in the face of the overall decline in earnings. between DTOs. The leadership of an individual DTO may try to maintain their earnings by eliminating close competitors.

Collapses PEMEX reforms- thats key to energy security Turns oil shocksJeremy Martin and Longmire 11, Director of the Energy Program at the Institute of the Americas, and Sylvia Longmire, Mexico Security Expert & President, Longmire Consulting, The Perilous Intersection of Mexicos Drug War & Pemex, 15 MARCH 11, http://www.ensec.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=283:the-perilous-intersection-of-mexicos-drug-war-aamp-pemex&catid=114:content0211&Itemid=374The drug war in Mexico is being fought on two fronts. First, roughly seven major drug trafficking organizations, or DTOs, are fighting against each other for control of lucrative drug smuggling corridors, or plazas, into the United States. Second, they are also fighting a massive military and law enforcement offensive under the direction of Mexican President Felipe Caldern, who decided upon entering office in 2006 that existing levels of drug trafficking and associated violence would not be tolerated. The DTOs took exception to Calderns new mandate, and fought back with a vengeance. Their attacks against each other and against government forces have included beheadings and dismemberments, targeted assassinations, mass murders, grenade attacks, public daylight shootings with high-powered assault rifles, and even the occasional use of car bombs. The result has been the death of more than 34,000 people, including an increasing number of innocent bystanders who have nothing to do with the drug trade. Last year, with over 15,000 deaths associated with the battle, was the deadliest yet. Despite the seemingly unending violence and impenetrability of DTO defenses, their drug trafficking activitiesand subsequently their drug-related profitshave been taking a hit from the combination of Mexican and US law enforcement actions. The escalating violence is partly a result of increased competition for more tightly guarded plazas and an increase in drug seizures on both sides of the border. For these reasons, DTOs have expanded their business to include kidnap-and-ransom operations, extortion, human smuggling, and oil theft. As will be discussed below, this has brought an increasing overlap between DTO activity and Mexicos oil industry. From politics to finance - oils continued hold on Mexicos national psyche The interconnection of oil and nationalism in Mexico is historic and constitutional. Indeed, the Mexican Constitution sets forth the basic facts that President Lzaro Crdenas emphasized during the nationalization period of the 1930s: The nation is the only owner of the all the hydrocarbons reserves and production; that licensing and concessions are prohibited; and that Pemex is the nations operator and controls the first-hand sales and must not share revenues, production or reserves. This fundamental political reality continues to affect development of the nations huge oil resource potential by restricting privateparticularly foreigninvestment. It has been said that in Mexico, oil is not merely a chemical compound but rather a fundamental element of sovereigntya part of the national DNA. The story is well known but worth repeating: Oil is an essential part of the national treasury. Though diminished in relative terms for Mexicos economy, oil still generates over 15 percent of current export earnings. Moreover, Pemex, due to its onerous fiscal and tax regime, accounts for about 40 percent of the governments budget. Oil long ago emerged as a significant form of hard currency and provided what amounted to an economic lifeline for a series of Institutional Revolutionary Party, or PRI, governments. In some cases, oil earnings provided a last gasp to stave off financial crisis in the country, such as the 1994 peso crisis. In late 1994, as Mexico neared default, the United States orchestrated an international bailout of roughly $50 billion. Mexican oil sales were usedquite successfullyas collateral for the roughly $20 billion in US loans to Mexico. Leaders for years have depended upon and pointed to the windfall of the nations oil patch for its economic well-being and, during the good times, growth. Without broad tax and fiscal reform in the nation, Pemex will remain a financial linchpin, albeit an increasingly tenuous one. From Cardenas to Cantarells golden age The Cardenas legacy is celebrated in textbooks and with a national holiday on March 18 to celebrate the expropriation, but it was a fishermans discovery that really gave it legs. Aided by a prolific field in the shallow waters of the Bay of Campeche, Mexico entered what might be termed a Golden Age of Oil in the 1970s with the discovery of the supergiant Cantarell field. Cantarell catapulted Mexico and Pemex into position as one of the worlds most important oil exporting nations, particularly in the Western Hemisphere. Nowhere was this more evident than in the oil commerce between Mexico and its northern neighbor, the United States. Thanks to Cantarell, Mexico became, after Canada, the United States most trusted supplier of foreign oil. The timing of the relationships maturation was perfect as our