AGEOGRAPHYOFPEACE:

ANINVESTIGATIONOFPOST‐CONFLICT

PROPERTYANDLANDADMINISTRATIONINACEH

ArthurGerrishGreenIV

DepartmentofGeographyMcGillUniversityMontréal,Québec

April2013

AthesissubmittedtotheFacultyofGraduateStudiesandResearchinpartialfulfillmentoftherequirementsofthedegreeof

DoctorofPhilosophy

©ArthurGreen2013

Thereisnoimage,nopainting,novisibletrait,whichcanexpresstherelationthatconstitutes

property.Itisnotmaterial,itismetaphysical;itisamereconceptionofthemind.

~JeremyBentham

Metaphorsinlawaretobenarrowlywatched,forstartingasdevicestoliberatethought,theyend

oftenbyenslavingit.

~USSupremeCourtJusticeBenjaminN.Cardozo

i

ABSTRACTThisdissertationcontributestotheunderstandingofhowthesocialembeddednessofproperty

impactspost‐conflictnaturalresourcemanagementandpeacebuilding.Whiletheideaofproperty

asrightsisnaturalizedinmanycurrentdiscourses,workingwiththisideathatpropertyismerely

rightscancauseunanticipatedproblems.Thisisespeciallythecaseinpost‐conflictscenarios,

whererights‐focusedapproachestopropertydonotrecognizehowpropertyisdeeplylinkedto

socialidentity,livelihoods,andpoliticalauthority.Infact,infailingtounderstandthecomplexityof

property,rights‐focusedapproachesmayalsofailtograsphowpost‐conflictnaturalresource

managementcancontributetopeacebuildingopportunities.Thedissertationarguesthatfailureto

designpoliciesthatreflectthecomplexwaysinwhichnaturalresources,property,socialidentity,

livelihoods,andviolentconflictareinterlinkedcanunderminepost‐conflictnaturalresource

managementandleadtomissedopportunitiestosupportpeacebuilding.Usingananalytical

frameworkthatdrawskeyideasfromliteratureonproperty,post‐conflictnaturalresource

management,legalgeography,legalpluralism,andsocialidentity,thisdissertationcritically

examinesexperiencesanddebatesregardingpropertyinpost‐disaster/post‐conflictAceh,

Indonesia,from2005through2009.Researchforthisdissertationincludedsemi‐structured

interviews,focusgroups,archivalresearch,andobservationsfromfourfieldvisits(totalingfive

months)betweenAugust2006andJune2008tothecityofBandaAcehandtheregenciesofAceh

Jaya,Pidie,andAcehBarat.

Thecentraltheoreticalcontributionsofthisresearchinclude:(1)insightsintohownarratives

surroundingpropertyimpactpost‐conflictnaturalresourcemanagementpolicyandprojectdesign;

(2)areconceptualizationofthemulti‐scalarnatureofproperty;and(3)developmentofapolicy

toolthatidentifieswaysinwhichsocialidentityinteractswithnaturalresourcesandviolent

conflictinpost‐conflictscenarios.Theprimarypracticalcontributionofthisresearchistheanalysis

oflessonslearnedfromthelandtitlingprojectundertakeninpost‐disaster/post‐conflictAceh,

Indonesiaandthedistributionofthisanalysistofieldworkersandpolicymakers.

ii

RÉSUMÉCetteétudeapourbutdecomprendrecommentlesfacettessocialesdelapropriétéaffectentla

gestionderessourcesnaturellesainsiquelaconsolidationetlemaintiendelapaixenmilieuxpost‐

conflits.Bienqueleconceptdelapropriétédéfinientantquedroitssoitcommundansde

nombreuxdiscoursintellectuels,simplifierlapropriétéàdesdroitsentraînedenombreux

problèmes.Celas’avèreàêtreparticulièrementlecasdansdeszonespost‐conflitsoùdes

approchesaxéessurlesdroitslégauxnereconnaissentpascommentlesrégimesfoncierspeuvent

êtreassociésàuneidentitésociale,àdesmoyensdesubsistance,ouàuneautoritépolitique.En

ignorantlesdimensionssocialesdelapropriété,uneapprochecentréesurlesdroitsjuridiques

sous‐estimelepotentieldelagestionderessourcesnaturellescommeoutilstratégiquepour

favoriserlemaintienetlaconsolidationdelapaix.Eneffet,lathèsecentraledecetteétudesouligne

l’importanced’étudierlesinterrelationsentrelapropriété,lesressourcesnaturelles,lesidentités

socialesetlesmoyensdesubsistanceenprésencedeconflits.Ignorerceslienspeutnonseulement

minerunegestiondesressourcesnaturellesdemanièredurable,maissous‐estimel’opportunitéde

créeretconsoliderlemaintiendelapaix.Lecadreconceptueldecetterecherches’appuiesur

plusieursoutilsthéoriquestelsquelalittératuresurlesdimensionsphilosophiquesdelapropriété,

lesthéoriesenmatièredegestiondesressourcesnaturelles,lagéographieetlepluralisme

juridique,ainsiquelathéoriedel'identitésociale.Cetteétudeexaminelesexpériencesetlesdébats

concernantlapropriétédansunerégionpost‐désastre/post‐conflitenIndonésie(laprovincede

BandaAceh),de2005à2009.Cetteétudequalitativeaétéréaliséeàtraversdesentretienssemi‐

directifs,desgroupesdediscussionparticipatifsenzonesruralesetpéri‐urbaines,delarecherche

enarchives,ainsiquedel’observationdirecteàtraversquatrevisitesdeterrain(totalisantcinq

mois)entreaoût2006etjuin2008dansáBandaAcehetlesrégionsAcehJaya,PidieetAcehBarat.

Cetterechercheapporteplusieurscontributionsthéoriques,notamment:(1)uneétudesurles

discoursetrécitsconceptualisantlapropriétéetsonimpactsurlagestionderégimesfonciers;(2)

uneconceptualisationgéographiquedeladimensionmulti‐scalairedelapropriété;etfinalement,

(3)ledéveloppementd'unoutilstratégiqueidentifiantlestypesdeliensentreidentitésocialeet

ressourcesnaturellesencontextedeconflits.Finalement,cetteétudeapporteunecontribution

pratiqueàtraversuneanalyseapprofondiedesleçonstiréesduprojetderestructurationdes

régimesfonciersentreprisparlegouvernementindonésiensuiteautsunamide2004.

iii

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTSIdeeplyappreciatethetimethatthepeopleofAcehgavetomyresearchandwork.Ihopethatthis

dissertationprovidesawindowintotheirworldandvoicefortheirstruggles.

TherearenowordsthatareabletoexpressthedeepdebtofgratitudeIfeelforthelovingsupport

ofmylifepartner,ClaireTugault‐Lafleur.Thatfrigidwintereveningthatthebusnevercameand

wewalkedkilometerstogethomethroughMontrealwasthefirsttimeIknewthetruewarmthof

love.IhopethatIwillhavetheopportunitytoreturnyourloveasamplyasyouhavegiventome.

Ithankmymother,Dr.ClaudiaGreen,forprovidingmetheinspirationtopursueacareerin

educationandthebeliefthatanythingispossible.Ithankmyfather,Dr.ArthurGreenIII,for

teachingmetherootoftheword‘doctor’andforplantingacorebeliefinmethatwecanmakeour

worldabetterplace.

IthankSteveHundleyforintroducingmetotheartandscienceofgeographyandbeingagood

hikingbuddy.IthankCarolynGreenforencouragingmysenseofexplorationandloveofscience.I

thankMikeRobsonforliterallyprovidingaroofovermyheadwhileIdidthisresearch.Thanksto

myfriendSkeeforbeingtheflipofmyflop.

Myadvisor,Dr.JonUnruhexpressedhisconstantbeliefinthevalueofmyworkandprovidedme

withseveralopportunitiesoverthecourseofmyresearch–forthis,Ithankhim.

FundingforthisresearchcamefromtheMcGillMajorJ.W.McConnellFellowship,theUnitedStates‐

IndonesiaSociety(USINDO)SumitroFellowship,theIndonesianSocialEquityProjectFellowship,

andagrantfromtheInstitutefortheStudyofInternationalDevelopment.Itakeallresponsibility

forerrorsordeficienciesinthetext.

iv

TABLEOFCONTENTS

Abstract……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….iResume……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….iiAcknowledgements………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….…iiiListofFigures……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………viiListofTables………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….…ixChapterOne:Introduction...................................................................................................................................................1 

1.1ProblemStatement.....................................................................................................................................................1 

1.2ResearchContext........................................................................................................................................................5 

1.3Researchobjectives.................................................................................................................................................14 

1.4OutlineofDissertation............................................................................................................................................15 

ChapterTwo:LiteratureReviewandAnalyticalFramework.............................................................................18 

2.1Introduction................................................................................................................................................................18 

2.2Post‐ConflictNaturalResourceManagement(PCNRM)...........................................................................21 

2.2.1PCNRMandPeacebuilding...........................................................................................................................23 

2.2.2Post‐conflictPropertyIssues......................................................................................................................27 

2.3Property........................................................................................................................................................................32 

2.3.1ApproachingProperty...................................................................................................................................32 

2.3.2Juralrelations....................................................................................................................................................36 

2.3.3Narratives............................................................................................................................................................43 

2.3.4Personhood........................................................................................................................................................47 

2.4LegalGeography........................................................................................................................................................49 

2.4.1DefiningLegalGeography............................................................................................................................49 

2.4.2GeographicPerspectivesonProperty.....................................................................................................51 

2.4.3Landscape...........................................................................................................................................................57 

2.4.4Scale.......................................................................................................................................................................62 

v

2.5Socialidentity.............................................................................................................................................................67 

2.5.1SocialIdentityandArmedConflicts.........................................................................................................68 

2.5.2NaturalResourcesandArmedConflicts.................................................................................................72 

2.5.2SocialIdentities,NaturalResources,andArmedConflict...............................................................73 

2.6Conclusion....................................................................................................................................................................76 

ChapterThree:Methods.....................................................................................................................................................78 

3.1ResearchContext&SiteSelection.....................................................................................................................78 

3.2EthicalConsiderationofPost‐ConflictDataCollection.............................................................................81 

3.3DataCollectionMethods........................................................................................................................................82 

3.1DataAnalysis..............................................................................................................................................................85 

ChapterFour:TitleWave–LandTenureandPeacebuildinginAceh.............................................................89 

4.1Introduction................................................................................................................................................................90 

4.2Methods........................................................................................................................................................................94 

4.2.1DataCollection..................................................................................................................................................94 

4.2.2DataAnalysis.....................................................................................................................................................97 

4.2.3EthicalConsiderationsofPost‐ConflictDataCollection..................................................................97 

4.3ConflictandLandSecurityinAceh....................................................................................................................97 

4.3.1TenureSecurityandNormativePluralisminAceh........................................................................100 

4.3.2LandRegistrationandtheTorrensTitleSystem.............................................................................106 

4.3.3LandTenureSecurityaftertheTsunamiandSecessionistConflict.........................................109 

4.4PeacebuildinginAceh..........................................................................................................................................115 

4.5ConnectingLandTenureSecurityandPeacebuilding............................................................................117 

4.5.1LandTenureSecurityinthePeaceProcess.......................................................................................117 

4.5.2RALASandthePeaceProcess..................................................................................................................119 

4.5.3BasicNeedsandEssentialServices.......................................................................................................124 

vi

4.5.4EconomicDevelopmentandSustainableLivelihoods...................................................................125 

4.5.5ReintegrationofCombatantsandReturnandResettlementofRefugees...........................126 

4.5.6Reconciliation.................................................................................................................................................126 

4.5.7GoodGovernance..........................................................................................................................................127 

4.6Conclusion:LessonsLearned............................................................................................................................127 

ChapterFive:ScalingProperty.....................................................................................................................................130 

5.1Introduction.............................................................................................................................................................131 

5.2Property,Authority,andScalarpoliticsinPost‐ConflictContexts....................................................138 

5.2.1AuthorityandPropertyinAceh..............................................................................................................138 

5.2.2ScalarPoliticsandProperty.....................................................................................................................149 

5.2.3JuralRelations................................................................................................................................................154 

5.3StakingClaimsonTheGround.........................................................................................................................158 

5.3.1MeulabohNeighborhood...........................................................................................................................159 

5.3.2PangaVillage...................................................................................................................................................165 

5.4Discussion.................................................................................................................................................................168 

5.5Conclusion.................................................................................................................................................................175 

ChapterSix:SocialIdentity,NaturalResources,andPeacebuilding.............................................................178 

6.1Introduction.............................................................................................................................................................179 

6.2Literaturereview...................................................................................................................................................181 

6.2.1PersonhoodandConstitutiveProperty...............................................................................................182 

6.2.2SocialIdentityandArmedConflicts......................................................................................................184 

6.2.3NaturalResourcesandArmedConflicts..............................................................................................188 

6.2.4SocialIdentities,NaturalResources,andArmedConflict............................................................190 

6.3Methods.....................................................................................................................................................................193 

6.4FrameworkLinkingSocialIdentityandPCNRM......................................................................................194 

vii

6.4.1Link1:EconomicConvenience................................................................................................................195 

6.4.2Link2:LackofStateControl.....................................................................................................................196 

6.4.3Link3:IndivisibleValue.............................................................................................................................199 

6.4.4Link4:SavingFace.......................................................................................................................................204 

6.5PolicyResponses....................................................................................................................................................206 

6.6Conclusion.................................................................................................................................................................209 

ChapterSeven:Conclusion.............................................................................................................................................210 

References.............................................................................................................................................................................218 

Appendices............................................................................................................................................................................246 

AppendixI:ResearchEthicsBoardApproval....................................................................................................247 

AppendixII:ApprovalFromPublishertoUseArticlesinDissertation..................................................248 

AppendixIII:CalendarofFieldworkandPublications..................................................................................250 

AppendixIV:ExampleSemi‐StructuredInterview.........................................................................................251 

AppendixV:ExampleFocusGroupAgenda.......................................................................................................254 

AppendixVI:CodingTree..........................................................................................................................................257 

viii

LISTOFFIGURESFigure1.1IndonesiaandAceh…………………………………………………………………………………………….……….3

Figure1.2IndianOceanearthquakeandtsunamiAceh………………………………………..………………..………4

Figure1.3GAMwomensoldiersapproximately1998‐1999……………………………..……………………..……6

Figure1.4MassgravesrevealinghumanrightsabusesinAceh…………………………..…………………….….6

Figure1.5HernandodeSotoandIndonesianPresidentSusiloBambangYudhoyono.…………………11

Figure2.1LiteratureReview…………………………………………………………………………………………….…..…...19

Figure2.2AnalyticalFrameworkGuidingtheDissertation……………………………………….….….………..…20

Figure2.3The‘landscapeofproperty’…………………………………………………………………..…………………..59

Figure3.1MapofAcehshowingthefourfieldworkdistricts…………………………………….……….……....79

Figure4.1MapofAcehshowingthefourfieldworkdistricts…………………………………….……………....95

Figure4.22004ConflictEventandDisasterDamageMap..………………………………………………………..110

Figure5.1FruitstandinMeulaboh.…………………………………………………………………………………………163

Figure5.2Newbuildingsdestroyedbyfloodingin2007inMeulaboh………………………………..………163

Figure5.3Pangavillageshowingdividedricefields………………………………………….………….…..……...166

Figure7.1Sectionofthe2012electionposterforGovernorZainiAbdullahandDeputyGovernorMuzakirManaf………………………………………………………………………………………………………………..………212

ix

LISTOFTABLES Table2.1Hohfeld'sJuralCorrelatives………………………………………………………………………………………..39

Table3.1Levelofdamagecausedbyconflictandtsunami…………………………………………………….…….79

Table3.2Anexampleofthemesandfactsassociatedtonarratives……………………………….……………..87

Table4.1QuantitativeoutcomesofRALASatclosurein2009………………………………………………..…122

Table5.1QuantitativeoutcomesofRALASatclosurein2009.DataSource:WB2010…………….…137

Table5.2Hohfeld'sJuralCorrelatives………………………………………………………………………………….….156

Table6.1PCNRMPolicyOptions………………………………………………………………………………………….......208

1

CHAPTERONE:INTRODUCTION

Thepurposeofthisdissertationistoadvanceunderstandingofhowthesocialembeddednessof

propertyimpactspost‐conflictnaturalresourcemanagementandpeacebuilding.Usingananalytical

frameworkthatdrawskeyideasfromliteratureonproperty,post‐conflictnaturalresource

management(PCNRM)andpeacebuilding,legalgeography,andsocialidentity,thisdissertation

criticallyexaminesexperiencesanddebatesregardingpropertyinpost‐disaster,post‐conflictAceh,

Indonesia,duringtheperiodof2005–2009.Researchforthisdissertationincludedsemi‐structured

interviews,focusgroups,archivalresearch,andobservationsfromfourfieldvisits(totalingfive

months)betweenAugust2006andJune2008tothecityofBandaAcehandtheregenciesofAceh

Jaya,Pidie,andAcehBarat.

1.1PROBLEMSTATEMENT

Whilepost‐conflictscenariosposeuniqueopportunitiesandproblemsforresearch,propertyisa

difficultsubjecttoresearchunderanycircumstances(Unruh2003,2006;Benda‐Beckmannetal.

2006).Onereasonforthisdifficultyisthattheconceptsandpracticessurroundingpropertyare

dynamic(Benda‐Beckmannetal.2006).Propertyhasmanydiverse,contextuallydependent

meaningsfordifferentcultures,ideologies,legalsystems,socialgroups,andindividuals.Indeed,

thereisarichbodyofacademicliteraturethatexamineshowhumansunderstandandenact

property(see,forexample,Becker1977;Macpherson1978;Benda‐Beckmann1979;Bromley

1991;Radin1993;Demsetz1967;Blomley2003a,2010;Peluso2005;Benda‐Beckmannand

Benda‐Beckmann2006;Davies2007;Mansfield2007;Berry2009;GrayandGray2009;Sikorand

Lund2009).Yet,despitetherichnessofboththeoryandpracticeregardingproperty,modern

discussionaboutpropertyinacademia,policydocuments,andpublicdiscourseis“saturatedbytalk

ofrights”(Verdery2004,139).Infact,propertyisoftendefinedasa‘bundleofrights’and

discussionlimitedtothevarietyofrightsthatareincludedinthebundle(Johnson2007;Singer

2000).Whiletheideaofpropertyasrightsisnaturalizedinmanycurrentdiscourses,workingwith

theideathatpropertyismerelyrightscancauseunanticipatedproblems.Thisisespeciallythecase

inpost‐conflictscenarios,whererights‐focusedapproachestopropertydonotrecognizehow

propertyisdeeplylinkedtosocialidentity,livelihoods,andpoliticalauthority.Recentworkon

post‐conflicthousing,land,andproperty(HLP)issueshasemphasizedusingrights‐based

2

approaches(Leckie2005;UN‐HABITAT2007).However,infailingtounderstandthecomplexityof

property,rights‐focusedapproachesmayalsofailtorecognizehowPCNRMcancontributeto

peacebuilding.

Thecentralcontentionofthisdissertationisthatthinkingofpropertyasmerelyrightsisan

inadequateanalyticalapproachforresearchinpost‐conflictscenarios.Suchthinkingcreates

blindnesstothefullnatureofproperty—inparticular,tothecomplexityofnarratives;physical

incarnations;materialpractices;andjural,emotional,political,geographic,andsocialrelationsthat

constitutepropertyinpeople’sdailylives.Broadeninganalyticalapproachestopropertyrequires

examininghowpropertyisdefinedandenacted.Movingbeyondrights‐focusedapproachesto

propertyisnecessarytoadvancegeographicresearchonpropertyandtodesignpost‐conflict

policiesthatreflectthecomplexityofpropertydynamics.

Tomovebeyondinherentproblemswithrights‐focusedapproachestoproperty,Iproposean

analyticalframeworkthatidentifiesthreealternativeapproachestoproperty.Thesethree

approachesarenarratives,juralrelations,andpersonhood.Althoughthesethreeapproachesare

notexhaustiveofwaystounderstandproperty,thisframeworkprovidesaplatformdesignedto

challengeandadvancetheoryandpost‐conflictpoliciesconcerningpropertyandnaturalresource

management.Thethreeapproachesaredevelopedandexaminedthroughacasestudyofpost‐

disaster,post‐conflictpropertyissues(withafocusonlandmanagement)inAceh,Indonesiawhere

the2004IndianOceanearthquakeandtsunamistruck(seeFigures1.1and1.2).Theresultsofthis

researchincludethreemanuscriptsthatchallengerights‐focusedpolicyapproachesandreveal

uniquewaysinwhichpropertycanbetheorizedinstudiesofimbricatedsubjectssuchaspolitical

authority,PCNRM,legalgeography,andsocialidentity.Thethreemanuscriptsshowthat

broadeningofanalyticalframeworksregardingpropertyiscriticalforenhancingpropertytheory

andforunderstandingwhyspecificpost‐conflictprojectsexperiencelimitedsuccessinperforming

activitieslikeissuinglandtitles.

3

Figure1.1IndonesiaandAceh.Source:authorpublication(preparedbyM.Pritchard).

4

Figure1.2IndianOceanearthquakeandtsunami.Source:USGS.

5

Thisdissertationmakestheoreticalcontributionstotwobodiesofliterature:(1)anemergent

literatureonthetheoreticalfoundationsofPCNRMandpeacebuildingpoliciesand(2)agrowing

bodyoflegalgeographyliteraturethataddressestheoriesofproperty.Thedissertationalsomakes

apracticalcontributiontoPCNRMpolicybyusingtheproposedanalyticalframeworktooutlineand

analyzelessonslearnedfromtheimplementationofacontroversial,post‐conflict/post‐disaster

landtitlingprojectcalledtheReconstructionofAcehLandAdministrationSystem(RALAS).

1.2RESEARCHCONTEXT

TheIndonesianprovinceofAceh,alsoknownasNanggroeAcehDarussalam,encompassesthe

northerntipoftheislandofSumatra.From1976to2005,thisregionwasthesiteofasporadic

secessionistconflictbetweentheFreeAcehMovement(GerakanAcehMerdeka,orGAM)(seeFigure

1.3)andthegovernmentofIndonesia(GOI).Cyclicaloutbreaksofviolence—combinedwithlong‐

termintimidation,torture,andmaterialdispossessionofcivilians—haveclaimedsome15,000to

33,000lives,paralyzedregionaldevelopment,andpolarizedmuchofthepopulation(Reid2006;

Schulze2007).

AlthoughtheconflictinAcehhassometimesbeendepictedasbeingbasedononeormoremain

cleavages,theviolenceisactuallyaresultofacomplexmixofcontextualopportunitiesandissues.

Theseissuesincludeethnonationalterritorialclaims,adesireforlocalpoliticalautonomy,disputes

overlocaldistributionofhydrocarbonandresourcerevenues,andevenpersonalvendettas(Reid

2006;Aspinall2007;McCarthy2007;Schulze2007;Drexler2008).Addingfurthercomplexityare

theissuesofAcehneseculturalidentity,recognitionofIslamicprinciplesofgovernance,and

grievancesinvolvingjusticeandreparationsforconflict‐relatedcrimes.Theissuesandthe

conditionsthatescalatedandsupportedviolentresistanceinAcehhavechangedovertime

accordingtothestrategicagendasofchangingparticipants(Reid2006;McCarthy2007;Schulze

2007;Drexler2008).GAMdemandsforamnestyandaspecialreintegrationfundforformer

combatants,forexample,contributedtothefailureofthe2003peacenegotiations.Workingtoward

asustainablepeaceinAcehhasrequiredconfrontingthecomplexoverlapofeliteandgrassroots

grievances;dealingwithchangingparticipantsandchangingconditionsthatencourageviolent

resistance;andacknowledgingthespecialneedsofpartiesinvolvedintheviolence.

6

Figure1.3GAMwomensoldiersapproximately1998‐1999.Source:MinistryofDefenseoftheRepublicofIndonesia.

Figure1.4MassgraverevealinghumanrightsabusesinAceh.Source:Shearn&Townsend2012,online(JacquelineKoch,epa/Corbis).

7

EventhoughpreviouspeaceprocesseshavetreatedGAMandtheGOIasmonolithicrepresentatives

oftheAcehnesepeopleandtheIndonesianstate,victimsofviolenceareindicativeoftheinternal

fissureswithinandbetweenGAM,Acehnesecivilsociety,theIndonesianmilitary,andtheGOI

(Drexler2008).Thesefissures,whichoftenescapeconflictanalyses,contributedtofailedpeace

negotiationsandcontinuetoposeobstaclestoasustainablepeace.AsDrexler(2008,20)notes,

“observationsoftheAcehconflictoverthelasttenyearsshowthatoversimplifiedanalysesof

conflictsextendandevenintensifyviolence”.

Disregardoftheinternalcomplexitiessupportspoliticizednarrativesofgroupidentities—

narrativesthathavebeenusedtounderminecertainplayersandlegitimizeothersintheconflictin

Aceh.Forexample,whilesomenarrativesfindtherootsoftheconflictandofGAMinanearly

unbrokenhistoryofarmedresistancetocolonialDutch,Japanese,andIndonesianforcessince

1873,othersidentifyGAMasacriminalorganizationwhosegoalshavelittleconnectiontothis

historicalresistance(Reid2006;Nessen2006;Drexler2008).However,theconflictinAcehis

complexandcannotbereducedtoaconflictbasedonanysingleissuebetweentwomonolithic

parties.Analysesoftheconflictandprogressinpeacebuildingmustrecognizethattheactors

involvedinandthereasonsforcontinuedviolenceinAcehhaveevolvedduringthe29‐yearconflict.

Likewise,analysisofpropertyissuesrequiresrecognizingthatthesechangingpoliticalnarratives

haveinfluencedapproachestopropertyandlandmanagement.Asof2013,thehumanrights

abusesthatoccurredthroughoutmuchofAcehhavestillnotbeenadequatelyinvestigated,despite

clearevidenceofmassacres(seeFigure1.4)andatrocitiescommittedonciviliansbythe

Indonesianmilitary(TNI),GAM,andothersmallerseparatistsgroups(AI2013).Inadditiontothe

above,widespreaddispossessionanddestructionofpropertyoccurredduringthe29‐yearconflict

(Wongetal.2007).Thewayinwhichconflict‐relateddamagetopropertyhasbeentreatedhas

beeninfluencedbythesenarratives.

ThesigningoftheMemorandumofUnderstanding(HelsinkiMOU)betweentheGovernmentofthe

RepublicofIndonesiaandtheFreeAcehMovementinFinland,inAugust2005markedtheendof

themostrecentperiodofviolenceinAceh,anditisthestartingpointforthisstudy’sinvestigation

8

ofproperty,landtenuresecurityandpeacebuilding.1TheHelsinkiMOUsigningwasinextricably

linkedwiththe2004IndianOceantsunami.Althoughthetsunamiwasonlyoneofmanyfactors

leadingtotheendofviolence,itsmassivedestructionsetthestageforthepeaceprocessby

changingimmediatepoliticalandmilitarystrategiesandtheregion’seconomic,social,and

ecologicallandscape(LeBillonandWaizenegger2007;Gaillardetal.2008).

On26December2004,amassiveearthquakeandtsunamistrucklowlandcommunitiesinAceh.A

tragedyofinconceivableproportionsemergedinthefollowingdays,withreportsofsome167,000

peoplekilledormissingand500,000moredisplacedandhomelessintheAcehregionalone(BRR

2005;USAID2005).Inresponsetothetragedy,internationalaidanddevelopmentworkerspoured

intoAcehtoprovideimmediateassistancefortherecoveryandto‘reconstruct’whattheybelieved

weretheinfrastructuralhallmarksofadevelopedeconomyandcivilsociety.Inresponsetothe

tragedy,anestimatedUSD7.2‐7.7billionwaspledgedtoAcehbyinternationaldonorsandtheGOI

(MasyrafahandMcKeon2008;BRR2009).

Yetthereweremanydifficulties—bothanticipatedandunanticipated—thatchallengeddisaster

recoveryandreconstruction.Progresswasmostobviouslyhamperedbythemagnitudeof

devastation,includingthesubstantiallossofhumancapacityandthedifficultyofallocating

materialresourcesforthereconstructionofbothbasiclegaldocumentationandphysical

infrastructuresuchasroadsandbuildings.Renderingthissituationevenmoredifficultwasthat

Acehwasbothapost‐disasterandpost‐conflictscenario,whereinconflictingdevelopmentand

politicalagendascompetedatmultiplescales.

Atthetimeofthetsunami,fewinternationalaidanddevelopmentworkerscouldhaveunderstood

howthecomplexitiesofanaturaldisasterandviolentconflictinAcehmightbeinterlinked.Many

internationalaidanddevelopmentworkershadlittlespecificknowledgeofregionalpoliticsandthe

culturalcontextofAceh(BurkeandAfnan2005).Thislackofcontext‐specificknowledgewas

understandable.Atthetimethetsunamistruck,Acehwasalmostcompletelyclosedtodevelopment

agenciesandwasknownintheoutsideworldforprimarilythreethings:substantialoffshore

hydrocarbonreserves,astrongIslamicheritage,andanearlythirty‐yearseparatistwarbetween

theGovernmentofIndonesia(GOI)andtheFreeAcehMovement(GAM,GerakanAcehMerdeka)1ForthecompletetextoftheHelsinkiMOU,seewww.aceh‐mm.org/download/english/Helsinki%20MoU.pdf

9

(Ross2005;Reid2006).Whileaworkingunderstandingoftheregionandconflictcouldbe

establishedvialocalsourcesandexistingacademicpublicationsontheregionalhistory,

understandinghowtologisticallyapproachandframethesimultaneousnaturaldisasterand

ongoingviolentconflictprovedtobemoredifficult.In2005,therewerenobestpracticeguidesfor

situationswhereinnaturaldisastersandpeacebuildingeffortsoccursimultaneously.Aswell,there

waslittleacademicandpolicyworkthatrecognizedthecomplexityofcasesinwhichnatural

disastersinfluencedviolentconflictsandpeacebuilding(Comfort2000).Thelackoflocal

knowledge,thelackoftheoreticalandpolicyframeworksforunderstandingthesimultaneous

naturaldisasterandviolentconflict,andthelackofcrossovertechnicalskillsamongaidworkers

ledtoseparatestreamsofpost‐conflictandpost‐disasterprojectsthatrarelycalledforcoordinated

activitiesorprojectdesigns(BurkeandAfnan2008;WaizeneggerandHyndman2010;Hyndman

2011;Phelpsetal.2011).

Ofcourse,someofthesituationallinkagesbetweenthetsunamiandconflictinAcehwere

immediatelypointedout.Newsmedia,developmentworkers,researchers,andgovernmentofficials

spokeof‘disasterdiplomacy’astheyarguedthatthetsunamiimpactscreatedconditionsthat

facilitatedtheeventualceasefireandtheMemorandumofUnderstanding(MoU)thatendedthe

separatistwarinAugust2005(LeBillonandWaizenegger2007;Gaillardetal.2008).Yetthe

complexwaysinwhichdifferentpost‐conflictandpost‐disasterprojectswouldinteractwitheach

otherandwiththesocial,cultural,andpoliticallandscapewerefarfromclearin2005andarestill

beingstudiedseveralyearsafterthedisaster(WaizeneggerandHyndman2010;Hyndman2011;

Phelpsetal.2011).Thisdissertationcriticallyexamineshowpropertyissuesweredealtwithinthis

complexsituation.

ThetsunamiadverselyimpactedpropertymanagementinAcehinnumerousways.Accordingto

estimates,some300,000landparcels,250,000homes,over2,000schools,10,000kilometersof

roads,and15percentofagriculturallandswereseverelydamagedordestroyedbytheearthquake

andtsunami(Fitzpatrick2005;Kennyetal.2006;Abidinetal.2006).Thedeathsofthosewhohad

localknowledgeofpropertyholdingsandofforty‐onegovernmentemployeeswhohadmanaged

thestatepropertyrecords,aswellasthelossoftraditionalpropertymarkers,thedestructionof

statepropertyrecords,andtheunclearstatusofthepropertyrightsoforphansandwomen,led

manyorganizationsinvolvedinAcehtoseelandtenureinsecurityasacentralthreattothe

10

sustainablerecoveryandfuturedevelopmentoftheregion.Therewasconsensusamong

internationaldevelopmentorganizations,thegovernmentofIndonesian(GOI),andnon‐

governmentalorganizations(NGOs)thatidentifyingpropertyowners,adjudicatingdisaster‐related

propertydisputes,anddemarcatingandregisteringlandwiththestatewerecriticallogistical

hurdles–bothforimmediaterecoveryandforthefutureestablishmentofafunctioningeconomyin

Aceh(WB2006).Asaresult,internationaldevelopmentorganizations,theGOI,andmanyNGOs

framedpropertyissuesprimarilyaspost‐disasterchallengesanddidnotmakesubstantial

connectionsbetweenpropertyissuesandpost‐conflictdynamics.Thenarrativethatdeveloped,on

thebasisoftheseearlyimpressions,wasthattherewereveryfewpost‐conflictpropertyissues

(Fitzpatrick2005).However,giventhatrebelstrongholdswerespatiallydistributedthroughoutthe

highlandsandlowlands,andthatthetsunamiprimarilyimpactedthelowlands,thispost‐disaster

narrativeregardingpropertyissueswouldprovetobetoosimplistic.

Inadditiontothenarrativethatframedpropertyissuesexclusivelyaspost‐disasterchallenges,

problemsarosefromaspecificconceptualizationofpropertythatbecameprevalentinAcehduring

therecoveryandreconstructionperiod.TheWorldBank,theGOI,andinternationalorganizations

promulgatedavisionofpropertythatwasdrawndirectlyfromandfollowedthepolicy

prescriptionsofHernandodeSoto’sapproachtoproperty,landmanagement,andcapitalism(de

Soto2000)(seeFigure1.5).DeSotoarguesthatthestatemusthelppeoplerealizethepotentialof

theirinformalmaterialassetsbyissuingthemstatutorytitlesforsuchassets(deSoto2000).De

Sototakesarights‐focusedapproachtopropertythatemphasizestheeconomicvalueofmaterial

assets,therighttotransferthoseassets,andtheroleofthestateasprimaryguarantorof

individuals’propertyrights.ItisanextensionofwhatJosephSingercallsa“misleadingandmorally

deficient”ownershipmodelofproperty,whereinpropertyisextractedfromitssocialrelationsand

definedsimplyasabundleofrights(Singer2000,6).Indeed,becausedeSotoreducespropertytoa

singleright(itsabilitytobetransferredincapitalmarkets)andsimplylabelsallnon‐statutory

propertyrelationsandpracticesas‘deadcapital’,onecouldarguethatthistheorydoesnottruly

recognizepropertyoutsideofstatutorypropertyentitlements.Whilestatutoryrecognitionof

propertyrightsandthepossessionofstatutorytitlecanbeliberatingformanyindividualsandmay

openuptheabilitytotransferproperty,deSoto’stheoryhasbeencriticizedasbeinginappropriate

11

Figure1.5HernandodeSotoandIndonesianPresidentSusiloBambangYudhoyono.Intheimmediateaftermathofthetsunami,deSoto’sapproachtopropertywascitedasthebasisforwork

inAceh.Hereheishandinghisbook“TheMysteryofCapital”tothepresident.Source:TheAge.

forpost‐conflictandruralareas,wherelandtransfersarenottheprimaryfunctionofproperty,and

propertyrightsarenotbestguaranteedbycorrupt,illegitimate,orineffectivestateinstitutions.

Underlyingthesecriticismsistheawarenessthatthistheoryismoreconcernedwiththeblanket

recognitionoflegalrightsoftransferthanwithrecognizingthecomplexsocialembeddednessof

property(HomeandLim2004;Otto2009).Infact,scholarsarguethatitistheverylogicofde

Soto’sapproachthatunderliesmanyapproachestolandtitlingthathavedispossessedsome

marginalizedcommunitiesofthepropertyrightsthatstatutorylandtitlingissupposedto

guarantee(Elyachar2005;Davis2006).

InthecaseofAceh,deSoto’slogicwasrealizedinthedesignandimplementationofthe

ReconstructionofAcehLandAdministrationSystem(RALAS)project.Inresponsetotheperceived

12

urgencyofresolvingthebroadarrayofpropertyissuesthatwereoftensimplylabeledas‘land

tenureinsecurity’,theMultiDonorTrustFundforAcehandNias(MDTF)focusedthefirstoftheir

23projectsintheregiononsupportingtheregistrationandtitlingoflandparcels.2InJune2005,

thefundestablishedabudgetofUS$28.5millionforRALAS,astate‐administeredlandtitling

project.AlthoughRALASwasfundedthroughthepooledcontributionsofmanyinternational

donors,itwasdirectlyadministeredthroughtheNationalLandAgency(BadanPeranahanNasional

orBPN),wassubjecttoIndonesiannationalpropertylawsregardinglandandnaturalresources,

andwaslinkedtoactivitiesofthenationalagencymeanttopresideoverthetsunamirecovery

knownastheAgencyforRehabilitationandReconstruction(BadanRehabilitasidanRekonstruksior

BRR).Aspropertyissueswereframedaspost‐disasterissues,RALASwascreatedtodealwith

naturaldisasterimpactsonproperty.TheRALASprojectbeganinAugust2005withthegoalof

issuing600,000titleswhileencouragingcommunityparticipationinthetitlinganddispute

adjudicationprocessandguaranteeingprotectionofthepropertyrightsoforphansandwomen.

TheRALASprojectwastheequivalentofaposterchildfortherecovery,reconstruction,

developmenteffortsinAceh.EvenformerUSPresidentBillClinton,servingastheUNSpecialEnvoy

toAceh,extolledthisprojectandrecognizedtheinfluenceofdeSoto’stheoryincreatingtheRALAS

projectnotjustforAcehbutasaprototypeforlandtitlingprojectsaroundtheworld:

Those of you familiar with the work of Mr. (Hernando) de Soto around the world andsimilarprojectsknowthattheworld’spoorpeoplehaveroughly5trilliondollarsinassetsthataretotallyunusableforeconomicgrowthbecausetheydon’thavetitletothemsotheycan’t get credit using what they own as collateral. This is going to be done through theWorldBankgrantinAceh.ItisveryforwardthinkingonboththepartoftheWorldBankandIndonesiabutIhopethattheothercountriesaffectedwilldothatandinitspursuitoftheMillenniumDevelopmentGoals,Ihopethatyou,Mr.PresidentandECOSOC,canhaveaninfluence in urging this sort of project tobedone in other countries outside the tsunamiaffectedareas.~BillClintonJuly2005(Bell2006)

Despitetheabovesupport,RALASexperiencedonlylimitedsuccessinissuinglandtitles.By2009

whenRALASclosed,fewerthan223,000oftheintended600,000landtitleshadbeenissues‐the

2TheWorldBankservedastrusteeoftheMultiDonorTrustFundforAcehandNias(MDTF)‐apartnershipoftheIndonesiangovernmentandtheinternationalcommunitytosupporttherecoveryfollowingthetsunami.Thefundcoordinatedcontributionsfrom15donors:theEuropeanCommission,theNetherlands,UnitedKingdom,WorldBank,Sweden,Denmark,Norway,Germany,Canada,Belgium,Finland,AsiaDevelopmentBank(ADB),UnitedStates,NewZealandandIreland.

13

majorityofwhichwereconcentratedinurbanareas(WB2010).Nearly50percentoftherecipients

oftitlecertificateswhowereinterviewedinalarge‐scaleprojectassessmentofRALASdidnotfeel

thatthecertificatehadimprovedtheirtenuresecurity(Deutsch2009).Likewise,halfofthese

respondentsalsorecognizedthatthecommunitydemarcationandadjudicationactivitieshadnot

beenfair,especiallywithregardtowomen’srights,duetotheinternalpowerdynamicsthat

dominatedsuchsessions.NotonlydidRALASfailtoresolvemanyofthelingeringdisputesover

property,severaldisputeswerecausedbyerrorsoflandmeasurementorinadequaterecordingof

ownershipinformationonthetitles.Inaddition,aplethoraofotherissuesbegantounderminethe

ideathatstatutorylandtitlesguaranteedtenuresecurity,suchasthegovernment’sroleinland

management,theclarificationoflandtransmissiondetails,themistreatmentofwomen’sclaimsto

propertyrightsevenafterissueofthetitlecertificates,andtheprospectoffuturetransfercostsand

taxesthatremaineduncleartoalargeportionoftheresidentsofAceh(Fitzpatrick2008a;Jaliletal.

2008;Deutsch2009).

TheexperiencessurroundingpropertyandlandmanagementinAcehduring2005‐2009pointto

problemsinthewaythatpropertywasmanagedinthisparticularpost‐disaster,post‐conflict

scenario.However,theseexperiencesalsoindicatebroaderissuesregardinghowweconceptualize

propertyandwhetherpost‐conflictpolicymakersorresearchershaveadequateanalyticaltoolsto

confrontthecomplexityofthesocialembeddednessofpropertyinwaysthatencourage

peacebuildingefforts.Viewedthroughanarrow,rights‐focusedapproachtoproperty,theinability

ofRALAStomeetitslandtitlinggoalcansimplybeblamedonbureaucraticfailures.Yet,the

researchinthisdissertationrevealsthatduring2005‐2009,manypeopleinAcehquestionedwhy

statutorylandtitleswereprioritizedbyinternationalinstitutionsastheonlyroutetotenure

securityinaseparatistregionwheredistrustofGovernmentofIndonesia(GOI)representatives

wasstillpalpableandwidespread.Aswell,theregionhasatleastthreestronglegaltraditionsthat

complementeachother(Islamiclaw,adat,andstatutorylaw)andarecommonlyusedtomanage

propertyandprovidetenuresecurityinlocalcommunities.Asaresult,peoplequestionedwhy

statutorytitlesshouldoverruleallothertraditions.Indeed,someNGOandinternational

developmentworkersopenlyquestionedwhethertheRALASlandtitlingprojectwassimplya

governmentlandandtaxgrabmeanttobringtheterritoryoftheseparatistregionunderthe

administrativecontroloftheGOI.Theresearchinthisdissertationrevealsthatmanipulating

14

propertyinpost‐conflictregionsisapotentstrategyfororganizingandconsolidatingpolitical

authority.UsingthelandtitlingcaseofAceh,Idevelopananalyticalframeworktoexplorehow

propertywasdefinedandenacted,providealternativewaysofapproachingpost‐conflictproperty

policyandPCNRM,andcontributetoresearchapproachestopropertyinlegalgeography.

1.3RESEARCHOBJECTIVES

Thisdissertationhasthreeobjectivesthateachlinktothedissertationaimanddrawfromoneor

moreofthethreeapproachesofpropertyoutlinedintheanalyticalframework.Eachofthe

objectivesisalsodirectlylinkedtooneofthethreemanuscriptsthatconstituteChapterFour,

ChapterFive,andChapterSixofthisdissertation.Thethreeobjectivesare:

1. Identifyhowtheframingofpropertyissuesbyindividualsandorganizationsactivein

post‐disaster/post‐conflictrecoveryandreconstructionimpactedthedesign,

implementation,andoutcomesoftheland‐titlingprojectReconstructionofAcehLand

AdministrationSystem(RALAS)(ChapterFour).Toachievethisobjective,Iusethe

‘narrative’approachtopropertyquestionwhypropertyissueswereframedaspost‐disaster

ratherthanpost‐conflictissues.

2. Examinehowpoliticalauthorityinteractswithpropertythroughscalarpolitics

(ChapterFive).Toachievethisobjective,Iusethe‘juralrelations’approachtopropertyto

examinehowpropertyandlandmanagementarelinkedtothedynamicsofauthority

throughscalarpoliticsinpost‐conflictscenarios.

3. Developapolicytoolintegratingthecomplexityofthesocialembeddednessof

propertyintothedesignofpractical,post‐conflictnaturalresourcemanagementand

peacebuildingpolicyoptions(ChapterSix).Toachievethisobjective,Iapplythe

‘personhood’approachtopropertytoanexaminationofthenexusofsocialidentity,

property(landandothernaturalresources),andpeacebuilding.

15

1.4OUTLINEOFDISSERTATION

Thisdissertationcontainssevenchapters,threeofwhicharestandalonemanuscriptsthathave

beenorwillbepublishedinpeer‐reviewedoutlets(ChaptersThree,Four,andFive).Asoutlined

above,eachoftheobjectivesislinkedtooneofthreemanuscripts.Atthetimeofpresentationof

thisdissertation,bothChapterFourandChapterSixhavebeenpublishedaschaptersinpeer‐

reviewed,editedbooks.AmodifiedandshortenedversionofChapterFourwasalsopublishedina

peer‐reviewedjournal.ChapterFourhasbeensubmittedforpublicationasajournalarticle.Details

aboutpublicationsareincludedatthebeginningofeachchapter.Themanuscriptshavebeenkept

ascloseaspossibletotheirpublishedformat,sosomeelementsoftheliteraturereviewfoundin

ChapterTworeappearineachofthemanuscripts.Inaddition,thereissomereplicationinthe

coverageofmethodsineachmanuscript.Thestructureofthedissertationandcontentofeach

chapterissummarizedbelow.

InChapterTwo,Ireviewliteraturethatprovidesthefoundationofthedissertation’sanalytical

frameworkandsituatethedissertation’sresearchquestionswithinongoinglegalgeographyand

post‐conflictresearchregardingproperty.

InChapterThree,Iprovideanoverviewofthemethodsusedtogatherandanalyzedatainthe

dissertationaswellassomeoftheissuesencounteredinthefieldthatareuniquetopost‐conflict

andpost‐disasterresearch.

ChapterFourconsistsofthefirstmanuscriptandcorrespondstothedissertation’sfirstobjective.

Thischapterprovidesgeographicandhistoricalcontextonthecasestudyusedinthedissertation.I

overviewthepost‐disasterandpost‐conflictscenarioinAceh,outlinepropertysystemsinAceh,

andprovideadescriptionofRALAS.Whilethismanuscriptprovidesdetailedbackground

informationforthedissertation,italsoincludesacriticalexaminationoftheimpactsthatresulted

fromframingpropertyasonlyapost‐disasterandnotasapost‐conflictissue.Ininvestigatinghow

propertyissueswereframed,thischapterengageswiththe‘narrative’approachtopropertythat

drawsfromCarolRose’s(1994)workonproperty.Theconceptsofpropertiedlandscapesand

evidencelandscapesareexploredaswaystooperationalizepropertynarratives.Iarguethatthe

narrativesframingofpropertyissuesasapost‐disasterproblemwerelinkedtobothlogistical

16

efficacyandpoliticalauthoritydynamics;ledtopoliciesthatfailedtoconsiderthenexusof

property,land,socialidentity,andpoliticalauthorityinaseparatistregion;impactedthesuccessof

RALASinissuinglandtitles;andledtomissedopportunitiesforpost‐conflictlandmanagementto

contributetopeacebuildingintheregion.

ChapterFiveconsistsofthesecondmanuscriptandcorrespondstothedissertation’ssecond

objective.Inthischapter,Ioverviewgeographicliteraturelinkingproperty,politicalauthority,

andscalarpolitics.Iusethe‘juralrelations’approachtoproperty.DrawingfromWesley

NewcombHohfeld’s(1913)frameworkofjuralrelationsandJosephSinger’s(2000)workon

obligations,Iexaminehowtheformalizationofpropertyrights(entitlements)instatutory

systemsfundamentallychangesthewaysinwhichpropertyisdefinedandenacted.Usingthis

framework,Iexaminehowpropertyandpoliticalauthorityinteractthroughscalarpolitics

throughtwocasestudiesoflandtitlingexperiencesthatoccurredbetween2005‐2009inarural

villageandanurbanneighborhoodinAceh,Indonesia.Iarguethatthattheinteractionof

propertyandscalarpoliticsisimportanttotheconsolidationofauthority.Ioutlinehow

recognitionofscalarpoliticsandjuralrelationsofpropertyprovidepolicymakersinsightinto

appropriatetiming,locations,andproceduresforlandtitlinginpost‐conflictscenarios.

ChapterSixconsistsofthethirdmanuscriptandcorrespondstothedissertation’sthirdobjective.

Inthisfinalmanuscript,Iapplythe‘personhood’approachtopropertytoanexaminationofthe

nexusofsocialidentity,property,andpeacebuilding.Thisapproachtopropertydrawsfrom

MargaretJaneRadin’s(1993)theoryonpersonhoodtoemphasizethemutuallyconstitutive

connectionsbetweenpropertyandsocialidentity.Thischapterincludesanoverviewofsocial

identityliteratureinrelationtoviolentconflictandnaturalresources.Iargueagainstmodelsthat

relyprimarilyontheeconomicvalueofnaturalresourcestodesignandimplementPCNRMplans

andleveragepeacebuildingefforts.Drawingoninsightsfromthisdissertation’sresearchon

propertyinAcehaswellascasestudiesonseveralotherpost‐conflictscenariosinvolvingsocial

identityandnaturalresourcemanagement,Iarguethatsocialidentitiesareflexibleframeswith

complexandmutuallytransformativelinkagestopropertyandconflictdynamics.Iproposeapolicy

toolwithrelatedpolicyoptionsforappropriatenaturalresourcemanagementandpeacebuilding

17

policiesthatrecognizethesocialembeddednessofproperty—particularlythecomplexlinkages

betweensocialidentity,property,andconflictdynamics.

ChapterSevenconcludesthedissertationwithanoutlineofthepracticalandtheoretical

contributionsoftheresearchundertaken.Thecentraltheoreticalcontributionsofthisresearch

include:(1)insightsintohownarrativessurroundingpropertyimpactPCNRMpolicyandproject

design;(2)areconceptualizationofthemulti‐scalarnatureofproperty;and(3)developmentofa

policytoolthatidentifieswaysinwhichsocialidentityinteractswithnaturalresourcesandviolent

conflictinpost‐conflictscenarios.3Theprimarypracticalcontributionsofthisresearchincludethe

recommendations(locatedattheendofeachmanuscript)forpost‐conflictlandtitleproject

planningandPCNRMpolicy.Toconclude,Ireviewlimitationsofthedissertationandmake

recommendationsforfutureresearch.

3Thislattercontributiononsocialidentityisapolicytoolthatisanoutcomeoftheresearchundertakeninthisdissertation,itisnottheanalyticalframeworkusedforframingtheactualdissertationresearch.

18

CHAPTERTWO:LITERATUREREVIEWANDANALYTICALFRAMEWORK

2.1INTRODUCTION

Inthischapter,Iintroduceandcritiqueliteraturethatprovidesthefoundationofthedissertation’s

analyticalframeworkandsituatesthedissertationwithincurrentpost‐conflictnaturalresource

management(PCNRM)andlegalgeographyresearch.Iarguethatconceptualizingpropertyas

merelyrightsisaninadequateapproachforresearchandpropertymanagementinpost‐conflict

environments.Alternativestorights‐focusedapproachestopropertyarenecessarytoappreciate

thesocial‐embeddednessofproperty,advancegeographicresearchonproperty,anddesignpost‐

conflictpoliciesthatreflectthecomplexityofpropertydynamics.

Theanalyticalframeworkisinformedbyfourbodiesofliterature:PCNRM,property,legal

geography,andsocialidentity.Figure2.1providesaroadmapidentifyingkeythemesfromeach

bodyofliterature.Aspreviouslydiscussed,thepurposeofthisdissertationistoadvance

understandingofhowthesocial‐embeddednessofpropertyimpactsPCNRMandpeacebuilding.

Figure2.2outlinestheanalyticalframeworkandillustrateshowconceptsdrawnfromtheliterature

relatetothethreeobjectivesofthedissertation.Thethreeobjectivesoutlinethreealternative

approachestoproperty,eachexploredwithinthecontextofPCNRMand,morespecifically,land

managementissuesinAceh.

Inthenextsection,IintroducetheemergingfieldofPCNRMliterature(Section2.2).Throughout

thedissertation,PCNRMliteratureprovidesthecontextthroughwhichIexplorethelinksbetween

peacebuildingandpropertyissues.Ofthemanyresourcesthatareimpactedbyconflicts,Ifocuson

land.Landmanagementisoneoftheprimaryavenuesthroughwhichproblematicpropertyissues

ariseinpost‐conflictsettingsanditisthewindowthroughwhichthisresearchonpropertytakes

place.InSection2.3,Iexplaintheintellectualevolutionofthenotionofpropertyasa‘bundleof

rights’andoutlinethreealternativeapproachestoproperty:juralrelations,personhood,and

narrative.AsnotedinFigure2.1,thetheoreticalandpracticalimplicationsofeachofthesethree

approachesareexploredinthreerespectiveresultschapters.Forexample,inChapterFour,the

narrativeapproachisusedtoexplorehowpost‐disasterandpost‐conflictnarrativesregarding

propertyimpactedpeacebuilding.InSection2.4,Ioverviewapproachestopropertyingeography

19

andoutlinehowlegalgeographyunderstandingsofpropertiedlandscapes,evidencelandscapes,

andscalarpoliticscanbeusedtooperationalizealternativeapproachestopropertyinpost‐conflict

scenarios.InSection2.5,Idefinehowthisdissertationapproachessocialidentityasaframing

processandIoverviewliteraturethatontheinteractionsofsocialidentity,armedconflict,natural

resources,andproperty.

Figure2.1LiteratureReview

•PCNRM and Peacebuilding (Bruch et al. 2008)

• Post‐Conflict Land Tenure (Unruh 2003)

Post‐Conflict Natural Resource Management

• Jural Relations (Hohfield 1913,1917) (Singer 2000)

•Narratives (Rose 1994)

• Personhood (Radin 1993)

Property

•Propertied Landscapes (Blomley 1998)

• Evidence Landscapes (Unruh 2006)

• Scalar Politics (Mackinnon 2011)

Legal Geography

• Social Identity Theory (Tajfel and Turner 1979)

Social Identity

BodyofLiterature Chapter4 Chapter4 Chapter6

PCNRMPeacebuildingandNRM

Post‐ConflictLandTenure

PeacebuildingandNRM

Post‐ConflictLandTenure

PeacebuildingandNRM

Post‐ConflictLandTenure

Property Narratives JuralRelations Personhood

LegalGeography PropertiedLandscape

EvidenceLandscape

ScalarPolitics

SocialIdentity SocialIdentityTheory

Objective1

Identifyhowtheframingofpropertyissuesbyindividualsandorganizationsactiveinpost‐disaster/post‐conflictrecoveryandreconstruction

impactedthedesign,implementation,andoutcomes

oftheland‐titlingprojectRALAS.

Objective2

Examinehowpoliticalauthorityinteractswithpropertythroughscalar

politics.

Objective3

Developapolicytoolintegratingthecomplexityofthesocial

embeddednessofpropertyintothedesignofpracticalPCNRMandpeacebuildingpolicyoptions.

Figure2.2AnalyticalFrameworkGuidingtheDissertation

21

2.2POST‐CONFLICTNATURALRESOURCEMANAGEMENT(PCNRM)

Emergingpublicationsonpost‐conflictnaturalresourcemanagement(PCNRM)and

peacebuildinghascreatedacorpusofliteraturethatdrawsinsightsfromseveraldisciplines

includingeconomics,anthropology,peacestudies,law,politicalscience,andgeography

(JensenandLonergan2011;LujalaandRustad2011).Thisdissertationcontributestothis

growingcorpusofliteraturebyusinggeographicapproachestoconceptssuchaslandscape

andscaletoexaminehowconflictingapproachestopropertyinfluencePCNRM.

Theimportanceofnaturalresourcesandenvironmentalfactorsinarmedconflicthaslong

beenrecognized.Theenvironmentasthelocationofconflictposeslogisticalchallenges;

conflictgroupsmaystrategicallydestroyordamagenaturalresourcestocks;andnatural

resourcesarecriticalforfinancing,recruitment,andmilitarystrategy(Galeano1973;Dyer

2005;Yergin1991;Ettenetal.2008).Yet,academicdebateovertopicsinenvironmental

security,resourcewars,andenvironmentalconflictrevealthatlinksbetweennatural

resourcesandarmedconflictaredeeperthansimplylogisticsandmilitarystrategy

(Gleditsch1998;Ross2004;Dalby2007;O’LearandDiehl2007).Thesocialcontextsthat

establishthevalueanddefinitionof‘resources’andthecharacteristicsofthoseresources

themselvesmaycontributetotheonsetandescalationofarmedconflict,sustainand

financeconflict,andimpactpeacebuildingefforts(LeBillon2001a;UNEP2009;Bruchetal.

2008).Disputesandgrievancesovernaturalresourcesarerarelytheuniquecauseofarmed

conflict,thoughthey“contributetoarmedconflictwhentheyoverlapwithotherfactors,

suchasethnicpolarization,highlevelsofinequity,poverty,injusticeandpoorgovernance”

(UNEP2012,8).Aswell,thecomplexityofthelinkagesbetweenarmedconflictandnatural

resourcesposechallengestoframingtheresearchfield.AsGleditsch(1998)pointsout,

posingappropriateresearchquestionsfordifferentscalesofanalysisandfordifferent

methodologicalapproachesisanongoingchallenge.Sincethe1990s,scholarsworkingon

theseissueshavegeneratedarichliteratureoutliningthemulti‐dimensionalwaysinwhich

naturalresourcesandconflictinteract(Ross2004).Forexample,therearedebatesover

waysinwhichenvironmentalstressandresourcescarcity(Homer‐Dixon1994;Gleditsch

1998),theabundanceofhighvalueresources(CollierandHoefller1998;WattsandPeluso

2001;Fearon2005;BrunnschweilerandBulte2009),spatialandtemporalcharacteristics

22

ofresources(LeBillon2001),andgrievancesoverperceivedinequitiesofrentsfrom

resourceexploitation(CollierandHoefller1998;Aspinall2007)impacttheonset,duration,

andstrategiesandtacticsusedinarmedconflicts.Thesetheoreticaldebateshaveledto

appliedpolicyinterventionsthat,forinstance,haveattemptedtolimitrebelfinancingfor

armedconflictbystoppingtradeindiamonds(LeBillon2008).Infact,theUNSecurity

Councilhasexplicitlyrecognizedtheroleofnaturalresourcesinconflictsandpost‐conflict

scenarios.4

Incontrast,thewaysinwhichnaturalresourcescanplayaroleinpeacebuildingefforts

havereceivedlessattention.(Bruchetal.2008).Yet,astheUNEP(2009,5)observes,“the

recognitionthatenvironmentalandnaturalresourcescancontributetoarmedconflictonly

underscorestheirpotentialsignificanceasapathwayforcooperationandconfidence‐

buildinginwar‐tornsocieties”.Therealizationthatnaturalresourcemanagementplays“a

pivotalroleinthetransitionofpost‐conflictsocietiestowardslastingpeace”hasledtocalls

fortheoreticallyinformedresearchtogenerateappliedpolicyrecommendations(Bruchet

al.2008,58).Infact,Bruchetal.(2008,58)arguethat“thereisnoeffectiveconceptual

framework(orframeworks)foranalyzing,explaining,orunderstandingtheroleofnatural

resourcesinpost‐conflictpeacebuilding.”BuildingeffectiveframeworksforPCNRM

requiresidentifyingcommonchallengesandthemeswhilealsodevelopingdetailed

approachesforspecificresourcesectorsandresourcetypes(JensenandLonergan2011;

LujalaandRustad2011;UNEP2012).

4S/PRST/2007/22:89Maintenanceofinternationalpeaceandsecurity:naturalresourcesandconflict.“TheSecurityCouncilrecallstheprinciplesoftheCharteroftheUnitedNationsandinparticulartheSecurityCouncil’sprimaryresponsibilityforthemaintenanceofinternationalpeaceandsecurity.Inthisrespect,theSecurityCouncilrecognizestherolethatnaturalresourcescanplayinarmedconflictandpost‐conflictsituations[…]Moreover,theSecurityCouncilnotesthat,inspecificarmedconflictsituations,theexploitation,trafficking,andillicittradeofnaturalresourceshaveplayedaroleinareaswheretheyhavecontributedtotheoutbreak,escalationorcontinuationofarmedconflict.TheSecurityCouncil,throughitsvariousresolutions,hastakenmeasuresonthisissue,morespecificallytopreventillegalexploitationofnaturalresources,especiallydiamondsandtimber,fromfuellingarmedconflictsandtoencouragetransparentandlawfulmanagementofnaturalresources,includingtheclarificationoftheresponsibilityofmanagementofnaturalresources”

23

Conceptualclarityisrequiredfordevelopingeffectiveanalyticalframeworks.Kalyvas

(2006)recognizesthatviolence,conflict,andwarareoftenconfoundedinpopularand

scholarlyaccountseventhoughtheyexpressconceptsthatareanalyticallydifferent.There

isalsoconsiderableconfusionoverterminologyinthefieldofconflictandpeacestudies

withwelloverahundreddifferentwaysofclassifyingtypesofconflict(Ramsbosthametal.

2005)andseveraldifferentdefinitionsofpeacebuildingamongnotonlydifferentscholars,

butalsodifferentbranchesoftheUnitedNations(Barnettetal.2007).Thisdissertation

considers‘post‐conflict’torefertoperiodsafterarmedconflictthatentaileddirect,physical

violencebetweenpoliticalgroups.Institutionally,thismomentisoftencorrelatedwitha

ceasefireorformalpeaceagreement.Below,Ioutlinehowthisdissertationconceptualizes

peaceandpeacebuildinginpost‐conflictcontexts.

2.2.1PCNRMANDPEACEBUILDINGGeographershaverecentlystruggledwithdefining"peace"andoperationalizing

peacebuildingresearchinthecontextofthediscipline'shistoryandcurrentresearch

themes.InwoodandTyner(2011)arguethatthedisciplineofgeography–adisciplinethat

hashistoricallybeenimplicatedinthemakingandmappingofarmedconflict.–hasan

unfinishedpro‐peaceagenda.Theyarguethatoneofthefirststepsofengagingapro‐peace

agendaisinconceptualizingpeaceasmorethantheoppositeofwar–morethanthe

absenceofdirect(physical)violence.Severalauthorshaverecentlyarguethatgeographers

havebeenmuchbetteratstudyingwarandhavenotbeenabletobuildpeacebecause

geographicworkisthusfartooambiguousinindefiningpeace(Megoran2011;Williams

andMcConnell2011).

DrawingfromJohanGaltung'sworkonnegativeandpositivepeace,Megoran(2011)

attemptstoreorientgeographerstowardstheworkofpositivepeace.Wustenalsodraws

fromGaltung’s(1976,1996)distinctionbetweennegativepeace(theabsenceofdirect

violence)andpositivepeace(absenceofdirect,structural,andculturalviolence).Galtung’s

distinctionisaconceptualcornerstoneofmanyapproachestopeacebuildingthathave

continuedtoextendtheideaofpositivepeace.ForLederach(1997)andMiall(2007)who

drawfromGaltung,positivepeacesignifiesthepresenceofmeanstoachievesocialjustice‐

thepresenceofthemeanstopreventviolenceinallforms.Wusten(2005,62)arguesthat

24

geographerswhoexploredifferenttypesofviolenceanddevelopmentmayconsiderpeace

astheabsenceofviolenceonlyiftheyrecognizethat“asviolencebecomes

multidimensional,sodoespeace:notonlytheabsenceofdirect,physicalviolence,but

possiblyofalsotheabsenceofmentaland/orstructuralviolence”.Yet,Ross(2011)argues

thattheabovecallsforareorientationofresearchtowardspeaceareactuallyproblems

withepistemologicalapproachestothewar/peacedivide.Thatifweunderstandpeacewith

anexpansivepositivepeaceapproach,thenmuchoftherecentgeographicworkon(for

example)war,terrorism,andjusticearepro‐peace.Koopman(2011)arguesinasimilar

veinthatgeographersarealreadyworkingonpeacebuildingresearchontheground‐that

theyaredoingworkthatrecognizesthesocio‐spatialrelationsandcontextdependencyof

peaceandattemptingtobringthese"peace(s)"backintoacoherentwhole.

Takingapost‐conflictinterventionpointofview,peacebuildingentailsanexpansivefocus

ontherootcausesofallformsofviolenceanditmovesbeyondpeacekeeping(conflict

management)andpeacemaking(conflictresolution)thatnarrowlyfocusontheinstanceof

directviolence(Lederach1997;Miall2007).Thediscussioningeographyoverpeaceand

peacebuildingreflectsthebroadertheoreticaldifficultiesofmovingfromtheclearlogistical

tasksandmilepostsofpeacekeepingandpeacemakingtotheexpansiveconceptsof

peacebuildingandpositivepeace‐conceptswhichattempttoencapsulatetheflexibleidea

ofsocialjusticeinarapidlychangingworld.

WhileGaltung(1976)coinedtheterm‘peacebuilding’inthe1970s,itiswidelyrecognized

thatpeacebuildingwasnotamajorfeatureofinternationalpoliticsuntilthe1992

publicationofAnAgendaforPeacebyUNSecretary‐GeneralBoutrosBoutros‐Ghali.Indeed,

post‐conflictpeacebuildingprocessesdrivenbytheUnitedNationswerenoteven

consolidateduntilthe2005establishmentoftheUnitedNationsPeacebuildingCommission

(UNPBC).Whilemanyorganizationscontributetopost‐conflictpeacebuilding,theUNPBC

nowhasthemandatetocoordinatepost‐conflictpeacebuildinginwartorncountries.

Despitethismandate,thereismuchdebatesurroundingtheemphasesandapproachesof

peacebuildingasaninstitutionalpractice.Sincethe1990sinstitutionalactivitiesunderthe

rubricofpeacebuildinghavechangedtoconformtopoliticalandeconomicdevelopments

25

(Paris2004;Tschirgi2004;Biersteker2007).Biersteker(2007,39)arguesthat

operationalizationofpeacebuildingismadedifficultbecausethereis“noconsensusonthe

definitionofandthebestpracticesforachievingpeacebuilding,itisinpracticealiberal

project.”Tschirgi(2004)notesthatpeacebuildingdiscoursechangedfromanethical

obligationtointerveneinwartornsocietiesinthe1990stoapost‐9/11UnitedStates

discourseofnation‐building,regimechange,andstabilizationandreconstruction.

Moreover,theemphasisonsupportinginternalpeacebuildingactorsandinitiativesisnow

replacedbyexternalprescriptionofasetofpoliciesforpost‐conflicttransitions.These

policieshaveclearpoliticalandeconomicgoalsthatconformtoneoliberalapproachesto

state‐buildingandemphasizeruleoflaw,privateproperty,democratization,andfree

markets(Paris2004).Paris(2004)outlineshowcurrentpeacebuildingpolicyprescriptions

influencedbyeconomicandpoliticalideologyofliberalizationandmarketizationare

appliedindiscriminatelytoallpost‐conflictscenarios.Ratherthanfocusonthetemporal

phasingofstabilization,transition,andconsolidation(Kievelitzetal.2004;Dobbinsetal.

2007)5,establishingthe‘marketdemocracy’ismoreoftenstronglyemphasizedintheearly

stagesofpeacebuilding.6Democratizationandneoliberalmarketpoliciesmaybegoals,but

introducingthemimmediatelycanhaveunintended,negativeconsequencesandclearly

opensupsomeofthemorevulnerablepartsofsocietytopoliticalandeconomicpredation

(Klein2007).Suchpolicieshaveoftenbeen“counterproductiveinpost‐conflict

peacebuildingsincetheypromoteeconomicandpoliticalcompetitionatadifficultand

fragilephase”(Tschirgi2004,15).Suchpoliciesmayalsounderminethestewardshipof

naturalresourcesthatwhenappropriatelymanagedcouldprovidesupportfor

peacebuilding.

5Anotherframingofthisprogressionispost‐conflictrecovery,reconstruction,anddevelopment.Whileslightlydifferent,theycanbesummarizedtogether:recovery/stabilizationisaimedattheshorttermgoalsofrestoringthecapacityofinternalactorstorebuildandrecoverfromcrisisandtopreventrelapse;reconstruction/transitionisaprocesswithmidtolongtermgoalsofrebuildingpolitical,security,socialandeconomicdimensions;anddevelopment/stabilizationincludesprogramsandprojectsaimedatsolvinglongtermgoalsofhumanandcommunityflourishing.Anothercommonapproachidentifies6Itisinterestingtonotethatcritiquesofpeacebuildingandpost‐conflictworkmoreoftenemphasizetemporalphasing(seeParis2004)thanspatialphasingandtargeting.Thisbecomescriticalwhenconsideringthegeographyofarmedconflictsandhowcompetingauthoritiesuseterritorialcontrol.Thisisespeciallyimportantforunderstandingthetemporalandspatialneedsofpost‐conflictnaturalresourcemanagementasresourcesrequirespatiallyawaremanagement(Giordano2003).

26

Mismanagementofnaturalresourceswitheconomic,symbolic,andecologicalvalue

increasestheriskofconflictrelapseinmanyways–e.g.,unequaldistributionofrents,

destructionoflivelihoods,violationofproperty,andviolationofprinciplesofgood

governance.Onthecontrary,theoreticallyinformedPCNRMcancontributeto

peacebuildingby:

1. Supportinghumanitarianoperationsbyprovidingbasicneedsandessentialservices;

2. Supportingeconomicdevelopmentandsustainablelivelihoodsbyprovidingemploymentandfinancingofrecoveryandreconstructionactivities;

3. Assistingwithreintegrationofcombatantsandreturnofdisplacedpersonsandrefugeesbyprovidingjobs;

4. Contributingtoreconciliationthroughdialogueandconfidencebuildingbyfunctioningasaneffectiveplatformorcatalystforexploitingsharedinterestsandbroadeningcooperationbetweendividedgroups;and,

5. Promotinggoodgovernancebyrebuildinglegitimate,transparent,accountable,andparticipatorysocialandpoliticalsystemswithprinciplescoherenttolocalpractices(Bruchetal.2008;OECD2012).

WhilethereispotentialforPCNRMtomaketheabovecontributions,itisnecessaryto

disseminatelessonslearnedanddevelopbestpracticesforpractitionersthroughabroad,

overarchingdialoguethatcan“examine,compare,andcontrasttheexperiencesofvarious

institutions”(Bruchetal.2008,62).LessonslearnedfromexperiencesinPCNRMhaveonly

recentlybeenanalyzedinanycomprehensiveformat(UNEP2009;JensenandLonergan

2011;LujalaandRustad2011).Aswouldbeexpected,lessonslearnedneedtobelinkedto

differentresourcesectors(JensenandLonergan2011;LujalaandRustad2011;UNEP2012;

UnruhandWilliams2013).However,keylessonscanbeoutlinedasfollows.First,

peacebuildingguidanceanddoctrinedonoteffectivelyaccountfornaturalresource

management(NRM)(Bruchetal.2008).Second,phasingandincrementalapproachesto

policydesignandimplementationovertimeandspacemaybemoresuccessfuland

adaptivetoevolvingsituationsthansweepinglaws(Bruchetal.2008).Third,timeframes

betweenpeacebuildingandpost‐conflictneedsoftenconflict.Indeed,whilepost‐conflict

practitionersarefocusedonimmediaterecoveryandreconstructionneeds,

environmentalistsandresourcemanagersmayseelongertermenvironmentalimpactsas

27

thetemporalpriority(Bruchetal.2008).Fourth,thereisoftenadisconnectionbetween

articulatedpoliciesandconcreteaction.Forexample,the2007loggingmoratoriuminAceh

wasignoredbymuchofthepopulation(HotliandAfrizal2009).Fifth,community

engagementiscritical.Theimportanceofnaturalresourcesinarmedconflictsandtolocal

livelihoodsandsocialidentitiesmeansthatanyPCNRMneedstobeawareofthelocal

practices,powerdifferentials,andpolitics(Unruh2003).Sixth,third‐partymonitoringand

oversightiscriticalinPCNRMasstateauthorityisoftenweakened,notconsidered

legitimate,orinneedofreform(Bruchetal.2008).Finally,manyNRMapproachesassume

alegitimateandstrongstatethatcansupportpropertysystems.PCNRMisdifferentthan

normalNRMduetoweakenedcapacityofthestateandambiguityoverpropertylaw(Unruh

2003;UnruhandWilliams2013).

Asshownabove,PCNRMrequiresdifferentapproachesthanNRM.Oneofthemost

challengingissuesforPCNRMacrossallresourcesectorsinvolvesestablishinglegitimate

andresponsivepropertysystems.Inthenextsection,Ioverviewpost‐conflictproperty

issues,withparticularemphasisonland.

2.2.2POST‐CONFLICTPROPERTYISSUESEstablishingeffectiveandlegitimatepropertymanagementsystemsforlandisoneofthe

mostimportantandcomplicatedcomponentsofpost‐conflictreconstructionandpeace

processes(Unruh2003;Leckie2005;UN‐HABITAT2007;UnruhandWilliams2013).

Managinghousing,land,andproperty(HLP)issuesisimportanttoavoidingrelapseinto

violence(Leckie2005;UN‐HABITAT2007).Forexample,landmightbeimplicatedinthe

causeofconflictandinvestmentsinlanddestroyedduringconflictmightbeongoing

grievances,andnewdisputesinvolvinglandclaimsmightreigniteviolence(Unruh2005).

Landandpropertyclaimsareimportanttorestitutionandcompensationprocesses

(Reimann1997;Das2004).Landasconnectedtohomelandsandplacesplaysanimportant

roleintheformationofidentity–asaresultconflictswhereinlandisimplicatedandpoorly

managedmaybecomeprotractedconflictsofvalueoversymbolicidentityresources(Azar

1990;Unruh1998;Miall2007).Landislogisticallyimportantforestablishingwhere

humanitarianaidandpersonnelwillbelocatedandindeterminingwheretopermanently

resettleandtemporarilyhouserefugeesanddisplacedpersons(Fitzpatrick2002).Sorting

28

outlanddisputesiscriticaltoencouragingsustainablelivelihoodsandincreasingfood

security(FAO2002;Unruh2005).Establishingaformalsystemoflandownership

(typically,theTorrenstitlesystem)isthoughttobecriticalinencouragingruleoflawand

immediateandlongterminvestmentinaregion(deSoto2000;Deininger2003;Otto2009).

Becauselandisoftenconsideredtheprimaryspatialrepresentationofproperty,landclaims

serveasproxyforanumberofothernaturalresourceclaims(e.g.,accesstowater,forests,

grasslands,andrevenuefromcarboncredits)(FAO2002).Landmanagementcanleadto

peacebuildingopportunitieslikeincreasingcapacityforgoodgovernance,increasingtrust

inthegovernment,andprovidingnewlivelihoodopportunities(Bruchetal.2008).Socially‐

justandco‐adaptivelandmanagementmighthelpeliminatepowerdifferentialsinland

access,aimattherootsofpoliticalandeconomicmarginalization,rethinkexistingsocial

relations(propertyandlandmanagementsystemsareofteninherited),andavoidland

grabsbyelites(BruceandMigot‐Adholla1994;Unruh2006).

Landprovidesapowerfulandilluminativewindowintopost‐conflictpropertyissuesand

thesociospatialaspectsofconflicts.Infact,landissoprevalentasthespatialrepresentation

ofpropertythatthetermslandandpropertyareoftenusedinterchangeably(Cotulaetal.

2004;HerreraanddaPassano2006;Sikor2004;Otto2009).‘Landtenuresecurity’isalso

frequentlyidentifiedasaprobleminpost‐conflictsituations(Unruh2003;Cotulaet

al.2004;Otto2009).Inthisdissertation,Iexaminehowapproachestopropertyimpact

post‐conflictlandmanagement,soitthereforeisimportanttobrieflyelucidatesomeofthe

languagesurroundingtheseissues.

Inacademicresearchandpropertylaw,propertyiscommonlydefinedasa‘bundleofrights’

inordertoreflecttheabilityofmultiplepartiestosimultaneouslyhavelegalinterests

(Penner1996).7Rightsaredefinedassocially‐enforcedclaims(Bromley1991).Tenure

referstothesocialrelationsandrulesamongpeoplewithrespecttoaresource.These7InSection2.3Property,Icritiquethisdefinition.MoreontheevolutionofspecificapproachestopropertyindevelopmentcanbefoundinSection2.4.2.3EvidenceLandscape.Ifpropertyistakentoberights,manyofthereferencesto‘propertyrights’intheliteratureareeitherredundant,premisedonthemorecommonnon‐academicperceptionthatpropertysignifiesamaterialthing,orseepropertyasmorethanrights.Idifferentiatebetweenlandasmaterialentityandproperty.WhenitisnecessaryforclarificationthatIamspeakingofpropertyinreferencetoland,Irefertolandproperty.

29

relationsandrulescanbeformalorinformal.Theycanbebasedinlocalpracticesorstate

law.Therelationsandrulesoflandtenuredefinetherightstouse,control,andtransfer

land;howaccessisgrantedtotheserights;andtheobligationsassociatedwithownership.

Therelationsandrulesoflandtenuredefinehowpropertyrightsinlandaretobeallocated

withinsocieties.Putsimply,landtenuredetermineswhocanusewhichresourcesforhow

longandunderwhatconditions(FAO2002).Tenureisrepresentativeofhumansociety;

thus,changestotenuresystemschangewidersocialrelationsandunderstandingsof

property(Olwig2002).Likewise,armedconflictsthatdisruptsocietycancausesevere

disruptionsinthesocialrelationsregardingproperty–severeenoughthatalternative

tenureorpropertysystemsevolve(Unruh2003).

Thetermsregime,tenure,andpropertysystemareoftenusedassynonymsthroughoutthe

academicliteratureregardingpropertyandland,thoughsomedifferentiationcanbemade

(Bromley1991;FAO2002;Ciparisse2003;Cotulaetal.2006).8Mosttenuresystemshave

thecapacityofrecognizingdifferentformsofpropertyandpropertyregimes.Authorsnote

thattherearefourcommontenureregimesorpropertyregimes–openaccess,common

property,stateproperty,andprivateproperty(Ostrom1990;Bromley1991).These

regimesareidealtypesthataredescriptiveofawidearrayofsocialrelationsandrules

applicabletoanynumberofmaterialobjectsorideas(e.g.,intellectualproperty).These

regimescanbefoundcoexistinginmanytenuresystems.Theseregimesmayoverlapin

timeandspacewhencompetingapproachestopropertyorcompetingtenuresystemsare

present.Aspropertytakesshapefromtenuresystemsandregimes,Iarguethatbothtenure

systemsandregimesarecomponentsofpropertyandthatpropertyismorethana‘bundle

ofrights.’

Landtenuresecuritymaybeunderminedincaseswheretherearedifferentapproachesto

property,conflictingtenuresystemsorregimes,andindividualdisputes.Landtenure

8Someoftheconfusioninterminologybetweentenure,regimes,andpropertysystemsmightbeduetotheetymologyoftenurewhichoftentracedbacktotheLatintenēre(tohold),butitismoreinterestingtonotethatthemodernuseofthetermisdirectlyinheritedfrommedieval,Anglo‐Saxonfeudallandrelationswhereintenantsowedobligationstolordsfortherighttostayonanduseland(Abels1988).

