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Gas Regional InitiativeNorth West Region
-Gas Target Model
-BNetzA/Ofgem
Pre-Comitology MeetingBonn – 26 May 2011
2 Pre-Comitology MeetingBonn – 26 May 2011
Introduction
The Target Model (Madrid Conclusions) should:
provide support for FG and NC development to reach 2014 goal for completing the internal market
guidance also for Commission´s guidelines and Regional Initiative / Int. Projects
Internal market means: real choice, more cross-border trade, competitive prices…
provide an outlook on the EU gas market beyond that date
Starting Point is problems the gas market faces
3 Pre-Comitology MeetingBonn – 26 May 2011
Status of Project
Series of public workshops Vienna (December 3rd 2010) Bonn (February 22nd 2011) London (April 11th 2011) Brussels (June 28th 2011)
Stakeholder roundtables
Input from two external studies LECG Florence School of Regulation in co-operation with the Clingendael
Energy Programme and Wagner, Elbling & Co. MECO-S Model
CEER Paper is currently being drafted Final draft version to be presented at 4th workshop in Brussels
4 Pre-Comitology MeetingBonn – 26 May 2011
Setting the scene
?
Challenges: Internal market by 2014 Competition
EU 20-20-20, integration of RES more CCGT’s? Power to Gas?
Security of Supply N-1, Reverse Flow, access to diff. supply sourcesless domestic gas production more transit, new investment
LNGLNG
LNG
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Problem Identification
3rd Package makes Entry-Exit systems obligatory: Large Entry-Exit Systems may reduce firm capacity
- Internal congestion may lead to cross-subsidisation Small Entry-Exit systems are not market capable
- problem of “pan-caking” for long-distance transport
For gas to flow where it is needed (price signal) there needs to be available capacity
Contractual Congestion identified as a major problem, but not for all IPs
Recital 21: “There is substantial contractual congestion in the gas networks.”
Definition: "contractual congestion" means a situation where the level of firm capacity demand exceeds the technical capacity, Art. 2(21) Reg. 715/2009
Commission proposal on Congestion Management
6 Pre-Comitology MeetingBonn – 26 May 2011
Status of market integration in the NW region
Significant indigenous gas production, but increasingly import dependent Decoupled entry-exit zones implemented in almost every country NBP most liquid hub (churn rate:14-15), Zeebrugge (4-6), TTF (3-4), NCG (2-3)
Gaspool (2-2,5), PEG Nord (1,5), trading volumes increasing Increasing price convergence but still price differences Significant infrastructure investments of European dimension (e.g. Northstream)
Source: European Commission
Traded Gas Volumes on European Hubs
0 GWh
20.000 GWh
40.000 GWh
60.000 GWh
80.000 GWh
100.000 GWh
120.000 GWh
140.000 GWh
Aug
06
Okt
06
Dez
06
Feb
07
Apr 0
7
Jun
07
Aug
07
Okt
07
Dez
07
Feb
08
Apr 0
8
Jun
08
Aug
08
Okt
08
Dez
08
Feb
09
Apr 0
9
Jun
09
Aug
09
Okt
09
Dez
09
Feb
10
Apr 1
0
Jun
10
Aug
10
Okt
10
Dez
10
Feb
11
PEG North TTF NCG GPL (bis 01.10.2009 MG H-Gas Norddtl.) ZEE
7 Pre-Comitology MeetingBonn – 26 May 2011
Overview of high level options
Enable Markets: Connecting markets:• Market areas (sub-) national or
cross-border• Full vertical integration• Merging of market areas
• Taking physical connection into account
• Trading region• Merger of entry-exit systems
• Taking physical connection into account
• Seperate end-user zones with national balancing system
• Bundling of capacity• Harmonisation of products, Gas-day• Explicit Auctions• Make capacity available via UIOLI and/or
Overbooking
• Market coupling• Day-ahead implicit auctions/allocation as
possible element to be tested in pilots first
LECG + MECO-S
LECG + MECO-S
only MECO-S
LECG + MECO-S
MECO-S & LECG
Improve effectiveness by realising economic pipeline investments
8 Pre-Comitology MeetingBonn – 26 May 2011
How to enable functioning wholesale markets?
Different pictures all over Europe call for different approaches which are not mutually exclusive
If a country is capable of establishing a functioning market itself the establishment of one (or two, based on C/B analysis) zone within this country is important (e.g. GB, Germany, France, Spain);
If a country is not capable of establishing a functioning market itself (e.g. due to lack of liquidity or size) - Cross-border market areas (full merger) is one solution; or - Accession to a larger, already functioning market; or- Trading Regions – a single cross-border zone for wholesale markets with
congestion-free interconnection to national end-user zones.
