GANGL - Taming the Struggle. Agonal Thinking in Nietzsche and Mouffe

8/12/2019 GANGL - Taming the Struggle. Agonal Thinking in Nietzsche and Mouffe

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Taming the Struggle? Agonal Thinking in Nietzsche and Mouffe

Georg H. Gangl, unpublished paper, written in Feb 2011

1) Introduction

The last two decades or so saw the rise of agonal political theory. Theorists with a leftist bent

such as Bonnie Honig, Lawrence Hatab, William Connolly or Chantal Mouffe re-appropriated

agonistic thinking so as to render it fertile for their conception of (radical) democracy (see

Fossen 2008 for a first overview). The former three draw in this endeavour explicitly on

Nietzesches theory of the Agon, the latter bases her agonistic theory on Jacques Derridas

and Carl Schmitts thinking (see, for instance, Mouffe 2005). We have heard to some extend

about Honig, Hatab and Connolly in our course, in my paper I would like to deal in more

detail with the theory of Chantal Mouffe.

In what follows I want to focus primarily on the agonal elements in Mouffes theory as well

as their ontological underpinnings (and not so much on her theory of radical democracy in

general). A viable research question for this endeavour would be the following: DoesMouffes agonism that is informed by Jacques Derrida and Carl Schmitt open up political

dimensions of the agon, which Nietzsche did not see, or does Nietzsches account of the agon

expose critical problems or weaknesses in her political agonism? One could say that I would

like to weigh Mouffe against Nietzsche in this paper, and Nietzsche against Mouffe, giving

thereby special attention to the ontological foundations of both theorists. It is my firm

contention that ontological questions are at the heart of most debates and that they cannot be

eschewed. Instead, they should be fleshed out as precisely as possible so as to make themaccessible for deliberations1. Against this background I will focus on both theorists

conception of the Agon along three interrelated topics: identity, pluralism and the problem of

limits.

Nietzsche is known to be the philosopher of life; his whole theory gravitates around an

affirmation of the forces of life in their totality. Yet, he is not advocating every form of

destructive struggle just for the sake of lifes enhancement. Nietzsche is aware of the problem

that the forces of life, in the way he defines them, have to be nurtured without disintegrating

1This stance is informed by a philosophical position developed by Roy Bhaskar in the last decades. I can merelyindicate it here without giving it the proper space it deserves. See, for instance, Bhaskar 1998 and 2008.


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into battles of mutual annihilation in Nietzsches own terms: Vernichtungskmpfe. In other

words, affirming the forces of life entails for Nietzsche equally affirming the dark side of

human existence with all its suffering, without letting the destructive dynamic hold sway over

the whole process, since this could lead to a destruction of this very dynamics of life. In the

following chapter we will look at the presuppositions of this position, because this kind of

partisanship is based on a specific ontology of life and struggle. An ontology that embraces

strife, antagonism and contestation while at the same time seeking for some form of

moderation that does not impede these essential forms of life. We will, in this sense, talk in

the following section about Nietzsches organization-struggle model (Aydin 2007: 40) and

counterpose it to Mouffes ontology of power that is primarily informed by her

poststructuralist conceptualist commitments.

On these grounds both theorists differing conception of agonal interaction can be discussed.

The Agon is for Nietzsche a fragile social constellation that can at the same time foster the

competitive needs of every society and pose (necessary) limits on them, without rendering

competition in general nugatory. The Agon is for him a source of non-coercive measure

(Siemens 2001: 521). For Mouffe the agonal is likewise a form of mutual measure and

restraint in the social realm, though the ways of functioning of the measures that lead to

mutual limitation are totally different in both theories. We will therefore outline both

conceptions of agonal interaction so as to come to an assessment concerning the question

posed above. But before we engage with these questions I would like to reflect shortly on the

relevance of a comparison between Nietzsche and Moufe.

2) Nietzsche and Mouffe: Two Kinds of Agonal Thinking

Nietzsche is normally not acknowledged as a very prolific political thinker. This has at least

partially also to do with Nietzsches own writing: he never put forth any systematic account of

his political thinking. His primary concerns were questions of culture, especially the

enhancement of humankind (Ansel-Pearson 1994: 3). He was devoted to the perfection of the

human animal, which was for him, for better or worse, das nicht festgestellte Thier (2[13]

12.72). However, a more pertinent view on the relation Nietzsche and Politics would be that

Nietzsches work gravitates around the most essential political question of all, founding the

political field as it is: what is human life for and what should it become? Chantal Mouffe


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shares this interest in the grounding questions of the political. She is likewise predominantly

asking foundational questions about the political realm itself, in her own words she intends to

grasp the nature of the political (Mouffe 2005: 99). Her thought equally wants to establish

the foundations of any political Gemeinwesen(in lack of a better word), foundations, which

must exist for any political association to prosper.This also indicates that for both there is no

stark contrast between ethical and political questions; asking questions about the purpose of

the political entails questions about the proper conduct of human beings in relation to this

purpose. However, Mouffes political theory is, as we will see shortly, not so much propelled

by the motif of human perfectibility than by an emancipatory impulse. Mouffe sees her

project of radical democracy as the only real alternative for the Left after the demise of real

socialism (Mouffe 1993a: 1)

Both theorists recuperate, in this sense, the genuine meaning of democracy. Mouffe does so in

an explicit fashion, whereas Nietzsches thought is very prone to such an adaptation, as

agonal theorists in his tradition are by all differences eager to emphasize. If democracy as

a term signifies any basic meaning in this tradition, then it is a framework of incessant

contestation. Things are not taken for granted, they are publicly disputed without any a-priori

limitations to deliberation.

