I t FORUM ~

Landscape: The Lowenthal Legacy Kenneth Olwig

Department of Landscape Planning, Sveriges Luubmksuniversitet;Alnarp

The concept of landscape is enjoying a period of scholarly development in contemporary geography that has spread to, and enriched, disciplines ranging from anthropology, archaeology, and sociology to history and philosophy. This development is occurring despite the fact the concept of landscape was once effectively dismissed, by an influential geographical theorist, as being of "little or no value as a technical or scientific term" in geography. This article argues that the contemporary analytical power of landscape derives in important measure from the timely ability of David Lowenthal to turn the critique oflandscape on end. He did this by transforming the very contradic­tions embodied by landscape, which made it a liability as technical or scientific term, into a phenomenon for epistemological inquiry. Key Words: Political landscape, environmental perception, David Lowenthal, Carl 0. Sauer, George Perkins Marsh.

T he foundational theoretical document for the Department of Geography at the University of California was Carl Sauer's benchmark 1925

paper, The M;rplwlogy of Landscape (Sauer 1969). From the outset, landscape served as the key concept for what became known as the Berkeley school of American cultural geography. Fourteen years later, in another benchmark text, The Nature of Geography, Richard Hartshorne (1939, 149-74, 250-84) leveled a trenchant criticism at the concept of landscape, which until then had been "perhaps the single most important word in the geographic language" (Hartshorne 1939, 149). Hart­shorne (1939, 154), who spent the bulk of his career at the University ofWisconsin, Madison, criticized the confusing use of the term in both what he saw to be a specifically German sense, where it meant "a definitely restricted area," and in an English sense, where it referred to ''a more or less definitely defined aspect of an unlimited extent of the earth's surface."

It has been argued by Neil Smith that Hartshorne's critique effectively "assassinated" the concept of land­scape by branding it as being, in Hartshorne's words, of '"little or no value as a technical or scientific term/" leading it to be "largely excluded from theoretical discourse almost to the present day" (Smith 1989, 107; Hartshorne 1939, 158). The term "landscape," however, was not entirely excluded from theoretical discourse. One of the central figures who kept that discourse alive was David Lowenthal. 1 His ability to do this, I will argue, lay in his special position as a scholar whose formative years were

AnnallofW Association of American Geogr(lphers, 93(4), 2003, pp. 871--877 © 2003 by Association of American Geographers

spent both at Sauer's Berkeley, where Lowenthal did his initial graduate studies, and at Madison, where he completed his doctorate in history while minoring in geog­raphy and where he worked with Hartshorne. Further­more, Lowenthal was active as a scholar in both the United States and Britain. This meant that he was put into a position to build upon and rethink elements of both the Sauer program and the Hartshornian critique, while drawing upon both American and British landscape ex­perience. In retrospect, it can be seen that Lowenthal's work effectively prepared the way for new approaches to landscape by transcending the differences between the schools of geography defined by Sauer and Hartshorne. Lowenthal was thus a key figure in paving the way for the contemporary revival of geographical interest in land­scape. The link between Lowenthal's work at Berkeley and that at Wisconsin lay in his biography of influential nineteenth ... century American conservationist George Perkins Marsh.

Marsh and Nature

The topic of Lowenthal's dissertation in history, the life and letters of George Peridns Marsh, was a long-term interest of Carl Sauer's. The recognition of Marsh as a formative figure in cultural geography took place largely through Sauer's efforts in organizing the symposium, re­sulting in one of the classic works of modern geography, William Thomas's 1956Man's Role in Changing the Face of the Earth. In his 1941 presidential address, "Foreword to

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872 Forum: The Lowenthal Papers

Historical Geography," Sauer (1969, 351-79) suggested that an ideal way of educating onese If as a geographer was to make a "full-length biographical inquiry" into

