Geetha GovindasamyGeetha Govindasamy

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Is it a geographical space? A conceptual arena? A substantial region? A fictional space?

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Residents share a common view? Geographic zone with some uniqueness- some sort

of identity? A zone that shares regional awareness based on

shared traditions, manners and political cultures? A space that is functional-conscious creation for

regimes or collaborative bodies that resolve various issues, such as frameworks for trade, energy and/or security?

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Asia is a fictional entity perceived by different people in different ways

It has never existed as a single physical geographical space

Countries and people of Asia do not share a common view of what Asia is

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Asia – the East and Orient – European inventions Until mid nineteenth century –few Asians saw Asia as

a distinct geographical entity Far East – Central Asia, South Asia, East Asia,

Southeast Asia East Asia - countries that were influenced by Sinic

Civilization/Confucianism- China, Korea, Japan, Vietnam

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A region with dynamic economic and military change Diverse in political system Differing levels of development Divided by historical and territorial disputes

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Asia Pacific – Northeast and Southeast Asia, Oceania, Russian Far East, littoral states of North and South America including the United States, Canada and Mexico

East Asia – Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia East Asia has never been politically united The international community recognised East Asia as a distinct

economic zone in the late 1980s – Japan,Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, ASEAN-miraculously high level of economic growth

East Asian countries achieved economic growth through an industrialization process characterised by the expansion of labour intensive, capital/technology based industries- metal, chemical and machine industries.

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There are significant common elements of identity in China, Japan and Korea

-heavily influenced by a shared civilization-sinic/Confucian centred-all three accelerated their economic/political development under

authoritarian rule- All three are part of the ongoing process of building an East

Asian community East Asia has no future if Japan, China and Korea cannot reach

a meaningful reconciliation and build a more constructive relationship

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Maintaining internal stability Taiwan and Tibet issue Economic development

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China’s economic growth for almost 30 years and during the economic currency crisis has enabled it to avoid economic stagnation

This has generated insecurities among East Asian nations that feel threatened by its growth

Certain enterprises and industries face direct competitions from Chinese products, policymakers elsewhere feel insecure about a powerful China and are starting to lobby for import restrictions and other safeguards

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Though the rise of China poses a challenge to its neighbours, it also provides an opportunity.

There is still a significant gap in industrial power between China and its neighbours-Japan and Korea

China’s strengths-world factory, world market, labour intensive products due to low level wages

China’s weaknesses- weak in technology and environmental problems

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Threat perceptions from North Korea and China Japan as a normal nation Japan’s international role Bid for UNSC Yasukuni Shrine/historical interpretations in

textbooks/Takeshima

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Since the early 1990s, a number of Japanese policymakers and opinion leaders have called for the "normalization" of their country

Japan must face the dark side of its past A Japan that desires a leadership role in regional and global

affairs cannot allow its top politicians to visit the Yasukuni Shrine time and again because that gesture is deeply offensive not only to Asians

Therefore, a "normal" Japan, by definition, will need to initiate an official policy of "reconciliation" with its past war victims. Only then could Japan be accepted as a natural leader for East Asian affairs and have a more constructive relationship with China.

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The notion of a so-called "normal Japan" has been central to the debate over the country's security policy. The Japanese normalization discourse and its active international security policy have put China on the alert.

For China, normalization is closely associated with the re-emergence of extreme militarism and jin patriotism. Japan's normalization may involve various elements, such as the of its Self-Defense Force (SDF) and the revision of its pacifist constitution.

Any constitutional change will create background conditions for military buildup and the overseas deployment of the SDF will only stimulate such buildup further.

moderate interpretation links normalization with the rise of assertive Japanese nationalism.- enables the Japanese to whitewash their war-time history

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Ichiro Ozawa ex-leader of the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), first introduced this concept in the early 1990s. For him, a normal Japan is a nation that can participate in international peacekeeping activities, mainly under the auspices of the UN.