increasing dependency on oil took inescapable hold in the 1970s. Beyond Cantarell? In hindsight, what seemed like a golden age for oil production and government coffers in Mexico instead foisted upon the nation a more ominous trend toward the first effects of Cantarell disease and easy oil affliction. The myopic policies of the time, coupled with the seemingly infinite spoils of Cantarell, placed Pemex and the nation on a bumpy path toward the unkind decade of 2000-2010 that saw Cantarells production crash. True, Cantarell is not the only significant field in Mexico. But the steady production increase of Ku Maloob Zaap (KMZ) has barely offset Pemexs overall plummeting production. Worse, in 2010 Pemex indicated that KMZ production reached its peak and has about a three year horizon for the current optimum production of roughly 850,000 barrels per day (bpd). And then theres the Chicontopec field. A geologically challenging play, it has proved a major disappointment for Pemex, which long offered it as the key to offsetting both Cantarell and KMZ decline. Chicontopec has only recently hit 40,000 bpd, far below earlier estimates of hundreds of thousands of barrels per day of production. The facts are unfortunate but fairly plain to see: Mexicos oil production is in serious decline. In 2004, Pemex oil production peaked just below 3.5 million barrels per day (mbd); in 2009, it dipped to roughly 2.7 mbd. And though some success at stabilization has been made, production in 2010 still ended at just under 2.6 mbd. Figure 2 offers a stark picture of the issue at hand for Mexico, Pemex and the regional energy matrix. Simply put, the recent decade was not kind to Pemex. To further answer the question of what happens in Mexico beyond Cantarell, the current predicament and context must be acknowledged. Indeed, estimates have pointed to oil production average decline rates of about 5 percent per year, beginning in 2010. In the last few years, talk has emerged that Mexico will likely cease to be an oil exporter by the end of the current decade. The Energy Information Administration, however, indicates that may be an optimistic premise: In its International Energy Outlook 2010, it estimated that Mexico could become a net importer by 2015, with imports surpassing 1 mbd by 2035. It is also worth noting that Mexicos stated plan to deal with the foregoing scenarios and its hope to reverse these ominous trends lie in the deep waters on Mexicos side of the Gulf. The touted treasure at the bottom of the sea bandied about during the 2008 energy reform debate remains the true X factor for any legitimate answers to what happens beyond Cantarell, and whether or not the EIA forecast for imports in 25 years holds true. Pemex exposed and impacted As discussed previously, oil theft from Pemex pipelines, money laundering by way of service stations, and, worst of all, provocative kidnappings of the companys executives and those of service companies working with the state firm, are all on the rise. Unofficial figures place thefts from the Pemex network at roughly $2 billion annually. And security experts point to this as an important source of revenue for drug cartelsespecially as the Mexican government continues to crack down on them. Thefts from the Pemex network are not new, but the increase and the strain it is placing on the already-taxed company is important. And the illegal tapping has grown significantly in the areas where the drug war is the most pervasive. The spike in fuel thefts and illegal trading, as well as kidnappings, has led some to question whether Pemex is fully in charge of all its facilities across the nation. For some experts following the situation, the answer is a resounding no. Indeed, many analysts indicate that the physical security and monitoring of pipelines belonging to Pemex are severely lacking. According to Mexican daily El Universal, oil looting has occurred in almost every state in Mexico, while the Wall Street Journal, citing Pemex statistics, indicated that between January and November 2010, Pemex discovered 614 illegal siphons368 in liquid fuels pipelines, 196 in oil pipelines, and 50 in liquefied petroleum gas ducts. Pemex has begun installing systems to detect declines in pressure in some oil product pipelines but the project is expected to take years to complete. Kidnappings send shudders Kidnappings of Pemex executives and subcontractors, including workers from international firms, have taken place across the country but most notably in Tabasco, Tamaulipas and Nuevo Leon, sending shudders throughout the company and Mexico. The kidnappings have terrorized a community where, according to a Los Angeles Times story, jobs on the oil rigs and at the gas wells are handed down, father to son, for generations. How is it, asked a relative of a kidnapped worker, that Pemex, supposedly the backbone of the nation, can be made to bow down like this? One analysis, published by Grupo Reforma highlighted the oil town of Reforma, Chiapas, where at least 30 Pemex employeesranging from executives to laborershave been kidnapped over the past year. Mexico Weekly has also reported on other forms of violence that have flared in prime Pemex production zones, such as the Burgos Basin, site