· a historical figure such as Marsh. This, he argued, w0uld "provide a truly liberal geographic education, provided each is taken as a whole, and not skimmed eclectically in terms of prearranged views as to what is and is not geo­graphic" (Sauer 1969, 355-56). Sauer saw himself as an historical geographer and found inspiration in the histori­cally oriented work of Marsh, and it was thus natural for Sauer to wish to see Marsh himselfbecome the object of an historical study. Lowenthal responded by making Marsh the subject of his doctoral dissertation, which, though he counted himself a student of Sauer, he chose to do under historian Merle Curti at the University of Wisconsin, ·Madison (Lowenthal 2000, xvi). The dissertation was published by Columbia University Press and, a lifetime .later, rewritten and republished, under the aegis of envi­ronmental historian William Cronan, by the University of Washington Press (Lowenthal1958, 2000). Lowenthal also edited the definitive edition of Marsh's Man and Nature ([1864] 1965), published by Harvard University Press.

Sauer's (1969, 351-79, 389--404) historically oriented approach to geography as something one does as a form of praxis or an intellectual calling contrasted deliberately with Hartshorne's approach to the subject as a disciplined field of academic endeavor, the theory and methodology of which had been established by a succession of professo­rial authorities (autodidactic Marsh thus had no place in Hartshorne's disciplinary pantheon). Lowenthal's histor­ical approach led him to relativize and contextualize the meaning of geographical concepts as products of their time, rather than as timeless precepts. This occurred not least because he was working with historians who were exploring the changing meaning of complex concepts, such as nature, that occurred in the course of a new nation's confrontation with a new environment. This app­roach was particularly relevant to Marsh because Marsh was concerned with the role of people's environmen­tal perceptions and conceptions in shaping environmental behavior, and because he actively sought to change their perceptions and behavior. In other words, Marsh was con­cerned with nature not simply as an object of study, but also as an individually and culturally perceived phenom­enon that was historically constituted as much through the arts as through the sciences.

The term 11Anglo ... American'' assumes a necessary alignment between the intellectual life of the United States and Britain, but America was actually colonized by people from all over Europe, and they helped create a broader cosmopolitan educational culture than could have been derived from Britain alone. In matters

geographical, German geographers such as Alexander von Humboldt thus weighed more heavily in Marsh's writings-as they did in the work of most cosmopolitan thinkers-than in those of contemporary British geog­raphers. Marsh was expert in languages ranging from Ita­lian to the Nordic languages, in which he could claim philological expertise, and his geographical reading was often in the original language (Lowenthal1957). Sauer's writings reveal a similar knowledge of the history of European geographical thought in the broadest mean­ing; in addition, like Marsh, he was conversant with the thought of poets as well as that of scientists. Thus, even though Marsh was not a trained scientist, he fulfilled Sauer's Germanic conception of science as Wissenschaft, meaning an "organized process of acquiring knowledge" (as opposed to the common restricted English meaning "of a unified body of physical law"). This was in line with what Sauer saw to be a 11 phenomenologic view of science" as outlined in Hermann Graf Keyserling's 1910 Prolego­mena zur Nawrphilosophie (Sauer 1969, 315-16).

The suffix "schaft" in Wissenschaft and Landschaft (which, as Sauer pointed out, can be roughly translated as "shape" in English) suggests a concern with both the shape and constitution of the phenomenon in question-that is, the phenomenon of knowledge-and the way in which it is shaped. This approach lends itself to a concern with epistemology, and hence-as Sauer notes, with reference to johann Wolfgang von Goethe-with the "nature and limits of cognition (1969, 326-27) ."It was his philosophic position, with its concern for morphology--or shape­that led Goethe to argue that "[O]ne need not seek for something beyond the phenomena; they themselves are the lore [Lellfe]" (1902, p. 72; quoted in Sauer 1969, 326-27). It was against this background of thought that Sauer (1969, 316) declared landscape to be a "naively given, important section of reality, not a sophisticated thesis." Sauer's morphologic approach to landscape has been widely assumed by his critics (see Cosgrove and Jackson 1987; Duncan 1990; Olwig 1991) to mean a narrow, atheoretical focus on physical objects in the material landscape. In fact, it refers to a concern with phenomenological shape or form and with the way the world is shaped as place. Though such an approach initially seeks to comprehend the shape of "phenomena," it is not adverse, as Sauer (1969, 350. n. 56) argued in the Morphology of Landscape, to appropr.ate forms of theoret­ical explanation, such as that offered by the discipline of anthropology: "At present anthropology is the study of culture per se. If our studies of man and of his work have large success in synthesis, a gradual coalescence of social anthropology and of geography may represent the first of a series of fusions into a larger science of man."