In 1993 book, Ozawa raised the following issue: "How can Japan, which so depends on world peace and stability, seek to exclude a security role from its international contributions?“

In other words, the key point at issue in the normalization debate since the early 1990s has been international peacekeeping activities and constitutional change: whether and to what extent should Japan participate in such activities, through the overseas deployment of its SDF and the changing of its constitution?

Article 9 - Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes. (2) In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.

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Article 9 forbids the use of force as a means to settling international disputes and forbids Japan from maintaining an army, navy or air force. Therefore, in strictly legal terms, the Self Defense Forces are not an army, navy and air force, but are extensions of the national police force. This has had broad implications for foreign, security and defense policy. The Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) tends to concur with the government's interpretation. At the same time, both parties have advocated the revision of Article 9 by adding an extra clause explicitly authorizing the use of force for the purpose of self-defense against aggression directed against the Japanese nation.

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Both Koreas are technically at war Unification South Korea -Sunshine policy South Korea - Self Sufficient South Korean defense policy North Korea – rejects economic reform, human rights and

outside contacts- challenges to Kim Jung Il’s regime North Korea- devotes most resources to the development of its

military, missiles and nuclear weapons Seoul’s policies based on Korean nationalism have yet to elicit

North Korean reciprocity or a reduction in military deployments

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President Lee Myung-bak, unveiled his own V "Vision 3000, Denuclearization, Openness“ - proposal, an ambitious new commitment to help to lift North Korean per capita income up to $3000 per year in a decade if Pyongyang completely abandons its nuclear quest

Lee has said that unconditional aid has spoiled the North, helped the Pyongyang rulers to stay in power and brought about a serious crisis in relations between Seoul and Washington

Vision 3000 describes what will become possible if North Korea surrenders its nuclear weapons. In such a case, the South promises, the North will see a flood of aid on hitherto unthinkable scale. Within merely a decade, the South Korean aid will help to increase the average per capita annual income to the level of US$3,000, some three times above the current level

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Its title includes the word "openness" or kaebang - the term the North Korean ideologues have repeatedly described as a cunning imperialist trick aimed at destroying the North's socialist system. The North Korean ruling elite understands that the only way to survive is to keep their society closed and tightly controlled. If North Korean populace learns too much about foreign prosperity (especially South Korean prosperity), the masses might become restive and unmanageable, and the entire system might collapse overnight, East German (or even Romanian) style. This is what the North Korean leadership is afraid of, and this fear can hardly be discarded as mere paranoia.

pihaek, or de-nuclearization -the North has neither intention nor reason to surrender its nuclear weapons. If it does so, it will loose a powerful deterrent against foreign attack as well as a powerful tool to squeeze more money and aid from the international community. It will also face some domestic difficulties since the allegedly successful nuclear weapons project has been the only visible achievement of Kim Jong il's regime, and giving it away will be difficult to explain. Even a large lump-sum payment is unlikely to be an adequate compensation for the risks and lost opportunities.

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No international institution in the region Two nuclear powers- China and North Korea No stable or mutual deterrence mechanism China-rising power but Japan- ailing power- regional capital is

shifting from Tokyo to Beijing Significant shift in power raises new anxieties

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History as a source of contending memories of the past-interpretation of history in japanese textbooks, territorial issues

China-ethnic anger and hatred that is festering in Tibet and adjacent Xinjiang Province.

Continued tension and military deployments along the inner-Korean border,

The need to replace the 1953 armistice with a formal peace treaty

Effects of military buildups by North Korea Wider ramifications of North Korea's nuclear weapons

and missile programs Korean reunification

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North Korean leaders are sometimes presented in media as madmen, as people driven by some irrational (or ideology-motivated) to create trouble.

The North Korean nuclear arms program was conceived in the late 1950s, began in earnest in the mid-1960s, and acquired military dimensions around 1980. In other words, the program has a long history, it is a result of decades of sacrifice and hard work.