30

securityissimplytheperceptionofthestrengthofanindividual’sclaimtolandandthe

abilityofanauthorityorgrouptoenforcethatclaim.Landtenure–likepropertyitself–is

reinforcedandconstitutedbyauthorityornormativeordersthatrecognizeandenforce

claims.Therearemanychallengestolandtenureinpost‐conflictandothersituations

whereincompetingpropertysystemsbasedondifferentauthoritiesareavailable(Cotulaet

al2003;Benda‐Beckmann2001).Thesesituationsarecharacterizedbynormative

pluralism(Bowen2003).Normativepluralismisthesocialfactofhavingmultiple

normativeordersinasocialfield.Moore(1973,720)operationalizesnormativeordersas

Semi‐AutonomousSocialFields(SASF)–acommunityofpracticethat(1)cangenerate

rules,customs,andsymbolsinternally;(2)has“themeanstoinduceorcoercecompliance”;

(3)“isalsovulnerabletorulesanddecisionsandotherforcesemanatingfromthelarger

worldbywhichitissurrounded…setinalargersocialmatrixwhichcan…affectandinvade

it…”FollowingMoore’sconceptualizationofnormativeordersasSASF,Unruh(2003)

identifiescompetitionoverresourcemanagementasguidedbydifferentSASF.Unruh

arguesthatuntanglingthenormativepluralismsurroundingpostwarlandregimesisan

importantpartofpost‐conflictrecoveryanddevelopment.

Infact,insurveying20casestudiesofpost‐conflictlandmanagement,UnruhandWilliams

(2013)findthatfourbroadcategoriesofproblemscommonlyunderminelandmanagement

forpeacebuilding–legalambiguity,legalpluralism,disputes,andlandrecovery.Threeof

thesefouraredirectlyrelatedtonormativepluralism.Legalambiguityresultsfrom

normativepluralism,normativehybridity,andpoorlyconceivedandenforcedlaws;land

disputesimplicateauthorityandofteninvolve‘forumshopping’whereinclaimantscan

choosefromnormativeforumsreflectingcompetingnormativeorders;andlegalpluralism

isacriticaltermpoliticallydeployedtodescribenormativepluralisminsituationswherein

thestatecentralizespowerbymarginalizingalternativenormativeorders.9Whatlegal

9Evenwhiletheacademicandpoliticalutilityoflegalpluralismisinnodoubtincolonialstudieswherelawwasconsideredtobethesoledominiumofthestate(Kidder1998)andMoore’sconcepthasledtosomeconsensusastowhatconstitutesnormativepluralism(Griffiths1986;Moore2001),thereisstillverylittleagreementonwhatdifferentiateslegalpluralismfromnormativepluralism(Tamanaha2007b).Merry(1988,878)posedthisquestionearlyon,“Wheredowestopspeakingoflawandfindourselvessimplydescribingsociallife?”Anagreementonwhat‘law’describesor

31

pluralistshaveconsistentlyarguedfor–andisplainlyrevealedinpost‐conflictland

management–isthatlawsandnormscancomefromauthoritiesotherthanthestate,that

thereishybridityinnormativeheterogeneity,andthatjusticecomesfromthisrecognition

(Kidder1998).InChapterFive,Iarguethatratherthanthinkingofthemodernstateasan

overwhelmingforceof‘centralization,’onemightconceiveofthemovementinmodern

statesasoneofequilibriumandcoordinationthroughscalarpoliticsofpropertyamong

severalauthorities.10Tamanaha(2007)arguesthatdevelopingatypologyofnormative

ordersfacilitatesexaminationofheterogeneityandhybridity.Hearguesthatsixidealtypes

ofnormativeordersareoftenfoundinthenormativepluralismliterature:official‐legal,

customary‐cultural,capitalist‐economic,community‐cultural,religious‐cultural,and

functionalnormative.Theseareusefulheuristicsforrecognizingdifferentlogicsandtypes

ofauthoritythatconstitutenormativeorders.Thesedifferentgroupsmayhelpus

understanddifferentapproachestoproperty.Tamanaha’sworkisespeciallyusefulinAceh,

wheretherehasbeenastaticassumptionbyscholars,practitioners,andevenlocalsthat

onlythreenormativeordersexist(theflexibleadatcategory,Islamiclaw,andstatelaw).11

Thisdespitetheclearinfluenceofcapitalistapproachestopropertythroughnon‐

governmentorganizations(NGOs),multi‐lateralagencies,investmentfirms,andforeign

governments’influenceofpost‐conflict,post‐disasterreconstructionanddevelopment

priorities–particularlylandmanagement.

constitutesisfundamentaltounderstandingtheboundsoflegalpluralismasatheoreticalandanalyticalconcept,thussomescholarshaveadoptednormativepluralismasamoreappropriateandanalyticallyusefultermforourmodernworld(Tamanaha2000,2007;Bowen2000,2003).10ThisismoreinlinewithwhatSantos(2002)describesas‘interlegality.’Thereisnodoubtthatcentralizinglawimpactssocialrelations(Elyachar2005)andbeginsaprocessofdisciplinarycontrol(Blomley2003),butitnevertotallyovercomesthecentrifugalforceofsocialconditions(Ehrlich1936).Infact,itisherethatFoucault’sdisciplinarysubjectistoopessimistic(Lukes2005)andthatothertheorieslikeGiddens’(1986)structurationtheoryofferawayoutofthestructuringgridofproperty(Blomley2003).Thestateanditsdisciplinarytechniquesarepowerfulandtransformative,butnotall‐colonizingandnotalwayshegemonic.11InIndonesiabetween1909‐1926theDutchscholarC.vanVollenhovenandtheschoolaffiliatedwithhisunderstandingof‘customarylaw’(theLeidenSchool)notonlyrecognizedtherealmof‘customarylaw’butwerecentralintheorizinghowcolonialandcustomarylawshouldintegrate.Indeed,theyeventuallyplayedalargeroleindefiningwhatconstitutesthecustomarylawnowknownasadat,buttheyarerarelymentionedaslegalpluralists(Burns2004).

32

Space,politicalpower,andlawinteractinmultifacetedways(HolderandHarrison2003;

Blomley2008a).Whileauthorshavefocusedonhowlandtenureregimesconstituteandare

constitutedoverthelandscape(Olwig2002:Mohr2006;Unruh2006;Maandi2009)and

hownormativeordersconstituteseveralgeographicorpoliticalscales(Berman2007),

therehasbeenlessattentiononpost‐conflictnormativeordersinregardtoproperty

(Benda‐Beckmann,Benda‐Beckmann,andGriffiths2009).InChapterFive,Iexplorehowa

differentapproachtoproperty(juralrelations)illuminatesauthorityandscalarpoliticsin

thecontextofpost‐conflictlandtitlingprojects,specificallyRALAS.Inthenextsection,I

outlineandcritiqueseveralapproachestoproperty,approachesthatformthescaffoldof

theanalyticalframework(Figure2.2)ofthisdissertation.

2.3PROPERTY

2.3.1APPROACHINGPROPERTYWhilethecommonunderstandingofpropertyisofamaterialthing(e.g.,alandparcel,

building,orcar),academicdefinitionsofpropertyemphasizethatpropertyconsistsof

relations“betweenpersonswithrespecttotheuseorbenefitofvaluedthings”(Blomley

2009,593).Yet,therearenumerouswaysofdefiningpropertythatchallengebothofthe

aboveversionsofproperty.AsMacphersonpointsoutthe“meaningofpropertyisnot

constant.Theactualinstitutionandthewaypeopleseeit,andhencethemeaningtheygive

totheword,allchangeovertime”(1978,1).Societies,specificallythedominantclasses,

constantlyreshapetheformsandfunctionsofproperty(Macpherson1978).Thewaysin

whichpropertyisdefinedinfluencethewaysinwhichweinteractashumanbeings,howwe

createandmaintainpowerrelations,andevenhowwequestionandpursuescholarly

researchregardingproperty.Yet,landlawexpertsGrayandGray(2009,87)writethat“our

everydayreferencestopropertyareunreflective,naïveandrelativelymeaningless.”

Bromley(1991,1)recognizesthisdeficiencyinacademia,writingthattherearefew

concepts“thataremorecentral–yetmoreconfused–thanthoseofproperty,rights,and

propertyrights.”Bromley’sobservationissharedbyadiversegroupofsocialscientists,

policymakersandpractitionersthatseektobringmorefocusonhowwethinkabout

property(GuyandHenneberry2000;Benda‐Beckmannetal.2006).

33

Benda‐Beckmannetal.(2006)suggestthatthenumerousdefinitionsofpropertyacross

cultures,politicalideologies,andacademicdisciplinescanbeclassifiedaseitherdescriptive

ornormative.Thedescriptivedefinitionsofpropertyareattemptstodescribehowproperty

isunderstoodandpracticedwithindifferentsocialcontexts.Whiledescriptivedefinitions

areofteninfluencedbyobservers’pre‐existingunderstandingsofproperty,these

definitionsdonotultimatelyattempttodefinewhatpropertyshouldandcanbe.Onthe

otherhand,normativedefinitionssetlimitstotheconceptofpropertyandthusattemptto

controlorchangehowpropertyisconceivedandpracticedindifferentsocialcontexts–

theyoutlinewhatpropertyshouldandcanbe(Benda‐Beckmannetal.2006).Normative

definitionsareoftendeeplyinterwovenintoparticularideologies,discourses,andpolitical

andlegalsystems.Asnormativedefinitionsinfluencechangingconceptsandpractices

surroundingproperty,theysimultaneouslyfunctionassubtlebutpowerfulwaysofframing

powerrelations.

Thereiscurrentlyonenormativedefinitionthatinfluencesalargeportionofacademicand

legalworkonproperty(Verdery2004).Whenpressedforadefinitionofproperty,most

juristswillofferthedidacticmetaphorthat‘propertyisabundleofrights’or‘sticks’(Rose

1994;Penner1996;Krier2006;Johnson2007).Indeed,sincetheearly20thcentury,many

oftheinstitutionsofWesternsocietyhavedefinedandconceptualizedpropertythrough

thismetaphorofa‘bundleofrights’(Johnson2007).Thisdefinitiontendstoviewproperty

asstatutoryrights(entitlementsguaranteedthroughstatelaw)andthusreliesona

particularunderstandingoflaw,legality,authority,andtheproperrelationofindividualsto

societyandtoeachother(Singer2000).However,thisdefinitionalsoallowsflexibility

withinproperty–differentrights,likesticks,mightbetakenoutofandreinsertedintothe

propertybundle.Infact,theflexibilityoftheconceptofpropertyreflectedinthisdefinition

issaidtobenotjusta‘legalcuriosity’,butacentralcomponentofmodernlifeandcapitalist

economiesasitallowsustodivideupcomplexinterestsinpropertyandcreatemultiple

ownershiptypes.Indeed,itfunctionslikean“enginethatgeneratesnewpossibilitiesfor

gainsfromtradeintherightsoverasingleasset”(Epstein2010,109‐110).

34

Thebundleofrightsmetaphoriscompellingandeffectiveinconveyingthemodernlegal

understandingofpropertyasseparablerights(Munzer1990;Johnson2007).Itisa

powerfulmetaphorthatoftenservesasthedefaultdefinitionofpropertyforlegal

scholarship(Munzer1990;Johnson2007),forscholarsinthesocialsciences(Demsetz

1967;Bromley1991;SchlagerandOstrom1992),andforpolicymakersandpractitioners

focusedonformalizingpropertyrightswithintherevived‘lawanddevelopment’movement

(FederandFeeny1991;deSoto2000;McAuslan2003)orworkingattheinterfaceof

naturalresources,propertylaw,anddevelopment(ILRI1995;Sunderlinetal.2008).Yet,as

usefulasthismetaphorcanbe,itisalsodangerous.Dangerousinthatitlimitsthewayswe

thinkaboutpropertyand,insodoing,restrictshowweconceptualize,research,and

performproperty(Penner1996).Itlimitsourunderstandingofpropertytostatutory,legal

rights.Itleadstalkaboutpropertytobe‘saturatedbytalkofrights’despitearichliterature

ofalternativeapproachestoproperty(Verdery2004,139).AsU.S.SupremeCourtJustice

BenjaminCardozowrotein1927,“Metaphorsinlawaretobenarrowlywatched,for

startingasdevicestoliberatethought,theyendoftenbyenslavingit.”12

Manylegalscholarscritiquethebundleofrightsmetaphorasaninadequateimagethat

limitsthinkingaboutproperty.Rose(1994,281)notesthateventhoughdiversetypesof

rightsoverlapandhavedifferentlegalandsocialvalue,thebundleofrightsmetaphor“isin

largepartadeviceforseparatingthevariousfacetsofpropertyandforgivinganintuitive

graspoftheirseparatenessandmovabilityratherthantheirinterrelatednessandporosity”.

Themetaphorpresentsalltheconstituentpropertyrightsofthebundleofrightsaseven,

separable,andnot‘interconnectedandinterdependent’(Rose1994).Sheproposes

alternativemetaphorsforproperty–likeatoychest(likerights,notalltoysareequal)ora

horse(likerights,notallpartsareseparable).Penner(1996)alsocritiquesthebundleof

rightsforthewaytheconceptinfluencesjudicialthinkingaboutpropertyandhe

recommendsalternativemetaphors–likeacake(rightsarenotpredefinedentitiesthatare

compiledintoabundle,butpiecesofawholethatarecarvedofftoservesocialfunctions).

Schroeder(1994)furthersthesefigurativecritiquesonfeministandpsychoanalytic

12Berkeyv.ThirdAvenueRailwayCo244N.Y.602(1927).

35

grounds,arguingthatthebundleofrightsisnothingmorethanoneexampleofalonglineof

phallicmetaphorswithinpropertytheory.Grey(1980)findsthatthemetaphorsignalsthe

disintegrationoftheconceptofpropertyandmeansthat‘property’isnolongercoherent

enoughtobearelevantconceptforpolicyoracademia.

Macpherson(1978)questionsthecapitalistunderstandingofpropertyastherightto

alienateandtherighttoexclude.Hereturnstotheideathatpropertymustbeanothertype

ofrightandrecastspropertynotastherighttoalienateorexclude,butastherighttonotbe

excludedfromtheproductofsocietyortheresourcesnecessarytoenablehumanlife.In

reflectingonMacpherson’swork,Blomley(2010,305)writes,“Ifhumanflourishingisthe

endofaliberaldemocracy,itcannotbesustainedbycapitalistpropertyrelations.”Likewise,

Iarguethattheconceptofpropertyasabundleofrights–theconceptthatunderlies

modern,capitalistrelationsandthatnowpredominatesinneoliberalpolicyandacademic

thought–istoosimplistic.Iquestionwhether,ingeographicresearch,propertyissimply

anextensionofwhatlawandcapitalistrelationsdefineasproperty.Ifpropertyismore

thanrights,whatisproperty?Howdoespropertyinterminglewithlandscapes,scalar

processes,andauthority?Whatkindofanalyticalframeworkcouldprovideinsightintothe

natureofproperty?

Thenotionthatpropertyisequivalenttoabundleofstatutory,legalrightsisparticularly

inadequateforpolicymakersinpost‐conflictscenariosandforsocialscientiststryingto

understandanddescribethesocialrelations,materialpractices,narratives,andemotive

connectionsofhumansinrelationtoproperty.Theimpoverisheddefinitionandthe

ideological,politicalnatureofmuchofpropertytheoryhaveleftgeographers,likeother

socialscientists,withoutanadequateanalyticalframeworkforstudyingproperty(Benda‐

Beckmannetal.2006).Infact,eventhoughseveralgenerationsofgeographershavedealt

withpropertyrightsandresourcetenure,geographershaverecentlybeencalleduponto

takepropertyseriously(Blomley2005).Indeed,severalrecentpublicationsingeographic

literatureattempttodojustthat.Theychallengethesettlingandnaturalizationof

definitionsofpropertyinbotheverydaylifeandacademicthoughtbyexploringhow

propertyisconstitutedthroughnarrativediscourses,modesofcapitalistproduction,human

36

emotions,ecologicaldynamics,andsociospatialrelations(Delaney2001;Unruh2003;

Whatmore2003;Blomley2004;Sikor2004,2006;Unruh2006;Blomley2007;Brown

2007b;FlemsæterandSetten2009).Thus,abroaderviewofpropertyasafieldofinquiryis

neededinordertoimproveanalyticalframeworksandtocriticallyengagewithideological

approachestoproperty.

Inthenextsection,Ioutlinemoreradicalcritiquesoftheideathatpropertycanbelimited

torightsalone.Thesecritiquestakeissuewiththeideaofrightsandattempttoeitherplace

rightswithinabroadercontextofsocialrelationsortomoveentirelybeyondrights‐based

approachestounderstandingproperty.Inthefollowingsubsections,theseargumentsare

sortedintothreeapproachesthataddress:(1)thejuralrelationsofproperty;(2)narratives;

and(3)personhood.

2.3.2JURALRELATIONSThissubsectionintroducesWesleyNewcombHohfeld’s(1913)frameworkofjuralrelations

andJosephSinger’s(2000)ideasregardingrightsandobligationsinproperty.Developing

anunderstandingofjuralrelationsiscentraltounderstandingthenatureofproperty–they

mustbeconsideredinordertounderstandnotonlythepropertyrightsinquestionbut

‘property’itself(Hohfeld1913;Munzer1990).Usingjuralrelationstoanalyzepost‐conflict

propertyissuesallowsustosharpenthedefinitionofpropertyrightsandtoexpand

analysisofpropertyissuesbeyondrightsintothecomplicatedpowerrelationswithinwhich

propertyevolves.

Intwopapersin1913and1917,Hohfeldarguesthattheabuseoftheterm‘rights’and

confusionover‘property’inlegalandpoliticaldiscoursesmustbeclarifiedtofacilitateclear

judicialreasoninganddecisions.AsHohfeld(1913,21)pointsoutaboutproperty,“Both

withlawyersandwithlaymenthistermhasnodefiniteorstableconnotation.Sometimesit

isemployedtoindicatethephysicalobjecttowhichvariouslegalrights,privileges,etc.,

relate;thenagain‐withfargreaterdiscriminationandaccuracy‐thewordisusedtodenote

thelegalinterest…”Hohfeldsetsouttocorrecttheambiguityofpropertyandrightsby

definingtheterm‘rights’andcontextualizingtheideaofrightswithineightfundamental

legalconceptsandfourjuralrelations.Beforedelvingmoreintotheselegalconceptsand

37

juralrelations,hiscritiqueraisesthreeinterestingquestions:Whatarerights?Can‘legal’

rightsrefertobothstatutoryandnon‐statutorynormativeordersorislegalitythesole

purviewofthestate?Finally,howcanweunderstandrightswithinthecontextofjural

relations?

Thebundleofrightsmetaphordoesnotspecifywhethertherightsinquestionarenatural,

legal,orothertypesofrights(Clark1982).Whereasnaturalrightsareactuallyjustifications

forclaims,legalrightsaresocially‐enforcedclaims.Hohfeld(1913)arguesthat‘property

rights’(whetherinvolvingaccess,usufruct,exclusion,orotheractions)usuallyrefertolegal

rightsinthesensethatpropertyrightsarenotjustjustificationsforclaims,theyreflect

entitlementsandimposedutiesonothers.Thus,propertyrights(aslegalrights)reflect

socialenforcementofaspecifictypeofrelation.Penner(1996)pointsoutthattheterm

‘bundleofrights’isactuallyawidespreadmisnomerandthatproperlyunderstood

“‘propertyasabundleofrights’expressesthethesisthatpropertyconstitutesalegal

complex,ofvariousnormativerelations,notsimplyrights”(Penner1996,713).Whileone

mightbetemptedtosaythatthistensioncanberesolvedbysimplyadjustingthemetaphor

tosaythat‘propertyisabundleofrelations,’wemustbemorepreciseabouttheserelations

forthisnewrephrasingtohaveanyanalyticalvalue;and,inanycase,propertymightbe

morethanabundleofrelations.

Onedeeplinguisticproblemwithrecognizingpropertyrightsaslegalrightsisthatlegality

istakenbysomescholarstorefertoonlystatutorylawandnottothewidearrayof

informalandcustomaryinstitutionsthatfunctionmuchlikestatutorylegalsystems(Moore

1973;Merry1988;Kidder1998).Whileapproachestopropertyhavelongrecognizedthat

ownershipofpropertyisconditionalonsocietalrecognitionofhumanrelationsregarding

thingsofvalue(Macpherson1978),manyeconomistsandlegalscholarsassumethatstate

legalinstitutionsarethebestmirrorofthesocietalrecognitionofpropertyin‘modern’

societies(Demsetz1967;Bromley1991).Suchoverlystatistframingsofrightsarecritiqued

inlegalscholarship,legalanthropology,andliteratureonnon‐statenormativeorders

(Benda‐Beckmann1979;Rose1994).Appliedtocontextslikepost‐conflictscenariosand

informalurbansettlements,theassumptionthatthesepropertyrelationsdescribedas

38

‘legalrights’arealwaysequivalenttoorshouldbemadeequivalenttostatutoryrightscan

leadtoseriousproblems(HomeandLim2004).Wheredefacto,socially‐embedded

propertyrelationsaretranslatedintodejurestatutorypropertyrights,thefocuson

statutoryrightsalonesometimesnegatespre‐existingpropertyrelationsintranslation

whileelevatingtheclaimsofpoliticalelitesthataresupportedbystatelaw(HomeandLim

2004;Sowerwine2004a;Elyachar2005).Yet,asBromley(1991,16)writes,“societal

recognitionofaspecificsetoforderedrelationsamongindividualsisalegalrelation.”

Followingliteratureinlegalpluralism,theideaoflegalitycanbebroadlyappliedtonon‐

statutorynormativeorders(like‘traditional’or‘customary’law)especiallyinpost‐conflict

scenarios(Unruh2003).Thekeypointsherearethat:(1)propertyrightssignifysocial

enforcementofparticularclaimsandnormativerelationsregardingproperty;(2)legality

canbeinterpretedinbothstatutoryandnon‐statutorynormativerelations,and(3)afailure

torecognizetheuniquestatusofrightswithinnumerouspropertyrelationsandthe

correlativelegalconceptscanleadtoimpoverishedanalyticalframeworks.

Hohfeld’sframeworkofjuralrelationsandSinger’sideasconcerningrightsandobligations

canbeemployedtoprovidearichunderstandingofpropertydynamicsinpost‐conflict

scenarioslikeAceh.Hohfeld(1913)outlineseightlegalconceptsincludingrights,duties,

privileges,no‐rights,disabilities,liabilities,immunities,andpower.InTable2.1,theseeight

legalconceptsarecategorizedaseither‘Elements’or‘Correlatives’.Therelationsbetween

thetermsinthesetwocolumnscapturethefourjuralrelations.Thefourjuralrelationscan

beunderstoodbysubstitutingthetermsfromtherespectivecolumnsfortheunderlined

wordsinthefollowingsentence:‘ifAhasanelement,thenBhasacorrelative’.IfAhasa

right,thenBhasadutytorespectthatright.Indeed,A’srightdoesnotexistwithoutB’s

correlatedduty.Inthecaseoflandproperty,AmayhavetherighttoexcludeB,andBhasa

dutytonotenterA’sproperty.Hohfeldarguesthatincommonusage,theterm‘right’(which

shouldbelimitedtothisnarrowcorrelationwithduty)isdifferentfrombutoften

mistakenlyusedtorefertowhatareactuallyprivileges(liberties),powers,andimmunities.

39

Table2.1Hohfeld'sJuralCorrelatives(adaptedfromHohfeld1913,710)13Elements CorrelativesRight(Claim) DutyPrivilege(Liberty)14 No‐RightPower LiabilityImmunity Disability

Inthefirstjuralrelation,rightsrefertosocially‐enforcedclaims.Hohfeld(1913)conceives

ofrightsaswhatcanbecalledlegalrightsor‘claim‐rights.’AccordingtoHohfeldallrights

involveclaimsandonlybydifferentiatingrightsassocially‐enforcedclaimsfromotherlegal

conceptscanwefacilitateclearjudicialreasoninganddecisions.Hohfeldarguesthat

recognitionofarightforaright‐holderentailstheenforcementofadutyonothers–that

rightsrequireduties(Hohfeld1913,1917;Bromley1991;Singer2000).“Dutiesrefertothe

absenceofpermissiontoactinacertainmanner”(Singer2000,132).Thus,legalrights–

whetherenforcedthroughstateinstitutionsornon‐statenormativeorders–areproductsof

communitiesandtheyareataminimumdyadicwithright‐holdersandduty‐holders(Rose

1994).15Oneofthegreatesthindrancestounderstandingandsolvinglegalproblems

“frequentlyarisesfromtheexpressortacitassumptionthatalllegalrelationsmaybe

reducedto‘rights’and‘duties,’andthattheselattercategoriesarethereforeadequatefor

thepurposeofanalyzingeventhemostcomplexlegalinterest”(Hohfeld1913,28).

Inthesecondjuralrelation,aprivilegeisalibertythatcorrelateswithasituationofno‐

rights(Munzer1991).Forexample,iftherearenolawsthatgovernthecatchofwhalesin

13Hohfeld’sframeworkalsostipulatesasetof“JuralOpposites”whicharetwolegalconceptsorpositionsthatcannotexisttogether.WhileusefulforunderstandingHohfeld’sframework,thejuraloppositesproveoflessinterestforanalyticalpurposesinthisdissertationsotheyarenotpresentedhere.

14Legalscholarssometimescallprivilegea‘liberty‐right’andHohfeld’srighta‘claim‐right,’yetsuchchangestothewordingdilutetheclarityandanalyticalvalueofHohfeld’sframeworkandhisargumentconcerningrights.

15Bromley(2006,55)arguesthatpropertyrightsarenecessarilytriadic–involvingrightholders(‘owners’),dutyholders(‘allotherpersonsinthepolity’),andtheobjectofproperty(‘objectorcircumstanceofvaluetotheownersaswellastoothers’).Thebundleofrightsmetaphorneglectstheseothernecessarycomponentsoflegalrights–theduties,objectsofproperty,authorities,andphysicalandsocialcontexts.

40

globalfisheries,AandBbothhavetheprivilegeofcapture–therearenorightsandno

dutiesimplicatedoneitherparty.Therearenolimitationsexceptthenaturallimitsofwhale

populations.Asituationwhereineveryonehasliberties,butnoonehasdefinedrightsor

dutiesmightbedefinedasanopenaccessregime.Ifpropertyisdefinedonlyasabundleof

rights,thenwemightfollowBromley(1991)andlabelsuchopenaccessregimesas‘non‐

property’regimes.16Or,wecouldrecognizethatevenintheabsenceoflegalrights,thereis

apropertyrelationship.

Ifweusethethirdjuralrelation(powerandliability)tounderstandanopenaccessregime,

wemovebeyondrights,privileges,anddutiestoexplorewhomayhavetheabilitytocreate

newlegalrulesorpromotesocialenforcementofdifferentpropertyrights,duties,and

privileges.Power,forHohfeld(1913),istheabilityofonepartytochangelegalrelations.IfA

haspower,BhasaliabilityinthatB’spropertyrelationmaybechanged.Acouldcreatenew

ordestroyoldpropertyrelations(likealease,easement,orprivilegeinanopenaccess

regime).17Toreturntotheexampleoftheopenaccessregimeofwhaling,Amayhavethe

powertoinstitutenewinstitutionalregulationsthatapplyscientificlimitstothenumber

andtypesofwhalescapturedbyallpartiesinvolvedinwhaling.B’sliabilityisrevealedasA16Bromleyusestheconceptofa‘non‐property’regimetocontrastthemanagementinvolvedincommonpropertyregimes.Hearguesagainstthehistoricallyfalseandmisleading‘tragedyofthecommons’metaphorbyshowingthatGarretHardinwasnottalkingabout‘commons’atall,butratheraboutopenaccessregimes(Hardin1968;Bromley1991).Whileitistruethatthe‘tragedyofthecommons’isactuallythe‘tragedyofopenaccessregimes’,labelingopenaccessregimesas‘non‐property’regimesistolimitpropertytopropertyrightsalone.Advocatesofaccesstheorynotethatsocialrelationsofaccessexistin‘openaccess’situations,buttheytoolimitpropertyrelationstopropertyrightsinthissituationandfindthatthereisnopropertyhere(Mansfield2001).Suchalimitomitshowotherlegalconceptsandjuralrelationsdescribepropertyinthissituationanditdevalueshowotherapproachestoproperty(forexample,propertyasnarratives,aspoliticalrelations,orinregardtoproblemswiththedynamiccharacteristicsoftheobjectsofpropertyincomparisontorelativelystaticculturalnotionsofproperty)continuetoproviderichinsightsintothesocialrelationsofproperty.HereyoucanseeadirectimpactoflimitingpropertytorightsinBromley’sanalyticalattackon‘thetragedyofthecommons.’17Inthisrespect,Hohfeld’slegalideaofpowerissimilartowhatLukes(2005)callstwodimensionalpower,atypeofpowerthatisexercisedtochangeinstitutionalstructuresandnotthesameasonedimensionalpowerthatismeasuredbyinstitutionaloutcomes.Hohfeld’sideaofpowerisnotasophisticatedsocialtheoryofpowerlikeLukes’ideathatathirddimensionofpowerexistswhereinthemodalitiesandtechniquesofpowerareintegratedintothebehaviorandpreferencesofsubjects(muchlikeFoucault’sversionofpower).Hohfeld’spowerissimplyaboutalegalpowertochangelegalrelations,butifsocialtheoryonpowercanbeusedtoexpandHohfeld’sframeworktherewouldcertainlybefruitfuloutcomes.

41

exercisesapowertoinfluencechangestoinstitutionalrulesandregulationsinordertoend

anopenaccessregimeandcreateanewwhalingpropertyrightsregime.Propertyas

privilege,power,andliabilityfunctionsevenwithinanopenaccessregimethatdoesnot

haverightsorduties.

Thefourthjuralrelationofimmunityanddisabilitycanalsobeappliedtothisopenaccess

regime.IfBhasimmunity,thenAhasadisabilityandAhasnopowerwithregardtoB’s

propertyrelations.Inthewhalingexample,Bmighthaveimmunityfrominstitutional

regulationsthatlimitwhalingbecausesuchregulationsthatstopB’sharvestofwhales

wouldirreparablydamagetheculturalfabricofB’ssociety.Inotherwords,Amayhave

powertochangetheinstitutionalstructureandendtheopenaccessregimeforallparties

exceptforBwhohasimmunity.InrelationtoBthen,Ahasnopower,Ahasadisabilityand

cannotchangetheinstitutionalstructure.Bcontinuestohavetheprivilegeofharvesting

whaleswithoutlimits.However,asmentionedabove,sinceBhasonlyaprivilegeandnota

right,AisundernodutyandAmayusetheirownprivilegestomakeB’sattemptstoharvest

whalesimpossible–runningwhalesawayfromB’sships,blockingB’sabilitytodetect

whales,blockingB’sabilitytogetwhalesonships,etc.Ontheotherhand,ifBhasarightto

harvestwhales,thenAhasadutytonotinterferewithBthroughsuchbehaviors.

Insummary,Hohfeld’sfourjuralrelationsandeightlegalconceptsshowhowproperty

existsbeyondmerelyrights.However,thereisonefinaladditiontothissection–itcouldbe

consideredafifthjuralrelation.Thisfifthrelationoccursbetweenrightsandobligations

(Singer2000;Verdery2004).Right‐holdersalwayshaveobligationstothesocial

communityandauthoritythatguaranteeentitlementoftheirclaim.Theseobligationsare

differentfromHohfeld’sdutiesinthat,ratherthanaduty‐holderrespectingaright,the

right‐holdersthemselvesareencumberedbytheseobligations.Theterm‘obligation’isused

differentlyfromdutiesandislargelysynonymouswithwhatMunzer(1990)calls

‘disadvantages’:

The idea of property rights is narrower than that of property. Property rightsinvolve only advantageous incidents. Property involves disadvantageous incidentsas well. Meant here is advantage or disadvantage to the right‐holder or owner.

42

Although property obviously involves disadvantages to persons other than theright‐holder, it is important to see that there can be disadvantages to the right‐holderaswell.(Munzer1990,24)

Thesedisadvantagesmightbeoutlinedinstatutorylawasobligationstoauthority(like

taxes)orobligationstootherpropertyholders(aslimitsinnuisancelaw).Aswell,theymay

beframedorstatutorily‐definedasrisksandfinancialobligationssuchasdebtsand

liabilities(Verdery2004).Yet,theseobligationsalsocomefromnon‐statutorylegalsystems

(normativeorders)intheformofsocialnormsandinstitutionsconcerningproperty(Singer

2000).

Singer(2000)outlinestheobligationsofpropertyentitlementsinaconvincingargument

againstusingthe‘ownershipmodel’ofpropertyforpolicyandlegaldecisions.Heargues

thatthereare“multiplemodelsofproperty”withinanyonesocietyorsinglelegalsystem

andthatthesemodelsaredeployedindifferentsocialandlegalcontexts(Singer2000,86).

Bybuildingfroma‘nuisance’modelofproperty(whereinpropertyrightsarelimitedby

nuisancelaws),Singerderivesan‘entitlementmodel’ofpropertythatisopposedtothe

dominantpoliticalimaginationofanownershipmodel.18Whiletheownershipmodel

focusesontherelationbetweenownersandthingsandownersandthestate,the

entitlementmodelrefocusesattentiononthe“interrelationsbetweenthestateandits

citizens,amongownersandbetweenownersandnon‐owners”(Singer2000,92).

Inbrief,complexsetsofobligationstoanauthoritativeentityandmembersofone’ssocial

communityareinherenttopropertyitself.Theabovejuralrelationsrepresentone

approachtoproperty.InChapterFive,thesejuralrelationsareusedtoexaminehow

propertyrelatedtoscalarprocessandauthorityinthepost‐conflict,post‐disasterland

titlingprojectinAceh.Thenarrativeapproachtopropertyoutlinedinthenextsection

18Hisentitlementmodelisbasedontheobservationthatthereare(1)multipleownerswithdisaggregatedrights,(2)conflictingrightsandtheneedforjudgment,(3)changingconditionsthatwarrantchangesinrightsovertime,(4)boundariesthatarerelevantbutnotdeterminativeorrights,(5)propertyrightsarelimitedbyotherlegitimaterights(onecannotcommitharmtoothersundertheexcuseofpropertyrights),(6)relationshipsbetweenownersandbetweenownersandnon‐ownersmatter,and(7)attentiontothetensionatthecoreofproperty–betweenharmfulbutlegitimateusesofpropertyandconflictingsocialinterests.

43

examineshowhumanstellstoriesthatprovideanethicalandpoliticalframingofproperty.

Ithelpsusunderstandhowdifferentunderstandingsofproperty(andthuspropertyitself)

canbenaturalized,illuminated,created,oreffaced.

2.3.3NARRATIVESWhilethejuralrelationsdescribedintheprevioussectionarerecognizedascriticalfor

scientificanalysisofcapitalistrelations,thisanalysis“squeezesallthemoralandintuitive

senseoutoftheconceptofproperty”(Rose1994,2).ForRose(1994)propertyis

persuasion.Shefocusesonnarratives,rhetoricaldevices,andthetextualityofpropertyand

findsthatthenarrativesusedinstrugglesoverthemeaningofproperty,propertyrights,

andpropertyregimesarethemselvesintegralpartsofpropertyandnotjustawaytogetto

rights.Rose(1994)arguesthatpropertyalwaysinvolvessomesortofpersuasionandthat

narrativediscoursesprovidethatpersuasivevehicle.Sheexaminesnarrativesineverything

from‘firstpossession’to‘neo‐utilitarianprivateproperty,’communitarianproperty,story‐

tellingingametheory,andtheprocessofEasternEuropeattheendoftheColdWar‘quite

consciously’talkingitselfintoproperty.Inbrief,allpropertyconceptsandinstitutionsare

basedonsomesortofmoralframeworkandjustificatorynarratives(Rose1994).As

propertyfunctionsasatoolforsocialoutcomes,itisinevitablethatindividualsandgroups

insocietyusenarrativestojustifyparticularpropertyclaimsaswellasparticularformsand

functionsofpropertywithinsociety.

Here is where narrative matters: stories, allegories, and metaphors can changeminds. Through narratives… people can create a kind of narrative community inwhich thestorytellercansuggest thepossibility that thingscouldbedifferentandperhapsbetter(or,alternatively,worse).(Rose1994,6)

44

Rights‐talkasanarrative

WhenRose’snarrativeapproachisappliedtothebundleofrightsmetaphor,itshowsthat

thenotionthatpropertyisrightsalonelimitslegitimatepoliticaldiscourseaboutproperty

to‘rights‐talk’(Glendon1991).Rights‐talkcanputsubalternormarginalcommunities’

propertyinterestsatadisadvantagebylimitingthetypesofpropertyrightsavailable,the

methodsusedformakingclaims,andthetypesofclaimsthatcanbemade(Tushnet1983;

Razzaz1993;Meinzen‐DickandPradhan2002;Blomley2004).

Limitingpropertytopropertyrights,limitsourpoliticalimaginationanddiscoursesto

‘rights‐talk’–itservesasapoliticaltooltoframeallpoliticalcurrencyas‘rights’andall

‘legitimate’politicalargumentsas‘rights‐basedclaims’(Tushnet1983,1989;Glendon

1991).Rights‐talkmumblesthroughimportantissuesregardingtheinstabilityand

performativityofrightsinsocialandspatialcontexts(Tushnet1983).Takingageographic

perspective,Delaney(1998)revealshowdifferentsetsofrightslegislatedforprotecting

minorities,definingpublic/privatespaces,andprotectingprivatepropertycomeinto

conflictasrightsmustsometimesnavigatethenebulousregionofjudiciaryreasoning.

Blomley(1994)alsoshowstheinstabilityofrightsinastudyofmobilityrightsinCanada.If

propertyisdefinedasrights,thenpropertyislimitedtoanunstableterrainof

interpretationandsocialcontext.Rightsareunstableinsocialcontexts,sowhilerights‐talk

canbeapowerfulpoliticalmotivatorforunitingdiversesubalterngroupsormakingclaims

toproperty,rights‐talkalsofunctionsasatooltolimitsubalternclaimsinjudicialcontexts

(Blomley1994).Inlimitingdiscourseandimaginationofpropertytorights‐talk,welimit

ourpoliticalargumentationtounsteadygroundandpauperizeanalyticalframeworksfor

researchonproperty.

Rights claims are limited, not only because they are often tied to notions ofpossessive individualism, but because of the geographies written into liberalism,notablythelinebetweenpublicandprivatespace.Whenrightsclaimsarecontested,spatial tropes are often deployed to weaken others’ claims: in the DowntownEastside, property owners have utilized images of transience and empty space todevalue longer term residents’ rights to place: in the case of domestic workers,imagesofthesanctityofthehomeasaprivatespacehavebeencalledupontodenyrightsasemployees.(BlomleyandPratt2001,163)

45

Classicpropertytheoriesasnarratives

Roses’approachalsorevealsthatclassicpropertytheoriesconsistsofnarrativesthatserve

asjustificationsfortypesofproperty,propertyrights,andpropertyregimes.Forexample,

Rosecritiquestwogroupsofnarrativesthatdriveapproachestopropertyandpossessionin

literatureontheoriginsofproperty.Thefirstgroupdrawsfromnaturalrightsthoughtand

islinkedtoJohnLocke’s(1821)labortheoryofproperty.Thesecondgroupemphasizesthe

roleofsocialrecognitionincreatingpropertyandincludesphilosopherslikeKantand

Bentham.Locke’sfamousaccountoftheoriginsofpropertyisbasedontheassumptionthat

humansowntheirlaborandthathumans’haveanatural,divinelygivenrighttoprocurethe

necessitiesoflife–orasheputit,toappropriatethe“acornshepickedupunderanoak,or

theappleshegatheredfromtreesinthewood”(Locke1821,210).Inthisaccount,property

precedesthepolity–privatepropertyrightsarenaturalrights.Privatepropertyevolves

fromtherightsestablishedthroughfirstpossessionofandthroughmixinglaborwith

naturalentities–thatGodgavelandtohumansincommonbutespeciallytothe

“industriousandrational”ontheconditionthat“laborwastobehistitle”(Locke1821,

214).Ofcourse,thistheoryoflaborandfirstpossessionastheoriginsofpropertyhas

numerousinadequacies–Whatexactlyispossession?Isenclosurethesameaspossession?

Howmuchlabormustbemixedwithanentitytoclaimit?Mightpersonallaborbelostin

mixingitwithentities?Forexample,Nozick(1974,175)famouslyasksofmixinglaborwith

entities,“IfIownacanoftomatojuiceandspillitintheseasothatitsmoleculesmingle

evenlythroughoutthesea,doItherebycometoownthesea,orhaveIfoolishlydissipated

mytomatojuice?”DespitethelogicalfallaciesandmoralhazardofLocke’snarrativeof

property(specificallyprivateproperty),hisjustificationcontinuestobeapowerful

narrativethatunderliesdiversemodernlegalideasliketheruleofcapture,adverse

possession,andterranullius.While,theroleoflawinLocke’snarrativeistoprotectpre‐

existingpropertyrightsobtainedthroughlaborandfirstpossession,inthesecondapproach

propertyandlawarisetogether.Benthamsuccinctlysummarizesthesecondapproach,

“Propertyandlawareborntogether,anddietogether.Beforelawsweremadetherewasno

property;takeawaylaws,andpropertyceases”(Bentham1914,113).Kantalsoarguedthat

Locke“confusedempiricalpossessionwithdejureintelligiblepossession”and“thatasocial

convention–asocialcontract–islogicallypriortorealownership”(Bromley1991,5).

46

Yet,inbothoftheabovenarratives,theideaofpropertyisconflatedwithownership,

specificpropertyrights,andparticularpropertyregimes(namelyprivateproperty).Inthe

firstnarrative,Lockemakesanargumentaboutprivateownershipofpropertyrightsvia

possession.Inthesecondnarrative,thesocialrecognitionofrightstoarightholderisused

todifferentiatepropertyfrompossession(whichmaynotinvolvesocialrecognition).This

secondnarrativesometimesreferstopropertyas‘intelligiblepossession’,butthiscauses

manyauthorstoblurtheideaofownershipwiththeideaofproperty.Amorelucid

narrativeforjustifyingpropertyrecognizewouldseparatetheconceptofownershipfrom

theconceptofpropertytorecognizethatneitherdefactonordejurepossessionis

equivalenttopropertyorownership(Honoré1987).Theseconceptseachrepresentdistinct

analyticalcategoriesthatshouldnotbecollapsedintoasynonymousjumble.Munzer

(1990)arguesthatownershipisneitherdejurerecognitionnordefactopossessionbut

ratherthesocietalrecognitionofacontinuumofrightsthatareoftendeterminedby

culturalreferenceandcontext.19Possessionisnotproperty,butthenarrativeofpossession

aspropertycontinuestoplayanimportantroleinmodernlawandcolloquial

understandingofownership(Rose1994).

Insummary,insightsintohowinterestgroupsjustifyownershipandpropertywhilequietly

dispossessingandnegatingequallyvalidnarrativesofownershipandformsofproperty

cannotbeeasilyextractedfromanalysisofrightsalone.Otherhumanrelationsthat

contextualizepropertyinsocietymightalsobeoverlookedifnarrativesarenotincludedas

partofasocialscientificapproachtoproperty.Thisisofcriticalimportanceinpost‐conflict

scenarioswhereinnarrativesareusedtojustifyparticularpropertyregimes,policies,and

19Honoré(1987)arguesthatthefollowingincidentsarecommonrequisitesfortheideaofownershiptobeappliedtosomeonewhohaspropertyinterestsinanentity:therighttopossess,therighttouse,therighttomanage,therighttotheincome,therighttothecapital,therighttosecurity,thepoweroftransmissibility,theabsenceofterm,theprohibitionofharmfuluse,liabilitytoexecution,andresiduarycharacter(Becker1977;Honoré1987).Thus,holdingspecificpropertyinterests(legalincidentsorentitlements)leadstosocietalrecognitionthataholderisanownerorhasownership.MunzercombinesHonoré’sincidentsintoaHohfeldianframeworkoflegalconcepts:(1)claim‐rightstopossess,use,manage,andreceiveincome,(2)powerstotransfer,waive,exclude,andabandon,(3)libertiestoconsumeordestroy,(4)immunitiesfromexpropriation,(5)dutiesnotuseharmfully,and(6)liabilitiesforexecutiontosatisfyacourtjudgment(Munzer1990,22).Munzer(1990)observesthatif‘apersonhasalloftheseincidents,ormostofthem,withrespecttoacertainthing,thenheorsheownsit’(Munzer1990,22).

47

projectssuchasstatutorylandtitling.InChapterFour,thisnarrativeapproachisusedto

examinepost‐conflictversuspost‐disasterframingofpropertyrelationsandproperty

issues.

2.3.4PERSONHOODRadin,likeHohfeld(1913)andRose(1994),seespropertyasmorethaneitheramaterial

thingorabundleofrights.Radin(1993,2)arguesthatthestudyofrelationsbetween

propertyandpersonhood“hascommonlybeenbothignoredandtakenforgrantedinlegal

thought.”Shedevelopsapropertytheorythatisbasedonacontinuumbetweenconstitutive

property(thatwhichisboundupinapersonandmakesuswhoweare)andfungible

property(instrumental,monetary,ormarket).Whereasfungiblepropertycanbeassessed

andexchangedinpurelymonetaryterms,constitutivepropertyissocentraltoaperson’s

identitythatseparationwouldthreatentheiridentityandimpactthehumanabilityto

flourish–ortheirpersonhood.Someobjectsinaperson'slifearesointimatetotheperson’s

identitythattheobject’svaluecannotbeproperlyassessedorcommodifiedinmonetary

terms.Sheobservesthattheseconstitutiveconnectionsareoftenimplicitlypartofjudicial

reasoningandarguesthatpersonhoodshouldbeanexplicitcriterionindeterminingwhose

claimtopropertytrumpsotherclaims.Thatconstitutivepropertyclaimsshouldoutweigh

fungiblepropertyclaimswhendeliberatingentitlementsinrelationtopropertyand

desirablesocialoutcomes.Thecloserone’sclaimistotheextremeofconstitutiveproperty,

themoreweighttheclaimshouldbegivenindeterminingoutcomes.

IfHohfeld’sapproachfocusesonthejuralrelationsbetweenpeopleandRose’sapproach

focusesonthenarrativesandrhetoricaldevicesweusetojustifyproperty,Radin’s

approachcouldbesaidtofocusonthedialecticrelationbetweenthesubjectandobjectof

property.Radinquestionsthesubject/objectdichotomyandrevealsthattheobjectof

propertyispartofandconstructsthesubjectofproperty.Thesubject/objectdichotomy

delineatestheactiveandpassivepartsofproperty–thesubjectthatowns,manages,or

thinksversustheobjectthatisowned,managed,orthoughtless(Whatmore2003).The

subjectofpropertyiscommonlytakentobetheactivecomponent(thehuman,theproperty

manager,thecommunity,etc.)andtheobjectofpropertyiscommonlytakentobepassive

(ahouse,acar,anorchard,etc.).Inthissubject/object(active/passive)dichotomy,the

48

‘objectsofproperty’(theentitiesofvalue,benefitstreams,orotherwise)arepassive

entitiesinregardtoactivehumansandhumanrelations.Radinshowsthatsuch

dichotomiesarefalse.

Contrarytotheideathatpropertyconsistsonlyofrightsoractiverelationsbetween

humans(subjectsofproperty),understandingpropertyrequiresinclusionoftheso‐called

objectsofpropertyandtherelationsbetweenhumansandthings.Ofcourse,thisisnotto

suggestthattheconceptofpropertycanbelimitedtoonlythe‘objectsofproperty’or

relationsbetweenhumansandthings–astheserelationsarealwayssociallymediated.

Understandinghowpropertyisconstitutedthroughthesedichotomiesiscentralto

interpretingcurrenttrendsinneoliberalideologyandresourcemanagementstrategies.As

Mansfield(2007,394)describesit,“propertyhasbecomethecentralmodeofregulating

multipleformsofnature”and“effortstocreateandimposenewprivatepropertyregimes

areremakingecosystems,livelihoods,andidentities...”Whiletherelativeconsistencyof

landfacilitatesanimaginationofthe‘objectsofproperty’asinertentities,managementof

dynamicandmobileentitieslikewater,air,andmigratoryanimalsrevealchallengesto

ideasaboutpropertyandtopropertyrelations–especiallywhenprivatepropertyregimes

areassumedtobethemosteconomicallyefficientandrationalstrategiesbutdonot

producedesiredmanagementoutcomes(BrunsandMeinzen‐Dick2000;Schmidtand

Dowsley2010).

Radin’sworkisinterestingonanumberoflevels.First,asdescribedabove,Radinarguesfor

abetterunderstandingofpropertybyre‐examiningthefalsedichotomiesaroundour

notionofproperty.Second,Radincreatesajustificationforemotionandfeelingsofplaceto

bebroughtintojudgmentsregardingpropertybyarguingthatthesecomponentsare

integraltoanindividual’sidentityandtopropertyitself.Sociospatialidentitiesgroundedin

placeandspatialarrangementsareconstitutiveofpropertyasitistheeverydayworking

andinterpretationofhumanrelationsthroughlandscape,land,andthematerialworldthat

produceproperty.Third,fungiblepropertyandconstitutivepropertyarerepresentedona

continuum,asidentificationoffungibleandconstitutivepropertychangesovertimeandin

differentsocialandspatialcontexts.Thishasimplicationsforthewaysinwhichsocial

49

identityframesarelinkedtofungiblepropertyoverspaceandtime.Fourth,thelinksthat

Radinmakesbetweenpropertyandpersonhoodcanbeappliedininterestingwaystothe

relationbetweenterritoryorhomelandandnation.Inthesamewaythattherelationship

betweenapropertyentityandhumanmaybeconstitutivetopersonhood,therelationship

betweenterritoryandnationcanbefundamentalinthecollectiveimaginationof

nationhoodandanautonomous‘nation‐state.’Indeed,thereisastrongparallelbetween

liberalthoughtaboutpropertyandindividualsascitizensandterritoriesandnationsas

‘nation‐states’.Theparallelofpersonhoodandpropertytonationsandhomelands,

territories,andnaturalresourcesofferinsightsintopost‐conflictpropertydebates,

peacebuilding,andnaturalresourcemanagementasdiscussedinChapterSix.

Theorizingandoperationalizingpropertybeyondrightsisrendereddifficultbythefactthat

propertyismultivalentandmultifunctional.Propertyisacontestedterrainofideology,

politicalclaims,economicmodels,identity,religion,governance,andlegalmodelsthatplays

outin“strugglesatalllevelsofsocialorganization”(Benda‐Beckmann,Benda‐Beckmann,

andWiber2006,2).Inemployingtheabovethreeapproachestopropertyinthecasestudy

ofAceh,insightsaredrawnfromlegalgeographyliteratureonproperty,authority,

landscapes,scale,andpost‐conflictlandtenure.

2.4LEGALGEOGRAPHY

2.4.1DEFININGLEGALGEOGRAPHYLegalgeographyisasub‐disciplinethatexaminesrelationsbetweenlaw,physicalspace,

andsociospatialprocesses(HolderandHarrison2003;Kedar2003;Forman2006).While

legalgeographyisdiversebothintermsoftopicsandmethods,itisthematicallycoherentin

itsfocusonresearchandtheorythatexaminethelaw‐spacenexus(Blomley1989).20

Propertyisacoreconceptinthelaw‐spacenexus.AsWhatmorewrites,“propertyisoneof

20Thisfocuscanbediversebothintermsoftopicsandmethods,butthematicallyitiscoherent.Blomley(2000)outlinesfourthemesthatsummarizethetypeofquestionsbeingaskedaboutinterlinkagesofthelegalandthesociospatial.Thesethemesarethat(1)lawisproducedincontextandthroughspatialaspectsofpoliticalstruggle,(2)lawisinterpretedinspaces,(3)legalinterpretationproducesspaces,and(4)legalrepresentationmodifiesspatialphenomena.

50

the,ifnotthe,primarycurrenciesthroughwhichconversationsbetweenLawand

Geographyhavebeen,andcontinuetobe,conducted.Thisshouldcomeasnosurprise,

giventheirsharedcomplicityinthecartographiesofgovernance,commerce,andscience”

(Whatmore2003,211).Legalgeographicinterpretationsoflandscapeandscalecanprovide

analyticalframeworksthatrecognize“thedialecticbetweenpowerandresistance,the

mannerinwhichpropertyentailsbothpracticeandrepresentation,thecomplexpoliticsof

placeandthehistoricalnarrativesandspatialmappingsthatunderwritepropertyclaims”

(Blomley1998,608).Inutilizinglegalgeographyunderstandingoftheconceptsof

propertiedlandscapes(Blomley1998),evidencelandscapes(Unruh2006),andscalar

politics(MacKinnon2011)toinformapproachestopropertyinthecontextofPCNRM,this

dissertationcontributestoagrowingbodyofliteraturegrapplingwithapproachesto

property.

Whilelegalgeographymaybeanemergingsub‐discipline,Blomley(1994)findsthatthe

intellectualhistoryoflegalgeographycanbetracedbacktothe16thcenturywritingsof

BodinonmappinglawandMontesquieu’s18thcenturytheoryofclimaticinfluencesonlegal

traditions.Blomley(1994)arguesthatthreetheoreticalemphases–regionalism,impact

analysis,andcriticallegalgeography–canbeusedtoclassifythedifferentwaysinwhich

geographershavedealtwithlaw.Thefirstemphasis,regionalism,includesworksthatmap

categoriesoflegaltraditionsoverspaceandworksthatdeterministicallylinktheoriginof

legaltraditionstotheirphysicalcontexts.Thesecondemphasis,impactanalysis,explores

howlawandlegalpracticesinfluencelandscapesandspatialforms.Impactanalysis,thus,

invertsregionalism’slineofcausalitybetweengeographyandlaw.Thethirdemphasis,

criticallegalgeography,focusesonhowlaw,physicalspace,andsociospatialprocessesare

mutuallyconstituted.Itowesitsemergencetothelawandsocietymovement(Sibley2002;

Vago2008),criticallegalstudies(Gordon2001;deBeen2008),ideasaboutthesocial

productionofspaceandtheroleofspaceinsocialpower(Foucault1980;Lefebvre1991),

andconceptsresultingfromthebroader‘spatialturn’insocialtheory(WarfandArias

2009).Mutualconstitutionisthefundamentalconceptualdividebetweencriticallegal

geographyandpreviouslegalgeographicemphasesthatacceptedboththedivisionand

unilinearcausalityofspheresoflawandspace.

51

Thedistinguishingfeatureof thisperspective is itsrefusal toaccepteither laworspaceaspre‐politicalorastheunproblematicoutcomeofexternalforces.Bothareregarded as deeply social and political. Law is seen both as a site in whichcompetingvalues,practicesandmeaningsare foughtover,andalsoas themeansby which certain meanings and social relations become fixed and naturalized,either inoppressiveorpotentiallyempoweringways.Similarly,space isregardedasbothsociallyproducedandassociallyconstitutive,withattentionbeingdirectedtothe'politics'ofspace.(Blomley2000,436)

Researchonpropertyhasrecentlybeenreinvigoratedbythegrowthininterestinthe‘law‐

spacenexus’andlegalgeography’scross‐pollinationofcriticalinquiryinhumangeography,

legalanthropology,andlawandsociety(Blomley1994;Blomleyetal.2001;Delaney2001;

HolderandHarrison2003;Benda‐Beckmannetal.Griffiths2009).Ofcourse,thestudyof

propertyisnotthesoledomainoflegalgeographyasgeographershavelongbeeninvolved

withresearchonproperty.Inthefollowingsections,Icriticallyoverviewgeographicwork

onpropertyandthenintroducepropertiedlandscape,evidencelandscapes,andwaysin

whichthescalarpoliticscanbeusedtounderstandproperty.

2.4.2GEOGRAPHICPERSPECTIVESONPROPERTYWithinthedisciplineofgeography,thediversityofapproachestopropertydefiesanyeasy

categorization.TheseapproachesincludeeverythingfromKropotkin’s(1995)anarchistic

rejectionofprivatepropertytoattemptstounderstandsubject/objectdichotomiesin

regardtointellectualpropertyand‘wilderness’(Whatmore2003),analyzegenderedtenure

relations(RocheleauandRoss1995;RocheleauandEdmunds1997),disaggregateforest

andterritorialdefinitionsofproperty(Peluso1995),developappliedapproachesto

propertyclaimsandevidenceinpost‐conflictsettings(Unruh2003,2006),designpolicyfor

naturalresourcemanagementissues(Giordano2003),understandhowpropertylinksto

sovereigntyandhumanterritoriality(Sack1986;Scott1998),investigatelegalnarrative

andjudicialreasoningaboutpropertyinthecontextofsocietalchangeandinrelationto

humanrightsandthegeographicconceptofplace(Delaney1993,1998,2001b;Blomley

2004;FlemsæterandSetten2009).Despitetheoverwhelmingdiversity,thespectrumof

contemporarygeographicliteratureonpropertycanbeorganizedintothreeheuristic

groups.First,therearethoseapproachesthatusethetermpropertysimplyasasynonymof

land;second,areapproachestopropertynarrowlyasrights;and,third,areapproachesthat

52

seepropertyasabroadfieldofinquiryintothediscursiveandmaterialprocesses

implicatedinsociospatialrelations.Thefirstofthethreegroupsofgeographicliterature,

whichuses‘property’or‘landedproperty’asasynonymforlandorlandparcels,canbe

foundinstudiesthatinvestigatetopicslikepropertyvalue(Che2005),housingmarkets

(ChokoandHarris1990),andlandacquisitionprograms(Naylon1959).Whilethis

approachtopropertyaslandisinterestinginthatitrevealsthecognitivelinkbetweenland,

territory,andproperty,itisinsufficientfordevelopingananalyticalapproachtoproperty

asasociospatialprocess.Thus,themainfocusofthisoverviewofgeographyandpropertyis

thedistinctionbetweenpropertynarrowlyconceivedofasrightsandpropertymore

broadlyconceivedofasafieldofinquiry.

Thedistinctionbetweennarrowandbroadapproachestopropertyhasnot,untilrecently,

beenanissueinthedisciplineofgeography.Ofcourse,topicsthatimplicateproperty

relations(likeland,territory,andsovereignty)havelongbeenandcontinuetobeconcerns

ingeographicliterature(Jones2003;Delaney2005).Aswell,propertyrightsremaina

centralconcernofgeographicworkindiverse,thoughoftenoverlappingareaslikepolitical

enfranchisement,capitalismandclassstruggle,naturalresourcemanagement,gender,

peaceprocesses,landclaims,livelihoods,internationaldevelopment,authority,andplace

andrace(EmelandBrooks1988;Prem1992;Ford1994;Schroeder1997;Feldmanand

Jonas2000;Unruh2002,2003;Blomley2003b;Wolford2004;Campbell2007;Sikorand

Lund2009).Yet,severalauthorsarguethattherehasonlyrecentlybeenaninterestamong

geographersinhowsocietyconceivesofandpracticespropertyandhowpropertyfunctions

asasociospatialrelation(Blomley1994;Blomley,Delaney,andFord2001;Blomley2003a,

2003b;Whatmore2003;Blomley2004,2005;Brown2007a,2007b;FlemsæterandSetten

2009).

Thenarrowapproachtopropertyaccordswithgeography’slongstandingtraditionsof

empiricalresearchongovernance,resourcemanagement,economics(suchas,housingand

realestatemodels),andpolitics.Inthisapproach,propertyoftenfunctionsasan

independentvariableinthespatialmodelingoflanduseandlandcoverchange(Nelsonet

al.2001;Chowdhury2006)andineconomicdevelopmentmodelsinvestigatingtheroleof

53

property(rights)indetermininginvestmentinurbanandruralareas(Rogerson1996).

Approachestopropertyasrightsalsofigureintoarticlesthatconfrontthelogisticsand

ethicsofthedistributionofpropertyrightswithinsociety(Price1995).Authorsthatuse

thisdistributionalperspective,includingsomewhostudypoliticalviolenceinregardtoland

claims(Simmonsetal.2007),tendtofocusonpropertyrightsasanoutcomeorgoalof

actorsratherthanthepropertyrelationsornarrativesthatareconstitutiveofsociospatial

processes.

Onthespectrumbetweenthenarrowandbroadapproachesaremanyattemptsto

conceptuallysituatepropertyrightswithinlargeranalyticalframeworksconcerning

resourceaccess,governance,andauthority.Theseattemptsmovebeyondthenarrowview

ofpropertyassimplyvariablesinmodelsoroutcomes,buttheycontinuetodefineproperty

narrowlyasrights.Theseattemptscanleadtorichworkonhowpropertyrightsareusedto

structuresociospatialrelationsincontextswhereinstateformationandthelimitsofstate

legalsystemsarechallenged.Theycanalsobefruitfulininvestigatinghowpropertyrights

arerecognizedanddistributedbythestate,negotiatedinlocalcommunities’tenure

systems,andfunctioninresourcemanagementorinbuildingsystemsofpoliticalandlegal

authority(Peluso1995;Sowerwine2004a,2004b;SikorandLund2009).Yet,limiting

propertytorightsaloneweakensthetheoreticalframeworkandresultinganalyses.

Forexample,accesstheoryhasbeendevelopedbyscholarswhofocusonrurallivelihoods

wherestateinstitutionshaveincompleteterritorialcontrol,havechallengestotheir

legitimacy,andaresometimesnearlyirrelevanttolocalpropertyrelations(Ribotand

Peluso2003).Accesstheorycriticizespropertytheoryasfocusedonlyonrightsratherthan

thenumerouswaysthatpeopleexercisethe‘abilitytobenefitfromthings’(Ribotand

Peluso2003,153).However,ratherthanbroadeningtheunderstandingofproperty,access

theoryprovidesanarrowaccountofpropertyassimplyrights.Accesstheoryarguesthat

thewaysinwhichpeopleaccesspropertyareasimportanttosocialscientificanalysisasthe

rightsthatconstituteproperty.However,inseparatingaccessfromproperty,accesstheory

narrowlydefinespropertyasjustonetypeofauthority‐approvedclaimorauthority‐

approvedabilitytobenefitfromthings(RibotandPeluso2003;SikorandLund2009).For

54

example,inarecentlypublishededitedcollection,SikorandLund(2009)drawfromaccess

theorytoexaminegovernanceandresourcemanagementthroughaconceptualframework

basedonthedifferencebetweenproperty/accessandauthority/power.Theydrawfrom

theideathatproperty(specifically,rights)representaformalizationofaccessthatis

constitutiveofauthorityandpower.Yet,authorsintheeditedvolumestrayandcritically

engagewithbroaderideasofpropertyassociospatialprocesses,narratives,andnon‐rights

relations.Accesstheoryisanapproachthathasencouragedsomeinsightfulworkonthe

interactionsbetweenpropertyrights,authority,andnaturalresourcemanagement.Yet,

whenrigidlyfolloweditsframeworklosesthenuancesofthenatureofproperty–

proprietaryinterestsinrelationtosocietalchange,thewidediversityofpropertyrelations

(includingthediversityofemotionalconnections,typesofrightsandduties,andnumerous

juralrelations),andthedifferentculturalnarrativesandimaginationsofpropertyand

ownership.

Anotherexampleofliteraturethatfallssomewherebetweenthenarrowandbroad

approachesisGiordano’s(2003)articleonscale,propertyrights,andresourcegovernance.

Giordano(2003,369)conceptualizespropertyasthespatiotemporaldomainsofrights–a

rightsdomain.Hearguesthatthe“commonsproblemoccurswhenaresourcedomainis

coincidentwithorintersectstherightsdomainsoftwoormoreresourceusers”.To

illustratethemismatchingaspectsofthe“naturaldomainsofresourceandtherights

domainofusers”(2003,371)hedelineatesprivate,openaccess,fugitive,andmigratory

domainsbasedonhowresourceflowsmovethroughthetemporal,spatial,andscalar

structureofrightsdomains.These‘rightsdomains’representdifferentsortsofproperty

regimes,butheisonlyconcernedwiththerights.Hearguesthatunderstandingcommons

problemsinvolvescorrectlyspecifyingwhataspectsoftheresourcedomainsconflictwith

rightdomains.Whilehisframeworkisanimportantcontributiontoconceptualizingthe

commons,hedoesnotincludeanyotherjuralrelationsthatconstituteresource

managementregimes.Understandingandsolvingproblemsinthecommonsisnotjusta

questionofgettingthesociospatialaspectsofpropertyrightscorrect.Attentionshouldalso

beplacedonthesociospatialaspectsofpropertyobligations,duties,powers,immunities,

privileges,emotionalconnections,andnarrativeandmoraldiscourses.Withouta

55

considerationofalltheseotheraspectsofproperty,therightsdomainisarelativelylimited

waytoapproachthecommonsproblem.

Thebroadapproachtopropertyenvisionspropertyasanexpansivefieldofinquiry.Ituses

thenarratives,representationalpractices,sociospatialrelations,andmaterialpracticesthat

constitutepropertyasanalyticallensesthroughwhichbroaderhumanrelationscanbe

investigated.Literatureinthebroadapproachtopropertyismoreinterestedinhow

changingconceptsofpropertyandpropertyrelationsinteractwithsociospatialprocesses

thanwithsimplypointingtorightsasoutcomesofthoseprocesses.Criticallegalgeography

providestoolsforengaginginbroadapproachestogeography.Perhapsbecausecritical

legalgeography’soriginsarecloselylinkedtocriticallegalstudies,scholarsinvolvedwith

thisapproachtendtoquestionanysortoflaw/societydichotomy.Thus,theideaoflimiting

propertytoauthority‐approvedclaim‐rightstoaccessresourcesisantithesisto

investigatingthetotalityofpropertyrelationsandchangingconceptsofproperty(Blomley

1998).Legalgeographicapproachesinvestigatehowconceptualizationsofpropertymay

limitorenablepoliticalstruggles,impactpublicandprivatespaces,andinfluenceclaimsto

proprietaryinterests(Delaney2001b;Blomley2003;Unruh2003;Blomley2004;Unruh

2006).Suchapproachesalsocallintoquestionthewayweemphasizeonlyhumanrelations

inspeakingaboutrightsandthuscreateadichotomybetweenthesubjectandobjectof

property.Putinconcreteterms,thewaythatwedisregardhowcharacteristicsoftheobject

ofproperty(suchasahouseorhome)playaroleindefiningandchangingthesubjectof

property(suchasanhomeowner)(Whatmore2003).Theseapproachesprovideavenues

throughwhichsociospatialtheorycaninformtheinterplayofpropertyandlaw.21

Anexampleoftherecentlegalgeographicliteratureinthisbroadapproachtopropertyis

Delaney’s(2001a)investigationofpropertyintheAnti‐RentWars.Delaneyunderscores

thewaysthatlegalargumentationandjudicialdecision‐makinginseveral19thcentury

casesinvolvingtheManorofRensselaerwyckintheNewYorkStateCourtofAppealsreveal

21Forexample,drawingfromHenriLevebfre’s(1991)theoryoftripartitespace(thevécu,conçu,andperçu),someauthorshaveattemptedtoexaminehowpropertyinteractswithlaw,place,territory,landscapes,place,capitalism,andpoliticalresistance(Delaney2001;FlemsæterandSetten2009).

56

changesintheconceptofpropertyreflectiveofongoingsocial,political,andeconomic

changesinNewYorkStateandtheUSA.Attheheartofthematterinthesecaseswas

whetherthegrantingofthe‘manor’necessarilyentailedwhathadbecomeillegalfeudal

tenurerelations(subinfeudation)orwhetherthepropertyrelationsofthemanorwere

simplyincidentaltoalandgrant.Delaneyfocusesonthenarrativesusedtocontestthe

redistributionofsemanticelements(i.e.manorialterritoryandmanorialprivilege,property

andpossession,ownershipoflandandownershipofrent,andrentandremedy)andhow

“themaneuveringofthesesemanticelementscreatesnewpropertyrelations”(Delaney

2001a,503).Hisargumentisnotjustaboutwhohasorshouldhavethestrongerproperty

rights.Itisabouthowdifferentnarrativeschangeproperty,whohastheabilitytodecide

whichjuralrelationsarelegalandequitable,andhow“partisansattempttoproduce(or

reproduce)socialspacethroughthestrategicinterpretationoflinesofcontinuity(or

discontinuity)ofthelegalmeaningofspaceencodedinrivalconceptionsofproperty”

(Delaney2001a,493).ThisstudyontheAnti‐RentWars,likeotherstudiesinthebroad

approach,revealspropertytobearichareafortheexpansionofgeographicinquiry.

Inanotherexample,Peluso(1995)examineshowmappingand‘counter‐mapping’canbe

usedasnarrativedevicesforframingclaimstoresources.Whenlocalusersengagein

counter‐mappingtoprotecttheirforestresourcesagainststateclaims,theyengageina

“processofmappingthatforcesthereinterpretationofcustomaryrightstoresources

territorially,therebychangingboththeclaimandtherepresentationofitfromrightsin

trees,wildlife,orforestproductstorightsinland”(1995,388).Thisisapowerfulstatement

abouthowevenwhencontestingthestate,simplymakingclaimsinthelanguageofthe

statetransmuteslocalconceptsofpropertyfromacomplexnetworkofsociospatial

relationstoasimplified,lessdynamic,andmoreterritorialconceptcoherentwithstatutory

approachestoforestresourcesandpropertyrights.Peluso(1995)demonstrateshowthe

processof‘counter‐mapping’changesthesociospatialrelationsthatconstituteproperty,the

waypeoplemakeclaimstoproperty,andthewaypeoplethinkaboutproperty.Theabove

examplesofbroadapproachestopropertyrevealwaysinwhichsociospatialstrugglesover

discursiveandmaterialprocessesareimplicatedintherealizationofproperty.

57

2.4.3LANDSCAPELandscapeisacoreconceptinthedisciplineofgeographythathasprovenparticularly

usefulforexploringrelationshipsbetweengovernance,law,land,andproperty(Olwig

1996;Schein1997;Blomley1998;Unruh2006;Maandi2009).Approachestolandscapes

aredividedbroadlyintotwolinesthatfollow(1)Sauer’s(1925)‘morphologyoflandscape’

or(2)ideasabout‘landscapeasawayofseeing’and‘landscapeastext’(Cosgrove1984;

CosgroveandJackson1987;Duncan1990).Thislatterapproachissometimesknownas

‘newculturalgeography’(Mitchell2000).Althoughthelatterapproachsometimesdraws

fromSauer’s‘morphology’insightthatcultureactsasanagentonthenaturalarea

producingaculturallandscape,thenewculturalgeographyapproachalsocritiquesSauer’s

lackofacleardefinitionofcultureornatureandidentifieswaysinwhichlandscapesand

representationsoflandscapesworkpoliticallyandideologicallyonhumanpractices

(CosgroveandJackson1987).Thesenewculturalgeographersarguethatlandscapes

encapsulatecontestedpoliticaldiscoursesandsocialcontradictions(Duncan1990;Schein

1997).Duncan(1990),forexample,seesthelandscapeasatextandrevealshowpolitical

discoursesin19thcenturySriLankausedthematerialandsymbolicaspectsoflandscape

andarchitecturetocontestandreproducepower.Thestrugglesrepresentedbyand

realizedthroughlandscapesoftenrelatebacktohowsourcesofterritorialauthority

reproduceandcontestproperty(Moore1973;Blomley1998;Unruh2003;Moore2005).In

fact,Blomleyarguesthatlandscapeprovidesacriticalcomponentforframeworksdesigned

tounderstandpropertythatmustbesensitiveto“thedialecticbetweenpowerand

resistance,themannerinwhichpropertyentailsbothpracticeandrepresentation,the

complexpoliticsofplaceandthehistoricalnarrativesandspatialmappingsthatunderwrite

propertyclaims”(Blomley1998,608).

Ofinteresttothisdissertationisworkthatlinkslandscapetoproperty(Blomley1998,

2003),evidence(Unruh2006),andpost‐conflictlandtenure(Unruh2003).Therearetwo

mainbenefitsofusinglandscapeasawaytoinformapproachtopropertyinthis

dissertation.First,geographicapproachestolandscapecanhelpoperationalizeproperty

narrativesandfacilitatetheanalysisoflandpropertywithoutreducingpropertytostatic

rightsorlandparcels.Blomley(1998,577)pointsout,

58

If struggles around property concern, in part, contestedmaterial spaces, and therepresentationofspace,thepolysemicqualitiesoflandscapeseemausefulpointofentry.However,acloserattentiontothetermalsorevealsthat"landscape,"whetherunderstood as "morphology" or "representation," can be shot through withcontesting claims to property. To the extent that "landscape" alerts us to thematerialityofproperty,itseemsuseful.Landasbothanideologicallyreifiedsurfaceandasocialsiteforembodiedpracticesisimportanttopropertyrelations.Buttheconcept of landscape invites us to also think about the ways in which "land" isrepresented. Such representations, I shall suggest, are ineluctably caught upwithcontendingclaimstoproperty.

Thesecondbenefitoflandscapeisthatitnotonlyhelpsconceptualizerepresentationaland

materialstrugglesoverproperty,italsooffersawaytooperationalizethesestrugglesin

responsetoissuesinpost‐conflictscenarios.Unruh(2003)pointsoutthatlocaldisputes

overland,conflictsbetweeninformalandformalauthoritythatimplicateterritorialcontrol

overlandproperty,andambiguouslandtenureregimesarecentralproblemsinproviding

tenuresecurityinpost‐conflictscenarios.Navigatingtheseissueswithanunderstandingof

landscaperevealshowpropertynarratives(evidence)cometoberealizedinthelandscape

througheverydaypracticesandofferopportunitiestoovercomethedisconnectionbetween

informalandformalpropertyregimes(Unruh2006).Below,Ioutlinehowtheconceptsof

‘propertiedlandscape’and‘evidencelandscape’havebeenappliedinpost‐conflict

scenarios.

PropertiedLandscape

Blomley(1998)usestheterm‘propertiedlandscapes’toframehisinvestigationofthe

complexwaysinwhichpropertyisspatializedinurbanspaces.Heundertakesastudyof

downtownVancouverwhichrevealshowthecreationandmaintenanceofproperty

requiresnormativeorganizationoftherepresentationsandlivedpracticesofproperty.He

probesethicalquestionsunderlyingthewaypropertyisdiscursivelycreatedinrelationto

people’sactualbehaviour,connectionstoplace,andthesocialdistributionofrightsand

obligations.Hefindsthatlivedpracticescreatetypesofpropertyincoherenttomarket‐

drivengentrificationandthatalternative,progressiverepresentationoflegalspacesand

propertymustnecessarilycontradictthenormalideaofpropertyassimplytherightto

exclude.Blomley’sargumentalignswithbothSinger’s(2000)critiqueofthe‘ownership

model’ofpropertyasunrealisticandideologicalandRadin’s(1993)personhoodapproach

59

Figure2.3:The‘landscapeofproperty’.Thelayersrepresentdifferentwaysinwhichlandownershipisarticulated.Source:Maandi2009,456.

thatarguesconstitutivepropertyshouldbeweightedmorethanfungiblepropertyin

adjudicatingclaims.Blomley’spropertiedlandscapeopenssomeinterestingavenuesfor

exploringpropertyinpost‐conflictscenarios.Aspropertychallengesinpost‐conflict

scenariosofteninvolvelandproperty,theabilityoflandscapetooperationalizealternative

approachestopropertybyintegratinginsightsonlaw,land,andpropertyisparticularly

compelling.Maandi(2009)directlyappliesBlomley’sideaofpropertiedlandscapetoan

investigationofhowlocalEstoniancommunitiesmanagedtomaintainandarticulate

privatepropertyrightsthroughbehaviorsandsubtlelandscapefeaturesduringperiodsof

Sovietcontrolin1940‐41and1944‐1991.InFigure2.3,Maandiidentifiesfourlayersof

interactionofthepropertiedlandscape:stateterritoryandlawsonownership,official

propertystructure,localbehavior,andmateriallandscape.

Hefindsthatlocalpropertyrelationswereabletosurvivehalfacenturyofanalternative

visionofpropertyimposedbytheSovietstate.Claimstocertainspaceswerekeptthrough

activitieslikehaymakingandfuelwoodgathering;materialartifactsincludingnetworksof

tracks,stonewalls,cattlelanesandditches;andoralhistoriespasseddownthroughthe

family.Inhisthreecasestudies,pre‐Sovietownersortheirheirsreclaimed39‐100percent

60

ofvillagelandsbybasingclaimsonthesealternativeformsofevidenceduringthepost‐

Sovietprivatizationoflandparcels.Thesefindingsrevealthatwhiledominantvisionsof

propertycanbeviolentlyimposedthroughthefrontier,survey,andgrid,theremayalways

bealternativepropertiedlandscapesthatresistandcontinuetoexistbeneaththesurfaceof

structuresthatterritorializestatepowerandsingularvisionsofproperty,territory,and

sovereignty(Blomley1998;Blomley2003).Indeed,hereinwebegintoseewaysinwhich

authority,scale,andpropertyintermingle.WhileMaandi(2009)directlyoperationalizes

Blomley’spropertiedlandscape,Unruh(2006)offershisownuniqueconceptofthe

‘evidencelandscape’toexploretheconstructionofauthorityandstatutorysystems.

EvidenceLandscape

Theviolenceusedtocontrolpropertyisdramaticallydisplayedinwarandpost‐conflict

scenarioswhereincollapseofterritorialauthorityoccurs(Unruh2005).Theseoutbreaksof

violenceandfissuresinterritorialauthoritycreatenewandcontributetoexistingtenure

disconnectsbetweeninformal(non‐state)andformal(statutory)propertysystems–

between,respectively,defactoanddejuresystemsofproperty.Whilethetenuredisconnect

betweenformalandinformalpropertysystemsisacommonandparticularlyvisible

concerninpost‐conflictscenarios,itisalsoabroaderissuethattroublestheterritorial

extensionofthestate,tenuresecurity,andtreatmentofpropertyinrelationtohuman

rightsandunderstandingof‘development.’Infact,thistenuredisconnectisfundamentally

aboutdifferentunderstandingsofwhatpropertyshouldbeandofwhatpropertyrelations

canandshouldberecognizedbystatutorylaw.Unruh(2006)outlinesexistingparadigms

usedtobridgethetenuredisconnectasreplacement,evolution,andadaptation.The

replacementapproachsimplyimplementsanewpropertysystemwithoutregardtolocal

practicessoitislessofabridgeandmoreofabulldozer.Theevolutionaryparadigm“holds

thatpopulationincreaseresultsinlandscarcity,changeinlandvalues,increased

uncertainty,andconflict;asaresult,thepopulacedemandsandthestatedeliversmore

securepropertyrightsviatitle”(Unruh2006,758).Theevolutionaryparadigmimpliesthat

thereisanaturalevolutiontowardsprivatepropertyinalldomainsofpropertyrelations

(deSoto200).Thethirdparadigmofadaptation(orco‐adaptation),emphasizesthatthe

developmentofinformalpropertysystemsoccursthroughanadaptiverelationbetween

61

formalandotherinformalsystemsandleavesopenthepossibilitythatsomepartsofthe

policydisconnectmayneverbetrulyresolvedintoonecoherentpropertysystem.These

differentparadigmsaffecthowpost‐conflictpolicyandprojectsapproachpropertyandmay

influencewhetheropportunitiesforpeacebuildingareadequatelyrealizedinPCNRM.