9 Pre-Comitology MeetingBonn – 26 May 2011
The Market Area Model
Features:
One virtual point for wholesale trading Fully integrated wholesale market One balancing zone from import points to
final customers Full integration of DSO networks Single set of balancing rules Single balancing entity
Symbols
Virtual point of the market area serving as the sole marketplace of the market area
Entry or exit contract
Exit contract
Market Area A
Country A
Country A Country B
Market Area AB
Cross-border market
area
National market
area
VP
Final customers (A) Final customers (B)
VP
Final customers (A)
VP
10 Pre-Comitology MeetingBonn – 26 May 2011
The Trading Region Model
Country A Country B
Trading Region AB
End userzone A
End userzone B
Final customers (A) Final customers (B)
VP
Legend and Symbols
End user zone = National balancing zone for national final customers, no matter the system (distribution or transmission) they are connected to
Trading Region AB = Cross-border entry/exit system including all nominated points on the transmission systems of countries A and B
Entry or exit contract
Exit contract
Virtual point of the trading region serving as the sole marketplace of the trading region and all attached end user zones. Shifting of gas between trading region and end user zone is done by nominating a virtual exit on the VP.
VP
Features: One virtual point for wholesale
trading Fully integrated wholesale market Trading region is basically kept free
of imbalances Final customers are balanced in
national end user zones that may reflect national specifics
End-user balancing may be done by national balancing entity
Congestion-free interconnection between trading region and end user zones through the common virtual point ( virtual exit to end user zone)
11 Pre-Comitology MeetingBonn – 26 May 2011
What needs to be done in all approaches?
Prerequisite for merging market areas and creating trading regions:
Absence or at least limited physical congestion
As soon as we are talking about cross-border integration the following issues have to be analysed
Entry / Exit Tariffication Redistribution of revenues and costs Alignment of regulatory framework Investments TSO as well as NRA cooperation
12 Pre-Comitology MeetingBonn – 26 May 2011
How to connect markets? Option 1
Option 1 : Explicit capacity allocation with continuous trading
Example for “overselling”: -Shipper A books 100 units of capacity -Shipper A nominates 50 units -TSO assumes that shipper A will not use remaining 50 units, TSO sells them day-ahead -Shipper B buys remaining 50 units off TSO-Shipper A has paid for 100, but only used 50 units Capacity hoarding is a bad deal! TSO takes a risk and needs appropriate incentives
Explicit auctions (CAM FG) Bundled Products No gate closure, no restriction
of renomination rights Overselling Interruptible Use It Or Lose It All capacity is financially firm
(not necessarily physically firm)
Has been effective in GB, but requires NRAs to set appropriate incentives
13 Pre-Comitology MeetingBonn – 26 May 2011
Option 2: Explicit capacity allocation with gate closure
How to connect markets? Option 2
Gas trading would shift to where auction takes place, butcan be adapted to allow for renomination during the gas day
Example of Gate Closure with firm UIOLI or UIOSI- Shipper A has 100 units in long-term contract-Shipper A nominates 50 units, it loses or is paid for the remaining 50 units (or a proportion thereof) -TSO sells shipper A’s remaining 50 units (or a proportion thereof) in day-ahead auction on a firm basis- Shipper B buys the 50 units, nominates only 20, so loses the remainder intraday - If shipper A wants to increase its nomination, it buys additional capacity intraday
Intra-day shipper trading
Long-term market (explicit capacity allocation)
Nomination
Firm day-ahead auction of any capacity that was not nominated (Use It Or
Sell It)
Use it or lose it: unused capacity is sold through auction or FCFS
Gas day
14 Pre-Comitology MeetingBonn – 26 May 2011
More efficient than explicit capacity auctions as it removes risk of separate transactions and allows markets to merge where no physical congestion
How to connect markets? Option 3
Option 3: implicit auctions
15 Pre-Comitology MeetingBonn – 26 May 2011
Option 4: implicit, continuous
Can be used FCFS or implicit auctions
FCFS day-ahead not compatible with CAM FGs?
Series of implicit auctions may disperse liquidity but more auctions allow for flexibility
Arbitrages realised by the TSO from low price area to high price area with implicit allocation of capacity valued at the day-ahead price spread (GRTgaz-Powernext market coupling work)
How to connect markets? Option 4
Continuous implicit allocation may be a solution to allow for efficient gas flows while keeping the flexibility provided by continuous trading?
Day-ahead/ intra-dayLong-term market (explicit capacity allocation)
Auction gate
closures
Implicit allocation
16 Pre-Comitology MeetingBonn – 26 May 2011
Further issues: Interaction with long-term gas trading (1/2)
If short term capacity is freed-up, what should be the reserve price?
Zero reserve price allows capacity to be re-allocated at 0 cost if there is no congestion
If congestion, auction price will rise above zero
Will a zero reserve price change shippers behaviour and move markets towards the short term?
In non-peak periods maybe more reliance on short term
Peak period: long-term capacity still needed
Some markets have higher proportion of transit than others
Con
gest
ion
reve
nues
No interconnection
High level of interconnection capacity
0
Hig
h r
even
ues
Surplus inter-
connection capacity
Interconnection capacity
17 Pre-Comitology MeetingBonn – 26 May 2011
Further issues: Interaction with long-term gas trading (2/2)
Options for reserve prices for short term capacity
1. No reserve price (solution in electricity) but in gas domestic tariffs subsidise transit flows?
2. Set a reserve price to recover costs- impact on price convergence at congested points?
3. Set a reserve price at non-congested points but not at congested
4. No reserve price at interconnection points but a ’membership fee’ at end-user exit points
a. Flat rate
b. Based on flows
Need a redistribution mechanism