Olwig: Landscape: The Lowenthal Legacy 873

Landscape Epistemology

.... Jqwenthal's experience working with Marsh, following Sauer's recipe, appears to have helped open the way for his "epistemological" approach to landscape perception. This 11pproach was able to effectively turn Hartshorne's critique ·on 'end by making it into an avenue for fruitful research while at the same time retaining important aspects of Sauer's program. In his critique of the landscape concept, Hartshorne (1939) pointed out that the appropriate meaning of the term in English-language discourse would

· ·refer to the "appearance of a land as we perceive it" (150)-for example, "the section of the earth surface and sky that lies in our field of vision as seen in perspective from a particular point" (152). This sense, in turn, was related

. tO 'the "aesthetic" meanings or the term· as used in. · disciplines such as art history. These contributed to the

term's unclear meaning, disqualifying it as a technical or scientific term because it was capable of shifting "from the landscape as sensation to the objects that produce that sensation" (Hartshorne 1939, 152). Through his work with Marsh, however, Lowenthal came into contact with a very different evaluation of the potential contribution of landscape aesthetics to human understanding. Marsh ([1864] 1965, 15) drew upon a contemporary Danish poet, Frederik Paludan Muller, quoting him in both Danish and English translation:

"In the material eye, you think, sight lodgeth! The eye is but an organ. Seeing streameth From the soul's inmost depths. The fine perceptive Nerve springeth from the brain's mysterious workshop."

Marsh concluded:

To the natural philosopher, the descriptive poet, the painter, and the sculptor, as well as to the common observer, the power most important to cultivate, and, at the same time, hardest to acquire, is that of seeing what is before him. Sight is a faculty; seeing, an art. The eye is a physical, but not a self, acting apparatus, and in general it sees only what it seeks. Like a mirror, it reflects objects presented to it; but it may be as insensible as a mirror, and it does not necessarily perceive what it reflects.

Conceived from this perspective, landscape ceases to be a hindrance to comprehension and instead provides a door to understanding how individuals and societies perceive their environs and how they behave toward them. Hart­shorne objected to the lack of clarity in the meaning of landscape: was it scenery by nature, or was it essentially an area? Hartshorne wanted to know what sort of thing landscape was in and of itself. Lowenthal turned these contradictions into a virtue by showing, in effect, that

landscape as a thing-in-itself was uninteresting. What was interesting was what these contradictions tell us about the way environment is perceived and comprehended as land­scape by individuals and societies, and the consequences that this has for behavior toward that environment.

Lowenthal was fascinated by the multitude of ways in which people and societies knew landscape, and how this affected the way that they shaped the material envi­ronment. In his 1961 theoretical treatise, "Geography, Experience and Imagination: Towards a Geographical Epistemology" ([1961] 1972), Lowenthal revealed how his approach to geography-including landscape-fol­lowed the Sauer/Marsh model as well as that of another historian/geographer, John K. Wright. Though paying due respect to Hartshorne (whom he thanked for his com­mentary on the paper), Lowenthal ([1961] 1972, 220, n. 2) elucidated an alternative to Hartshorne's discipli­nary focus:

Hartshorne's methodological treatises analyze and develop logical principles of procedure for geography as a professional science, 11a form of knowing," as he writes, "that is different from the ways in which we 'know' by instinct, intuition, a priori deduction or revelation." My epistemological inquiry, on the other hand, is concerned with all geographical thought, scientific and other: how it is acquired, transmitted, altered, and integrated into conceptual systems; and how the horizon of geography varies among individuals and groups. Specifically, it is a study in what Wright calls geosophy: "the nature and expression of geographical ideas both past and present ... the geographical ideas, both true and false, of all manner of people-not only geographers, but farmers and fishermen, business executives and poets, novelists and painters, Bedouins and Hottentots." Because geographers [as Wright writes] are 11nowhere . .. more likely to be influ~ enced by the subjective than in their discussions of what scientific geography ought to be," epistemology helps to explain why and how methodologies change.