The‘evidencelandscape’isembeddedintheadaptiveparadigmasitemphasizesand

providesawayforpractitionersandresearcherstoinferandrecognizethepracticesof

existing,post‐conflictpropertysystemsinwaysthatbuildstatelegitimacyandrespect

ongoing,livedpractices.InUnruh’sanalysisofinformalandformalconflictsrangingfrom

ZuniclaimsintheUSSouthwesttopost‐conflictlandtenureinEastTimorandMozambique,

hearguesthat'evidencelandscapes'areconstitutedofempiricalartifactsgeneratedby

practiceslikeclearingvegetation,erectingfences,orplantingcertaintreetypestomake

claimstoland(Unruh2006).This'evidencelandscape'conceptfollowstheAmerican

traditionofculturallandscapesthatseesthelandscapeas“ourunwittingautobiography...

theculturalrecordwehave"written"inthelandscape…”(Lewis1989,12).Whilethis

empiricalandautobiographic‘evidencelandscape’isveryusefulforpractitionershopingto

supportpropertytenuresecurityinpostwarcontexts,itcanalsobeimportanttoanswering

questionsaboutthecreation,representation,andinterpretationofpropertyandauthority.

Indeed,asUnruh’sdiscussionofevidencereveals,hisworkisnotsimplyaboutculture’s

impactonnature,italsoaboutgettingstatutoryinstitutionstoreadthelandscapeina

differentway.Hecontendsthatitwillbe“mucheasiertosecurelandtenurebygetting

Western‐basedformallawtoattendmorecloselytoitsowntraditionsinthetreatmentof

evidence,ratherthanattemptingtoincorporatecustomaryrightsintoformallaw,orto

changecustomarytenureviatitling”(Unruh2006,756).HearguesthatWestern‐based

formallaw’sownunderstandingofevidenceasargumentsthatcanbeindeterminate,based

onfactandinference,andlinkedtootherargumentstobecomemorepersuasive,shouldbe

appliedtotheselandscapes.Inlinkingevidencetopersuasionandevidence,theevidence

landscapelinksdiscourseandmaterialpractices.Inatextualmetaphor,Westernlawhas

beenreformattingthelandscaperatherthanreadingitforthelogicalargumentscoherent

withWesternlegallogicandunderstandingofevidence.

62

InChapterFour,Iapplytheseideasoflandscapeaspersuasivenarrativeinboth

representationalandmaterialdimensionstoexplorehowthepost‐conflictversuspost‐

disasternarrativessurroundingpropertyissuesandpracticesonthegroundinfluencedthe

definitionofpropertyandwaysthatpropertywas/wasnotlinkedtopeacebuilding.

2.4.4SCALEScaleisacomplexandcontestedconceptthathascometobethefocusofsomeofthecore

debatesingeography.Infact,geographersareoftenatthecenterofbroaderacademic

debatesoverwhatscalemeans,howscaleshouldbethoughtofandresearched,and

whetherscaleevenexists(Taylor1982;Smith1984,1988,1992;Jonas1994;Agnew1997;

DelaneyandLeitner1997;Swyngedouw1997;Cox1998;Morrill1999;Marston2000;

Brenner2001;Purcell2003;Mansfield2005;Marstonetal.2005;LeitnerandMiller2007;

Moore2008;Herod2011;MacKinnon2011).Ofparticularinteresthereishowthebroad

approachtopropertymightbelinkedtoscalarprocesses;morespecifically,howscalesare

sociallyconstructedthroughthediscursiveandmaterialpracticesofpropertyand,inturn,

howpropertyisconstitutedthroughscalarprocesses.

Ingeography,scalehas“atleasttwoverydifferentmeanings”–onethatistechnical(asa

methodologicalissueindatacollectionandcartography)andanotherthatreferstohuman

perceptionsofthesize(geographicextentandsometimesquantity)andlevel(likenational,

regional,orurbanlevels)ofprocessesandphenomena(Herod2011,xi).Thislattertypeof

scaleassizeorlevelisinnatelysubjective,relational,andfluid(Howitt1998,2002).Several

authorsarguethatratherthanfocusonhowtoconceptualizeandoperationalizethese

differentscales,researchersshouldreorienttheirfocustowardsthepoliticalandsocial

processesthroughwhichscalesareconstituted(Moore2008;Herod2011;MacKinnon

2011).MacKinnonarguesthatafocuson‘scalarpolitics’replacesthenotionthatthe

‘politicsofscale’areaboutscalewiththeideathat‘particularpoliticalprojectsand

initiativeshavescalaraspectsandrepercussions’and‘focusesattentiononthestrategic

deploymentofscalebyvariousactors,organizationsandmovements’(2011,29).This

drawsfromtheargumentthatratherthanperceivingofscalesasterritorialcontainersor

‘spaceenvelopes’thatgainorlosepowerthroughprocesseslike‘rescaling’thestatein

neoliberalismorserveasplatformsforpoliticalstrategiesof‘jumpingscales,’weshould

63

analyzescalesasvariabledimensionsofpoliticaleconomicpracticesandprocesses

(Mansfield2005).MacKinnon(2011)alsoarguesthatafocusonscalarpoliticsrevealsthe

influenceofperceptionsofscalarstructuresonthematerialanddiscursivepracticesof

projectsengagedinscalarprocesses.Inotherwords,scalesthemselvesarethecontingent

resultofpolitical,social,cultural,economic,andecologicalprocesses.Additionally,suchan

approachrecognizesthatnoparticularscalecanbedesignatedasaprivilegedentrypoint

foranalyses.

Scalingpropertyand‘propertying’scale

Linksbetweenpropertyandscalefeatureingeographicresearchontopicslike

environmentalgovernance,sovereignty,andnaturalresourcemanagement(Giordano

2003;Liverman2004;McCarthy2005).Yet,thisliteraturetendstoeitherlimitpropertyto

restrictedversionsofpropertyasrightsortoreifyversionsofscaleaslevelsor‘space

envelopes.’Thefocusisoftenonthedistributionofpropertyrightsbetweenpredefined

levelsliketheindividual,household,neighborhood,community,province,andnation‐state.

Otherstudiesinvestigatehowsocialactorsoperatingfromdifferentlevelsobtainproperty

rights.Theseapproachestendtoframepropertyconflictsasoccurringbetweenscales–

suchasthe‘community’versusthenation‐state(orotherlevelsofgovernment)or‘local’

actorsversus‘global’actors.Occasionally,inrelyingonscaleaslevel,theseapproachesmay

drawondisputednotionsofthenation‐stateasamonolithicforceorasavehiclefor

corporateintereststhatdispossesspeopleofpropertyrightsthroughvariouslevelsof

statutorylawactingagainstorrestructuring‘local’,‘community’,‘customary’,‘traditional’,

or‘indigenous’propertypracticesandrelations(Scott1998;Blomley2003;Harris2004;

Zulu2009).Suchworksengagewithinterestingtheoreticalconstructsregardingsocial

powerandcanrevealmuchabouttheproblemsandprocessesinvolvedinpropertyrights

distributionoverscales.However,itisrarethatscalarprocessesaregivenpriorityover

scalelevels.Aswell,otherlegalconceptsorjuralrelationsrarelyfeatureaspartofthese

analyses–evenwhentheculturalandemotionalconnectionstomaterialresourcesare

discussedasethicalgroundsformakingpropertyclaimsandareseeninsomewaysto

sociospatiallyconstitutethenatureofa‘community’(Moore2005).

64

Oneexampleofastudythatusesalternativelegalconceptstoexplorepropertyrelations

withinascalarframeworkisSikor’s(2004)studyof‘post‐socialist’landreformsinrural

Vietnam.DrawingfromGluckman’s(1972)workonBarotsejurisprudenceandVerdery’s

(1999)ideasabout‘post‐socialist’fuzzyproperty,Sikor(2004)outlinesaframeworkfor

examiningchangingobligationsandrightsinthecontextofstate‐ledchangestoproperty

relations.Thesechangesstemmedfroma1993landlawthatrequired‘landallocation’

(demarcationofplots,registration,andissuanceoftitlecertificates)thatconflictedwith

existingpropertyrelations.Inhisarticle,Sikoruses‘landrelations’and‘propertyrelations’

interchangeably.Hearguesthatthelandallocationprocessembodieda‘post‐socialist,’

neoliberalideaofpropertythatchallenged‘pre‐socialist’propertyrelationsandsocialist

landlaws–theallocationprocesserasedthecomplexityofoverlappingtemporaland

spatialrightsanddestroyedthesocialembeddednessofexistingpropertyrelations.

SikorarguesthattheutilityofGluckman’s(1972)frameworkforanalyzingproperty

relationsisinGluckman’sincorporationoftheideaofobligationsandvisionofproperty

relationsasbasedonahierarchyofscalesoroverlappingestates.FollowingGluckman,

Sikorusestheterms‘duties’and‘obligations’interchangeably.Gluckmanrecognizes,like

manyphilosophersandanthropologistbeforehim,thatrightscomefromasocial

communityand,inacquiringpropertyrights,allright‐holderssimultaneouslyacquirea

numberofsocialobligationsthatbindthemmorallytotheircommunityandtothesocial

authoritythatrecognizesandenforcestheirrights.Taxes,giftsofwildgame,portionsof

harvests,orothertransfersmaybepropertyrights‐holders’obligationstomaintaintheir

right.Otherpartieshaveadutytorespecttherightuntiltheright‐holderdoesnotfulfillhis

orherobligations.InGluckman’s(1972,89‐93)framework,theauthoritativebodyitself

alsohascertaindutiesandobligations.Theauthorityhasadutynottopreemptpeople’s

rightswithoutgoodcause(whatissometimescalled‘takings’)andithasanobligationto

provideforclaimsofcommunitymembers.Theseobservationsbecomeclearerwithinan

analysisofGluckman’shierarchicalframeworkofestates.

WhileSikorusestheterms‘estates’,‘powers’,and‘rights’interchangeablythroughouthis

article,Gluckmanreservestheterm‘estates’todescribeacomplexofrightsandobligations

65

(Gluckman1972,90).Brieflysummarized,Gluckmantheorizesthatpropertyembodiesa

hierarchyofoverlappingestates(Sikor2004,77).Therearetwotypesofestates–an‘estate

ofadministration’and‘estateofproduction’.Theestateseachincludeseveraldifferent

typesofrightsandobligations.Theestateofadministrationinvolves“actionsastrusteeson

behalfofsubordinatesbyseniors,thepowerandobligationtoapportionlandamong

subordinates,andtosomeextentpowerstoregulatetheuseoftheland,”whiletheestateof

productionreferstodifferentcomplexesofusufructrights(Gluckman1972,89‐90).While

theestatesofproductioncanbeconcurrentandoverlapping,theyalwaysoccuras

subsidiarytotheestatesofadministration.Anestateofadministrationcanbesubdivided

intofurtherestatesofadministrationorestatesofproduction.Theseestatesareseenas

“’nestedlayersofcontroloverland’or‘a‘hierarchy’inthesenseofa‘seriesofestates’”

(Sikor2004,77).Whetheroneholdsaprimary,secondary,ortertiaryestateof

administrationdependsonone’slocationonscalesofsocialorpoliticalstatus–akingholds

aprimaryestate,chiefsholdsecondaryestates,householdsholdtertiaryestates,andso

on.22Thoughthisframeworkisproposedasahierarchyofsocialstatus,Gluckman’sdivide

betweenestatesofadministrationandproductionparallelscommoncontemporary

approachestopropertythatdesignatetherightoftransferand‘rightstoregulate,

supervise,representinoutsiderelations,andallocateproperty’assuperiorrightstothe

rightstouseorexploitresources(Benda‐Beckmannetal.2006,17).Thisframeworkisan

interestingpointofdepartureforstudyingpropertyinrelationtoauthorityandscale.Sikor

pointsoutthatthoughlowerestateholdersdonothavetherightofalienation,aslongas

theymeettheirobligations“theycontinuetoenjoysecureestatesofproduction...

Obligationsandsocialdebtthusareprimarytorights”(Sikor2004,77).

BuildinguponGluckman’sframework,Sikormakesomestimulatinginsightsaboutthe

‘post‐socialist’changeinpropertyrelationsinruralVietnam.First,inregardtothe1993

landlaw,hedescribesasituationinwhichallresourcesandpropertyrelationshavebeen

subsumedunderadiscourseoflandlaw.Asinmanycases,propertyrelationsregardingall22Similartofeudalsystems,holdersoflowerestatesmayhaveobligationstogivesuperiorestateholderspartoftheirharvestorhunt,butunlikefeudaltenuresystemstheholdersofprimaryestateshaveobligationstoprovidelandforpeoplewhoarepartofvillageswithintheirrealmofauthority(Gluckman1972).

66

resources(forest,water,andotherwise)havebeentreatedasiftheywerelandor

permanentlyconnectedtolandparcels.Second,the1993‘post‐socialist’Vietnameseland

lawterritorializesallresources,renderingthecomplexandflexiblerelationsregarding

resourcesintoabounded,staticformularegardingland.Thesocialistandpre‐socialist

frameworksallowedfluidandfuzzygeographicboundariesandasituationwherein,

“Propertyclaimscanrelatetodifferentresourcesonthesamepieceofland,theycanvary

overtime,andtheymaybeembeddedinaseriesofallocationsincludingmultipleclaims”

(Sikor2004,78).Third,“thebalanceofpowersbetweenthedifferentlayersofsocialcontrol

maydifferbetweenplacesandplots”(Harris2004,78)duetolandscarcity.Accordingto

Gluckman,thebalanceofpowerbetweenvariousholdersofestatesofadministrationand

estatesofproductiontendstoleanmoretowardsholdersofestatesofadministrationas

landscarcityincreases.Thisfinalinsightrevealshowthedistributionofrights,duties,and

obligationshasanimpactonhowscalesarepoliticallyconstitutedandthatproperty

relationschangeinresponsetosocietalandecologicalcontexts.

Drawingontheaboveinsightsandempiricaldata,Sikorarguesthat‘locallandrelations’are

multi‐layered(onscalesofsociopoliticalstatus),socially‐embedded,spatiallyfluid,bound

tostrongobligations,legitimizedthroughmoralandsocialgoals,andflexibleenoughto

allowdynamicdistributionofpowersbetweenscalelevels.Thisisincomparisontothe

1993legislationwhichcreatespropertythatonlyhasadualhierarchy(individual‐state),is

detachedfromsocialstatus,islegitimizedonlythroughformallegalprocedures,hasrigid

spatialboundaries,hasweakobligations(fromthetopdown,thestatehasfewobligations

tothepeople),andcreatesasituationwhereinthebalanceofpowerisfixedandinflexibleto

localecologicalconstraintsandsocialneeds.Sikor’sapproachtendstoreifysociopolitical

scales(inboththepreandpost‐1993versionsofproperty)asfixedlevelsfromwhich

powerisnegotiatedratherthanasscalepositionsordimensionsthatareconstituted

throughthesociospatialaspectsofpropertyrelations.Yet,hisargumentsrevealthepower

oftheorizingpropertyrelationsinrelationtosociopoliticalscalesandthatproperty

relationsplayaroleinconstitutingsociopoliticalscales.AsSikor’s(2004)article

demonstrates,investigatingpropertyrightsandobligationswithinscalarprocessescan

67

revealmuchaboutwhyparticularstatutoryregulations,programs,andprojectsthat

attempttochangepropertyrelationssucceedorfail.

InChapterFive,Idrawfromtheseframeworkstoanalyzetoexaminehowauthority,

property,andscalarprocessesinteractedinacontroversiallandtitlingprojectthattook

placeinAceh,Indonesiabetween2005and2009.Iarguethatthisprojectrescaledproperty

relationsand,insodoing,redistributedpoliticalpoweracrossdifferentscalesof

governance.

2.5SOCIALIDENTITY

InChapterSix,Ibuildapolicytoolthatusesanunderstandingoftheconstitutivedimension

ofproperty(Radin1993)tolinksocialidentitytoPCNRMandpeacebuilding.Below,Ioffer

aworkingdefinitionofsocialidentitybasedonsocialidentitytheory;examinehowsocial

identityandnaturalresourcesarelinkedtoarmedconflicts;andoutlinesomegapsinthe

analyticallinksbetweensocialidentity,property,naturalresourcesandPCNRM.

Iarguethatconceptualizingsocialidentityaseitherafixed,permanentcategoryorasa

framingprocessthatisalwaysreflectiveofsocialandspatialcontextswillinfluencehowwe

understandtherelationofidentitytoproperty,territory,andplace.Thesedifferent

understandingsofsocialidentitychangehowweunderstandtheinterplayofidentity

framesandconstitutivepropertyintheflourishingofindividuals(Radin1993).Property

strugglesimplicatesocialidentitynarrativesandmaterialartifactsofthelandscape(Schein

1997;Blomley1998;Unruh2003,2006).Afterall,identity,property,authority,and

landscapearecloselyintermingled,the“normalizing,normativecapabilitiessimultaneously

makethelandscapecentraltotheongoingproductionandreproductionofplaceand

identity(individualandcollective)”(Schein1997,676).Changingthewaythatwe

understandsocialidentitymayhelpinprovidinginsightsintointractableconflicts.

Thelinksbetweensocialidentityandpropertymayresultinpositiveoutcomesintermsof

naturalresourcestewardship,individualpersonhood,andgroupfunctions.Yet,thesesame

linkscancauseproblemswhensocialidentitiesareinconflictsinvolvingproperty.Inthe

68

caseofpost‐conflictnaturalresourcemanagement,thesocialidentitylinkstopropertymay

underminepeacebuilding–particularlywhenlandisinvolved.Landandlandscapes

functionasthespatialcontainersthroughwhichsuchsocialconstructsasterritory,

homeland,andhomecometobeconceptuallyframedandmateriallyrealized(Moore2005).

Anunderstandingofthelinksbetweensocialidentityandproperty(andparticularlyland)

mightassistplanningappropriatetiming,locations,andmethodsfordesigningand

implementingPCNRMpolicies.

2.5.1SOCIALIDENTITYANDARMEDCONFLICTSThereisawell‐developedliteratureonthelinksbetweensocialidentitiesandarmed

conflict(Huntington1997;KaufmanandSmith1999;FearonandLaitin2000;Shmuelietal.

2006).Muchofthisliteraturefocusesonethnicityorethnicconflict(Nagel1994;Gurrand

Harff1994;Gurr2000;Eriksen2001;Toft2003),yetethnicityisonlyonetypeofidentity

frame.Itisnecessarytoconsiderboththebroadliteratureonsocialidentityandthemore

narrowlyframedworkonethnicconflicttounderstandhowsocialidentitieshavebeen

linkedtoarmedconflict.

Approachestosocialidentitycanbelocatedonacontinuumbetweentwoontological

stances:primordialismandconstructivism.Primordialistapproachesconceptualizesocial

identityasafixedcollectionoftraitsthataregeneticallyinherited(inthestrongsenseof

primordialism)ordeterminedbyculturalnarrativesandsocialstructures(intheweak

senseofprimordialism)(GurrandHarff1994).Primordialistapproachesareboth

essentialistanddeterministintheirunderstandingofidentityasastableaspectofgroup

andindividualpsychology.Huntington‘s(1997)well‐knownworkontheclashof

civilizationsisamodernexampleofhowaprimordialistperspectiveframessomeconflicts

astheinevitableresultofirresolvable,ancientprejudicesandpredictspeople’sbehaviors

alonglinesofhistoricalidentitycategories.Ontheotherhand,constructivistapproaches

emphasizethatidentityisnotfixed;theyrecognizethecomplexwaysinwhichsocial

identityandcollectiveactionaresimultaneouslyconstructedthroughsocialpsychological

framing,context,anddiscourse(Bowen1996;Schmuelietal.2006).Constructivist

approacheslookmoreatcontextualfactorsandagents’decisionsconcerningoverlapping

69

socialroles,framingdiscourses,andhistoricalexperiences.Inotherwords,constructivist

approachesaccepttheideathatsocialidentityishistoricallyconstructed,multi‐faceted,and

contextuallydependent(Gardner2003).Examplesofconstructivistapproachestoidentity

includeeverythingfromSmith‘s(1998)perennialismtopoliticalopportunitytheory(Meyer

2004),socialidentitytheory(TajfelandTurner1979;Hoggetal.1995),andsocial

movementtheory(Tilly2003).Thechoiceofaconstructivistorprimordialistviewpoint

influencesunderstandingofhowsocialidentityrelatestoproperty,naturalresources,war,

andpeacebuilding.Forexample,aprimordialistapproachwouldseethelinkbetween

identityandhomelandterritoriesasafixedrelation.Notonlywouldtherelationbefixed,

butitwoulddeterminethetypesofpossibleinteractionsbetweenidentitygroupswith

competingclaimsforthesamehomelandandwouldinevitablyleadtoconflict.Ontheother

hand,aconstructivistwouldarguethatviolentconflictsarenotinevitable,buttheresultof

strategicinterestsandpoliticaldiscourseslinkingidentitytoterritorialorresource

claims—forexample,irredentistclaimsofGreeceoverthesouthernBalkans(Peckham

2000)andtheflexiblelinksbetweenidentitiesandlivelihoodsinDarfur(Youngetal.2009)

revealhowterritorialclaimsareoftenmanipulatedorcontextuallyframedassocialidentity

claims.Whereaprimordialistapproachenvisagesinevitableconflict,aconstructivist

approachencouragesasearchforwaystoreordertheprimacyofidentityframes(for

exampletodeemphasizesomeidentityclaimsandtoemphasizethebenefitsofshareduser

rights,topointtocommoninterestsinmaintainingresources,ortocreatenewidentity

frames)inconflictsinwhichidentitiesarelinkedtonaturalresourcesorviolence.

Inthisdissertation,thedefinitionofsocialidentityisbasedonsocialidentitytheory—a

constructivistapproachthatemphasizeswaysthatstructuralfactors,groupcharacteristics,

andindividualactordecisionsplayaroleinframingandchoosingidentities(Tajfeland

Turner1979;Hoggetal.1995;StetsandBurke2000;Ashmoreetal.2001).Theemphasisin

socialidentitytheoryislessonhowintragrouprolesinteractandmoreonhowcategories

(orframes)areformedthroughintergroupinteraction.Thisapproachisusefulformoving

beyondsimplyfindingidentitiesinconflicttofindingouthowidentitiesareconstructedas

categories,interactwitheachother,andarelinkedtonaturalresourcesinconflicts.Idraw

fromTafjel‘s(1978,63)definitionofsocialidentityas“thatpartofanindividual'sself‐

70

conceptwhichderivesfromhisknowledgeofhismembershipinasocialgroup(orgroups)

togetherwiththevalueandemotionalsignificanceattachedtothatmembership”.The

emphasisinsocialidentitytheoryisonboththepersonandthedynamicsofgroups.

However,itislessonhowintragrouprolesinteractandmoreonhowcategories(orframes)

areformedthroughintergroupinteraction.Thisapproachisusefulforstudyingtheprocess

bywhichidentitiesrelatetointergroupconflict(Ashmoreetal.2001).

BrubakerandCooper(2000)identifysomeadditionalkeyconceptualdistinctionsthatare

usefulwheninvestigatinghowtypesofsocialidentityareconstructed.First,doessocial

identityrefertorelationalorcategoricalmodesofidentification?Second,doestheactof

identificationcomefromanexternalsourceorthroughself‐identification?Brubakerand

Cooper(2000)recognizethatthedivisionsbetweenrelational/categoricaland

external/self‐identificationarenotalwaysclear,butthatthesecanbeanalyticallyuseful.

Forexample,identificationbypositioninginarelationalweb(suchaskinship,friendship,or

businessties)maysometimesoverlapwithidentificationthroughcategoricalattributes

(suchasrace,ethnicity,language,orcitizenship)buttheserepresenttwoverydifferent

modesofidentification.Likewise,anexternallyimposedidentity(suchaslegalcitizenship)

canbeincompatiblewithself‐identification.Forexamplein1933,theBelgianidentitycards

issuedinRwandarigidlyclassifiedresidentsintoethniccategoriesofHutuorTutsiand

deniedthemixedheritageandself‐identificationofmanyresidentsassomethingotherthan

whatwasontheiridentitycards.

Thedistinctionsofexternal/self‐identificationandrelational/categoricalcanbeimportant

forunderstandinghowsocialidentityisdescribedincasesinvolvingnaturalresourcesand

armedconflict.Forexample,inexploringhoweconomicrentsfromnaturalresourcesare

usedtorecruitsoldiersforrebelgroups,Weinstein(2007)examinedhowyoungmen

developidentitiestiedtorebelgroupsthroughrelationalmodesofself‐identification.Such

dynamicsarealsoevidentinplaceslikeDarfur,whereidentitiesoftenconsideredasancient

labelsforethnicgroupsortribesactuallyhaveamorefluidandpermeablenatureinwhich

politicalalliances,ecology,andlivelihoodstrategiescauseindividualsorgroupstoadopt

newidentitiesbasedoncontext‐dependentopportunities(Youngetal.2009).InSoutheast

71

Asia,Scott(2009)describeshowtheflexibilityofidentitiesofremotegroupsmayinfactbe

strategiesforescapingoppressivegovernments’tendencytocategoricallydefineand

managecommunities.Li(2000,151)investigatesthisinterplaybetweenimposed

categoriesandself‐identificationinIndonesiaandnotes“thatagroup’sself‐identificationas

tribalorindigenousisnotnaturalorinevitable,butneitherisitsimplyinvented,adopted,

orimposed.Itis,rather,apositioningwhichdrawsuponhistoricallysedimentedpractices,

landscapes,andrepertoiresofmeaning,andemergesthroughparticularpatternsof

engagementandstruggle…thecontingentproductofagencyandtheculturalandpolitical

workofarticulation.”

Categoricalmodesofidentificationarepowerfulsocialorganizingtoolsthatcanbeusedby

actorsthatarebothexternalandinternaltogroupstodiscursivelyframepropertyclaims,

resourceaccess,andpoliticalpositions.AsLi(2000)pointsout,identitycategoriesarenot

alwaysinternallyeschewedasgroupsandindividualscanadoptthemfortheirownpolitical

goals.Forexample,Bowen(2005,160)outlineswaysinwhichtheAcehneseliberation

movementisbasedonthegroupcategoryof‘Acehnesepeople’–acategorythatheargues

hasbeeninternallygeneratedbyanarrativeofprecolonialautonomyandbydrawingfrom

internationaldiscoursesexternaldefiningthecategoryof‘indigenouspeople’toposition

themovementandconsolidateseveraldistinctregionalandlanguagegroups.AlsoinAceh,

BurkeandAfnan(2005)pointtotheriskofsuchdynamicsincomplexpolitical

emergencies.Theyoutlinehowthedesignationofrecipientsofaidandthetimingofaid

wereaffectedbywaysinwhichindividualswerecategorizedbyexternalorganizationsas

conflictrefugeesordisasterrefugees.Peoplemaystrategicallyself‐identifywithexternal

categoriesthatbetterpositionthemforaid.Anotherexampleofcategoricalmodesof

identificationcanbefoundinthenegotiationsleadingtothePermanentCourtof

Arbitration’sredrawingofthebordersforhistoricallandclaimsintheAbyeiregionof

Sudan.AsdetailedinChapterSix,thesenegotiationsarguablyuseanunderstandingof

identitybasedonimposedcategoriesthatbearlittleresemblancetotheactualhistorical

characterofcommunitiesandkinshipnetworksintheregion.Thenarrativesusedtoframe

problemsinpeacebuildingprocessesmayinvolvecreatingcategoricalmodesofself‐

identificationandexternalidentificationrelevanttoestablishingpoliticalnegotiation

72

positionsortogainingaccesstoresourcesorpost‐conflictaid.

Thesocialidentityframesformedthroughexternallyimposedcategories(forexample,by

thecolonialstate)areanalyticallydifferentfromandplaydifferentsocialrolesthan

relationalmodesofself‐identificationthataresoimportantindefiningincentivesin

recruitmentprocesses,servingaswaystoresiststatepower,anddefiningthecontoursof

armedconflictdynamics.Yet,itisalsokeyheretonotethatcategoricalidentitiesarenot

alwaysexternallyimposedastheycanalsobeinternallyimposedandusedbygroupsfor

theirownpoliticalandeconomicbenefittopositionthemselvesinregardtoothergroupsor

toerasetheflexibilityofrelationalidentificationstrategies(Li2000).

2.5.2NATURALRESOURCESANDARMEDCONFLICTSAsdiscussedinSection2.2,theliteraturelinkingnaturalresourcestoarmedconflicthas

mushroomedsincethe1990s.Severalissuesinthisfieldhavegainedattentioninthe

popularmedia.Onesuchissueistheresource‐scarcity‐versus‐resource‐abundancedebate,

whereinargumentsthatresourcescarcitytriggersarmedconflictinseveralwayshavebeen

criticizedbyauthorswhopointoutthatpetroleumandothertypesofresourceabundance

betterpredictandexplaininterstateandintrastatearmedconflicts(Homer‐Dixon1998;

PelusoandWatts2001).Popularinterestinglobalenvironmentalchangeanditspotentially

dramaticimpactonhumansocietieshasinspiredalargebodyofresearchandsome

misguidedpopularspeculationonthepotentialforfuture‘resourcewars’causedby

environmentaldegradation,scarcity,andmigration(NordåsandGleditsch2007;Dyer

2010).

Oneinfluentialmodelofthelinksbetweenresourcesandarmedconflictisthe‘greedand

grievances’model(CollierandHoeffler1998,2004,2005).Thegistofthismodelisthat

high‐valuenaturalresourcesprovidetheincentives(forgreedyrebelleaders)or

opportunities(forrebelgroups)thatencouragearmedconflictandundermine

peacebuilding(Aspinall2007).Whilethegreedisclear,grievancesaresimplyrelatedto

perceivedunequaldistributionofrents.Thismodelhasinspiredtheoreticalworkonhow

thecharacteristicsofresourcesaffectbothrebelgroupformationandconflicttypes,andit

73

hasdrivenpolicyapproachesthatfocusoninterveninginresourcecommoditychainsto

stoprebelfinancingandbuildpeaceinplaceslikeLiberiaandAfghanistan(Ross2004;Le

Billon2008).However,thismodelhasalsobeencriticizedbyscholarswhoemphasizethat

naturalresourcesaffectawiderrangeofeconomic,political,andculturalfactors(Ballentine

andSherman2003;Ross2004;Fearon2005).Forexample,anabundanceofahigh‐value

resourcelikepetroleumhasbeenshowntodestabilizegovernmentsbycausing

macroeconomicinstability,tounderminethestate’sabilitytogoverndissentinggroups,to

leadthestatetoadoptpoliciesthatencourageoppositionalgroupstouseviolence,andto

encouragecompetitionoverstatecontrolwhenstatecontrolbecomesequivalenttocontrol

ofhigh‐valueresources(Humphreys2005).Humphreys(2005)discusseshow,inthe

Chadiancase,armedconflictwasnotmaintainedthroughresourcerents,butrather

alternativerevenuescouldberaisedinadvancetofightforcontroloftheChadianstateand

thefutureoilrevenuethatwouldcomewithcontrolofthestate.

Whilethesymbolicvalueofresources(especiallyland)isoftenrecognizedasanimportant

factorinconflictescalation,duration,andintractability(KahlerandWalter2006),popular

modelslikethe‘greedandgrievances’modeltendtofocusontheeconomicvalueof

resourcesasthemaincausalandlimitingfactorintheescalationanddurationofviolence.

Whilethemodelisusefulforunderstandingmanygroupsengagedinmodernconflictsand

isresponsibleforpolicyprescriptionsthatunderminerebelfinancing,thismodelfailsto

explaintheescalationanddurationofarmedconflictsoverresourcesthathavelittle

economicvalue.Aswell,itisinadequateforexplainingthewaysinwhicharmedconflicts

overidentityresources(suchassacredforests,fishingrights,andhomelands)andlocally

valuablelivelihoodresourcesoccurandbecomeintractable.

2.5.2SOCIALIDENTITIES,NATURALRESOURCES,ANDARMEDCONFLICTCulturalorpoliticalvaluesassociatedwithland,sacredforests,fisheries,water,andother

naturalresourcesplayaroleinethnonationaldiscourses,livelihoodstruggles,andreligious

narratives,andlinktomanyidentityframes.Theselinksarebetweenidentityandnatural

resourcesareoftenmediatedthroughpropertyrelationsthatcansometimesbeconstitutive

ofboththesubjectandobjectofproperty–especiallyinthecaseofthesymboliccultural

andpoliticalvalueofland.Ofcourse,theselinksbetweensocialidentityandproperty(in

74

thiscase,naturalresources)existoutsidetherealmofarmedconflict,butthissectiononly

focusesonsomewaysinwhichthelinksofsocialidentitiestonaturalresourcesinfluence

armedconflict.

Theoriesofarmedconflictoftenunder‐theorizethecomplexlinksbetweensocialidentities

andnaturalresources(BallentineandSherman2003;Ross2004;Aspinall2007).Yet,the

overlapbetweenidentityandnaturalresourcesinvolvesatleastfourlinksrelatedtoarmed

conflicts.Theselinksareimportantinidentityformationandmobilization,theydonot

necessarilyleadtoarmedconflictbuttheyhelptounderstandhowarmedconflictsoccur

(PelusoandWatts2001).Theselinksarenotisolatedandoneormoreoftheselinksmaybe

foundwithinanyoneconflict:

1. Howidentityclaimsinvolvingownershiporprivilegedaccesstoresourcesleadtoarmedconflict.

2. Howidentityinfluencesclaimsofinequitabledistributionofresourcerentsandleadstogrievancesandarmedconflict.

3. Howidentitiesareusedbyelitesand‘ordinaryfolk’tomobilizecollectiveactioninconflictsovernaturalresources.

4. Howidentityframingfacilitatesconflictovernaturalresources.

Thefirstlinkincludesidentityconflictsoverthehistoricuseorsymbolicvalueofresources.

Forexample,narrativesthatinfluencethelegalalienationofArablandsinIsraeldrawfrom

historicalclaimstotheland(FormanandKedar2004).Thesecondlinkisrepresentedin

severalcenter‐peripheryrelationshipsinwhichrentsfromhigh‐valuenaturalresources

locatedinperipheralregionsarecapturedbyurbanelitesorstatesandnotequitably

distributedtopopulationsintheseperipheralregionsthatoftenbearthecostsofresource

extraction.Insituationswherecenterorperipherygroupscanbelinkedtoidentityframes

(likeethnicgroups),identityoftenbecomesoneoftheprimaryframesthroughwhich

claimstoequitabledistributionarepursued.Forexample,Suliman‘s(1999)studyand

recentworkbytheInternationalCrisisGroup(ICG2008)onthedynamicsoftheNubaand

BaggaraconflictoverlandsinSudan‘sSouthernKordofanstateindicatehowidentityhas

beenshapedbycenter‐peripheryrelationsandconflictdynamics.

ThethirdlinkincludestheCollier‐Hoeffler(‘greedandgrievances’)lineofresearchwherein

75

greedypoliticalentrepreneurscreateormanipulateexistinglocalidentitiesinorderto

profitfromnewpoliticalandsocialarrangementsorcontinuingarmedconflict.Inthis

situation,casestudiesofRwandahavesometimescitedtheunderlyinglandconflictasa

sourceoftensionandindicatedtheroleofpoliticalentrepreneursinrecastingthistension

intothegenocidalconflict(PercivalandHomer‐Dixon1998;AndréandPlatteau1998).

Otherauthorsseeperceivedgrievancesagainstacommunityasoneofthemainwaysin

whichidentitybecomesaprimarymobilizingframeforconflict.Robinson‘s(1998)studyof

theroleofhydrocarbonextractioninmobilizingcollectiveidentityandlegitimizingviolence

inAceh,Indonesiaillustratessuchanaturalresourceextraction‐politicalmanipulation‐‐

identitygrievances‐armedconflictcausalchain.Thischainisalsoclearlypresented

specificallyforlandpropertyinIndonesiabythePelusoandHarwell(2001,86)studyofthe

1997violenceinWestKalimantan,whereviolenceresulted“tosignalareclamationofthe

Dayaks’historicallyoccupiedspaces,resources,andidentities,andtodemonstratethe

protectionoftheircollectivehonor.Thenotionofkawasan,orterritory,isacrucialpartof

theircollectiveconcerns.”HereweheartheechoesofRadin’s(1993)constitutiveproperty

asweexamineiftheDayakgroupcanexistandflourishwithoutkawasanand,ifnot,what

happensinresult.

Thefourthlinkissubtlydifferentfromthethirdinthatitarguesthataspecifictypeof

identityframemustpre‐existpoliticalmanipulationandmobilizationofidentityframesin

armedconflict.Ratherthanassumingthatpoliticalmanipulationcanmobilizeanyidentity

frameforarmedconflict,thislinkindicatesthatspecifictypesofidentityframesmustpre‐

existpoliticalmanipulation.Forexample,Aspinall(2007),indiscussingAceh,attemptedto

gobeyondthetypicalpoliticalmanipulationidentitygrievances‐armedconflictcausal

narrativebyarguingthatcollectivegrievancesandlegitimizationofviolencecannotoccur

withoutaspecifictypeofpre‐existingidentityframe.

Rather than seeing natural resource grievances as a source of conflict, or as acatalystoraccelerantforthecrystallizationofidentity,Iemphasizethatitwastheevolving framework of Acehnese identity that provided a prism through whichnaturalresourceexploitationwasinterpretedingrievanceterms.Putmorebluntly,one might say that without the identity framework there would have been nogrievances,atleastnopoliticallysalientones.Instead,naturalresourceexploitationin Aceh may have been viewed as unfair and irritating, but also as banal andunavoidable,as itarguablywasinotherprovinces. Inthisview,grievancesshould

76

notbeseenastriggerfactors,antecedenttothediscoursesthatmotivateviolence.Grievances are instead integral to the ideological frameworks though which thesocial world, including notions like “justice” and “fairness” are constructed andunderstood.(Aspinall2007,957)

Despiteargumentsbetweenscholarsprioritizingdifferentcausalmechanisms,identityand

naturalresourceconflictsarenotmutuallyexclusivethemesinthestudyofarmedconflict.

Propertyasnaturalresourcesislinkedinseveralwaystosocialidentitiesinarmed

conflicts.Thisdissertationfocusesonterritoryandlandissuestoexaminehowthewaysin

whichsocialidentitiesaremobilizedinresourceconflictsaffecthowlinksbetweensocial

identitiesandnaturalresourcesmightpositivelyornegativelyaffectPCNRM.Althoughthe

literatureonpeacebuildingandnaturalresourcesoftenreferstotheroleofcommunal

groupsinPCNRMandpeacebuilding(BushandOpp1999;Bruchetal.2011),thereisrarely

atheoreticalorpracticallinkdrawnbetweennaturalresources,identity,andpeacebuilding.

Asshowninanumberofcasestudies,thelackofconsiderationofsuchlinksundermines

PCNRMandpeacebuildingprograms(WebersikandCrawford2011;Yezer2011).

InChapterSixthesethemesofsocialidentity,constitutiveproperty,naturalresource

management,armedconflict,andpeacebuildingareexploredusingdatacollectedinthe

dissertationresearchsupplementedbyothercasestudies.Theresultisananalyticalpolicy

toolforpolicyandresearchonsocialidentityandPCNRM.

2.6CONCLUSION

Thischapterintroducedandcritiquedfourbodiesofliteraturethatprovidethefoundation

ofthedissertation’sanalyticalframework:PCNRM,property,legalgeography,andsocial

identity.AsoutlinedinFigure2.2,thedissertationisbroadlysituatedinthegrowingfieldof

PCNRM,usesthreeapproachestopropertydrawnfrompropertyliterature,drawsseveral

conceptsfromlegalgeographytoexplorepropertythroughscalarpoliticsandlandscape,

andreliesonsocialidentitytheorytoconceptualizesocialidentityasaframingprocess.

Throughouttherestofthedissertation,Iusetheaboveconceptstoexaminehowthesocial‐

embeddednessofpropertyimpactsPCRNM.Aseachchapterisastandalonemanuscript,

thereissomeoverlapwiththeliteraturereview.InChapterFour,Iexaminehowpost‐

77

conflictandpost‐disasterdisasternarrativesinfluencedapproachestopropertyandland

titlinginAceh,Indonesia.Iusetheconceptsofpropertiedlandscapeandevidence

landscapetoexplorethematerialanddiscursivenatureofthesenarratives.InChapter

Five,Ianalyzesemi‐structuredinterviewsandsurveydatatoexplorehowthroughscalar

politicsmaychangerights,duties,obligations,andotherjuralrelations.InChapterSix,I

drawfromthepersonhoodapproachtopropertytodesignananalyticalpolicytoolthat

linkssocialidentity,property,andconflicttohelppractitionersevaluateoptionsinforusing

identityframingtosupportPCRNMforpeacebuilding.

78

CHAPTERTHREE:METHODS

Thischapterprovidesamoredetailedversionofthemethodssectionsthataresummarized

inthemanuscriptsinChaptersFour,Five,andSix.Editorsofthemanuscriptsoftenwanted

moreemphasisonpolicyrelevantfindingsandlessonslearnedatthesacrificeofmore

detailedexplorationofmethodsandreflectiononthecourseofresearch.Below,Ioverview

theresearchcontext,ethicalconsiderationsofdatacollection,themethodsusedtocollect

data,anddataanalysisprocedures.

3.1RESEARCHCONTEXT&SITESELECTION

Thisdissertationcriticallyexaminesexperiencesanddebatesregardingpropertyinpost‐

disaster,post‐conflictAceh,Indonesia,duringtheperiodof2005–2009.Ididmyresearchin

Acehasitprovidedoneofthemostinterestingcasesofsimultaneouspost‐disasterand

post‐conflictscenariosinmoderntimes.Researchforthisdissertationincludessemi‐

structuredinterviews,focusgroups,archivalresearch,andobservationsfromfourfield

visits(totalingfivemonths)betweenAugust2006andJune2008tothecityofBandaAceh

andtheregenciesofAcehJaya,Pidie,andAcehBarat(seeFigure3.1).

IdidmostofmyfieldworkinthedistrictsofAcehJayaandAcehBaratwherepost‐tsunami

andpost‐conflictrecoveryactivitiessimultaneouslyoccurredandwhereseveralcoastal

villagesandurbancentersweretargetedbythestate‐ledlandtitlingprogramknownas

RALAS.InAcehJayaandAcehBarat,Iwasbasedinthedistrictcapitals(respectively,Calang

andMeulaboh)butmadefrequenttripsintothesurroundingregionwhereIconducted

semi‐structuredinterviews,directobservation,andfocusgroups.AsshowninTable3.1,

damagefromboththetsunamiandconflictwasextensiveinthesedistrictssotheyprovided

idealplacestoexaminehowpropertyissueswerebeingframedbyactorsontheground

andhowtheRALASprojectwasbeingimplementedontheground.Beingbasedinthese

areasalsoallowedmetoworkwithinternationalorganizationstogainaccesstoruralareas

Iwouldnothavebeenabletoeconomicallyorlogisticallyaccessasanindividual

researcher.Whilethemilitaryrestrictionsthathadlimitedtravelbeforethetsunamiwere

notofmajorconcernby2006(whenIwasontheground),therewereseveralgeographic

79

Figure3.1Mapoffourfieldworkdistricts(‘regencies’orkabupaten).Source:Author.

Table3.1Levelofdamagecausedbyconflictandtsunami.Source:Wongetal.2007.

District ConflictIndex District DisasterIndexAcehTimur 3.63 AcehJaya 5.46BenerMeriah 3.34 Simeulue 4.93NaganRaya 2.11 Bireuen 3.74AcehJaya 1.75 AcehBarat 3.38Pidie 1.65 AcehBesar 3.17AcehUtara 1.64 AcehSingkil 3.15AcehSelatan 1.56 AcehSelatan 3.00GayoLues 1.50 AcehBaratDaya 2.79AcehBarat 1.49 GayoLues 2.75Lhokseumawe 1.35 AcehTenggara 2.67Bireuen 1.04 Pidie 2.65AcehTenggara 0.87 AcehUtara 2.35AcehSingkil 0.80 NaganRaya 2.01AcehBesar 0.74 AcehTengah 1.85AcehTamiang 0.69 AcehTamiang 1.76AcehBaratDaya 0.56 AcehTimur 1.47AcehTengah 0.46 Lhokseumawe 1.11Simeulue 0.22 BenerMeriah 0.81

80

areasthatwerenotaccessibletomeduetothetsunamidamageandtolingeringsecurity

concerns.

Muchofthearchivalresearchandseveralofthesemi‐structuredinterviewswithofficial

representativesoftheGovernmentofIndonesia(GOI),internationalandnationalnon‐

governmentalorganizations(INGOandNGO),andotherinstitutionsoccurredinAcehBesar

inthecityofBandaAceh(theprovincialcapital).

WhenIoriginallyplannedthedissertationresearchandfieldwork,Ihadhopedtousea

mixedmethodsapproachthatincludedsemi‐structuredinterviewsandalarge‐scale,

randomly‐sampledsurveythatexaminedhowstatutorytitlewasperceivedindifferent

regions,whether/howmanyloanswerebeingaccessedviamortgage,andhowmuch

foreigndirectinvestmentwascomingintospecificareasoftheregionbasedonthetitling

thatsupposedlyincreasedtenuresecurityandopeneduppropertymarkets.Whenonthe

groundin2006,itquicklybecameevidentthatIneededtochangethewayIapproached

datacollectionduetomyinabilitytoaccesstosomeareas,theslowrateatwhichlandtitles

werebeingissued,thelackofanyclearaccountingofforeigndirectinvestment,andthe

uniqueethicalandlogisticalconstraintsofworkinginapost‐conflict,post‐disasterscenario

withcommunitiesthatoftenmovedbetweenlocations.Duetotheabovereasonsandlackof

financialsupporttoemployenoughgroundpersonneltoadministerthesurveyortofund

anextendedperiodofstayintheregion,Idecidednottopursuethealarge‐scale,randomly‐

sampledsurveyandtofocusmoreondatathatwasreadilyavailable(publiccomments,

publications,andarchives),expandthenumberofsemi‐structuredinterviewsovera

numberofvisits,andrelyonfocusgroupstounderstandwhyorwhynotlandtitlingwasan

importantcommunitypriority.Thischangeinthemethodsrequiredreorientingthedata

analysisawayfromstatisticalmodelsandmoretowardsqualitativeapproachesto

gatheringdata,analyzingdata,andpresentinginformation.

Qualitativeresearchmustbesensitivetonuanceandsituation.Thisrequirementposes

specialproblemstoresearchworkinginforeigncontextsandinlanguagesthattheyhave

notmastered.Formyfieldwork,gatheringdatarequiredlearninganewlanguage,

recruitingtranslators,andjumpingthroughmanybureaucratichurdlestobeintheregion

81

(hurdlesthatmaybeencounteredinmanystudiesthattakeplaceabroadbutareever

presentandintensifiedindisasterandconflictareas).Oneofthemostdifficultaspectsof

conductingresearchwasthenumberoflanguagebarriersrequiredtonavigateIndonesia

andinparticularthemulti‐ethnicregionofAceh.Mylanguagetrainingtookplacein

Yogyakarta,Java,Indonesiawherethereareseverallanguageschoolsandaslanguage

trainingwasnotavailableinAcehwhenIstartedmyresearch.IlearnedBahasaIndonesia

asitisthelinguafrancaofIndonesia.DespitehavingafunctionalabilityinBahasa

Indonesia,IwasrequiredtohireatranslatorasmanyofthepeopleinAceharemore

comfortablespeakingoneofthelocallanguages–ofwhichAcehneseisonlyone.Iworked

withtwodifferenttranslatorsovertheperiodofmyresearch,oneatatime.Ialso

occasionallyemployedautomatictranslationtoolstoaidintexttranslationwhenmy

languageabilitydidnotallowfullcomprehension.Necessarily,muchnuanceislostinthis

processandthisislimitationoftheresearch.Moreonmethodsandanalysisisbelowin

Sections3.3and3.4.Beforeoverviewingmethods,itisnecessarytooutlinesomeofthe

ethicalconsiderationsuniquetopost‐conflictscenariosandtomyownpositionality.

3.2ETHICALCONSIDERATIONOFPOST‐CONFLICTDATACOLLECTION

Acehisapost‐conflictscenarioandcouldhaverelapsedintoviolentconflictduringmyfield

research.Infactasof2013,therearestillseriousthreatstoasustainablepeaceinAceh(AI

2013).Mydatacollectionrequiredconfidentiality(seeAppendices).Inordertoavoid

problemsmydatacouldpotentiallycauseforinformants,Ikeptthedataonapassword

protecteddrive.Inthefinalproductsofmyresearch,noneofthedatacollectedaretraceable

tospecificcommunitiesorindividuals.Ihavechangednamesandgivenalevelofgeographic

specificitywhichprovidesdetailbutnotenoughtojeopardizecommunitiesorindividuals.

ThedatacollectedforthisresearchproposalwasapprovedbytheMcGillUniversity

ResearchEthicsBoard(seeAppendixI).

AsaCaucasian,male,USAmericanresearcherinapost‐conflictandpost‐disastersetting,I

wasnotabletoaccesscertaincommunitiesandsituationsfordatacollection.Ibelievethat

theprimaryimpactsofthisondatacollectionwerelowratesofwomenparticipationand

implicitassumptionthatmypresencemeantmoreaidwascoming.Womenparticipantsin

interviewsandfocusgroupswereunderrepresented.Thismayhavebeenduetovillage

82

dynamics,myfailuretomoreovertlyinvitewomentoparticipateinfocusgroups,andthe

lackofwomeninleadershippositionsinmanyofthesub‐districts.WhileImadeitclearin

initialmeetingsthatIwastheretolookatneedsandunderstandingthedynamicsaround

landtitling,sometimesfocusgroupsleanedtowardslistsofwantsratherthanmore

thoughtfuldiscussionofthemeritsandproblemswithcertainrequests.

Myareaofresearchinvolvedcollectedinformationaboutconflict‐relatedpropertydamage.

Often,otherhumanrightsabuseswerementioned,commonlyphysicalabuseand

occasionallyhumandeath.Giventhenatureofmyresearchpeoplemayhaveembellished

detailsorhiddendetails.TheonlytoolsIhadfortriangulatingpropertydamageclaimswere

tolookbackatnewspaperrecordsortoaskothercommunitymembersabouttheir

experience.

Inadditiontochallengestodatacollection,dataanalysisandmyresearchdirectionsare

influencedbymypositionality.Ichosetofocusondifferencesinpropertynarratives,the

manipulationofpropertyrelationsoverscale,andwaysthatsocialidentitylinktoproperty

(asnaturalresources)becausetheseavenuesforapproachingpropertyappearedevidentto

meinthedata.Surely,anothersetofeyesmayhavefoundanotheravenueofthinkingabout

propertythatmayhavebeeninformedbyalternativeunderstandingsofthelogicofgender,

Islam,orsocialjustice.Inbrief,Imyresearchismeanttopointoutgapsinthewayswe

approachandofferalternativesratherthandictatea‘silverbullet’solutiontoproperty

issues.Ithinkthisisthebestwaytopresentresultsthatarenecessarilysubjecttoethical

andpositionallimitationsandwouldbeinterpreteddifferentlybydifferentpeople.

Whilemypositioninevitablycausedsomedistortionofdatacollectedandanalysis,Ialso

believeitallowedcertainfranknessfromsomerespondentsthatmayhavenotbeenmore

forthcomingtolargersurveysandresearchprojectslikethebeneficiaryimpactassessments

conductedforinternationalinstitutions.Thesubduednatureofthequotesreportedinsuch

assessmentsandthepassionbehindthestatementsIcollectedinthefieldleadmetobelieve

thateithermyfashionofquestioningormypositionalityledtostrongerstancesfrom

informants.

3.3DATACOLLECTIONMETHODS

Giventhecontextandthenatureoftheresearchquestions,methodssuchasregional

83

surveyswerenotadvisableorrealisticdatacollectionmethodsforanindividualresearcher.

Asaresult,mysamplingstrategyforsemi‐structuredinterviewsfollowedareferral

samplingstrategy(snowballsampling).Forfocusgroups,Iidentifiedcommunitiesthatwere

undergoinglandtitlingprojectsandworkedwithNGOandINGOcolleaguestoidentify

communitiesthatwereaccessibleandprovidedarepresentativesampleofthedisasterand

conflictimpactedcommunities.

Non‐EnglishdocumentsandinterviewsinBahasaIndonesiaweretranslatedusingan

interpreter,myownlanguagetraining(May‐August2005,Yogyakarta),andautomated

languagetranslationtools.Datacollectedincludes:

1. 68semi‐structuredinterviews(Bernard1994)withfarmers,non‐government

organization(NGO)staff,andgovernmentofficialsestablishedtheimportanceof

landtitlingasalocalpriority,examinedofficials'publicandprivateopinionsabout

landtitling,identifiedconstraintstolandtitling,anddocumentedthelandtitling

process.SeeAppendixIVforexamplequestions.

2. 16focusgroups(Morgan,Krueger,andKing1998)withfarmers.Thefocusgroups

rangedfrom3‐12participants.Activitiesinvolvedtheidentificationandrankingof

communityneedsandsemi‐structuredquestionstounderstandpropertyissues.See

AppendixVforanexampleagenda.

3. Directobservation(Bernard1994)ofcommunitymappingandreconstruction

activitiesthroughsitevisitsduringfivemonthsinAcehBesar,AcehJaya,AcehBarat,

andPidie.

4. Archivalresearchonavailableregistrydocumentsandlegalcasesconcerning

propertyinheritance(BPNofficesandattheSyiahKualaUniversity).

5. Collectionandanalysisofpublicdocumentsdealingwithpropertyandlandissues

developedduringtheperiodof1999‐2010.Sourcesincludeacademicliterature,

grayliterature(NGOsandgovernmentoffices),legaltexts,andnewsarticles‐which

include:

a. SerambiNewspaper(BahasaIndonesia)

b. WaspadaNewspaper(BahasaIndonesia)

c. AcehKita(English/BahasaIndonesia)

84

d. AnalisaDaily(BahasaIndonesia)

e. CeureumenAceh'sReconstructionNewsletter(English/BahasaIndonesia)

f. JakartaPost(English/BahasaIndonesia)

g. GoogleNews(English/BahasaIndonesia)

h. FactivaSubscriptionNewsService(English)

i. AcehConflictMonitoringUpdate(English)

6. Collectionofsecondarycensusandassessmentdatasetsfrom:

a. BRR:AgencyfortheRehabilitationandReconstructionofAcehandNiasor

BadanRehabilitasidanRekonstruksi(2005‐2009)

b. BPN:NationalLandAdministrationorBadanPertanahanNasionalRepublik

Indonesia(spatialdataandreports2005‐2007)

c. BPS:StatisticsIndonesiaorBadanPusatStatistik(2005)

d. VillagePotentialStatisticscensus(PODES)(2003and2005)

e. GAMReintegrationNeedsAssessment(2006)

f. KecamatanDevelopmentProjectAcehVillageSurvey(2006)(Wongetal.

2006)

g. ASNLFviolentincidentreports(2003‐2005)

h. ProjectreportsfromtheWorldBankandRALAS(2005‐2009)

WhiletheabovedatacollectionmethodsareapplicabletoChapterFourandFive,Chapter

Sixdeviatedasitinvolvedcollectionofdatafromanumberofcasestudies.Researchforthe

manuscriptinChapterSixdrawsfromYin’s(2003a,2003b)approachtocasestudy

research.Yindefinesthecasestudyresearchmethodologyasanempiricalinquiryto

examineacontemporaryphenomenonwithinitsreal‐lifecontextinwhichmultiplesources

ofevidenceareused.TheAcehcasestudydrawsfromdatacollectedduringfieldresearch

betweenAugust2006andJune2008inAceh,Indonesia.Thematerialcollectedforthetwo

additionalcase‐studiesinSudanandChiapaswasaccomplishedvialiteraturesearchesand

includedgrayliteratureandacademicarticles.WhileIdrawmanyinsightsfromtheprimary

andsecondarydatacollectedfromAceh,itwasnecessarytoincludeothercasestudiesto

developandexplorethepolicytoolwhichistheoutcomeofthismanuscript.Noonecase

studywouldsufficetobuildapolicytoolthatcanbedeployedingeographically,politically

85

andculturallydiversepost‐conflictscenarios.Therefore,Istudiedseveralcasesand

presentedhosewhichIthoughttobemostilluminativeofthelinksfound.

3.1DATAANALYSIS

IusedSPSSandArcGIStovisualizedescriptivestatisticsandforexploratorydataanalysisof

censusdata.ThereliabilityofcensusdatainAcehisquestionableduetothedatacollection

occurringduringconflict,butthisearlyinvestigationhelpedidentifyregionsthatwouldbe

ofinteresttotheresearchquestion.Interviews,focusgroups,observations,archival

research,andtextswereanalyzedusingcontentanalysisprocedures.Contentanalysis

followsKrippendorff's(2004)modelofdataorganization.Theapproachtocodingdata

followsHsiehandShannon’s(2005)definitionofdirectedcontentanalysis–wherein

theoreticallyinformedcodesareusedtobegincodingbutinductivelyderivedcodesarealso

generated,added,andusedthroughreiterativeprocessesofworkingwiththedata.To

examinethecodeusedfordatapleaserefertoAppendixVI.

AsIintendedtoletthedataspeak,codinganddataanalysiswerethemosttimeintensive

partoftheresearchprocess.IusedNVIVO7toperformcomputerassistedqualitativedata

analysisprocedures.Thisrequiredsometraining,butalsoallowedmetosharemycoding

structurewithcolleagues.Colleaguefeedbackandthedataitselfcausedchangestothe

codes.Indirectedcontentanalysis,Ibeganbyopencodingtheinterviews,focusgroups,and

otherdocumentslinebyline.ThecodesusedwerederivedfromIndonesianlandlaw,

propertytheory,andothertheoreticalbodies.Inaddition,moresimplecodeswereusedto

analyzeadisasternarrativeversusaconflictnarrative.Duringopencoding,somethingsdid

notfitthepre‐existingcodes–leadingtothenewcodesarisingfromthedataandto

experimentationwithalternativecodingframeworks.Forexample,earlyonitbecameclear

thatsimplycodingpropertysystemsasstatutory,Islamic,oradatwasnotanalytically

adequatefordescribingthenumberofnormativepropertyrelationsatworkinAceh.This

ledmetoexperimentwithacodingmodelsbasedonTamanaha(2007)andMorseand

Woodman(1988).

Tamanaha(2007)arguesthatdevelopingatypologyofnormativeordersfacilitates

examinationofheterogeneityandhybridity.Hearguesthatsixidealtypesofnormative

86

ordersareoftenfoundinthenormativepluralismliterature:official‐legal,customary‐

cultural,capitalist‐economic,community‐cultural,religious‐cultural,andfunctional

normative.Theseareusefulheuristicsforrecognizingdifferentlogicsandtypesofauthority

thatconstitutenormativeorders.Thesedifferentidealtypesmayassistunderstanding

differentapproachestopropertyinAcehinthattheyallowustoidentifyamorecomplex

terrainofauthoritynarrativesandinstitutionsthanWeber’sthreetypes(charisma,

customary,bureaucratic).Tamanaha’sworkisespeciallyusefulinAceh,wherethereisoften

astaticassumptionbyscholars,practitioners,andevenlocalsthatonlythreeauthoritiesare

relevant(theflexibleadatcategory,Islamiclaw,andstatelaw)andthateachofthese

authoritiesisautonomous.WhileTamanaha’sapproachwasinteresting,Iultimatelysetit

asideasIwasmoreinterestedinanalysingthetypesofpropertyrelations(Hohfeld’sjural

relationsandSinger’sobligations)morethanjustcategorizingtypesofnormativeorders.

IwentthroughsimilarattemptsatcodingusingMorseandWoodman’s(1988)approachto

sortingthroughthecomplicatedwaysinwhichstatutorylawrelatestonon‐statutory

normativeorders.Thereareanumberofwaysinwhichthedomainoflaw(particularly

statutorylaw)caninteractwithexistingnormativeorders.MorseandWoodman(1988)

identifyhowinteractioncanbenegative(lawprohibitsordoesnotrecognizeotherorders)

orpositive(variouslevelsofacknowledgingtherelevanceofnon‐state,normativeorders).

Thesepositiveinteractionsinvolveaspectrumofincreasingrecognitionstartingfrom

admittanceofevidence,incorporationofprocedures,ordesignatingareas/topicswhere

non‐state,normativeordershaveequalornearlyequalauthoritytothestate.Thestatecan

makelegislativeacknowledgementofadjudicationbetweensystems,confertherightof

anotherordertopractice,recognizeexistinglegitimatepowers,ormadeprovide

overlappingorsoleauthorityovercertainlegalpowers.Thesedifferenttypesofinteraction

andrecognitionareinterestinginregardtopropertyandevidence,andcanbeusedto

exploreandcategorizerelationsbetweennormativeorders,notjuststatutorylawandother

normativeorders.

Thismethodofopencodingdatalinebylineandtryingdifferentcodesfromtheoretical

bodiesthatcodeinforminsightsintothedataaswellasattemptingtoletthedatachallenge

87

Table3.2Anexampleofthemesandfactsassociatedtonarratives.ConflictNarrative DisasterNarrative

LegitimacyofstateStateclaimsduringtheconflictEvidence:needforstatutoryvs.Islamic,adat,andotherinformalrelationsLackofculturalcontextformortgagesLackoflandmarketsProblemswithstatutoryrecognitionofadatTaxesRelapseofconflict€3500fordestroyedhouse

Neglectedpost‐conflictissues(noconflictdisplacementlikeEastTimorbutupto160,000conflictIDPinAceh)ThreattowomenandorphanspropertyinheritanceHernandodeSoto(neoliberal,mortgages,rightoftransfer,typesofevidence,title>deed)Mapping(clearlinesproperty)OverestimatedcapacityandlegitimacyofstateinstitutionsIslamicinheritance€7000fordestroyedhouse

suchtheoreticalframeworksproducedsomeinterestinginsightsbutwasextremely

consumptiveofdataanalysistime.Inordertopresentresultsthatcouldbesummarizedfor

policymakersandthatwouldallowmetofinishthedissertation,Isimplifiedmycoding

hierarchy,butIplantolookatwhethertheaboveapproachesarefeasibleaspost‐doctoral

researchprojectsafterIfinishmydoctorate.

Afteropencoding,Iperformedrelationalcoding,whereinrelationsbetweencodesare

exploredtopossiblygeneratenewcodesorprovideinformationthatcanbeusedtosupport

orrefuteanargument.ItwasthroughthisprocessthatIbegantoseehowdifferentactors

andpropertyrelationswereemphasizedinthedisasternarrative.Forexample,inTable3.2,

Ioutlinesomeofthedifferentthemesandfactsthatwereassociatedtodisasterthroughthe

relationalcodingprocess.

Inretrospect,Icanseeseveraldifferentwaysthatthisresearchmayhavebenefitedfrom

alternativedatacollectionanddataanalysismethods–butIbelievethatisthenatureof

researchendeavoursthatareforcedtoconformtothesituationratherthanmakesituations

conformtotheresearchquestions.Theresultsfrommydataanalysiswerepresentedas

88

severalconferences,asworkingpapers,andcirculatedamongcolleagues.Comments

receivedhavebeenintegratedintothemanuscriptsinthefollowingresultschapters–which

eachconstituteanarticle.

89

CHAPTERFOUR:TITLEWAVE–LANDTENUREANDPEACEBUILDINGINACEH

ChapterFourconsistsofthefirstmanuscriptandcorrespondstothedissertation’sfirst

objective.Thefirstobjectiveistoidentifyhowtheframingofpropertyissuesby

individualsandorganizationsactiveinpost‐disaster/post‐conflictrecoveryand

reconstruction(stabilizationandtransition)impactedthedesign,implementation,and

outcomesofthelandtitlingprojectReconstructionofAcehLandAdministrationSystem

(RALAS).Ininvestigatinghowpropertyissueswereframed,thischapterconceivesof

propertybyemployingRose’s(1994)workonthenarrativesofproperty.Drawingfrom

theconceptsof‘propertiedlandscape’(Blomley1998)and‘evidencelandscape’(Unruh

2006),Iarguethatthenarrativesthatframedpropertyissuesaspost‐disasterproblems

ledtopoliciesthatfailedtoconsiderthenexusofproperty,land,socialidentity,and

politicalauthorityinaseparatistregion;impactedthesuccessofRALASinissuingland

titles;andledtomissedopportunitiesforpost‐conflictlandmanagementtocontribute

topeacebuilding.Thischapteralsoprovidesgeographicandhistoricalcontextforthe

post‐disasterandpost‐conflictscenarioinAceh,outlinespropertysystemsinAceh,and

providesadescriptionofRALAS.Editedversionsofthismanuscripthavebeen

publishedasfollows:

Green,Arthur.2013.“TitleWave:LandTenureandPeacebuildinginAceh.”InManagingNaturalResourcesinPost‐ConflictSocieties:LessonsinPeacebuilding,ed.JonDUnruhandRhodriWilliams,289–316.London,UK:Routledge.

Green,Arthur.2010.“LandTenureSecurityandPeacebuildinginAceh,Indonesia.”AsianJournalofEnvironmentandDisasterManagement2(1):283–290.

90

4.1INTRODUCTION

Inthischapter,Iexaminehowactivitiesmeanttoimprovelandtenuresecuritymayhave

supportedorunderminedpeacebuildingduringthepost‐conflictstabilizationand

transitionperiodof2005‐2008inAceh,Indonesia.Drawingfromtheideathatpropertyis

narrative(Rose1994)andtheconceptsof‘propertiedlandscape’(Blomley1998)and

‘evidencelandscape’(Unruh2006),Iarguethatthenarrativeframingofpropertyissuesas

apost‐disasterproblemledtomissedopportunitiesforpost‐conflictlandmanagementto

contributetopeacebuildingintheregion.Policynarrativesconcerningpropertyandtenure

securityaffectedthedesign,implementation,andoutcomesoftheinternationallyfunded

andstate‐administeredprojectforlandregistrationandtitleissuancecalledthe

ReconstructionofAcehLandAdministrationSystem(RALAS).WhileRALASsuccessfully

registeredlandinseveralareasofAcehandrebuiltmuchofthetechnicalcapacityofthe

statelandadministrationsystem,theRALASfocusonpost‐disasterpropertyissuesmeant

thatconnectionsbetweenlandtenuresecurity,propertyissues,post‐conflictdynamics,and

peacebuildingwereoftenneglected.Thelackofconsiderationofpost‐conflictlandand

propertyissuesmayhavenotonlylimitedRALAS’abilitytoissuelandtitlesandsupport

tenuresecurity,butmayhavealsounderminedexisting,securetenurerelations.Iargue

thatthenarrativesforframingpropertyinAcehwerelinkedtobothlogisticalefficacyand

politicalauthoritydynamics;ledtopoliciesthatfailedtoconsiderthenexusofproperty,

land,socialidentity,andpoliticalauthorityinaseparatistregion;impactedthesuccessof

RALASinissuinglandtitles;andledpolicymakerstomissanopportunitytoengagenatural

resourcemanagementinpeacebuilding.Thisarticleconcludeswithlessonslearned

regardingthetiming,location,institutionalcapacities,andmethodsofimplementingpost‐

conflictlandmanagementforpeacebuilding.

In2005,thepopulationofAcehbeganrecoveryfrombotha29‐yearseparatistwarandthe

2004IndianOceanTsunami.Infrastructure,land,andlandtenuresystemswereseverely

damagedbyboththewarandtsunami.(Wongetal.2007;Jaliletal.2008).Although

propertyrightsandtenuresecuritywerenotamongthecentralissuesnegotiatedinthe

peaceprocessnoramongissuesidentifiedasproblematicfordemobilization,disarmament,

andreintegration(WB2006a),theyweremajorconcernsformanyofthepeopleinvolvedin

91

post‐disasterrecovery(Fitzpatrick2005).Manyinternationaldonors,international

nongovernmentalorganizations(INGOs),andstateactorsperceivedthelackofstate‐issued

landtitlesintheselowlandareastobeareflectionoftenureinsecurityandacentral

obstacletotsunamirecoveryandfuturepoliticalandeconomicdevelopment(WB2006b).

Inresponsetoperceivedtenureinsecurity,donorsofferedtechnicalresourcesandabudget

ofUS$28.5millionforastate‐administeredlandregistrationprogramcalledRALAS.Partly

asaresultoftheearlyemphasisonpost‐disasterpropertyissues,theongoingnarratives

andapproachestopropertyinAcehemphasizedpost‐disasterdynamicsandjudgedthe

benefitsandproblemsofRALASinpost‐disasterterms(Harper2006;Fitzpatrick2008a;

Jaliletal.2008;Deutsch2009).

Thischapterisnotintendedtosupportargumentsfororagainststate‐administeredland

titles,registrationprograms,orpropertysystems.Ampledebatesoverthemeritsand

problemsoftransitionstostate‐administeredpropertysystemsdocumenthowstatutory

landtitles,landregistrationprograms,andpropertysystemscansimultaneously

emancipatesomepeopleanddispossessothers(Scott1998;deSoto2000;Blomley2003b;

HomeandLim2004;Elyachar2005;Otto2009).Thesedebatesclearlyindicatethelackofa

simplesolutiontopropertyproblems.However,thereisatendencyamongpolicymakersto

optfor‘silverbullet’solutionstodevelopmentproblemsandpropertyisnoexception(Otto

2009).Thesedebatespointtotheneedtomovebeyondideologicalapproachestoproperty

andtoinvestigatethemeritsandproblemsofpropertysystemsinregardtospecific

situationsandhumanrelations.

Rose(1994)arguesthatthesehumanrelationsandstrugglescanbeinterpretedthrough

narrativesthatcreateproperty.Shefocusesonnarratives,rhetoricaldevices,andthe

textualityofpropertyandfindsthatthenarrativesusedinstrugglesoverthemeaningof

property,propertyrights,andpropertyregimesarethemselvesintegralpartsofproperty

andnotjustawaytogettorights.ForRose,propertyispersuasion.Rose(1994)arguesthat

narrativediscoursesprovidethepersuasivevehicle.Sheexaminesnarrativesineverything

from‘firstpossession’to‘neo‐utilitarianprivateproperty,’communitarianproperty,story‐

tellingingametheory,andtheprocessofEasternEuropeattheendoftheColdWar‘quite

92

consciously’talkingitselfintoproperty.Inbrief,allpropertyconceptsandinstitutionsare

basedonsomesortofmoralframeworkandjustificatorynarratives(Rose1994).As

propertyfunctionsasatoolforsocialoutcomes,itisinevitablethatindividualsandgroups

insocietyusenarrativestojustifyparticularpropertyclaimsaswellasparticularformsand

functionsofpropertywithinsociety.WhileRosearguesthatpropertyandstrugglesover

propertymustbeunderstoodthroughnarrative,theeverydaymaterialpracticesthat

interminglewithandresultfromnarrativesarecentraltothegeographiesofproperty

(Blomley1998).

Indeed,landscapeisacoreconceptinthedisciplineofgeographythathasproven

particularlyusefulforexploringthespatialrealizationofnarrativesandmaterialpractices

ingovernance,law,land,andproperty(Olwig1996;Schein1997;Blomley1998;Unruh

2006;Maandi2009).Geographicapproachestolandscapesemphasizehowpolitical

strugglesarerealizedboththroughthemateriallandscape(Mitchell2000)andvia

‘landscapeasawayofseeing’and‘landscapeastext’(Cosgrove1984;CosgroveandJackson

1987;Duncan1990).Thediscursiverepresentationsandmaterialreorganizationsof

landscapesarepolitical.Duncan(1990),forexample,seesthelandscapeasatextand

revealshowpoliticaldiscoursesin19thcenturySriLankausedthematerialandsymbolic

aspectsoflandscapeandarchitecturetocontestandreproducepower.AsGregoryandPred

(2006,4)observe,landscapedoesideologicalworkanditis“morethanametaphor[...]the

sheerphysicalityoflandscapecanbecomesaturatedwithpoliticalviolence”.

Thestrugglesrepresentedbyandrealizedthroughlandscapesoftenrelatebacktohow

sourcesofterritorialauthorityreproduceandcontestproperty(Moore1973;Blomley

1998;Unruh2003,2006;Moore2005).Infact,Blomley(1998,608)arguesthatlandscape

providesacriticalcomponentforframeworksdesignedtounderstandpropertythatmust

besensitiveto“thedialecticbetweenpowerandresistance,themannerinwhichproperty

entailsbothpracticeandrepresentation,thecomplexpoliticsofplaceandthehistorical

narrativesandspatialmappingsthatunderwritepropertyclaims.”Whilemanysocio‐legal

scholarsinsistthatpropertyisnotamaterialandthatitisonlyabundleofrightsor

93

relations(Penner1996),geographicapproachestolandscaperemindsusthatproperty

narrativeslinktomaterialpractices.Theyhelpusfacilitatetheanalysisoflandproperty

withoutreducingpropertytostaticrightsorlandparcels.Blomley(1998,577)pointsoutin

developinghisconceptof‘propertiedlandscape’:

If struggles around property concern, in part, contestedmaterial spaces, and therepresentationofspace,thepolysemicqualitiesoflandscapeseemausefulpointofentry.However,acloserattentiontothetermalsorevealsthat’landscape’,whetherunderstoodas’morphology’or’representation’,canbeshotthroughwithcontestingclaims to property. To the extent that ’landscape’ alerts us to the materiality ofproperty, itseemsuseful.Landasbothanideologicallyreifiedsurfaceandasocialsite for embodiedpractices is important to property relations. But the concept oflandscape invites us to also think about the ways in which ‘land’ is represented.Such representations, I shall suggest, are ineluctably caught up with contendingclaimstoproperty.

Landscapenotonlyunderlinestherepresentationalandmaterialstrugglesthatconstitute

property,italsocontextualizespropertystrugglesinpost‐conflictscenarios.Unruh(2003)

pointsoutthatlocaldisputesoverland,conflictsbetweeninformalandformalauthority

thatimplicateterritorialcontrol,andambiguouslandtenureregimesarecentralproblems

inprovidingtenuresecurityinpost‐conflictscenarios.Navigatingtheseissuesrevealshow

propertynarratives(asevidence)cometoberealizedinthelandscapethrougheveryday

practicesandofferopportunitiestoovercomethedisconnectionbetweeninformaland

formalpropertyregimesthroughthe‘evidencelandscape’(Unruh2006).Inthischapter,I

contendthatthedominanceofaparticularnarrative(post‐disaster)overanother(post‐

conflict)impactedtheenactmentofpropertythroughtheRALASlandtitlingproject.

Theremainderofthechapterisorganizedasfollows.Section4.2offersadescriptionofthe

methodsusedforcollectingandanalyzingdata.InSection4.3,Ioverviewthehistoryof

secessionistconflictinAcehandexaminelandtenuresecurityandlandregistrationsystems

beforeandafterthetsunami.InSections4.4and4.5,Ioverviewthepeacebuildingprocess

andexaminelinksbetweenproperty,tenuresecurityandpeacebuilding.Throughoutthe

chapter,Ishowevidenceofhowthepost‐disasternarrativeinfluencedapproachestoand

embodiedpracticesofproperty.Iexaminehowpropertynarrativesimpacted

peacebuildingeffortsthroughthefollowingquestions:

94

1. TowhatextenthaspeacebuildingbeensuccessfulinAceh?2. Didactivitiesmeanttostrengthenlandtenuresecurityalsosupport,create

opportunitiesfor,orhinderthesuccessofpeacebuilding?3. Whatlessonsaboutpost‐conflictlandmanagementandpeacebuildingcanwe

generalizefromtheAcehneseexperiencetoothercontexts?

Section4.6concludesthechapterwithseverallessonslearnedregardingtransitory

approachestotiming,location,institutionalcapacities,andmethodsofimplementingland

tenurereformforpeacebuilding.

4.2METHODS

4.2.1DATACOLLECTIONIcollecteddatafromfourdistricts(‘regencies’orkabupaten)intheprovinceofAceh,

Indonesia:AcehBesar,AcehJaya,AcehBarat,andPidie(seeFigure4.1).Ididmostofmy

fieldworkinAcehJayaandAcehBaratwherepost‐tsunamiandpost‐conflictrecovery

activitiesweresimultaneouslyoccurringandwhereseveralcoastalvillagesandurban

centersweretargetedbythestate‐ledlandtitlingprogramknownasRALAS.InAcehJaya

andAcehBarat,Iwasbasedinthedistrictcapitals(respectively,CalangandMeulaboh)but

madefrequenttripsintothesurroundingregionwhereIconductedinterviews,

observations,andfocusgroups.Muchofthearchivalresearchandseveraloftheinterviews

withofficialrepresentativesoftheGovernmentofIndonesia(GOI),internationaland

nationalnon‐governmentalorganizations(INGOandNGO),andotherinstitutionsoccurred

inAcehBesarinthecityofBandaAceh(theprovincialcapital).

95

Figure4.1Mapoffourfieldworkdistricts(‘regencies’orkabupaten).Source:Author.

Non‐EnglishdocumentsandinterviewsinBahasaIndonesiaweretranslatedusingan

interpreter,myownlanguagetraining(May‐August2005,Yogyakarta),andautomated

languagetranslationtools.Datacollectedincludes:

7. 68semi‐structuredinterviewswithfarmers,non‐governmentorganization(NGO)

staff,andgovernmentofficialsestablishedtheimportanceoflandtitlingasalocal

priority,examinedofficials'publicandprivateopinionsaboutlandtitling,identified

constraintstolandtitling,anddocumentedthelandtitlingprocess.SeeAppendixIV

forexamplequestions.

8. 16focusgroupswithfarmers.Thefocusgroupsrangedfrom3‐12participants.

Activitiesinvolvedtheidentificationandrankingofcommunityneedsandsemi‐

96

structuredquestionstounderstandpropertyissues.SeeAppendixVforanexample

agenda.

9. Directobservationofcommunitymappingandreconstructionactivitiesthroughsite

visitsduringfivemonthsinAcehBesar,AcehJaya,AcehBarat,andPidie.

10. Archivalresearchonavailableregistrydocumentsandlegalcasesconcerning

propertyinheritance(BPNofficesandattheSyiahKualaUniversity).

11. Collectionandanalysisofpublicdocumentsdealingwithpropertyandlandissues

developedduringtheperiodof1999‐2010.Sourcesincludeacademicliterature,

grayliterature(NGOsandgovernmentoffices),legaltexts,andnewsarticles‐which

include:

a. SerambiNewspaper(BahasaIndonesia)

b. WaspadaNewspaper(BahasaIndonesia)

c. AcehKita(English/BahasaIndonesia)

d. AnalisaDaily(BahasaIndonesia)

e. CeureumenAceh'sReconstructionNewsletter(English/BahasaIndonesia)

f. JakartaPost(English/BahasaIndonesia)

g. GoogleNews(English/BahasaIndonesia)

h. FactivaSubscriptionNewsService(English)

i. AcehConflictMonitoringUpdate(English)

12. Collectionofsecondarycensusandassessmentdatasetsfrom:

a. BRR:AgencyfortheRehabilitationandReconstructionofAcehandNiasor

BadanRehabilitasidanRekonstruksi(2005‐2009)

b. BPN:NationalLandAdministrationorBadanPertanahanNasionalRepublik

Indonesia(spatialdataandreports2005‐2007)

c. BPS:StatisticsIndonesiaorBadanPusatStatistik(2005)

d. VillagePotentialStatisticscensus(PODES)(2003and2005)

e. GAMReintegrationNeedsAssessment(2006)

f. KecamatanDevelopmentProjectAcehVillageSurvey(2006)(Wongetal.