The ethical commitments as well as the conceptions of the political of both, Nietzsche and

Mouffe, are anchored in their respective ontologies of power and antagonism. In the next

section we will turn to these ontologies and try to carve out the differences between both.

Nietzsche is very explicit about his ontology of power and struggle, in one phrase: the famous

will-to-power. Mouffe, on the contrary, more a political theorist than a philosopher, does not

spell out her general ontology in much detail. We therefore will have to read between the lines

to get a grasp of her most basic concepts. This exposition of Nietzsches and Mouffes basic

ontological commitments is a precondition for engaging with their respective agonal thinking.

As we have just heard, incessant contestation in one way or another is vital part of any kind ofhuman society for both Nietzsche and Mouffe. Yet, matters of contestation raise immediately

issues of measure and limitation. Against the backdrop of their ontologies we will be able to

compare Nietzsches and Mouffes account of the intertwining of both opposed principles. In

short, we should see the differences in their conceptions of pluralism, identity and limitations

all three crucial parts of any agonal interaction.


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2.1) Nietzsches and Mouffes ontology of power

In Nietzsches ontology the concepts of pluralism, dynamism and struggle play a

quintessential role. Nietzsche is the pre-eminent philosopher of antagonism and conflict, hefurnished without a doubt a genuine Philosophie der Gegenstze (Mller-Lauter 1971: 4).

His form of pluralism is therefore not one of self-sufficient entities, but one that entails the

dynamic entwining of forces, leading to some sort of conflict or struggle. In the light of

Nietzsches critique of Causalism (2[139] 12.135) and subject-object dichotomies in

general it is probably even misleading to say dynamism leads to struggle in Nietzsche, instead

it should be emphasized that struggle is the very form of dynamism. Reality is in this sense

continuously pregnant with a measureless variety and multiplicity of possibilities (Aydin

2007: 43), yet it is not just a contingent flux of multifarious and countervailing forces, it has

according to Nietzsche equally some sort of grounding principle: the will-to-power. As such

all life-forms, which are in themselves different and unique, are will-to-power. Nietzsches

philosophy tries to embrace the widest possible notion of pluralism and dynamism, while at

the same time holding to some kind of monism and structuring principle of reality, a

monism, however, which is not understood in classical metaphysical terms. The will-to-power

is not so much something akin to a traditional substance, but Nietzsches attempt to get a

handle of the inherent processuality of all reality a processuality that can hardly be

expressed in our kind of language with its strict separation between subject and object. In this

sense it could be said that that the will-to-power is the common quality of all reality, but not

so much as a metaphysical grounding principle that somewhat rests in itself. The will-to-

power cannot be separated off from its inherent processual dynamic of struggle (Mller-

Lauter 1971: 30).

This becomes immediately clearer when we see the will-to-power not as a substance that is

willing something, but as an inextricableprocess. Will-to-power does not signify an entity

that is striving for this or that, for something external to its very being, it implies an active

process where both sides can just be tentatively separated; they are initially one yet one

process. The will-to-power in Nietzsche can only be understood in relational terms, it entails

some sort of directedness or striving without there being a solid fundament (or subject) that is

the doer of this striving (Aydin 2007: 26). In Nietzsches own words:


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[D]as Leben ist nicht Anpassung innerer Bedingungen an uere, sondern Wille zur

Macht, der von innen her immer mehr ueres sich unterwirft und einverleibt ()

(7[9] 12.295, original emphasis)

In this quote the conflictual character of the will-to-power becomes apparent. It does not adapt

itself to its environment, it actively wants to subordinate the external world, i.e. other wills-to-

power with the same aspiration. Overall, this amounts to a ubiquitous struggle for life and

expansion. Nietzsches worldview is in this sense dynamic to the utmost and this kind of

dynamic can only exist in the way of becoming instead of mere being, to evoke the terms

inherited from ancient Greek philosophy (in this sense Nietzsche sides with Heraclites against

Parmenides). However, being is for Nietzsche still a part of the world, but one subordinated to

multiple struggling forces that are always already becoming. All life is therefore in the

process of becoming, and it has become what it is, and will become something else in the

future. Becoming is ineradicable and it is the fate of any being. Everything has to change to

stay the same, to put it somewhat paradoxically. Nietzsches maxim for every life-form is

therefore self-overcoming (in his words: Selbst-berwindung or Selbst-Aufhebung2). In a

nutshell Nietzsche states: Alles ist () geworden (MA I 2.24).