By taking this epistemological approach, Lowenthal was able to turn Hartshorne's critique on end by making it foundational to his interest in environmental perception and behavior. Lowenthal's work thus represents less a break with Hartshorne than a creative rethinking of the positive potentiality of Hartshorne's sharp critique of landscape geography. Lowenthal was in the forefront of the geographers who developed the study of landscape perc< ption in which it was the relationship between the perception of "landscape as sensation" and "the objects that produce that sensation" that was in focus (Lowenthal 1962; Lowenthal and Prince 1964, 1965; Lowenthal and Riel1972).

As will be seen, however, Lowenthal did not limit his approach to landscape to the pictorial definition

874 Forum: The Lowenthal Papers

featured in many studies of landscape perception (e.g., Bourassa 1991). Quoting john K. Wright, Lowenthal emphasized that his epistemology was concerned with the "'fascinating terrae incognitae'" that He 11 'within the minds and hearts Of men"' (Wright 1947, 15). It was also concerned with "'the relation between the world outside

. and the pictures in our heads'"-a phrase Lowenthal ([1961] 1972, 219) borrowed from American journalist and author Walter Lippmann (Lippmann [1922] 1961; Wright 194 7). In several key articles on English landscape and. landscape tastes written with English geographer H\1gh ·Prince, Lowenthal brought out the connection between the pictures in the heads of leading segments of English society and the shape and appearance of the material landscape of England (Lowenthal and Prince '1964, 1965). These articles were largely empirical ex­ercises,' illustrating the relationship between certain aesthetic ideals (such as the picturesque) and the material landscape.

This approach raised issues that, in turn, opened the , door for the vital theoretical contributions of such English geographers as Denis Cosgrove and Stephen Daniels to the epistemological basis for the study of landscape iconography, which were basically concerned with the relationship between the pictures on our walls and in our heads and the world outside (Cosgrove 1984; Cosgrove and Daniels 1988a; Daniels 1993, 1999). The vitality enjoyed today by the landscape concept in fields ranging from anthropology and archaeology to sociology, philoso­phy, and history owes much to scholars inspired by the work of Cosgrove and Daniels. 2 Their work, however, is arguably indebted to Lowenthal's epistemological in­tervention at a time when Hartshorne's critique had weakened the appeal of what had once been the discipline's central concept. It was hardly a coincidence that Daniels studied with both Lowenthal and Prince at Universiry College, London, and that Cosgrove (1993) dedicated the published version of his doctoral disserta­tion to Lowenthal.

The Landscape Inside and Outside Our Heads

Different approaches to landscape raise different prob­lems and possibilities for landscape research. The focus on landscape as a form of pictorial representation opened up new avenues of research, but it also created a narrow~ ing framework which, given the postmodern mindset, could easily lead to a de-emphasis upon that which is represented. ''A landscape," according to Cosgrove and Daniels (1988b, I), "is a cultural image, a pictorial way

of representing or symbolising surroundings." In empha­sizing the pictures in our heads, they are working in Lowenthal's epistemological terrain. When taken to its postmodern extreme, however, this approach appears to deny the connectiviry to things in the world ol<lside. From the postmodern position, according to Cosgrove and Daniels ( 1988b, 8), landscape thus becomes "a flickering text displayed on the word-processor screen whose mean­ing can be created, extended, altered, elaborated and finally obliterated by the merest touch of a button." This kind of argument (to which neither Daniels or Cosgrove continues to subscribe), downplaying the importance of the world outside, has led like-minded critics of American cultural geography to perceive Berkeley geography as being overly concerned with material things in the world outside (Cosgrove and Jackson 1987; Duncan 1990; Olwig 1991). The resulting emphasis on the landscape within has, in turn, given rise to countercriticism, such as that of anthropologist/archaeologist Tim Ingold.