2006)

g. ASNLFviolentincidentreports(2003‐2005)

h. ProjectreportsfromtheWorldBankandRALAS(2005‐2009)

97

4.2.2DATAANALYSISIusedSPSSandArcGIStovisualizeandcomparedescriptivestatisticsandforexploratory

dataanalysis.Interviews,focusgroups,observations,archivalresearch,andtextswere

analyzedusingcontentanalysisprocedures.ContentanalysisfollowsKrippendorff's(2004)

modelofdataorganization.TheapproachtocodingdatafollowsHsiehandShannon’s

(2005)definitionofdirectedcontentanalysis–whereintheoreticallyinformedcodesare

usedtobegincodingbutinductivelyderivedcodesarealsogenerated,added,andused

throughreiterativeprocessesofworkingwiththedata.Toexaminethecodeusedfordata

pleaserefertoAppendixVI.

4.2.3ETHICALCONSIDERATIONSOFPOST‐CONFLICTDATACOLLECTIONAsaCaucasian,male,USAmericanresearcherinapost‐conflictandpost‐disastersetting,I

wasnotabletoaccesscertaincommunitiesandsituationsfordatacollection.Giventhe

contextandthenatureoftheresearchquestions,methodssuchasregionalsurveyswerenot

advisableorrealisticdatacollectionmethodsforanindividualresearcher.Asaresult,my

samplingstrategyforsemi‐structuredinterviewsfollowedareferralsamplingstrategy

(snowballsampling).Forfocusgroups,Iidentifiedcommunitiesthatwereundergoingland

titlingprojectsandworkedwithNGOandINGOcolleaguestoidentifycommunitiesthat

wereaccessibleandprovidedarepresentativesampleofthedisasterandconflictimpacted

communities.Inordertoavoidproblemsmydatacouldpotentiallycauseforinformants,I

keptthedataonapasswordprotecteddrive.Inthefinalproductsproduced,noneofthe

datacollectedaretraceabletospecificcommunitiesorindividuals.Thedatacollectedfor

thisresearchproposalwasapprovedbytheMcGillUniversityResearchEthicsBoard(see

AppendixI).

4.3CONFLICTANDLANDSECURITYINACEH

TheIndonesianprovinceofAceh,alsoknownasNanggroeAcehDarussalam,encompasses

thenortherntipoftheislandofSumatra.From1976to2005,thisregionwasthesiteofa

sporadicsecessionistconflictbetweentheFreeAcehMovement(GerakanAcehMerdeka,or

GAM)andthegovernmentofIndonesia(GOI).Cyclicaloutbreaksofviolence—combined

withlong‐termintimidation,torture,andmaterialdispossessionofcivilians—haveclaimed

98

some15,000to33,000lives,paralyzedregionaldevelopment,andpolarizedmuchofthe

population(Reid2006;Schulze2007).

AlthoughtheconflictinAcehhassometimesbeendepictedasbeingbasedononeormore

maincleavages,theviolenceisactuallyaresultofacomplexmixofcontextualopportunities

andissues.Theseissuesincludeethnonationalterritorialclaims,adesireforlocalpolitical

autonomy,disputesoverlocaldistributionofhydrocarbonandresourcerevenues,andeven

personalvendettas(Reid2006;Aspinall2007;McCarthy2007;Schulze2007;Drexler

2008).AddingfurthercomplexityaretheissuesofAcehneseculturalidentity,recognitionof

Islamicprinciplesofgovernance,andgrievancesinvolvingjusticeandreparationsfor

conflict‐relatedcrimes.Theissuesandtheconditionsthatescalatedandsupportedviolent

resistanceinAcehhavechangedovertimeaccordingtothestrategicagendasofchanging

participants(Reid2006;McCarthy2007;Schulze2007;Drexler2008).GAMdemandsfor

amnestyandaspecialreintegrationfundforformercombatants,forexample,contributed

tothefailureofthe2003peacenegotiations.WorkingtowardasustainablepeaceinAceh

hasrequiredconfrontingthecomplexoverlapofeliteandgrassrootsgrievances;dealing

withchangingparticipantsandchangingconditionsthatencourageviolentresistance;and

acknowledgingthespecialneedsofpartiesinvolvedintheviolence.

EventhoughpreviouspeaceprocesseshavetreatedGAMandtheGOIasmonolithic

representativesoftheAcehnesepeopleandtheIndonesianstate,victimsofviolenceare

indicativeoftheinternalfissureswithinandbetweenGAM,Acehnesecivilsociety,the

Indonesianmilitary,andtheGOI(Drexler2008).Thesefissures,whichoftenescapeconflict

analyses,contributedtofailedpeacenegotiationsandcontinuetoposeobstaclestoa

sustainablepeace.AsDrexler(2008,20)notes,“ObservationsoftheAcehconflictoverthe

lasttenyearsshowthatoversimplifiedanalysesofconflictsextendandevenintensify

violence”.

Disregardoftheinternalcomplexitiessupportspoliticizednarrativesofgroupidentities—

narrativesthathavebeenusedtounderminecertainplayersandlegitimizeothersinthe

conflictinAceh.Forexample,whilesomenarrativesfindtherootsoftheconflictandof

99

GAMinanearlyunbrokenhistoryofarmedresistancetocolonialDutch,Japanese,and

Indonesianforcessince1873,othersidentifyGAMasacriminalorganizationwhosegoals

havelittleconnectiontothishistoricalresistance(Reid2006;Nessen2006;Drexler2008).

However,theconflictinAcehiscomplexandcannotbereducedtoaconflictbasedonany

singleissuebetweentwomonolithicparties.Analysesoftheconflictandprogressin

peacebuildingmustrecognizethattheactorsinvolvedinandthereasonsforcontinued

violenceinAcehhaveevolvedduringthe29‐yearconflict.Likewise,analysisofproperty

issuesrequiresrecognizingthatthesechangingpoliticalnarrativeshaveinfluenced

approachestopropertyandlandmanagement.

ThesigningoftheMemorandumofUnderstanding(HelsinkiMOU)betweenthe

GovernmentoftheRepublicofIndonesiaandtheFreeAcehMovementinFinland,inAugust

2005markedtheendofthemostrecentperiodofviolenceinAceh,anditisthestarting

pointforthisstudy’sinvestigationofproperty,landtenuresecurityandpeacebuilding.23

TheHelsinkiMOUsigningwasinextricablylinkedwiththe2004IndianOceantsunami.

Althoughthetsunamiwasonlyoneofmanyfactorsleadingtotheendofviolence,its

massivedestructionsetthestageforthepeaceprocessbychangingimmediatepoliticaland

militarystrategiesandtheregion’seconomic,social,andecologicallandscape(LeBillonand

Waizenegger2007;Gaillardetal.2008).

OnDecember26th,2004,theIndianOceantsunamiinundatedthelowlandsofAceh,killing

some167,000peopleandleaving500,000morehomeless.Inadditiontothehumandeath

toll,itisestimatedthatsome300,000landparcels,250,000homes,15percentof

agriculturallands,over2,000schools,and10,000kilometersofroadswereseverely

damagedordestroyed(Fitzpatrick2005;Kennyetal.2006;Abidinetal.2006).Indonesian

militaryoperationsfrom2003to2004hadweakenedGAM,andunpublicizedpeace

negotiationshadbegunatleastasearlyasOctober2004,butthetsunamiallowedGAMand

theGOItomakepublicconcessionsonissueslike disarmament, amnesty, and a special

reintegration fund for former combatants–issuesthathadbeenfundamentalsticking23ForthecompletetextoftheHelsinkiMOU,seewww.aceh‐mm.org/download/english/Helsinki%20MoU.pdf

100

pointsinthecollapsedpeacenegotiationsof2003(Schulze2007).However,eventhough

thetsunamiallowedconcessionsandchangedshort‐termopportunitiesforpursuing

politicalandpersonalviolence,theresultingpeacemakingprocessdidnotaddressallthe

grievancesofdifferentgroupsinAceh(LeBillonandWaizenegger2007;RennerandChafe

2007;Drexler2008;Gaillardetal.2008).

4.3.1TENURESECURITYANDNORMATIVEPLURALISMINACEHInmanypost‐conflictscenarios,clarifyingandsupportingpropertytenuresecurityarekey

stepsinaddressingtherootsoftheconflict,conflict‐relatedgrievances,andpost‐conflict

conditionsthatmayleadtorelapsesofviolence.Evenwheredisputesoverpropertyarenot

theprimarydriverofviolentconflict,thedestructionofpropertysystemscanresultinpost‐

conflictdisputesoverresourcesandarelapseintoviolence.Thisisespeciallythecasewith

landtenuresecurity(Unruh2003).Re‐establishinglandtenuresecurityisfundamentalfor

meetingimmediaterecoveryneeds,enablingdisputeresolution,layingthefoundationfor

sustainablelivelihoods,andenablinginvestmentandeconomicdevelopment(USAID2005).

However,inpost‐conflictscenarios,thestateoftenlackslegitimacyandisfacedwith

existingtraditionsandinformalsystemsthatcanunderminestateterritorialauthority.

Wherethestateitselfisunreliableandisknownforusingitslegalsystemtodispossessand

underminelocalclaimstoproperty,theproblemswithmakingthestatutorylegalsystem

locallylegitimatecanbedifficulttoovercome(MorseandWoodman1988;Das2004;Home

andLim2004;Unruh2004).

InAceh,theimportanceofdisputesoverpropertyownership–particularlylandclaims–as

aconditionfortheescalationanddurationofviolentconflicthaschangedovertime.

Althoughindividualandcommunalpropertyrightswerenotcentraltotheescalationof

violentconflictin1976,thedisruptionovertimeofinformalandformalpropertysystems

byviolence,humanrightsabuses,andhydrocarbonresourceexploitationhaveledto

property‐rightsgrievancesagainstthegovernment(Fitzpatrick2008a).Asidefromthe

effectsoftheviolentconflictonpropertyrights,thereareseveralproblemswithapplying

theIndonesianlegalframeworkforpropertyrightsinAceh.Forexample,thelegal

frameworkregardingcommunalpropertyrightsisunclear(Lindsey2008).Thisambiguity

meansthatapplicationofthestatutorysystemcancreatetenureinsecurityandelitesor

101

stateofficialscanmanipulateclaimsthroughthelegalsystemorothermeans(Peluso2005;

McCarthy2006).Indeed,theNationalLandAgency(BadanPertanahanNasional,orBPN)is

locallyperceivedtobeoneofthemostcorruptagenciesinthecountry,andIndonesiahas

lowoverallperformanceingovernanceasmeasuredbyindicatorssuchasTransparency

International’sCorruptionPerceptionsIndex(2011).24

Theweaklegalframeworkandresultingtenureinsecurityareespeciallyproblematicfor

thepost‐conflictlegallandscapeofAceh,wheretheIndonesianstate’slegitimacyasa

sovereignpowerisstillquestionedbysomeformercombatants.FormerGAMcombatants

didnotwanttoregistertheirlandsastheyfeltthathavingtheirnamesonalistmighthelp

thegovernmentfindthemincaseofrecurrenceofviolence(InterviewIndah,Calang,May

2007).Asof2008,thepolitical,economic,ecological,andsocioculturalvalueofland

remainedpointsofcontentionaschangingregionallaws,fees,taxes,andstateclaims

transformedlocalownershipandlocallyacceptableunderstandingsofpropertyandtenure

security(Fitzpatrick2008a).Underlyingthesechallengeswithimplementationofthe

statutorylegalframeworkisthefactthatAcehisalegallypluralisticcommunitywhere

propertyclaimsareoftensubjecttocontradictorylegaltraditions(Bowen2003).

ResidentsofAcehdrawfrommultiplelegalandnormativetraditionsintheirdaily

interactions.ManyauthorsandAcehneseresidentsidentifythreeworkingsetsoflawsor

normativetraditionsthatdefinetenuresecurityandgoverntheuseandownershipof

property:adat(informalorcustomaryinstitutions),statutorylaw(formalinstitutions),and

IslamicjurisprudenceandIslamiccourts(Bowen2003;Harper2006).Nevertheless,these

threetraditionsarenotnecessarilybestconceivedofasautonomous,opposingsetsoflaws.

Therearemanywaysthatthethreetraditionsareinterlinked,mutuallyconstituted,and

composedofoverlappingpractices.Forexample,adatiscloselyassociatedwithIslamic

jurisprudenceinAceh,andovertimelocalcommunitieshaveinvesteddifferingweightin

flexible,equitablepracticesversusdogmaticreligiousprinciples(Bowen2003).However,

differenttraditionsareassociatedwithuniquegovernancestyles,economicrelations,and

24In2011,Indonesiawasranked100thoutof183(TransparencyInternational2011)

102

culturalplaces.

Thesethreedesignationsarealsousedtolabelpracticesforpoliticalpurposes.Individuals

andgroupssometimesusethesetraditionsaspoliticallabelstodifferentiateandcategorize

hybridlegalpracticesandhybridlegalspacesinordertomakepotentpoliticalarguments

andclaims(Li2001).Proponentsofonetraditiontendtopointtolimitationsandabusesin

othertraditionsinordertojustifychangesthattheyfeelareappropriateorthatbenefit

themselves.Supportersofstatutorytitlingcontrastedwhattheyconsideredasthevagaries

andinequitiesofcustomarylaws(adat)withthesupposedeconomicbenefitsoftitle,the

state’sabilitytoavoidandadjudicateviolentdisputes,andtheprotectionthatstatutorylaw

providesfortheenvironmentandfortherightsofwomen,children,andmembersof

minoritygroups.Forexample,arepresentativeofthestatesaidthatinspiteofadatand

Islam,“Withoutstatesupportedlandtitlesandjointtitling,womenandchildrenwillhave

noprotectionfrommalerelativesthattaketheirinheritancerights”(InterviewBPN,Banda

Aceh,August2006).

Anumberofothernormativetraditionscouldalsobeconsideredeitherdirectlyrelevantto

propertyoratleastimportantfordefiningthepracticesofthethreeabovetraditionsin

regardtoproperty.Forexample,theinformalpropertytransactionsthatoccurinperi‐

urbanandurbanareasdonotneatlyfitintooneofthethreemajortraditions.Also,inpost‐

disasterAcehinternationalandlocalNGOsinfluencedpropertyrightsthroughsuch

activitiesascommunitymapping,buildingnarrativesaboutpropertyrights,interveningin

propertydisputes,andaddingdiscoursesofnaturalorhumanrightstopropertydebates.

(InterviewUN‐HABITAT,BandaAceh,August2006;InterviewFFI,Meulaboh,May2007).

StatutorylandlawinIndonesiaisbasedontheBasicAgrarianLawof1960(LawNo.

5/1960),whichlaysoutthebasicrightstolandownershipandthelegalprocessesfor

resolution.Rightstolandincludeprivateownershiprights(hakmilik,whichissimilarto

landownershipasrecognizedbyfreeholdtitle),buildingrights(hakgunabangunan),rights

ofcommercialexploitation(hakgunausaha),rightsofuse(hakpakai),rentalrights(hak

sewa),andcommunallandrights(hakulayat,whichrecognizecustomarylandandresource

tenure).StatutorylawslinktoorrecognizetheauthorityofadatandIslamicjurisprudence

inseveraldifferentwaysandatdifferentscalesofgovernance.TheIndonesianstatealso

103

usestermsthatderivefrombroaderIslamiclaw.Forexample,thetermhakmilikcomes

fromtheIslamictermmulk/milkanddescribes“privatefullownership”(SaitandLim2006,

12).

InAceh,Islamicjurisprudencehaslongbeenintimatelylinkedtoadatandplaysan

importantroleinlocaldecision‐makingprocesses(musyawarah)atthegampung(village)

andmukim(aggregateofvillages)levels(Bowen2003).Islamicjurisprudencehas

commonlybeenconsideredanavenueforhandlinginheritancecases,andnewregional

laws(qanun25)andnationallawshavegivenIslamicjurisprudencelargergovernance

capacitiesandamoreformalroleindecisionsoverlanduse,investments,theproperty

rightsofwomenandmembersofminoritygroups,andtheuseoflandasfinancialcollateral

(Bowen2003;Harper2006).Forexample,throughNationalLawNo.48/2007,Islamic

courts(mahkamahsyar’iyah)aregiventheauthoritytodeciderightfulheirsandguardians

ininheritancecases,andtheIslamictreasury(BaituMalAceh)isgivenequalauthoritywith

thepublictrust(BalaiHartaPeninggalan)tomanagepost‐tsunamipropertywherenolegal

heirhasbeenidentified.ThisincorporationandformalizationofIslamiccourtsand

jurisprudenceintothedifferentscalesofgovernmentreflectandrepeatsomeofthe

historicalmisstepsandlegalvaguenessthatoccurredduringpreviousattemptsto

regularizeorregisterpropertyandtoformalizethediverse,informaltraditionsknownas

adat(InterviewUNDP,Calang,May2007).

Adatpracticesareofficiallyrecognizedinstatelaw;however,thisrecognitioncantake

manydifferentformsinpractice(MorseandWoodman1988).Thisrecognitionmightvary

basedonwhetherthestatelegallyconfersoracknowledgesgovernancepowertoadat

institutions,whetheradathassoleorsharedauthority,andwhetheradatsanctionsare

renderedimpotentorleftintact.Additionally,recognitioncaneffectivelyintegrateadatinto

stateauthoritywhenthepowertoappointorchangethecompositionofadatleadership

requiresstateapproval.Therecognitionofadatgovernancestructureshasbeencrucialto

thedecentralizationofgovernmentofIndonesia.Whilethisdecentralizationhasbeenkeyin

25QanunreferstoregionalregulationsaspassedbytheRegionalHouseofRepresentatives(DPRD)inAceh.ThecapacitytocreateqanunwasfirstgrantedbyLawNo.18/2001(theSpecialAutonomyfortheProvinceofAcehastheProvinceofNanggroeAcehDarussalam)andwasreaffirmedbyLawNo.11/2006(theLawonGoverningAcehorLoGA).

104

attenuatingsomeidentityclaimsinAceh,therehasbeenasimultaneousdrivetoreorganize

adatinstitutionssotheyfitseamlesslyintothestate.Forexample,theformalizationofthe

gampung(village)andmukim(aggregateofvillages)hasimplicationsfortheadjudicationof

propertydisputes.Whencommunitiesarefacedwithformal,statutorytitlesthatreinforce

hakmilik,thesecommunitiesmaylosetheauthorityandpowertoenforcetraditional

punitivesanctionsthatmayalienatepropertyrightsfromindividualownersorexpel

ownersfromthecommunity.Infocusgroupsinruralcommunities,farmersworriedthat

punitivesanctionimposedbythecommunitywouldnolongerbehonoredoncestatetitles

weregranted(FocusGroup10,Panton,May2007).

Oneofthemostimportantwaysinwhichstatutorylawsinteractwithadatisinthe

recognitionofcommunalpropertyrights(hakulayat).Statutorylawrecognizes

communities’abilitytoallocateland,approvetransfers,controluse,andadjudicateland

disputes(Harper2006).Butthereareseveralproblemswiththeclarity,implementation,

andbreadthofapplicationofstatutorylawsregardingcommunityproperty(Lindsey2008).

Forexample,communallandsareoftensubjecttoforestrylaws,naturalresourcepolicy,

andseveralbureaucraticlayersinaccessibletolocals.Searchingforapplicablelaws

regardingcommunalforestsandforest‐resourceaccessinAcehrequiresacknowledgingthe

temporalsequenceandambiguitiesbetweentheBasicAgrarianLawandlawsonforestry,

regionalautonomy,andspecialautonomyforAceh.Inshort,therelativesimplicityofthe

BasicAgrarianLawframeworkoverlookshowlandisconnectedtoresources,andit

thereforecontributestodisputessurroundingforestsandcommunalresources(Eyeon

Aceh2009).

Disputeswiththegovernmentovercommunalresourceswerenotpartofthepeace

process,buttheyhavebeensourcesoflocalgrievanceinAceh.Sincethereisnoconceptof

adversepossession(obtaininglandbyoccupyingit)withinIndonesianlaw,insomecases

thestatehasfailedtorecognizecommunities’claimstolandonwhichtheyhavelivedand

paidtaxesformorethanfortyyears(Fitzpatrick2008a).Ininterviewswithrural

householdsintheAcehJayaregionin2007,theselegalambiguitieswerecitedasa

disincentivetotheadoptionofstatutorylawandasoneofthereasonsthattitleshavenot

successfullysupplantedadatpracticesandtheuseofsaledocumentsasdeeds(FocusGroup

11,Madreng,May2007).Thatsaid,adatpracticesaresometimesdefinedbythestate,so

105

theyshouldnotbesimplyelevatedasantecedent,customarypracticesthatopposethestate

(Li2001;Burns2004).Indeed,adatpracticesmayincorporatestatutorylaw;mayconsider

thereactionofstatutorylawbeforelocaldecisionsaremadeconcerningnaturalresources;

or,inthecaseof‘countermapping’and‘weaponsoftheweak’,maybereshapedbytheir

resistancetothestate(Peluso2005;Bowen2003).

TheinformalpracticesknownasadatareresilientinAcehperhapsbecauseoftheveryway

inwhichtheyaredefinedasflexible,localcreationsthatdrawfrombutareindependentof

statutorylawandIslamicjurisprudence.Interestingly,thedefinitionofadatanditsuseasa

labelevolvedfromcolonialdebatesoverpropertysystems.Dutchlegalscholarsplayeda

significantroleindefiningadat(Burns2004).Otto(2009,181)writes:

Concerning the Netherlands Indies, vehement debates about the future of thecolony’s legalsystemtookplaceduringthe firstdecadesof the20thcentury,withthe focus on land tenure issues. The debate […] featured a ‘Leiden’ school led byProfessorvanVollenhovenclaimingthatfornativeIndonesianstheindigenousadatlawsshouldremainthefoundationofthelegalsystem.ThisschoolarguedthatmostIndonesian landbelonged to Indonesiannativecommunities,and that thecolonialstate should legally, by recognitionof theiradat law, preserve this land for them.‘Utrecht’however,ledbyProfessorNolstTrenité,andassociatedwiththeeconomicinterestsofDutchcolonialenterprise,claimedthattheintroductionofaunifiedcivillegislationwouldstimulatelandmarketsinthebestinterestsofboththenativeaswellastheEuropeanpopulationgroups.Afterprotractedandintensepolemics,VanVollenhoven’s views prevailed in parliament and state policies and law. Dutchcolonial law continued to recognize adat law as theprivate lawof the indigenouspopulation.Thisadatlawpolicywassupportedbyanimmensebodyofknowledge,collectedbydozensoffieldresearchersofthe‘Adatrechtsschool’,whichcouldnotbeeffectivelycounteredbyUtrecht.

Thesesamepositionsareechoedinmoderndebatesoverpropertymanagementin

Indonesiaandotherpost‐colonialnation‐states.Infact,the‘Leiden’positionisclosetowhat

somepropertyexpertsnowrefertoastheco‐adaptationparadigm(BruceandMigot‐

Adholla1994;Platteau1996;Unruh2006).Ontheotherhand,deSoto’s(2000)framework

thathasbeenadoptedbymanydevelopmentprogramsmirrorstheideasofthethe‘Utrecht’

positioninthatdeSoto“proposesadesignofrapidandmassivedirectincorporation

throughnationalprogramsforsystemictitlingandregistrationofplotsasindividual,

transferableproperty”(Otto2009,183).

106

Thefundamentalpointofagreementinalladatpracticesistheemphasisonlocal,flexible

managementandconsensualmediationsthatcanconsideramultitudeoffactorsoutsidethe

rangeofformalcourtsandfreeholdtitlerights.Thesepracticesvaryoverspaceandtime.

Despitethisdiversity,adatcommonlyprovidesrightsrelatedtocommunalland(hak

ulayat);customaryownership(hakmilikadat);anduse,includingagriculturalusage

(useuha),rentalusage(sewa/kontrak),sharecropping(bagihasil/mawaih),pledge/pawn

usage(gadai/gala),andcultivation(numpangtanam)(Harper2006).Althoughpaper

documentsarenotalwaysusedinadatprocesses,statutorytitlesordeeds(aktejualbeli)

canbeimportantcomponentsofinformaltransactionsandsourcesofevienceindisputes

thataremediatedbynon‐statutoryinstitutions.Thebroad,qualitativedifferencesbetween

statutoryandadatpracticesinregardtoprocessanddefinitionofpropertycanbe

summarizedasthesocialembeddednessofadat.Adatcanworkwithoutoraroundformal

titlesanddeeds,lowercostsoftenure‐securitymaintenance,andincludeparticularrules

concerningpreemptionandthetransferandsaleofland.Forexample,landheldunderhak

milikadat(typicallyruralandsometimesperi‐urbanland)mayonlybesoldiffirstoffered

toneighborsandifthirdparties’ongoingrightofaccesswillberespected,maynotbesold

tooutsiders,andmaybeappropriatedbythecommunityorcommunityleader(keucik)asa

communitygood(Fitzpatrick2005;Harper2006).Theselimitsarenotverydifferentfrom

statutorycovenants,easements,andtakingsbutaresometimesembeddedintheunwritten

traditionsofacommunityandmakelittlesensetostatutoryunderstandingsofprivate

property(Peluso2005).Adatpracticesofferstrong,flexible,andequitabletenuresecurity

forlocalneeds.However,withoutstaterecognition,adattenureisusuallyinsufficientas

collateralforbankloansorasprotectionfromstateclaims(InterviewGema,BandaAceh,

June2008).

4.3.2LANDREGISTRATIONANDTHETORRENSTITLESYSTEMAsmentionedabove,themainformofpropertyadministrationcurrentlyendorsedinmany

developmentprojectsfollowsdeSoto’sframework.DeSotoproposesthattheregistration

ofpropertyinstate‐administeredtitlesystemsistheonlymeanstoachievetenuresecurity

thatfacilitatespoliticalandeconomicadvancement(deSoto2000).Statutorytitlescan

providebenefitsintermsoftenuresecurityagainstforeignclaims,abilitytomortgage

107

assets,andincreasedabilitytoalienate(transfer)property.Moreover,inacapitalistland

market,awell‐maintained,accountable,andtransparentpropertyadministrationsystem

thatguaranteesanindefeasibletitlecanreducetimeandcostsnormallyassociatedwith

otherstate‐administeredpropertymanagementsystemslikedeedssystems.Yet,despite

thesepurportedbenefits,someauthorsarguethatthereasondeSoto'snarrativeof

propertyhasbeenwidelyadoptedisbecauseitisanarrativethatiswell‐suitedtothe

neoliberal,state‐buildingpoliciesofthepost‐ColdWarera.AsOtto(2009,180)argues:

First,DeSoto isabrilliantstory‐teller.Thestyleofhisbook isveryconfidentandconvincing. Secondly, he tells whatmost policy‐makers and peoplewant to hear,namelythatthereisasolutiontoalltheirproblems,andthatthissolutioncombinesall the goals of development and governancewithout problemsor contradictions;theonlyconditionisthatweallstopbeingstupid.Thirdly,hisstoryfitswellinthedominant political and economic trends of neo‐liberalism. Finally, mostpractitioners in land law and development, policy‐makers, consultants and evenacademics do not speak out against him because they are faced with a difficultdilemma.Ontheonehand,hereisarelativenewcomertoanareatheyhaveworkedin for decades,whomakes claims that they findwildly exaggerated.On the otherhand, finally here is someone who, more than anyone before, has promoted theimportance of their field, of the rule of law, especially land law for economicdevelopment.

DeSoto’snarrativewasadoptedasthepost‐disasterapproachtopropertyanddroveland

titlingactivitiesinAceh.InthecaseofAceh,deSoto’slogicwasrealizedinthedesignand

implementationoftheRALASproject.Inresponsetotheperceivedurgencyofresolvingthe

broadarrayofpropertyissuesthatwereoftensimplylabeledas‘landtenureinsecurity’,

theMultiDonorTrustFundforAcehandNias(MDTF)focusedthefirstoftheir23projects

intheregiononsupportingtheregistrationandtitlingoflandparcels.26Thefund

establishedabudgetofUS$28.5millionforRALAS,astate‐administeredlandtitlingproject.

AlthoughRALASwasfundedthroughthepooledcontributionsofmanyinternational

donors,itwasdirectlyadministeredthroughtheNationalLandAgency(BPN,Badan

PeranahanNasional),wassubjecttoIndonesiannationallawregardinglandandnatural26TheWorldBankservedastrusteeoftheMultiDonorTrustFundforAcehandNias(MDTF)‐apartnershipoftheIndonesiangovernmentandtheinternationalcommunitytosupporttherecoveryfollowingthetsunami.Thefundcoordinatedcontributionsfrom15donors:theEuropeanCommission,theNetherlands,UnitedKingdom,WorldBank,Sweden,Denmark,Norway,Germany,Canada,Belgium,Finland,AsiaDevelopmentBank(ADB),UnitedStates,NewZealandandIreland.

108

resources,andwaslinkedtoactivitiesofthenationalagencymeanttopresideoverthe

tsunamirecoveryknownastheAgencyforRehabilitationandReconstruction(BRR,Badan

RehabilitasidanRekonstruksi).Aspropertyissueswereframedaspost‐disasterissues,

RALASwascreatedtodealwithnaturaldisasterimpactsonproperty.TheRALASproject

beganin2005withthegoalofissuing600,000titleswhileencouragingcommunity

participationinthetitlinganddisputeadjudicationprocessandguaranteeingprotectionof

thepropertyrightsoforphansandwomen.TheRALASprojectwastheequivalentofa

posterchildfortherecovery,reconstruction,developmenteffortsinAceh.EvenformerUS

PresidentBillClinton,servingastheUNSpecialEnvoytoAceh,extolledthisprojectand

recognizedtheinfluenceofdeSoto’stheoryincreatingtheRALASprojectnotjustforAceh

butasaprototypeforlandtitlingprojectsaroundtheworld:

“ThoseofyoufamiliarwiththeworkofMr.(Hernando)deSotoaroundtheworldand similar projects know that the world’s poor people have roughly 5 trilliondollars inassets thatare totallyunusable foreconomicgrowthbecausetheydon’thavetitletothemsotheycan’tgetcreditusingwhattheyownascollateral.ThisisgoingtobedonethroughtheWorldBankgrantinAceh.ItisveryforwardthinkingonboththepartoftheWorldBankandIndonesiabutIhopethattheothercountriesaffectedwilldothatandinitspursuitoftheMillenniumDevelopmentGoals,Ihopethat you,Mr. President and ECOSOC, can have an influence in urging this sort ofproject to be done in other countries outside the tsunami affected areas.” (July2005)

DeSoto’snarrativenotonlypushesaneoliberal,market‐focusedversionofproperty,butit

alsorecommendsspecificregistrationmethods–thatregulatoryframeworksbe

immediatelychangedandthatpropertyberegisteredandtitledinawidespread,massive,

immediateoverhauloftheentirepropertysystem.Aswell,herecommendsimplementation

ofaspecifictypeofpropertyadministrationsystem–theTorrenstitlesystem–overany

othervariationofstate‐administeredpropertysystems.DevelopedinAustralia,theTorrens

systemorganizesthecentralmanagementoftitlesandfocusesonthestatecadastreasthe

primarylegalinstrumentfortenuresecurity.Butsuchasystemisnotcostless,politically

neutral,freeoffaults,ortheonlyoptionforstatesthatneedtointerveneinorderto

reinforceorguaranteetenuresecurity.Theprocessofcreatinggeographicallycompleteand

accurateproperty‐administrationsystemssometimesdispossessespoliticallymarginal

communitiesandforcesnewcosts(suchastaxes,transferfees,andregistrationfees)onto

109

poorcommunitiesthatuseinformalpractices(HomeandLim2004).Suchasystemalso

requiresthatthestatehavethecapacityandlegitimacytoenforcetheregistrationof

propertyandpropertytransactions.Furthermore,theeconomicandsocialcostsof

convertinginformalsystemsintostate‐administeredtitlesystemsareoftenquitehighand

tendtodisregardsystemsthatarebetterabletointeractwithinformalpractices,suchas

thosethatemphasizedeedsorthatincorporatesocial‐tenuremodels.

Althoughsomeurbanareas,peri‐urbanareas,andmarket‐orientedruralcommunitiesmay

benefitfromstateregistrationinTorrenstitlesystems,statetitlescanbeinappropriatein

ruralandpost‐conflictareasthatdonotmeetmanyassumptionsregardingstatelegitimacy,

landmarkets,orcost‐benefits(HomeandLim2004;Otto2009).Moreover,someauthors

andactivistsarguethatstate‐ledregistrationandtitlingprocessesaresynonymouswiththe

dispossessionoflocalpropertyrightsandthereorganizationofsocial,cultural,andpolitical

relations(Scott1998;Elyachar2005;Moore2005;Fauzi2009).Indeed,theregistrationof

landsappearedtonotrecognizethatclaimstolandandresourcesmadebythestateduring

theconflictsometimesdispossessedlocalresourcesusers(InterviewMukir,BandaAceh,

June2008).Infact,localsmaderoadblocksthatlimitedmovementonthemainroadsin

protestofsuchresourceclaimsincommunitiesbetweenBandaAcehandcitiesonthe

southerncoastofSumatraduring2006‐2008(DirectObservation,April‐May2007).The

costsofmaintainingcentralizedtitlesystemsthataccuratelyreflecttransactions,the

absenceofanticipatedbenefitsamonglocalpopulations,andthepoliticizationof

registrationprocesseshavehistoricallyunderminedformalpropertysystems(Smith2003;

Sowerwine2004a,2004b).Likewise,whereeverydayinteractionsdeviateovertimefrom

centralizedtitlesystems,variationsoftheTorrenstitlesystemareunabletoadequately

mirrorwhatisactuallyoccurringwithpropertytransfersandownershipattheground

level.Theseconcernscastseriousmoraldoubtsontheutilityandefficacyofallocating

moneytobuildcentralizedtitlesystemsimmediatelyafterconflictswhenalternativedeeds

systemsorinformalnetworkscansupporttenuresecurity.

4.3.3LANDTENURESECURITYAFTERTHETSUNAMIANDSECESSIONISTCONFLICTTheextenttowhichpropertyandformalorinformaltenuresystemsweredamagedbythe

110

tsunamiandconflictislargelyageographicquestion.Tsunamiimpactswerelimitedto

lowlandareaswhereasconflictintensityandimpactswereclusteredinareasthatwereand

werenotimpactedbythetsunami(Wongetal.2007)(seeFigure4.2).Thewidearrayof

tsunami‐andconflict‐relatedproblemsconfrontinglandtenuresecurityinAcehincluded

thedestructionoftheBPN(NationalLandAgency)offices,thedeathofseveralBPNstaff,

thedestructionoffieldmarkersandboundarylines,promisesoflandforreintegrationof

formercombatants,anddisputedclaimsagainsttheIndonesianstate.

Figure4.2:2004ConflictEventandDisasterDamageMap.Source:BRR2005.

111

Inaddition,therehavebeengenderrightsandinheritanceissuesresultingfromdeaths,

tsunamiandconflictrefugeemovementandresettlement,aswellasinconsistencies

betweenintactlocalpracticesandstatutorylaw(Fitzpatrick2005).Furtherproblems

includedcompensationforirrecoverablydamagedlandandproperty,thenebulousstatus

ofrentersandsquatters,andinformalagreementsregardingpropertyuseandownership.

Complicatingthesemattersweretheregion’slegalpluralismandthefactthatlandand

propertyrightswerepotentpoliticalsymbolsthatwereespeciallyproblematicwherethe

state’sterritorialcontrolandrighttotaxwerestilldisputed(Fitzpatrick2005).

ThelegitimacyandthecapacityofIndonesianstateinstitutionswerelimitedintheregion,

andinformalinstitutionswerethepredominantbasisoftenuresecurityandproperty

management.Ofthe300,000parcelsaffectedbythetsunami,only25percenthadtitles

issuedbythestate(Fitzpatrick2005;Abidinetal.2006).Statutorylawwasmostprevalent

inthelowlandcities,wherethetsunamiwasmostdevastating.BykillingseveralBPN

officialsanddestroyingexistingtitles,stateregistrationoffices,andfieldmarketsforplot

identification,thetsunamithrewthecadastralsystemintochaos(Abidinetal.2006).Some

80percentofthedamagedtitleshavebeenrecoveredbyworkattheJapanInternational

CooperationAgency,butthelackoffidelityofthesedocumentstoactivitiesontheground

maycontradictcommunitymapsofclaimsandcauseadditionalproblemsfortenure

security.LowlandinformalinstitutionsweremoreresilientthantheBPN‐administered

cadastre,buttheysufferedgreatlyfromthelossoftraditionalpropertymarkers,ofhuman

knowledgesurroundinguserightsandinformalarrangements,andoftheoverloadof

inheritancecases(InterviewAdhi,BandaAceh,August2006;FocusGroup3,SetiaBakti,

May2007).

Inthehighlandsandinsomeseparatistareas,thetsunamihadalimitedimpact.Inthese

areas,formalinstitutionswerenotwellstaffedor,insomecases,evenfunctional.Local

resistancetostatutorylawandalackofimplementationcapacitymeantthatstatutorylaws

neversupplantedlocaltraditionsinruralandconflict‐proneareas.Likewise,inurbanareas

informal(butnotalwaysadat)arrangementsregardingrenters,squatters,anduserights

underminedthestatecadastre’sabilitytoreflectreality.Thereweremanyreasonswhythe

112

state‐administeredcadastrewasunabletomakeapermanentfootholdinAcehbeforethe

tsunami,includingthehistoryofcoloniallegalstructures,economiccostsoftitle

registrationandtitlemaintenance,incompatiblyoflocalcustomsandnationallegal

systems,andcorruptiononthepartofgovernmentofficials.Lackofimplementation

capacity,lackoflandmarkets,GAM’sterritorialauthorityinsomeareas,andageneral

resistancetostateinstitutionsalsoimpededthecadastre(DirectObservation,April‐May

2007;InterviewWening,Meulaboh,February2008).

Landtenuresecuritywasthoughttobeimportantfordisasterrecoverybecauseitallowed

agenciestoestablishcampsandnegotiaterelocationofrefugees,providebasicservices,and

identifyandcompensateownersofdestroyedproperty.Furthermore,agencieswereableto

protectorphans’andwidows’propertyrights,beginreconstructinghouses,andmediate

land‐relateddisputes(BRR2005;Fitzpatrick2005).Encouraginglandtenuresecuritywas

alsothoughttosupportpeacebuilding.Itwasarguedthatitprovidedtheabilitytogive

immediateaccesstobasicandessentialservices,mediateconflict‐relatedlanddisputes,

resolveland‐relatedgrievances,providelandforreintegrationofformercombatants,and

promotelong‐termgoalsofgoodgovernanceandeconomicdevelopmentequitablefor

womenaswellasmen(Harper2006).

Landtenuresecurityinpost‐conflictAcehappearedtobegreaterthaninotherpost‐conflict

regionsbecausetherewere:(1)intactvillage‐levelcustomaryinstitutionsforland

management;(2)nosignificantsecondaryoccupationsofhouses,andthereforefewer

resettlementissues;(3)nolayeredhistoryofdisplacementanddispossession,and

thereforefewercompetingclaimsbetweenlocalgroups;and(4)nosignificantcommercial

tourismdevelopmentsonthecoasts,andthereforefewercompetingclaimsbetween

commercialandlocalgroups(Fitzpatrick2005).Assumingthatconflict‐relatedlandissues

wereminor,policymakersconcentratedalmostexclusivelyonpost‐disasterissuesrather

thanpost‐conflictdynamics(Deutsch2009).Theconceptsandprocesswereoriented

towardsurbanandpost‐tsunamirecoverybyanumberoflogisticalfactors.Theseincluded:

(1)thedevelopmentfocusonurbanareaswheretherewaslittleinternationalcommercial

investments;(2)anabsenceofimmediatelanddisputes;(3)alackofconflict‐related

113

resettlementproblems;(4)alackofunderstandingoftheambiguitiesregardinglandand

resourceaccess.Infact,understandinghowpolicymakersdefinedlandtenuresecurityis

centraltounderstandinghowtheypursuedregionalpropertyadministrationandhowthis

affecteddisasterrecovery,post‐conflictstabilizationandtransition,andlong‐term

development.

Despitethewidespreaduseofadatandthepost‐conflictresonanceoftheculturaland

politicalrepresentationoflandinseparatiststruggle,themainemphasisofinternational

donorsandnationalagencieswasonexpandingthestate‐administeredcadastre.Even

beforetheHelsinkiMOUwasratifiedinAugust2005,internationaldonors,INGOs,local

activists,BPN,andtheNationalDevelopmentPlanningAgency(BadanPerencanaandan

PembangunanNasional,orBAPPENAS)identifiedlandtenuresecurityasapriorityforpost‐

disasterrecovery,post‐conflictreconstruction,andfutureregionaldevelopment

(Fitzpatrick2005;Kennyetal.2006;LindseyandPhillips2005).InApril2005,the

BAPPENASMasterPlanforRehabilitationandReconstructioninAcehandNiasmade

specificmentionofrestoringtitlesandexpandingthenationallandcadastre(BAPPENAS

2005).TheBPN‐administeredlandregistrationprojectcalledRALASbecametheprimary

tenure‐securityprogramintheregion.ThegoalofRALASwastofacilitatefairprocessesfor

landregistration,improvestatecapacitytomanagethecadastre,anddigitizethecadastre

andlandregister.MandatedtorunfromAugust2005toAugust2008,RALASwasinitially

financedbyagrantofUS$28.5millionthroughtheMulti‐DonorTrustFundforAcehand

NorthSumatra.RALASalsoreceivedtechnicalsupportfromseveralotherdonorsand

INGOs.

AsevidencedbyearlypublicationsandpublicstatementsbyGOIofficials,explicitly

underlyingtheentireprojectweredeSoto’sassumptionsthatfreeholdtitleguaranteedby

thestatewasthemostsecureformoflandtenuresecurity,allowedthestatetoprotect

individualpropertyrights,gavelicensetoreconstructbuildings,andliberatedthe‘dead

capital’ofthepoorasfinancialcollateral.Additionalassumptionshavebeenthatfreehold

titleenabledmoreequitabletreatmentofwomenandorphansandpermittedthestateto

mediateconflictingclaimsanddisputesoverlands(BRR2005).However,forcriticsonthe

114

ground,theproject’sgoalofregistering600,000parcelsseemedunrealisticandappearedto

beanopportunisticefforttoincreasestatecontroloverlandsandtogeneratenewtax

revenues(InterviewUNDP,Calang,May2007).Regardlessoftheunderlyingmotives,

RALAStooklaudablestepstolowereconomicbarrierstoregistration(forexample,the

MinistryofFinancewaivedtaxesandfees),toincorporateadatthroughlegislativereform,

andtoimplementparticipatorymethodsforthedelineationofpropertyandadjudicationof

landclaims(Abidinetal.2006;Kennyetal.2006).

Overtime,however,problemssurfaced,andtheinitiativemetwithlimitedsuccess.

Community‐drivenadjudicationandmappingperformedbyNGOsandINGOswerenot

recognizedbytheBPNasvalidforissuingtitles;theearlyconsultativecommunications

betweenNGOsandtheBPNended;stateclaimsoverlandsinAcehJayaandAcehBesar

dispossessedresidents;activistsfromtheAcehLegalFoundationwerearrestedfor

assistingvillageswithclaimsfromtheconflictperiodthatidentifiedgovernment

dispossessionorunderpaymentforland;andsomeneighborhoodswerepartiallymapped

andregisteredbytheBPN,onlytobeleftwithouttitles(Fitzpatrick2008a;Deutsch2009).

By2009whenRALASclosed,fewerthan223,000oftheintended600,000landtitleshad

beenissues‐themajorityofwhichwereconcentratedinurbanareas(Deutsch2009;WB

2010).Nearly50percentoftherecipientsoftitlecertificateswhowereinterviewedina

projectassessmentofRALASdidnotfeelthatthecertificatehadimprovedtheirtenure

security(Deutsch2009).Likewise,halfoftheserespondentsrecognizedthatthecommunity

demarcationandadjudicationactivitieshadnotbeenfair,especiallywithregardto

women’srights,duetotheinternalpowerdynamicsthatdominatedsuchsessions.Notonly

didRALASfailtoresolvemanyofthelingeringdisputesoverproperty,several

disagreementswerecausedbyerrorsoflandmeasurementorinadequaterecordingof

ownershipinformationonthetitles(InterviewMukir,BandaAceh,June2008).Therewere

otherissuesregardingthegovernment’sroleinlandmanagementincludingtheclarification

oflandtransmissiondetails,themistreatmentofwomen’sclaimstopropertyrightseven

afterissueofthetitlecertificates,andtheprospectoffuturetransfercostsandtaxesthat

remaineduncleartoalargeportionoftheresidentsofAceh(Fitzpatrick2008a;Jaliletal.

2008;Deutsch2009).

115

4.4PEACEBUILDINGINACEH

TowhatextenthaspeacebuildingbeensuccessfulinAceh?Asoflate2011,Acehappeared

tobeexitingthepost‐conflicttransitionphaseandmovingtowardaconsolidationofpeace.

Butevenasseveralgrievancesandconditionscontributingtoarmedviolencehavebeen

attendedto,somerootsoftheconflictremainunaddressed.Thoughitistemptingtolookat

thecurrentlackofarmedviolenceinAcehandproclaimpeacebuildingsuccess,several

measuresofpeacebuildingprogresssuggestconsideringbroadercriteria(Paris2004;

Barnettetal.2007).Indeed,Kingsbury(2006)notesthatalthougharmedviolencehas

decreasedasaresultoftheHelsinkiMOUanddemobilization,disarmament,and

reintegration,acommitmenttotheletterandthespiritofthepeaceagreementmaystillnot

guaranteeasustainablepeaceinAceh.Broadchangesinunderlyingsocial,political,and

economicrelationsremainnecessaryforasustainablepeace.

Keepingthesechangesinmind,thischapteradoptstheUnitedNationsEnvironment

Program’sdefinitionofpeacebuilding—adefinitionconsistentwithpeacebuilding

approachesthatmovebeyondpeacemakingandpeacekeepingtofocusontransformationof

therangeofconditionsthatmayleadtoviolence:

Peacebuilding comprises the identification and support of measures needed fortransformation towardmore sustainable, peaceful relationships and structures ofgovernance, in order to avoid a relapse into conflict. The four dimensions ofpeacebuildingare:socio‐economicdevelopment,goodgovernance,reformofjusticeandsecurity institutions,andthecultureof justice, truthandreconciliation(UNEP2009,7).

AnumberoforganizationshavebeeninvolvedwithpeacebuildinginAceh.The

peacemakingprocessandresultingHelsinkiMOUrequiredtheestablishmentoftheAceh

MonitoringMission(AMM)tomonitorpeacekeepingactivities.TheAMMandtherelated

CommissiononSecurityArrangementsbeganinSeptember2005andendedinDecember

2006.Atthattime,theCommunicationandCoordinationForumforPeaceinAcehandthe

CommissionontheSustainabilityofPeaceinAcehtookupwheretheAMMleftoff.The

116

AMMimprovedthesecuritysituation,butreformsinvolvingthepoliticalprocessand

socioeconomicdevelopmentwerebeinghandledbyotherINGOsandofficialagencies,such

asBAPPENAS,theUNDP’sEmergencyResponseandTransitionalRecoveryProgram,and

theInternationalOrganizationforMigration.

Immediatelyafterthepeacedealwasconcluded,theInternationalOrganizationfor

MigrationandtheWorldBankprovidedsupportfor“socializingthepeace”throughthe

SocializationTeam,andinFebruary2006,thegovernmentformallyestablishedtheAceh

ReintegrationBoard(BRA,BadanReintegrasi‐DamaiAceh).TheSocializationTeamplayeda

roleinreintegratingsome2,000formercombatantsand400formerprisoners,andtheBRA

wasresponsibleforeconomicandsocialassistancetoconflictvictims,aidtoformer

combatantsandpoliticalprisoners,reconstructionhelpforthosewholostproperty,and

compensationforvictimsandtheirfamilies.Inareaswherethetsunamihadaheavyimpact,

thedutiesoftheBRAandtheRehabilitationandReconstructionAgency(BRR,Badan

RehabilitasidanRekonstruksi)sometimesoverlapped.However,becausetheBRRwas

focusedprimarilyoninfrastructureandontheeconomic,psychological,andsocial

dimensionsofdisasterrecoveryandreconstruction,itdidnotexplicitlyexaminepost‐

conflictissuesorworkwithconflictvictims.

InAceh,peacebuildingisanongoingprocess,withsuccessesachievedovertime.

Demobilization,disarmament,andreintegrationofformercombatants,integrationofGAM

representativesintopoliticalparties,localelectionsin2006,aswellastheimplementation

oflocalautonomywithregardtoIslamicgovernanceandrecognitionofAcehnesecultureby

wayoftheinstallationofaceremonialheadofstate(WaliNanggroe)areallclear

peacebuildingsuccesses.OtherachievementsincludetheadoptionofanofficialAcehnese

flagandhymn,redistributionofhydrocarbonprofitsthroughdirectpaymentsandashared

fund,andgeneralimplementationoflivelihoodprojectsandinfrastructuredevelopment.

Whilepositive,allofthesesuccesseshaveattendantproblemsthatrequireattention.

Ontheotherhand,peacebuildinghasbeenunsuccessfulinestablishingaTruthand

ReconciliationCommission,supportingtheAcehHumanRightsCouncil,equitably

117

distributingreintegrationfunds,resolving17problematicpointsoftheLawonthe

GoverningofAceh,supportingthelocalgovernment’sdeliveryofbasicservices,and

constructingalong‐termpeacebuildingplanthatincludescivilsociety.Notyetresolvedare

sub‐provincialdemandstobreakfreefromAcehProvinceandinternalfrictionsamongGAM

memberswhocontinuetoinsistonaseparatiststate.Indeed,formercombatantsandthe

AcehTransitionalCommittee(KomitePeralihanAceh)arelinkedtoviolentcriminalacts,

kidnapping,andpoliticalintimidationintheregion(CenterforDomesticPreparedness

2009).

4.5CONNECTINGLANDTENURESECURITYANDPEACEBUILDING

Didactivitiesmeanttostrengthenlandtenuresecuritysupport,createopportunitiesfor,or

hinderthesuccessofpeacebuildinginAceh?Landandpropertywerementionedinthe

2005HelsinkiMOU,the2006LawontheGoverningofAceh,andmanypost‐disasterneeds

assessments.Theeffectsofthetsunamiandconflictonpropertyandlandtenuresecurity

werequalitativelydifferentandgeographicallyvaried.Despiterecognitionofthe

geographicvariationoflocalneedsandthementionoflandandpropertyinthepeace

process,landtenuresecurityhasbeenaddressedprimarilythroughthepost‐disaster‐

orientedRALASproject.Thissectionoutlinesthewaysinwhichlandandpropertywere

addressedinthepeaceprocess.Itthensummarizesthedesignandimplementationofthe

RALASprojectandexamineshowRALASandotherlandsecurityactivitiesaffected

peacebuilding.

4.5.1LANDTENURESECURITYINTHEPEACEPROCESSArticle3.2oftheHelsinkiMOU(2005)outlinesseveralgeneralactivitieswithregardtoland

andpost‐conflictpeacebuildingandrequiresthefollowing:

3.2.3:GOIandtheauthoritiesofAcehwilltakemeasurestoassistpersonswhohaveparticipated inGAMactivities to facilitate their reintegration into thecivil society.These measures include economic facilitation to former combatants, pardonedpolitical prisoners and affected civilians. A Reintegration Fund under theadministrationoftheauthoritiesofAcehwillbeestablished.

3.2.4: GOIwill allocate funds for the rehabilitation of public and private property

118

destroyedordamaged as a consequenceof the conflict tobe administeredby theauthoritiesofAceh.

3.2.5:GOIwill allocate suitable farming landaswell as funds to theauthoritiesofAceh for the purpose of facilitating the reintegration to society of the formercombatantsandthecompensationforpoliticalprisonersandaffectedcivilians.TheauthoritiesofAcehwillusethelandandfundsasfollows:a)Allformercombatantswill receive an allocation of suitable farming land, employment or, in the case ofincapacity to work, adequate social security from the authorities of Aceh. b) Allpardoned political prisoners will receive an allocation of suitable farming land,employmentor,inthecaseofincapacitytowork,adequatesocialsecurityfromtheauthoritiesofAceh.c)Allcivilianswhohavesufferedademonstrablelossduetotheconflictwill receive an allocation of suitable farming land, employment or, in thecaseofincapacitytowork,adequatesocialsecurityfromtheauthoritiesofAceh.

TheLawontheGoverningofAceh,passedin2006,wasmeanttoprovidelegalfollow‐

throughrelatedtotheguidelinessetoutintheHelsinkiMOU.Althoughtherearestill

unresolvedcomplaintsaboutdeviationsbetweentheHelsinkiMOUandtheLawonthe

GoverningofAceh,thelatteriscurrentlythemainlegalfoundationforconfrontingthe

originsandconditionsofconflictinAceh.Itsmostrelevantsectionsforlandtenuresecurity

areseveralarticlesfromchapters29and39:

XXIX,213:(1)EveryIndonesiancitizenwhoispresentinAcehhasrightoverlandinaccordancewith the stipulation of law. (2)AcehGovernment and/orDistrict/cityare authorized to regulate and manage the allotment, utilization and legalrelationship in relation to the right over land by acknowledging, honoring andprotectingtheexistingrightsincludingtheindigenousrightsinaccordancewiththenationallyprevailingnorms,standardsandprocedures.(3)Rightoverlandasmeantinclause(2)coverstheauthoritiesofAcehGovernment,District/Citytograntrighttobuildandrightofexploitationinaccordancewiththeprevailingnorms,standardsandprocedures.(4)AcehGovernmentand/orDistrict/Cityareobligedtoconductlegalprotection towardswakaf lands, religiousassets andother sacredneeds. (5)Furtherstipulationregardingtheprocedureforgrantingrightsoverlandasmeantin clause (1), clause (2) and clause (3) is regulatedwith Qanunwhich heeds thestipulationoflaw.

XXIX,214:(1)AcehGovernmentisauthorizedtogranttherighttobuildandrightofexploitation for domestic capital investment and foreign capital investment inaccordance with the prevailing norms, standards and procedures. (2) Furtherstipulationregardingtheprocedureforthegrantingoflicenseasmeantinclause(1)isregulatedwithAcehQanun.[…]

XXXIX,253:TheRegionalOfficeofNationalLandAgencyinAcehProvincialRegionandtheOfficeofDistrict/CityNationalLandAgencybecomeAcehandDistrict/CityRegional apparatus at the latest in the beginning of the Budget Year of 2008. (2)

119

Further stipulation regarding the implementation of thosemeant in clause (1) isregulatedbyPresidentialRegulation.

TheHelsinkiMOUclearlyoutlinesthegovernment’sroleinprovisioningandreplacing

property.Ontheotherhand,theLawontheGoverningofAcehismoreorientedtoward

outliningassignmenttotheAcehneseregionalgovernmentofresponsibilityforrespecting

andprotectingpropertyrights.However,accordingtoa2006WorldBankstudyonGAM

reintegrationneeds,manyofGAMneverlefttheircommunities,solandforreintegration

wasamootpoint;55.5percentofGAMcombatantshadaccesstolandandmostofGAM

combatantswhowereinterestedinfarmingwerepartofthisgroup;mostlandaccesswas

facilitatedthroughfamilyholdings(63.8percent),individualholdings(24.4percent),or

communallands(7.4percent);andlandwasonlyanissueforGAMreturneeswhereitwas

alsoadisasterorconflictissueforreceivingcommunities(WB2006a).Becausethe

provisionsmentionedhereapplyspecificallytoformerGAMcombatantreintegrationand

becausemanyofthecombatantsdidnotneedlandaspartofreintegrationaid,thewaysin

whichlandandtheviolentconflictwerelinkedweresometimesignoredordeemphasized.

FormerGAMcombatantsinterviewednearbothCalangandPidiesaidthattheyhadnoneed

forgovernmentaidtogetfarmlandastheycouldasktheircommunity,andinanycasethey

wouldbesuspiciousof“corruptBPNofficialstakingmoneyfornothing”(InterviewHasan,

Calang,February2008;InterviewUmar,Pidie,February2008).

4.5.2RALASANDTHEPEACEPROCESSDespitethepreviousreferencestolandinthepeaceprocess,themainvehiclefor

implementinglandtenuresecuritywasthedisaster‐focusedRALASproject.RALASrebuilt

landadministrationoffices,offeredtechnicaltraining,digitizedcadastresandlandrecords,

andrestoredandexpandedthelandtitlesadministeredbytheBPN.Severalnon‐

governmentalorganizationsandaidgroupswereinvolvedinadvocatingforandsupporting

propertyrightsandcommunitymapping.SomeoftheworkoutsideRALASincludedthe

extensivepropertyrightsstudiesperformedbyoronbehalfofOxfamandtheInternational

DevelopmentLawOrganization,FaunaandFloraInternational’seffortsincommunity

mapping,andUnitedNationsHumanSettlementsProgram(UN‐HABITAT)materials

developedtoinformthepopulationoftheirrightsandthestepsneededtoregister

120

property.UN‐HABITATmaterialsincludedanumberofeducationaltoolsandformsthat

couldserveastemporarystatementsofpropertyownership.Althoughtheseformswere

distributedandoccasionallyfilledout,theyhadnolegalweightasevidenceinstatelaw

(InterviewUN‐HABITAT,BandaAceh,August2006).

LandnegotiationswithresidentcommunitieswereundertakenbyBPNrepresentativesand

NGOandINGOstafftoallowentirecommunitiesoftsunamirefugeestorelocatetolandfar

fromthecoast.LegalassistanceincreasedasmobileIslamiccourtsdeployedprimarilyto

tsunami‐affectedregionstoassistcommunitiesthatwerepuzzlingthroughcomplicated

inheritanceandguardianshipissues.HumanrightsactivistsfromtheAcehLegalAid

Institute(LBH‐Aceh)playedasignificantroleindistributingpropertyrightsmaterialsand

assistingvictimsoflandexpropriationsthatoccurredduringtheconflict.LBH‐Acehalleged

thatduringtheconflict,communitiesinEastAcehhadbeenforcedtoselltheirlandatlow

pricestotheplantationcompanyPTBumiFloraor,iftheyresistedthelandpurchase,be

declaredpartoftheseparatistmovement(InterviewMukir,BandaAceh,June2008).These

allegationsledtotheretaliatoryJuly2007arrestofeightLBH‐Acehactivistsandtotheir

August2008convictiononchargesof“orallyorinwritingcommittingaviolentactagainst

thegovernment”and“disseminatinghateagainstthegovernment.”27Thisprosecution

suggeststhatpropertyexpropriationmaybemuchmoreprevalentthancurrentlyknown,

butthatcasesarerarelyreportedduetothepoliticaldynamicsintheregion.

TheRALASframeworkadaptedofficialprotocolsforregisteringrealpropertytothe

situationinAceh.Itexperimentedwithcommunity‐drivenadjudication(CDA),community

mapping,andloweringregistrationcoststofacilitateandlegitimizetheregistration

process.Registrationoccurredinseveralstages:locationdetermination(villageselectionby

theBPNandtheBRR),communityagreement,measuringandmapping(BPNvalidation),

announcement,filingofrightsandissuingoftitlecertificates,andtitlecertificate

presentation.Communityparticipationwaslargelylimitedtothestagecalledcommunity

agreement,whereinmembersofthecommunitycametoagreementregardingthe

demarcationoftheparcelboundariesandrecognitionofparcelownership(BPN2005).The27IndonesianPenalCode,Articles160and161.

121

processempoweredNGOsandINGOsascommunity‐agreementfacilitators,outlined

specifictypesofcomplaints,anddesignatedthepartiestowhomcomplaintsshouldbe

addressed.InvillagesthatwerenotselectedbytheBPN,otherprograms,suchasthe

“districtdevelopmentprogram,ProgramfortheEliminationofUrbanPoverty,Local

GovernmentInnovationFoundationprogramorUNDPoranyotherBRRendorsed

programs”couldimplementthecommunity‐agreementphase(BPN2005,7).

Oncedelineationofproperty,ownershipstatus,andasketchoftheparcelswereagreed

uponbythecommunityanditsfacilitators,theBPNvalidatedthecommunity’sworkby

checkingthejuridicalandphysicalevidenceonboundaries,ownership,andlandtypes.In

principle,theseparticipatoryprocessesweremeanttolegitimizeandexpediteregistration,

butBPNstaffwouldsometimesrepeatmappingexercisesbecauseofinconsistencies

betweentheparticipatoryprocessesandtheBPN’sinternalregulationsorinconsistencies

betweentheBPN’sexistinglandregister,the80percentofdamagedtitlesreturnedtoAceh,

andparticipatorymappingresults(Fairall2008;Deutsch2009).ResultsoftheBPN

validationwerepubliclyannouncedforthirtydays,duringwhichobjectionstoanyofthe

datacouldbepresented.Afterthisperiod,thetitlecertificatesweretoberegisteredand

issuedbytheBPNofficeandthenpresentedthroughtheadjudicationcommitteetoland

owners.

AlltitleswereregisteredinandissuedfromJakarta.Unfortunately,therelianceonJakarta

toissuethetitlescauseddelaysintitledistributionandsometimesresultedinchangesto

theboundariesoutlinedinparticipatorymapping(Fairall2008).Alltitlesregistered

throughthisprocesseswereintegratedintoanelectroniclandinformationsystemtoavoid

futurelossandtofacilitategovernmentmanagement.Theprojectalsotookstepsto

establishandprotectwomen’sandchildren’srightsregardinginheritance,custodianship,

andownershipofland.Itdidsobyrequiringwomen’sparticipationincommunity

adjudicationandbyoutliningclearstandardsforcustodianshipandjointtitling.In

December2008,mostlandadministrationdutiesweretransferredfromJakartatothe

Acehneseregionalgovernment.

122

RALAScertainlyhadpositiveeffects,includingthetrainingofnearly700NGOfacilitators

and500BPNstaffinCDAmappingmethods,theestablishmentofnewlandoffices,the

clarificationofpropertyrightsinurbanareas,andtheintroductionofadigitalcadastre

(Deutsch2009).However,theRALASprocesswasalsowidelycriticized.Thesecriticisms

revolvedmainlyaroundchoicesinthetargetingofcommunities,theexclusionofcertain

communitysegments,theirrelevanceoftheregistrationprocesstotheculturalmilieu,the

ambiguityoftheIndonesianlegalframeworkconcerningtraditionalandinformallandand

foresttenure,andthebureaucracyandcorruptionoftheBPN.Thesecriticismscanbe

generalizedtolandregistrationintherestofIndonesia,butinAcehtherewereadditional

conflict‐relatedproblemsthatunderminedtheprocess.TheBPNwasalsoresponsiblefor

implementingsimilarcadastralprogramsthroughoutIndonesiainitsLandManagement

andPolicyDevelopmentProject,butRALASwasuniquetoAceh.ComparisonofRALASin

AcehtotheLandManagementandPolicyDevelopmentProjectthroughoutIndonesiashows

thatRALASwasmuchlesseffectivethancouldbeexpected(Fairall2008).WorldBankstaff

andanAustralianconsultantattributethedifferingresultstoa“mixofpoorleadership,

corruptionandmistrustoftheprocessbylocallandowners.Acehhasbeeninalmost

perpetualrebellionagainstJakartasincecolonialtimes,sothisisnotsurprising”(Fairall

2008,online).

AlthoughofficialrecognitionofthelimitedsuccessofRALASusuallyidentifiesbureaucratic

bottlenecksandlimitedcapacityonthegroundasthemainhurdles(InterviewBPN,Banda

Aceh,August2006;InterviewBPN,Meulaboh,May2007),therewereclearlyanumberof

othercultural,economic,andpoliticaldisincentivestotitling,whichhavebeenidentifiedin

thischapter.Itseemsthatthepolicymakersfocusedonpost‐disasterissuesbecausethere

wasalackofintra‐communaldisputesandimmediateproblemsrelatedtopost‐conflict

resettlement.Yet,intermsofthesymbolicvalueoflandandtrustinnationalgovernment,

thepost‐conflictlandregistrationhurdlesinAcehweresimilartomanyotherpost‐conflict

scenarios.Iftakenintoconsideration,theseproblemsmayhavealteredthewayinwhich

landregistrationwasperformedandlandtenuresecurityconceivedinAceh.Indeed,the

assumptionthatinstitutingastate‐administeredlandcadastreinaseparatistregionsimply

123

requirescommunityparticipationandloweringofeconomicdisincentivesisnaiveatbest

andideologicalatworst;naiveinthatmanyoftheaidagenciesandinternational

consultantsframedpropertyasapost‐disasterissueduetotheirlackofexperienceinpost‐

conflictsituations;andideologicalinthatthisassumptionistheresultofoverextendingde

Soto’sideasregardingformalizationofpropertytoruralandpost‐conflictscenarios.De

Soto’stheorywasusedtojustifyRALAS,eventhoughhistheorywasdevelopedforperi‐

urbanandurbancommunitiesandhasbeenwidelycriticizedforitsfailuretorecognize

specificpolitical,geographic,cultural,andsocialdynamicsregardingproperty(Homeand

Lim2004).DespitethefactthatRALASidentifiedwaysforthecommunitytoparticipatein

andtolowercostdisincentivesforlandregistration,theworkingconceptsofpropertyand

tenuresecurity,andthegoaloflandregistrationthemselvesneedtobereevaluated.

TheRALASemphasisonstatelandregistrationfortenuresecurityisunderstandablefrom

thestandpointofdisasterrecoveryandinternationalfinancialinvestment,butitignoresthe

post‐conflictsituation,strongexistingtenuresystems,localperceptionsregardingthe

legitimacyoftheIndonesianstate,andcontradictionsinthenationallegalframeworkthat

weakenrecognitionofcustomaryresourcepracticesinacontextoflegalpluralism.Without

abettergraspofthedisincentivestolandregistrationandthespecificneedsofdifferent

geographicareas,theRALASprogramwasboundtobeonlypartiallysuccessfulinitsaims

toincreasetenuresecuritythroughregistration.

Despiteallthis,RALASwasnecessaryforincreasingtenuresecurityinsomeurbanand

tsunami‐affectedareas.Likewise,whetherornotRALASsucceededinincreasingtenure

securityandissuingtitles,theRALASprocessandactivitiesregardingproperty

administrationmayhaveaffectedpeacebuilding.Landtenuresecuritywasoftenmentioned

asthefoundationofthepost‐conflictsocietyinAceh,butthewaysthatproperty

registrationaffectedlandtenuresecurityandpeacebuildingremainanopenquestion.Did

formallandregistrationprovidetenuresecurity?Didtheprocessactuallyassistorhinder

therestorationofbasicneedsandessentialservices,economicdevelopmentand

sustainablelivelihoods,reconciliation,goodgovernance,thereintegrationofcombatants,or

thereturnandresettlementofrefugees?

124

4.5.3BASICNEEDSANDESSENTIALSERVICESAlthoughGAMreintegrationdidnotrequireformallandregistrationprocesses,the

reconstructionofhousesformanyofthe500,000tsunamirefugeesdependedonRALAS.In

tsunamiaffectedurbanareaswherelandmarketsexistedandwhereinformalpracticesand

agreementswerenotascleartosurvivorsastheadatpracticeswereinruralareas,

accessingstatutorytitlesplayedaroleinestablishingtenuresecurity.TheemphasisofUN‐

HABITATandothersonprovidingsomesortoftemporaryevidenceofpossession–evenif

notlegallybinding—assistedwiththeprocessofprovidinghousingasmostinternational

organizationswerenotequippedtodealwithlocaltenuresystems.INGOsanddonor

agenciesoftenrequiredcleartitleinordertobuildnewhomesonlandparcels(Interview

Mukir,BandaAceh,June2008).

WhileRALASwasnotorientedtowardrebuildingconflict‐damagedpropertyandtheBRA

mayhavecausedmoreproblemsthanitresolvedwithitsconflict‐damageandvictim‐

compensationschemes,westillneedtoconsiderwhatmighthavehappenedtothepeace

processifformalizationoflandholdingshadnotbeenperformedinurbanandtsunami‐

affectedareas.WouldthepeaceprocesshaveprogressedifRALASdidnotexist?Although

therewereproblems—includingriotsin2005and2006directedattheBPNandtheBRR

fornotmovingfastenoughtoprovideshelterandtitle—theworkdonethroughRALAS

pavedthewayforpost‐tsunamishelterand,onecouldargue,helpedpreventrelapseof

violentconflict.

Evidenceindicatesthatformalizingpropertyrightswascentraltoaccessingimproved

shelterandplayedaroleinaiddistribution.Theallocationofemergencyhousingandthe

rateatwhichneighborhoodscouldberebuiltwerecontingentontheabilityofgroupsto

eitherprovetheirpropertyclaimswithformaltitleorimplementtheRALAStitling

procedures(InterviewUN‐HABITAT,BandaAceh,August2006).Compensationforowners

withstatutorilyrecognizedclaimsoftenexceededthatpaidtorentersandotherslacking

formaltitles(InterviewMukir,BandaAceh,June2008).Oxfam’sworkonpropertyrightsin

theregionindicatethatthefocuson‘reconstruction’andextendinglandadministrationand

125

landregistrationledRALAStooverlookpropertyrightsasabroadersocialjusticeissuefor

displacedandvulnerablegroups(Fan2006).Despitethedivisionsthismayhavecaused,

formalizationofpropertyrightshelpedmovethebuildingofsheltersandvisible

reconstructionforward–preventingfurtherdelays,grievancesandseriouspolitical

backlashthatcouldhavederailedpeacebuilding.

4.5.4ECONOMICDEVELOPMENTANDSUSTAINABLELIVELIHOODSInAceh,theRALASprojectandformalpropertyrightswereexplicitlylinkedtotheabilityto

investinlandandtomortgagelandtogainaccesstofinancialresources.Indeed,theBRR,

politicians,andinternationalorganizationsciteddeSoto’sapproachtoproperty

registrationforempoweringthepoorasoneofthemainjustificationsfortheRALASproject

(BRR2005).ButdespiteanecdotalevidenceofbusinesspeopleinBandaAcehandother

urbanareasmortgagingtheirland,mostofthepeopleinAcehhavealternativemeansto

accesstemporaryfinancialassistance—throughsocialnetworksorarrangementsinvolving,

forexample,cooperatives,forwardsalesofcropharvests,ormortgagesonvehicles(Focus

Group4,KreungSabee,May2007)(InterviewMuntasir,Calang,February2008).

Thesearrangementsaretypicallypreferableformostofthepoorandruralareaswhere

communitiesdonotwanttoriskthemainsourceoftheirlivelihoodsorwell‐being(their

landorhomes)andcannotextractpropertyfromsocialrelationsandobligationsinwhichit

isembedded.Severalbankrepresentativesexpressedhesitationattakinglandascollateral

evenifitisformallytitledbecausethesocialrelationsandlegalframeworksurroundingthe

landmaylimititsuseandbecauseitisdifficulttovaluerurallandswherethereisno

developedmarket.Deutsch(2009,43)reportedthat“withinthestudysample,onlyabout

2.5%ofrespondentsreportedaccessingcreditfromcommercialbankspriortoreceiving

RALASlandtitles,whilenearly7%tookbankloansafterthereceiptoftitles.”However,he

notes,thesmallsamplesizedoesnotaccountforsuchfactorsasapossibleincreasein

investmentandtheloweringofcollateralstandardsintheregionduetotheendofthe

conflict;nordidthestudyfocusonareaswherelandmarketsalreadyexisted.Thereare

plentyofexamplesofhowformalregistrationhasallowedinvestmentinurbanareas,but

thereisnoclearevidencethatlivelihoodsrequiredformallandtitleorthattheprocessof

126

registeringlandhasallowedthepoortoaccessmoreresourcesandencouragedinterna‐

tionalinvestmenttothebenefitofthepeacebuildingprocess.

4.5.5REINTEGRATIONOFCOMBATANTSANDRETURNANDRESETTLEMENTOFREFUGEESReintegrationofGAMcombatantswasabletotakeplaceindependentlyoftheeffortsto

formallyregisterlandtitles(WB2006a).MostofGAMcombatantsaccessedlandthrough

communalnetworksanddidnotneedtoberelocatedontolandwithformaltitleinorderto

gaintenuresecurity.Whereformaltitlecouldhelpwasinpaymentforpropertydamage

inflictedduringthetwenty‐nine‐yearconflictandinresolutionoflanddisputesbetween

communitiesandgovernmentagencies.Communitiesthatwereforcedtomoveorselltheir

landunderthreatduringtheconflictbecamerefugeesorexperiencedviolationoftheir

propertyrights.WhengroupssuchasLBH‐Acehhavesupportedcommunitieswithclaims

againstthegovernment,theallegationsledtoactivistsbeingseverelypunished.Publicized

disputeswithseveralcommunitiesovergovernment‐claimedland,localacknowledgment

thatlandshadbeentakenbutanabsenceofaclimatedeemedappropriateforpursuing

theseclaims,thepunishmentofLBH‐Aceh,andtheongoingpoliticalandpersonalviolence

intheregionindicatethataminefieldofconflict‐relatedpropertyclaimsstillneedstobe

addressed.

4.5.6RECONCILIATIONAtaminimum,reconciliationwiththegovernmentshouldaddressthedifferentexperiences

offormerGAMcombatantsversusthoseoflocalcommunities.DidtheRALASlandtitling

processbringGAMandtheGOIintoacooperativerelationship?Diditprovideanavenuefor

resolutionoflocalgrievanceswiththegovernment?Theanswertothefirstquestionis

outlinedinthetaxstructureandtheLawontheGoverningofAceh:landregistrationwasa

cooperativegovernanceproject,anditwillestablishasourceofrevenuetobeshared

betweentheGOIandtheAcehParty(formerlyGAM),whichnowrunslocalpolitics.

Thecommunity‐drivenadjudicationprocess—whereitwasdesiredbythecommunityand

wassuccessfullyimplemented—certainlybuiltconfidenceinthecapacityoftheGOIto

undertakeprojectswiththelocals’well‐beinginmind.Cynicismregardingtherealreasons

127

forlandtitlingandtheutilityofthelandtitlingprocesscouldbeovercomewherethe

community‐drivenprocesswasmeticulouslyfollowedandwherelocalpowerdynamics

wereamenabletoit.However,duetoproblemswithimplementationandlocal

disincentivestoregistration,thisprocessoftenfailedtoprovidereconciliationbetween

localcommunitiesandthegovernment.

4.5.7GOODGOVERNANCEByemphasizingparticipation,transparency,accountability,andmonitoring,RALAS

promotedpositiveprinciplesofgoodgovernance.Moreover,itbuiltcapacitieswithin

communitiestointeractwiththegovernment,createddigitalsystems(landcadastresand

evidence)thatwerelesssusceptiblethanearlierrecordkeepingsystemstocorruption,

decentralizedpowersbytransferringsomeofthemtolocalpoliticalauthorities,and

providedalternativeavenuesfordisputeresolutionthroughBPN‐appointedfacilitators.

WhatRALASandtheregionalfocusonpropertyadministrationcouldnotdowaschangethe

substantivecontentoftheruleoflawbyclarifyingtheambiguousnationallegalframework

regardingcommunaltenureandtransitionsofpropertybetweenadatandstatutory

systems.Butpromotionoflocalcapacityandprinciplesofgoodgovernancehelpedthe

peaceprocessbyencouragingresponsiblegovernance.

4.6CONCLUSION:LESSONSLEARNED

TheimplementationoftheRALASlandtitlingprojectinAcehpresentsuswithmanylessons

aboutpost‐conflictdevelopmentandpropertyadministration.TheRALASprojectindirectly

supportedpeacebuildingbysupportingthemeetingofbasicneedsandthedeliveryof

essentialservicessuchasshelter,andbyprovidingopportunitiesforreconciliationand

goodgovernance.Buttherewaslittlerealconnectionbetweenlandtitling,ontheonehand,

andeconomicdevelopment,sustainablelivelihoods,reintegrationofcombatants,or

resettlementofconflictrefugees,ontheother.Ultimately,theprojectmissedseveral

opportunitiestosupportpeacebuildingandwasitselflimitedbyitslackofconsiderationof

theconflict’seffectsonpolitical,social,andeconomicrelationssurroundingland.Property

narrativesledexpertstodetachlandtitlingfromproblemsofviolentconflictandto

128

associateitwithtsunamirefugeesandtsunamidamage.Thesuccessofthelandtitling

projectdependedonthelegitimacyofstateinstitutions,adequatelegalframeworks,

understandingoflocalpowerdynamics,andaccurateidentificationofincentivesand

disincentivestoregistration.Thepost‐disasterpropertynarrativebasedondeSoto’s

frameworkwoveastorythatoverlookedalloftheabove.

AnumberoflessonsfromAcehmightbegeneralizedtootherpost‐conflictsituations.For

example,incomplexpoliticalemergencies,developmentprogramsshouldbewaryof

categorizingprogramsaspost‐disasterwhileconflictdynamicsarestillrelevant.

Specifically,oneshouldneverassumethatlandisfreeofculturalandpoliticalvalueorthat

alldisputesbetweenindividualsorbetweenindividualsandinstitutionsareopenly

presentedinpost‐conflictscenarios.Transparency,accountability,community

participation,andmonitoringcanpromoteconfidenceintheprocessofadjudicationand

demarcationofproperty.Legalandfinancialaccountabilitywithinthegovernment

hierarchyshouldbeclearlyestablishedattheearliestpossibledateinordertoprevent

bureaucratictensionorhesitationsinimplementation.Likewise,theestablishmentofan

independentmonitoringinstitutionandofrequirementsforregulardisclosurecanbemore

efficientandeffectivethanrelianceonexistinginstitutionstoself‐policeormonitorother

institutions.

Furthermore,integratingINGOsandNGOsintogovernmentextensionregardingproperty

ortheprovisionofessentialservicesrequiresaclearlegalframework.Time‐limitedand

renewablelawscanbeissuedbyexecutiveordertoallowanimmediatelegalframeworkfor

suchactivities.Theallocationoffinancialresourcesforlandregistrationshouldbegoal‐

orientedinsteadoftime‐oriented;thereshouldbenoexpiringbudgetsthatmustbe

immediatelyused.Theremustalsobeclarificationofthelegalstatusofinformalpractices

regardingpropertyrightsbeforeproperty‐registrationprogramsareundertaken.

Whereinformalordeeds‐basedsystemsarefunctioning,itisnotnecessarytoimmediately

convertalllandtoastate‐administered,centralizedtitlesystem.Titlingshouldbelocally

evaluatedinsteadofbroadlyapplied.

129

Finally,theuseofsocialtenuredomainmodelsorsimpleregistersthatdonotspecifylegal

boundariesofpropertybutallowinstitutionstobuildrecordsofcommunitylocationsmay

bebettersuitedtofinanciallimitsandcommunityneedsinpost‐conflicttransitions.