But becoming itself is for Nietzsche not a totally unstructured and chaotic flux of forces and

processes. There is also relatively enduring being in his account, so that struggle can also

yield to organizationand relative fixity. There are no pre-given forms for Nietzsche, but that

does not mean that the different struggling wills-to-power cannot be kept together in a certain

arrangement, triggering some form of organization (Aydin 2007: 30). This organization is

then itself held together by one will-to-power, a will-to-power that was able to overpower all

other wills and thereby to give the whole a certain shape. Aydin gives a succinct definition of

the outlook of such will-to-power organizations:

A will to power organization can be characterized as a hierarchically structured

multiplicity of will to power organizations that internally and externally interact with

each other continuously (Aydin 2007: 30)

2 The german noun (Selbst-)Aufhebung expresses the relation between being and becoming in a veryillustrative fashion. Basically Aufhebung (or aufheben as a verb) has 3 interrelated meanings. Firstly itmeans to lift something (from the floor), secondly to keep or maintain something and thirdly to suspend. So, the

inherent processuality Nietzsche upholds is condensed in this term: the first meaning connotes process and theother two the inexorability of suspending (or change) if we want to maintain something. Hegel drew, of course,already on the threefold meaning of the verb aufheben, yet in totally different philosophical system very muchopposed to Nietzsches.


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These organizations are thus not bereft of dynamic and becoming, something alien to

Nietzsches thought. On the contrary, they still exhibit this dynamic but in a hierarchical way

with one will or some wills-to-power at the top of it. This inner constitution can give such an

organization, for better or worse, certain durability. It should be clear by now that Nietzsches

philosophy is not just one of eternal unmitigated dynamic and struggle, as it also entails

temporary organization as one of its central concepts. Nietzsches will-to-power can just exist

through struggle and conflict, but struggle and conflict can yield to partial organization (or

even transient pacification), without being capable of terminating the underlying struggle

once and for all. It is therefore legitimate to speak of an organization-struggle model (Aydin

2007: 40) in Nietzsches ontology. Nietzsche himself puts this thought in a very instructive

way, highlighting once more the organizational moments of his overall processual view:

Leben wre zu definieren als dauernde Form von Prozeder Krftefeststellungen, wo die

verschiedenen Kmpfenden ihrerseits ungleich wachsen (36[22] 11.560)

Krftefeststellungen here is an ambiguous term that epitomizes Nietzsches organization-

struggle model. It means simultaneously that there is a certain evaluation of forces as well as

the establishment of a certain hierarchy of organization (feststellen). In the second sense we

find to some degree a suspension of the overall dynamic without its nullification. And the

quote makes clear that this suspension if it at all can be called a suspension cannot be a

total one, as Nietzsche equally argues in its second part that there is an incessant process of

forces that grow very differently (and have thus very different potential to overpower each

other).

Since process and struggle are underlying even the most stable organizations, there can be no

institution without struggle and process. So, in a temporary Feststellung in organizational

form the struggle has to be maintained and maybe even intensified, otherwise the organizationlooses its vitality and its power for self-overcoming (and overpowering others). But internal

struggle always bears the risk of becoming inimical to the organizational structure itself, with

the consequence of its eventual disintegration (Aydin 2007: 38). This fragile relation between

incessant and possibly destructive processes on the one hand and the temporary Feststellen

on the other is especially of importance when we talk about Nietzsches notion of the Agon,

which can tentatively be defined as a very special form of organization, which maintains the

necessary inner and outer struggle while at the same time enjoining a sort of measure on itselfso that it does not degenerate (the possibility to do so is, of course, indelible).


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The will-to-power is for Nietzsche one (anti-metaphysical) principle stretching over the whole

of reality from the inorganic world to the wills and wants of human beings. If everything is an

expression of the will-to-power or is will-to-power tout court, then Nietzsches own

philosophy cannot be said to stand beyond that principle, instead it has to be seen as yet just

another expression of it. Nietzsche endorses in this sense, more theoretically put, a certain

epistemologicalperspectivismthat does away with such traditional philosophical conceptions

like truth, cause, effect and so on3(the latter two are for Nietzsche figments of our language

see Nietzsches note on Causalism: 2[139] 12.135). Correspondingly does Nietzsche favour

an instrumental notion of truth. For him it is not so much material whether a belief is true or

not, but whether it affirms life as such - as the will-to-power in all its sometimes dreadful

shades (Ansell-Pearson 1994: 16).

Nietzsches ontology is generally speaking an ontology of becoming that consists of

pluralism, dynamism and struggle. All these notions are entailed by the all-pervasive, but not

substantive principle of the will-to-power. However, such a dynamic view of reality does not

rule out, as we have just seen, temporal stability and fixity. On the contrary, Nietzsche shows

how certain forms of Feststellen stem itself from the struggle of countervailing forces, from

overpowering others and being overpowered by them. In the engagement with the other wills-

to-power a certain Struktur der Selbstverabsolutierung und Selbstrelativierung (Van

Tongeren 1989: 202) is characteristic of the struggle, and this structure can form the basic

configuration of the Nietzschean Agon, of which we will talk shortly. The general objective

of all wills-to-power, however, is self-overcoming, something that can only be achieved

according to Nietzsche by overpowering others. His position could thus be called teleology

without telos (Aydin 2007: 26, original emphasis) and it is the ontological point of origin of

Nietzsches ethical perfectionism.