of Mexico's biggest natural gas field in Tamaulipas. Last spring, gunmen seized the Gigante Uno gas plant and kidnapped five Pemex workers. Increasingly unsafe conditions are severely hindering Pemexs ability to produce natural gas in the Burgos Basin. The Burgos Basin stretches across the northern border state of Tamaulipas, where the Gigante Uno plant is located, and spills into the states of Nuevo Len and Coahuila. All three states are experiencing extremely high levels of drug-related violence, especially along these states border with Texas. The stretch from Nuevo Laredo to Matamoros is in the midst of a bloody conflict between the Gulf cartel and Los Zetas, former paramilitaries and enforcers for the Gulf cartel who are now one of the more vicious DTOs in their own right. Los Zetas are viewed as largely responsible for the kidnapping of Pemex employees in that region. Once Pemex comes under regular attack from the cartels, rather than just random, disorganized thugs, then you have far more serious national security problems much worse in the government's eyes than a bunch of homicides in the slums of Ciudad Jurez," said Malcolm Beith, author of The Last Narco, a book about the hunt for Joaquin El Chapo Guzmn Loera. Regrettably, Burgos is becoming synonymous with the perilous intersection of Mexicos raging drug war with Pemexs efforts to produce the critical energy supplies the nation and region demand. The Murphy Energy case One case of fuel theft from Pemex thats winding its way through the justice system provides a unique insight into that part of the problem the company is confronting. According to MarketWatch, federal documents released in August 2010 revealed a Texas chemical plant, owned by German chemical company BASF Corp., bought $2 million worth of petroleum products that had been stolen from Pemex and smuggled across the US border. The documents also showed the stolen condensate passed through several companies' hands before arriving on a barge at the BASF facility in Port Arthur, Texas. The actual transport of stolen oil from Mexican pipelines into US corporate hands is complicated at best. Donald Schroeder, former president of Trammo Corp., testified that in January 2009, two companies, Murphy Energy Corp. and Continental Fuels, contacted him. Both wanted to sell him stolen condensate. Apparently he agreed to buy it, and the transfers began. Unnamed import companies would sell the condensate to intermediary companies like Continental (which has since shuttered its headquarters in Houston). Those import companies would smuggle the condensate across the border and store it in Continental facilities. No details were available on how those trucks managed to successfully cross the US Mexico border. These piecemeal transfers would continue until there was enough oil in the storage facility to fill a barge and ship to BASF. Jim McAlister, an Assistant US Attorney, said he has no reason to believe that BASF has any involvement in the alleged wrongdoing. The President and founder of Murphy Energy Corp., Matt Murphy, said the company did not know that the condensate was stolen. Josh Crescenzi, the vice president of Continental Fuels, has not been indicted in the case, nor has anyone else from Continental. This particular case has been a success, resulting in the handover of $2.4 million by US customs authorities to the Mexican government. But the extent of corruption in Mexicowithin Pemex, in particularand the ease with which oil can be stolen from pipelines makes the mitigation of oil looting an almost insurmountable challenge. Adding to the problem is the fact that Mexican cartels are involved. According to Reuters, the Mexican government believes the cartels use stolen jet fuel in their aircraft to cover up any evidence of illicit flights. In August 2009, Mexicos federal police commissioner Rodrigo Esparza said Los Zetas used false import documents to smuggle at least $46 million worth of oil in tankers to unnamed US refineries. President Felipe Caldern has said that DTOs in northern Mexico are responsible for most oil theft. On some levels Pemex is not just a victim of oil-thieving DTOs; sometimes, its directly involved. In February 2010, Mexican military units seized more than four tons of marijuana at Pemex installations in Reynosa, Tamaulipas. The discovery was made after Pemex security alerted officials that armed men were removing Pemex employees from a fuel supply station. In response, a Mexican Naval helicopter was dispatched to the scene but retreated after receiving heavy weapons fire from the ground. When military units arrived on the ground, they found the marijuana loaded on trucks abandoned at the site. These alarming facts have led to perhaps the most ominous question of all: Is the company being infiltrated by the perpetrators of the nations drug business? In light of the increasing number of incidents President Caldern has acknowledged, there may well be internal operatives at Pemex aiding and abetting the DTOs. For its part, Pemex is soliciting the help of the Mexican people to try to put a stop to oil looting. Last August, the Mexican government posted a Pemex press release, in which exhorts that oil looting is not just an unpatrio