Communityparticipationinlanddemarcationandadjudicationshouldbeprecededby

community‐ledassessmentofneedsandshouldidentifymethodsofintegratingwomenand

membersofminoritygroupsintopublicforumsthataremoreeffectivethansimplymixing

themwithmenandmembersofdominantgroups.Althoughtherewereapproachesthat

couldhavestrengthenedtenuresecurityinAcehwhilerespectingthedynamicsof

communalpropertyandfactorssurroundingviolentconflict,alternativestoRALASwere

neverexplored(BaranyiandWeitzner2006).

Insummary,managingpropertyforpeacebuildingrequiresunderstandingthecompeting

narrativesandembodiedpracticesofpropertiedlandscapes.AsshowninthecaseofAceh,

adoptingpropertynarrativesthatfailtoconsiderthesocial‐embeddednessofpropertyin

relationtoconflictdynamicscanleadtoinappropriatetiming,location,andmethodsfor

implementingpropertysystemsandlandtenuresecurityprogrammingforpeacebuilding.

130

CHAPTERFIVE:SCALINGPROPERTY

ChapterFiveconsistsofthesecondmanuscriptandcorrespondstothedissertation’ssecondobjective.Thesecondobjectiveistoexaminetheinteractionofpoliticalauthority,scalarpolitics,andproperty.Inthismanuscript,IoutlineaframeworkthatdrawsfromHohfeld’s(1913)workonjuralrelations,Singer’s(2000)workonobligations,andtheconceptsofscaleandscalarpoliticsinrelationtoproperty(Sikor2004;McCarthy2005a,2005b;Mackinnon2011).Thisframeworkisusedtoexamineexperiencesofpropertyregistrationandlandtitlinginaruralvillageandaperi‐urbanneighborhoodinAceh,Indonesia.Inbothcases,theprocessofformalizingpropertyrightsinstatutorysystemsfundamentallychangeswaysinwhichpropertyisdefinedandenactedontheground.Theresearchshowsthattheconsolidationofpoliticalauthorityandtheoutcomesofpost‐conflictnaturalresourcemanagementstrategiesaredependentontheinterplayofpropertyrelationsandscalarpolitics.Iconcludebyoutliningwaysinwhichrecognitionofhowpropertyrelationsinteractwithscalarpoliticsprovidesinsightsintotheappropriatetiming,locations,andproceduresforlandtitlinginpost‐conflictscenarios.ThismanuscriptwasoriginallysubmittedforpublicationtoEnvironmentandPlanningD:SocietyandSpaceasasingleauthored(ArthurGreen)manuscript.

131

5.1INTRODUCTION

Developinganunderstandingofhowpost‐conflictnaturalresourcemanagementintersects

withgovernanceiscriticalforsupportingpeacebuildingprocesses(Bruchetal.2008;

JensenandLonergan2011;Wennmann2011).Howpropertyisdefinedandenactedis

fundamentaltonaturalresourcemanagement,governancepractices,andtheconstitutionof

authority(Macpherson1978;Bromley1991;SikorandLund2009).Socialnegotiations

overpropertythrow“intosharpreliefthelineamentsofasocietyandthetensionsbetween

alternativeclaimstocontrolitsresources”(Bowen1988,274).Examinationofpost‐conflict

propertymanagement(particularlyland)providesapowerfulandilluminativewindowon

theselineamentsandintotheinteractionofauthoritywiththesociospatialaspectsof

conflicts.Indeed,establishingeffectiveandlegitimatepropertymanagementsystemsisone

ofthemostimportantandcomplicatedcomponentsofpost‐conflictnaturalresource

management,reconstruction,andpeaceprocesses(Unruh2003;UnruhandWilliams2013).

Recentworkoutlinesseveralbestpracticesforpost‐conflictpropertymanagement

(Reimann1997;Fitzpatrick2002;Unruh2003;Cotulaetal.2004;Das2004;Leckie2005;

UNHABITAT2007;Otto2009;UnruhandWilliams2013).Yet,thereisstillrelativelylittle

literaturethatexaminesbestpracticesforcomplexpoliticalemergencieswhereinnatural

disastersandconflictdynamicsbothimpactpropertymanagement.Despiteagrowing

literatureon‘disasterdiplomacy’(LeBillonandWaizenegger2007;Gaillardetal.2008;

WaizeneggerandHyndman2010),theintricaciesofmanagingnaturalresourcesinsuch

situationshavenotbeenadequatelytheorizedordocumented.

Thisstudyexaminestheinteractionofpropertyandscalarpoliticsinpost‐disaster,post‐

conflictNanggroeAcehDarussalam(Aceh),Indonesia.Iarguethatanunderstandingof

scalarpoliticsandpropertyprovideausefulframeworkforunderstandinghowpolitical

authorityisconstitutedinpost‐conflictscenariosandinturn,helppractitionersmakesense

oftheoutcomesofpost‐conflictnaturalresourcemanagementstrategies.Ioutlinea

frameworkthatdrawsfromHohfeld’s(1913)workonjuralrelations,Singer’s(2000)work

onobligations,andseveralauthors’ideasregardingscaleandscalarpoliticsinrelationto

property(Sikor2004;McCarthy2005a,2005b;Mackinnon2010).Iusethisframeworkto

examineexperiencesandimpressionsofpropertyregistrationandlandtitlinginarural

132

villageandaperi‐urbanneighborhoodinAceh,Indonesia.Thisstudyconcludeswithsome

lessonsapplicabletopropertymanagementinanyscenarioofsimultaneousnatural

disasterandarmedconflict.

Intheearlymorningof26December2004,amegathrustearthquakestrucklessthan150

kilometersoffthecoastofAceh.Thisearthquaketriggeredamassivetsunamiwithwaves

thatmeasuredbetween12‐30metersinheightandthattraveledasmuchasseven

kilometersinland(BAPPENAS2005a;Parisetal.2007).Atragedyofinconceivable

proportionsemergedoverfollowingdaysasnewsreportsrevealedthescaleofdamagein

countriessurroundingtheIndianOcean.Aceh’slowlandcommunitiesweresomeofthe

worstimpactedareas(JayasuriyaandMcCawley2010).InAcehalone,anestimated

167,000peoplewerekilledormissingandover500,000morepeopledisplacedor

homeless(BRR2005;USAID2005a).Localinfrastructurewasdevastatedassome300,000

landparcels,250,000homes,15percentofagriculturallands,over2,000schools,10,000

kilometersofroads,andmanypublichealthfacilitieswereseverelydamagedordestroyed

(BRR2005;Fitzpatrick2005b;Kennyetal.2006;Abidinetal.2006).TheGovernmentof

Indonesia(GOI)estimatedUSD4.45billionindamagesandlosses–78%ofwhichwereto

privateassets(BAPPENAS2005a).28Inresponsetothetragedy,anestimatedUSD7.2‐7.7

billionwaspledgedtoAcehbyinternationaldonorsandtheGOI(MasyrafahandMcKeon

2008;BRR2009).29Over400agencies,severalmilitarydeployments,andthousandsof

internationalaidanddevelopmentworkersmobilizedtoprovideassistanceforthe

recoveryandto‘reconstruct’whattheybelievedwerethehallmarksofadeveloped

28NationalDevelopmentPlanningAgency(BAPPENAS,BadanPerencanaandanPembangunanNasional).

29BRR(2009)estimates93%ofthepledgedwasactuallycommittedandused.Disasterfinancialaidflowsweredifficulttomeasureinallcountries,soamountsvaryquitealot.JayasuriyaandMcCawley(2010)factorinadditionalityandotheraccountingissuestoestimatethataidtoalltsunamiimpactedcountriestotaledUSD17.5billion;internationaldonorscommittedUSD14billioninaidandUSD3.5billioninaidwasmadeavailablefromdomesticsources.

133

economyandcivilsociety(MasyrafahandMcKeon2008;JayasuriyaandMcCawley2010).30

Nevertheless,ontheground,thereweremanydifficulties–bothanticipatedand

unanticipated–thatchallengeddisasterrecoveryandreconstruction.Progresswasmost

obviouslyhamperedbythemagnitudeofdevastation,includingthesubstantiallossof

humancapacity,logisticaldifficultiesofdeliveringaid,recoveryofbasiclegal

documentation,andprocurementofresourcesforreconstructionofphysicalinfrastructure

suchasroadsandbuildings.RenderingthissituationevenmoredifficultwasthatAcehwas

bothapost‐disasterandpost‐conflictscenario,whereinconflictingdevelopmentand

politicalagendascompetedatmultiplescales(Hyndman2011).

Atthetimethetsunamistruck,Acehwasalmostcompletelyclosedtodevelopmentagencies

andwasknownintheoutsideworldforprimarilythreethings:substantialoffshore

hydrocarbonreserves,astrongIslamicheritage,andanearlythirty‐yearseparatistwar

betweentheGOIandtheFreeAcehMovement(GAM,GerakanAcehMerdeka)thathad

resultedinsome15,000deaths(Barronetal.2005;Ross2005;Reid2006).Beginningin

1976andintensifyingthroughoutthe1990s,thecausesanddriversofthemodernconflict

werecomplex–involvingaspirationsforlocalpoliticalautonomy,ethnonationalterritorial

claims,personalvendettas,reactiontohumanrightsviolations,andgrievancesfromlocal

distributionofhydrocarbonandotherresourcerevenues(Reid2006;Aspinall2007;

McCarthy2007;Schulze2007;Drexler2008).31Explanationsoftheconflict’srootcauses

arestillembeddedinpoliticalnarratives.ManyformerGAMseetheconflictasanongoing

struggleofdecolonizationandtheirnarrativestracetheconflictthrougha130yearhistory

30MasyrafahandMcKeoon(2008,8)estimate“463agencieswereinvolvedwithimplementingprojects”including326internationalNGOs,109nationalNGOs,27donors(includingUNagencies),andtheGOI(whichwhileactuallyhadmultipleagenciesonthegroundincludingTNI,BRR,BPN,MOFandBAPPENAS).

31Schulze(2004)andRoss(2005)identifythreephasesofconflictthatcorrelatetothreeincarnationsofGAM.AccordingtoRoss(2005,35),“thefirstin1976–79,whenitwassmallandill‐equipped,andwaseasilysuppressedbythemilitary;thesecondin1989–91,whenitwaslarger,bettertrained,andbetterequipped,andwasonlyputdownthroughharshsecuritymeasures;andthethirdbeginningin1999,whenitbecamelargerandbetterfundedthaneverbefore,challengingtheIndonesiangovernment’scontroloftheprovince.”

134

ofresistanceincludingtheDarulIslamRebellion(1953‐1959)andoppositiontoBritish,

Dutch,Japanese,andotherforeignentities(Schulze2004;Reid2006).Ontheotherhand,

representativesoftheGOIandIndonesianNationalArmedForces(TNI,TentaraNasional

Indonesia)havedescribedGAMasanopportunistic,looseaffiliationofunorganized,

criminalgangsdealingillegaldrugsandoftenattemptedtodegradethecharacterofGAM

leaders(Reid2006;Drexler2007).Scholarlyanalysesrecognizethesecompetingnarratives

asdiscursiveweaponsbasedonpartialtruthsandthatthecomplexandchangingmixof

actorsrepresentingGAMand‘thestate’havetovariousdegreescontrolledtheterritoryand

committedcrimesagainsttheAcehnesepeople(Schulze2004;Drexler2007).

Interestingly,post‐disastervillagelevelsurveysconductedin2006indicatethatconflict‐

affectedareasactuallyexperiencedmoreextensiveinfrastructuraldamagethanthe

tsunami‐affectedareas(Wongetal.2007).Aswell,conflict‐relateddamageswerenot

limitedtothenortheastandcentraldistricts–areastypicallyidentifiedasGAM’straditional

stronghold(Wongetal.2007).WesterndistrictslikeAcehJayaandAcehBaratthat

experiencedthebruntofthetsunamiwerealsoamongthedistrictsmostdamagedbythe

conflict–AcehJayabeingthemostimpactedofalldistricts,withmorethan80%of

infrastructuredestroyedbyeitherconflictordisaster(Wongetal.2007,28).Despitea

requestforceasefireafterthetsunami,conflictincidentscontinuedandevenincreasedinto

mid‐2005withseveralreportsofTNIkillingGAM(Barron2005).Itwasthoughtthatsome

GAMmovedtowardsthewestcoastandsoutherndistricts,wheremembershipwasthought

tobelessideologicalandmorebasedoneconomicself‐interest(Schulze2004;Barron

2005).Ironically,petitionfromCentralAceh,SoutheastAcehandWestAcehinrecentyears

(2006‐2013)hasbeentoseparatethedistrictsfromtheprovinceofAcehintoanew

province,thoughthismaybethepoliticalmaneuveringofelites(Simanjuntak2013).

Despitethisviolenceontheground,thetsunamiprovidedthepoliticalspaceforrenewed

peacenegotiationsthatledtotheHelsinkiMemorandumofUnderstanding(MOU)on15

August2005(LeBillonandWaizenegger2007;Drexler2008;Gaillardetal.2008).While

theHelsinkiMOUbeganthepost‐conflictphase,thepeacemakingprocessdidnotaddress

allthegrievancesofdifferentgroupsinAceh(LeBillonandWaizenegger2007;Drexler

135

2008;Gaillardetal.2008)andvillagesurveysindicatedalackoflocalunderstandingand

accesstoinformationregardingtheMOU(Wongetal.2007).

In2005,therewerenobestpracticeguidesforsituationswhereinnaturaldisastersand

peacebuildingeffortsoccursimultaneously.Researchthatrecognizedthecomplexityof

casesinwhichnaturaldisastersinfluencedviolentconflictsandpeacebuildingwasjust

emerging(Comfort2000).Theabsenceoftheoreticalandpolicyframeworksfor

understandingasimultaneousnaturaldisasterandviolentconflict,thelossoflocalhuman

capital,andthedearthoflocalknowledgeandcrossovertechnicalskillsamongaidworkers

ledtoseparatestreamsofpost‐conflictandpost‐disasterprojectsthatrarelycalledfor

coordinatedactivitiesorprojectdesigns(BurkeandAfnan2005;Hyndman2009;

Hyndman2011;Phelpsetal.2011).The“dualdisaster”resultedintwoaidstreamsandtwo

solitudesbetweenpeoplethatwerevictimsofthetsunamiorvictimsoftheconflict

(Hyndman2011).Infact,WaizeneggerandHyndman(2010)arguethefactthatassistance

fortsunamisurvivorssignificantlysurpassedaidforconflictsurvivorsandex‐combatants

mayjeopardizeasustainingpeaceinAceh.Thereconstructionofpropertyandland

administrationsystemswasoneofthehighpriorityaidareasinwhichpost‐conflictand

post‐disasteractivitieswereentirelydisconnected.

TheReconstructionofAcehLandAdministrationSystem(RALAS)wastheflagshipproject

fortheWorldBank–ledMultiDonorTrustFund(MDTF)anditwasbackedbypolitical

luminarieslike“U.S.PresidentBillClinton(SpecialEnvoyfortheTsunami),Hernandode

Soto(thefatherofmodernthinkingofpropertyrightsforthepoor),PresidentPaul

WolfowitzoftheWorldBankandAgnesvanArdenne,theNetherlandsMinisterfor

DevelopmentCooperation”(BretecheandSteer2006,online).ApprovedforUSD28.5

millionfundinginJune2005(beforetheHelsinkiMOUwassigned)andimplementedfrom

August2005toJune2009,theprojectwasapost‐disasterlandtitlingprojectinapost‐

conflictenvironment(WB2010).RALASwasmeanttotargetnon‐conflictareasandavoid

conflict‐relatedpropertyissues(Deutsch2009).Yet,aftera29‐yearconflict,therewerefew

placesinAcehthatwereunaffectedbytheconflict–especiallyinRALASareaslikePidie,

Bireuen,AcehUtara,Lokseumawe,NaganRaya,AcehJaya,andAcehBarat.Alloftheseareas

136

wereeitherthoughtofasGAMstrongholdsorhadconflict‐relateddamageabovethe

provincialaverage(Schulze2004;Barron2005;Reid2006;Wongetal.2007).Moreover,

whenmappingandregistrationwereimplemented,thereasoningbehindthechoiceof

specificareaswasnotcleartolocalsorpolicymakersandseveralnon‐tsunamilocations

wereincluded(Deutsch2009).WhentheWorldBankdeclinedtorenewfundingforRALAS

inJune2009,RALAShadbeenabletoissuetitlesforlessthan40%ofitstargetedgoal

(222,628of600,000landparcels)andabout50%ofthetsunamidamagedparcels(151,387

of300,000landparcels)(WB2010).WhiletheWorldBankidentifiedthisquantitative

failureasmostlyafailureofnationalmanagementandimplementation,BPNidentified

fundingflowsfromtheMDTFasaseriousobstacle.Inadditiontothebureaucratic

bottlenecksandproblemswithimplementation,communitymembersandpeopleworking

onthegroundquestionedthevaluecreated,culturalappropriateness,andmotivesbehind

landtitling(InterviewFFI,Meulaboh,May2007;InterviewMuntasir,Calang,February

2008).Asaresultoftheproject’sclosure,manyownerswereleftinlimbowithouttitlesfor

over90,000landparcelsthathadgonethroughcommunitydrivenadjudication/community

landmappingprocesses(some40,000parcels)orhadbeenconfirmedthroughofficial

surveyandpublicnotification(some50,000parcels)(WB2010)(seeTable4.1).While

bureaucraticineptitudewasasignificantandoftenidentifiedproblem(Deutsch2009;WB

2010),thestrongconnectionsbetweenproperty,authority,andpoliticswereoverlooked.

Thetwocasestudiesinthischapterarebasedonfieldworkconductedonlandtitlingduring

fivemonthsspentintheregionspacedoutoverthreeyears(2006‐2008).Thefirstcase

studyisaruralvillageinthedistrictofAcehJaya;thesecondisaperi‐urbanneighborhood

nearMeulaboh–thecapitalofthedistrictofAcehBarat.TheRALASlandtitlingproject

implementedactivitiesthatweremeanttoreconstructpropertyandlandsystemsinornear

bothofthesecommunities.Thedatacollectedincludes68semi‐structuredinterviews,16

focusgroupswithlocalfarmers,directobservation,andarchivalresearchincludingcensus

andsecondaryassessmentdatasets.Semi‐structuredinterviewswithfarmers,non‐

governmentorganization(NGO)staff,internationalagencystaff,andgovernmentofficials

establishedtheimportanceoflandtitlingasalocalpriority,examinedofficials'publicand

137

Table5.1QuantitativeoutcomesofRALASatclosurein2009.DataSource:WB2010.

privateopinionsaboutlandtitling,identifiedconstraintstolandtitling,anddocumentedthe

landtitlingprocess.32

Thechapterisorganizedasfollows.Thenextsectionoverviewsliteratureonproperty,

authority,andscalarpolitics.Thethirdsectionappliesthisframeworktotwocasestudies

inAcehandprovidesanoverviewofRALAS.Thefourthsectionprovidesadiscussionof

researchfindings.Theconcludingsectionsummarizeslessonslearned.

32Exactlocationsandnamesarechangedtoprotecttheidentityofinformants.

138

5.2PROPERTY,AUTHORITY,ANDSCALARPOLITICSINPOST‐CONFLICTCONTEXTS

5.2.1AUTHORITYANDPROPERTYINACEHCompetingvisionsofpropertyandpropertysystemsoftenindicatebroaderdisagreements

overpoliticalauthority(Macpherson1978;Benda‐Beckmann1979).AsSikorandLund

(2009,8)pointout,authority“relatestopropertybecauserights,privileges,duties,

obligations,etc.requiresupportbypolitico‐legalauthority”andauthorityitselfis

constitutedthroughthesociospatialpracticesofproperty.Weber(1978)defines‘authority’

aslegitimatedominationandoutlinesthreeidealtypesofauthoritybasedontradition,

charisma,orrational(legal/bureaucratic)grounds.Differenttypesofauthorityinfluence

geographiesofpowerandgovernancestrategies(Allen2003).Forexample,similarto

Weber’sthreeidealtypesofauthority,Watts(2004)identifiesthreeformsofgovernable

spaceandrule(thechieftainship,theethnicminority,andthenationstate)associatedwith

oil‐basedcapitalisminNigeria.Watts’workindicatesthatexamininghowdifferenttypesof

authorityareexpressedandconstitutedthroughsociospatialprocessescanprovidekey

insightsintogovernanceofsocietiesdisruptedbyarmedviolence.Governingspace

implicatesestablishingterritorialauthoritywhichoftentranslatesintocontrolover

property(VandergeestandPeluso1995).Thus,propertysystemsandlandtenuresecurity

areintimatelyconnectedtothedynamicconstitutionofauthority(Macpherson1978;

Bromley1991;Unruh2003;SikorandLund2009).

Theinteractionofpropertysystemsandauthorityarefundamentaltotheconstitutionof

thestateandthepowerofgovernmentstocontrolorinfluencehumanbehaviour(Blomley

2003b;Larson2010).Infact,themodernstateissometimesconsideredthemainguarantor

ofpropertyentitlementsandtenuresecurity(deSoto2000;Otto2009).Yet,othersocial

institutionsexpressauthorityoverpropertyrelationsthroughnon‐statutorynormsand

laws(Bromley1991;Singer2000;Unruh2003;Benda‐Beckmannetal.2006a).Landtenure

securitycanbestronginnon‐statutorypropertysystems(HomeandLim2004),thoughit

maybeunderminedincaseswherecompetingauthoritiessupportconflictingproperty

systemsorpropertyclaims(Bowen1988;Benda‐Beckmann2001).Situationswherein

multipleauthoritiesoverlapandcompetearecharacterizedbynormativepluralism(Bowen

2003).Operationalizingauthorityinnormativelypluralsituationsisdifficultasauthorities

139

mayusethesameprinciples,evidence,andlegalforum;ostensiblydifferentauthoritiesmay

beembeddedwithinthesamegovernancestructure(forexample,villagecouncils

appointedbycentralstateofficials);orauthoritiesmaybetooephemeraltoadequately

engagewithandstudy(MorseandWoodman1988;Watts2004;Santos2006).Several

authorsstudyingpropertyandgovernanceshaveconceptualizedthecomplicated

discoursesandactivitiesonthegroundassemi‐autonomoussocialfields(Moore1973,

2001;Griffiths1986),normativeorders(Bowen2003;Tamanaha2007b),orsocio‐legal

configurations(McCarthy2004).Whiletheebbandflowofauthoritythroughassociated

networksandsociospatialprocessesaredifficulttooperationalize,theseapproacheshave

provenusefulforprovidingtheoreticalinsightandpolicyguidanceforpost‐conflictnatural

resourcemanagement(Unruh2003;Plunkett2005).

Normativepluralismandconflictingpropertysystemsarecommonchallengesto

sustainablepost‐conflictnaturalresourcemanagement–particularlyinthecaseofland

(Cotulaetal.2003;Unruh2003).Inpost‐conflictscenarios,centralgovernmentsoftenlack

legitimacyandcapacitytoimplementpropertyadministration;aswell,theymayhave

statutorylegalframeworkswhichdonotrepresenttherealityontheground(Unruh2003).

UnruhandWilliams(2013)findthatfourbroadcategoriesofproblemscommonly

underminelandmanagementforpeacebuilding–legalambiguity,legalpluralism,disputes,

andlandrecovery.Threeofthesefourdirectlyrelatetonormativepluralism:(1)legal

ambiguityresultingfromnormativehybridityandpoorlyenforcedlaws;(2)landdisputes,

implicatingauthorityandofteninvolving‘forumshopping’whereinclaimantscanchoose

fromforumsreflectingcompetingauthorities;and(3)legalpluralismisacriticalterm

politicallydeployedtodescribenormativepluralisminsituationswhereinthestate

centralizespowerbymarginalizingalternativeauthorities(Kidder1998).Theinteractionof

multipleauthoritieswithpropertysystemsandgovernanceisoftencomplicatedbypeople’s

abilitytochooseauthoritiesatoneormorescales;bynormativehybriditywherein

evidence,adjudicationprinciples,andrulesmightbesharedbetweenauthorities;andwhen

authoritiesareembeddedincomplicatedscalarrelationswhereingovernanceissharedor

politicalcategoriesbecomesassociatedwithparticularscales.Inpost‐conflict,post‐disaster

Aceh,alloftheabovedynamicswereimplicatedinpropertymanagement.

140

InAceh,threedominantauthoritiesareoftenrecognizedaspertinenttoproperty

management–statutorylaw,Islamiclaw(sharia,inIndonesiansyariah),andcustomarylaw

(i.e.theflexibleadatcategory)(Bowen2003;Harper2009).Whileitiseasytoimagine

theseauthoritiesasthreeseparateentitiesornormativeorderswithcompetinginstitutions,

theseauthoritiesareactuallyenmeshedinacomplicatednetworkofpoliticalmanoeuvre

andnormativehybriditywhereatanygiventimetheymaycomplementanddefertoone

another,mayoverlapandblendinadjudicationdecisions,ormaybedeployedaspolitically

antagonisticcategories(Bowen2003;McCarthy2005a;Harper2006).Since1999,therole

ofIslamicandadatauthoritieswithinpoliticsimplicatingAcehneseidentityandinnewly

createdinstitutionalpositionsinthecourtsandingovernmentadministrationhascreateda

complicated,unique,anddynamicgovernanceenvironment(Harper2009).

TherelationshipsbetweentheseauthoritiesinAcehareinfluencedbybroaderpoliticaland

legalcurrentsimpactingtheIndonesianarchipelago.Colonialgovernancestrategies,

nationalpolitics,andglobalundercurrentshavealteredtheIndonesianlegalrecognitionof

theroleofadatinstitutions,thuschangingthedefinitionofadatitselfandmodifyingthe

roleadatplaysinpropertyandnaturalresourcemanagement(Haverfield1998;Li2000,

2001;Burns2004).Dutchcolonialruleleftanindelibleimprintonpropertymanagement

throughoutIndonesiathatcontinuestoinfluencejurisprudence,governance,andthe

relationsbetweenthestate,Islam,andadatinregardtolandlawandpropertymanagement

(Burns2004;Wallace2008).33Between1909‐1926theDutchscholarC.vanVollenhoven

andhisLeidenSchoolwerenotonlycentralintheorizinghowcolonialandcustomarylaw

shouldintegrate,theyalsoplayedanimportantroleindefiningwhatconstitutescustomary

law(adatrecht)–identifyingnineteenlocaladatsystemsthatcouldbeunitedthrough

universalprinciplesintoasupercategoryof“ur‐adat”(Burns2004;LindseyandPhillips

2005).This“ur‐adat”ideaunderliestheideaofapan‐Indonesianadatasarticulatedinthe

BasicAgrarianLaw(LawNo.5/1960),thefirstlawinpost‐independenceIndonesiato

33Wallace(2008,192‐194)indicateslaw,administration,andtraditionalorinformalbehaviorasthree“discretecomponents”thathaveinteractedduringthePre‐CadastralPhase(1626‐1837),OldCadastralPhase(1837‐1875),NewCadastralPhase(1875‐1961),andModernCadastralPhase(1961tocurrent).

141

codifypropertyrelations.Ontheotherhand,duringthe1990s,therevivalofadatlinkedthe

termtoasupposedlyincommensurablearrayofdynamic,localpracticesandwasoften

discursivelydeployedtosupportregionalclaimsforautonomyandresourcecontrol(Li

2000;Bowen2003;Fitzpatrick2006;Lindsey2008).34Thislatterusageofadattosupport

indigenous,ethnic,orlocalresourceclaimsparallelslargerdiscoursesinthe1990sthat

identifiedthelocalasthepointofresistancetofightagainst‘globalization’(Swyngedouw

2000).Fitzpatrick(2006,75)outlinesthreephasesofIndonesianlandlawthatreflecthow

largerpoliticaltrendshaveinfluencedthewaydifferentauthorities(particularlyadat)have

beenimplicatedinpropertymanagementandterritorialcontrolsinceindependencein

1945:

Thefirst,characterisedbytheBasicAgrarianLaw1960("theBAL"),wasconcernedwith attempts to unify the colonial legacy of legal dualism. This endeavour waspartly based on the alleged existence of pan‐Indonesian customary (adat) lawprinciples.Thesecond,coincidingwiththeNewOrderperiod,wascharacterisedbyextensionofcentralisedexecutivecontroloveraccesstolandandnaturalresources.Inthisperiodadatlawfailedtomeetitsromanticisedpromise,eitherasaneffectivesource of private law or as a check on public administrative power. The third,apparent in current processes of reformasi and regional autonomy, is ostensiblyconcerned with re‐recognising pluralism, devolving public administrative powerandensuringmoreequitableaccesstolandandnaturalresources.

AspoliticalprerogativeschangedinJakarta,acomplexandsometimescontradictory

melangeofforestry,villagegovernance,regionalautonomy,andgovernmentappropriation

lawsandregulationsunderminedtheBAL.35Thesechangesoftencreatedinsecurityof

34Specifically,theregionalandlocaluseofadatforadvocatingpoliticalandlegalinterestsplayedacentralroleduringtheendoftheNewOrderandbeginningofreformasiaslawsliketheAutonomyLawNo.22/1999recognizedtheroleofcustomarynormsinlocalgovernanceandRegulationNo.5/1999bytheMinisterofAgricultureandHeadoftheBodyofNationalLandconcerningtheGuidelinesforResolvingtheIssueofTraditionalCommunalRightsofficiallyrecognizedhakulayat(translatedasbeschikkingsrechtortherightofdisposition,allocation,oravail)andtheexistenceoftraditional,communalrightssubjecttotraditionallaw(Wallace2008,205).

35Forexample,the1967ForestryLawdefined70‐75%ofallofIndonesiaasforestlandundertheadministrationofthenationalMinistryofForestrythusunderminingtheBALpurview.TheForestryLawNo.41/1999recognizedsomerightsofcustomarygroupswhichsubsequentlywerecastindoubtbylawsonregionalautonomyandresourcecontrol.Inaddition,LawNo.5/1979,Law

142

tenureforlocalandcustomaryinterestsregardingnaturalresourcemanagement,an

insecuritythatleftopeningsforcorruptioninpropertyandnaturalresourcemanagement

andlittleopportunityforrecourse(Thorburn2004;McCarthy2005a;Wallace2008).

Giventheongoingproblems,in1988,theNationalLandAgency(BPN,BadanPerananhan

Nasional)wasestablishedwiththeobjectivesofcoordinatingtheregistrationofproperty,

managingpropertytransfers,anddevelopinglandpolicy.Yet,BPNrapidlybecamea

representativeofthecorruptionandproblemsofNewOrderrule(Thorburn2004;

Fitzpatrick2008a;Lindsey2008).BPNwasnearlyclosedin1999duetodecentralization

legislationthatwouldhavehandedoverlandaffairstosome416localofficeswithno

centralcoordinatingagency(HeryaniandGrant2004;Wallace2008).However,BPN

remainedactiveatthenational(pusat),provincial(kanwil),anddistrict(kantah)levelwith

adirectorthatanswereddirectlytothepresidentofIndonesia.36AlthoughWorldBank

fundedprojectsliketheLandAdministrationProject(LAP)andLandManagementand

PolicyDevelopmentProject(LMPDP)continuetobeimplementedthroughBPN,by2011

theslowrateofregistrationresultedinonly39millionoftheestimated87millionland

parcelsinIndonesiabeingregistered–lessthan10%ofthetotalsurfaceareaofthecountry

(HeryaniandGrant2004;Abidinetal.2011;WB2011).37Effortstohaveanorderly

decentralizationoflandadministrationhavecontinuedthroughoutthe2000sthough

constantlyplaguedbypoliticsandtechnicaldifficulties(Lindsey2008;Abidinetal.2011;

Belletal.2013).Inpost‐conflictAceh,WorldBankreportsindicatethatresistanceto

No.22/1999,LawNo.32/2004,andanumberofagencyregulationshavechangedregionalgovernance,adat,andvillagegovernancebyrestructuringtraditionalvillagecouncilsandgivingmoreauthoritytovillageheads.

36BPNrecentlywentthroughrestructuringunderpresidentialdecreeNo.10/2006butcontinuestomaintainitslegislatedcentralroleinlandregistration,landmanagement,andlandpolicyacrossthecountrydespitethepushtodecentralize.

37Suchprojectsledtoregulationsspecifyingsystematiclandtitlingproceduresbeingintroducedjustbeforethe1999decentralizationthreat:PPNo.24/1997,PMNA3/1997andPMNA7/1998(Deutschetal.2009).

143

decentralizeBPN,“wasfueledlargelybyissuesthatgobeyondRALAS,suchastheoiland

gasconcessionsofenergy‐richAceh,whicharecurrentlyunderthejurisdictionofBPN–

Jakarta”(WB2010,8).Thepoliticalmanoeuvering,slowrateofpropertyregistration

throughBPN,andcomplexlegalframeworkforpropertyhaveneveradequatelyrecognized

localresourcerightsormettheneedsofrapidurbangrowth,industrialization,and

changingagriculturalpracticesthathaveoccurredsincethe1960sthroughoutIndonesia

(Lindsey2004,2008).

ImplementationofIndonesia’slegalandregulatoryframeworkforpropertymanagement

wasextraordinarilycomplicatedandproblematicinpost‐disaster,post‐conflictAceh(WB

2010).Asmentionedabove,propertydamagefromboththetsunamiandwarwas

widespread(Wongetal.2007).Thelossofboundarymarkers,lossofproofofownership,

lossofBPNpaperworkanddeathofstaff,temporaryrelocationandpermanent

resettlementfortsunamivictims,andthedestructionof300,000landparcels(130,000

rural,170,000urban)weredramaticimpactsafterthetsunami(BRR2005;Deutsch2009).

Inturn,propertyissuesfromtheconflictincludedinfrastructuraldamage,some36,000

internallydisplacedhouseholds,andwidespreaddamagetoproductiveassetslike

agriculturalfields,generators,andforestgardens(Barron2005;Wongetal.2007).

Moreover,largeswathsoflandinAcehhadneverbeenregisteredastheywereremote

regionswithpoortransportationinfrastructure;hadstrongcustomaryresource

managementsystemsandvillagegovernance;ormayhavehadsubstantialGAMinfluence

(Bowen2003;Schulze2004;Fitzpatrick2005,2008;Harper2006).Lingeringdisputes

allegethatduringtheconflictcentralgovernmentclaimsonandgrantsoflandfor

commercialentitiesfailedtorecognizehistoricallocaluse.38

Acehhasanumberofuniquelawsandregulationsthatmakeregionalgovernancedifferent

fromotherpartsofIndonesia.ThisuniquenessevolvedduetoAcehstatusasaspecial

38Forexample,TNIclaimstolandformilitarybarrackswerechallengedbysomecommunitiesandexpansionofthepalmoilindustryplantationsduringtheconflictalsosometimesdisregardedlocalpropertyrights–seecourtdecisionPTUNBandaAcehonPT.Nafasindovs.GovernorAceh2011.

144

region(daerahistimewa)andfollowsthepeaceagreement(HelsinkiMOU)andsubsequent

post‐conflictlegislationinboththeregionandnationallegislativebodies.Theselawssetup

anumberofuniqueinstitutionsandlegislativetoolsthataredifferentfromotherprovinces.

Theprovincialanddistrictlegislativebodiesareallowedtopassqanun–regional

regulationsbasedonIslamiclaw.39Theqanunhavebeenusedtoestablishandincreasethe

purviewofshariacourts(MahkamahSyariah),shariapolice(WilayatulHisbah),andthe

UlamaConsultativeAssembly(MajelisPermusyawaratanUlama).Furthercomplicating

propertymanagement,post‐disasterreconstructionanddevelopmentwitnessedthe

introductionofnewideasandneoliberalprinciplesregardingthesocialfunctionof

property(likemortgages,taxes,etc.)(WB2010).Thepre‐tsunamicadastredidnot

representmanyinformaltransactionsthatoccurredwithregisteredlands.Thehighcostsof

registeringalltransactions(5%ofthevalueofpropertyforinitialregistration)andthepoor

legalframeworkforrecognizingsuchtransactioncausedpeopletouseadatorinformal

systemsandtounderreporttransactionstoBPN(InterviewMuntasir,Calang,February

2008).40Whileframedasaprocessof‘reconstructing’thestatutorypropertysystemin

Aceh,propertyregistrationandtitlingwereactuallyprocessesofcreatingastatutory

systeminaregionwheremostlandwaspreviouslysecuredthroughinformalortraditional

mechanisms.RegisteringlandinAcehwasnotjustasimpletaskofdrawingboundariesand

recordingrightsandnames,itwasachangetotheexistingwaysinwhichpropertywas

enactedandfunctionedinlocalsocietiesandinpracticesofgovernance.

39ThecapacitytocreateqanunwasfirstgrantedbyLawNo.18/2001(theSpecialAutonomyfortheProvinceofAcehastheProvinceofNanggroeAcehDarussalam)andwasreaffirmedbyLawNo.11/2006(theLawonGoverningAcehorLoGA).

40Whilehakmilikisthestandardrightofownership,donotflowfromhakmilikbutratherfurthergovernmentregistration.Sobeyondhakmilikadditionalrightsthatmustberegisteredwiththestateincludebuildingrights(hakgunabangunan),userights(hakpakai),rentalrights(haksewa),andcommercialexploitation(hakgunausaha).Theverycentralizedlandadministrationsystembecomesoverwhelmedwithregisteringtransactionsandrightsthatmightbebetterhandledthroughacombinationoflocalzoninganddistrictorsubdistrictregistrationoftransactions–whichironicallyisthedefactorealityinAceh.

145

ThethreedominantauthoritiesinAcehinfluencewaysinwhichpropertyisunderstoodand

enacted,yettheyarenotthesoleinfluencesonproperty.Humanrights,environmentalrisk,

andcapitalistdiscoursesregardingpropertyalsoinfluencedpropertymanagement

strategies,especiallyintheimmediateaftermathofthetsunamiwheninternational

agencies,investmentfirms,NGOs,andforeigngovernmentsinfluencedreconstructionand

developmentprioritiesandpromotedspecifictypesofpropertyrelationsbasedon

HernandodeSoto’s(2000)work(BRR2005;BretecheandSteer2006).Thecombinationof

discourses,accompanyinglawsandnorms,andactionstakenonthegroundbythese

institutionsmightbeconsideredalternativesemi‐autonomousfieldsorauthorities(Wilson

2000;Tamanaha2007b).41Inaddition,eventheideaofamonolithicstateapproachto

propertyneedstobequestionedinAceh.InmodernIndonesia,thebasicorganizationof

governanceandlegalframeworkforpropertycauseconflictsoverpropertyandresources

betweendifferentbureaucraticentitieswithinthestate(e.g.,MinistryofForestryand

MinistryofAgriculture)aswellasbetweengroupsthatrepresenttheterritorialand

hierarchicalorganizationofgovernance(e.g.,local,provincial,regional,national)(McCarthy

2005a;Wallace2008).Thehybridityofstatutorylawandconflictoverpropertybetween

nationalagenciescanonlybeunderstoodwithamorein‐depthunderstandingofpost‐

conflictgovernanceinAceh.

ThecontroversialLawNo.11/2006(LOGA,theLawonGoverningAceh)wasmeantto

implementtheHelsinkiMOU.Yet,duetoambiguouslanguageitbecame“asourceof41DespitetheclearinfluenceofcapitalistapproachestopropertythroughNGOs,internationalagencies,investmentfirms,andforeigngovernments’influenceofpost‐conflict,post‐disasterreconstructionanddevelopmentprioritiestheseauthoritieshavenotbeenrecognizedasinfluencingpropertyinthecontextofAceh.Tamanaha(2007)arguesthatdevelopingatypologyofnormativeordersfacilitatesexaminationofheterogeneityandhybridity.Hearguesthatsixidealtypesofnormativeordersareoftenfoundinthenormativepluralismliterature:official‐legal,customary‐cultural,capitalist‐economic,community‐cultural,religious‐cultural,andfunctionalnormative.Theseareusefulheuristicsforrecognizingdifferentlogicsandtypesofauthoritythatconstitutenormativeorders.ThesedifferentidealtypesmayassistunderstandingdifferentapproachestopropertyinAcehinthattheyallowustoidentifyamorecomplexterrainofauthoritynarrativesandinstitutionsthanWeber’sthreetypes(charisma,customary,bureaucratic).Tamanaha’sworkisespeciallyusefulinAceh,wherethereisoftenastaticassumptionbyscholars,practitioners,andevenlocalsthatonlythreeauthoritiesarerelevant(theflexibleadatcategory,Islamiclaw,andstatelaw)andthateachoftheseauthoritiesisautonomous.

146

substantialconflictsbetweenAcehandthecentralgovernment”(May2008,42).LOGA

specifiedAceh’srelationtoJakartainlightofseveralprecedinglawsregardingregional

autonomyandthespecialstatusofAcehanditorganizedgovernanceinAcehashierarchy

ofterritoriallevels.42Theselevelsincludetheprovince,kabupaten(regencyordistrict)and

kota(municipality),kecamatan(subdistrict),mukim(gatheringofvillages,traditionally

aroundamosque),andgampung(village).43WhilenotinLOGA,thelevelofdusun(a

neighborhoodinavillage)isalsorecognizedasanimportantlevelofgovernancewithin

villages.Eachoftheselevelsplaysdifferentrolesinpropertymanagement–definingrights,

notarizingtransfers,mediatingdisputes,etc.Theprovincialanddistrictlevelsinthe

hierarchyhavespecifiedexecutive,legislative,andjudicialinstitutions.Ofnotearethe

specificationofanumberofparticularadatinstitutionsandthepresenceofthreecourt

systemswithfirstinstanceatthedistrictlevelandappellateattheprovinciallevel.The

threecourtsystemsaretheGeneralCourt(criminalandcivilissues),AdministrativeCourt

(forcasesinvolvingpublicofficials),andIslamicCourt(MahkamahSyariah)(whichoften

handledivorcesandinheritanceissuesbutmayhaveanincreasingpurviewoverproperty).

ThelackofconfidenceinGeneralCourtsandhigherlevelofconfidenceinIslamicCourtshas

ledsomeobserverstorecommendthatalllandandpropertyissuesbemovedintothe

IslamicCourts(Fitzpatrick2008).

TheabovegovernancelevelsrepresentamixofGOIlegislationandtraditionalAcehnese

governanceinstitutionssothegovernancepowersoftheselevelsandeventhepolitical

natureofpostsareoftenambiguous.Forexample,theprovinciallevelincludesagovernor,

thecourts,theregionallegislativebody(DPRA,DewanPerwakilanRakyatAceh),anAceh

42TheLOGAfollowedalonglineoflawsthateachfundamentallychangedstateandadatgovernancestructuresinAceh,includingLawNo.5/1979onVillageGovernance,LawNo.44/1999ontheSpecialStatusoftheProvinceofAceh,Law18/2001onSpecialAutonomyfortheProvinceofNanggroeAcehDarussalam,LawNo.32/2004onRegionalGovernment,Lawno.33/2004onFiscalBalancebetweentheCentralGovernmentandRegions,andnumerousqanun.

43TheLOGArecognizeskelurahanbutstipulatesthatallkelurahanbecomegampungwithintwoyearsofLOGAimplementation.SpellingvariesgreatlyinEnglishversionsofAcehneseandIndonesianwords.Gampungaresometimesspelledgampong;avillageheadisvariouslywrittenasgeucikorkeucik.

147

AdatCouncil(MAA,MadjelisAdatAceh),theTuhaNanggroe(CouncilofElders),andaWali

Nanggroe.ThepositionofWaliNanggroeisuniquetoAceh.InGAMthepositionwas

consideredtheheadofstate,buttheLOGAspecifiesthatitfunctionasasortofstewardof

indigenoustraditionsandthusisneitherapoliticalnorgovernmentalinstitution.

Interestingly,DPRAdraftqanunin2010politicizedWaliNanggoebystipulatingthatthe

positionwouldbeabletodissolvetheregionalparliament,setdatesforelections,dismiss

thegovernorfromoffice,signbusinesscontractswithforeigncompanies,establish

Acehneseconsulates,anddeterminefatwa(StangeandMissbauch2011).44

Belowtheprovinciallevel,Acehisorganizedintodistrictsandmunicipalities

(kabupaten/kota).Thislevelincludesbupatiandwalikota(districtandmunicipalityheads),

legislativebodies(DPRK,DewanPerwakilanRakyatKabupaten/Kota),andfirstinstance

courts.ThecompositionofdistrictlevelcourtshasincludedanumberofIslamicscholars

thatareforcedtotreadanarrowlineofIslamicjurisprudenceandadattraditioninregard

tolocalsensibilities(Bowen2003).Yet,fewpropertydisputesareelevatedtoeventhe

districtlevelasmostmediationoccursatthesub‐district,mukim,village,orneighborhood

level(InterviewKharil,Calang,May2007)(InterviewSeta,Calang,May2007).Atthesub‐

district(kecamatan)level,camat(sub‐districthead)andthesub‐districtsecretaryplaya

leadingrole,typicallywithoutastrongjudicialorlegislativepresence.Whiletheabove

provincialanddistrict/municipalitylevelsoftenhaverepresentativesofnationalagencies

likeBPNandMOF,atthesub‐districtlevelthecamatservesasamoremultifunctionoffice

thatdoesthingslikerecognizinglandtransfers.Indeed,thecamathasservedasthemain

notaryfortransfers,issuedsporadikwhichareatypeofletterusedasevidenceforclaim.

ThecamathasalsomaintainedpropertytransferrecordsthataredifferentfromthatofBPN

–addingtothecomplexityofdefiningcadastralrecordsforevennon‐tsunamiregions

(Fitzpatrick2008).

44Since2009,theAcehParty(formerGAMpoliticalparty)hasledtheDPRAtopassorattempttopassseveralqanunthatappeartobeemphasizetheperceivedfailureoftheLOGAtoimplementtheMOU,pushambiguitiesintheLOGA,andseemheadedtowardsmoreseparatistsentiment.Forexample,DPRAqanunNo.3/2013instatedtheformerGAMseparatistflagastheofficialflagofAcehandmayresultinSupremeCourthearings.

148

Belowthesub‐districtlevel,Acehhasanotheruniquegovernanceinstitutionincorporated

intothestate,themukim.Themukimisacollectionofthreetotenvillages(gampung)thatis

traditionallylocatedaroundamosqueandledbytheimeummukimandcommitteeofelders

(tuhapeutmukim).Themukimoverseesissueslikelandandresourceallocationand

customarylaw.Therehasbeensupportforincreasingthebindingnatureofproperty

mediationsanddecisionsmadeatthemukimlevel(Fitzpatrick2008).Atthegampung

level,thereareanarrayofrolestobeplayedincommitteerepresentationofthecommunity

throughtuhapeutandtuhalapan,buttheroleofgeuchik(villagehead)hasbeenattributed

morepowerinthelastfortyyearsrelativetovillagecommitteesduetoacombinationof(1)

legislationthatredefinedvillagecommitteemembership,(2)corruptioninresource

management,and(3)thedynamicsofconflictanddisaster(Barron2005;McCarthy2005a;

ACARP2007).Theroleoftheteungkuimuemmeunasah(gampungreligiousleader)has

recentlyseenanincreaseinauthority,thatintheoryparallelsthatofthegeucik.Aspartof

thetuhapeut(ofteninvolvedinreligiousandlandissues)ortuhalapan(ofteninvolvedin

developmentissues),villageeldersandleaderslikethevillagesecretary,religiousleader,

youthleader,orwomenleadermayplayaroleinresolvinglanddisputes.Beyondthese

governancepositions,someareashaveresourcegovernanceinstitutionsthatmanagea

specificterritorialspaceseparatelyorintandemwithothermorecommongovernance

institutions.Forexample,pepper(whichisledbytheketuaseuneubock)andmarinefishing

(whichisledbythepanglimalaot)aresoimportantthatspecificpositionsarisefor

managingpropertyanddisputeresolutioninparalleltovillagegovernance(McCarthy

2005a;ACARP2007).Inmanycases,propertydisputesareresolvedatthelocallevel

throughmusyawarah(consensusbuildingprocesses)ledbythegeuchikandimplicateor

arewitnessedbyseveralofthevillageleaders(Directobservation,AcehJaya,May2007).

Whilethelocallevelmeetingsareoftenpaperedoverasadat,theyreflecthighlydynamic

andcomplexbalancingofdifferenttypesofevidencelikelandreceipts(jual‐beli),oral

testimonies,andevenstatetitleswithprinciplesthatreflectthesocialfunctionofproperty

andideaofjusticeinindividualcommunities(Directobservation,AcehJaya,May2007;

Bowen2003).Whenpartiesareunabletoresolveanissue,thecasemightescalatetothe

camatandthenhighercourtorterritorialgovernancelevels.

149

Althoughthereisacurrenttrendofformalizationofreligiouscourtsathigherlevels,ulama

(thecollectionoflocalreligiousleaders)oftenplayformativerolesinlocal,informal

meetingsfordeterminingtheoutcomesofpropertydisputes–applyingprinciplesdrawn

fromhukum(law,value,consequences),fique(interpretation),andsharia(hadithsbased

action)(Bowen2003;Harper2006).SeveralstudiesfundedbytheInternational

DevelopmentandLawOrganization(IDLO)pointtothecentralroleofIslamiccourtsand

principlesininheritance,conveyance,classificationofpropertyasgifts(e.g.,wakaf),45

adjudication,andotheraspectsofpropertymanagement(LindseyandPhillips2005;

Harper2006).TheemerginginstitutionalizationofIslamicjurisprudenceincourtsparallel

tothestatecourtsandintegrationofIslamicprinciplesintoadatwasnotedbeforeand

acceleratedafterthetsunami(Bowen2003;Harper2006;LindseyandPhillips2005).In

fact,AcehisoftensaidtohavetheoldestIslamicheritageofanyregioninIndonesia.Islam

playedacomplexroleintheconflictandcontinuestobeacentralissueinAcehnese

identity,Aceh’scivilsociety,andregionalgovernance(Schulze2004;Reid2006).46

5.2.2SCALARPOLITICSANDPROPERTY

Fromageographicperspective,presentingAcehneseauthoritiesandgovernancestructures

asahierarchicalscaleoflayersofnestedspaceenvelopesissomewhatproblematic.Scaleis

acomplexandcontestedconceptthathascometobethefocusofsomeofthecoredebates

ingeography.Infact,geographersareoftenatthecenterofacademicdebatesoverhow

scaleshouldbethoughtofandresearched,andwhetherscaleevenexists(Taylor1982;

Smith1984,1988,1992;Jonas1994;Agnew1997;DelaneyandLeitner1997;Swyngedouw

1997;Cox1998;Morrill1999;Marston2000;Brenner2001;Purcell2003;Mansfield2005;

Marstonetal.2005;LeitnerandMiller2007;Moore2008;Herod2011;MacKinnon2011).

45Wakaf(commonlywrittenaswaqf)isatypeofinalienablereligiousendowmentmeanttosupportIslamicworkshop.Ittypicallyconsistsofpropertyormoney.

46AsthepurportedplaceofintroductionofIslamtoSoutheastAsia,AcehissometimescalledtheVerandahofMecca.AcehhasbeenthehosttoanumberofarmeduprisingsandpoliticalgroupsthattookasthecoregoaltheimplementationofIslamicgovernanceinIndonesiaorwithinaseparateAcehnesestate(Reid2006).

150

Scaleandpropertyissuesarecloselyinterlinked–bothintermsofunderstandingauthority

(Sikor2004)andinunderstandingthewaysinwhichpoliticsintersectswithenvironmental

governance(Giordarno2003;Mansfield2004;McCarthy2005b).Cox(2013)recentlynoted

thatscalarpoliticsarecentraltoterritorialorganizationofauthority.Thatterritorial

organizationreliesonthefactthatscalesaresociallyconstructedthroughthediscursive

andmaterialpracticesofpropertyand,inturn,propertyisconstitutedthroughscalar

processes.

Ingeography,scalehas“atleasttwoverydifferentmeanings”–onethatistechnicaland

anotherthatreferstohumanperceptionsofthesizeandlevelofprocessesandphenomena

(Herod2011,xi).Thislattertypeofscaleisinnatelysubjective,relational,andfluid(Howitt

1998,2002).Recentdebatesoverscaledivideadvocatesofa‘humangeographywithout

scale’fromthosewhowouldkeepscaleasavaluableanalyticalcategory(Marstonetal

2005;Jonas2006;LeitnerandMiller2007;Moore2008).Marstonetal.(2005)arguethat

theconceptofscalehasbecomeaconfused,overburdenedconceptwithinhuman

geography–thatthedominantunderstandingsofscaleasaverticalhierarchyconfounds

sizeandlevel,createsdichotomousthinkingaboutscaleslikethelocal‐globalandmicro‐

macro,providesa‘scaffoldimaginary’intowhichresearchersassumepre‐givenscalar

architectures,andleadstoposturedobjectivityinsocialscienceresearch.Theyproposethat

itistimetoabandon‘scale’inordertoadoptnetworkapproachesthatprivilege‘sites’and

betterreflectthetruenatureofsocialrelations.

ManyauthorshaveeithertakenissuewiththelogicofMarstonetal.(2005)oraccepttheir

argumentsbutrejectthepropositionofjettisoningscalebecausesitesandnetworksdonot

capturescalarpracticesorpopularimaginariesofscale.Thesescholarscallforreorienting

researchtowardsthepoliticalandsocialprocessesthroughwhichscalesareconstituted

(Moore2008;Herod2011;MacKinnon2011).Forexample,Jonas(2006,404)arguesthat,

so‐called “scalists” […]are responding to thechallengeofnarrativeanddeployingscalarcategories inways thatattempt toshowhowparticularmaterial structuresandprocesseshavebecome fixedat or around certain sites and scales, are in theprocessofbecomingunfixedataspecificscale,orcombinetodifferentiatetheworldincomplexscalarandsite‐specificdimensions.

151

Moore(2008)arguesthatthemainproblemisnotwithscale,butwithgeographers’failure

todifferentiatebetweenscaleaspracticeandscaleasanalyticalorontologicalcategory.

Investigatingscalarpracticesandhowscalesareimagined(inmuchthesamewaythat

ethnicitiesandnationsareimagined)revealstheimportanceofcontinuingtofocusonscale

discourseswhetherornotscaleexists(Moore2008).MacKinnon(2011,29)arguesthata

focusonscalarpoliticsshouldexaminethe“scalaraspectsandrepercussions”ofpolitical

projectsand“thestrategicdeploymentofscalebyvariousactors,organizationsand

movements”(2011,29).Hearguesagainstperceivingscalesasterritorialcontainersor

‘spaceenvelopes’thatgainorlosepowerthroughprocesseslike‘rescaling’thestateorby

servingasplatformsforthepoliticsof‘jumpingscales.’Similarly,Mansfield(2005)argues

weshouldanalyzescalesasvariabledimensionsofpolitical,social,cultural,economic,and

ecologicalprocesses.

Linksbetweenpropertyandscalefeatureingeographicresearchontopicslike

environmentalgovernance,sovereignty,andnaturalresourcemanagement(Giordano

2003;Liverman2004;McCarthy2005b).Suchworkengageswithinterestingtheoretical

constructsregardingsocialpowerandcanrevealhowpropertyrelationsaredistributed

overdifferentlevelsofgovernance.However,itisrarethatscalarprocessesaregiven

priorityoverscalelevels(McKinnon2010).Theseapproachestendtoframeproperty

conflictsasoccurringbetweenfixedscalessuchasthecommunityversusthenation‐stateor

localactorsversusglobalactors,ratherthananalyzingthefluidprocessesthatworkata

scaleandbetweenscales(Smith1992;McCarthy2005b).Awell‐developedliterature

challengestheprioritizationandsimplejuxtapositionofspecificscalesofgovernance

(Swyngedow1997;Martin1999;Morrill1999).Itemphasizesthesocialconstructionof

scale(Marston2000)andthenetworked,reciprocalprocessesthroughwhichsocialand

physicaltransformationoftheworldbecomesembeddedinscalarspatialities

(Swyngedouw1997).Aswell,scalarprocessesareattheforefront,propertyisrarely

featuredasmorethanabundledofrightsintheseanalyses–evenwhentheculturaland

emotionalconnectionstomaterialresourcesarediscussedasethicalgroundsformaking

152

propertyclaimsandareseeninsomewaystosociospatiallyconstitutethenatureofa

‘community’(Moore2005).

Oneexampleofastudythatsetsouttoexplorepropertyrelationswithinascalar

frameworkisSikor’s(2004)studyof‘post‐socialist’landreformsinruralVietnam.Drawing

fromGluckman’s(1972)workonBarotsejurisprudenceandVerdery’s(1999)ideasabout

‘post‐socialist’fuzzyproperty,Sikoroutlinesaframeworkforexaminingchanging

obligationsandrightsinthecontextofstate‐ledchangestopropertyrelations.These

changesstemmedfroma1993landlawthatrequired‘landallocation’(demarcationof

plots,registration,andissuanceoftitlecertificates)thatconflictedwithexistingproperty

relations.47Hearguesthatthelandallocationprocessembodieda‘post‐socialist,’neoliberal

ideaofpropertythaterasedthecomplexityofoverlappingtemporalandspatialrightsand

destroyedthesocialembeddednessofexistingpropertyrelations.Gluckman’s(1972)

frameworkisusedtoshowhowinacquiringpropertyrights,right‐holderssimultaneously

acquireanumberofsocialobligationsthatbindthemmorallytotheircommunityandtothe

socialauthoritythatrecognizesandenforcestheirrights–ahierarchyofscalesof

overlappingestates.48

Gluckmanusestheterm‘estates’todescribeacomplexofrightsandobligations(Gluckman

1972,90).Brieflysummarized,Gluckmantheorizesthatpropertyembodiesahierarchyof

overlappingestates(Sikor2004,77).Therearetwotypesofestates–an‘estateof

administration’and‘estateofproduction’,eachincludingseveraldifferenttypesofrights

andobligations.Theestateofadministrationinvolves“actionsastrusteesonbehalfof

subordinatesbyseniors,thepowerandobligationtoapportionlandamongsubordinates,

andtosomeextentpowerstoregulatetheuseoftheland”(Gluckman1972,89‐90).An47Sikorusestheterms‘landrelations’and‘propertyrelations’interchangeably.

48Taxes,giftsofwildgame,portionsofharvests,orothertransfersmaybepropertyrights‐holder’sobligationstomaintaintheirright.Otherpartieshaveadutytorespecttherightuntiltheright‐holderdoesnotfulfillhisorherobligations.InGluckman’s(1972,89‐93)framework,whiletheright‐holderhasobligations,theauthorityhasadutynottopre‐emptpeople’srightswithoutgoodcauseanditsownobligationtoprovidefor/adjudicateclaimsofcommunitymembers.

153

estateofadministrationcanbesubdividedintofurtherestatesofadministrationorinto

estatesofproduction.Theestateofproductionreferstodifferentcomplexesofusufruct

rights.Theseestatescanbeseenas“’nestedlayersofcontroloverland’or‘a‘hierarchy’in

thesenseofa‘seriesofestates’”(Sikor2004,77).49Thoughthisframeworkisproposedasa

hierarchyofsocialstatus,thedividebetweenestatesofadministrationandproduction

parallelscommoncontemporaryapproachestopropertythatdesignatetherightoftransfer

and“rightstoregulate,supervise,representinoutsiderelations,andallocateproperty”as

superiorrightstotherightstouseorexploitresources(Benda‐Beckmannetal.2006b,17).

BuildinguponGluckman’sframework,Sikormakessomestimulatinginsightsabout

propertyinrelationtoauthorityandscaleinthecontextof‘post‐socialist’changeinrural

Vietnam.First,inregardtothe1993landlaw,hedescribesasituationinwhichall

resourcesandpropertyrelationshavebeensubsumedunderadiscourseoflandlaw.50

Second,the1993landlawterritorializesallresources,renderingthecomplexandflexible

relationsregardingresourcesintoabounded,staticlandparcels.Thesocialistandpre‐

socialistframeworksallowedfluidandfuzzygeographicboundariesandasituation

wherein,“Propertyclaimscanrelatetodifferentresourcesonthesamepieceofland,they

canvaryovertime,andtheymaybeembeddedinaseriesofallocationsincludingmultiple

claims”(Sikor2004,78).51Third,thebalanceofpowerbetweenvariousholdersofestates

49Whiletheestatesofproductioncanbeconcurrentandoverlapping,theyalwaysoccurassubsidiarytotheestatesofadministration.Whetheroneholdsaprimary,secondary,ortertiaryestateofadministrationdependsonone’slocationonscalesofsocialorpoliticalstatus–akingholdsaprimaryestate,chiefsholdsecondaryestates,householdsholdtertiaryestates,andsoon.Similartofeudalsystems,holdersoflowerestatesmayhaveobligationstogivesuperiorestateholderspartoftheirharvestorhunt,butunlikefeudaltenuresystemstheholdersofprimaryestateshaveobligationstoprovidelandforpeoplewhoarepartofvillageswithintheirrealmofauthority(Gluckman1972).

50Inthiscase,propertyrelationsregardingallresources(forest,water,andotherwise)havebeentreatedasiftheywerelandorpermanentlyconnectedtolandparcels.Thiseffectivelyrendersallresourcesintofixturesandnegatesanysortoffluidityofresources.

51MuchlikeRocheleauandEdmunds’(1997)argumentregardingtheflexibilityofrightsandtheflexibledeploymentofstrategiestoaccessresourcesingenderedtenuresystemsinWestAfrica,thisrejectionofthecomplexityofexistingpropertyrelationsthroughsimplifiedmodelsofownershipthatarelaterrenderedintocapitalistrelationsisclearexampleofterritorializationandamirrorof

154

ofadministrationandestatesofproductiontendstoleanmoretowardsholdersofestatesof

administrationaslandscarcityincreases.Thisfinalinsightrevealshowthedistributionof

rights,duties,andobligationshasanimpactonhowscalesarepoliticallyconstitutedand

thatpropertyrelationschangeinresponsetosocietalandecologicalcontexts.

Sikorarguesthatlocallandrelationsaremulti‐layered,socially‐embedded,spatiallyfluid,

boundtostrongobligations,legitimizedthroughmoralandsocialgoals,andflexibleenough

toallowdynamicdistributionofpowersbetweenscalelevels.Thisisincomparisontothe

1993legislationwhichcreatespropertythatonlyhasadualhierarchy(individualand

state),isdetachedfromsocialstatus,islegitimizedonlythroughformallegalprocedures,

hasrigidspatialboundaries,hasweakobligations,andcreatesasituationwhereinthe

balanceofpowerisfixedandinflexibletolocalecologicalconstraintsandsocietalneeds.

Sikor’sapproachtendstoreifysociopoliticalscalesasfixedlevelsfromwhichpoweris

negotiatedratherthanfocusonscaleprocessesthatareenactedthroughthesociospatial

aspectsofpropertyrelations.Nevertheless,hisstudyunderscorestheimportanceof

investigatingpropertywithinscalarprocessesandmayhelpexplainwhyparticular

statutorylandtitlingprogramssucceedorfail.

Asshownabove,literatureonscalingpropertytendstorestrictversionsofpropertyto

bundlesofrightsortoreifyversionsofscaleasfixedlevelsof‘spaceenvelopes.’Thefocusis

oftenonthedistributionofpropertyrightsbetweenpredefinedlevelssuchasthe

individual,community,province,andnation‐state.However,morecomprehensive

frameworkstoapproachingproperty,scale,andauthorityareneededandpossible(Benda‐

Beckmannetal.2006b).

5.2.3JURALRELATIONS

dispossessionpracticesthathavebeendeployedonindigenouscommunitiesthroughoutcolonialhistories(VandergeestandPeluso1995;Blomley2003b;Harris2004).

155

Hohfeld’s(1913,1917)frameworkofjuralrelationsandSinger’s(2000)ideasregarding

rightsandobligationsinpropertyprovideanalternativeapproachtounderstanding

propertyandscalarpolitics.Hohfeldarguesthatabuseoftheterm‘rights’andconfusion

over‘property’inlegalandpoliticaldiscoursesmustbeclarifiedtofacilitateclearjudicial

reasoning.Hepointsoutthatpropertyisaconfusedconcept,“…withlawyersandwith

laymenthistermhasnodefiniteorstableconnotation.Sometimesitisemployedtoindicate

thephysicalobjecttowhichvariouslegalrights,privileges,etc.,relate;thenagain‐withfar

greaterdiscriminationandaccuracy‐thewordisusedtodenotethelegalinterest”(1913,

21).Hohfeldarguesthattheterm‘right’shouldbelimitedtoanarrowcorrelationwithduty

becauseitisoftenconfusedwithpropertyandotherlegalconcepts.

Hohfeld(1913)outlineseightconceptsthatconstitutepropertyincludingrights,duties,

privileges,no‐rights,disabilities,liabilities,immunities,andpower.InTable4.2,theseeight

legalconceptsarelistedastermsinthetwocolumnsnamed‘Elements’and‘Correlatives’.52

Correlativesmustexistinorderfortheelementstoexist;thusthefourjuralrelationscanbe

understoodbysubstitutingthetermsfromtherespectivecolumnsfortheunderlinedwords

inthefollowingsentence:‘ifAhasanelement,thenBhasacorrelative’.IfAhasaright,then

Bhasadutytorespectthatright.Indeed,A’srightdoesnotexistwithoutB’scorrelated

duty.

52HohfeldalsooffersanoverviewofoppositestotheelementsthatIdonotutilizeinthisanalysis,butwhichcouldprovideadditionalinsights.

156

Table5.2Hohfeld'sJuralCorrelatives(adaptedfromHohfeld1913,710)53Elements CorrelativesRight(Claim) DutyPrivilege(Liberty)54 No‐RightPower LiabilityImmunity Disability

Inthefirstjuralrelation,rightsrefertoonlysocially‐enforcedclaims.Recognitionofaright

foraright‐holdernecessarilyentailstheenforcementofadutyonothers(Hohfeld1913,

1917;Bromley1991;Singer2000).“Dutiesrefertotheabsenceofpermissiontoactina

certainmanner”(Singer2000,132).Oneofthegreatesthindrancestounderstandingand

solvinglegalproblems“frequentlyarisesfromtheexpressortacitassumptionthatalllegal

relationsmaybereducedto‘rights’and‘duties,’andthattheselattercategoriesare

thereforeadequateforthepurposeofanalyzingeventhemostcomplexlegalinterest”

(Hohfeld1913,28).Inthesecondjuralrelation,aprivilegeisalibertythatcorrelateswitha

situationofno‐rights(Munzer1990).Situationswhereineveryonehaslibertiesbutnoone

hasdefinedrightsordutiesaresometimesdefinedasopenaccessregimes.Ifpropertyis

definedonlyasabundleofrights,thenwemightfollowBromley(1991)andlabelsuch

openaccessregimesas‘non‐property’regimes.Or,wecouldrecognizethateveninthe

absenceofrights,thereisapropertyrelation–onebetweenprivilegeandno‐rights.Inthe

thirdjuralrelationofpowerandliabilitywemovebeyondrights,privileges,anddutiesto

explorewhohastheabilitytocreatenewrulesorpromotesocialenforcementofdifferent

propertyrelations.Power,forHohfeld(1913),istheabilityofonepartytochangeproperty

53Hohfeld’sframeworkalsostipulatesasetof“JuralOpposites”whicharetwolegalconceptsorpositionsthatcannotexisttogether.WhileusefulforunderstandingHohfeld’sframework,thejuraloppositesproveoflessinterestforanalyticalpurposesinthisdissertationsotheyarenotpresentedhere.

54Legalscholarssometimescallprivilegea‘liberty‐right’andHohfeld’srighta‘claim‐right,’yetsuchchangestothewordingdilutetheclarityandanalyticalvalueofHohfeld’sframeworkandhisargumentconcerningrights.

157

relations.55Thefourthjuralrelationofimmunityanddisabilitycanalsobeappliedtothis

openaccessregime.Immunityexemptsapartyfromtheexerciseofpowerofanotherparty.

Therefore,ifAhasimmunity,thenBhasnopower(Bhasadisability)inregardtotheA’s

propertyrelations.

Onemightaddthatafifthrelationoccursbetweenrightsandobligations(Singer2000;

Verdery2004).AspointedoutinGluckman’sframework,right‐holdersalwayshave

obligationstothesocialcommunityandauthoritythatguaranteeentitlementoftheirclaim.

TheseobligationsaredifferentfromHohfeld’sdutiesinthat,ratherthanaduty‐holder

respectingaright,theright‐holdersthemselvesareencumberedbytheseobligations.The

term‘obligation’isuseddifferentlyfromdutiesandislargelysynonymouswithwhat

Munzer(1990)calls‘disadvantages’.Thesedisadvantagesmightbeoutlinedinstatutory

lawasobligationstoauthority(liketaxes)orobligationstootherpropertyholders(as

limitsinnuisancelaw).Aswell,theymaybestatutorily‐definedasrisksandfinancial

obligationssuchasdebtsandliabilities(Verdery2004).Yet,theseobligationsalsocome

fromnon‐statutoryauthoritiesintheformofsocialnormsandinstitutionsconcerning

property(Singer2000).

Singer(2000)outlinestheobligationsofpropertyentitlementsinaconvincingargument

againstusingthe‘ownershipmodel’ofpropertyforpolicyandlegaldecisions.Heargues

thatthereare“multiplemodelsofproperty”withinanyonesocietyorsinglelegalsystem

andthatthesemodelsaredeployedindifferentsocialandlegalcontexts(Singer2000,

86).56Whiletheownershipmodelfocusesontherelationbetweenownersandthingsand

55Inthisrespect,Hohfeld’slegalideaofpowerissimilartowhatLukes(2005)callstwodimensionalpower,atypeofpowerthatisexercisedtochangeinstitutionalstructuresandnotthesameasonedimensionalpowerthatismeasuredbyinstitutionaloutcomes.Hohfeld’sideaofpowerisnotasophisticatedsocialtheoryofpowerlikeLukes’ideathatathirddimensionofpowerexistswhereinthemodalitiesandtechniquesofpowerareintegratedintothebehaviorandpreferencesofsubjects(muchlikeFoucault’sversionofpower).Hohfeld’spowerissimplyaboutalegalpowertochangelegalrelations,butifsocialtheoryonpowercanbeusedtoexpandHohfeld’sframeworktherewouldcertainlybefruitfuloutcomes.

56Bybuildingfroma‘nuisance’modelofproperty(whereinpropertyrightsarelimitedbynuisancelaws),Singerderivesan‘entitlementmodel’ofpropertythatisopposedtothedominantpolitical

158

ownersandthestate,an‘entitlementmodel’refocusesattentiononthe“interrelations

betweenthestateanditscitizens,amongownersandbetweenownersandnon‐owners”

(Singer2000,92).Inbrief,complexsetsofobligationstoanauthorityandmembersofone’s

socialcommunityareinherenttopropertyitself.Inthefollowingcasestudies,Iuse

Hohfeld’sandSinger’sideastoanalyzehowscalarpolitics,propertyrelations,andauthority

interactinapost‐conflict,post‐disasterlandtitlingprojectinAceh.

5.3STAKINGCLAIMSONTHEGROUND

ThestatedgoaloftheRALASprojectwastoimprovelandtenuresecurityinAcehby(1)

recoveringandprotectinglandownershiprightsofthepeopleintsunamiaffectedand

surroundingareasand(2)rebuildingthelandadministrationsystem(Deutsch2009).Yet,

justificationfortheprojectbytheWorldBank,theGOI,andBRRandBPNstaffreferrednot

onlytopost‐tsunamidamageitdrewfromseveralothernarratives.Thesesources

emphasizedRALASasaprototypemodelofdeSoto’s(2000)neoliberalstrategyof

implementingWesternstyleprivatepropertysystemstounlockwhathecalls‘deadcapital’

buttheprojectadvocatesgentlyrecastitas‘substantialdormantcapital’(Bretecheand

Steer2006,online)inthedisastercontextofAceh(BRR2005;Bell2006).Reportsfromthe

WorldBankoffermixedevaluationsoftheresultsofRALAS–sometimesoptimistically

statingthatRALASaccomplisheditsprimarygoalofsupportingtenuresecurity(WB2010),

butthengivetheentireproject“mostlyunsatisfactory”to“moderatelyunsatisfactory”

ratingsonachievingtargetoutcomesandimplementation–pointingtodetailslikeerrors

ontitlecertificates,failuretoeducatenearly70%ofrecipientsonhowtoregister

subsequenttransactions,corruptionofBPNofficialschargingforfreetitles,failureto

imaginationofanownershipmodel.Hisentitlementmodelisbasedontheobservationthatthereare(1)multipleownerswithdisaggregatedrights,(2)conflictingrightsandtheneedforjudgment,(3)changingconditionsthatwarrantchangesinrightsovertime,(4)boundariesthatarerelevantbutnotdeterminativeorrights,(5)propertyrightsarelimitedbyotherlegitimaterights(onecannotcommitharmtoothersundertheexcuseofpropertyrights),(6)relationshipsbetweenownersandbetweenownersandnon‐ownersmatter,and(7)attentiontothetensionatthecoreofproperty–betweenharmfulbutlegitimateusesofpropertyandconflictingsocialinterests.

159

adequatelyidentifydisputesoverlandcompensationinadjudication,unfinishedtitlingof

someareas,andfailuretodistributeapprovedtitles(Deutsch2009;WB2010).Oftenthe

supporttowomenthroughjointtitling,orderlytransitionoforphans’inheritanceinto

guardianship,trainingoffacilitators,andinfrastructuralimprovementstoBPNofficesare

mentionedasthemainpositivemeasurableoutcomes(Deutsch2009;WB2010).57

Nevertheless,RALASfellfarshortofitsquantitativegoalofregisteringpropertyandissuing

titles,completingonly37%of600,000landparcels(WB2010).Themanagement,

intentions,andlogicunderlyingRALASwereopenlyquestionedbycivilsocietyandUN

agencystaffininterviewsconductedforthisresearch.BPNstaff,civilsocietyorganizations,

andinternationaldonorsoftenidentifiedbureaucraticproblemsasthemainhurdlesto

successfulimplementation(Jaliletal.2007;InterviewBPNStaff,Calang,February2008;

Deutsch2009;WB2010).Yet,politicsandgovernanceissuesinpost‐conflictproperty

managementcannotbeignored.Thecasesbelowdocumentlocalexperiencesand

impressionsofRALASthatshowthecomplexwaysinwhichscalarpoliticsandproperty

relationsinteract.

5.3.1MEULABOHNEIGHBORHOOD

Meulaboh,thecapitalofthekabupaten(districtorregency)ofAcehBarat,wastheclosest

citytotheepicentreofthe2004earthquakeandlostsome40,000peopleinthetsunami.

Abouttwokilometersfromthecenterofthecity,thetsunamidestroyedmostofaperi‐

urbanneighborhoodofmixedresidentialandcommercialbuildingssurroundedby

farmland.ThisneighborhoodwaschosenasoneoftheRALASprojectareasandunderwent

landtitlingactivitiesduring2006‐2007.InterviewswereheldinFebruary,May,andJune

2008.

57Thoughearlyreportsweredismalwithonly5%ofalltitlesgoingtowomen(Fitzpatrick2008),aWorldBankprojectreviewfoundanamazingincreaseto45%ofalltitlesgoingtowomenbythetimeRALASended.Despitethedramaticincrease,“Manyobstacleswereexperiencedregardingwomen’sparticipationinthetitlingprocess,including(a)insufficientrepresentationofwomeninfieldteams;(b)meetingplacesandtimesthatwereofteninconvenienttowomenwhohadtocareforfamilymembers;(c)presentationsinBahasaratherthaninthelocalAcehneselanguage;and(d)nomeetingswereheldexclusivelyforwomen”(WB2010,21).

160

TheRALASapproachtolandtitlingisoutlinedintheRALASManual(theManualofLand

RegistrationintheAffectedTsunamiAreasatNanggroeAcehDarussalamandSumatraUtara:

ReconstructionoftheAcehLandAdministrationSystem)(BPNandBRR2005).BRRandBPN

decidedonprioritylocationsfortitlingactivities–though,theyoftendidnotprovide

adequateexplanationastothecriteriausedforselectiontopartnersorcommunities

(Deutsch2009,53‐54).Beyondsiteselection,RALASincludedthreephasesof

implementation.PhaseIestablishedpropertyrightsusingparticipatoryprocesses

(communitylandmapping,communitydrivenadjudicationforagreementonlandparcels

andownership,andcompletionofrequiredformsforapplication).PhaseIIconfirmed

propertyrights(officialsurveyoflandparcels,reviewofthedocumentsreceivedbyfield

adjudicationteams,committeemeetings,publicnotification,receiptandresolutionof

objectives,andconfirmationofstatusofthelandparcels).PhaseIIIsecuredpropertyrights

(enteringtitlesintocadastres,confirmationandsignatureofrecordsbydistrictlandoffice,

anddistributionoftitlecertificatestolandholders)(Deutsch2009,13;WB2010,15‐16).

TheNGOLandForumconstitutedin2005andmentionedthroughouttheRALASManual,

wasmeanttoprovideinputineachphase–specifically,steeringRALASactivities,

disseminatingeducationalmaterials,andcoordinatinglandmappingledbyNGOsand

INGOs.

Howeverbylate2006,thefeelingonthegroundwasthatBPNhadalready“stopped

consultingitspartnersinanymeaningfulway”(InterviewUNHABITAT,BandaAceh,August

2006).Asaresult,mostcommunitymembersintheMeulabohneighborhoodfeltill‐

informedaboutRALASandthespecificsofwhattodowhenproblemsregardingtitling

arose(InterviewHadi,Meulaboh,June2008).Indeed,alargersurveyofRALASarea

landownersacrosstheprovincefoundthat70%oflandownersdidnotgetinformationon

howtoregistersubsequenttransactions,over60%receivednoinformationonwhattodoif

errorsinthefinaltitlewerepresent,andlessthan50%actuallyunderstoodthetypesof

landthatcouldberegisteredthroughRALAS(Deutsch2009).Accordingtoprojectreports,

BPNhadafundamentalcommunicationfailurewiththepublic(Deutsch2009,21‐23),did

notconsultwithcamatorgeuchik(Deutsch2009,53‐54),and“neverengagedadequately

161

withotherstakeholdersparticularlyINGOsandNGOs”beforeorduringthethreephasesof

systematictitlingimplementation(WB2010,58).

WhilethereceptionofRALASinthisperi‐urbanneighborhoodwasoverwhelmingly

positiveatthebeginningoftheprocess,by2008criticismswerebeingvocalized:“ithas

been16monthssincethey[BPNstaff]firstcameandmanymonthssincetheyjust

disappeared…me,Ihavenotitletomylandbuttheyputmynameontheboard.Why?”

(InterviewHadi,Meulaboh,June2008).Atthetimeofinterviews,evidenceindicatedthat

theMeulabohneighborhoodhadundergoneconfirmingpropertyrights(PhaseI)and

securingpropertyrights(PhaseII)activities.However,severalcommunitymembers

expressedfrustrationthattheyhadnotbeenissuedlandtitles–inotherwords,PhaseIII

waseithernotbeingimplementedorappearedtohavebeenimplementedinapartial

mannerthatunderminedthesecurityoftheverypropertyrightsthatRALASwasmeantto

solidifyand‘reconstruct’(InterviewHadi,Meulaboh,June2008;InterviewThayeb,

Meulaboh,June2008;InterviewWening,Meulaboh,February2008).