Nietzsche anchors ethics explicitly in ontology. Something is good when it affirms life, life

understood as the eternal struggle of wills-to-power for self-overcoming and overpoweringothers. Reality demands to lead your life in a certain way, to overcome and perfect yourself in

the dynamics of conflicts and struggle. This notion seems to be at the core of Nietzsches

ethical perfectionism. Nietzsche admits openly to this kind of naturalism when he states the

following:

3Nietzsche formulates this in his own words as follows: Die Welt ist uns vielmehr noch einmal unendlichgeworden: insofern wir die Mglichkeit nicht abweisen knnen, dass sie unendliche Interpretationen in sichschliesst (FW 374 3.627)


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Grundsatz: wie die Natur sein: zahllose Wesen zum Opfer bringen knnen, um Etwas mit

der Menschheit zu erreichen (25[309] 11.91)

Nietzsches basic ethical principle is to lead a life in accordance with nature, whereas nature

is not understood harmonically, but as will-to-power, as self-overcoming and striving for

more power. The goal of this endless striving without a telos is the production of true and

great human beings that affirm life as it is (and do not sooth their misery by blaming others

something Nietzsche famously came to call the slave revolt of morality). So, human beings

have for Nietzsche to be exposed to the hardships of contesting human perfectibility

(Siemens 2001: 519), moreover they should openly embrace these hardships, as they are

constitutive of every form of life. Everything else would lead, in Nietzsches words, to the

Verkleinerung des Menschen (GM I.12 5.278), to mediocre human beings that lag far

behind their possibilities.

This partisanship for life and the hardships of human perfectibility can even be seen in the

performative dimension of Nietzsches theory: The form of his engagement with opponents

and his style of polemicism can be defined as an agonalmodel of limited warfare (Siemens

1998: 334, original emphasis). Not just the Genealogy of Morals is a polemic, as its

subtitle reveals. Nietzsches own aphoristic style tries to convey dynamics and struggle and he

does not want so much to destroy his opponents as to declare war on them (Van Tongeren

1989: 208). This is a performative stance very much in line with Nietzsches basic ontological

commitments and his perfectionist account that both highlight the centrality of struggling

against others.

In Nietzsche we have, to sum up, a veryfirm ontology. The core principle of his ontology of

becoming is will-to-power and in this principle pluralism, dynamism, struggle and

organization are closely interrelated. This ontology of one all-pervasive, non-substantial

principle then yields to Nietzsches epistemological perspectivism and his instrumentalist

notion of truth and it also underpins his ethical perfectionism and his performative (or

stylistic) polemicism (his art of agonal warfare). With this framework in mind we can have

a closer look on Nietzsches social ontology of tension and his theory of the Agon 4. But

4We should, however, refrain from calling Nietzsches theory of the Agon a special and more concrete form ofhis general ontology. The Agon was devised by Nietzsche already in 1871-2, especially in his famous textHomers Wettkampf [HC 1.783-92], his ontology of struggle evolving around the will-to-power dates from1881 (and onwards). So, one should refrain from reading back into the Agon the concepts outlined here., I

would, nevertheless, uphold that the Agon is underpinned by a forerunner of the ontology named here, especiallythe theory of the inescapability of struggle and organization I think the Agon can be consistently re-described inthe terms given in this chapter. It can be seen as a (will-to-power) organization with a plurality of approximatelyequal forces enticing and restraining each other and thereby bringing together the necessary internal struggle


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before we do that we will turn to Chantal Mouffes essential ontological commitments.

Mouffe is first and foremost a political theorist; consequently her general ontology has to be

unearthed out of her more concrete political ontology. At any rate, I find it indispensable to

give equal attention to her general ontology, as certain nexuses and contradictions can just be

pinned down against the background of a theorists most basic ontological commitments.

Chantal Mouffes basal ontology is likewise one of power relations, whereby for her these

power relations are at the same time intrinsically political. She herself puts this thought of the

pervasiveness of power and its inherently political character as follows:

The central thesis of the book is that social objectivity is constituted through acts of

power. This implies that any social objectivity is ultimately political and that it has to

show the traces of exclusion which governs its constitution (Mouffe 2005: 99)

Power is for Mouffe the central constituent of the social in general and it appears to have in

her account necessarily exclusionary character (see also Mouffe 1995: 42). Human sociality is

then due to this exclusionary character intrinsically prone to antagonisms and violence; the

same forces that make human beings band together divide them, so that rivalry and violence

display an ever-present possibility (Mouffe 2005: 131) in any kind of human society.

However, this propensity of power to strife and misery is for Mouffe not something that

should be thought of in essentialist terms. Power constitutes objectivity, objectivity does not

underlie power. So, different forms of power will create different forms of objectivity and, a

fortiori, different forms of exclusion. Mouffe works in this sense in an anti-essentialist

framework (Mouffe 1995: 33). This also entails for her that social relations have a purely

constructed character and are themselves an outcome of competing and excluding power

relations.For Mouffe, to come to the linchpin of her ontology, social relations without antagonism and

exclusion are a conceptual impossibility (Mouffe 2005: 98). That means her ontology of

power and antagonism is at the rock-bottom undergirded by some sort of ontological

conceptualism that reduces reality to the conceptual. As we will see in the section on

Mouffes agonistic pluralism, her whole account is premised on this conceptualism. But as

far as I can see, there is no discussion (let alone a tentative justification) of this conceptualism

in her work. In Mouffes account power leads by virtue of this anti-essentialist ontological

with some sort of measure and limitation. We will outline this in more detail in the following section of thispaper.