The idea that landscape "is a cultural image, a picto­rial way of representing or symbolising surroundings" Cosgrove and Daniels 1988b, 8) is explicitly rejected by Ingold, who, in fact, rejects the very "distinction between inner and outer worlds-respectively of mind and matter, meaning and substance-upon which such distinction rests." For him "as the familiar domain of our dwelling," landscape "is with us, not against us, just as we are part of it [emphasis in original]" (Ingold 1993, 154; see also Ingold 2000, 191). Following this line of argument, Ingold has promoted an approach that emphasizes the importance of the earth under our nails and in our heads (metaphorically speaking). Inspired by his interpretation of the philoso­phy of Martin Heidegger and its particular approach to phenomenology, Ingold sees the material landscape as a field in which humans manifest their existence as living beings by shaping physical things in their environment through the praxis of dwelling. This approach has had an impact on contemporary landscape study in geography (Cloke and jones 2001).

The contradiction between the approach of Daniels and Cosgrove, on the one hand, and Ingold, on the other, can be illuminated by consulting a contemporary stan­dard American dictionary's definition of landscape. 3 The definitions "Ia: a picture representing a view of natural inland scenery; b: the art of depicting such scenery" clear­ly underlie :he approach of Cosgrove and Daniels. The second entry suggests that the strictly pictorial meaning of the term is on the wane, because the meaning of landscape as"vista, prospect" is now "obsolete" (Merriam ... Webster 1995). Nonetheless, other meanings, such as "2c: a particular area of activity: SCENE (political landscape>," are not pictorial, and because of its emphasis

Olwig: Landscape: The Lowenthal Legacy 875

on activity, this definition would appear to be closer to Ingold's idea of landscape. I would suggest, however, that this last definition nevertheless suggests a third approach, which does not, as with Ingold, deny the validity of the distinction between the landscapes within and with-

. out our heads, but rather mediates between the two by emphasizing the role of a third landscape-the politi­cal landscape.

The Political Landscape

. The apparent impasse between the postmodern land­scape, as explicated by Cosgrove and Daniels, and Ingold's premodern inspired landscape seems to leave the land­scape researcher caught between a focus on the ephemeral pictures in our heads and one on the tangible realm of mearlingful material things constituted through down-to­earth dwelling. Lowenthal, however, was not concerned with one or the other, but with the relations between them. He took the phrase "'the relation between the world outside and the pictures in our heads"' from the title of the introductory chapter of Lippmann's 1922 book, Public Opinion (Lippmann [1922] 1961, 3-34). This book was largely concerned with the polity as constituted through the realm of discourse-public opinion-as it occurs both through words and through visual means such as maps. As'Lippmann ([1922]1961, 25) wrote,

We shall assume that what each man does is based not on direct and certain knowledge, but on pictures made by himself or given to him. If his atlas tells him that the world is flat he will not sail near what he believes to be the edge of our planet for fear of falling off. If his maps include a fountain of eternal youth, a Ponce de Leon will go in quest of it. If someone digs up yellow dirt that looks like gold, he will for a time act exactly as if he had found gold. The way in which the world is imagined determines at any particular moment what men will do.

Marsh's book Man and Nature ([1864] 1965) was similarly concerned with the connection between the political landscape as shaped by discourse and the shaping-and misshaping-of the environment. 4 This emphasis on the role of public opinion within a polity fits the dictionary definition of the landscape as "a particu­lar area of activity," such as "the political landscape" (Merriam-Webster 1995).5 The landscape, in this sense, is neither the intangible pictures within our heads nor the material thing outside the mind, but the social and political realm of discourse-public opinion-that in­forms both. As Lippman ([1922] 1961, 29) put it, "The pictures inside the heads of these human beings, the pic­tures of themselves, of others, of their needs, purposes,

and relationship, are their public opinions. Those pictures which are acted upon by groups of people, or by individuals acting in the name of groups, are Public Opinion with capital letters." The political landscape, in this sense, was the underlying subject of much that Lowenthal wrote about Marsh, who was politically engaged, among other things, as a diplomat and a politician. It is also, I would argue, the underlying subtextofLowenthal's (1985, 1996) later concern with landscape as a locus of environmental concern and heritage identity!