Thisdelaycausedsomelocalstotakemattersintheirownhands.Forexample,most

buildingsthatwerestillstandingintheneighborhoodafterthetsunamineededtobetorn

downandrebuiltduetoinfrastructuraldamage.Yet,therewasuncertaintyastowhether

localswouldbeapprovedforfundingviatsunami‐aidiftheyknockeddowntheirown

buildings.Onelocalentrepreneurwhoendedupspendingsavingsandborrowedmoneyto

reinforcehisdamagedbuildingcomplainedthat“Itwouldbebetterifthewavetook

everythingthennoonecantellmetokeepabadbuilding”(InterviewThayeb,Meulaboh,

June2008).Forthosethatwereworriedaboutthelackoffinancialaidfortheirparticular

situation,statesupportedtitleswereimportantstepstowardsobtainingclearclaimon

propertyandobtainingfinancingtorebuild.Yetthosetitleswerelongincomingdueto

whattheBPNdistrictofficeconsistentlyreportedas“problemsinJakarta”wheretheysaid

theysenttheoriginaldocumentsandmappingforapproval(InterviewThayeb,Meulaboh,

June2008).Thesameentrepreneursaidthat,“Inthisneighborhood,everyonewantsto

havecertificate[title]sothattheycanstarttobuildtheirstoresagainwithnoproblem…

Buthowcanwewaitforever?”

162

Tothesurpriseofmany,BPNofficialsneitherdistributedtitlesinthefieldnorinformed

peopletoobtaintheirtitleswhentitleswereleftatthekantahoffices.Inaddition,many

BPNstafffeltthatRALASwasacentralgovernmentprojectthattheywerenotnecessarily

involvedinimplementingormanaging(Fitzpatrick2008;Deutsch2009;WB2010).BPN

staffarguedthattheproblemswithRALASstemfromproblemswithMDTFfinanceflows

andthelackofapresidentialdecreetorelieveindividualBPNstaffoftheirliabilityfor

incorrectregistrationinformation–adecreethatwasdeliveredonlyinSeptember2007

(InterviewBPNStaff,Calang,February2008).58Furthercomplicationsoccurredwhen

buildingswererebuiltinfloodzonesanddamagedbyminorfloodingandearthquakes

severalyearsafterthetsunami.ItwasunclearifBPNoranygovernmentagencyheld

furtherobligationtomoveandrebuildthesefamiliesagain(seeFigure5.2).

Althoughmanycommunitymembersdidnotobtaintitles,otherswereissuedtitlesandthis

partialtitlingledtounintendedconsequences.Twofruitvendorsthatrecountedworking

onaparticularstreetcornerbeforethetsunami,suddenlyfoundthattheirlocationofwork

wastitledtotheJakartarelativesofadeceased,local,previousowner(seeFigure5.1).The

Jakartarelativesinsistedonpaymentforuseofthelandandthefruitvendorswere

contemplatingshuttingdowntheirshopsormovingtonewlocations(InterviewHadi,

Meulaboh,June2008;InterviewRamli,Meulaboh,June2008).Whiletheclaimtothe

originallandwasvalidinthevendors’eyes,itwasthenewtermsofagreementthatwere

unjust.Theagreementwiththepreviousownertousethespaceinexchangefora

percentageofprofitsratherthanamonthlyfeebecamethestickingpoint.Onementioned

thatthedeceasedownerhadevenletthevendoraggregatepaymentsoverseveralmonths

orpayoffinproductsratherthemoney.Thislossofflexibleuseagreementsatthe

58“PresidentialDecree(PeraturanPenggantiUndang‐Undang–PerPu)wasissuedinSeptember2007.Itisawide‐rangingregulationwithmainprovisionsfocusingon:(a)landthatwasdestroyedorlostbytsunamiorearthquake;(b)landaffectedbytsunamiorearthquakethatstillexists;(c)managingthepropertyforwhichthereisnoclaimantorowneratpresent;(d)specificprocedurestocoverlandacquiredforreconstructionandrehabilitationpurposes;(e)prohibitionontransferoflandparcelsbeforethestatusisdetermined:(f)bankrecordsasevidenceofownership,dealingswiththeaccountsofdeceasedcustomers,decisionsonmortgageanddebtandtheBank’srighttoreplacementdocumentsformortgagedland;(g)inheritanceandguardianship;and(h)penaltiesforincorrectstatements”(WB2010,38).

163

Figure5.1FruitstandinMeulaboh.Source:author.

Figure5.2Newbuildingsdestroyedbyfloodingin2007inMeulaboh.Source:author.

164

communitylevel,impactedtraders’livelihoodstrategiesbycreatingfixedcostsand

paymentmethodsthatmayhavebeenundulyhard.Thefruitvendorsplannedtoclosetheir

shopgiventhenewarrangement.RALASfocusedonissuinghakmilikownershiprights,as

theseweretypicallyclosesttothehakmilikadatstatusofmostoftheland.However,direct

conversionofsociallyembeddedpropertyfrominformaltostatutorylegalstructurescan

resultinthenegationofexistingsocialfunctionsofpropertyandresultintenureinsecurity

forabroadarrayofpropertyrelationsoutsideofthenarrowstatutorystructure.Infact,the

focusonhakmilikatthesacrificeofotherpropertyrightsandrelationsledtoserious

grievancesamongrentersandsquatterswhowereleftoutoftheoriginalplanningaround

propertyrights.AstheytookpartinprotestsagainstBRRduring2006‐2007(Direct

Observation,BandaAceh,August2006),theirissuesbecamewidelyrecognizedparticularly

throughOxfam’slargeradvocacyforpropertyrightsinAceh(Kennyetal.2006)

Asmentionedabove,suchsituationsofpartialtitlingandpartialrightrecognitionwerenot

uncommoninAcehattheendofRALASin2009.Some90,000landparcelswereleft

withoutpropertyrightssecuredeventhoughtheyhadgonethrougheithercommunityland

mappingprocessesorhadbeenconfirmedthroughofficialsurveyandpublicnotification

(WB2010).Whiletheseparcelswithouttitleswereoftenexplainedasbureaucratic

problemsandcommunityleveldisputes,Fitzpatrick(2008)noticedthatalargeamount

(possiblyupwardsof1outofevery30)oftheparcelsinAcehhadbeenregisteredtoan

unknown“Mr.X”duetoBPNstaffgettingpaidbythenumberofparcelsregisteredand

wantingtoavoidlegalliabilityincaseofdisputes.Whensurveyingthelandscapeof

ownershipintheneighborhood,onelocalwithanuntitledclaimcommentedthatanother

neighbor“hasfour[title]certificatesbutIhavenone.Igavethelandpurchasereceipts[akte

jual‐beli]andsignedmynamethesameashim,butthenBPNleftandIstillhavenothing”

(InterviewMahmud,Meulaboh,June2008).Anotherinformantpointedout,thatMahmud’s

purchaseofthepropertywasdisputedbyaMedanrelativeoftheprevious,deceasedowner

asthepurchaseoccurredjustweeksbeforethetsunamiandtheysaidtheywereunawareof

thesaleorBPNrecordsindicatingthesale.Whilefearsthatdisputesregardinginheritance

wouldoverwhelmthejudicialsystemwerevalidatedinsomecontexts,themaindisputes

mentionedbyintervieweesinthisMeulabohneighbourhoodinvolveddistantrelatives

165

makingclaimsthatwentagainstsomeinformalpropertyrelationsandunregistered

transactionsatthelocallevel.

5.3.2PANGAVILLAGE

IssuessurroundingpropertyinMeulabohwerequitedifferentfromtheconcernsexpressed

inaremote,ruralvillageofthePangasub‐districtofAcehJaya.Whilethevillagewasnot

targetedbyRALASasalandtitlingarea,wordoftheRALASprojectreachedthecommunity

aslandtitlingactivitiesunfoldedinthelowlands.Inafocusgroupondevelopment

prioritiesandsubsequentinterviewsregardingthelandtitlingproject,thereweremixed

feelingsthatrepresentedacommunitygrapplingwithitspresent,past,andfuturewithin

AcehandIndonesia.

Thevillageofapproximately95people(52%male,48%female)wasundamagedbythe

tsunamiduetoitslocationintheuplandsandseveralkilometersinland.Allhouseholdsin

thevillageengagedinagriculture,primarilyricewithcontributionsfromamixofother

perennialcropsincludingbetelnuts,durian,citrus,rubber,coconuts,andsomeoilpalm

(FocusGroup13,AcehJaya,May2008)(seeFigure5.3).Someofthevillagemenhad

clearedasmallareaofforest(~2ha)forpatchouliasanexperimentforexporttrade.

Patchouliisanherbthatisusedtomakefragrances.Pricesinpatchoulihadspikedinthe

2000sandthiswasanattempttoimplementadiverselivelihoodportfolioratherthana

movetowardsonlyexport‐orientedcashcropproduction.Patchoulirequiresverylittle

maintenance,butinitiallaborinvestmentcanbehighandspecializedequipmentandskills

forextractingoilsarerequired(DirectObservation,AcehJaya,May2008).Someselective

extractionoftimberwasapparent,buttheareawasnotdeforestedonanindustrialscale.

Wongetal.(2007)notethatwhenthedamageofthetsunamiandconflictaretaken

together,AcehJayawasthemostdamageddistrictinAceh.Whiletsunamidamagewas

absent,conflictdamageincludedbridges,generators,forests,andagriculturalfields.In

additiontomaterialresources,intervieweesmentionedanunspecifiednumberofvillager

deathsduringthe1990sincreaseinviolentconflictbetweenGAMandTNI.Threeofthe

intervieweesadmittedtobeingmembersofGAM.Barronetal.(2005)showthatmany

166

Figure5.3Pangavillageshowingdividedricefields.Source:author.

areasofAcehexperiencedahighlevelofconflictdivisionbetweenvillagesandbetween

householdsinvillages.Althoughnotconclusive,commentsregardingtrustintheGOIfrom

thisvillage’sfocusgroupleadtheauthortobelievethatthisvillagehadsomeinternal

divisionsoverGAMsupportduringtheconflict.

Themainlandholdingtypecanbeclassifiedashakmilikadat.Landandpropertytenureare

securedviacustomarysystems(i.e.negotiationswithinthecommunitybetween

householdsandwiththegeuchik)thoughformsofevidencesuchassignedlettersfromthe

geuchikandcamat(SKKT,SuratKeteranganKepemilikanTanah)areconsideredimportant

forillustratingindividualandfamilyclaims(FocusGroup13,AcehJaya,May2008).In2008,

therewasnoknownoutsideinterestinpurchasinglandinthevillage.UnliketheMeulaboh

neighborhoodwherepropertyissuesseemedlargelyfocusedonindividualdisputesand

someinheritanceissues,villagers’issuesrevolvedaroundinheritance,stateclaimstoforest

land,andthepossibilityofexpansionofindustrialpalmoilcultivationintheregion(Focus

Group13,AcehJaya,May2008).Thesetypesofpropertyissuesaresimilartofindingsof

167

otherauthorsinAcehandthroughoutIndonesia(Lindsey1998,2008;Thorburn2004).The

concernsaboutforestrightsinthisvillagearesimilartothelackofrecognitionoflocal

resourceclaimsinforestedareasthroughoutAcehandIndonesia(McCarthy2006).

Thegeuchick,tuhapeut(villagecommitteeoffour),andninefarmerswerepresentata

focusgroupwhichaimedtoidentifydevelopmentpriorities,rankdevelopmentpriorities,

anddiscusstheroleofstatutorypropertysystemsinthevillage.59Basedonthisfocus

group’sresults,villagers’topprioritiesincludednewroads,closerlocationofaclinic,

improvementoftheprimaryschool,andsupportforanelectricgeneratorandsmall‐scale

sawmillequipment.Supportforstatutorypropertyregistrationwasnotinthetopfive

priorities,butconstitutedalargeportionoftheconversationduetotheknowledgethat

lowlandcommunitieswerecurrentlyundergoingregistrationthroughRALAS.Three

farmerswereveryvocalsupportersforpropertyregistration,citing(1)protectionof

communityandindividualpropertyfromstateclaims(whilemostoftheseconcernswere

aboutforestresources,therewasalsotalkoflandbeingtakenforapossibleroad

developmentproject),(2)thefactthattheyalreadyregisteredlandtransactionswiththe

camatasnotarysowhynotdoitwiththeBPNsothattheirpaperworkis“stronger”,and(3)

benefitstoclarifyingclaimsandavoidinginheritancedisputes.Nevertheless,opponentsto

propertyregistrationoutnumberedproponentsthreetoone.Opponentscitedawidearray

ofreasonstorejectstatutorypropertyadministrationandregistration.Theirreasons

included:(1)disputesoverpropertycanberesolvedbythevillageleadersasthey“always

havebeen”becausethegeuchickandtuhapeutrequirelesstravel,costlessthanBPNor

courts,andmakejustdecisions;(2)aspartofthemukimofPangaPasieanyotherland

issuesshouldbetakencareofatthemukimlevelbecausethiswasthe“adatway”approved

byregionalqanun;(3)itwillcosttoomuchtoregisterallfuturetransactionsattheBPN;(4)

thestatewillaskfortaxesinthefuture;(5)localsmayhavetopayfeestoboththecamat

andBPNiftheyregistertheirland;(6)BPNcouldlimittheauthorityandabilityofthe

59Onlyonewomanattendedthefocusgroup,thoughtheentirevillagewasinvited.Sheleftbeforetherankingexercisewasoverandwasmostlysilentthroughout.Thismayhavehadtodowiththetimingoraperceivedneedtokeepchildrenoutofthemeetingwhichtherebyeliminatedwomenasparticipantsduetochildcare.Thiswasanunanticipatedresultofresearchdesign.

168

geuchikandcamattomediatelanddisputes;and(7)doubtsoverwhatwouldhappenif

peoplesoldtheirlandwithoutapprovalofthevillagecommitteesandthegeuchick.60

Thefinalwordonstatutorypropertyregistrationandthelandtitlingprojectinthe

lowlandswenttoavillageelderwhosaid,“Weshouldnotwepay[GOI],whenwecan

resolveourownlandandinheritanceissueshereandnow.”Inindividualinterviewsafter

thefocusgroup,thethreeformerGAMmemberseachexpressednodesiretohavetheir

nameonaregistryifthegovernmentcouldfindtheirhouseholdwhentheywentbackto

battle.ThiswasnearlythreeyearsaftertheHelsinkiMOUwassigned.Additionally,when

askedaboutmortgagingland,farmersinthefocusgroupthoughtthattheideaofraising

moneyfromlandmaybegoodforlowlandsbut“herewehavecannotgofishwhentheland

isgone.”Themajorityagreeditwaswisertosellfutureharvestsofbetelnuts,citrus,or

othercropstotoke(middlementhatbuyfutureproductionforlowprices–basically,an

informalagriculturalfuturesmarket)ifthefarmersneededmoneyforimmediateneeds.

Manyofthereasonsforstatutorypropertyregistrationandlandtitlinginthelowlands

simplywerenotapplicabletothemoreremotehighlands.Resultsfromthefocusgroupand

interviewswithlocalfarmers,UNagencystaff,governmentstaff,andNGOmemberssuggest

thattheperceivedbenefitsofstatutorypropertyadministrationweremainlyrelevantto

urbanandcommercializedperiurbanareas.WhiletitlingdidnotoccurinthePangavillage

duringtheresearchperiod,thestatementsbringintoquestionwhetherthefocuson

registeringandissuingtitlesacrossAcehwasappropriateatthetimeandinthelocationsit

wasimplemented.

5.4DISCUSSION

Clearly,bureaucracyandlogisticaldelaysplaguedimplementationofRALAS(Deutsch2009;

WB2010).However,tothoroughlyunderstandreasonswhyRALASwasnotassuccessful

asoriginallyenvisioned,itisessentialtoanalyzethedesignandimplementationofRALAS

60Inmanypropertysystemswherehakmilikadatpredominates,landisnottobesoldtooutsiderswithoutfirstofferingitforsaletoothervillagemembers.

169

withinthebroadercontextofpropertymanagement,politics,anddevelopmentin

Indonesia.Aswell,attentiontothepost‐conflictdynamicssurroundingpropertyissuesin

AcehcanprovideinsightintothepropertylandscapeinwhichRALASwasimplemented.

Suchapproachesremindusthatpropertyregistrationisadeeplypoliticalproject–

especiallyinrelationtothesociospatialprocessesofcentralization,decentralization,and

territorialcontrol(McCarthy2004;Thorburn2004;VandergeestandPeluso2005;

Fitzpatrick2006;Lindsey2008).Theexperiencesandimpressionsofpropertyregistration

inthetwocasespresentedabovetookplaceinapost‐disaster,post‐conflictcontextwitha

fragmentedstateandhybridformsofstatutorylaw,Islamicjurisprudence,andhundredsof

locallymodifiedadatsystems.Thesedynamicshaveresultedinnumeroushybrid

institutions(e.g.,ShariacourtsandtheWaliNanggroe),dysfunctionalrelationsbetween

governmentlevels,andambiguousimplementationbystateagencies(Lindsey2004,2008;

Fitzpatrick2006).Since1999,theincompleteandunevenprocessofregionalautonomy

(decentralization)inIndonesiahasresultedindiverselocalsocio‐legalconfigurationsthat

reflectthefragmentationofauthoritywithinthestateitselfandimpactproperty

managementstrategies(Bowen2003;McCarthy2004,2006;Fitzpatrick2006).The

distributionofpowerbetweendifferentstateagenciesandbetweenrepresentativesof

local,sub‐district,district,provincial,andnationallevelshasdramaticallychangedoverthe

last50years,especiallyinAceh(LindseyandPhillips2005;ACARP2007).InAceh,the

authoritativeinfluenceofinstitutionsthatdonotneatlyfitintotheabovecategories(e.g.,

developmentagencies,NGOs,investmentfirms,orcriminalgangs)needstobeconsidered;

thisistrueevenifsuchinstitutionsareephemeralterritorialinfluencesinthecontextofa

fracturedstate(Watts2004).Thediscursiveandmaterialpracticesofpropertycanbea

mediumthroughwhichthesescalarpoliticsofauthorityareenacted.

McCarthy(2005b)identifiesseveralscalarstrategiesthatassistanalysisofthescalar

dimensionsofauthorityandpoliticalaction.Heoutlinessixprocessesthatarestrategically

employedinordertogainpoliticalpower:defenseofanestablishedscale,useofestablished

scaleasaplatform,reconfigurationofrelationswithinscales,participationinconstruction

ofnewscales,redefinitionofrelationshipsamongscales,andjumpingscales.Theuseof

theseprocessesmayoccursimultaneouslyandeveninseeminglycontradictoryways,for

170

exampleenvironmentalorganizationssimultaneouslydrawonandunderminenationaland

internationalscalesinordertosupporttheirinstitutionalandpoliticalgoalsfor

conservation(McCarthy2005b).McCarthy’sframeworkrecognizesboththefixityand

fluidityofscaleswhileallowingexaminationoftheconsolidationofauthorityviascalingof

propertyrelations–rights,duties,privileges,no‐rights,powers,immunities,liabilities,

disabilities,andobligations.Ratherthanfocusonspecificestatesorfixedlevels,afocuson

thesescalarprocessesaslensesallowsustofollowthearabesquequalitiesofproperty

relationsinthetwocasesdescribedabove.

Theterms‘local’or‘community’areoftenpoliticallydeployedlabels(Joseph2002)that

representgroupingsthatmightsometimesbebetterthoughtofasactivenetworks

(Marstonetal.2005).Yet,inAceh,suchdifferentiationisdifficult.Thevillagefunctionsasa

territorialnetworkwhereinpresenceontheland,inheritancerules,normsandlaws

preventthesaleofpropertytooutsiders,therebycreatingalocalscalethatcanbe

characterizedascommunity(McCarthy2005a).Infact,byQanunNo.5/2003onGampung

Governance,thevillageisdefinedasaterritorialunitwithitsownsourceofwealthandrun

byageucikunderthemukimlevel.Asmentionedabove,ingovernanceandpoliticstheterm

adathascometosignifythisintenselylocalscaledespiteattemptedappropriationofadat

fortheprovincialandnationalgovernance(Li2001;Burns2004).Ifthespatialdimensions

ofadatcanbethoughtofatthevillageormukimlevel,thentheconsolidationofauthority

throughpropertyrelationscanalsobeexaminedattheselevels.

Insupportingthegeuchikandvillageleadershipasmediatorsinpropertydisputes,the

Pangavillagerssupportedadatandthelocalscaleofthevillage.Theyplacedthepower(in

thejuralrelationssenseoftheterm)todetermineandallocatepropertyrightsatthelocal

scale.Liabilitieswerethenonallvillagerswhohadanobligationtofollowthedecisionsand

thestandardsofevidenceusedbyauthorityatthatscale,evenifthesedecisionsdidnot

resultintheirpersonalbenefit.Thegeuchickandtuhapeutdidnothavearightwith

correlateddutyonthevillagers,itisratherarelationofpowerandliabilitiesembeddedin

culturalsystemofobligations.Whiledecisionsthatreferdisputesbetweenhouseholdsonto

mukimorcamatorIslamiccourtscanbereadasmovingauthoritytonewscales,such

171

referralsareexpressionsofthepowerandliabilityandtheobligationtofollowsuch

decisionsembeddedinsocialnormsn(Fitzpatrick2008b).Theargumentssupporting

statutoryregistrationinthisvillagewerepartlybasedontheideathatregisteringrights

wouldprotectthelocalclaimstopropertybyplacingadutyuponthegovernmentto

compensatelandacquisitionsatanadequaterate.Yet,ahistoryofpoorlegaldefinitionof

rights/dutiesandpoorfinancialratesofcompensationforpropertyappropriationplague

developmentinAcehandthroughoutIndonesia(McCarthy2006;Fitzpatrick2006;Lindsey

2008).Indeed,LawNo.2/2012onLandProcurementforThePublicInterestwas

specificallydesignedtoprovidelegalcertaintyforsuchprocessesastheywerehistorically

vagueandcorrupt,butmanystilldoubtwhetherthenewlawwillprovidelegalcertaintyfor

holdersofadatrightsorevenhasthepotentialtoexpediteprojectsthatmayrequiretwoto

fiveyearsforsimpleacquisitions(Tampubolon2012).InAceh,adequatecompensationfor

landacquisitionduringroadconstructiononthetsunamiimpactedareaswasasourceof

protests(DirectObservation,AcehJaya,May2007)andcommunalclaimstolocalforests

arestillnotrecognizedbythenationalgovernmentandpalmoilindustry(Arma2012).

Thereisafailureofthestatutorysystemtofullyrecognizeprivaterightsandthepublic

dutytocompensate.Registeringpropertywouldencumberlocalswithcostlyobligations

(i.e.taxes)tothestatewhileloweringtheperceivedrelevanceoflocalobligationsto

communitymembers(e.g.,thenormofsellingpropertytoothercommunitymembers

beforesellingtooutsiders)andadatauthorities.Whilebothlocalizedandstatutory

registrationmaintainseveralliabilitiesonvillagers,statutoryregistrationtransferspower

(todetermineandallocatepropertyrights)fromanaccountablelocalauthoritytostate

agenciesandcourtsthatarenotoriouslycostlyandcorrupt.Sometypicalobligationsthat

hakmilikadatholdershavetothecommunitywouldnotnecessarilyberecognizedgivena

comprehensivestatutoryregistrationsystemthatre‐orientsobligationstothestateand

reinforcesstrongindividualistic,transferrights.Typicallyadatproperty,“mayonlybesold

ifofferedfirsttotheneighbours(andpossiblyothercommunitymembersaswell);cannot

besoldtocommunityoutsiders(althoughitmaybeleasedwithcommunityapproval);is

subjecttoneighbours’andothercommunitymembers’legitimaterightsofaccess;may(in

theory)beappropriatedbythecommunityforcommunitypurposes”(Fitzpatrick2008a,

10).Supportingthepowertodefineandmediatedisputesoverrights,duties,and

172

obligationsatthelocalscaleispartofthescalarpoliticsofproperty.Whiletheabove

representsdefenseofanestablishedscale(thevillagelevel),itshadesintouseof

establishedscaleasaplatform.

InMeulaboh,thedisputeoverpropertyusebetweenlocalsanddistantrelativesofdeceased

propertyownerscouldbeseenasuseofestablishedscaleasaplatform.Thefruitvendors

desiringaccesstothelocationtheyhadusedforyearsfortheirfruitstandsfeltthatthe

conditionsoftheagreementtheyhadmadewiththepreviousownershouldberespected.

Yet,inthiscaseclaimswereapproachedwiththeideaof‘legalcertainty’beingbasedon

strictinterpretationofstatutorilydocumentedrightsandformsofevidence(e.gaktejual‐

beli,taxreceipts,orpreviouslanddocuments).Distantrelativesdrewonthenationalscale,

formallawtoreinforcetheirclaimoverthelocalnetworkofinformalrelations.Locally

perceiveddutiesshadedintoobligationsthatdisappearedwhenthedistantpartiesused

establishedscalestoenforceclaims.Thevendorsfirstarguedthattheyarighttothespace

underthetermsofthepreviousagreement(thatitwasthedutyofthedistantrelatives),but

giventheopportunitytorenegotiatetermstheyarguedthatoutsiderelativeshadan

obligationtoallowthecommunitytorecoverandforthemtopursuetheirlivelihoods.This

useofanestablishedscaletoreinforceclaimsandproducetypesofevidenceissimilarto

theideaofforumshoppingthatistypicallyconceptualizedasauniscalardecision,but

actuallyimplicateshybridsocio‐legalspacesandformsofevidencedrawnfromand

producedatmanyscales.

Thepromotionoftheroleofthemukimscaleinpropertymediationwasaninteresting

outcomeofthepost‐conflict,post‐disastercontext.Forexample,Jaliletal.(2007),argue

thatRALASleftthecamatandmukimoutofthepropertyregistrationprocess.While

Deutsch(2009)dismissedmanyoftheconcernsexpressedbytheaboveauthors,thelarge

scaleRALASreviewthatheledactuallysupportedthefindingthatRALASstaffhadnot

adequatelyconsultedNGOsorleadersbelowthedistrictlevel(imeummukim,camat,tuha

peut,andgeuchik).Analysesinthefieldresultedinrecommendationsofclarifyingand

increasingstatutorylawsupportforleadersattheselevelsasitwouldleadtoexpediting

andimprovingtheclarityofgovernanceandpracticessurroundingmediationofdisputes

173

andongoingtransfersofland(Fitzpatrick2008a,2008b).Regionalqanunspecifiedthatthe

geuchikandimeummukimshouldplayaroleinresourcemanagement.61Moreover,asan

intermediarylevelbetweenthevillageandsub‐district,themukimwastobenewly

recognizedandinvestedwithstatutorypoweror,insomecases,createdwherethemukim

levelmayhaveceasedtoexist.Thecomplaintsaboutfailurestoconsultwiththesenew

levelsandtheactionstakentoreinforcetheselevelsrepresentparticipationinconstruction

ofnewscalesandredefinitionofrelationshipsamongscalesinregardstoauthorityand

property.Asmentionedbefore,theauthoritytomediatedisputesandenforcedecisionsis

effectivelyapropertyrelationshipofpowerandliabilitythatinfluencethedefinitionand

allocationofrights,duties,obligations,privileges,andno‐rights.

Whiletheabovediscussionofthemukimlevelshowsbothcreation(statutoryrecognition)

ofanewscaleandareconfigurationofrelationsbetweenscales,theideaofreconfiguration

ofrelationswithinscalesalsoframesacentralquestionofmanyoftheinterviewees

regardingthemotivesbehindRALAS.RALAShelpedreconstructadministrativeoffices,

trainhundredsofpeopleinlandregistrationprocedures,andprovidedsomesupportfor

propertyclaimsbyorphans,widows,andwomeningeneral(WB2010).Yet,thelarger

claimedoutcomesofaccesstofinanceandtenuresecurityestablishedthroughcreationof

anorderly,costefficient,andaccountablepropertysystemwerequestionedbyUNagency

staff,NGOsstaff,andlocalswhowonderedwhystatutoryregistrationwaspursuedso

quickly,withlittleregardforthepost‐conflictdynamics.UNstaffquestionedthelogicofthe

RALASprojectandwonderedifthestatutorypropertyregistrationprojectwassimplyan

exerciseinextendingthenationalgovernment’sterritorialcontrol(InterviewUNDP,Calang,

May2007;InterviewUNHABITAT,BandaAceh,May2007).Despitethebureaucraticissues,

RALASwasdesignedtofocusonsecuringrights(andparticularlytherightoftransferabove

allotherrights)withinastatutorysystem.Asaresult,considerationofduties,liabilities,

power,privileges,no‐rights,immunities,disabilities,andobligationswerebrushedundera

61Specifically,QanunNo.4/2005onGeuchikroleinmanagingagriculturallandsandQanunNo.2/2003andQanunNo.4/2003onMukimgovernance.

174

neoliberal,post‐disasterdiscoursethatdrewinspirationfromdeSoto’svisionofproperty

andfailedtoconsiderthelargerproblemsofpropertyregistrationacrossIndonesia.

McCarthy(2005b)arguesthatreconfigurationofrelationsbetweenscales,creationofnew

scales,andreconfigurationofrelationswithinscalesareactuallyallsimultaneousprocesses

thatcannotbeeasilydisaggregated–infact,thisishisprimarycritiqueofBrenner’s(2001)

suggestionthatwefocusoneithera‘‘scalepoliticsofspatiality’’ora‘‘politicsofscalar

structuration’TheintroductionofnewIslamiccourtsandadatinstitutionsatseverallevels

ofgovernmentreconfiguredrelationswithinscalesandrepresentedashiftinrelations

betweenscalesaswell.Whilemostmediationoccurredattheneighborhood(between

households),village,orsub‐districtlevels,elevationofpropertydisputesintocourtsalso

occurred.Mobileshariacourtsweredeployedthroughouttheprovincetoassisttheselower

levelsininterpretingandimplementingIslamiclaw,thoughsomepropertydisputes

escalatedtothemoreformalizedIslamiccourtsatthedistrictlevel.Noticingthatthetrust

levelsinIslamiccourtswerehigherthanthoseofthegeneralcourts,expertsrecommended

thatIslamiccourtsbegivenawiderpurviewthatincludednotonlymediatingdisputesover

inheritancebutmediatingalllandissues(Fitzpatrick2008a)andpublishedseveralreports

meanttoaidpractitionerunderstandingandcooperationwithIslamiclawaspracticedin

Aceh(LindseyandPhillips2005;Harper2006).Infact,thegrowthandformalizationof

IslamicinstitutionsinAcehlargelyresultedfromthepushforIslamicaspartofAcehnese

identity,qanunlegislatingpowertotheIslamiccourts,theimportanceofinheritanceinthe

post‐disastercontext,andtheperceptionofcostandcorruptioninthegeneralcourts.

Propertyregistrationisaprocessthatsurveystheunknownfrontierconvertingitinto

spacesintelligibletogovernmentcontrolandoftenresultinginapowerfulgridof

governance(Blomley2003b).Thisgridofgovernancereliesontheredistributionofspecific

elementsofthepropertyrelationstoparticularscalesofgovernances.Theprocessstarts

withcentralizingpropertyadministrationandadjudicationwithinstatutorylawand

administrationsystemswhilefailingtopositivelyrecognizedefactopropertyrelationsor

cooptingindigenousinstitutions(MorseandWoodman1988;Unruh2006).Theprocess

resultsinthecreationofthesubjectcitizenwhointernalizestherulesandcodesofthestate

175

inregardstoappropriatepropertyrelations–oftenthosewhichfacilitatecapital

accumulationbyrenderingpropertyintelligibletothestateandinvestment(Blomley

2003b;Elyachar2005).Inparticular,powerandliabilitiesdescribepropertyrelationsthat

controlaccessinproblematicwayswithincontextswhereinrights,duties,immunities,and

disabilitiesarelegallyambiguousandpoliticallydebated.Thepowerandliabilitiesof

propertyrelationsdescribetheabilitytomakerulesandenforcethemthroughlegitimate

authority,obligations,politicalmanoeuvre,andviolence.Inshort,whileitisitisimportant

todeterminewhohasrightsandhowtogetrightsinpost‐conflictcontexts,itisequally

importanttodeterminewhodecideshowtodefineproperty(forexample,thespatial

extent,temporalduration,andtypeofrights)andhowthejuralrelationsofpropertyare

allocated.Whileitistruethatpropertyispersuasionthroughnarrative(Rose1994),itis

theserelationsofpropertythatthesenarrativesseektoreinforce,change,orcreate.

5.5CONCLUSION

Thecasesaboveshowthatattentiontothescalarpoliticsofpropertyrelationsinpost‐

conflictcontextsiscriticalforunderstandingthedynamicsofauthorityandtheoutcomesof

post‐conflictnaturalresourcemanagementprojects.Byfocusingonscalarprocessesand

propertyrelations,theRALASexperienceasperceivedbyaruralandaperi‐urban

neighbourhoodpointoutunderlyingdesignissuesintheproject.Whiledonorreviews

describedRALASasawell‐designedprojectwithminorflawsintermsofimplementation

(Deutsch2009;WB2010),evidenceonthegroundindicatesotherwise.Theimplementation

oftheRALASlandtitlingprojectinAcehpresentsuswithmanylessonsaboutscalarpolitics

withregardstolandmanagement.

First,rights‐basedapproachestopost‐conflictnaturalresourcemanagementaretoo

narrowwhenrightsareextractedfromthecorrelatedpropertyrelationsanddefinedonly

asbundleofentitlementsrecognizedbythestate.Rights‐basedapproachesneedto

recognizethejuralrelationsandobligationsinbothdefactoanddejuresystems.Aswell,

thetendencytofocusontherightoftransferoverlookstheimportanceofdocumenting

othertypesofinterestsinproperty.Infact,thisisnotisolatedtopost‐conflictscenarios,as

Markussenetal.(2011)indicatethatsuchafocusonrightsoftransferoverthe‘forgotten

rights’ofuseisabroaderproblemintheapplicationoflawtodevelopmentproblems.

176

Second,normativepluralismisamulti‐scalarphenomenon.Oftenwhendiscussing

normativepluralism,theideaofforumshoppinghasanassumedspatialcomponentof

differentiation.Thatis,forumsarethoughttobeseparategeographiclocationsorspaces

ratherthanflexibleinterpretationofprinciplesandrulesbyauniqueauthority.Inthecase

ofadat,hybridsocio‐legalconfigurationsareforcedtoweighevidenceandprinciplesfrom

manysources.Insodoingtheymaintaincomplexrelationstoothermoreclearlydelineated

authorities(suchasstatecourts)thatproducetheirownformsofevidenceandhavetheir

ownabilitytoenforcelaws.Inaddition,normativepluralismisnotjustaboutchoosing

evidenceorforum,itisalsoaboutchoosingproperty–aboutchoosingpropertyrelations

thatdescribetherights,duties,obligations,andotherrelationsthatarebeneficialtothe

claimant.

Third,legalambiguityoverpropertyrelationsisamajorhindrancetosustainablenatural

resourcemanagement.However,providinglegalcertaintyisnotequivalenttothe

centralizationofallpropertyintoastatutorysystemthatrecognizesonlyselectrightsand

attemptstodocumentalltransfersandallholdersinarapidlychangingpost‐conflict

scenario.Decentralizeddeed‐basedsystemscanprovidepartofthetransitionnecessary

towardsmorecentralizedsystemswhereappropriate.Indeed,legalcertaintyandtenure

securitycanbeprovidedbytransitionallawsthatprovidegradualchangesinthe

governanceofproperty,opportunitiestoworkthroughobstaclesofrecognitionbetweende

factoanddejuresystems,andoptionsforlandholdersthroughouttheprocess.Inthecase

ofAceh,suchlawswereattempted(waivingtheregistrationfee,changinglandtitling

procedures,etc.)butstalledduetotheneedforpresidentialdecreestoenforcetheRALAS

communitydrivenadjudicationmanualandtowaiveliabilityforBPNstaff.Theoveralllegal

frameworkforrightsinIndonesiaisambiguousinmanycircumstanceandsomeexperts

recommendusingAcehnesedefactopracticesforpropertyconveyanceratherthaninsisting

onnationalstandards(Fitzpatrick2008a).Whiledecentralizationwasthoughttobe

problematicbecausetherewaslowstategovernancecapacityonthegroundduetoconflict,

theopportunitytoempowerexistinggovernancestructuresandgraduallyimplement

regionallyspecificregulationandlawsfornaturalresourcemanagementprovidesone

avenuetoescapesuchconflicttraps(Schulze2007;Fitzpatrick2008a;Wennman2011;

Aspinall2012).

177

Fourth,assuggestedabove,timingandlocationmatter.Conveyingclearcriteriaforthe

selectionoflocationsforpropertyregistrationinconsultationwithlocalauthoritiesisan

importantsteptowardshavinglocalparticipationintheprocess.Identifyingareaswhere

conflictdamageiscommoninadditiontodisasterdamageshouldprovideforadditional

resourcesorrethinkingthetimingofpropertyregistration.WhileRALASidentifiedtsunami

affectedandneighboringregionsaspriorities,itdidnotidentifyconflictdamagedregions

asoverlappingornearbylocationsatall.Perhaps,areasthatexperiencedhighlevelsof

conflictshouldbephasedinatlaterdatesratherthancountedaspartoftheoriginalpushto

titlehundredsofthousandsofparcels.Intermsoftimingofimplementation,allowing

consultantstodevelopeducationalmaterialsanddeliveringthosematerialsandeducation

sessionstobeneficiariesshouldprecedetheimplementationofpropertyregistration.The

WorldBankfoundthatthetimingofsucheducationalinitiativeswereoff,didnotconsult

localauthorities,andfailedtoprovideadequateinformationregardingdisputeresolutionor

thebenefitsofregisteringfuturetransactions(Deutsch2009).

Finally,incomplexpoliticalemergenciesthatinvolvenaturaldisasterandpoliticalconflict,

thereshouldbeaentitychargedwithoverseeingandintegratingthetwostreamsof

activitiesinordertoavoidcompartmentalizationofaid.Neitherlocals,governments

involvedinconflicts,norunderfundedNGOshavethiscapacity,sosuchanentityneedsto

arisefromdonorcommunitiesorotherinternationalbodies.WhilethedualdisasterinAceh

wasrareinitsmagnitude,anagencythatcanpromotecrosstrainingofthoseinvolvedin

peaceprocesses,thoseinvolvedindisasterrecovery,andthoseinvolvedinnaturalresource

managementwouldoffertheseedsofexpertisethatcantrulyengageinpost‐conflict

naturalresourcemanagementforpeacebuilding.Recognitionofthepoliticaldimensionsof

propertyregistrationincomplexlandscapesofhybridauthorities,ambiguousstatutorylaw,

andlowcapacityorcorruptimplementingagenciesindicatethatattentiontothescalar

politicsofpropertyiscriticalforthedesignofpost‐conflictnaturalresourcemanagement.

178

CHAPTERSIX:SOCIALIDENTITY,NATURALRESOURCES,ANDPEACEBUILDING

ChapterSixconsistsofthethirdmanuscriptandcorrespondstothedissertation’sthird

objective.Thethirdobjectiveistodevelopapolicytoolintegratingthecomplexityofthe

socialembeddednessofpropertyintothedesignofpost‐conflictnaturalresource

managementandpeacebuildingpolicyoptions.Toachievethisobjective,Idrawfrom

Radin’s(1993)ideaof‘personhood’or‘constitutiveproperty’toexaminehowlinks

betweensocialidentity,naturalresources,andarmedconflictsaffectpeacebuildingand

post‐conflictnaturalresourcemanagement(PCNRM).Iarguethatsocialidentitiesare

flexiblyconstructedandlinkedtonaturalresourcesthroughbothindividualagentdecisions

andelitemanipulationofpoliticaldiscourses.Ioutlinewaysinwhichsocialidentitiesare

mobilizedinconflictswhereinresourceshavepoliticalandculturalvalues.Drawingfrom

fieldworkinAceh(2005‐2009)andreviewofotherPCNRMcases(AbyeiandChiapas),I

examinetheparticularchallengesthatconnectionsbetweensocialidentitiesandnatural

resourcescreateforpost‐conflictpropertyadministration.Insummary,Iproposeapolicy

toolforassistinglandmanagementinpost‐conflictenvironments.Editedversionsofthis

manuscripthavebeenpublishedasfollows:

Green,Arthur.2013.“SocialIdentity,NaturalResources,andPeacebuilding.”InLivelihoods,NaturalResources,andPost‐ConflictPeacebuilding,ed.HelenYoungandLisaGoldman.London,UK:Routledge.Pages:forthcoming.

Green,Arthur.2010.“SocialIdentity,NaturalResources,andPeacebuilding.”CAPRiWorkshoponCollectiveAction,PropertyRights,andConflictinNaturalResourcesManagement,June28–July1,2010.SiemReap,Cambodia.

179

6.1INTRODUCTION

WhatdococagrowersmarchinginColumbia,communitiesstrugglingoverlandand

propertyrightsinEastTimor,andSomaliclansdisputingovercharcoalrentshavein

common?Thesediversestrugglesareallexamplesoffailurestoadequatelyconsidersocial

identityinpost‐conflictnaturalresourcemanagement(PCNRM).Inthischapter,Iexamine

howlinksbetweensocialidentity,naturalresources,andarmedconflictsimpact

peacebuildingandPCNRM.Iarguethatsocialidentitiesareflexiblyconstructedandlinked

tonaturalresourcesthroughindividualagentdecisionsandelitemanipulationofpolitical

discourses.IdrawfromRadin’s(1993)conceptof‘personhood’or‘constitutiveproperty’to

helpconceptualizetheimportanceofsocialidentity‐naturalresourceslinkagesandto

emphasizethatseparatingthemanagementofnaturalresourcesfromidentityissuesmay

resultinfailedresourcemanagementstrategiesandjeopardizepeacebuilding.Iproposea

PCNRMpolicytoolformanaginglandinpost‐conflictenvironmentsinawaythat

acknowledgestheconnectionsbetweensocialidentities,naturalresourcemanagement,and

peacebuilding.

Naturalresourcesareoftenaffectedbyarmedconflictandimplicatedinconditionsthat

lengthenorintensifyviolentconflicts(Ross2004;LeBillon2007).Infact,oneofthecentral

challengesofmanagingnaturalresourcesinpost‐conflictsettingsisidentifyingifandhow

resourcesarelinkedtosocialidentitiesandthedynamicsofrecentorhistoricalarmed

conflict.TheselinksimpactthewaysinwhichPCNRMprogramscandefineanddistribute

rightstoaccess,own,orotherwiseuseandprofitfromnaturalresources.Failuretomanage

theselinksmayleadtobothunsustainableresourceextractionandrenewedorcontinued

violence.Forexample,successfulsanctionsonblooddiamondsshowthatunderstanding

howtheeconomicrentsofnaturalresourcesarelinkedtofinancingviolentconflictisnot

onlyimportantforsustainableresourcemanagementbutsometimescriticalfor

peacebuildinganddisruptingincentivesandopportunitiestopursueviolence(LeBillon

2008).

Manystudieshaveexaminedhowthemanagementofeconomicallyvaluablenatural

resourcesinfluencestheonsetanddurationofarmedconflictandcanpositivelyor

180

negativelyimpactpeacebuilding(CollierandHoeffler1998,2004,2005;Collieretal.2009;

Ross2004;Weinstein2007;Bruchetal.2011).Thesestudiesindicatethecriticalrolethat

naturalresourcerentscanplayinprocesseslikerebelrecruitmentandboththedestruction

andreconstructionofnationaleconomies(Ross2004;Weinstein2007).Whenundertaking

PCNRM,itisvitaltointerveneincommoditychainsthatfundviolentconflictsandto

considerhoweconomicvaluableresourcescanbeequitablydistributedorevenusedto

buildgoodgovernance,fulfillbasicneeds,orotherwisepromoteeconomicdevelopment,

reconciliation,andreintegration(JensenandLonergan2011).Yet,theroleofnatural

resourcesinconflictcannotbeexplainedonlybyresources’economicvalueorlogistical

importance.Naturalresourcesalsoplaypotentsymbolicrolesinethnonationaldiscourses,

canbedeeplyembeddedinlocalsocialrelations,andaresometimesusedasavehiclefor

identity‐basedclaimsthatservestrategicpoliticalinterests.Infact,whengroupidentities

arecloselylinkedtonaturalresources,economic‘conflictsofinterest’maybecome

intractable‘conflictsofvalue’(Aubert1963;Rothman1997).

Despiteampleevidenceindicatingthecentralroleofsocialidentityinconflictsover

everythingfromterritorytooilandcocaplants,muchoftherecentworkonmanaging

naturalresourcesforpeacebuildinghasfocusedonhowtomanagetheeconomicvaluesof

naturalresources.Lessattentionhasbeendirectedtowardsunderstandinghowcultural

andpoliticalvaluesofnaturalresourcesmustbemanagedinPCNRM.Indeed,thereis

currentlynoanalyticalframeworkforunderstandinghowtheconstructionand

mobilizationofsocialidentitiesimpactandcanbemanagedinPCNRM.However,PCNRM

strategiesthatdonotconsiderthesesymbolicvaluesandthecomplexwaysinwhich

naturalresourcesarelinkedtosocialidentityinconflictsmayignoreimportantcriteriafor

successfulpeacebuildingandresourcemanagement.

ThereisaneedforbothaclearframeworkforunderstandingsocialidentitylinkstoPCNRM

andforfutureresearchthatmodifiesanddevelopsthepracticalapplicationofthisresearch.

Inthischapter,Iproposeapolicytoolforunderstandinghowsocialidentitiesarelinkedto

naturalresourcesinpost‐conflictsettingsandexaminehowitmightbeusedtounderstand

threecasesstudiesininvolvinglandresourcesandidentityinAceh(Indonesia),Chiapas

181

(Mexico),andAbyei(Sudan).Atthetimeofthewritingofthisdissertation,someofthese

post‐conflictsettingscouldarguablybeconsideredtobeongoingconflicts.However,itis

importanttoincludesuchcasestoconsiderhowfailuretolinksocialidentityclaimsto

naturalresourcesmayleadtocontinuationofviolentconflictandunderminenatural

resourcemanagementforpeacebuilding.Ineachofthecasestudies,Ioverviewsomeofthe

policyapproachesusedandexaminewhatotherstepsmighthavebeenundertaken.

Inthefollowingsection,Iintroducethepersonhoodapproachtoproperty,adefinitionof

socialidentity,andexplorehowsocialidentityislinkedtonaturalresourcesandwarin

contemporaryliterature.InSection6.3,Ipresentthemethodsusedtogatherdataonthe

threecasestudies.InSection6.4,IoutlinefourlinksbetweensocialidentityandPCNRM

andexploretheselinksviacasestudiesofpost‐conflictlandissues.Section6.5providesa

policytoolthatofferspotentialpolicyresponsesbasedonthefourlinksbetweensocial

identityandPCNRMproposedinSection6.4.InSection6.6,Iconcludebyindicating

potentialdirectionsforfutureresearch.

6.2LITERATUREREVIEW

Thewaysinwhichwedefinesocialidentityaffectthewaysthatweunderstandthe

interminglingofsocialidentityandproperty.Likewise,thewaysinwhichweunderstand

propertyinfluencethewaysinwhichwemanagenaturalresources.Inthischapter,Idraw

onRadin’s(1993)understandingof‘personhood’and‘constitutiveproperty’toapproach

PCNRM.IarguethatbasingPCNRMpolicyonthisapproachcanleadtousefulinsightson

policystrategiesformanagingresourcesforpeacebuilding.Below,IoutlineRadin’s

approachtopersonhoodandproperty.Then,Iturnattentiontothewaythatsocialidentity,

naturalresources,andarmedconflicthavebeenconceptualizedincontemporaryliterature.

Iofferaworkingdefinitionofsocialidentitybasedonsocialidentitytheory(Tajfeland

Turner1979),examinehowsocialidentityandnaturalresourcesarelinkedtoarmed

conflict,andexaminelinksbetweensocialidentity,naturalresourcesandPCNRM.Iargue

thatworkonarmedconflictthatfocusesonlyontheeconomicvalueofresourceshas

diminishedconceptualapproachestosocialidentityandPCNRM.

182

6.2.1PERSONHOODANDCONSTITUTIVEPROPERTYRadinseespropertyasmorethaneitheramaterialthingorabundleofrights.Radin(1993,

2)arguesthatthestudyofrelationsbetweenpropertyandpersonhood“hascommonly

beenbothignoredandtakenforgrantedinlegalthought.”Shedevelopsapropertytheory

thatisbasedonacontinuumbetweenconstitutiveproperty(thatwhichisboundupina

personandmakesuswhoweare)andfungibleproperty(instrumental,monetary,or

market).Whereasfungiblepropertycanbeassessedandexchangedinpurelymonetary

terms,constitutivepropertyissocentraltoaperson’sidentitythatseparationwould

impactthehumanabilitytoflourish–ortheirpersonhood.Someobjectsinaperson'slife

aresointimatetotheperson’sidentitythattheobject’svaluecannotbeproperlyassessed

orcommodifiedinmonetaryterms.Sheobservesthattheseconstitutiveconnectionsare

oftenimplicitlypartofjudicialreasoning.Shearguesthatpersonhoodshouldbeanexplicit

criterionindeterminingwhoseclaimtopropertytrumpsotherclaims–thatconstitutive

propertyclaimsshouldoutweighfungiblepropertyclaimswhendeliberatingentitlements

inrelationtopropertyanddesirablesocialoutcomes.Thecloserone’sclaimistothe

extremeofconstitutiveproperty,themoreweighttheclaimshouldbegivenindetermining

outcomes.

Indevelopingatheoryofconstitutiveproperty(personhood),Radinquestionsthe

subject/objectdichotomyandrevealsthattheobjectofpropertyispartofandconstructs

thesubjectofproperty.Thesubject/objectdichotomydelineatestheactiveandpassive

partsofproperty–thesubjectthatowns,manages,orthinksversustheobjectthatis

owned,managed,orthoughtless(Whatmore2003).Radinshowsthatsuchdichotomiesare

false.Contrarytothisideathatpropertyconsistsonlyofrightsoractiverelationsbetween

humans(subjectsofproperty),understandingpropertyrequiresinclusionoftheso‐called

objectsofpropertyandtherelationsbetweenhumansandthings.Ofcourse,thisisnotto

suggestthattheconceptofpropertycanbelimitedtoonlythe‘objectsofproperty’or

relationsbetweenhumansandthings–astheserelationsarealwayssociallymediated.

Understandinghowpropertyisconstitutedthroughthesedichotomiesiscentralto

interpretingcurrenttrendsinneoliberalideologyandresourcemanagementstrategies.As

183

Mansfield(2007,394)describesit,“propertyhasbecomethecentralmodeofregulating

multipleformsofnature”and“effortstocreateandimposenewprivatepropertyregimes

areremakingecosystems,livelihoods,andidentities...”Whiletherelativeconsistencyof

landfacilitatesanimaginationofthe‘objectsofproperty’asinertentities,managementof

dynamicandmobileentitieslikewater,air,andmigratoryanimalsrevealchallengesto

ideasaboutpropertyandtopropertyrelations–especiallywhenprivatepropertyregimes

areassumedtobethemosteconomicallyefficientandrationalstrategiesbutdonot

producedesiredmanagementoutcomes(BrunsandMeinzen‐Dick2000;Schmidtand

Dowsley2010).

Radin’sworkisinterestingonanumberoflevels.First,asdescribedabove,Radinarguesfor

abetterunderstandingofpropertybyre‐examiningthefalsedichotomiesaroundour

notionofproperty.Second,Radincreatesajustificationforemotionandfeelingsofplaceto

bebroughtintojudgmentsregardingpropertybyarguingthatthesecomponentsare

integraltoanindividual’sidentityandtopropertyitself.Sociospatialidentitiesgroundedin

placeandspatialarrangementsareconstitutiveofpropertyasitistheeverydayworking

andinterpretationofhumanrelationsthroughlandscape,land,andthematerialworldthat

produceproperty.Third,sheseesthatfungiblepropertyandconstitutivepropertyarenot

staticevenonacontinuumasidentificationoffungibleandconstitutivepropertychange

overtimeandindifferentsocialandspatialcontexts.Thishasimplicationsforthewaysin

whichsocialidentityframesarelinkedtofungiblepropertyoverspaceandtime.Fourth,the

linksthatRadinmakesbetweenpropertyandpersonhoodcanbeappliedininteresting

waystotherelationbetweenterritoryorhomelandandnation.Inthesamewaythatthe

relationshipbetweenapropertyentityandhumanmaybeconstitutivetopersonhood,the

relationshipbetweenterritoryandnationcanbefundamentalinthecollectiveimagination

ofnationhoodandanautonomous‘nation‐state.’Indeed,thereisastrongparallelbetween

liberalthoughtaboutpropertyandindividualsascitizensandterritoriesandnationsas

‘nation‐states’(Sassen2006).WhileRadin’swritingsfocusonincreasingthelegal(judicial)

andsocialrecognitionofthewaythatpropertyandanindividual’spersonhoodaremutually

constituted,herapproachcanbeproductivelyappliedtoindividualandgrouprelations

withpropertyatdifferentpoliticalscales.Theparallelofpersonhoodandpropertyto

184

nationsandhomelands,territories,andnaturalresourcesoffersinsightsintopost‐conflict

propertydebates,peacebuilding,andnaturalresourcemanagement.

Linksbetweensocialidentityandpropertymayresultinpositiveoutcomesintermsof

resourcestewardship,individualpersonhood,andgroupfunctions.Yet,thesesamelinks

cancauseproblemswhensocialidentitiesareimplicatedinconflictsinvolvingproperty.In

thecaseofPCNRM,thesocialidentitylinkstopropertymayunderminepeacebuilding–this

isparticularlythecasewhenlandisinvolved.Landandlandscapesfunctionasthespatial

containersthroughwhichsuchsocialconstructsasterritory,homeland,andhomecometo

beconceptuallyframedandmateriallyrealized(Moore2005).Anunderstandingofthe

stronglinksbetweensocialidentityandproperty(andparticularlyland)mightassist

planningappropriatetiming,locations,andmethodsfordesigningandimplementing

PCNRMpolicies.

Usingaprimordialistorconstructivistapproachestosocialidentitychangeshowwe

understandRadin’s(1993)constitutivedimensionofpropertythatlinkstheflourishingof

individualstotheiridentityrelationswithproperty.ApproachingPCRNMwithan

awarenessofpropertyandsocialidentityconnectionsrequiresconceptualizingsocial

identityasmorethanafixedcategory.Itrequiresthinkingofsocialidentityasaframing

process.Below,Ioverviewwaysinwhichsocialidentity,naturalresources,andarmed

conflicthavebeenconceptualizedandarguethatthemostcommonapproacheshave

narrowedunderstandingofsocialidentityinPCNRM.Ithenoutlinehowsocialidentitycan

beunderstoodasaframingprocess.

6.2.2SOCIALIDENTITYANDARMEDCONFLICTSThereisawell‐developedliteraturelinkingsocialidentitiesandarmedconflict(Huntington

1997;Kaufman1999;FearonandLaitin2000;Shmuelietal.2006).Muchofthisliterature

focusesonethnicityorethnicconflict(Nagel1994;GurrandHarff1994;Gurr2000;Eriksen

2001;Toft2003),yetethnicityisonlyonetypeofcontestedidentityframe.Itisnecessaryto

considerboththebroadliteratureonsocialidentityandthemorenarrowlyframedworkon

ethnicconflicttounderstandhowsocialidentitieshavebeenlinkedtoarmedconflict.

185

Approachestosocialidentitycanbelocatedonacontinuumbetweentwoontological

stances:primordialismandconstructivism.Primordialistapproachesconceptualizesocial

identityasafixedcollectionoftraitsthataregeneticallyinherited(inthestrongsenseof

primordialism)ordeterminedbyculturalnarrativesandsocialstructures(intheweak

senseofprimordialism)(GurrandHarff1994).Primordialistapproachesareboth

essentialistanddeterministintheirunderstandingofidentityasastableaspectofgroup

andindividualpsychology.Huntington’s(1997)well‐knownworkontheclashof

civilizationsisamodernexampleofhowaprimordialistperspectiveframessomeconflicts

astheinevitableresultofirresolvable,ancientprejudicesandpredictspeople’sbehaviors

alonglinesofhistoricalidentitycategories.Ontheotherhand,constructivistapproaches

emphasizethatidentityisnotfixed;theyrecognizethecomplexwaysinwhichsocial

identityandcollectiveactionaresimultaneouslyconstructedthroughsocialpsychological

framing,context,anddiscourse(Bowen1996;Schmuelietal.2006).Constructivist

approacheslookmoreatcontextualfactorsandagents’decisionsconcerningoverlapping

socialroles,framingdiscourses,andhistoricalexperiences.Inotherwords,constructivist

approachesaccepttheideathatsocialidentityishistoricallyconstructed,multi‐faceted,and

contextuallydependent(Gardner2003).Examplesofconstructivistapproachestoidentity

includeeverythingfromSmith’s(1998)perennialismtopoliticalopportunitytheory(Meyer

2004),socialidentitytheory(TajfelandTurner1979a,1979b;Hoggetal.1995),andsocial

movementtheory(Tilly2003).

Thechoiceofaconstructivistorprimordialistviewpointinfluencesunderstandingofhow

socialidentityrelatestoproperty,naturalresources,war,andpeacebuilding.Forexample,a

primordialistapproachwouldseethelinkbetweenidentityandhomelandterritoriesasa

fixedrelation.Notonlywouldtherelationbefixed,butitwoulddeterminethetypesof

possibleinteractionsbetweenidentitygroupswithcompetingclaimsforthesame

homelandandwouldinevitablyleadtoconflict.Ontheotherhand,aconstructivistwould

arguethatviolentconflictsarenotinevitable,butarisefromstrategicinterestsandpolitical

discourseslinkingidentitytoterritorialorresourceclaims.Forexample,irredentistclaims

ofGreeceoverthesouthernBalkans(Peckham2000)andtheflexiblelinksbetween

identitiesandlivelihoodsinDarfur(Youngetal.2009)revealhowterritorialclaimsare

186

oftenmanipulatedorcontextuallyframedassocialidentityclaims.Whereaprimordialist

approachenvisagesinevitableconflict,aconstructivistapproachencouragesasearchfor

waystoreordertheprimacyofidentityframes(forexampletodeemphasizesomeidentity

claimsandtoemphasizethebenefitsofshareduserrights,topointtocommoninterestsin

maintainingresources,ortocreatenewidentityframes)inconflictsinwhichidentitiesare

linkedtonaturalresourcesorviolence.

Inthisdissertation,thedefinitionofsocialidentityisbasedonsocialidentitytheory—a

constructivistapproachthatemphasizeswaysthatstructuralfactors,groupcharacteristics,

andindividualactordecisionsplayaroleinframingandchoosingidentities(Tajfeland

Turner1979;Hoggetal.1995;StetsandBurke2000;Ashmoreetal.2001).Theemphasisin

socialidentitytheoryislessonhowintragrouprolesinteractandmoreonhowframesare

formedthroughintergroupinteraction.AuthorsusingthisapproachdrawfromTafjel’s

(1978,63)definitionofsocialidentityas“thatpartofanindividual'sself‐conceptwhich

derivesfromhisknowledgeofhismembershipinasocialgroup(orgroups)togetherwith

thevalueandemotionalsignificanceattachedtothatmembership”.Theemphasisinsocial

identitytheoryisonboththepersonandthedynamicsofgroups.Thisapproachisuseful

forstudyingtheprocessbywhichidentitiesrelatetointergroupconflict(Ashmoreetal.

2001).

BrubakerandCooper(2000)identifysomeadditionalkeyconceptualdistinctionsthatare

usefulwheninvestigatinghowtypesofsocialidentityareconstructed.First,doessocial

identityrefertorelationalorcategoricalmodesofidentification?Second,doestheactof

identificationcomefromanexternalsourceorthroughself‐identification?Brubakerand

Cooper(2000)recognizethatthedivisionsbetweenrelational/categoricaland

external/self‐identificationarenotalwaysclear,butthatthesecanbeanalyticallyuseful.

Forexample,identificationbypositioninginarelationalweb(suchaskinship,friendship,or

businessties)maysometimesoverlapwithidentificationthroughcategoricalattributes

(suchasrace,ethnicity,language,orcitizenship)buttheserepresenttwoverydifferent

modesofidentification.Likewise,anexternallyimposedidentity(suchaslegalcitizenship)

canbeincompatiblewithself‐identification.Forexamplein1933,theBelgianidentitycards

issuedinRwandarigidlyclassifiedresidentsintoethniccategoriesofHutuorTutsiand

187

deniedthemixedheritageandself‐identificationofmanyresidentsassomethingotherthan

whatwasontheiridentitycards.

Thedistinctionsofexternal/self‐identificationandrelational/categoricalcanbeimportant

forunderstandinghowsocialidentityisdescribedincasesinvolvingnaturalresourcesand

armedconflict.Forexample,inexploringhoweconomicrentsfromnaturalresourcesare

usedtorecruitsoldiersforrebelgroups,Weinstein(2007)examinedhowyoungmen

developidentitiestiedtorebelgroupsthroughrelationalmodesofself‐identification.Such

dynamicsarealsoevidentinplaceslikeDarfur,whereidentitiesoftenconsideredasancient

labelsforethnicgroupsortribesactuallyhaveamorefluidandpermeablenatureinwhich

politicalalliances,ecology,andlivelihoodstrategiescauseindividualsorgroupstoadopt

newidentitiesbasedoncontext‐dependentopportunities(Youngetal.2009).InSoutheast

Asia,Scott(2009)describeshowtheflexibilityofidentitiesofremotegroupsmayinfactbe

strategiesforescapingoppressivegovernments’tendencytocategoricallydefineand

managecommunities.InIndonesia,Li(2000,151)investigatesthisinterplaybetween

imposedcategoriesandself‐identificationandnotes“thatagroup’sself‐identificationas

tribalorindigenousisnotnaturalorinevitable,butneitherisitsimplyinvented,adopted,

orimposed.Itis,rather,apositioningwhichdrawsuponhistoricallysedimentedpractices,

landscapes,andrepertoiresofmeaning,andemergesthroughparticularpatternsof

engagementandstruggle…thecontingentproductofagencyandtheculturalandpolitical

workofarticulation.”

Categoricalmodesofidentificationarepowerfulsocialorganizingtoolsthatcanbeusedby

actorsthatarebothexternalandinternaltogroupstodiscursivelyframepropertyclaims,

resourceaccess,andpoliticalpositions.AsLi(2000)pointsout,identitycategoriesarenot

alwaysinternallyeschewedasgroupsandindividualscanadoptthemfortheirownpolitical

goals.Forexample,Bowen(2005,160)outlineswaysinwhichtheAcehneseliberation

movementisbasedonthegroupcategoryof‘Acehnesepeople’–acategorythatheargues

hasbeeninternallygeneratedbyanarrativeofpre‐colonialautonomyandbydrawingfrom

internationaldiscoursesexternaldefiningthecategoryof‘indigenouspeople’toposition

themovementandconsolidateseveraldistinctregionalandlanguagegroups.AlsoinAceh,

188

BurkeandAfnan(2005)pointtotheriskofsuchdynamicsincomplexpolitical

emergencies.Theyoutlinehowthedesignationofrecipientsofaidandthetimingofaid

wereaffectedbywaysinwhichindividualswerecategorizedbyexternalorganizationsas

conflictrefugeesordisasterrefugees.Peoplemaystrategicallyself‐identifywithexternal

categoriesthatbetterpositionthemforaid.Anotherexampleofcategoricalmodesof

identificationcanbefoundinthenegotiationsleadingtothePermanentCourtof

Arbitration’sredrawingofthebordersforhistoricallandclaimsintheAbyeiregionof

Sudan.Asexaminedinmoredepthbelow,thesenegotiationsarguablyuseanunderstanding

ofidentitybasedonimposedcategoriesthatbearlittleresemblancetotheactualhistorical

characterofcommunitiesandkinshipnetworksintheregion.Thenarrativesusedtoframe

problemsinpeacebuildingprocessesmayinvolvecreatingcategoricalmodesofself‐

identificationandexternalidentificationrelevanttoestablishingpoliticalnegotiation

positionsortogainingaccesstoresourcesorpost‐conflictaid.

Insummary,thesocialidentityframesformedthroughexternallyimposedcategories(for

example,bythecolonialstate)areanalyticallydifferentfromandplaydifferentsocialroles

thanrelationalmodesofself‐identificationwhicharecentralindefiningincentivesin

recruitmentprocesses,servingaswaystoresiststatepower,anddefiningthecontoursof

armedconflictdynamics.Yet,categoricalidentitiesarenotalwaysexternallyimposedas

theycanalsobeinternallyimposedandusedbygroupsfortheirownpoliticalandeconomic

benefittopositionthemselvesinregardtoothergroupsortoeliminatetheflexibilityof

relationalidentificationstrategies(Li2000).

6.2.3NATURALRESOURCESANDARMEDCONFLICTSTheliteraturelinkingnaturalresourcestoarmedconflicthasmushroomedsincethe1990s.

Severalissuesinthisfieldhavegainedattentioninthepopularmedia.Onesuchissueisthe

resource‐scarcity‐versus‐resource‐abundancedebate,whereinargumentsthatresource

scarcitytriggersarmedconflicthavebeencriticizedbyauthorswhopointoutthat

petroleumandothertypesofhigheconomicvalueresourceabundancebetterpredictand

explaininterstateandintrastatearmedconflicts(Homer‐Dixon1998;PelusoandWatts

2001).Aswell,popularinterestinglobalenvironmentalchangeanditspotentiallydramatic

impactonhumansocietieshasinspiredalargebodyofresearchandsomemisguided

189

popularspeculationonthepotentialforfuture‘resourcewars’causedbyenvironmental

degradation,scarcity,andmigration(NordåsandGleditsch2007;Dyer2010).

Oneinfluentialmodelofthelinksbetweenresourcesandarmedconflictisthe‘greedand

grievances’model(CollierandHoeffler1998,2004,2005).Thegistofthismodelisthat

high‐valuenaturalresourcesprovidetheincentives(forgreedyrebelleaders)or

opportunities(forrebelgroups)thatencouragearmedconflictandundermine

peacebuilding(Aspinall2007).Whilethegreedisclear,grievancesaresimplyrelatedto

perceivedunequaldistributionofrents.Thismodelhasinspiredtheoreticalworkonhow

thecharacteristicsofresourcesaffectbothrebelgroupformationandconflicttypes.In

addition,thismodelhasdrivenpolicyapproachesthatfocusoninterveninginresource

commoditychainstostoprebelfinancingandbuildpeaceinplaceslikeLiberiaand

Afghanistan(Ross2004;LeBillon2008).However,thismodelhasalsobeencriticizedby

scholarswhoemphasizethatnaturalresourcesaffectawiderrangeofeconomic,political,

andculturalfactors(BallentineandSherman2003;Ross2004;Fearon2005).Forexample,

anabundanceofahigh‐valueresourcelikepetroleumhasbeenshowntodestabilize

governmentsbycausingmacroeconomicinstability,tounderminethestate’sabilityto

governdissentinggroups,toleadthestatetoadoptpoliciesthatencourageoppositional

groupstouseviolence,andtoencouragecompetitionoverstatecontrolwhenstatecontrol

becomesequivalenttocontrolofhigh‐valueresources(Humphreys2005).Humphreys

(2005)discusseshow,intheChadiancase,armedconflictwasnotmaintainedthrough

resourcerents,butratheralternativerevenuescouldberaisedinadvancetofightfor

controloftheChadianstateandthefutureoilrevenuethatwouldcomewithcontrolofthe

state.

Whilethesymbolicvalueofresources(especiallylandproperty)isoftenrecognizedasan

importantfactorinconflictescalation,duration,andintractability(KahlerandWalter

2006),popularmodelslikethe‘greedandgrievances’modeltendtofocusontheeconomic

valueofresourcesasthemaincausalandlimitingfactorintheescalationanddurationof

violence.Whilethemodelisusefulforunderstandingmanygroupsengagedinmodern

conflictsandisresponsibleforpolicyprescriptionsthatunderminerebelfinancing,this

190

modelfailstoexplaintheescalationanddurationofarmedconflictsoverresourcesthat

havelittleeconomicvalue.Aswell,itisinadequateforexplainingthewaysinwhicharmed

conflictsoveridentityresources(suchassacredforests,fishingrights,andhomelands)and

locallyvaluablelivelihoodresourcesoccurandbecomeintractable.

6.2.4SOCIALIDENTITIES,NATURALRESOURCES,ANDARMEDCONFLICTCulturalorpoliticalvaluesassociatedwithland,sacredforests,fisheries,water,andother

naturalresourcesplayaroleinethnonationaldiscourses,livelihoodstruggles,andreligious

narratives,andlinktomanyidentityframes.Theselinksbetweenidentityandnatural

resourcesareoftenmediatedthroughpropertyrelationsthatcansometimesbeconstitutive

ofboththesubjectandobjectofproperty–especiallyinthecaseofthesymboliccultural

andpoliticalvalueofland.Ofcourse,theselinksbetweensocialidentityandproperty(in

thiscase,naturalresources)existoutsidetherealmofarmedconflict,butthissectiononly

focusesonsomewaysinwhichthelinksofsocialidentitiestonaturalresourcesinfluence

armedconflict.

Theoriesofarmedconflictoftenunder‐theorizethecomplexlinksbetweensocialidentities

andnaturalresources(BallentineandSherman2003;Ross2004;Aspinall2007).Yet,the

overlapbetweenidentityandnaturalresourcesinvolvesatleastfourlinksrelatedtoarmed

conflicts.Theselinksareimportantinidentityformationandmobilization;theydonot

necessarilyleadtoarmedconflictbuttheyhelptounderstandhowarmedconflictsoccur

(PelusoandWatts2001).Theselinksarenotisolatedandoneormoreoftheselinksmaybe

foundwithinanyoneconflict:

1. Howidentityclaimsinvolvingownershiporprivilegedaccesstoresourcesleadtoarmedconflict.

2. Howidentityinfluencesclaimsofinequitabledistributionofresourcerentsandleadstogrievancesandarmedconflict.

3. Howidentitiesareusedbyelitesand‘ordinaryfolk’tomobilizecollectiveactioninconflictsovernaturalresources.

4. Howidentityframingfacilitatesconflictovernaturalresources.

Thefirstlinkincludesidentityconflictsoverthehistoricuseorsymbolicvalueofresources.

Forexample,narrativesthatinfluencethelegalalienationofArablandsinIsraeldrawfrom

191

historicalclaimstotheland(FormanandKedar2004).Thesecondlinkisrepresentedin

severalcenter‐peripheryrelationshipsinwhichrentsfromhigh‐valuenaturalresources

locatedinperipheralregionsarecapturedbyurbanelitesorstatesandnotequitably

distributedtopopulationsintheseperipheralregionsthatoftenbearthecostsofresource

extraction.Insituationswherecenterorperipherygroupscanbelinkedtoidentityframes

(likeethnicgroups),identityoftenbecomesoneoftheprimaryframesthroughwhich

claimstoequitabledistributionarepursued.Forexample,Suliman’s(1999)studyandthe

recentworkbytheInternationalCrisisGroup(ICG2008)onthedynamicsoftheNubaand

BaggaraconflictoverlandsinSudan’sSouthernKordofanstateindicatehowidentityhas

beenshapedbycenter‐peripheryrelationsandconflictdynamics.Assal(2006)andSuliman

(1999)havearguedthatthestateescalatedtheconflictandthattheconflictitselfhas

heightenedthecollectivesenseofaNubaidentity.

BeforetheonsetofviolentconflictintheNubaMountains,thediverseNubapeoplewerefullyawareonlyoftheirclanaffiliations.Theyneitherperceivedthemselvesasa Nuba nation nor actively sought to be one. Their relations with their Arabneighbors, theHawazma andMisiriya,were tolerable. They exchanged goods andservices,andintermarriagewasanacceptablepracticeespeciallyamongArabsandMuslim Nuba. At the beginning of the conflict, many Nuba even sided with thegovernment, because they perceived the conflict to be a political discord, ratherthan an ethnic or economic strife . . . Most violent conflicts are over materialresources—actualorperceived.However,withthepassageoftime,ethnic,cultural,andreligiousaffiliationsseemtoundergotransformationfromabstractideologicalcategories into concrete social forces. In a wider sense, they themselves becomecontestablematerialsocialresourcesand,hence,possibleobjectsofgroupstrifeandviolentconflict.(Suliman1999,219)

Thethirdlink(identitiesareusedbyelitesand‘ordinaryfolk’tomobilizecollectiveaction

inconflictsovernaturalresources)isoneoftenpresentedintheCollier‐Hoeffler(‘greedand

grievances’)lineofresearchwhereingreedypoliticalentrepreneurscreateormanipulate

existinglocalidentitiesinordertoprofitfromnewpoliticalandsocialarrangementsor

continuingarmedconflict.Inthissituation,casestudiesofRwandahavesometimescited

theunderlyinglandconflictasasourceoftensionandindicatedtheroleofpolitical

entrepreneursinrecastingthistensionintothegenocidalconflict(PercivalandHomer‐

Dixon1998;AndréandPlatteau1998).Otherauthorsseeperceivedgrievancesagainsta

192

communityasoneofthemainwaysinwhichidentitybecomesaprimarymobilizingframe

forconflict.Robinson’s(1998)studyoftheroleofhydrocarbonextractioninmobilizing

collectiveidentityandlegitimizingviolenceinAcehillustratessuchanaturalresource

extraction‐politicalmanipulation‐identitygrievances‐armedconflictcausalchain.This

chainisalsopresentregardinglandpropertyinIndonesia.Forexample,the1997violence

inWestKalimantansignaled“areclamationoftheDayaks’historicallyoccupiedspaces,

resources,andidentities,andtodemonstratetheprotectionoftheircollectivehonor.The

notionofkawasan,orterritory,isacrucialpartoftheircollectiveconcerns”(Pelusoand

Harwell2001,86).HerewehearechoesofRadin’s(1993)constitutivepropertyasthey

examinewhethertheDayakgroupcanexistandflourishwithoutkawasanand,ifnot,what

happensasaresult.Examiningwhethertheconstructionofethnicity(asatypeofidentity)

raisesthelikelihoodofarmedconflict,FearonandLaitin(2000)proposethreepathways

throughwhichidentityisconstructed:(1)throughthelogicofculturaldiscourses,(2)

throughelites’strategicmanipulationofidentitycategoriesorrelationalnetworks,and(3)

throughstrategicactionofmasses(‘ordinaryfolk’)tomaintainspecificgroupboundaries

andrights.UsingcasestudiesfromSudan,SriLanka,Ireland,Rwanda,andtheBalkans,they

suggestedthatinmanyarmedconflicts,so‐calledethnicoridentity‐basedviolenceis

actuallyamaskforstrategicactionsbyelitesorstrategicactionbyindividualsinthe

masses.Thus,culturalandpoliticalvaluesarebestunderstoodaswaystomobilizegroups

duringarmedconflictsinordertoachievestrategicgainsinresourcesorpower,which

supportstheconceptofrationaleconomicagencydescribedintheCollier‐Hoefflermodel.

Thefourthlinkissubtlydifferentfromthethirdinthatitarguesthataspecifictypeof

identityframemustpre‐existpoliticalmanipulationandmobilizationofidentityframesin

armedconflict.Ratherthanassumingthatpoliticalmanipulationcanmobilizeanyidentity

frameforarmedconflict,thislinkindicatesthatspecifictypesofidentityframesmustpre‐

existpoliticalmanipulation.Forexample,indiscussingAceh,Aspinall(2007)attemptstogo

beyondthetypicalpoliticalmanipulation–identitygrievances–armedconflictcausal

narrativebyarguingthatcollectivegrievancesandlegitimizationofviolencecannotoccur

withoutaspecifictypeofpre‐existingidentityframe.

Rather than seeing natural resource grievances as a source of conflict, or as acatalystoraccelerantforthecrystallizationofidentity,Iemphasizethatitwasthe

193

evolving framework of Acehnese identity that provided a prism through whichnaturalresourceexploitationwasinterpretedingrievanceterms.Putmorebluntly,one might say that without the identity framework there would have been nogrievances,atleastnopoliticallysalientones.Instead,naturalresourceexploitationin Aceh may have been viewed as unfair and irritating, but also as banal andunavoidable,as itarguablywasinotherprovinces. Inthisview,grievancesshouldnotbeseenastriggerfactors,antecedenttothediscoursesthatmotivateviolence.Grievances are instead integral to the ideological frameworks though which thesocial world, including notions like “justice” and “fairness” are constructed andunderstood.(Aspinall2007,957)

Despiteargumentsbetweenscholarsprioritizingdifferentcausalmechanisms,identityand

naturalresourceconflictsarenotmutuallyexclusivethemesinthestudyofarmedconflict.

Propertyasnaturalresourcesislinkedinseveralwaystosocialidentitiesinarmed

conflicts.Thisdissertationfocusesonterritoryandlandissuestoexaminethewaysin

whichsocialidentitiesaremobilizedinresourceconflictsandhowlinksbetweensocial

identitiesandnaturalresourcesmightpositivelyornegativelyimpactPCNRM.Althoughthe

literatureonpeacebuildingandnaturalresourcesoftenreferstotheroleofcommunal

groupsinPCNRMandpeacebuilding(BushandOpp1999;Bruchetal.2011),thereisrarely

atheoreticalorpracticallinkdrawnbetweennaturalresources,identity,andpeacebuilding.

ThelackofconsiderationofsuchlinksunderminesPCNRMandpeacebuildingprograms

(WebersikandCrawford2011).

6.3METHODS

ResearchforthismanuscriptisqualitativeanddrawsfromYin’s(2003a,2003b)approach

tocasestudyresearch.Yindefinesthecasestudyresearchmethodologyasanempirical

inquirytoexamineacontemporaryphenomenonwithinitsreal‐lifecontextinwhich

multiplesourcesofevidenceareused.TheAcehcasestudydrawsfromdatacollected

duringfieldresearchbetweenAugust2006andJune2008inAceh,Indonesia.Itincludes

fivemonthsdirectobservation,68semi‐structuredinterviews,17focusgroups,archival

research,andanalysisofacademicliterature,grayliterature(NGOsandgovernment

offices),legaltexts,andnewsarticlesduringtheperiodof1999‐2010dealingwithland

issues.Thematerialcollectedforthetwoadditionalcase‐studiesinSudanandChiapaswas

accomplishedvialiteraturesearchesandincludedgrayliteratureandacademicarticles.

194

WhileIdrawmanyinsightsfromtheprimaryandsecondarydatacollectedfromAceh,it

wasnecessarytoincludeothercasestudiestodevelopandexplorethepolicytoolwhichis

theoutcomeofthisarticle.Noonecasestudywouldsufficetobuildapolicytoolthatcanbe

deployedingeographically,politicallyandculturallydiversepost‐conflictscenarios.