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conceptualism to ineradicable strife and antagonism in the social realm. In other words,

Mouffe derives central antagonisms from conceptual claims, not so much from genuine

ontological or empirical ones. In the section of this paper on Mouffes political ontology we

will see how exactly she envisages such a derivation by help of the Derridean differnce

and the Schmittian logic of the political. Here it suffices to remark that Mouffes task on the

most basic level is to derive the permanence of conflict and strife out of some form of

conceptual necessity.

Furthermore, pluralism is for Mouffe equally an axiological principle; we should celebrate

and enhance (Mouffe 1996: 246) the plurality of being. Pluralism has thus a central standing

in Mouffes ethics of emancipationand we will have to examine in the following parts of this

paper in which ways (if at all) this axiology is joined up and mediated with her basic

conceptualism.

There is not much more that can be said on this most fundamental level about Mouffes anti-

essentialist ontological conceptualism of power. These most basic axioms of Mouffes

thought are located, to adapt her terminology in a way she would not endorse, in the pre-

political, as they inform her account of the political, without being fully fleshed out as such.

The political precedes for Mouffe politics, it is the dimension of antagonism that is inherent

in human relations (Mouffe 2005: 101). Her whole account gravitates around the political so

as to furnish it with a proper theory that can account for its alleged inherent antagonism. Here

we were concerned in the abstract with Mouffes concealed derivation of this antagonism and

in the section on her political ontology proper we will see how this antagonism is unfolded

within the political by the help of Derridarean and Schmittian theory; with the objective of

grounding the Mouffian agonistic pluralism (Mouffe: 2005: 101).

In Nietzsche we have a firm ontology that gravitates around the will-to-power and leads to

Nietzsches basic attitudes towards epistemology, ethics and style listed above. Mouffes

fundamental ontology can also be called an ontology of power, but one that is conceptuallyanchored and coupled with an epistemological perspectivism and a pluralist ethics of

emancipation. At least with the latter it is not quite clear how it is related to the underlying

ontology. Also both, Nietzsche and Mouffe, embrace antagonism and pluralism, yet on

different grounds. Whereas in Nietzsche both are characteristics of the will-to-power, standing

in a determinable relation to the other pivots of his theory, in Mouffe this relation becomes

more blurry. Pluralism and dynamism seem somehow be related to Mouffes overarching

anti-essentialist ontological conceptualism, but she keeps quiet about the precise relations, inwhich they stand to each other (at least on this most fundamental level). Overall, this means


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both ontologies display a considerable difference, and Mouffes ontology also exhibits certain

indeterminacy in the linkage of its basic principles. We will now turn to the social ontology

proper of both, dealing firstly with Nietzsches theory of the (Greek) Agon. The differences

we pinpointed here very abstractly should become more palpable on the more concrete levels

we now focus on.

2.2) The Agon in Nietzsche

Nietzsches discussion of the Agon occurs early in his writing, around the time he broke up

withRichard Wagnerand his cult of (himself as) the genius. Nietzsche realised in these days

that the reign of one genius is very likely to degenerate into one form or another of open

tyranny. In old Greece he could spot a counter-model to this tyrannical structure: the Agon. In

texts like Homers Wettkampf (1.783-792)) he sets out to scrutinize the enormous

productivity of Greek culture and recognizes as its main cause the competitive character of

the whole of this culture. Competition, struggle and strife are not condemned in ancient

Greece; quite to the contrary these traits are affirmed and nurtured. So, in agonal settings or

institutions there is a regime of reciprocal stimulation and restraint among a plurality offorces or geniuses (Siemens 2009: 23). Plurality is required so that no single towering

individual can seize power and subordinate all the others to his/her tyrannical rule. More

abstractly, these competing forces or geniuses engage with each other and entice each other to

excel in the vocabulary of the later Nietzsche one could say in this setting they try to

overpower and overcome each other (and in this process also themselves) without destroying

thereby the whole organizational structure of the Agon: they mutually stimulate as well as

restraint each other. Nietzsche himself puts this thought in Homers Wettkampf thefollowing way:

()da, in einer natrlichen Ordnung der Dinge, es immer mehrere Genies giebt, die

sich gegenseitig zur That reizen, wie sie sich auch gegenseitig in der Grenze des Maaes

halten. Das ist der Kern der hellenistischen Wettkampf-Vorstellung () sie begehrt als

Schutzmittelgegen das Genie ein zweites Genie (HC 1.789, original emphasis)

Nietzsche emphasizes in this quotation that there is an inseparable intertwining in this peculiar

socio-institutional setting in ancient Greece of enticing each other tilts through competition


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and restraining each other. Here it should also be noted that Nietzsche conceptualizes this

restraining measure not as the intentional deed of the competitors, but as some sort of

outcome of side-effect of their very competition. This whole social arrangement seems

therefore to be fragile and prone to be thrown into turmoil. Nietzsche himself acknowledges

that the Agon was abolished in ancient Greece followed by tyrannical rule (which is for

Nietzsche the starting point of the decline of Greek culture).

