General Maxwell Taylor: The Sword and the Pen by John M. TaylorReview by: Gregory F. TrevertonForeign Affairs, Vol. 68, No. 4 (Fall, 1989), p. 201Published by: Council on Foreign RelationsStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20044133 .

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RECENT BOOKS 201

the brutality and murkiness of war but also to the pettifoggery of bureau cratic war-making. (Hackworth's disenchantment culminated in a 1971

appearance on "Issues and Answers" that ended his career.) Yet his criticism is both intemperate and indiscriminate, leaving unclear exactly what lessons

he draws from Vietnam, other than that the army is no better positioned now for the most likely wars?unconventional, messily political, limited conflicts in the Third World?than it was then.

TERRITORY OF LIES. By Wolf Blitzer. New York: Harper & Row, 1989, 336 pp. $22.50.

Why did Jonathan Pollard deliver U.S. national secrets to Israel? Ac

cording to Blitzer, it was largely the tug of what Pollard saw as a higher loyalty, with some hero worship and derring-do fantasy thrown in. The

prose is occasionally offhand, but Blitzer, longtime Washington correspon dent for the Jerusalem Post, knows his two countries in detail and is careful not to venture beyond his evidence.

STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE FOR AMERICAN NATIONAL SECU RITY. By Bruce D. Berkowitz and Allan E. Goodman. Princeton: Princeton

University Press, 1989, 232 pp. $19.95. While covert operations grab the headlines, intelligence analysis, carried

out by CIA officers and their colleagues who are more professorial than

conspiratorial, is more important to America's security. This is a primer to that analytic function, the authors' updating of Sherman Kent's classic of 40 years ago, Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy. Primarily focused on the executive branch, it treats Congress as an overseer and

supporter; the real revolution?Congress as a coequal consumer of intelli

gence?lies just at the edges of its pages.

GENERAL MAXWELL TAYLOR: THE SWORD AND THE PEN. By John M. Taylor. New York: Doubleday, 1989, 457 pp. $22.50.

Taylor was never far from

controversy?resigning as Eisenhower's army

chief of staff over the administration's reliance on nuclear weapons and then putting his critique in The Uncertain Trumpet', catching Kennedy's eye for his clear-minded review of the Bay of Pigs debacle; soldiering on in

support of the war in Vietnam while ambassador in Saigon. This is a

thorough, affectionate biography written by his son, a retired intelligence officer.

General: Economic and Social

William Diebold, Jr.

OPEC: TWENTY-FIVE YEARS OF PRICES AND POLITICS. By Ian Skeet. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988, 263 pp. $29.95.

This first-rate book provides a persuasive interpretation of the history of OPEC by stressing the different stages through which it has passed and the ways in which changes, not only in supply and demand but in national concerns with revenue and foreign policy and in the international political setting, affected the process. Skeet, who worked for Shell for 30 years, says that October 1973 was the dividing line between the period when OPEC

was negotiating for independent power and the period in which it was able

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