6.4FRAMEWORKLINKINGSOCIALIDENTITYANDPCNRM

Althoughtheliteratureonpeacebuildingandnaturalresourcesoftenreferstotheroleof

communalgroupsinPCNRMandpeacebuilding(BushandOpp1999;Bruchetal.2011),

thereisrarelyatheoreticalorpracticallinkdrawnbetweennaturalresources,identity,and

peacebuilding.ThislackofconsiderationofsuchlinksunderminesPCNRMand

peacebuildingprograms(WebersikandCrawford2011).Attentiontoidentityframingand

theculturalandpoliticalvaluesofnaturalresourceswouldseemtobeanessentialpartof

PCNRM,butthereareseveralstraightforwardexplanationsastowhytheselinksare

currentlyunder‐theorized.Forinstance,duetofundingandlogistics,PCNRMprojectsoften

haveatime‐limited,practicalfocusthatemphasizeseconomicrecovery–eventhoughthese

limitsandthenarrowfocusmaycauseimportantculturalandpoliticaldynamicstobe

overlooked(BushandOpp1999;Paris2004).Recenttheoreticalworkreliesheavilyonthe

Collier‐Hoeffler’sconflictmodelandtendstodownplayidentityclaimsbasedoncultural

andpoliticalvalues.Finally,elitemanipulationofpolicy,legislative,andpoliticalprocesses

mightstrategicallydenylinksbetweenidentityandresourcesinpost‐conflictscenariosin

ordertogaineconomicbenefits(likelandclaims)forthemselves.Thisstrategicdenialof

linkagesbetweenidentityandresourcesisnotuniquetopost‐conflictscenarios;evidencein

Indonesiaindicatesthatwhileethnicityisimportantforunderstandingdifferent

approachestonaturalresourcemanagement,itwaspracticallytabooandseenasa

detrimenttonationalismtospeakof,basepolicyon,orgroundresourceclaimsinethnic

identities(Cofler,Newton,andHerman1989).

Socialidentitiesinteractwithnaturalresourcesinatleastfourwaysthatshouldbetaken

intoaccountwhenestablishingPCNRMprograms.Similarlytothefourlinksbetween

violentconflict,resources,andsocialidentitiesexplainedinSection6.2.4,morethanoneof

theselinksmayoccursimultaneouslywithinonecasestudyandmayevolveovertimeinto

195

anothertypeoflink.Asthefirstlinkisadequatelyrepresentedbymuchoftheliterature

(CollierandSambanis2005;Weinstein2007),thecase‐studiesforthischapterfocusonthe

second,thirdandfourthlinks..Thelinksrepresentdifferentwaysinwhichconstitutive

property(asnaturalresources)comestoeitherconstituteindividualandgroupidentities.

Thefourlinksare:

1. EconomicConvenience:Identitygroupsaremobilizedtofightoveraresourcethathaslittleculturalorpoliticalsymbolicsignificance.

2. LackofStateControl:Socialidentitiescanbethemainwayinwhichpeopleorganizeresourcesintheabsenceofacentralizedterritorialauthority.

3. IndivisibleValue:Resourcescanhavesuchstrongculturalorpoliticalmeaningtoidentitygroupsthattheybecomeindivisibleandanylimitstouseorownershipwouldthreatenagroup’sidentity.

4. SavingFace:Winningorlosingitselfcantakeonasymbolicsignificance,evenwhenresourceownershiporaccessisofmarginaleconomicimportance.

6.4.1LINK1:ECONOMICCONVENIENCEThefirstofthesefourlinksoccursinsituationsinwhichinterestandidentitygroups

intermingleandaremobilizedtofightoveraresourcethathasactuallittleculturalor

politicalsymbolicvalue.Putdifferently,resourceswithhigheconomicorlogisticallyvalue

areatthecenterofaconflictbetweeninterestgroupsmobilizedaccordingtohistoricalor

contemporaryidentityframes.Forexample,diamondspartiallyfundedviolentconflicts

overpoliticalpowerinthe1990sinLiberiaandSierraLeone(LeBillon2008).Inthis

situation,theculturalsignificanceofthediamondswaslessimportantthanthefactthatthe

diamondsofferedalucrativerevenuestreamandthatcontrolofthatrevenuestreamcould

offerstrategicadvantagestodifferentbelligerentgroups.InLiberia,theNationalPatriotic

FrontofLiberia(NPFL)ledbyCharlesTaylordrewmanyofitsoriginaladherentsfromGio

andManogroupswhichhadbeendiscriminatedagainstbythePresidentSamuelDoe’s

appointmentofmostlyKrahntribalmemberstogovernmentposts.Theseidentity(ethnic)

groupsinvolvedintheconflictinLiberiafunctionedasinterestgroupsinregardto

diamondsastherewaswerenoclearculturalorpoliticalvalencesconnectingthespecific

resourcebasetotheidentitiesinconflict.Ifanalternativelucrative,lootableresource

becameavailable(forexampleasuddenpricespikeforsapphires)therewouldhavebeen

littlehesitationtoabandondiamondsinpursuitofalternativerevenuestreams.Inthiscase,

196

constitutivepropertyisabsentandthepolicyresponsestosucharelationbetweensocial

identityandcanbedesignedinawaythatisrelativelyindifferenttoculturalandpolitical

valuesofresources.Eliminatingrevenuestreamsthroughsanctionsorotherdirect

interventionsandprovidingalternativelivelihoodsareoftensomeoftheonlypractical

toolsavailabletoinitiatepeacebuilding.Suchinitiativesunderminethecapacitytowage

war,thoughtheymaynotstopalleconomicflowsandcanalsounderminelocallivelihoods

(Laudati2013).Thislinkisalsodescriptiveoflivelihoodconflictswhereresourceshave

onlyeconomicvalueanddonothaveculturalorpoliticalvaluetothebelligerentgroups.As

conceptualizedbythislink,resourcescanbeatthecenterofconflictsbetweengroupsthat

havemobilizedaccordingtohistoricalidentityframesorresourcescanbeatthecenterof

conflictsinwhichgroupaffiliationshavebecomedefinedinreferencetotheresource

conflictitself.

6.4.2LINK2:LACKOFSTATECONTROLThesecondlinkreferstothewaysinwhichcommunitiesmanageresourcesintheabsence

of,orinresistancetothecentralizedlegalorderofthestate.Unruh(2003)examineshow

multiplelegalandnormativeorders(normativepluralism)influencelandtenureregimesin

post‐conflictsituationswherestatepowerisweakenedorillegitimate.Thesecompeting

normativeordersareinstrumentalinterestoridentitygroupsthatmayunderminethe

state’sterritorialcontrolordisruptstate‐ledresourcemanagementpractices–practices

whichmayormaynotbeconsideredlegitimateorlegal.WorkinColumbia,EastTimor,

Mozambique,SierraLeone,Angola,andotherregionsillustratessituationswhere

inadequateunderstandingandrecognitionofidentitygroupsandtheirclaimstoproperty,

inadequaterecognitionofthesegroups’desireandneedtousealternativetypesofevidence

(forexample,tocalluponcommunitywitnessesratherthanrelyonstatutorytitlesordeeds

thatmayhavebeendestroyed),andinadequaterecognitionofthesegroups’abilityto

efficientlyandlegitimatelymanageresourceshaveplaguedpost‐conflicteffortstoenforce

andcreatestateadministeredrealpropertysystemsandlandlaws(Unruh1998,2003,

2004;Larsonetal.2010).Inthenextsection,Ielaborateonthislinkbydiscussingthecase

oftheZapatistas’propertyissuesinChiapas,Mexico.

197

CaseStudy:Chiapas,Mexico

Chiapas,locatedinthefarsouthofMexico,sharesborderswithGuatemala,andtheMexican

statesofVeracruz,Oaxaca,andTabasco.Accordingtothe2005INEGI(NationalStatistics

andGeographyInstitute)censustheregionhasnearly4,300,000inhabitantsofwhich

approximately960,000(22%)areindigenousMayan.Ofthisindigenouspopulation,81.5%

liveeitherinthehighlands,theforest,orthenorthernzoneregionofChiapas.Chiapasis

primarilyinhabitedbysubsistencefarmerswhohavesufferedfrombothethnicandclass‐

basedstructuralviolenceandhavelongexperiencedlimitedaccesstopropertyrights.In

fact,propertyissuesspecificallyinreferencetolandaccessareoneofthecentralbonesof

contentionintheregion.The1917agrarianreformsthatweremeanttodestroythe

encomiendasystem(whichwasasystemoffeudaltenurelaborandlandgrantsinherited

fromtheSpanishcolonialists)withtheejidosystem(whichwasasystemofholding

commonpropertyinacommunitytrustrecognizedbythegovernment)neveractually

impactedmanyofthelargelandholdersinthisregionastheymanagedtoholdontolarge

estatesortore‐establishestatesbytitlingadjacentpropertiestodifferentfamilymembers.

Issuessurroundinglandaccessandthemigrationofcommunitiesintothisregioncaused

manyindigenouspeopleandmigrantstomoveintotheLacondonforestareainthe1950s.

Deforestationanddegradationofresourceswithintheforestedareacausedcommunitiesto

continuetomovewithinandunderliemanypropertydisputesandconflictsintheregion.

Despitethefailureofthe1917laws,Chiapascurrentlyhasthelargestamountofejidosof

anyregioninMexico.Theseejidolandswereprotectedfromfuturesalebythelawof1917,

butwerereformedbylegislationin1992thatallowedtitlingandtransferofejidolands.

Thisnewlawisconsideredbysomeasthetriggereventincrystallizingresistancein

Chiapas(Harvey1998).

In1994,theZapatistaArmyofNationalLiberation(EjércitoZapatistadeLiberación

NacionalorEZLN)declaredwaragainsttheMexicanstate.WhiletheEZLNdeclarationof

warcoincidedwiththefirstdayofNAFTAandwascouchedinananti‐neoliberalrhetoric,

Harvey(1998,8)considerstherootsofresistanceinChiapasas“ecologicalcrisis,lackof

availableproductiveland,thedryingupofnon‐agriculturalsourcesofincome,thepolitical

andreligiousreorganizationofindigenouscommunitiessincethe1960s,andthere‐

articulationofethnicidentitieswithemancipatorypoliticaldiscourses.”Whilesomeauthors

198

believethattheleadershipofEZLNcomesfromtheMarxistleftofthe1970sthatisnow

usingtheindigenousrebellionforitsownpurposes,otherauthorsarguethattheZapatistas

constituteanoriginalindigenousrebellionbasedondemandsforlandtenure,democracy,

andrespectforindigenousrights(Harvey1998;CollierandQuaratiello2005).Eitherway,

thedemandsforancestrallandsandstatutoryrecognitionofthepreviousrightsofejidoand

communallandstoavoidtransferandalienationthroughprivatesalesareconsistent

concernsamongtheZapatistamovement.Afterthedeclarationofwartherewereseveral

instancesofviolenceagainstcommunitiessupportiveoftheZapatistagoalsandcontinued

expropriationofejidolandsforuseandsalebygovernmentorprivateindividuals.

TheZapatistastruggleinChiapasisaprotractedsocialconflictthatisstrengthenedby

persistentidentitygroup(indigenous)claimstolandandpropertyrights.Itisacaseofa

failedPCNRMinthatbetweentheperiodsofepisodicviolenceeffortscouldhavebeenmade

toreformthenationalorregionallegalframeworkforpropertyandlandtomeetthe

demandsofindigenouscommunities.Reinstatementandrespectoftheejidoandcommunal

landswereexplicitlystatedinthefivecomponentsoftheSanAndrésAccords(1996):

1. BasicrespectforthediversityoftheindigenouspopulationofChiapas.2. Theconservationofnaturalresourceswithintheterritoriesusedandoccupiedby

indigenouspeoples.3. Greaterparticipationofindigenouscommunitiesinthedecisionsandcontrolof

publicexpenditures.4. Participationofindigenouscommunitiesindeterminingtheirowndevelopment

plans,aswellashavingcontrolovertheirownadministrativeandjudicialaffairs.5. Theautonomyofindigenouscommunitiesandtheirrightoffreedeterminationin

theframeworkoftheState.

ThisconflictreflectsbothafailedpeaceagreementandfailedPCNRM.Bothcategoricaland

relationallydefinedidentitygroupshaveformedaroundtheresourcesinquestion.The

identity‐PCNRMlinksinthiscasearerepresentativeoflinktypetwoandlinktypethree.

Legitimatecommunalstructuresthatcanfunctionallymanagelandandpropertyoutsideof

acentralizedterritorialstategovernmentsystemexistandneedtoberecognizedbythe

government,reflectiveoflinktwo.Inlinkthree,identityclaimstospecificspacesandways

oflifeentailclaimsoflandandpropertythatareviolatedwhenthegovernmentassumes(as

inthe1992law)therighttoexpropriate,transfer,and/orotherwisealienateotherrights

199

fromtheindigenousowners.IntegratingRadin’sperspectiveonconstitutivepropertyinto

analysisoftheseissues,,weseeamovementherebetweenlinktwo(whereinfungible

propertycanbeeffectivelymanagedbygroups)towardslinkthree(whereinthatproperty

isconstitutiveofthegroup’sidentity).Offersofexchangesforlandelsewheredonotmeet

demandsforabsoluteownershipofancestrallands.Asconstitutiveproperty,suchlands

cannotbeexchanged.Moreover,thelogicoftheterritorialstatethatclaimsthatallodialtitle

residesinthegovernment(i.e.thattheterritorialstateisthepreeminentauthoritythat

originates,guarantees,andhastheunderlyingpowertodenyownershipoflandproperty)

isoftenindirectcontradictiontoclaimstoancestrallandsandtothewayinwhichland

propertyandgroupidentityareconstituted.Inrarecircumstances,demandsforancestral

landsaremetbyanuneasyrecognitionofnativetitleasparalleltothatoftheterritorial

stateclaimtoallodialtitle(whichmayoriginatefromtheCrownorothersourceof

authority),butprobablylessrareisasituationofongoingdisputesandconflictoversuch

landsthatexpresslinkthreeunlessinnovativeapproachestoidentityareintegratedinto

propertyconceptsandnaturalresourcemanagement.

6.4.3LINK3:INDIVISIBLEVALUEThisthirdlinkreferstotheculturalandpoliticalembeddednessofresources.Aresource

mayhaveconflictingculturalorpoliticalvaluesfordifferentidentitygroups.Forexample,

enduringseparatistmovements(liketheELAintheBasqueregionofEurope)showthat

particularplacesinthelandscapehavenotonlyeconomicandlivelihoodvaluebutalso

culturalvaluethatcannotberesolvedwithstatenarrativesofcitizenshipandterritory

(RaentoandWatson2000).Moore(2005)offersanexampleoftheseconflictingvaluesin

Zimbabwewherethedivisionoflandandprovisionofalternativelandisinsomecases

unacceptabletogroupswhoseidentityisboundtocertainplacesandspatialconfigurations.

Demandsbyrefugeesandinternallydisplacedperson(IDP),forcedtofleeduringthewarin

BosniaandHerzegovina,toreturntotheirprevioussettlementsreflectboththeneedfor

materialrecoveryandthesocialandpsychologicalvalueofcertainplaces(Mikelicet

al.2005).Indeed,thesettlerdilemmainIsraelreflectsdifferentidentitygroups’conflicting,

incommensurablevaluesregardinglandclaims(Kedar2003;Forman2006).However,

thesevaluesarenotalwaysstatic–theyareoftenmanipulatedandframedbyelitesor

200

otheractorsforstrategicpoliticalreasons.Elitemanipulationandinternalgroupdynamics

canhelpbringaboutasuddenincreaseinthepoliticalorculturalvalueofnaturalresources

orterritories.Forexample,anareasurroundingthe1,100‐year‐oldHindutemplePreah

VihearontheThaiandCambodianborderhasbeencontestedsinceatleastthenineteenth

century.AlthoughtheregionwasawardedtoCambodiabydecisionoftheInternational

CourtofJusticein1962,intimesofdomesticpoliticalupheavalinThailand,thisregionis

sometimesinvadedbyThaileaderswhowishtodisplaytheirpatrioticleaningandto

distractthepopulationfromotherpoliticalissues.Accordingtointerviewsofsomelocals,

thepoliticiansbringtheconflictovertheregiontotheforefrontofpoliticalandcultural

consciousnessandframetheconflictoverthetempleasanationalidentityissueinorderto

advancedomesticpoliticalstrategies(UnpublishedInterviewsbytheauthor,Cambodian

soldersinPreahVihearandalongThai‐CambodiabordertotheSouth–June2010).

CaseStudy:Aceh,Indonesia

TheregionofAceh,alsoreferredtoasNanggroeAcehDarussalam(NAD),isgovernedasa

specialterritorybytheGovernmentofIndonesia(GOI).In2005,thepopulationofAceh

beganrecoveryfrombotha29‐yearseparatistwarandthedevastationofthe2004Indian

OceanTsunami.Propertyandtenuresystemswereseverelydamagedbyboththearmed

conflictandtsunami(Wongetal.2007,WB2008).The2004IndianOceantsunami

inundatedthelowlandsofAcehkillingsome167,000peopleandleaving500,000more

homeless.Whilethetsunamistruckthelowlands,thetsunami’simpactschangedthe

region’spolitical,economic,social,andecologicallandscape.Inadditiontothehumandeath

toll,itisestimatedthatsome300,000landparcels,250,000homes,15%ofagricultural

lands,over2,000schools,and10,000kmofroadswereseverely‐impactedordestroyed

(Fan2006:Abidinetal.2006).Ofthe300,000parcelsaffectedbythetsunami,25%had

titlesissuedbythestateandtheother75%weremanagedunderadat(customary)and

informalinstitutions(Fitzpatrick2005a;Abidinetal.2006).WhilemuchofthelandinAceh

isnotregisteredunderstatelaw,thedestructionofsome90,000titles,registrationoffices,

andallfieldmarkersforplotidentificationcoupledwiththedeathsofBPN(NationalLand

Agency)officialsthrewthesystemofcadastresanddeedsintochaos(Abidinetal.2006).Of

course,theIndonesiacadastreisproblematicacrossIndonesiaandthestateofthecadastre

201

inAcehduringtheconflictwasunreliable,partialwithafocusonurbanareas,and

containedmanydisputedclaims(InterviewUN‐HABITAT,BandaAceh,August2006).Adat

systems,commoninruralareas,weremoreresilientthanBPN‐administeredcadastral

systems,buttheseinformalsystemsalsosufferedfromthelossofhumanknowledge

surroundinguserightsandinformalarrangements.Themassivedestructionofthetsunami

isthoughttohaveplayedanindirectroleinendingAceh’scyclicallyviolentseparatistwar

thathadclaimed15,000livesandparalyzeddevelopmentforsome29‐years(Gaillardetal.

2008;LeBillonandWaizenegger2007).TheAcehneseseparatistconflictwasbasedona

mixofidentity,political,andeconomicthemesthatdrewfromacenturyofviolentconflict

withcolonialpowersandtheIndonesianstate.Yet,eightmonthsafterthetsunami,the

HelsinkiMemorandumofUnderstanding(MoU)wassignedbetweentherebelGAM

(GerakanAcehMerdekaortheFreeAcehMovement)andtheGoI.Withanestimated$8

billioninpost‐tsunamiaidpledges,theregionthenbecameoneofthelargestreconciliation,

recovery,reconstruction,anddevelopmentprojectintheworld(Kennyetal.2006).

Whiletenuresecuritywasnotamongthecentralissuesidentifiedasproblematicforpost‐

conflictdemobilization,disarmament,andreintegration(WB2006a),tenureinsecuritywas

identifiedasamajorconcernformanyactorsinvolvedinpost‐disasterrecovery

(Fitzpatrick2005a).Manyinternationaldonors,internationalnongovernmental

organizations(INGOs),andstateactorsperceivedthelackofstate‐issuedlandtitlesin

lowlandareasdevastatedbythetsunamiasareflectionoftenureinsecurityandasacentral

obstacletotsunamirecoveryandfuturepoliticalandeconomicdevelopment(WB2006b).

Asaresponsetothisperceivedtenureinsecurity,donorsofferedtechnicalresourcesanda

budgetofUSD28.5millionforastate‐administeredlandregistrationprogramcalledthe

ReconstructionofAcehLandAdministrationSystem(RALAS).

WhileRALASemphasizedcommunityparticipationinthemappingofboundariesand

adjudicationofclaims,theemphasisontheprimacyofstatutorylaw,wide‐scalestate

registration(or‘regularization’),andissuanceoflandtitlescausedseveralproblemsforthe

program.InAceh,tenuresecurityisabalancingactbetweenthreenormativeorders(or

legalsystems):adat(customarylaw),Islamicjurisprudence,andstatutorylaw.Ofcourse,

202

thesethreeordersrepresentadramaticsimplificationofactualpracticesontheground.

Peoplesometimesdrawsimultaneouslyfromthedifferentordersorsearchforthemost

favorableforumfortheirargumentstobeheard.Theordersarenotmonolithicbodiesof

normsandlaws.Adatpracticescanchangeindifferentcommunitiesandovertimeandstate

lawchangesaccordingtojurisdiction,governmentallevel,andthedepartmentwithwhich

oneinteracts.Aswell,therearearguablyothernormativeordersatworkintheAceh

context(likerebelcontrolledareasorinternationalandtransnationaldiscoursesinvolving

humanrightsandenvironmentalstewardship).AsoneUNDPemployeestated,“Sometimes

Igetthefeelingthatouradvocacyforhumanrightsandpropertyclaimsjustdoesn’tneatly

fitintoanyoftheexistingunderstandings[adat,Islam,statutorylaw]ofwomenand

children’spropertyrights”(InterviewUNDP,Calang,May2007).Aswell,thesameUNDP

employeewentontoquestiontheprimacyofprivatepropertyformortgagesinapost‐

conflictregionthathadneitherfunctioningbankswillingtogivecreditoranestablished

andprovenlandmanagementstrategy.

Someofthegreatestchallengestodesigningaprogramthatcouldsupporttenuresecurity

wereclearlyindefiningwhatconstitutedtenuresecurityandthenidentifyinghowa

programwouldnavigatethemultiplelegalandnormativesystemsregardinglandand

propertytosupporttenuresecurity.Despitetherecognizedneedforrespectingand

workingwithnon‐statenormativeorders,RALAStransformedtheneedfortenuresecurity

intoablanketcallforlandregularization.PolicymakersinAcehadoptedHernandode

Soto’slandregularizationlogicthatequatestenuresecuritywithstatutorylandtitle(de

Soto2000).Infact,BPNandBRRofficialsexplicitlymentioneddeSoto’sideasasthebasis

forthelandadministrationprogramimplementedin2005(interviewBPN,BandaAceh,

August2006;interviewBRR,BandaAceh,August2006).Whilesuchaprogramisoftenan

importantpartofprovidingtenuresecurityforperi‐urbanandurbanresidents,for

householdsexposedtorealestatemarkets,andformigrantsinnewregions,inapost‐

conflictregionwherethestate’slegitimacyandcapacitywereundermined,theseideasneed

criticalevaluation.

Thisdiscussionbringsustoasecondmajorproblem:landisnotonlyaneconomicasset,but

203

alsoapotentculturalandpoliticalsymbol.Statutorylandtitlewasnotonlyirrelevantto

manyoftheruralcommunitiesofAcehJayaandAcehBaratthatwerenotexposedtoland

markets,itwasalsoconsideredaburden(intheformoffuturetaxesandfees)andland

titlingwasopposedbysomeofthepeoplewhostillfeltthatAcehdeservedmorethan

recognitionofspecialautonomy.Onefarmermaderemarkstypicalofmanyinterviewees,

“WhyshouldIpaytaxformyfamily’slandwhenthe[Indonesia]governmentneverdid

anythingforme”(InterviewYuli,Calang,February2008).Somecommunitymembersand

formerGAMrebelsevengreetedlandregistrationrepresentativeswithmakeshiftweapons

hiddenonthem,indeed“thiswasnotawelcomeparty”forthelandregistrationproject

(InterviewMuntasir,Calang,February2008).Interestingly,alowlandtsunamidoesnot

wipeoutallthepoliticalemotionsofmembersofaseparatistmovementbasedlargelyin

highlandandforestedareas.EvenmembersoftheUNstaffquestionedthelogicof

extendingalargelandtitlingprogramintoaregionwherecorruptionwasthenormand

governmentlegitimacy,capacity,andlegalframeworkswerenotsufficientlydevelopedto

recognizelocalpropertyrights.Infact,asof2009,oneofthemaincausesoftenuresecurity

forcommunitiesintheregioncontinuedtobestate(includingmilitary,forestry,andother

departments)claimstoland,thelackofrecognitionofcommunitymapsmadebyNGOsand

notwithBPNofficials,andthefactthatsomeoftheareasthathadbeentargetedbyRALAS

wereleftinalegalpurgatorybecausehouseholdshadonlypartiallyadvancedthroughthe

landtitlingprocesswhenRALAS(BPNofficials)lefttheircommunities.Additionally,the

AcehLegalAidFoundation’sactivitiesofeducatingcommunitiesabouttheirpropertyrights

andmountinglegalchallengestopropertygrantsandtransfersenactedduringtheconflict

yearsledtothearrestofsomeoftheirstaffforcommittingactsagainstthestate(Interview

Mukir,BandaAceh,June2008).

Inthiscase,thelackofsufficientattentionto(1)aclearstatutorylegalframeworkfor

recognizingpropertyrightsandalternativetenuresystems,(2)localincentivesand

disincentives62totitlelandwiththestate,and(3)lingeringidentityconflict(i.e.separatist

62Whilefirsttimeregistrationfeeswerecovered,futuretransactioncostsandtaxeswereunclearandusuallynotexplainedtoregistrants.Also,themaintargetedbenefitoftheprogramwastoallowtitledholdersto“liberatetheirdeadcapital”(InterviewBPN,BandaAceh,August2006).Yet,despite

204

sentimentinareasofAceh)ledthestatetopursueaprogramthatintheendissuedless

than30%ofitstargeted600,000titles.Returningtothequestionofsocialidentity–PCNRM

framework,inthiscaseweseealinkthree(resourceswithsuchstrongculturalorpolitical

meaningtoidentitygroupsthattheybecomeindivisibleandanylimitstouseorownership

wouldthreatenagroup’sidentity)butalsolinktwo(organizationintheabsenceofa

centralizedterritorialauthority–interestandidentitygroups).Recognizingandfactoringin

theconstitutivedimensionofpropertytothepolicydevelopmentstageinAcehmayhave

helpedovercomesomeoftheproblemswithdeterminingappropriateactivities,timing,

locations,andformsofpropertyforimplementingatenuresecurityproject.Itmayhaveat

leastledtoquestionsabouttherelevanceofprivatepropertycategoriesandtimingand

logicofimplementinglandtitlinginornearformerrebelregionsandareasthathadnever

previouslybeenregisteredduetolackofcommunitydesiretosellland.

6.4.4LINK4:SAVINGFACEThefourthlinkdescribeswhenwinningorlosingitselfcantakeonasymbolicsignificance,

evenwhenresourceownershiporaccessisofmarginaleconomicimportance.Inthese

anecdotalevidenceofbusinesspeopleinBandaAcehandotherurbanareasmortgagingtheirland,mostofthepeopleinAcehhavealternativemeanstoaccesstemporaryfinancialassistancethroughsocialnetworksorarrangementsinvolving,forexample,forwardsalesofcropharvests,cooperatives,ormortgageonvehicles(DirectObservation,April‐May2007).Thesearrangementsaretypicallypreferableformostofthepoorandruralareaswherecommunitiesdonotwanttoriskthemainsourceoftheirlivelihoodsorwellbeing(theirlandorhome)andcannotextractlandthatisembeddedinsocialrelationsandobligations(InterviewMukir,BandaAceh,June2008).Severalbankrepresentativesexpressedhesitationattakinglandascollateralevenifitisformallytitledbecausethesocialrelationsandlegalframeworksurroundingthelandmaylimititsuseandbecauseitisdifficulttovaluerurallandswherethereisnodevelopedmarket.Deutsch(2009:43)reportedthat“withinthestudysample,onlyabout2.5%ofrespondentsreportedaccessingcreditfromcommercialbankspriortoreceivingRALASlandtitles,whilenearly7%tookbankloansafterthereceiptoftitles.”Yet,henotesthesmallsamplesizeanddoesnotaccountforfactorslikethepossibleincreaseininvestmentandloweringofcollateralstandardsintheregionduetotheendofthewarorthefocusofthestudyonareaswherelandmarketsalreadyexist.Whilethereareplentyofexamplesofhowformalregistrationhasallowedinvestmentinurbanareas,thereisnoclearevidencethatlivelihoodsrequiredformallandtitleorthattheprocessofregisteringlandhasallowedthepoortoaccessmoreresourcesorencouragedinternationalinvestmenttothebenefitfromthepeacebuildingprocess.

205

situations,theactofwinningorlosingconflictsoverresourcestakesonsymbolicvalueand

victoryitselfbecomesanewsourceofpoliticalvaluewhetherornottheresourceis

economicallyvaluable.MostofthebelowmaterialisdrawndirectlyfromthePermanent

CourtofArbitrationdocumentationonTheGovernmentofSudan/TheSudanPeople’s

LiberationMovement/Army(AbyeiArbitration)(2009).

CaseStudy:Abyei,Sudan

AbyeiislocatedatthecenterofSudaninanoil‐richareathathasbeenattheheartofa

disputebetweencommunitiesrepresentingthenorthandsouthofSudanforthepast40

years.ThemainpopulationsinthisregionaretheNgokDinka(whoareassociatedwiththe

southandtheSudanPeople’sLiberationArmy(SPLA))andtheMessiria(whoareassociated

withthenorthandtheKhartoum‐basedgovernment).Althoughtherehasneverbeena

clearandunanimouslyacceptedlinedividingthisregionintonorth‐southzones,in2005

theAbyeiBordersCommissionattemptedtodelineatenorthandsouthzonesinthisregion.

TheresultsoftheAbyeiBorderCommissionwererejectedbytheKhartoum‐based

governmentandfrom2005‐2009theregionexperiencedseveralboutsofviolentconflict

andmassmigrationsofthousandsofpeople.Inanticipationofa2011referendumforthe

independenceofsouthernSudan,thePermanentCourtofArbitration(PCA)inTheHague

attemptedtoredefinethebordersoftheAbyeiregionon22July2009.

Although,thePCAborderschangedcontrolofnearly45,000squarekilometersoflandfrom

thesouthtothenorthandalsogavealargepartoftheregion’srichoilfieldsandthearea

throughwhichtheGreatNileoilpipelinerunstotheKhartoum‐controlledgovernmentof

thenorth,thePCAdecisionswerelargelycelebratedasawin‐windecision.Oneofthe

reasonscitedfortheintractableconflictwasthefactthattheinterestsofthedifferent

groupshadnotbeenclearlydefined.Whilebothpartieswereinterestedincontrollingthe

oilfieldsandpipeline,theactofwinning(ornotlosing)inthissituationtookonasymbolic

significancefortheNgokDinka,asignificancethatwentbeyondmaterialinterestsinthe

allocationoftheregion’srichoilfields.ThePCArulingresultedinanunequaldivisionofthe

oilrichesbutrecognizedboththeterritory’ssignificancetotheNgokDinka(atypethree

link)andtheimportanceofnotlosingtobothparties(atypefourlink).

206

Redrawingthebordersoftheregion,therulinggivesthenorthuncontestedrightstorichoildepositsliketheHegligoilfield,whichhadpreviouslybeenplacedwithinAbyei. But the decision leaves at least one oil field inAbyei and gives a symbolicvictory to the NgokDinka, affirming their claims to the heartland of the fertileregion… “Who controls Abyei has taken on a symbolic importance beyond thetraditionaltensionsoveroil,”saidColinThomas‐Jensen(Otterman2009:online)

Inadditiontothefourlinksjustdescribed,largerconflictsmayalsospilloverintosmaller

resourcedisputesorunderminePCNRMprojectsthatdonotseemtoberelatedtothe

centralproblemsoftheoriginalconflict.Forexample,landadministrationprogramsinAceh

from2005–2008didnotadequatelyrecognizeseparatistidentityissuesandhowthese

issuesimpactedthelegitimacyoftheIndonesianstateinaseparatistregionandthusthe

state’sabilitytoimplementalandadministrationsystemortheappropriatetimingand

locationofsuchaprogram(DirectObservation,April‐May2007).Whereexistingframesfor

cooperationandlegitimacydonotexistandcannotbecreated,communityparticipation—

especiallyinlandusedecisions—maynotbeforthcoming(KaufmanandSmith1999).The

shadowofidentityconflictcanbecastoverresourcesnotdirectlyinvolvedinarmed

conflict.

6.5POLICYRESPONSES

Becausethefourlinksdescribedabovemayoccurinanycombinationinaconflictorpost‐

conflictsetting,therecanbenosinglerecipeforPCNRMinsituationswheresocialidentity

isinvolved..Tobeeffective,policiesmustfirstsimplyrecognizethatsocialidentityplaysa

keyroleinPCNRMandthatsocialidentityisneitherinheritednorstaticbutisrather

constructed,eithercategoricallyorrelationally,throughaframingprocessthatmustbe

understoodinordertosuccessfullyengageinapeacebuildingprocess.Recognizinghow

constitutivepropertyfiguresinidentityisalsocriticalindeterminingwhatapproachesare

appropriateforthetypeoflinkbetweenidentityandnaturalresources.Whereaconflictof

interestovereconomicvaluesexistsbetweengroups,economicincentivescanoften

contributetopeacebuilding.However,whereconflictsoverculturalandpoliticalvaluesare

entrenchedinprotractedsocialconflicts,moreintensereframing(awayfromconflict

identitiesortowardsstrategiesforpartialrecognition)arerequired.Severalpost‐conflict

policyoptionsfordealingwithPCNRMandidentityissuesaredescribedinTable5.1.

207

Inexaminingtheselinksthroughthreecasestudies,Ipresentedhowtheselinkscanoccur

simultaneouslyandhowpoliticalandculturalvaluesarenotnaturallypresent–theyare

continuallymanipulatedbyelitesandotherinstitutionsoractorsortransformedthrough

alternatingcontextsandframingprocesses.ReferringbacktothecaseofAceh,weseeclearly

typicalcharacteristicsoflinktwoandthree,suggestingthatamoreappropriateresponse

wouldhavebeenstaterecognitionofgrouppropertyrights,community‐basedNRMwith

appropriatelegalframework,recognitionoftheauthorityofthevariousidentitygroups,anda

state‐ledreorganizationofpropertyrights.SuchapproachesareoutlinedinTable5.1which

canbeappliedtoeachofthecasestudiestoexaminepossibleapproachestoPCNRMthat

mightprovetosupportpeacebuildingbyrecastingidentityasaframingprocessand

recognizingthatdifferentidentityframesarelinkedtonaturalresourcesindifferentways.

Radin’s(1993)ideaofpersonhoodandpropertyprovidesanavenuetorecognizeandexplore

whichidentityframesmayormaynotbelinkedtoconstitutiveorfungiblepropertytypes.In

thecaseoflinkoneconnectionsinLiberia,IarguethatPCNRMinterventionsintomanaging

controloverfungiblepropertyiscritical,butdoesnotnecessarilyneedtoimplicate

complicatedsocialidentityrelations.InChiapas,boththeabilitytomanagefungibleproperty

inabsenceofcentralterritorialcontrol(Link2)andconnectionsthatrecognizeconstitutive

propertyandidentityconnections(Link3)werepresent.Thissituation,likethatofAceh,

requiresmorenuancedapproachestomanagingauthorityandidentitybasedclaimsto

resources.SuchapproachesarepresentedinTable5.1.Lastly,inthecaseofAbyei,simply

equitablydividingresourcesorresourceaccessisnotnecessarilytheresolutiontosituations

whereidentityisnotclearlytiedtotheresourcesitself,buttovictoryinaresourcebased

conflict(Link4).Insuchcases,approachesthatreframeidentitycategoriestofindnew

groundtoworkfromorthatbaseapproachestoresolutiononproceduraljusticevictories

ratherthanoutcomevictoriesaresomeofthemostinterestingandpossiblyproductive

approachestoPCRNMandpeacebuilding.

208

Table6.1PCNRMPolicyOptions

ConflictType

Socialidentity–naturalresourcelink

PossiblepolicyresponsesConflictsofinterest

Resourcesareatthecenterofconflictsbetweengroupsthathavemobilizedaccordingtohistoricidentityframesordefinedthemselvesinreferencetotheresourceconflict.

1. Interrupthigh‐valueresourcecommoditychains,andprovidealternativelivelihoods.

2. Interruptrelationalorcategoricalmodesofidentificationwithnarrativesfromalternativehistoricalperiodsorinterestframes.

Socialidentitiesarethemainwayinwhichpeopleorganizeresourcesintheabsenceofacentralizedterritorialauthority.

1. Seekstaterecognitionofgrouppropertyrights,whichusepropertyadministrationsystemsorientedtowardcommunalandindividualtitles.63

2. Implementcommunity‐basedNRMwithappropriatelegalframeworks.

3. Recognizetheauthorityofidentitygroupsorassign

authoritytothem.4. Seekstate‐ledreorganizationofpropertyrights,where

itispossibletoequitablyimplementsuchprogramsinaccordancewithexistingrightsandobligations.

Conflictsofvalue

Resourceshavesymbolicculturalorpoliticalmeaningandmaybeindivisible.

1. Disaggregatethedemandsofgroupstoseeifseparaterights,timing,locations,orothervariablescanbenegotiatedaccordingtoidentitygroup.

2. Reframeidentitybeyondcategoricalmodesof

identificationusingreferencestoalternativehistoricalperiodsorinterestframes.

Winningorlosingtakesonasymbolicsignificanceeveniftheresourcesthemselvesareofmarginalimportance.

1. Disaggregatethedemandsofgroupstoseeifseparaterights,timing,locations,orothervariablescanbenegotiatedaccordingtoidentitygroup.Thisapproachmayrevealthatthereisnorealconflictofvalue,oratleastclarifywhattheconflictofvalueisabout.

2. Seekagreementonproceduraljusticestandards.3. Reframeidentitybeyondcategoricalmodesof

identificationusingreferencestoalternativehistoricalperiodsorinterestframes.

63Thiscanbedonebyadvocatingforlandadministrationsystemsandlegalframeworkscapableofrecognizingcommunalandindividualstitlesanddevelopingsocialtenuredomainsmodels.Asocialtenuredomainmodel(STDM)isatypeoflandadministrationsystemthatusesalternativerepresentationalformatstorepresentpropertyownershipinsituationswherestrictlydefined,parcel‐basedlandadministrationdoesnotcorrelatetoactualrelationsontheground.TheSTDMisanefforttodeveloppro‐poor,flexiblelandadministrativesystems(Lemmen2010).

209

6.6CONCLUSION

Thelinksbetweensocialidentityandnaturalresourcesinviolentconflictsaffectthe

strategiesthatcanbeusedforsuccessfulPCNRM.Therearefourkeywaysinwhich

identitiesareconstructedinreferencetoarmedconflictsinvolvingresources,andfourways

inwhichsocialidentityandnaturalresourcesarelinkedinPCNRM.ThefourPCNRMlinks

andthepolicyresponsesidentifiedinthischapterprovidethebeginningofapolicytoolfor

understandingconnectionsbetweennaturalresources,socialidentity,andpeacebuilding.

Applyingthispolicytoolmayprovideinsightsintowaystomanageresourcesfor

peacebuildinginsituationsthatareconsideredintractable.Whilecurrentpolicyresponses

frequentlyfocusonfixedsocialidentitiesandstaticterritorialboundaries,,alternative

approachesthatengagewithconstructivistunderstandingsofsocialidentitymayprovide

opportunitiesforcreativesolutions.Thesecreativesolutionsmightinvolvereframing

identitiesinordertodisruptincentivestoviolence,searchingforwaystorecognizegroup

rights,establishingproceduraljusticestandardsfornegotiation,ordisaggregatinggroup

demandsintonegotiablesubsets.

Furtherworkinthisareamightfocusonwhichresourcescommonlyaccruehighsymbolic

valueandwhatarewaysinwhichtheseresourcescanbemanaged.Furtherresearchis

neededtoexaminehowalternativedefinitionsofsocialidentityanddifferentformsof

violentconflictatdifferentsocialandpoliticalscalesmightchangethelinksandthus

foundationsoftheanalyticalframeworkidentifiedinthispaper.Disaggregatingtheways

thatdifferenttypesofidentityandinterestgroupslinktoPCNRMandexploringhow

specificgroupcharacteristics(gender,class,orotherwise)andspecificresourcetypes

interactwouldfurtheradvancethepolicytoolIofferinthischapter.Finally,nextsteps

involveapplyingthisoranimprovedframeworktosinglecasestudiesinordertoprovide

morein‐depthunderstandingofsocialidentityformation,mobilization,andinvolvementin

violentresourceconflicts.

210

CHAPTERSEVEN:CONCLUSION

Inthisdissertation,Ihavearguedthatpost‐conflictdynamicsaroundpropertywerelargely

overlookedintheaftermathofthemassivenaturaldisasterinAcehin2004.TheGOIand

WorldBankmovedforwardwithstatutorytitlingsystemduetothedestructioncausedby

thenaturaldisaster.Yet,theymovedforwardinJune2005beforeapeaceagreementhad

beenreachedbypartiesatwarwitheachotherfor29‐yearsandinaregionwherethestate

runpropertysystemwaswidelyconsideredascorrupt,expensive,andnotrelevanttothe

everydaypracticesofpeopleontheground.ThisdissertationdoesnotarguethatRALAS

wasfutile,butratherthatinsettingasideconflictissuesaroundproperty,RALASdidnot

reachitsfullpotentialandwasinadequatelytimedanddesignedforthecomplexitiesonthe

ground.Iarguethatinpromotingavisionofpropertyasonlyarighttobeguaranteedby

thestate,andspecificallytherighttotransfer,thesocialembednessofpropertywas

overlookedtothedetrimentoftheprojectandtothepeopleofAceh.Clearly,therewere

bureaucraticbottlenecks,buttheunderlyingpost‐conflictpropertydynamicswerenever

recognizedandthishinderedimplementationandparticipation.Thewaysthatsocial

identityisinterlinkedtopropertyandpeacebuilding;thewaysthatjuralrelationsof

propertyaremanipulatedoverscalesofgovernance;andthewaysthatnarratives

surroundingpropertysupportspecificjustificationsforanddefinitionsofpropertyallneed

tobeconsideredinpost‐conflictscenarios–eventhoseinmassivepost‐disastersettings.

Whilethelinksbetweenpropertyandterritoryarecomplex,thewebsofgovernancein

whichpeoplelivetheirlivesareclearlyinfluencedbywaysinwhichcommunitiesand

modernstatesinfluencethegridofpropertyrelationsthatdefinetheirsociospatial

existence(Blomley2003).JeremyBenthamwroteinhisbookTheoryoflegislationthat,

“Thereisnoimage,nopainting,novisibletrait,whichcanexpresstherelationthat

constitutesproperty.Itisnotmaterial,itismetaphysical;itisamereconceptionofthe

mind”(1864,111).Thewaysinwhichweapproachpropertyreflecthowweconceiveofour

worldandourproperplaceinthatworld.Inpost‐conflictsocieties,propertythusoften

meansmorethanjustameanstoalivelihoodoraclaimtoinheritance.Itmeanstakinga

stanceonspecificsocialrelations,specificrelationsbetweennationsandstates,andspecific

waysoflivingintheworld.Ifnothingelse,thisdissertationrevealsthatindevelopment

211

circles,theviewofGrayandGray(2009,87)that“oureverydayreferencestopropertyare

unreflective,naïveandrelativelymeaningless”isnotonlytruebutdangerouslytrueinthe

contextofpeacebuilding.

TheDecember2006electionsinAcehwerecelebratedasaremarkableevent.Theywere

“thefirst‐everdirectlocalelectionsinAceh,thefirstelectionsthereofanykindafterthe

August2005Helsinkipeaceagreement[…]andthefirstinIndonesiaallowingindependent

(non‐partyaffiliated)candidatestostand”(ICG2007,1).Thenewlyelectedgovernorof

Aceh(IrwandiYusuf)wasaformerGAMmemberthatsurvivedthetsunamibyclimbing

abovethewatertotheroofoftheKeudahPrisoninBandaAcehwherehewasbeingheldfor

interrogationduringthewar(Mydans2007).Thestoriesofhissurvivalofthetsunamiand

thereemergenceofAcehnesesocietyaftertheconflictrepresentthesuccessofaresilient

people.Yet,an“unfinishedreconciliation”hauntstheAcehneserecoveryandintegration

intoIndonesiansociety(JakartaPost,27February2012).

Celebrationsoverthe2006electionstendedtooverlooktheinternaldivisionswithinGAM;

theimpactofGovernorIrwandiYusuf’sabsoluterejectionoftheseparatistagendaand

failuretocallmorestronglyforjusticeforconflictvictims;thecomplexrolethatIslam

playedinAcehnesepoliticsandwouldplayingovernance;andtheongoingstruggle

betweenprovincialelitesandtheGOIoverrepresentationofregionalpoliticalparties(ICG

2007;Aspinall2009,2012).Since2006,therehavebeenseveralincidentsofviolencethat

raisequestionsaboutthestabilityofpeace,includingkidnappingandbeatingofsoldiersby

factionsofGAM(JakartaPost,29September2008).Despitethedisarmament,weapons

remaindistributedthroughouttheprovince(JakartaPost,27February2012).Thebuildup

tothe2012electionswasmarredbyseveraldeaths,intimidation,andanassassination

attemptonIrwandiYusuf(Bachelard2012;JakartaPost,28February2012).Whilethe

recentpoliticalviolencehasbeencategorizedasviolencebetweenformerGAMmembers,it

indicatesthatacultureandcapacityforviolencestillexist.TheAcehParty’sZainiAbdullah

(theGAMnegotiatorfortheHelsinkiMOU)andMuzakirManaf(formerGAMguerilla

commander)wonthegovernoranddeputygovernor’sseatwithover50%oftheprovincial

212

Figure7.1Sectionofthe2012electionposterforGovernorZainiAbdullahandDeputyGovernorMuzakirManaf.Source:PartaiAceh

votein2012.TheircampaignutilizedGAMrelatedsymbols,dresseditselfinclothingand

symbolsrepresentativeofAcehneseidentity,andassociateditselfcloselywithIslamicpiety

(seeFigure7.1whereintheclothingrepresentsAcehnesetraditionalgarbandInsyaAllahis

theIndonesianspellingofthecommonMuslimsaying“godwilling”).Thecampaignran

undertheslogan“StruggleandPeace”(Perjuangan&Perdamaian)indicatingthattheparty

embodiedboththehistoricbattletoliberatetheAcehneseandacommitmenttopeacein

thefuture.Yet,aftertheinaugurationceremoniesforZaini,theformergovernorIrwandi

wasphysicalbeatenaspartisanscalledhimatraitortoGAMandAceh(Arnak2012).

InAugust2012,theWaliNanggroeMalikMuhamadechoedseveralyearsofcomplaints

aboutthe2006LOGAwhenhestatedthatifremainingissuesfromthe2005HelsinkiMOU

werenotsettledby2014,“hecouldnolongerguarantee[theabsenceof]futureproblems

213

betweenIndonesiaandGAM”(PartaiAceh,15August2012).InMarch2013,theDPRA

passedaqanunthatmadetheformerGAMrebelflagthenewprovincialflag.Jakartagave

theAcehgovernment15daysto“rethinkitsbylaw”inthecontextofIndonesiannational

integrity(Simanjuntak2013).InApril2013,AmnestyInternationalreleasedareportthat

acknowledgedthegreatsuccessofeconomicdevelopmentandregionalautonomyinAceh,

butalsooutlinedthefailuresoftheGOItoacknowledgeandremedythedamagestoconflict

survivors(AmnestyInternational2013).AmnestyInternationalarguedthatthesefailures

toaddresstruthandreconciliationandlingeringconflictissuesposedanongoingthreatto

peace.TheJakartaPostwentwiththeheadline“AcehatRiskofRetuningtoViolence”

(Dawsonetal.2013).

Nearlyadecadeafterthetsunami,thephysicalandculturallandscapesofAcehremain

markedbythenaturaldisasterandthirty‐yearconflict.Acomplexpoliticallandscapethat

combinesAcehneseidentity,Islamicprinciples,violence,andterritorialcontrolcontinuesto

playoutthroughthemanylevelsofgovernmentinAceh.Infact,politicsinAcehmightbe

consideredthecontinuationofwarbyothermeans.64Thecontrolofpropertyandterritory

hasalwaysandcontinuestoplayanimportantroleindeterminingthestrengthofauthority.

Ageographyofpeaceisnotsimplytheabsenceofviolentconflict.Ageographyofpeaceisa

recognitionofjusticeinthesociospatialprocessesthroughwhichwemakeourworld.At

theheartofmanyofthosesociospatialprocessesisourpersonalrelationshipwithland,as

mediatedbythesocialrelationsofproperty.Inthisdissertation,Ihaveexploredseveral

waysofmovingbeyondconceptualizingpropertyasasimplebundleofrights.This

dissertationgoesbeyondrights‐basedapproachestoadvanceunderstandingofhowthe

socialembeddednessofpropertyimpactsPCNRMandpeacebuildingbycriticallyexamining

experiencesanddebatesregardingpropertyinpost‐disaster,post‐conflictAceh,Indonesia.

Eachofthethreeobjectivesinthedissertationwasexaminedinthreemanuscriptsthat

maketheoreticalandpracticalcontributionstothefieldsofproperty,PNCRMand

peacebuilding,legalgeography,andsocialidentity.64CarlvonClausewitzfamouslysaid“Waristhecontinuationofpoliticsbyothermeans.”

214

ChapterFouraddressedthefirstobjectiveandidentifiedhowtheframingofproperty

issuesbyindividualsandorganizationsactiveinpost‐disaster/post‐conflictrecoveryand

reconstruction(stabilizationandtransition)impactedthedesign,implementation,and

outcomesofthelandtitlingprojectRALAS.Ininvestigatinghowpropertyissueswere

framedinAceh,IusedRose’s(1994)workonthenarrativesofproperty.Drawingfromthe

conceptsof‘propertiedlandscape’(Blomley1998)and‘evidencelandscape’(Unruh2006),I

arguedthatnarrativesthatframedpropertyissuesaspost‐disasterproblemsledtopolicies

thatfailedtoconsiderthenexusofproperty,land,socialidentity,andpoliticalauthorityina

separatistregion;impactedthesuccessofRALASinissuinglandtitles;andledtomissed

opportunitiesforpost‐conflictlandmanagementtocontributetopeacebuilding.This

chapterconcludedwithanumberoflessonslearnedregardingimprovementstolegal

ambiguity,appropriatetimingandgeographiclocationsforpropertyregistration,linking

communityparticipationtoadministrativetransparencyandaccountabilityinorderto

improveconfidenceintheregistrationprocess,andintegratingpost‐conflictandpost‐

disasteractivitieswhendealingwithlandissuesincomplexpoliticalemergencies.

ChapterFiveaddressedthesecondobjectiveandexaminedtheinteractionofpolitical

authority,scalarpolitics,andproperty.Ioutlinedaframeworkforunderstandingproperty

basedonHohfeld’s(1913)workonjuralrelations,Singer’s(2000)workonobligations,and

scalarpoliticsinrelationtoproperty(Sikor2004;McCarthy2005a,2005b;Mackinnon

2011).Iexaminedexperiencesofpropertyregistrationandlandtitlinginaruralvillageand

aperi‐urbanneighborhoodinAceh,Indonesia.Inbothcases,theprocessofformalizing

propertyrightsinstatutorysystemsfundamentallychangeswaysinwhichpropertyis

definedandenactedontheground.Theresearchresultsshowedthattheconsolidationof

politicalauthorityandtheoutcomesofpost‐conflictnaturalresourcemanagement

strategiesweredependentontheinterplayofpropertyrelationsandscalarpolitics.I

arguedthatrecognitionofthewayscalardimensionsofpropertyrelationsinteractwith

authorityprovidesinsightsintotheappropriatetiming,location,andproceduresforland

titlinginpost‐conflictscenarios.Inaddition,Iusedthelinksbetweenscalarpoliticsand

propertyrelationstosuggestthattheoriesofnormativepluralismandunderstandingsof

legalambiguityneedtoincludeabetterunderstandingofsociospatialscale.Inconclusion,I

215

arguedthataninternationalbodythathasthetechnicalandtheoreticalskillstointegrate

approachestomixednaturaldisasterandconflictscenariosmightbeabletoprovidethe

oversightnecessaryforintegratingdifferentstreamsofaid.Theframeworkinthischapter

isanovelapproachtocombiningpropertyrelationsandscalarpolitics.

ChapterSixaddressedthethirdobjectiveanddevelopedapolicytoolintegratingthe

complexityofthesocialembeddednessofpropertyintothedesignofpost‐conflictnatural

resourcemanagementandpeacebuildingpolicyoptions.UsingRadin’s(1993)ideaof

‘personhood’or‘constitutiveproperty’Iexaminedhowlinksbetweensocialidentity,

naturalresources,andarmedconflictsaffectpeacebuildingandpost‐conflictnatural

resourcemanagement(PCNRM).Iarguedthatsocialidentitiesareflexiblyconstructedand

linkedtonaturalresourcesthroughbothindividualagentdecisionsandelitemanipulation

ofpoliticaldiscourses.Ioutlinedwaysinwhichsocialidentitiesaremobilizedinconflicts

whereinresourceshavepoliticalandculturalvalues.DrawingfrommyfieldworkinAceh

andreviewofotherPCNRMcases,Iproposedapolicytoolforassistingproperty

managementinpost‐conflictenvironmentsthatembodyanumberofdifferentpossible

socialidentity,naturalresource,andconflictconnectionsoutlinedinthetext.

WhiletheabovechaptersmakecontributionstotheoryandpracticeinthefieldofPCRNM,

therewerelimitationstomyresearch.Inadditiontothetypicalchallengesofresearchin

internationalareas(e.g.,learninganewlanguage,recruitingtranslators,dealingwith

logistics,thecostoftravel,andlearningnewadministrativesystems)theresearchinthis

dissertationoccurredinapost‐conflictcontextwhereinformantinformationissensitive.It

wasoftendifficulttogainaccesstopoliticalelitesandformercombatants.Although,I

promisedlocalintervieweesdiscretionwiththeirinformationastoavoidanyrepercussion

fortheircooperationwiththisresearch,inevitablythewrittentextofthedissertation

providescluestosomeofthepeoplethatIinterviewed.Ihavedonemybesttochange

nameswhenappropriatesoasnottojeopardizethesafetyofrespondents.Other

researchersintheregionhavereleasedlonglistsofallpeoplecontactedinthefieldthatI

personallydonotfeelcomfortablereleasinggiventhecommitmentIhavetomaintaining

confidentialityofmyinformants.

216

Asanon‐Muslim,Iwasoccasionallydeniedaccesstosomeareas.Asaman,Ididnothave

accesstointerviewswithmanywomentogaintheirinsightsandexperiencesregarding

property,especiallyinruralareas.Finally,asmyresearchtookplaceoverseveraltripsand

severalyears,sometimesthepeopleIinterviewedoneyearwouldbegonebythetimeI

camebacktocheckonhowtheirstorywasevolvinginfollowingtrips.Whilethisistobe

expectedinanylongitudinalstudy,itwasdifficultinAcehformetoobtainfollowup

informationtocontactpeoplethathadmovedontoothercitiesorbacktovillages.

Thisdissertationisaspringboardforanumberoffutureresearchprojects.Whileofgreat

interesttomeduringmydataanalysis,Iwasunabletointegratetheapproachto

recognitionbetweensocio‐legalsystemsthatMorseandWoodman(1988)outlinedueto

thecomplexityofthefieldinAceh.Inliteratureonnormativepluralism,muchhasbeen

writtenaboutthecompetitionbetweennormativeordersbutlessabouttheirhybridity

(Santos2006).MorseandWoodman’sapproachmightprovidesomeinterestinginsights

intolegalhybriditythatinformbothhowstatutorysystemstreatevidenceandhowpolitical

activistsmightapproachpropertyissues.

Innormativepluralismliteraturethereisanopportunityfornewanalysesthatexamine

typesofnormativeorders(Tamanaha2007b)andwhetherdifferenttypesofnormative

ordersusesimilartypesofevidence,propertynarratives,anddisputeresolution

mechanisms.Suchresearchisnotlimitedtopost‐conflictscenarios,butcouldbeappliedto

anumberofsituationsinindustrializingandindustrializedcountries.

AsmentionedinbothChapterFourandChapterSix,moreworkneedstobedoneon(1)

establishingappropriatetimingofinterventionsfortenuresecurityinpost‐conflict

scenarios,(2)understandinghowtocreatelegalframeworksthatcanintegratemultiple

approachestopropertyinregionalsystemswhileavoidinglegalambiguity,and(3)

investigatinghowtocreatetemporarystatutorylawsthatpromotephasedtransitionsto

unifiedpropertyadministrationsystems–whereappropriate.Likewise,socialtenure

domainmodels(STDM)mightprovidesomeuniquetoolsforrecognizingthesocial

embeddednessofpropertyandIbelievethatmoreexplorationofsuchmodelsinpost‐

conflictscenarioscanbeanimportantpracticalcontributiontothefield.

217

InChapterFive,Iproposeapolicytoolbutalsocallformoreresearchonhowtoapproach

socialidentityanddifferenttypesofviolentconflictsandnaturalresources.Workonthe

characteristicsofnaturalresourceshasalreadyshownthatthegeographiclocationand

characteristics(e.g.,marketvalue,spatialdiffusion,and‘lootability’)ofnaturalresources

playaroleindeterminingtheconnectionsbetweenconflictandnaturalresources(Ross

2004).Likewise,suchcharacteristicsshouldbefactoredintounderstandingPCNRMfor

peacebuilding.

Aswecometothecloseofthisdissertation,Ihopethatthereadertakesawayakeensense

thatthephilosophicalandlegalapproachestopropertyusedindevelopmentareoften

missingsomekeyingredients;namely,awarenessofthenarratives,emotiveconnections,

andactualjuralrelationsthatconstituteproperty.Approachestopropertymanagementin

post‐conflictscenariosaroundtheworldreflectthesebiases.Inpointingoutthesebiases

andexploringalternativewaysofapproachingproperty,Ihopethatthisdissertationopens

upnewwaysofunderstandingpropertyandhearingwhatjusticetrulymeanstopeople

dispossessedoflandandpropertyinpost‐conflictscenarios.

218

REFERENCES

Abidin,H.Z.,H.Andreas,I.Gumilar,F.H.Adiyanto,W.Rusmawar,andFirmansyah.2011.OntheUseofGPSCORSforCadastralSurveyinIndonesia.InFIGWorkingWeek2011,BridgingtheGapbetweenCultures,18‐22May2011.Marrakech,Morocco.

Abidin,H.Z.,T.S.Haroen,andE.Heryani.2006.Post‐TsunamiLandParcelReconstructioninAceh :Aspects,StatusandProblems.InShapingtheChange.XXIIIFIGCongress,8‐13October2006.Munich,Germanyhttp://www.fig.net/pub/fig2006/papers/ts45/ts45_03_abidin_etal_0503.pdf.

ACARP(AcehCommunityAssistanceResearchProject).2007.TheAcehneseGampongThreeYearsOn:AssessingLocalCapacityandReconstructionAssistanceinPost‐TsunamiAceh.Melbourne,Australia.

Agnew,J.1997.Thedramaturgyofhorizons:Geographicalscaleinthe“ReconstructionofItaly”bythenewItalianpoliticalparties,1992‐95.PoliticalGeography16:99–121.

Allen,J.2003.Lostgeographiesofpower.Malden,MA ;Oxford:BlackwellPub.

AmnestyInternational(AI).2013.TimetoFacethePast:JusticeforPastAbusesinIndonesia’sAcehProvince.London,U.K.

Andre,C.,andJ.P.Platteau.1998.Landrelationsunderunbearablestress:RwandacaughtintheMalthusiantrap.Journalofeconomicbehaviororganization34(1):1–47.http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/12321893.

Andrew,E.G.J.2006.Proscale:furtherreflectionsonthe“scaledebate”inhumangeography.TransactionsoftheInstituteofBritishGeographers31(3):399–406.http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1475‐5661.2006.00210.x.

Arma,Z.2012.Whenindigenouspeoplefightfortheirlandrights.DowntoEarth:Online.http://www.downtoearth‐indonesia.org/story/when‐indigenous‐peoples‐fight‐their‐land‐rights(lastaccessed26April2013).

Arnak,F.2012.Aceh’sEx‐GovernorIrwandiFearsforSafetyAfterAssault.JakartaGlobe1July:1–2.www.thejakartaglobe.com/lawandorder/acehs‐ex‐governor‐irwandi‐fears‐for‐safety‐after‐assault/527729.

Ashforth,B.E.,andF.Mael.1989.SocialIdentityTheoryandtheOrganization.AcademyofManagementReview14(1):20–39.http://www.jstor.org/stable/258189?origin=crossref.

Ashmore,R.D.,L.J.Jussim,andD.Wilder.2001.SocialIdentity,IntergroupConflict,andConflictReductioneds.R.Ashmore,L.Jussim,andD.Wilder.OxfordUniversityPress.http://www.jstor.org/stable/3089945?origin=crossref.

Aspinall,E.2009.Islamandnation :separatistrebellioninAceh,Indonesia.Stanford,Calif.:StanfordUniversityPress.

219

———.2012.SeparatisminAceh.InSocialActivisminSoutheastAsia,ed.M.Ford,40–55.Sydney:Routledge.

———.2007.Theconstructionofgrievance‐Naturalresourcesandidentityinaseparatistconflict.JournalofConflictResolution51:950–972.

Assal,M.A.M.2006.Sudan:IdentityandConflictoverNaturalResources.Development49(3):101–105.http://www.palgrave‐journals.com/development/index.html.

Aubert,V.1963.Competitionanddissensus:twotypesofconflictandofconflictresolution.JournalofConflictResolution7(1):26–42.

Azar,E.E.1990.Themanagementofprotractedsocialconflict :theoryandcases.Aldershot,Hampshire,EnglandBrookfield,Vt.,USA:Dartmouth ;GowerPub.Co.

Bachelard,M.2012.MurdersontheeveofAcehpollgivevoterscauseforalarmovercandidates.TheSydneyMorningHerald7April:Online.http://www.smh.com.au/world/murders‐on‐the‐eve‐of‐aceh‐poll‐give‐voters‐cause‐for‐alarm‐over‐candidates‐20120406‐1wgr4.html.

Ballentine,K.,andJ.Sherman.2003.Thepoliticaleconomyofarmedconflict :beyondgreedandgrievance.Boulder,Co.:LynneRiennerPublishers.

BAPPENAS.2005a.Indonesia:DamageandLossAssessment‐theDecember26,2004NaturalDisaster.Jakarta,Indonesia.

———.2005b.MasterPlanfortheRehabilitationandReconstructionoftheRegionsandCommunitiesoftheProvinceofNanggroeAcehDarussalamandtheIslandsofNias,ProvinceofNorthSumatra.Jakarta,Indonesia.

Baranyi,S.,andV.Weitzner.2006.Transformingland‐relatedconflict:policy,practiceandpossibilities.Ottawa:ILC&theNorth‐SouthInstitute.http://dlc.dlib.indiana.edu/dlc/bitstream/handle/10535/5479/06_NSI_ILC_Transforming_land_related_conflict.pdf?sequence=1.

Barnett,M.,H.Kim,M.O’Donnell,andL.Sitea.2007.Peacebuilding:WhatIsinaName?GlobalGovernance13:35–58.

Barron,P.,S.Clark,andM.Daud.2005.ConflictandRecoveryinAceh:AnAssessmentofConflictDynamicsandOptionsforSupportingthePeaceProcess.Washington,DC.

Becker,L.C.1977.Propertyrights :philosophicfoundations.London ;Boston:RoutledgeandK.Paul.

DeBeen,W.2008.Legalrealismregained :savingrealismfromcriticalacclaim.Stanford,Calif.:StanfordLawBooks.

Bell,K.C.2006.WorldBanksupportforlandadministrationandmanagement:respondingtothechallengesoftheMillenniumDevelopmentGoals.InShapingtheChange.XXIIIFIGCongress.,8‐13October2006.Munich,Germany:FIGhttp://www.fig.net/pub/monthly_articles/november_2006/bell_november_2006l.pdf.

220

Bell,K.C.,S.Srivinas,andJ.Martinez.2013.ReformingIndonesia’sComplexLegalEnvironmentforLandGovernance:ComplementaryTop‐DownandBottom‐UpApproaches.InAnnualWorldBankConferenceonLandandPoverty,22.Washington,DC:WorldBank.

Benda‐Beckmann,F.von.2001.LegalPluralismandSocialJusticeinEconomicandPoliticalDevelopment.IDSBulletin32(1):46–56.

———.1979.Propertyinsocialcontinuity :continuityandchangeinthemaintenanceofpropertyrelationshipsthroughtimeinMinangkabau,WestSumatra.TheHague:M.Nijhoff.

Benda‐Beckmann,F.von,andK.vonBenda‐Beckmann.2006.ChangingOneIsChangingAll:DynamicsintheAdat‐Islam‐StateTriangle.JournalofLegalPluralism&UnofficialLaw53‐54:239–270.

Benda‐Beckmann,F.von,K.vonBenda‐Beckmann,andA.Griffiths.2009.Spatializinglaw :ananthropologicalgeographyoflawinsociety.Farnham,England ;Burlington,VT:Ashgate.

Benda‐Beckmann,F.von,K.vonBenda‐Beckmann,andM.Wiber.2006a.Changingpropertiesofproperty.NewYork:BerghahnBooks.

———.2006b.ThePropertiesofProperty.InChangingPropertiesofProperty,2–39.Oxford,NewYork:BerghahnBooks.

Bentham,J.1914.Bentham’sTheoryoflegislation;beingPrincipesdelégislationandTraitésdelégislation,civileetpénale.EditedbyÉtienneDumont.TranslatedbyCharlesMilnerAtkinson.London:H.Milford,Oxforduniversitypress.

Berman,P.2007.GlobalLegalPluralism.SouthernCaliforniaReview80:1155–1238.http://ssrn.com/paper=985340.

Bernard,H.R.1994.Researchmethodsinanthropology :qualitativeandquantitativeapproaches2nded.ThousandOaks,CA:SagePublications.

Berry,S.2009.Property,AuthorityandCitizenship:LandClaims,PoliticsandtheDynamicsofSocialDivisioninWestAfrica.DevelopmentandChange40(1):23–45.

Biersteker,T.2007.ProspectsfortheUNPeacebuildingCommission.DisarmamentForum(2):37–44.

LeBillon,P.2001.Angola’spoliticaleconomyofwar:Theroleofoilanddiamonds,1975‐2000.AfricanAffairs100(398):55–80.http://afraf.oupjournals.org/cgi/doi/10.1093/afraf/100.398.55.

LeBillon,Philippe.2008.DiamondWars?ConflictDiamondsandGeographiesofResourceWars.AnnalsoftheAssociationofAmericanGeographers98:345–372.

———.2007.GeographiesofWar:Perspectiveson“ResourceWars”.GeographyCompass1:163–182.

———.2001.Thepoliticalecologyofwar:naturalresourcesandarmedconflicts.PoliticalGeography20:561–584.

221

LeBillon,Philippe,andA.Waizenegger.2007.Peaceinthewakeofdisaster?Secessionistconflictsandthe2004IndianOceantsunami.TransactionsoftheInstituteofBritishGeographers32(3):411–427.

Blomley,N.K.2003a.From`What’to`SoWhat':LawandGeographyinRetrospect.InLawandgeography,eds.J.HolderandC.Harrison,17–34.Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress.

———.2000.geographyoflaw.InTheDictionaryofHumanGeography,eds.R.J.Johnston,D.Gregory,G.Pratt,andM.Watts,435–438.BlackwellPublishershttp://www.credoreference.com/entry/734364.

———.1998.LandscapesofProperty.Law&SocietyReview32(3):567–612.

———.2003b.Law,Property,andtheGeographyofViolence:TheFrontier,theSurvey,andtheGrid.AnnalsoftheAssociationofAmericanGeographers93(1):121–141.

———.2007.Legalgeographies‐Kelo,contradiction,andcapitalism.UrbanGeography28(2):198–205.

———.2008a.MakingSpaceforLaw.InTheSAGEhandbookofpoliticalgeography,eds.KevinRCox,M.Low,andJ.Robinson,155–168.LosAngeles:SAGE.

———.1994.Mobility,empowermentandtherightsrevolution.PoliticalGeography13(5):407–422.

———.2010.Property,libertyandthecategory.Geoforum41:353–355.

———.2005.Rememberproperty?ProgressinHumanGeography29(2):125–127.http://phg.sagepub.com/content/29/2/125.short.

———.2008b.Simplificationiscomplicated:property,nature,andtheriversoflaw.EnvironmentandPlanningA40:1825–1842.

———.2004.Unsettlingthecity :urbanlandandthepoliticsofproperty.NewYork:Routledge.http://www.loc.gov/catdir/toc/ecip043/2003010528.html.

Blomley,N.K.,DavidDelaney,andR.T.Ford.2001.Thelegalgeographiesreader :law,power,andspace.Oxford ;Malden,Mass.:BlackwellPublishers.

Blomley,N.K.,andG.Pratt.2001.GeographiesofHumanRights:Canadaandthepoliticalgeographiesofrights.GeographeCanadien45(1):151–166.

Bowen,J.R.2000.ConsensusandSuspicion:JudicialReasoningandSocialChangeinanIndonesianSociety1960‐1994.Law&SocietyReview34:97–127.http://www.jstor.org/stable/3115117.

———.2003.Islam,law,andequalityinIndonesia :ananthropologyofpublicreasoning.Cambridge,UK ;NewYork:CambridgeUniversityPress.

222

———.2005.NormativepluralisminIndonesia:Regions,religions,andEthnicities.MulticulturalisminAsia:152–169.

———.1996.Themythofglobalethnicconflict.JournalOfDemocracy7(1):3–14.

———.1988.thetransformationofanIndonesianpropertysystem:adat,Islam,andsocialchangeintheGayohighlands.AmericanEthnologist15(2):274–293.http://blackwell‐synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1525/ae.1988.15.2.02a00050.

BPNandBRR.2005.ManualoflandregistrationintheaffectedtsunamiareasatNanggroeAcehDarussalamandSumatraUtara:ReconstructionoftheAcehLandAdministrationSystem(RALAS).BandaAceh.

Brenner,N.2001.Thelimitstoscale?Methodologicalreflectionsonscalarstructuration.ProgressinHumanGeography25(4):591–614.

Breteche,J.,andA.Steer.2006.LandtitlesinAceh:Somuchhope,butmoreactionneeded.TheJakartaPost12December.http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2006/12/02/land‐titles‐aceh‐so‐much‐hope‐more‐action‐needed.html(lastaccessed16April2013).

Bromley,D.1991.Environmentandeconomy :propertyrightsandpublicpolicy.Oxford,UK ;Cambridge:Blackwell.

Brown,K.2007.Reconcilingmoralandlegalcollectiveentitlement:Implicationsforcommunity‐basedlandreform.LandUsePolicy24(4):633–643.

Brown,K.M.2007.Understandingthematerialitiesandmoralitiesofproperty:reworkingcollectiveclaimstoland.TransactionsoftheInstituteofBritishGeographers32(4):507–522.

BRR(BadanRehabilitasi&Rekonstruksi).2009.10ManagementLessonsforHostGovernmentsCoordinatingPost‐DisasterReconstruction.Jakarta,Indonesia.

———.2005.AcehandNiasOneYearAftertheTsunami.BandaAceh:TheAcehandNiasRehabilitationandReconstructionAgency.

Brubaker,R.,andF.Cooper.2000.Beyond``identity.TheoryandSociety29(1):1–47.http://www.springerlink.com/content/j275j1309t423044/.

Bruce,J.W.,andS.E.Migot‐Adholla.1994.SearchingforlandtenuresecurityinAfrica.Dubuque,Iowa:Kendall/Hunt.

Bruch,C.,D.Jensen,M.Nakayama,andJ.Unruheds.2011.Post‐ConflictPeacebuildingandNaturalResources.London:Earthscan.

Bruch,C.,D.Jensen,M.Nakayama,J.Unruh,R.Gruby,andR.Wolfarth.2008.Post‐ConflictPeaceBuildingandNaturalResources.YearbookofInternationalEnvironmentalLaw19:58–96.

Brunnschweiler,C.N.,andE.H.Bulte.2009.Naturalresourcesandviolentconflict:resourceabundance,dependence,andtheonsetofcivilwars.OxfordEconomicPapers‐NewSeries61:651–674.

223

Bruns,B.R.,andR.S.Meinzen‐Dick.2000.Negotiatingwaterrights.London:InternationalFoodPolicyResearchInstitute(IFPRI),ITDGPub.

Bulkeley,H.2005.Reconfiguringenvironmentalgovernance:Towardsapoliticsofscalesandnetworks.PoliticalGeography24:875–902.

Burke,A.,andAfnan.2005.ReconstructioninaConflictEnvironment:ViewsfromCivilSociety,Donors,andNGOseds.P.BarronandL.Ashari.IndonesianSocialDevelopment.http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/8C7ED1CB8CCB557F492570E3001A11C2‐wb‐idn‐20dec.pdf.

Burns,P.2004.TheLeidenlegacy :conceptsoflawinIndonesia.Leiden:KITLVPress.

Bush,K.,andR.Opp.1999.PeaceandConflictImpactAssessment.InCultivatingpeace :conflictandcollaborationinnaturalresourcemanagement,ed.D.Buckles.Ottawa;Washington:InternationalDevelopmentResearchCenter ;WorldBankInstitute.

Campbell,L.M.2007.LocalConservationPracticeandGlobalDiscourse:APoliticalEcologyofSeaTurtleConservation.AnnalsoftheAssociationofAmericanGeographers97(2):313–334.

Che,D.2005.ConstructingaPrisonintheForest:ConflictsOverNature,Paradise,andIdentity.AnnalsoftheAssociationofAmericanGeographers95:809–831.

Choko,M.,andR.Harris.1990.TheLocalCultureofProperty‐aComparativeHistoryofHousingTenureinMontrealandToronto.AnnalsoftheAssociationofAmericanGeographers80:73–95.

Chowdhury,R.R.2006.LandscapechangeintheCalakmulBiosphereReserve,Mexico:Modelingthedrivingforcesofsmallholderdeforestationinlandparcels.AppliedGeography26:129–152.

Ciparisse,G.2003.Multilingualthesaurausonlandtenure.Rome:FAO.

Clark,G.1982.Rights,Property,andCommunity.EconomicGeography58:120–138.

CMI.2012.AcehPeaceProcessFollow‐UpProject.Helsinki,Finland.

Cochrane,J.2012.AcehPeaceProcessAtRiskinIndonesia?SoutheastAsiaRealTime:2–4.http://blogs.wsj.com/searealtime/2012/01/31/aceh‐peace‐process‐at‐risk‐in‐indonesia/(lastaccessed1January2013).

Colfer,C.J.P.,B.Newton,andHerman.1989.Ethnicity:AnimportantconsiderationinIndonesianagriculture.AgricultureandHumanValues6(3):52–67.

Collier,G.A.,andE.L.Quaratiello.2005.Basta!LandandtheZapatistaRebellioninChiapas.FoodFirstBooks.http://www.loc.gov/catdir/toc/ecip0511/2005011034.html.

Collier,P,AHoeffler,andD.Rohner.2009.Beyondgreedandgrievance:feasibilityandcivilwar.OxfordEconomicPapers‐NewSeries61:1–27.

224

Collier,Paul,V.L.Elliott,H.Hegre,AnkeHoeffler,M.Reynal‐Querol,andN.Sambanis.2003.BreakingtheConflictTrap:CivilWarandDevelopmentPolicy.WorldBank.http://www‐wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/IW3P/IB/2003/06/30/000094946_0306190405396/Rendered/PDF/multi0page.pdf.

Collier,Paul,andAnkeHoeffler.2004.Greedandgrievanceincivilwar.Oxf.Econ.Pap.56:563–595.

———.1998.Oneconomiccausesofcivilwar.OxfordEconomicPapers50(4):563–573.http://oep.oupjournals.org/cgi/doi/10.1093/oep/50.4.563.

———.2005.ResourceRents,Governance,andConflict.JournalofConflictResolution49(4):625–633.http://jcr.sagepub.com/cgi/doi/10.1177/0022002705277551.

Collier,Paul,A.Hoefller,andN.Sambanis.2005.TheCollier‐HoefflerModelofCivilWarOnsetandtheCaseStudyProjectResearchDesign.InUnderstandingCivilWar(Volume1:Africa),eds.PaulCollierandN.Sambanis,1–33.Washington,D.C.:WorldBankhttp://www.worldbank.icebox.ingenta.com/content/wb/2098.

Comfort,L.K.2000.Disaster:Agentofdiplomacyorchangeininternationalaffairs?CambridgeReviewofInternationalAffairs14(1):277–294.

Cosgrove,D.E.1984.Socialformationandsymboliclandscape1sted.London:CroomHelm.

Cosgrove,D.,andP.Jackson.1987.Newdirectionsinculturalgeography.Area:95–101.

Cotula,L.,C.Toulmin,andC.Hesse.2004.LandtenureandadministrationinAfrica:lessonsofexperienceandemergingissues.Hertforshire:InternationalInstituteforEnvironmentandDevelopment.

Cox,KR.1998.Spacesofdependence,spacesofengagementandthepoliticsofscale,or:lookingforlocalpolitics.PoliticalGeography17:1–23.

Cox,KevinR.2013.Territory,Scale,andWhyCapitalismMatters.Territory,Politics,Governance1(1):46–61.http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/21622671.2013.763734(lastaccessed29March2013).

Dalby,S.2007.GeopoliticalKnowledge:Scale,MethodandtheWillieSuttonSyndrome .Geopolitics12:183–191.

Daryono.2010.TheTransformationofLandLawinIndonesia:ThePersistenceofPluralism.AsianJournalofComparativeLaw5(1):1–32.http://www.degruyter.com/view/j/asjcl.2010.5.1/asjcl.2010.5.1.1180/asjcl.2010.5.1.1180.xml(lastaccessed10April2013).

Das,H.2004.RestoringPropertyrightsintheAftermathofWar.InternationalandComparativeLawQuarterly53(2):429–444.http://www.ingenta.com/journals/browse/oup/iclqaj.

Davies,M.2007.Property :meanings,histories,theories.AbingdonEngland ;NewYork:Routledge‐Cavendish.

225

Davis,M.2006.Planetofslums.London ;NewYork:Verso.

Dawson,L.,G.Kereh,andS.Siahaan.2013.AcehatRiskofReturningtoViolence,AmnestySays.JakartaGlobe:online.http://www.thejakartaglobe.com/home/aceh‐at‐risk‐of‐returning‐to‐violence‐amnesty‐says/586697.

Deininger,K.W.2003.Landpoliciesforgrowthandpovertyreduction.Washington,DC:AcopublicationoftheWorldBankandOxfordUniversityPress,Oxford[England],NewYork.

Delaney,D,andHLeitner.1997.Thepoliticalconstructionofscale.PoliticalGeography16(2):93–97.