The agonal setting displays in general a high degree of pluralism, dynamism and diversity.

There are always several competitors who intend to overcome each other and they are within

the setting part of a continuous strife. A precondition for this agonal interaction is an

approximate equilibrium of their strength. If the measure is not intentionally set by the

competing parties, what would amount to some sort of partial suspension of the struggle,

which in Nietzsches eyes is inimical to the inherent process of life, then the equal strength of

the opponents alone must keep them in compliance. The expectation (or fear) of the strength

of the other forces is keeping the Agon alive; in a thriving Agon there is thus an approximate

equilibrium of more-or-less equal forces (Siemens 2001: 516). With Volker Gerhardt we

could speak of a principle of equilibrium (Princip des Gleichgewichts) in Nietzsches

notion of the Agon (Gerhardt 1983). Within this equilibrium the antagonistic traits of all life,

as Nietzsche understands it, are maintained, but through the clash of the forces they are

equally constrained in a productive setting that stimulates them to peak-performances and that

forms the core driving force of the institution (or organization) of the Agon (Gerhardt 1983:

125). This equilibrium is anything but a subjective achievement of the antagonistic opponents

they stay antagonists the agonistic taming of them is done by the whole equilibrium

setting and is therefore an unintended emergent achievement of the whole setting of forces.

It is obvious that such a structure is frail and therefore of temporary and transient character.

That means it also needs certain institutional safeguards (Siemens 2001: 515) to be kept

alive. One of these safe-guards is explicitly mentioned by Nietzsche: the Greek custom ofostracism. On the same page of Homers Wettkampf that was quoted above Nietzsche calls

the ostracism a Stimulanzmittel instead of a Ventil (HC 1.789) of the agonal setting.

However, this institutional and intentional safeguard of the Agon in Nietzsches thought

points our attention to a certain tension between the intrinsic limitation of the agonal setting

and the generally measureless antagonistic drives of life (the antagonistic nature of the

many different will-to-power organizations). Nietzsche himself writes in Beyond Good and

Evil the following about the generalizability of the Agon:


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Sobald man aber dies Prinzip weiter nehmen wollte und womglich gar als Grundprincip

der Gesellschaft, so wrde es sich sofort erweisen als Das, was es ist: als Wille zur

Verneinung des Lebens, als Auflsungs- und Verfallprinzip (JGB 259, 5.207, original

emphasis)

The Agon stands in this sense in a certain tension to the general features of the will-to-power.

Ostracizing a towering individual or force is the opposite of an outright affirmation of

struggle and competition, even if it is just done for the sake of reintroducing proper

competition among defeated but more or less equal opponents. Nietzsche seems to suggest in

this quote, moreover, that the encroachment upon the dynamic of life would have to be huge

in case of a wholesale implementation of the Agon so that its overall dynamics of life would

thereby be nullified a thought every democratic appropriation of the Agon should pay

attention to.

The mediating instance between Nietzsches general ontology of the will-to-power and the

socio-institutional setting of the Agon is his social ontology of tension, which we have been

already spelling out throughout this chapter without naming it properly. Nietzsche upholds:

Jede Begabung muss sich kmpfend entfalten, so gebietet es die hellenische

Volkspdagogik (HC 1.789). Only in conflictual relations to others can endowments unfold

themselves, according to Nietzsche. People can just define their own identity in relation to

others, relations that are first and foremost built up by the resistance of these others against

oneself. So, individuals can develop their capacities solely in and through the antagonistic

striving with others and in this striving they also continuously change and overcome

themselves. This stance is also mirrored by Nietzsches perfectionist commitments, and that is

no surprise, as we have seen before that these commitments are derived from his ontological

tenets. The Agon can be seen as a social setting that animates human beings to excel and

perfect themselves in the struggle with others. And under favourable (balanced) conditionsthis struggle continues and therewith does the striving for human perfection (to recall: a

teleology without a telos).

In a nutshell can the Agon be defined as a socio-institutional setting exhibiting a dynamic of

mutual affirmation or empowerment, and mutual limitation or disempowerment (Siemens

1998: 338, original emphasis). The main feature of this double structure is the approximate

equilibrium of more or less equal forces that boosts competition as it puts a gauge on its

destructive dynamics. In relation to Nietzsches general ontology of struggle the Agon can bedefined as an especially favourable will-to-power organization that extends inner struggle as


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far as possible whilst it still remains one whole. So, there is a multiplicity of struggles and

divisions within the whole, but nevertheless there is a hierarchical whole that forms a certain

synthesis of all the forces. In short: The Agon represents utmost difference within one-ness,

the maximisation of inner tension consistent with the continued existence of the hierarchical

whole for Nietzsche very suitable conditions for the perfection of human beings.

Now, for this setting to prevail special circumstances are required. In Nietzsches ontology no

will-to-power organization is intrinsically stable, as it consists of many different forces. This

is, a fortiori, true of human societies where Nietzsches general ontology of struggle presents

itself in the guise of a social ontology of tension. Just under conditions of equilibrium within a

setting of institutional safeguards the Agon can burgeon. Yet, this setting is tendentially at

odds with the characteristics of the will-to-.power, as it tends to inhibit its intrinsic dynamics.