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North Korea needs nuclear weapons as a powerful strategic deterrent. Early on, Pyongyang had come to the conclusion that only the deterrent of weapons of mass destruction could guarantee its safety.

NK is afraid of a foreign attack (etc- Iraq and Afghanistan) NK believes no nuclear-armed country will be invaded by any

great power.

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Pyongyang leaders conceive their WMD as a bargaining tool In terms of population size and economic significance, it can

never be a major player. Therefore, the major reason why the international community

pays so much attention to North Korea is its nuclear and, to lesser extent, its missile program.

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The Kim Jong-il administration wants to negotiate its nuclear weapons program as part of a verified denuclearization of the whole of the Korean Peninsula in return for Washington's strategic decision to co-exist peacefully with Pyongyang.

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NK assumed the US would leave behind its policy of hostility to the DPRK,

US would conclude a peace treaty with North Korea, US would pledge in a verifiable way it would not attack NK with

nuclear and conventional arms. US would establish full relations with North Korea, show respect

for its sovereignty and independence, lift sanctions imposed on it, and provide it with fuel oil and light-water reactors.

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NK signed1994 Agreed Framework with the Clinton administration

Series of nuclear agreements from six-party talks with the Bush administration, including the September 19, 2005 joint statement, the February 13, 2007 agreement, the October 3, 2007 agreement and the July 12, 2008 agreement.

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Until the Bush administration, the US remained hostile to North Korea as it is bent on its nuclear disarmament, classifying it as a criminal state, and wanting to topple its regime.

The Clinton administration did not want to fulfill the US's obligations under nuclear agreements and procrastinated for years, secretly betting on the collapse of the DPRK.

The Bush administration was more overtly antagonistic, branding the DPRK as part of the "axis of evil", singling out it as a prime target for a nuclear pre-emptive strike, and moving to discard the nuclear agreement.

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To NK- the Obama administration is no different in terms of hostility to the DPRK

March 9-20 Key Resolve (Team Spirit) joint war games between the US and South Korea.

The US-led United Nation Security Council's (UNSC) condemnation of April 5 satellite launch which demonstrated that NK has joined the elite clubs of nuclear powers and space powers

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Every nation has a sovereign right to the peaceful use of outer space . The UNSC has never discussed a satellite launch by any other country.

A total of 5,736 satellites were launched during a 50-year period from 1957 to the end of 2006 with the US and Russia accounting for about 88% of these and Japan placed the third with 119, representing a yearly worldwide average of approximately 120 satellites.

satellite blasts off somewhere in the world every three days.

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NK now projects itself as a fully fledged nuclear weapon-armed state, with a military-first policy

Policy of seeking reconciliation with US -helpless superpower with a weak economy that is losing wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, on the back burner.

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NK wants to be part of the elite clubs of nuclear, space and economic powers by 2012, without seeking improved ties or a peace treaty with the US,

It seeks to be an independent global nuclear strike force which can carry the war all the way to the metropolitan US rather than on the Korean Peninsula.

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It is believed that NK is equipped with all types of nuclear warheads, atomic, neutron and hydrogen, and their means of delivery puts the whole of East Asia and the USA within effective range.

The Financial Times May 14,2009- "South Korea is increasingly concerned that North Korea's latest threat to process plutonium to expand its nuclear arsenal is no longer a negotiating ploy to gain leverage with the US.“

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It will take many years before North Korean missiles pose any credible threats to the country's neighbors (with the obvious exception of South Korea). Right now, North Korean missiles are unreliable, unwieldy, have very low accuracy and take days to be prepared for launch. On top of that, the North Koreans have not developed a nuclear device that is small and light enough to be mounted as a warhead.

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Nuclear weapons -Even without workable delivery systems, North Korean can find a way to smuggle a crude nuclear device to, say, a Japanese or American port.

The stockpile of weapons-grade plutonium is a potential threat, too. Finally, nuclear proliferation clearly constitutes a greater danger than the proliferation of missile technologies.

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