Delaney,David.1993.GeographiesofJudgment:TheDoctrineofChangedConditionsandtheGeopoliticsofRace.AnnalsoftheAssociationofAmericanGeographers83:48–65.

———.2001a.MakingNature/MarkingHumans:LawasaSiteof(Cultural)Production.AnnalsoftheAssociationofAmericanGeographers91:487–503.

———.1998.Race,place,andthelaw,1836‐1948.Austin,TX:UniversityofTexasPress.

———.2001b.Runningwiththeland:legal‐historicalimaginationandthespacesofmodernity.JournalofHistoricalGeography27(4):493–506.

———.2005.Territory :ashortintroduction.Malden,MA ;Oxford:BlackwellPub.

Demsetz,H.1967.TowardaTheoryofPropertyRights.TheAmericanEconomicReview57(2):347–359.

Deutsch,R.2009.IndonesiaReconstructionofAcehLandAdministrationSystem(RALAS)Project:ProjectImplementationandBeneficiaryAssessment,2008.BandaAceh:MDFTN,WorldBank.

Dobbins,J.,S.G.Jones,K.Crane,andB.C.DeGrasse.2007.TheBeginner’sGuidetoNation‐Building(GoogleeBook).RandCorporation.http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=7XIH9kMezOIC&pgis=1(lastaccessed4February2013).

Doocy,S,CRobinson,C.Moodie,andG.Burnham.2009.Tsunami‐relatedinjuryinAcehProvince,Indonesia.GlobalPublicHealth4(2):205–14.http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/19333809(lastaccessed11April2013).

Drexler,E.F.2008.Aceh,Indonesia :securingtheinsecurestate.Philadelphia,Pa.:UniversityofPennsylvaniaPress.

———.2007.TheSocialLifeofConflictNarratives:ViolentAntagonists,ImaginedHistories,andForeclosedFuturesinAceh,Indonesia.AnthropologicalQuarterly80(4):961–995.

Duncan,J.S.1990.Thecityastext :thepoliticsoflandscapeinterpretationintheKandyankingdom.CambridgeEngland ;NewYork:CambridgeUniversityPress.

226

Dyer,G.2005.War:thelethalcustom1stCarrol.NewYork:Carroll&GrafPublishers.

Ehrlich,E.1936.Fundamentalprinciplesofthesociologyoflaw.NewYork:ArnoPress.

Elyachar,J.2005.Marketsofdispossession :NGOs,economicdevelopment,andthestateinCairo.Durham:DukeUniversityPress.

Emel,J.L.,andE.Brooks.1988.ChangesinFormandFunctionofPropertyRightsInstitutionsunderThreatenedResourceScarcity.AnnalsoftheAssociationofAmericanGeographers78(2):241–252.

Epstein,R.A.2010.TheDisintegrationofIntellectualProperty?AClassicalLiberalResponsetoaPrematureObituary.StanfordLawReview62(2):455–521.

Eriksen,T.H.2001.Ethnicidentity,nationalidentityandintergroupconflict:Thesignificanceofpersonalexperiences.InSocialidentity,intergroupconflict,andconflictreduction,eds.R.D.Ashmore,L.D.Jussim,andD.Wilder.Oxford,NY:OxfordUniversityPress.

VanEtten,J.,J.Jongerden,H.J.deVos,A.Klaasse,andE.C.E.vanHoeve.2008.EnvironmentaldestructionasacounterinsurgencystrategyintheKurdistanregionofTurkey.Geoforum39(5):1786–1797.

EyeonAceh.ChallengesofForestGovernanceinAceh.2009.http://reliefweb.int/report/indonesia/indonesia‐challenges‐forest‐governance‐aceh(lastaccessed1January2013).

Fairall,J.2008.TheAftermath.ASMMagazine.http://www.asmmag.com/features/570(lastaccessed10April2008).

Fan,L.2006.TheStruggleforLandRightsinPost‐tsunami,Post‐conflictAceh.InTheWorldBank,LandPoliciesandLegalEmpowermentofthePoor.Washington:OXFAMInternationalAcehandNias.

FAO.2002.Landtenureandruraldevelopment.Rome:FAO.

Fauzi,N.2009.Landtitlesdonotequalagrarianreform.InsideIndonesia98.http://www.insideindonesia.org/feature‐editions/land‐titles‐do‐not‐equal‐agrarian‐reform(lastaccessed12December2010).

Fearon,JD,andDDLaitin.2000.Violenceandthesocialconstructionofethnicidentity.InternationalOrganization54:845–877.

Fearon,JamesD.2005.PrimaryCommodityExportsandCivilWar.JournalofConflictResolution49(4):483–507.http://jcr.sagepub.com/cgi/doi/10.1177/0022002705277544.

Fearon,JamesD,andDavidDLaitin.2003.Ethnicity,Insurgency,andCivilWar.AmericanPoliticalScienceReview97:75–90.

Feder,G.,andD.Feeny.1991.Land‐TenureandProperty‐Rights‐TheoryandImplicationsforDevelopmentPolicy.WorldBankEconomicReview5:135–153.

227

Feldman,T.D.,andA.E.G.Jonas.2000.SageScrubRevolution?PropertyRights,PoliticalFragmentation,andConservationPlanninginSouthernCaliforniaundertheFederalEndangeredSpeciesAct.AnnalsoftheAssociationofAmericanGeographers90(2):256–292.

Fitzpatrick,D.2005a.“Bestpractice”optionsforthelegalrecognitionofcustomarytenure.DevelopmentandChange36(3):449–475.

———.2002.LandclaimsinEastTimor.Canberra?AsiaPacificPress.

———.2008a.ManagingConflictandSustainingRecovery:LandAdministrationReforminTsunami‐AffectedAceh.

———.2006.PrivateLawandPublicPower:TangledThreadsinIndonesianLandRegulation.InIndonesianTransitions,eds.H.SchulteNordholtandI.Hoogenboom,75–114.Yogyakarta:PustakaPelajarhttp://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2019779.

———.2005b.RestoringandConfirmingRightstoLandinTsunami‐AffectedAceh.BandaAceh:OXFAM,UNDP.

———.2008b.Women’sRightstoLandandHousinginTsunami‐AffectedAceh,Indonesiaeds.A.Reid,B.Nowak,P.Daly,andM.Feener.AsiaResearchInstituteWorkingPaper#3.

Flemsæter,F.,andG.Setten.2009.Holdingpropertyintrust:kinship,law,andpropertyenactmentonNorwegiansmallholdings.EnvironmentandPlanningA41(9):2267–2284.

Ford,R.T.1994.TheBoundariesofRace:PoliticalGeographyinLegalAnalysis.HarvardLawReview107(8):1841–1921.

Forman,G.,andA.Kedar.2004.FromArablandtoIsraelLands:thelegaldispossessionofthePalestiniansdisplacedbyIsraelinthewakeof1948.Environmentandplanning.D,Society&space22(6):809–830.

Forman,Geremy.2006.LawandthehistoricalgeographyoftheGalilee:Israel’slitigatoryadvantagesduringthespecialoperationoflandsettlement.JournalofHistoricalGeography32:796–817.

Foucault,M.,andC.Gordon.1980.Power/knowledge :selectedinterviewsandotherwritings,1972‐1977.ed.C.Gordon,270.NewYork,N.Y.:PantheonBooks.

Gaillard,J.‐C.,E.Clave,andI.Kelman.2008.Waveofpeace?TsunamidisasterdiplomacyinAceh,Indonesia.Geoforum39(1):511–526.

Galeano,E.H.1973.OpenveinsofLatinAmerica :fivecenturiesofthepillageofacontinent.NewYork:MonthlyReviewPress.

Galtung,J.1976.Peace,waranddefense(HisEssaysinpeaceresearch).Ejlers.http://www.amazon.com/Peace‐defense‐Essays‐peace‐research/dp/8772413697(lastaccessed3February2013).

228

Gardner,R.2003.IdentityFrameseds.G.BurgessandH.Burgess.Boulder:UniversityofColorado.http://thegovernancecommons.beyondintractability.org/bi‐essay/identity‐frames.

Giddens,A.1986.Theconstitutionofsociety :outlineofthetheoryofstructuration.BerkeleyET‐1stpbk.:UniversityofCaliforniaPress.

Giordano,M.2003.TheGeographyoftheCommons:TheRoleofScaleandSpace.AnnalsoftheAssociationofAmericanGeographers93:365–375.

Gleditsch,N.P.1998.Armedconflictandtheenvironment:Acritiqueoftheliterature.JournalofPeaceResearch35:381–400.

Glendon,M.A.1991.Rightstalk :theimpoverishmentofpoliticaldiscourse.NewYorkTorontoNewYork:FreePress ;CollierMacmillan ;MaxwellMacmillan.

Gluckman,M.1972.TheideasinBarotsejurisprudence.NewHaven:YaleUniversityPress.

Gordon,R.W.2001.CriticalLegalStudies.InInternationalEncyclopediaoftheSocial&BehavioralSciences,eds.J.S.NeilandB.B.Paul,2968–2972.Oxford:Pergamon.

Gray,K.J.,andS.F.Gray.2009.Elementsoflandlaw.Oxford ;NewYorkET‐5th:OxfordUniversityPress.

Green,A.2010a.LandtenuresecurityandpeacebuildinginAceh,Indonesia.AsianJournalofEnvironmentandDisasterManagement2(1):283–290.

———.2008.LandTitleQuestionsinAceh.InAmericanAssociationofGeographersAnnualConference2008.Boston,Massachusettshttp://meridian.aag.org/callforpapers/program/AbstractDetail.cfm?AbstractID=17556.

———.2013a.SocialIdentity,NaturalResources,andPeacebuilding.InLivelihoods,NaturalResources,andPost‐ConflictPeacebuilding,eds.H.YoungandL.Goldman.London,UK:Routledge.

———.2010b.SocialIdentity,NaturalResources,andPeacebuilding.InCAPRiWorkshoponCollectiveAction,PropertyRights,andConflictinNaturalResourcesManagement,June28–July1,2010.SiemReap,Cambodia.

———.2013b.TitleWave:LandTenureandPeacebuildinginAceh.InManagingNaturalResourcesinPost‐ConflictSocieties:LessonsinPeacebuilding,eds.J.D.UnruhandR.Williams,289–316.London,UK:Routledge.

Gregory,D.,R.Johnston,G.Pratt,M.Watts,andS.Whatmore.2009.TheDictionnaryofHumanGeography5thEditio.eds.D.Gregory,R.Johnston,G.Pratt,M.Watts,andS.Whatmore.WestSussex,U.K.:Wiley‐Blackwell.

Gregory,D.,andA.Pred.2006.ViolentGeographies:Fear,Terror,andPoliticalViolence.NewYork:Routledge.

229

Grey,T.1980.TheDisintegrationofProperty.InPropertyNomosXxii,eds.J.W.ChapmanandJ.R.Pennock,418.NewYork:NewYorkUniversityPress.

Griffiths,J.1986.Whatislegalpluralism?JournalofLegalPluralismandUnofficialLaw24(1):1–56.

Gurr,T.R.2000.Peoplesversusstates :minoritiesatriskinthenewcentury.Washington,D.C.:UnitedStatesInstituteofPeacePress.

Gurr,T.R.,andB.Harff.1994.Ethnicconflictinworldpolitics.Boulder:WestviewPress.

Guy,S.,andJ.Henneberry.2000.UnderstandingUrbanDevelopmentProcesses:IntegratingtheEconomicandtheSocialinPropertyResearch.UrbanStudies37:2399–2416.

Hall,D.,P.Hirsch,andT.M.Li.2011.Powersofexclusion :landdilemmasinSoutheastAsia.Honolulu:UniversityofHawai*iPress.

Hardin,G.1968.TragedyofCommons.Science162(3859):1243–1248.

Harper,E.2006.Guardianship,InheritanceandLandLawinPost‐tsunamiAceh.InternationalDevelopmentLawOrganization(IDLO):161.http://www.idlo.int/publications/19.pdf(lastaccessed3January2013).

———.2009.PromotingLegalEmpowermentintheAftermathofDistaster:anEvaluationofPost‐TsunamiLegalAssistanceInitiativesinIndonesia.

Harris,C.2004.HowDidColonialismDispossess?CommentsfromanEdgeofEmpire.AnnalsoftheAssociationofAmericanGeographers94:165–182.

Harvey,N.1998.TheChiapasRebellion :thestruggleforlandanddemocracy.Durham,N.C.:DukeUniversityPress.

Hasan,N.2013.DPRAApprovesFreeAcehMovementFlagasOfficialProvincialBanner.JakartaGlobe24March:Online.http://www.thejakartaglobe.com/news/dpra‐approves‐free‐aceh‐movement‐flag‐as‐official‐provincial‐banner/581733/.

Haverfield,R.1998.Hakulayatandthestate:landreforminIndonesia.InIndonesia:LawandSociety,ed.T.Lindsey,42–73.Sydney:TheFederationPresshttp://digital.federationpress.com.au/9657i/.

Herod,A.2011.Scale.London ;NewYork:Routledge.

Herrera,A.,andM.G.daPassano.2006.Landtenurealternativeconflictmanagement.Rome:FAO.

Heryani,E.,andC.Grant.2004.LandAdministrationinIndonesiaLandAdministrationinIndonesia.3rdFIGRegionalConference:1–14.

Hogg,MA,D.Abrams,S.Otten,andS.Hinkle.2004.TheSocialIdentityPerspective:IntergroupRelations,Self‐Conception,andSmallGroups.SmallGroupResearch35(3):246–276.http://sgr.sagepub.com/cgi/doi/10.1177/1046496404263424.

230

Hogg,MichaelA,D.J.Terry,andK.M.White.1995.ATaleofTwoTheories:ACriticalComparisonofIdentityTheorywithSocialIdentityTheory.SocialPsychologyQuarterly58(4):255–269.http://www.jstor.org/stable/2787127?origin=crossref.

Hohfeld,W.N.1917.Fundamentallegalconceptionsasappliedinjudicialreasoning.TheYaleLawJournal26(8):710–770.

———.1913.SomeFundamentalLegalConceptionsasAppliedinJudicialReasoning.TheYaleLawJournal23(1):16–59.

Holder,J.,andC.Harrison.2003.Lawandgeography.Oxford ::OxfordUniversityPress.

Home,R.K.,andH.Lim.2004.Demystifyingthemysteryofcapital :landtenureandpovertyinAfricaandtheCaribbean.LondonPortland,Or.:GlassHousePress ;PublishedintheUSbyCavendishPub.

Homer‐Dixon,T.F.1994.EnvironmentalScarcitiesandViolentConflict:EvidencefromCases.InternationalSecurity19:5–40.

Honore,T.1987.Makinglawbind :essayslegalandphilosophical.OxfordOxfordshireNewYork:ClarendonPress ;OxfordUniversityPress.

Hotli,S.,andJ.Afrizal.2009.IllegalloggingcontinuesinAcehdespitemoratorium.TheJakartaPost27October.http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2009/10/27/illegal‐logging‐continues‐aceh‐despite‐moratorium.html(lastaccessed1December2012).

Howitt,R.2002.Scaleandtheother:Levinasandgeography.Geoforum33:299–313.

Howitt,Richard.1998.ScaleasRelation:MusicalMetaphorsofGeographicalScale.Area30:49–58.

Humphreys,M.2005.NaturalResources,Conflict,andConflictResolution:UncoveringtheMechanisms.JournalofConflictResolution49:508–537.

Huntington,S.P.1997.Theclashofcivilizationsandtheremakingofworldorder.NewYorkET‐1stTouchstone:Touchstone.

Hyndman,J.2011.DualDisasters:HumanitarianAidAfterthe2004Tsunami.Sterling,VA:KumarianPress.

———.2009.Sitingconflictandpeaceinpost‐tsunamiSriLankaandAceh,Indonesia.NorwegianJournalofGeography63(1):89–96.http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=aph&AN=37184646&site=ehost‐live.

ICG(InternationalCrisisGroup).2007.Indonesia:HowGAMWoninAceh‐UpdateBriefing.Jakarta,Brussels.

ILRI(InternationalLivestockResearchInstitute).1995.Livestockpolicyanalysised.M.Doran.AddisAbaba,Ethiopia:InternationalLivestockResearchInstitute.

231

Inwood,J.,andJ.Tyner.2011.Geography’sPro‐PeaceAgenda :AnUnfinishedProject.ACME:AnInternationalE‐JournalforCriticalGeographies10(3):442–457.

Jalil,A.,D.Silalahi,G.J.Aditjondro,S.K.Tarigan,Jufriadi,andDarmawan.2008.TheWorldBank‐financedReconstructionoftheAcehLandAdministrationSystem(RALAS).Medan:INFID.

JakartaPost.2008.Aceharmedgroupreleasessoldier.JakartaPost29September:Online.http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2008/09/29/aceh‐armed‐group‐releases‐soldier.html.

JakartaPost.2012a.PoliticsleadformerGAMguerrillastopartways.TheJakartaPost28February:Online.http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2012/02/28/politics‐lead‐former‐gam‐guerrillas‐part‐ways.html.

———.2012b.UnfinishedreconciliationhauntsAcehnese.TheJakartaPost27February:Online.http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2012/02/27/unfinished‐reconciliation‐haunts‐acehnese.html.

Jayasurija,S.,andP.McCawley.2010.TheAsianTsunami:AidandReconstructionafteraDisaster.Cheltenham,UK ;Northampton,MA.

Jensen,D.,andS.Lonergan.2011.AssessingandRestoringNaturalResourcesInPost‐ConflictPeacebuilding.Newyork:Routledge.

Johnson,D.R.2007.ReflectionsontheBundleofRights.VermontLawReview32:247–272.

Jonas,A.1994.TheScalePoliticsofSpatiality.EnvironmentandPlanningD‐Society&Space12:257–264.

Jones,G.A.2003.Camels,Chameleons,andCoyotes:problematizingthe“histories”oflandlawreform.InLawandgeography,eds.J.HolderandC.Harrison,169–190.Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress.

Joseph,M.2002.AgainstTheRomanceOfCommunity.Minneapolis:UnivOfMinnesotaPress.http://www.amazon.com/Against‐The‐Romance‐Of‐Community/dp/0816637962(lastaccessed27April2013).

Kahler,M.,andB.F.Walter.2006.Territorialityandconflictinaneraofglobalization.Cambridge,UK ;NewYork:CambridgeUniversityPress.

Kalyvas.2006.Thelogicofviolenceincivilwar.Cambridge ;NewYork:CambridgeUniversityPress.

Kashwan,P.2013.Thepoliticsofrights‐basedapproachesinconservation.LandUsePolicy31:613–626.http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.landusepol.2012.09.009(lastaccessed28February2013).

Kaufman,S,andJ.Smith.1999.Framingandreframinginlandusechangeconflicts.JournalOfArchitecturalAndPlanningResearch16(2):164–180.

232

Kedar,Alexander.2003.OnTheLegalGeographyofEthnocraticSettlerStates:NotesTowardsaResearchAgenda.InLawandgeography,eds.J.HolderandC.Harrison,401–441.Oxford ::OxfordUniversityPress.

Keen,D.2012.Greedandgrievanceincivilwar.InternationalAffairs88(4):757–777.http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1468‐2346.2012.01100.x/full(lastaccessed9April2013).

Kenny,S.,L.Fan,andR.Palmer.2006.TheTsunamiTwoYearsOn:LandRightsinAceh.OxfamInternational.

Kidder,R.1998.Justiceandpowerinstudiesoflegalpluralism.InJusticeandpowerinsociolegalstudies,eds.B.G.GarthandA.Sarat,194–207.Chicago,Ill.:NorthwesternUniversityPress ;AmericanBarFoundation.

Kievelitz,U.,T.Schaef,M.Leonhardt,H.Hahn,andS.Vorwerk.2004.PracticalGuidetoMultilateralNeedsAssessmentsinPost‐ConflictSituations.NewYork.

Kingsbury,D.2006.PeaceinAceh :apersonalaccountoftheHelsinkipeaceprocess.Jakarta:EquinoxPub.

Klein,N.2007.Theshockdoctrine :theriseofdisastercapitalism.Toronto:A.A.KnopfCanada.

Koopman,S.2011.Let’stakepeacetopieces.PoliticalGeography30(4):193–194.

Krier,J.E.2006.Property.ChicagoET‐17:Thomson.

Krippendorff,K.2004.Contentanalysis :anintroductiontoitsmethodology.ThousandOaks,CA:SAGE.

Kropotkin,P.A.1995.Theconquestofbreadandotherwritingsed.M.Shatz.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.

Larson,A.M.2010.Makingthe“rulesofthegame”:ConstitutingterritoryandauthorityinNicaragua’sindigenouscommunities.LandUsePolicy27(4):1143–1152.http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0264837710000293(lastaccessed6November2012).

Larson,A.M.,D.Barry,G.R.Dahal,andC.J.P.Cofler.2010.ForestsforPeople:CommunityRightsandForestTenureReform.London:Earthscan.

Laudati,A.2013.Beyondminerals:broadening“economiesofviolence”ineasternDemocraticRepublicofCongo.ReviewofAfricanPoliticalEconomy40(135):32–50.

Leckie,S.2005.Housing,LandandPropertyRightsinPost‐ConflictSocieties:ProposalsforaNewUnitedNationsInstitutionalandPolicyFramework.UNHCR:Geneva.

Lederach,J.P.1997.Buildingpeace :sustainablereconciliationindividedsocieties.Washington,DC:UnitedStatesInstituteofPeacePress.

233

Lefebvre,H.1991.Theproductionofspace.Oxford,OX,UK ;Cambridge,Mass.,USA:Blackwell.

Leitner,Helga,andB.Miller.2007.Scaleandthelimitationsofontologicaldebate:acommentaryonMarston,JonesandWoodward.TransactionsoftheInstituteofBritishGeographers32(1):116–125.

Lewis,M.W.1989.CommercializationandCommunityLife‐theGeographyofMarketExchangeinaSmall‐ScalePhilippineSociety.AnnalsoftheAssociationofAmericanGeographers79(3):390–410.

Li,T.M.2000.ArticulatingindigenousidentityinIndonesia:resourcepoliticsandthetribalslot.ComparativeStudiesinSocietyandHistory42(1):149–179.

———.2001.MasyarakatAdat,difference,andthelimitsofrecognitioninIndonesia’sforestzone.ModernAsianStudies35:645–676.

Lindsey,T.ed.2008.Indonesia:lawandsociety.Sydney:FederationPress.

Lindsey,T.2004.LegalInfrastructureandGovernanceReforminPost‐CrisisAsia:ThecaseofIndonesia.Asian‐PacificEconomicLiterature18(1):12–40.

———.1998.SquarePegs&RoundHoles:FittingModernTitleintoTraditionalSocietiesinIndonesia.PacificRimLaw&PolicyJournal7:699–719.http://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/pacrimlp7&id=715&div=&collection=journals(lastaccessed22April2013).

Lindsey,T.,andR.Phillips.2005.Inheritance,Guardianship,andWomen’sLegalRightsinPost‐TsunamiAceh:TheInteractionofSyariah,Adat&SecularLaws.BandaAceh:InternationalDevelopmentLawOrganisation.http://www.findanexpert.unimelb.edu.au/display/publication141068#time.

Liverman,D.2004.Whogoverns,atwhatscaleandatwhatprice?Geography,environmentalgovernance,andthecommodificationofnature.AnnalsoftheAssociationofAmericanGeographers94:734–738.

Locke,J.1821.Twotreatisesongovernment.London,:PrintedforR.Butleretc.

Lujala,P.,andS.C.A.Rustad.2011.High‐ValueNaturalResourcesandPost‐ConflictPeacebuilding.:688.

Lukes,S.2005.Power :aradicalview.NewYorkET‐2nd:PalgraveMacmillan.

Maandi,P.2009.ThesilentarticulationofprivatelandrightsinSovietEstonia:Ageographicalperspective.Geoforum40(3):454–464.

MacKinnon,D.2011.Reconstructingscale:Towardsanewscalarpolitics.ProgressinHumanGeography35(1):21–36.

Macpherson,C.B.1978.Property,mainstreamandcriticalpositions.Oxford:Blackwell.

234

Mansfield,B.2005.Beyondrescaling:Reintegratingthe“national”asadimensionofscalarrelations.ProgressinHumanGeography29:458–473.

———.2007.Privatization:PropertyandtheRemakingofNature–SocietyRelationsIntroductiontotheSpecialIssue.Antipode39(3):393–405.

———.2004.RulesofPrivatization:ContradictionsinNeoliberalRegulationofNorthPacificFisheries.AnnalsoftheAssociationofAmericanGeographers94:565–584.

Marfo,E.,C.J.P.Colfer,B.Kante,andS.Elias.2010.Fromdiscoursetopolicy:thepracticalinterfaceofstatutoryandcustomarylandandforestrights.InForestforPeople:CommunityRightsandForestTenureReform,eds.A.M.Larson,D.Barry,G.R.Dahal,andC.J.P.Cofler,69–89.London:Earthscan.

Markussen,T.,F.Tarp,andK.VanDenBroeck.2011.TheForgottenPropertyRights:EvidenceonLandUseRightsinVietnam.WorldDevelopment39(5):839–850.

Marston,S.A.2000.Thesocialconstructionofscale.ProgressinHumanGeography24(2):219–242.

Marston,S.A.,J.P.JonesIII,K.Woodward,J.JohnPaulIII,andW.Keith.2005.Humangeographywithoutscale.TransactionsoftheInstituteofBritishGeographers30(4):416–432.

Martin,D.G.1999.Transcendingthefixityofjurisdictionalscale.PoliticalGeography18(1):33–38.

Masyrafah,H.,andJ.M.McKeon.2008.Post‐TsunamiAidEffectivenessinAceh:ProliferationandCoordinationinReconstruction.:54.

May,B.2008.LawonGoverningofAceh:thewayforwardorasourceofconflicts?InReconfiguringpolitics:theIndonesia‐Acehpeaceprocess,eds.AguswandiandJ.Large,41–45.London:ConciliationResourceshttp://www.c‐r.org/accord‐article/law‐governing‐aceh‐way‐forward‐or‐source‐conflicts.

McAuslan,P.2003.Bringingthelawbackin :essaysinland,lawanddevelopment.Aldershot,England ;Burlington,VT:Ashgate.

McCarthy,J.F.2005a.BetweenAdatandState:InstitutionalArrangementsonSumatra’sForestFrontier.HumanEcology33(1):57–82.http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s10745‐005‐2426‐8(lastaccessed31March2013).

———.2004.ChangingtoGray:DecentralizationandtheEmergenceofVolatileSocio‐LegalConfigurationsinCentralKalimantan,Indonesia.WorldDevelopment32(7):1199–1223.http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2004.02.002(lastaccessed25April2013).

———.2005b.Scale,sovereignty,andstrategyinenvironmentalgovernance.Antipode37(4):731–753.

———.2007.Thedemonstrationeffect:Naturalresources,ethnonationalismandtheAcehconflict.SingaporeJournalofTropicalGeography28(3):314–333.

———.2006.Thefourthcircle :apoliticalecologyofSumatra’srainforestfrontier.Stanford,Calif.:StanfordUniversityPress.

235

———.2002.TurninginCircles :DistrictGovernance,IllegalLogging,andEnvironmentalDeclineinSumatra,Indonesia.Society15(10):867–886.http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/08941920290107620.

Megoran,N.2011.Warandpeace ?Anagendaforpeaceresearchandpracticeingeographyq.PoliticalGeography30(4):178–189.

Meinzen‐Dick,R.S.,andR.Pradhan.2002.Legalpluralismanddynamicpropertyrights.InternationalFoodPolicyResearchInstitute(IFPRI).

Merry,S.E.1988.LegalPluralism.Law&SocietyReview22(5):869–896.

Meyer,D.S.2004.ProtestandPoliticalOpportunities.AnnualReviewofSociology30(1):125–145.http://arjournals.annualreviews.org/doi/abs/10.1146/annurev.soc.30.012703.110545.

Miall,H.2007.Emergentconflictandpeacefulchange.Basingstoke[England] ;NewYork:PalgraveMacmillan.

Mikelic,V.,T.Schoen,andM.Benschop.2005.HousingandpropertyrightsinBosniaandHerzegovina,CroatiaandSerbia,andMontenegro.Nairobi.

Mitchell,D.2000.Culturalgeography:Acriticalintroduction.Oxford:Blackwell.

Mohr,R.2006.Territory,LandscapeandLawinThreeImagesoftheBasqueCountry.InThegeographyoflaw :landscape,identityandregulation,ed.W.M.Taylor,17–32.Oxford ;Portland,Or.:Hart.

Moore,A.2008.Rethinkingscaleasageographicalcategory:fromanalysistopractice.ProgressinHumanGeography32(2):203–225.http://phg.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/32/2/203.

Moore,D.S.2005.Sufferingforterritory :race,place,andpowerinZimbabwe.DurhamN.C.:DukeUniversityPress.

Moore,S.F.2001.CertaintiesUndone:FiftyTurbulentYearsofLegalAnthropology,1949‐1999.TheJournaloftheRoyalAnthropologicalInstitute7:95–116.

———.1973.LawandSocialChange:TheSemi‐AutonomousSocialFieldasanAppropriateSubjectofStudy.Law&SocietyReview7(4):719–746.

Morgan,D.L.1998.PlanningFocusGroups.ThousandOaks,CA:SAGEPublications.http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=7w5cImtxSLUC&pgis=1(lastaccessed21April2013).

Morrill,R.1999.Inequalitiesofpower,costsandbenefitsacrossgeographicscales:thefutureusesoftheHanfordreservation.PoliticalGeography18(1):1–23.

Morse,B.W.,andG.R.Woodman.1988.Indigenouslawandthestate.InternationalUnionofAnthropologicalandEthnologicalSciences.CommissiononFolkLawandLegalPluralism.ForisPublications.Dordrecht,Holland.

236

Munzer,S.1990.Atheoryofproperty.Cambridge,UK ;NewYork:CambridgeUniversityPress.

Mydans,S.2007.ARebel‐Turned‐GovernorTakestheWheelinIndonesia.TheNewYorkTimes14April:Online.http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/14/world/asia/14irwandi.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.

Nagel,J.1994.ConstructingEthnicity:CreatingandRecreatingEthnicIdentityandCulture.SocialProblems41(1):152–176.http://www.jstor.org/stable/3096847.

Naylon,J.1959.LandconsolidationinSpain.AnnalsoftheAssociationofAmericanGeographers49:361–373.

Nelson,G.C.,V.Harris,andS.W.Stone.2001.Deforestation,landuse,andpropertyrights:EmpiricalevidencefromDarien,Panama.LandEconomics77:187–205.

Nessen,W.2006.SentimentsMadeVisible:TheRiseandReasonofAceh’sNationalLiberationMovement.InVerandahofviolence :thebackgroundtotheAcehproblem,ed.A.Reid,177–198.SingaporeSeattle:SingaporeUniversityPress ;InAssociationwithUniversityofWashingtonPress.

Nordas,R.,andN.Gleditsch.2007.Climatechangeandconflict.PoliticalGeography26(6):627–638.http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0962629807000856.

Nozick,R.1974.Anarchy,state,andutopia.NewYork:BasicBooks.

O’Lear,S.,andP.F.Diehl.2007.NotDrawntoScale:ResearchonResourceandEnvironmentalConflict.Geopolitics12(1):166–182.

OECD.2012.EvaluatingPeacebuildingActivitiesinSettingsofConflictandFragility:ImprovingLearningforResults.

Olwig,K.2002.Landscape,nature,andthebodypolitic :fromBritain’srenaissancetoAmerica'snewworld.Madison:UniversityofWisconsinPress.

Olwig,K.R.1996.RecoveringtheSubstantiveNatureofLandscape.AnnalsoftheAssociationofAmericanGeographers86(4):630–653.http://www.jstor.org/stable/2564345.

Ostrom,E.1990.Governingthecommons :theevolutionofinstitutionsforcollectiveaction.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.

Otterman,S.2009.CourtRedrawsDisputedAreainSudan.NewYorkTimes23July:online.http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/23/world/africa/23sudan.html?adxnnl=1&adxnnlx=1366517597‐C3LXNXI35+9IoxzQpiFzLQ.

Otto,J.M.2009.RuleofLawPromotion,LandTenureandPovertyAlleviation:QuestioningtheAssumptionsofHernandodeSoto.HagueJournalontheRuleofLaw1(1):173–194.

Paris,R.,F.Lavigne,P.Wassmer,andJ.Sartohadi.2007.CoastalsedimentationassociatedwiththeDecember26,2004tsunamiinLhokNga,westBandaAceh(Sumatra,Indonesia).MarineGeology238(1‐4):93–106.http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.margeo.2006.12.009(lastaccessed18March2013).

237

Paris,Roland.2004.Atwar’send :buildingpeaceaftercivilconflict.Cambridge,U.K. ;NewYork:CambridgeUniversityPress.

PartaiAceh.2012.MalikMahmud:BALderivativeswillbeclearedbyInTwoYears.AcehParty’sOfficialWebsite:Online.www.partaiaceh.com/2012/08/malik‐mahmud‐turunan‐uupa‐akan.html(lastaccessed27April2013).

Peckham,R.S.2000.Mapmania:nationalismandthepoliticsofplaceinGreece,1870‐1922.PoliticalGeography19(1):77–95.

Peluso,NL.1992.Richforests,poorpeople:ResourcecontrolandresistanceinJava.Berkeley:UniversityofCaliforniaPress.

Peluso,N.L.,andE.Harwell.2002.Territory,customandtheculturalpoliticsofethnicwarinWestKalimatan,Indonesia.InViolentEnvironments,eds.N.PelusoandM.Watts,83–116.Ithaca:CornellUniversity.

Peluso,NancyLee.2005.SeeingPropertyinLandUse:LocalTerritorializationsinWestKalimantan,Indonesia.GeografiskTidsskrift105(1):1–15.

———.1995.WhoseWoodsAreThese‐Counter‐MappingForestTerritoriesinKalimantan,Indonesia.Antipode27(4):383–406.

Peluso,NancyLee,andEmilyHarwell.2001.Territory,custom,andtheculturalpoliticsofethnicwarinWestKalimantan,Indonesia.InViolentenvironments,83–116.Ithaca:CornellUniversityPress.

Peluso,NancyLee,andMichaelWatts.2001.Violentenvironments.Ithaca:CornellUniversityPress.

Penner,J.E.1996.Thebundleofrights’'pictureofproperty.UCLALawReview43(3):711–820.

Percival,V.,andT.Homer‐Dixon.1998.Environmentalscarcityandviolentconflict:ThecaseofSouthAfrica.JournalofPeaceResearch35(3):279–298.

Phelps,N.,T.Bunnell,andM.Miller.2011.Post‐disastereconomicdevelopmentinAceh:Neoliberalizationandothereconomic‐geographicalimaginaries.Geoforum42(4):418–426.

PierceColfer,C.J.,andH.Newton.1989.Ethnicity:AnimportantconsiderationinIndonesianagriculture.AgricultureandHumanValues6(3):52–67.http://link.springer.com/10.1007/BF02217669(lastaccessed9March2013).

Plunkett,M.2005.ReestablishingtheRuleofLaw.InPostconflictdevelopment :meetingnewchallenges,eds.G.JunneandW.Verkoren,73–98.Boulder,Colo.:LynneRiennerPublishers.

Prem,H.J.1992.SpanishColonizationandIndianPropertyinCentralMexico,1521‐1620.AnnalsoftheAssociationofAmericanGeographers82(3):444–459.

Price,E.T.1995.Dividingtheland :earlyAmericanbeginningsofourprivatepropertymosaic.Chicago:UniversityofChicagoPress.

238

Prill‐Brett,J.1994.IndigenousLandRightsandLegalPluralismamongPhilippineHighlanders.Law&SocietyReview28:687–698.

Purcell,M.2003.IslandsofpracticeandtheMarston/Brennerdebate:towardamoresyntheticcriticalhumangeography.ProgressinHumanGeography27(3):317–332.

Radin,M.J.1993.Reinterpretingproperty.Chicago:UniversityofChicagoPress.

Raento,P.,andC.J.Watson.2000.Gernika,Guernica,Guernica?:ContestedmeaningsofaBasqueplace.PoliticalGeography19:707–736.

Ramsbotham,O.,H.Miall,andT.Woodhouse.2005.Contemporaryconflictresolution:theprevention,managementandtransformationofdeadlyconflicts.Cambridge,UK ;Malden,MA:PolityPress.

Razzaz,O.M.1993.ExaminingProperty‐RightsandInvestmentinInformalSettlements‐theCaseofJordan.LandEconomics69(4):341–355.

Reid,A.2006.Verandahofviolence :thebackgroundtotheAcehproblem.SingaporeSeattle:SingaporeUniversityPress ;InAssociationwithUniversityofWashingtonPress.

Reimann,B.1997.Thetransitionfrompeople’spropertytoprivateproperty:ConsequencesoftherestitutionprincipleforurbandevelopmentandurbanrenewalinEastBerlin'sinner‐cityresidentialareas.AppliedGeography17(4):301–313.http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0143622897000234.

Ribot,J.C.,andNLPeluso.2003.Atheoryofaccess.RuralSociology68(2):153–181.

Robinson,G.1998.RawanIsasRawanDoes:TheOriginsofDisorderinNewOrderAceh.Indonesia66(1):127–157.

Rocheleau,D.,andD.Edmunds.1997.Women,menandtrees:Gender,powerandpropertyinforestandagrarianlandscapes.WorldDevelopment25:1351–1371.

Rocheleau,D.,andL.Ross.1995.TreesasTools,TreesasText‐StrugglesoverResourcesinZambrana‐Chacuey,Dominican‐Republic.Antipode27(4):407–428.

Rofi,A.,ShannonDoocy,andCourtlandRobinson.2006.TsunamimortalityanddisplacementinAcehprovince,Indonesia.Disasters30(3):340–50.http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/16911432.

Rogerson,J.1996.Thegeographyofpropertyininner‐cityJohannesburg.GeoJournal39:73–79.

Rose,C.M.1994.Propertyandpersuasion :essaysonthehistory,theory,andrhetoricofownership.Boulder,Colo.:WestviewPress.

Ross,A.2011.Geographiesofwarandtheputativepeace.PoliticalGeography30(4):197–199.

Ross,M.L.2005.ResourcesandRebellioninAceh,Indonesia.InUnderstandingCivilWar(Volume2:Europe,CentralAsia,&OtherRegions)EvidenceandAnalysis,eds.PaulCollierandN.C.N.Sambanis,

239

35–58.Washington,D.C.:WorldBankhttp://www.polisci.ucla.edu/faculty/ross/ResourcesRebellion.pdf.

———.2004.WhatDoWeKnowaboutNaturalResourcesandCivilWar?JournalofPeaceResearch41:337–356.

Rothman,J.1997.ResolvingIdentity‐BasedConflictInNations,Organizations,andCommunitiesJossey‐Bas.SanFrancisco,Calif.:Jossey‐Bass.

Sack,R.D.1986.Humanterritoriality :itstheoryandhistory.Cambridge ;NewYork:CambridgeUniversityPress.

Sait,S.,andH.Lim.2006.Land,lawandIslam:propertyandhumanrightsintheMuslimworld.London ;NewYork,NY:ZedBooks ;DistributedintheUSAbyPalgraveMacmillan.

Santos,B.deS.2006.TheheterogeneousstateandlegalpluralisminMozambique.Law&SocietyReview40:39–75.

———.2002.Towardanewlegalcommonsense :law,globalizationandemancipation.LondonET‐2nd:ButterworthsLexisNexis.

Sassen,S.2006.Territory,authority,rights :frommedievaltoglobalassemblages.Princeton,N.J.:PrincetonUniversityPress.

Sauer,C.O.1925.Themorphologyoflandscape.Berkeley:UniversityofCalifornia.

Schein,R.H.1997.ThePlaceofLandscape :87(4):660–680.

Schlager,E.,andE.Ostrom.1992.Property‐RightsRegimesandNaturalResources:AConceptualAnalysis.LandEconomics68(3):249–262.

Schmidt,J.J.,andM.Dowsley.2010.HuntingwithPolarBears:ProblemswiththePassivePropertiesoftheCommons.HumanEcology38(3):377–387.

Schroeder,J.L.1994.ChixNixBundle‐O‐Stix‐aFeministCritiqueoftheDisaggregationofProperty.MichiganLawReview93(2):239–319.

Schroeder,R.1997.“Re‐claiming”LandinTheGambia:GenderedPropertyRightsandEnvironmentalIntervention.AnnalsoftheAssociationofAmericanGeographers87(3):487–508.

Schulze,K.E.2007.GAM:Indonesia,GAM,andtheAcehnesepopulationinaZero‐SumTrap.InTerror,insurgency,andthestate :endingprotractedconflicts,eds.M.Heiberg,B.O’Leary,andJ.Tirman,83–122.Philadelphia:UniversityofPennsylvaniaPress.

———.2004.TheFreeAcehMovement(GAM):AnatomyofaSeparatistOrganization.Washington,DC.http://www.eastwestcenterwashington.org.

240

Scott,J.1998.Seeinglikeastate :howcertainschemestoimprovethehumanconditionhavefailed.NewHavenConn. ;London:YaleUniversityPress.

———.2009.Theartofnotbeinggoverned :ananarchisthistoryofuplandSoutheastAsia.NewHaven:YaleUniversityPress.

Scott,J.C.1985.Weaponsoftheweak :everydayformsofpeasantresistance.NewHaven ;London:YaleUniversityPress.

Shmueli,D.,M.Elliott,andSandaKaufman.2006.FrameChangesandtheManagementofIntractableConflicts.ConflictResolutionQuarterly24(2):207–218.http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/crq.169/abstract.

Sibley,S.2002.LawandSocietyMovement.InLegalsystemsoftheworld :apolitical,social,andculturalencyclopedia,ed.H.M.Kritzer,860–863.SantaBarbara,Calif.:ABC‐CLIO.

Sikor,T.2004.Conflictingconcepts:contestedlandrelationsinnorth‐westernVietnam.ConservationandSociety2(1):75–95.

———.2006.Politicsofrurallandregistrationinpost‐socialistsocieties:ContestedtitlinginvillagesofNorthwestVietnam.LandUsePolicy23(4):617–628.

Sikor,T.,andC.Lund.2009.AccessandProperty:AQuestionofPowerandAuthority.DevelopmentandChange40(1):1–22.

Simanjuntak,H.2013.Acehgiven15daystorethinkownbylaw.TheJakartaPost3April.www.thejakartapost.com/news/2013/04/03/aceh‐given‐15‐days‐rethink‐own‐bylaw.html.

———.2008.Finally,Acehlocalpartiestotakepartingeneralelection.TheJakartaPost18August:Online.http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2008/08/18/finally‐aceh‐local‐parties‐take‐part‐general‐election.html.

Simmons,C.S.,R.T.Walker,E.Y.Arima,S.P.Aldrich,andM.M.Caldas.2007.TheAmazonLandWarintheSouthofPará.AnnalsoftheAssociationofAmericanGeographers97(3):567–592.http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/anna/2007/00000097/00000003/art00007.

Singer,J.W.2000.Entitlement :theparadoxesofproperty.NewHavenConn. ;London:YaleUniversityPress.

Smith,A.D.1998.Nationalismandmodernism :acriticalsurveyofrecenttheoriesofnationsandnationalism.London ;NewYork:Routledge.

Smith,N.1992.Geography,differenceandthepoliticsofscale.InPostmodernismandthesocialsciences,eds.J.Doherty,E.Graham,andM.Malek,57–79.London:Macmillan.

Smith,Neil.1988.TheRegionIsDead‐LongLivetheRegion.PoliticalGeographyQuarterly7:141–152.

241

———.1984.Unevendevelopment :nature,capital,andtheproductionofspace.NewYork,NY:Blackwell.

Smith,R.E.2003.LandtenurereforminAfrica:ashifttothedefensive.ProgressinDevelopmentStudies3:210–222.

Soto,H.de.2001.DeadCapitalandthePoor.SAISReview21(1):13–43.http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/sais_review/v021/21.1de_soto.html(lastaccessed5April2013).

DeSoto,H.2000.Themysteryofcapital :whycapitalismtriumphsintheWestandfailseverywhereelse.NewYork:BasicBooks.

Sowerwine,J.2004.TerritorialisationandthePoliticsofHighlandLandscapesinVietnam:NegotiatingPropertyRelationsinPolicy,MeaningandPractice.ConservationandSociety2:97–136.

Sowerwine,J.C.2004.ThepoliticalecologyofDao(Yao)landscapetransformations:territory,genderandlivelihoodpoliticsinhighlandVietnam.WildlandResourceSciencesPhD.disse:646.

Stange,G.,andA.Missbach.2011.AsupremerulerforAceh?InsideIndonesia.http://www.insideindonesia.org/weekly‐articles/a‐supreme‐ruler‐for‐aceh(lastaccessed12December2012).

Stets,J.E.,andP.J.Burke.2000.IdentityTheoryandSocialIdentityTheory.SocialPsychologyQuarterly63(3):224–237.http://www.jstor.org/stable/2695870?origin=crossref.

Suhrke,A.,andI.Samset.2007.What’sinaFigure?EstimatingRecurrenceofCivilWar.InternationalPeacekeeping14(2):195–203.http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13533310601150776(lastaccessed12March2013).

Suliman,M.1999.TheNubaMountainsofSudan:Resourceaccess,violentconflict,andidentity.InCultivatingpeace :conflictandcollaborationinnaturalresourcemanagement,ed.D.Buckles.Ottawa:InternationalDevelopmentResearchCenter;WorldBankInstitute.

Sunderlin,W.D.,J.Hatcher,andM.Liddle.2008.Fromexclusiontoownership?Challengesandopportunitiesinadvancingforesttenurereform.Bogor(Indonesia):CentreforInternationalForestryResearch.http://www.rightsandresources.org/publication_details.php?publicationID=736.

Swyngedouw,E.2000.Authoritariangovernance,power,andthepoliticsofrescaling.EnvironmentandPlanningD:SocietyandSpace18(1):63–76.

———.1997.Neitherglobalnorlocal:“glocalisation”andthepoliticsofscale.InSpacesofglobalization :reassertingthepowerofthelocal,ed.K.Cox,137–166.NewYork:GuilfordPress.

Tajfel,H.1978.Differentiationbetweensocialgroups:Studiesinthesocialpsychologyofintergrouprelationsed.H.Tajfel.AcademicPress.http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=psyh&AN=1980‐50696‐000&site=ehost‐live.

242

———.1981.Humangroupsandsocialcategories:Studiesinsocialpsychology.Cambridgeuniversitypress.

———.1982a.Socialidentityandintergrouprelationsed.H.Tajfel.CambridgeUniversityPress.http://books.google.com/books?hl=nl&lr=&id=h_YA9CYXgG0C&pgis=1.

———.1982b.SocialPsychologyofIntergroupRelationseds.W.G.AustinandS.Worchel.AnnualReviewofPsychology33(1):1–39.http://www.annualreviews.org/doi/abs/10.1146/annurev.ps.33.020182.000245.

Tajfel,H.,andJ.C.Turner.1979.Anintegrativetheoryofintergroupconflict.InThesocialpsychologyofintergrouprelations,eds.WGAustinandSWorchel,33–47.Brooks/Colehttp://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0065260105370055.

Tamanaha,B.2007a.AConciseGuidetotheRuleofLawed.G.P.NeilWalker.HartPublishingCompany.http://ssrn.com/paper=1012051.

———.2007b.UnderstandingLegalPluralism:PasttoPresent,LocaltoGlobal.SydneyLawReview29:375–411.

Tamanaha,B.Z.2000.ANon‐EssentialistVersionofLegalPluralism.JournalofLawandSociety27(2):296–321.

Tampubolon,H.D.2012.Newlandrulesettobeineffective.TheJakartaPost11August:Online.http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2012/08/11/new‐land‐rule‐set‐be‐ineffective.html.

Taylor,P.1982.AMaterialistFrameworkforPolitical‐Geography.TransactionsoftheInstituteofBritishGeographers7(1):15–34.

Thorburn,C.C.2004.Theplotthickens:landadministrationandpolicyinpost‐NewOrderIndonesia.AsiaPacificViewpoint45(1):33–49.http://doi.wiley.com/10.1111/j.1467‐8376.2004.00226.x.

Tilly,C.2003.Thepoliticsofcollectiveviolence.Cambridge,U.K. ;NewYork:CambridgeUniversityPress.

Toft,M.D.2003.Thegeographyofethnicviolence :identity,interests,andtheindivisibilityofterritory.Princeton,NJ ;Oxford:PrincetonUniversityPress.

Tschirgi,N.2004.Post‐conflictPeacebuildingRevisited:achievements,limitations,challenges.InWSPInternational/IPAPeacebuildingForumConference.NewYork.

Tushnet,M.1983.Anessayonrights.TexasLawReview62(8):1363–1403.

UNEP.2009.Fromconflicttopeacebuilding:Theroleofnaturalresourcesandtheenvironment.Nairobi:UnitedNationsEnvironmentProgramme.http://www.unep.org/pdf/pcdmb_policy_01.pdf.

———.2012.ToolkitAndGuidanceForPreventingAndManagingLandAndNaturalResourcesConflict.NewYork:UnitedNations.

243

UNHABITAT.2007.HandbookonPost‐ConflictLandAdministrationandPeacebuilding:Volume1:CountrieswithLandRecords.UNHABITAT:Nairobi.

Unruh,J.D.2005.Accesstorurallandandlandadministrationafterviolentconflicts.Rome:FAO.

———.1998.LandtenureandidentitychangeinpostwarMozambique.GeoJournal46(2):89–99.

———.2003.LandTenureandLegalPluralisminthePeaceProcess.Peace&Change28(3):352–377.

———.2006.LandTenureandthe“EvidenceLandscape”inDevelopingCountries.AnnalsoftheAssociationofAmericanGeographers96(4):754–772.

———.2004.Post‐conflictlandtenure:UsingaSustainableLivelihoodsApproach.Rome:FAO.

———.2002.Povertyandpropertyrightsinthedevelopingworld:notassimpleaswewouldlike.LandUsePolicy19(4):275–276.

Unruh,J.D.,andR.Williams.2013.LandandPost‐ConflictPeacebuilding.NewYork:Routledge.

USAID.2005a.FactSheet#39.(01October2006).http://transition.usaid.gov/our_work/humanitarian_assistance/disaster_assistance/countries/indian_ocean/template/fs_sr/indianocean_et_fs39_07‐07‐2005.pdf(lastaccessed1January2013).

———.2005b.LandandViolentConflict:AToolkitforProgramminged.C.andH.A.ConflictManagementandMitigationBureauforDemocracy.Washington,D.C.:U.S.AgencyforInternationalDevelopment(USAID).http://transition.usaid.gov/our_work/cross‐cutting_programs/conflict/publications/docs/CMM_Land_and_Conflict_Toolkit_April_2005.pdf.

Vago,S.2008.Lawandsociety.UpperSaddleRiver,N.J.ET‐9th:Pearson/PrenticeHall.

Vandergeest,P.,andNLPeluso.1995.TerritorializationandStatePowerinThailand.TheoryandSociety24(3):385–426.

Verdery,K.1999.FuzzyProperty:Rights,Power,andIdentityinTransylvania’sDecollectivization.InUncertaintransition :ethnographiesofchangeinthepostsocialistworld,eds.M.BurawoyandK.Verdery,53–82.Lanham,MD:Rowman&Littlefield.

———.2004.Theobligationsofownership:restoringrightstolandinpostsocialistTransylvania.InPropertyinquestion:valuetransformationintheglobaleconomy,eds.K.VerderyandC.Humphrey,139–160.Oxford ;NewYork,NYET‐English:Berg.

Waizenegger,A.,andJ.Hyndman.2010.Twosolitudes:post‐tsunamiandpost‐conflictAceh.Disasters34(3):787–808.

Wallace,J.2008.Indonesianlandlawandadministration.InIndonesia:lawandsociety,ed.T.Lindsey,191–223.Sydney:FederationPress.

244

Warf,B.,andS.Arias.2009.Thespatialturn :interdisciplinaryperspectives.London ;NewYork:Routledge.

Watts,Michael.2004.Resourcecurse?Governmentality,oilandpowerintheNigerDelta,Nigeria.ed.PLeBillon.Geopolitics9(1):50–80.http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ijh&AN=54.6998&site=ehost‐live.

WB(WorldBank).2010.ImplementationcompletionandresultsreportonadonortrustfundforAcehandNorthSumatragrantintheamountofUS$28.5milliontotheRepublicofIndonesiaforaReconstructionofAcehLandAdministrationSystemProject.Washington,D.C.

WB(WorldBank).2008.AcehPovertyAssessment2008:TheImpactoftheconflict,thetsunami,andreconstructiononpovertyinAceh.Jakarta:WorldBank.http://go.worldbank.org/1XV3QQBWU0.

———.2006a.GAMReintegrationNeedsAssessment.EnhancingPeacethroughCommunity‐levelDevelopmentProgramming.BandaAceh:WorldBank.

———.2011.Indonesia‐LandManagementandPolicyDevelopmentProject.Washington,DC.http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2011/06/15443887/indonesia‐land‐management‐policy‐development‐projec.

———.2006b.MultiDonorTrustFundforAcehandNorthSumatra.(01October2006).http://www.mdtfans.org/p‐land.html.

Weber,M.1978.Economyandsociety :anoutlineofinterpretivesociology.Berkeley:UniversityofCaliforniaPress.

Webersik,C.,andA.Crawford.2011.GrowingUnrest:Charcoal,Bananas,Fisheries,andConflictinSomalia.InStrengtheningPost‐ConflictPeacebuildingThroughNaturalResourceManagement(VOLUME4:LivelihoodsandNaturalResourcesinPost‐ConflictPeacebuilding),eds.H.YoungandL.Goldman.London:Earthscan.

Weinstein,J.M.2007.InsideRebellion:ThePoliticsofInsurgentViolence.CambridgeUniversityPress.http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/abs/10.1086/524789.

Wennmann,A.2011.BreakingtheConflictTrap?AddressingtheResourceCurseinPeaceProcesses.GlobalGovernance:AReviewofMultilateralismandInternationalOrganizations17(2):265–279.http://journals.rienner.com/doi/abs/10.5555/1075‐2846‐17.2.265(lastaccessed24April2013).

Whatmore,S.2003.De/re‐territorializingpossession:theshiftingspacesofpropertyrights.InLawandgeography,eds.J.HolderandC.Harrison,211–223.Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress.

Williams,P.,andF.McConnell.2011.CriticalGeographiesofPeace.Antipode43(4):927–931.

Wilson,R.A.2000.ReconciliationandRevengeinPost‐ ApartheidSouthAfrica:RethinkingLegalPluralismandHumanRights.CurrentAnthropology41(1):75–98.

Wolford,W.2004.Thislandisoursnow:SpatialimaginariesandthestruggleforlandinBrazil.AnnalsoftheAssociationofAmericanGeographers94(2):409–424.

245

Wong,S.,L.Hoo,R.Gnagey,T.Dawood,J.Pribadi,S.Shewfelt,P.Barron,A.Mawardi,W.Setiono,E.Tan,andS.U.Tjan.2007.2006VillageSurveyinAceh:anassessmentofvillageinfrastructureandsocialConditionsed.K.D.P.K.D.Program.BandaAceh,Indonesia:WorldBank,GovernmentofIndonesia,theWorldBank,theMulti‐DonorFundforAcehandNias,andtheDecentralizationSupportFacility.

Wusten,H.vander.2005.Violence,development,andpoliticalorder.InThegeographyofwarandpeace :fromdeathcampstodiplomats,ed.C.Flint,61–84.NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress.

Yergin,D.1991.Theprize :theepicquestforoil,money,andpower.NewYork:Simon&Schuster.

Yezer,C.2011.WarsofwordsandpovertyintheVRAE:Reparations,culturalrightsandnarco‐terrorinPeru’sApurímacandEneValley.InStrengtheningPost‐ConflictPeacebuildingThroughNaturalResourceManagement(Volume1:High‐ValueNaturalResourcesandPost‐ConflictPeacebuilding),eds.P.LujalaandS.A.Rustad.London:Earthscan.

Yin,R.K.2003a.Applicationsofcasestudyresearch2nded.ThousandOaks,CA:SAGE.

———.2003b.Casestudyresearch :designandmethods2nded.SAGE.

Young,H.,A.MoniumOsman,A.M.Abusin,M.Asher,andO.Egemi.2009.Livelihoods,PowerandChoice:TheVulnerabilityoftheNorthernRizaygat,Darfur,Sudan.Medford,MA:FeinsteinInternationalCenter,TuftsUniversity.

Zulu,L.C.2009.Politicsofscaleandcommunity‐basedforestmanagementinsouthernMalawi.Geoforum40(4):686–699.http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6V68‐4WN1YHW‐1/2/87ad88de62a0fbec288401056bfe9631(lastaccessed15July2011).

246

APPENDICES

247

APPENDIXI:RESEARCHETHICSBOARDAPPROVAL

248

APPENDIXII:APPROVALFROMPUBLISHERTOUSEARTICLESINDISSERTATION

249

250

APPENDIXIII:CALENDAROFFIELDWORKANDPUBLICATIONS

Dates Activity2006May‐August LanguageTraining inYogyakarta,Indonesia.2006August ScopingvisittoAceh: Initialfieldsitevisit,semi‐structured

interviewsinBandaAceh.2007April Aceharrivalandprep.2007May‐June Aceh:Focusgroups andsemi‐structuredinterviewsinBandaAceh,

AcehJaya,AcehBarat.2008February Aceh:Focusgroups andsemi‐structuredinterviewsinPidie,Aceh

Barat,AcehJaya,andBandaAceh.2008April Boston:Presentationofinitialresultsat2008AAG(Boston)

Montreal:Surgeryforleginjurylimitsmobility.2008May ScopingvisittoEastTimor:collectedsemi‐structuredinterviews

andarchivaldatatoseeifcomparativecasestudycouldbedonewithAceh.

2008May‐June Aceh:Focusgroups andsemi‐structuredinterviewsinPidie,AcehBarat,AcehJaya,andBandaAceh.

2008September‐2009December

DataAnalysis:EastTimor,moreworkonAcehdata(codingandcontentanalysis).

2009March Presentationofresultsat2009AAG(LasVegas).2009December SubmissionofChapterFour andChapterSix forpublication.2010April PresentationofChapterFive 2010AAG(Washington).2010June PresentationofChapterSix foreditsatCAPRi (SiamReap).2010July–2013April Full‐timecollegeprofessoratOkanaganCollegeandlecturerat

UBC‐Okanagan.2010August–2013January

DataAnalysis:Aceh.Dissertationwriting.

2013April SubmissionofChapterFive forpublication.2013April Initialsubmission ofdissertation.2013May PublicationofChapterFour (bookreleased).2013September PublicationofChapterSix(bookreleased).

251

APPENDIXIV:EXAMPLESEMI‐STRUCTUREDINTERVIEW

OralConsentTextEnglish:“Hello.MynameisArthurGreen.IamfromCanada.IamstudentatMcGillUniversity.CanIaskyousomequestions?Today,Iwouldliketoaskyousomequestionsaboutcommunityprioritiesfordevelopmentandanyexperienceyouhavewithlandmanagement.Thisprocessshouldtakeaboutanhour.Allinformationsharedinthis[focusgroup/interview]willbesecurelystoredandifpublishedwillbeanonymous.Yournameswillnotbeincludedinthisinformation.Noonewillbeabletoconnectthisinformationtoyouinthefuture.InformationwillbeusedtoevaluateyourexperiencewithlandregistrationandImayprovidesomeinformationtoICRAFtohelpthemevaluatepotentialneedsforfarmerandcommercialtraininginthisregion.Ifyouwouldnotliketoparticipateoranswer,pleasefeelfreetodeclinetoanswer,toleavethemeeting,ortoinformmethatyouwouldliketostopthemeeting.DoIhaveyouroralconsenttostartwithourquestions?”BahasaIndonesia:NamasayaArthurGreen.SayadariKanada.SayamahasiswadiMcGillUniversity.Dapatkahsayamengajukanbeberapapertanyaan?Hariini,sayainginmengajukanbeberapapertanyaantentangpengembanganmasyarakatdanpengelolaanlahan.Prosesiniakanmemakanwaktusekitarsatujam.Semuainformasiyangdibagidalam[focusgroup/wawancara]akandisimpandenganamandanjikadipublikasikanakanmenjadianonim.NamaAndatidakakandisertakandalaminformasiini.TidakadayangakandapatmenghubungkaninformasiinikepadaAndadimasadepan.InformasiiniakandigunakanuntukmengevaluasipengalamanAndadenganpendaftarantanahdansayadapatmemberikanbeberapainformasiuntukICRAFuntukmembantumerekamengevaluasikebutuhanpotensialbagipetanidankomersialpelatihandiwilayahini.JikaAndatidakinginberpartisipasiataumenjawab,janganraguuntukmenolakuntukmenjawab,untukmeninggalkanpertemuan,atauuntukmemberitahukanbahwaAndainginberhentipertemuan.ApakahsayaharuspersetujuanlisanAndauntukmemulaidenganpertanyaan?"Contact:ArthurGreenTel:+15148397479Email:arthur.green@mcgill.ca

252

1. Date2. Location3. Contextofinterview(setting)4. Intervieweeposition(forinterview)andotherpositions/affiliations(political,

social,etc.)5. Numberofpeopleandwhoinpresence?6. Gender7. Themes(notnecessarilypresentedinthisorderduringthefocusgroup)

1. ConversationalTalkAboutThem1. Talkaboutthem2. Theirexperienceoftsunami3. Letthemexpressanyotherpersonal/politicalthingstheywant4. Anyquestionstheyhave5. LetthemtellstoryabouttheGOI‐GAMconflict

2. Areaofwork/livelihood1. Whereisareaofwork?2. Ifagency,howmanypeopleservedanddemographics?3. Ifindividual,askinformationabouthouseholdsizeandcomposition?4. Whataretheactivitiestheintervieweeparticipatesin?

3. Livelihoods1. Namemainlivelihoodsincommunity2. Whataremostcommonregionalproducts3. Commoditychainsdescription:whoproduces,whobuys,whotransportsto

market,whobuysinmarket,prices,quantities,storageareas,anythingelse.4. Financerelationshipswithintermediaries

4. Developmentneedsintheareaofwork1. Rank3‐5toppriorities(notvague,needclearactions)2. Howistheirworkinvolvedwiththesepriorities?3. Moreindepthunderstandingoftheirinstitutionalprioritiesandactivities

5. Resourcetenure6. Resourcetenure

1. Mainlandusetypesinarea?2. Whatlawsdotheyusetomanageland/resourceownership?3. Howaredisputesoverownershipsettled?

1. disputesresolved2. disputeshavenotbeenresolved

4. Howdidthetsunamichangelandownership?5. Howdid30yearsofconflictchangelandownership?6. Dowomenownlandorotherproperty?7. Whatarethemajorchangesownershipoverlast5‐10years?8. Whatarefutureplansfordeveloping?

7. RALAS1. Doyouwanttohavestatetitlecertificatesfortheland?2. Whyorwhynot?3. HaveRALASrepresentativescometothiscommunity?4. Howmany?5. WhataretheirexperienceswiththeRALASstaff?

253

1. Communitylandmapping2. Communitydrivenadjudication3. Disputeexamplesandresolutionmethods4. Officialdocumentationavailable?5. Waslandalltitled?6. Wasjointtitlingofwomenandmenaccomplished?7. Wereanyerrorsintitlesmade?8. Whatroledidthecommunityleadersplay(geuchik,tuhapeut,other)?9. Howaboutotherofficials(Sekdes,Camat,Bupati…etc.)10. SuggestionstomaketheRALASprocessbetter?11. Howmanypeoplehavemortgagedland?Why?Whynot?

6. Anyothercommentsaboutpropertyregistration?8. Whataresomesuggestionsformyworkinthisarea?9. Furthercontacts(snowball)?10. Anyadditionalinformationtheywouldliketoshare?11. Opencommentstoallpresent.

Contact:ArthurGreen,arthur.green@mcgill.ca,+15148397479

254

APPENDIXV:EXAMPLEFOCUSGROUPAGENDA

OralConsentTextEnglish:“Hello.MynameisArthurGreen.IamfromCanada.IamstudentatMcGillUniversity.CanIaskyousomequestions?Today,Iwouldliketoaskyousomequestionsaboutcommunityprioritiesfordevelopmentandanyexperienceyouhavewithlandmanagement.Thisprocessshouldtakeaboutanhour.Allinformationsharedinthis[focusgroup/interview]willbesecurelystoredandifpublishedwillbeanonymous.Yournameswillnotbeincludedinthisinformation.Noonewillbeabletoconnectthisinformationtoyouinthefuture.InformationwillbeusedtoevaluateyourexperiencewithlandregistrationandImayprovidesomeinformationtoICRAFtohelpthemevaluatepotentialneedsforfarmerandcommercialtraininginthisregion.Ifyouwouldnotliketoparticipateoranswer,pleasefeelfreetodeclinetoanswer,toleavethemeeting,ortoinformmethatyouwouldliketostopthemeeting.DoIhaveyouroralconsenttostartwithourquestions?”BahasaIndonesia:NamasayaArthurGreen.SayadariKanada.SayamahasiswadiMcGillUniversity.Dapatkahsayamengajukanbeberapapertanyaan?Hariini,sayainginmengajukanbeberapapertanyaantentangpengembanganmasyarakatdanpengelolaanlahan.Prosesiniakanmemakanwaktusekitarsatujam.Semuainformasiyangdibagidalam[focusgroup/wawancara]akandisimpandenganamandanjikadipublikasikanakanmenjadianonim.NamaAndatidakakandisertakandalaminformasiini.TidakadayangakandapatmenghubungkaninformasiinikepadaAndadimasadepan.InformasiiniakandigunakanuntukmengevaluasipengalamanAndadenganpendaftarantanahdansayadapatmemberikanbeberapainformasiuntukICRAFuntukmembantumerekamengevaluasikebutuhanpotensialbagipetanidankomersialpelatihandiwilayahini.JikaAndatidakinginberpartisipasiataumenjawab,janganraguuntukmenolakuntukmenjawab,untukmeninggalkanpertemuan,atauuntukmemberitahukanbahwaAndainginberhentipertemuan.ApakahsayaharuspersetujuanlisanAndauntukmemulaidenganpertanyaan?"Contact:ArthurGreenTel:+15148397479Email:arthur.green@mcgill.ca

255

1. Date2. Locationofcommunity(includelocationintraveltimeanddistancetoregional

capital)3. Contextofmeeting(setting)4. Numberofpeopleandwhoinpresence(gendercount,ages,otherdetails)5. Notetheposition/affiliationofthosepresentifpossible6. Themes(notnecessarilypresentedinthisorderduringthefocusgroup)

1. ConversationalTalkAboutThem1. Talkaboutthem2. Theirexperienceoftsunami3. Letthemexpressanyotherpersonal/politicalthingstheywant4. Anyquestionstheyhave5. LetthemtellstoryabouttheGOI‐GAMconflict

2. Populationmovement1. Migrationintoandoutofvillage?2. Demographicchangesoverlast5‐10years?

3. Livelihoods1. Namemainlivelihoodsincommunity2. Whataremostcommonregionalproducts3. Commoditychainsdescription:whoproduces,whobuys,whotransportsto

market,whobuysinmarket,prices,quantities,storageareas,anythingelse.4. Financerelationshipswithintermediaries

4. Developmentneedsinthearea1. Ongoingactivities2. Rank3‐5toppriorities(needspecificitems/actions):

1. Brainstormprioritiesinsmallgroup2. Iflargegroup,breakintogroupsof2‐3andgetthemtoidentifytop3‐5

prioritiesthenbringtogether3. Rankinconsensus

3. Howwouldthesechangesaffecttheirlives?4. Howwouldthesechangesaffectthelivesofpeoplearoundthem?

5. Resourcetenure1. Mainlandusetypesinthevillagearea?2. Whatlawsdotheyusetomanageland/resourceownership?3. Howaredisputesoverownershipsettled?

1. disputesresolved2. disputeshavenotbeenresolved

4. Howdidthetsunamichangelandownership?5. Howdid30yearsofconflictchangelandownership?6. Dowomenownlandorotherproperty?7. Whatarethemajorchangestolandorforestownershipoverlast5‐10

years?8. Whatarefutureplansfordevelopinglandorforestinthecommunity?

6. RALAS1. Doyouwanttohavestatetitlecertificatesfortheland?2. Whyorwhynot?3. HaveRALASrepresentativescometothiscommunity?

256

4. Howmany?5. WhataretheirexperienceswiththeRALASstaff?

1. Communitylandmapping2. Communitydrivenadjudication3. Disputeexamplesandresolutionmethods4. Officialdocumentationavailable?5. Waslandalltitled?6. Wasjointtitlingofwomenandmenaccomplished?7. Wereanyerrorsintitlesmade?8. Whatroledidthecommunityleadersplay(geuchik,tuhapeut,other)?9. Howaboutotherofficials(Sekdes,Camat,Bupati…etc.)10. SuggestionstomaketheRALASprocessbetter?11. Howmanypeoplehavemortgagedland?Why?Whynot?

6. Anyothercommentsaboutpropertyregistration?7. Opencommentsforallpresent.8. Invitationtospeakprivatelyforanyadditionalinformationtheywouldliketo

share.9. Fieldsitevisits(oftenfarmerswanttoshowusexamplesofwhattheywerejust

explaining...plantationsoffruittrees,areasdamagedbytsunami,damagetowatersourcesandwells,etc.)

Contact:ArthurGreen,arthur.green@mcgill.ca,+15148397479

257

APPENDIXVI:CODINGTREE

Interviews,focusgroups,observations,archivalresearch,andtextswereanalyzedusing

contentanalysisprocedures.ContentanalysisfollowsKrippendorff's(2004)modelofdata

organization.TheapproachtocodingdatafollowsHsiehandShannon’s(2005)definitionof

directedcontentanalysis–whereintheoreticallyinformedcodesareusedtobegincoding

butinductivelyderivedcodesarealsogenerated,added,andusedthroughreiterative

processesofworkingwiththedata.Thereweremanychallengesincoding.Thereiterative

processledcodinganddataanalysistobeverytimeconsuming.WhileIhadintermediate

languagetraininginBahasaIndonesia,manyoftheinterviewswereconductedinAcehnese

andtranslatedtoEnglish.WhereIwasunabletotranslatematerials,Iusedautomatic

translationtoolsthatdidnotalwayscapturethenuancesoftexts.Ididnothavebudgetto

allowintercoderreliabilitytests,thoughIdistributedmycodingmanualtoseveral

colleaguesforcommentsandchangedtheproceduresandcodesbasedontheirinput.

IusedNVIVOtoaidmycoding.Icodedintwophases:opencodingandrelationalcoding.

Opencodingrequiredmultiplesessions.Inafirstsessionwithadocument,Icodedusing

thefirstlevelcodes(thebroadcodesof“Time”,“Location”,“TenureIssues”,etc.).Ina

secondsessionwiththematerial,whereappropriateIexpandedonfirstlevelcodesto

specifyasecondlevelorthirdlevelcode.Forexample,Imightapplythefirstlevelcode

“TenureIssues”onthefirstgoaround;onthesecondgoaroundIwouldspecifyasecond

levelcodelike“ConflictwithState”or“AdversePossession”or“Resettlement”or“Property

Registration”.If“PropertyRegistration”ischosenasasecondlevelcode,Icangofurther

withthirdlevelcodesthatspecifywhetherregistrationdealswithdeedsortitles.

Inrelationalcoding,Itriedexaminedhowdifferentauthoritiesmightbelinked(oreven

created)todifferentpracticesinvolvingproperty.ThiswasatimeconsumingprocessthatI

thinkwouldhavebeenbetterframedbytheorygeneratingseveralhypotheseswhichcould

thenbetestedagainstthedatacodedintheopencodingsession.Iattemptedtouse

autocodingproceduresthroughNVIVO,butfoundthatsuchanapproachlostmostofthe

nuancesofthetextsanddidnotworkwellontextsinBahasaIndonesiaduetomyuseof

automatictranslatorstosupplementbyownabilitytotranslatetexts.

258

Thebelowthecodesusedforthedissertationarepresentedbylevel:

1. Time(ofactivitiesinquestionorofissuanceoflegislation/policy)a. Beforeconflictb. Duringconflictc. Post‐conflict(recovery,reconstruction,development)

2. Location(ofactivitiesinquestionorareatargetedbylegislation/policy)a. InternationalBordersb. LocalRegional(lawsoractivitiesfocusedononeregionorlocality–a

municipalbylawornationallegislationthatfocusesonaregion)c. National(lawsoractivitiesfocusedontheentirenation–national

legislation)d. Periurbane. RuralAgriculture(ruralregionsthatmaybeintenselysettledbyagricultural

communities)f. RuralRemote(remoteregions)g. Urbanh. Other

3. Narrativea. Conflictb. Disasterc. Womend. Orphanse. Mortgagef. Humanrightsg. Environmentalrisk

4. TenureIssuesa. Conflict‐State(conflictwithagovernmentofficeorauthority)b. Conflict–Non‐state(betweenprivateactors/non‐state

organizations/informalcommunities)c. Propertyregistration(andlandadministration/informationsystems)

i. Deedsregistrationii. Titleregistration(Torrenstitlesystem)

d. Indigeneity‐Citizenshipe. Landminesf. Evidence(ofclaim)g. AdversePossessionorSquattingh. Resettlementi. Restitutionand/orCompensationj. Violence(deathreportedinrelationtolanddisputes)

259

k. Inheritancel. Genderm. Adjudicationn. Conveyanceo. Mortgagesp. Taxesq. Leaser. Other

5. LandTenureRegimes(typesandcharacteristics)65a. Formal–State(statutoryorofficial‐legal)

i. Privateii. Communaliii. StateorPublicProperty(thisincludesparks)

1. National(federal,thisincludesmilitary)2. Sub‐national(province,state,county,ordistrict/sub‐district)3. Local(city,village,“community”,etc.)

iv. Open‐Access(abandoned)v. Other

b. Formal–Non‐stateorganizationsi. Religiousorganization(non‐state)ii. NGO(domesticNGOs)iii. INGO(CARE,Oxfam,RedCross,diasporaorganizations,etc.)iv. IGO(inter‐governmentalassociations:UNagencies,ILO,etc.)v. Other

c. Informali. “Customary”ii. Refugeeiii. IDPiv. Squatterv. Armedgroups(holdingterritory)vi. Formercombatantsvii. Corruptionorblackmarket

65Whilewenormallydrawadistinctiononlybetweenstateandnon‐stateorders,mydissertationresearchshowsthatweneedtoincorporateanunderstandingofothernotquiteinformallandtenureregimes.Forexample,thepoliciesthattheUNpursuedbetween1999‐2005inEastTimordonotcountasstateorasinformalbutareconsistentwiththeideaofanormativeorderandalandtenureregime.The“Formal‐State”sectiondividesupmajorclassificationsunderstatelaw;the“Formal‐Non‐state”and“Informal”sectiondonotaddressestatesorclassificationsastheyaresimplydescriptiveofgroupsinvolvedinlandtenureregimes.

260

viii. Otherd. Gender

i. Maleii. Female

e. Age:markonlyfor“youth”groupsf. SizeofRegimeMembership

i. Small:Involvinglessthan100householdsor400peopleii. Medium:Between100‐500householdsorbetween400‐2000peopleiii. Large:Involvingmorethan500householdsor2000people

g. Other6. LegalMechanisms(linkinglandtenureregimes)(basedonMorseandWoodman)66

a. Positive(one‐way)i. Admissionasfactii. Incorporationaslaw

b. Negative(one‐way)i. Prohibitionii. DenialofValidity

c. MutualAcknowledgement(two‐way)i. Parallelfunctions:regimesfunctiononsamematterinsamespace

andrecognizetheirdifferentoutcomesasvalid.ii. Collaboration:regimescollaboratewithotherregimesthrough

specialcommissions(forexample,mixedappointeesonacommittee).

iii. Insertion:regimeconstitutesalevelofanotherregime(forexample,communalcourtsmustbeeitherrecognizedbyorappointedbystategovernment).

iv. Substitution:aregimeactsasanotherregime(statecourtsactinlieuofcustomaryinstitutions).

7. PropertyTypesa. Landb. House/Buildingsc. Plants(CropsorTrees)d. Subsurfacemineralse. Animalsf. Waterg. Other

8. PropertySignifiers(evidenceandrepresentationoftitleorclaim)a. Paperdocuments

66Sincethereareavarietyoflegalmechanisms,thisframeworkismeanttoclassifymajorlegalmechanisms–notlistallofthem.

261

i. Titlecertificateii. Salesreceiptsiii. Taxreceiptsiv. Churchdocuments(parishdocuments)v. Documentsissuedbycommunityvi. Other

b. Images(satellite,aerial,drawings,etc.)c. Signs(wordedsignsinwood,plastic,metal,etc.)d. OralTestimonyorWitnesse. Plants(CropsorTrees)f. Rocksg. Fenceh. NaturalBarriersi. Other

9. PropertyRights67a. Possession:therighttopossess(asdifferentfromownership–suchasa

lease)ortogainotherrightsthroughpossession(adversepossession).b. Passage:therighttoenteradefinedphysicalareaandenjoynon‐subtractive

benefits(suchasaneasementorhiking,canoeing,camping,etc.).c. Withdrawal:therighttoobtainresourceunitsorbenefitfromthem

(usufruct,covenant,profitsaprendre,etc.).d. Management:therighttoregulateinternalpatternsofuseandtransformthe

resource(tocreatelimitsonpassageandwithdrawalrights).e. Exclusion:therighttodeterminewhowillhaveaccesstootherrights.f. Alienation:therighttotransferrights.

10. PropertyRightsGOIa. HakMilik–ownership(freehold)b. HakGunaUsaha–cultivationonlyc. HakGunaBangunan(HGB)–buildingonlyd. HakPakai–useonlye. HakPengelolaan–landmanagementonlyf. Haksewa–leaseg. Hakmembukatanah–openinglandh. Hakmemunguthasilhutan–collectingforestproductsHakmiliki. Hakmilikadat–individual,customaryj. Hakulayat–community,customaryk. Haktanggungan–mortgage

67Thereareseveralwaysofdividinguprights.ThisisbasedonDekker(2003).

262

11. Conveyance:a. pusaka(inheritance)b. penghibahan(presentingasagift)c. publoue(selling)d. gantouepeunayah(compensation)e. peugala(pawning)f. mawaih(sharecropping)g. peuwakeuh(grantaswakafland)

12. Governancea. Gampung

i. geucikii. religiousleaderiii. committee

b. Mukimi. Imeummukimii. committee

c. Kecamatani. Camatii. Secretary

d. Kabupateni. Bupatiii. Secretaryiii. Legislatureiv. AdministrativeCourtsv. GeneralCourtsvi. IslamicCourts

e. Provincei. Adatinstitution(non‐judicial)ii. Islamicinstitution(non‐judicial)iii. Governoriv. Legislaturev. MilitaryCourtsvi. AdministrativeCourtsvii. GeneralCourtsviii. IslamicCourts

f. Nationali. Presidentialii. Legislatureiii. MilitaryCourtsiv. AdministrativeCourtsv. GeneralCourts

263

vi. IslamicCourtsvii. BPNviii. MOFix. BRRx. Otheragencyxi. Other

g. Other13. Other