There seems to be no easy way out of this dilemma, and we will put it aside for the moment

(more about this difficulty and the adjacent problem of the detachability and transferability of

the ancient Agon in the conclusive section of this paper). In any case, what can be pointed out

here, before we engage with Mouffes political ontology, is that Nietzsches theory of the

Agon and his social ontology in general furnish us with sophisticated notions of identity,

difference and limitation. In Nietzsche we have an intrinsically antagonist notion of pluralism

that is continuously nurtured by the will-to-power. Identity is something of a derivative

category of this pluralism, it is the provisional and transient Feststellen or Festsetzen of

the dynamic of forces and it can in the case of human beings develop itself just in the

course of tension and struggle with other individuals. Overall these notions of identity and

pluralism are active ones and they are formed incessantly in endless struggle. Transient

measure or limitation is achieved in this struggle via organizations (in special cases:

equilibria), and they are neither in the social realm nor anywhere else outcome of intentional

behaviour. We will now see how Mouffe conceptualizes struggle and antagonism in her

political ontology, whereby special emphasis will be put on these three features. This is oftheoretical interest, because her general ontology, as we have seen, displays some

considerable indeterminacy that should also yield to certain repercussions on a more concrete

level.

2.3) The Agonal in Mouffe


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Mouffe dubs her own political theory agonistic pluralism. It can be subsumed in political

philosophy under the broader rubric of political agonism, whose distinctive feature is the

recognition of struggle and strife at the heart of politics. Politics is for theorists in this

tradition incessant contestation without the possibility of any kind of rational closure of

question of political concern (Fossen 2008: 376). Mouffe in particular argues in line with

modern liberal theories that modern-day democracies are devoid of a substantial common

good (Mouffe 1993b: 229), but she hastens to add, contra liberalism, that power and

antagonism are ineradicable parts of the political so that no rational or liberal consensus can

be achieved that would not have any repressive effects on one marginalized group or another.

Liberalism draws, in her own words, the picture of a dangerous utopia of reconciliation

(Mouffe 1996: 252).

For Mouffe modern democracy is, on the contrary, inherently contradictory, as it is always

potentially torn by two incommensurable logics: the democratic aspiration of equality and the

liberal promise of individuality trying to tare both signifies for her the democratic paradox

(Mouffe 2005). Mouffe herself affirms this paradox with its two conflicting logics and her

theory tries to mediate between both so as to turn antagonism into agonism and provide in this

framework also space for equality (along with her ethics of emancipation). In this endeavour

of furnishing an agonistic political ontology Mouffe draws particularly on Jacques Derrida

and Carl Schmitt and to the theoretical incorporation of both theorists in Mouffes framework

we are now going to turn.

The inherent pluralism, which every agonist theory of democracy pronounces, stems for

Mouffe from a logic of differnce in a Derridaean sense. Differnce is construed as the

condition of possibility of being and it concerns the symbolic level (Mouffe 1996: 246,

original emphasis). Here we can see again overtly Mouffes overarching ontological

conceptualism the reality is tantamount to the conceptual and the symbolic. Mouffe spells

this out as follows:

[I]t is the notion of the constitutive outside which helps me to emphasize the usefulness

of a deconstructive approach in grasping the antagonism inherent in all objectivity and the

centrality of the us/them distinction in the constitution of political identities. (Mouffe

2005: 12)

And this constitutive outside


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by showing the radical undecidability of the tension of its constitution, makes its very

positivity a function of the symbol of something exceeding it: the possibility/impossibility

of positivity as such (Mouffe 2005: 12)

These two quotes are a very dense account of Mouffes basic ontological commitment along

with the derivation of political antagonism thereof. Her whole notion of plurality hinges on

the (Derridaean) theory of the constitutive outside. It triggers for her the antagonism that

yields to a us/them-distinction and it is itself equivalent to the logic of differnce. In Mouffes

somewhat enigmatic formulation the opposition between inside and outside is a function of

the symbol of something exceeding it. Concepts are in general relational, one cannot be

defined without the other this is somewhat common sense in most branches of philosophy.

Yet, Mouffes embracement of the logic of differnce goes farther than that. In her anti-

essentialist conceptualism concepts are not just defined by virtue of each other, this definition

equally implies the impossibility of each concept as such, as it always refers to its

constitutive outside. The effect is for Mouffe an undecidability that can just be overridden

by fiats of power and those are by conceptual necessity then somehow antagonistic in

character.

Through the constructed character of every symbol and the immanent undecidability inherent

to this logic identity becomes purely contingent (Mouffe 1996: 247). Identity is constructed

by power and it is in this very process of identity forming that an outside is defined, which is

simultaneously expelled from it. The us stands then starkly against the them. There is no

identity beyond the symbolic act of identifications, which can be seen as partial fixations

that limit the flux of the signified under a signifier (Mouffe 1995: 34), at least for some

time. On a more concrete level political identity is for Mouffe formed by a chain of

equivalence (Mouffe 1995: 38). By definition different and divided people (constitutive

outside) rally for hegemony, but they might come together under one symbolic conceptionand then act as if there was no antagonism. The chain represents different people under a

common (eventually symbolic) signifier, say gay liberation, and thereby a common identity is

constructed (Rummens 2009: 380), an identity that is in permanence precariously and

temporarily sutured (Mouffe 1995: 10).