In Lowenthal's work on heritage, which has helped launch a new discipline of heritage studies, the morphol­ogy of landscape as a material phenomenon is understood in the context oflandscape as an area of cultural activity, a political landscape in its broadest meaning. The concern here is not just with the 11pictures in our heads/' in the narrow sense of graphic scenes and maps, but as world pictures, or cosmologies, that are deeply implicated in the ways that ethnic and national identities are generated, not only by geographers but also "by farmers and fishermen, business executives and poets, novelists and painters, Bedouins and Hottentots" (Wright 1947, 12). Further­more, by taking this approach, Lowenthal has managed to appeal to a public that goes far beyond disciplinary bounds within and outside geography,' and even beyond academia itsel£ A seminar with Lowenthal may thus attract not only archaeologists, anthropologists, and geographers, but also architects and planners, tribal representatives and West Indian statesmen, as well as the odd farmer and fisher­man, not to mention poets, novelists, and painters. Such seminars, in turn, tend to become the site of a form of anthropological research in which the participants be­come partners in the ongoing discourse that makes up the stuff of Lowenthal's scholarship.8

Conclusion

Hartshorne sought to define geography in terms of a scientific discipline in the Anglo-American sense of science. This led him to reject concepts such as "landscape" that could not be given a clearly fixed and defined meaning. For Lowenthal, however, the historically oriented tradition of Sauer, Marsh, and Wright led him to a concern with "all geographical thought, scientific and other: how it is acquired, transmitted, altered, and integrated into conceptual systems; and how the horizon of geography varies among individuals and groups" (Lowenthal [1961] 1972, 220, n. 2). It was this change in emphasis that allowed Lowenthal to take Hartshorne's perceptive but trenchant critique of landscape and work to transform it into a major new focus of scholarship and avenue of research. In this way, he helped bring landscape

876 Forum: The Lowenthal Papers

geography beyond the restrictions imposed by Sauer's morphological approach, and helped geography to begin to realize Sauer's dream of generating a synthesis of landscape geography and cultural understanding.

·Notes

1. Lowenthal, of course, was not alone. For other contributions to this discourse, see, for example,Tuan (1974), Mcinig (1979), jackson (1984), and Wagner (1972).

2. Recent works in the fields of anthropology, archaeology, sociology, philosophy, and history that derive, I would argue, from the epistemological approach to landscape pioneered by Lowenthal include Hirsch and O'Hanlon (1995), Bender (1993), Urry (1990), Casey (2002), and Schama (1995).

3. For a more detailed analysis of landscape's etymological .meaning, see Olwig ( !996, 2002).

4. Marsh, it should be noted, did not just contribute to discourse on the environment through his effort to shape public opinion; he also took a professional philological interest in language and text as the stuff of discourse (Lehtinen !99!).

5. The term 11politicallandscape" specifically refers to the mean~ ing of 11area of activity" as being synonymous with the word "scene.". The word "scene," in this context, means, "sphere of activity" (Merriam-Webster 1995).

6. It is this concern with the political landscape that has inspired my own work on the subject (Oiwig 1980, 1996, 2002) and that, in tum, has also helped inspire a younger generation of scholars, such as Don Mitchell (2000) and Tom Mels (!999, 2002).

7. This could be seen, for example, in the multidisciplinary contributions to the three sessions dedicated to Lowenthal at the 2002 meetings of the AAG in Los Angeles.

8. These observations are based on personal experience as a participant observer in a number of seminars held with Lowenthal in Scandinavia.

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Correspondence: Department of Landscape Planning, Sveriges Lantbruksuniversitet~Ainarp, Alnarp, Skfi.ne, SE;230 53 Sweden, e;mail: Kenneth.Olwig@lpal.slu.se.