Now, it is dubious whether Mouffes reliance on differnce really can furnish the

antagonism she is up for. Coming back to the two incommensurable logics of modern-day

democracy Mouffe refers to a political theorist of a totally different political bent: CarlSchmitt (who is also known as the Kronjurist des dritten Reichs). Schmitt argues that true


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democracy is premised on antagonistic opposition between peoples, whereas each of them is

understood as a uniform whole with a homogenous national identity (Rummens 2009: 378).

The political in this conception is then indeed pervaded by antagonisms between different and

mutually exclusive identities and one nation fears the existential threat of annihilation by

another. Mouffe agrees with Schmitt, as we have seen, that the mentioned logics are

potentially contradictory, but she shuns his consequence of jettisoning liberalist individuality

for the sake of unified nation (Mouffe 2005: 9). Her deconstructivist logic of the constitutive

outside forbids her to think of nations (or anything) as essentially homogenous entities,

instead she emphasizes that rifts and splits also appear by (conceptual) necessity within the

nation (Mouffe 2005: 53).

Mouffes objective is to mitigate Schmitts stark antagonism, as it leaves with the threat of

annihilation no room for agonistic interaction. Her endeavour is rather to turn antagonistic

enemies into agonistic adversaries, which are defined by Mouffe somewhat paradoxically as

friendly enemies (Mouffe 2005: 13). Spelled out in more detail this means for Mouffe that

they engage in a common symbolic space (Mouffe 2005: 13), yet they have different

visions for that common space and want to organize it accordingly. The common space

Mouffe dwells on is of course the agora of liberal democracy, understood from a pluralist

standpoint. Adversaries agree that they act within the democratic realm, they are characterized

in Mouffes terms by a shared adhesion to the ethico-political principles of liberal

democracy (Mouffe 2005: 102). The gauge that is put on antagonism and ubiquitous

enmities is in Mouffes account an intentional and subject-centred one; antagonistic enemies

undergo some sort of conversion into adversaries by subjecting themselves to the ethico-

political principles of democracies. At the core of this recognition Mouffe sees the respect

of pluralism and difference (Mouffe 1995: 39) and the objective of her agonistic pluralism is

to transform destructive and violent antagonism into a democratically tamed agonism. In the

just cited text Mouffe even speaks about a consensus (Mouffe 1995: 41) that is necessary tomake agonistic pluralism possible. Mouffes answer to the pressing question of the limits to

antagonism is an appeal to some sort of democratic ethos of self-restraint, or even a

consensus. The actors in the democratic game decide in her theory intentionally to mitigate

the antagonism they are subjected to by conceptual necessity. Of course, this collective

decision is encompassed by the general logic of Mouffes conceptual antagonism, yet it is

central to note that the whole question of limits within this overall antagonistic account boils

down to a question of agreement and consensus.


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Somehow detached from the theoretical references to both named theorists is Mouffes

emancipatory commitment (though Derrida shared her leftist stance). Radical democracy

means for Mouffe to acknowledge the fundamentally power-infested character of the political

its intrinsically violent character while still upholding the need to transform and redress

this power relations, as they are continuously creating harm, injustices and inequities (by

means of exclusion and restriction see Fossen 2008: 377).

Quite generally it can be said that both the Mouffian conceptualist ontology of power and her

political ontology proper are rather un-Nietzschean. Mouffe incorporates the thought of

Derrida and Schmitt on different levels in her theoretical framework. Overall, she is

committed to an anti-essentialist ontological conceptualism of power, which undergirds her

borrowings from Derrida (however, both cannot be separated that easily). The Derridaean

concepts of differnce and constitutive outside have the function to ground the

indomitable antagonism by means of conceptual necessity, yet her positions falls short of

showing how pluralism implies the permanence of conflict and antagonism (Mouffe 2005:

33). In other words, it is far from clear how purely conceptual reflections can furnish any such

real antagonism. Mouffe would have to show in which way reality is exhausted by concepts (a

matter of basic ontology) and how thereby genuine antagonism is created (a matter of

revolving around her theoretical borrowings from Derrida).

Her notions of pluralism and identity stand on the grounds of this conceptual antagonism.

Pluralism seems to be for Mouffe negative and in itself non-dynamic category, despite the

contingency of every identity construction. It is parasitic upon negation and forms something

like the necessary remainder of identity constructions. Similarly is her conception of identity

in itself without dynamics and bereft of any kind of activity. Once the undecidable has been

temporarily decided both spheres seem to be static and in the one there is no trace of the other,

though one is always defined in reference to the other. Both conceptions are grounded on a

reactive momentum in her theory that stems from the strong decisionist moment in Mouffetriggered by her general conceptual logic.

Since the Derridaean logic does not furnish the intended antagonism Mouffe turns in the

question of collective political identities to Carl Schmitt. His theory, in contrast to Derridas

differnce, definitely embraces antagonism, but it is hard to see how this antagonism could

be reconciled with Mouffes overall anti-essentialist conceptualist thinking (Schmitt is after

all a fervent essentialist). Mouffe mitigates this logic by means of a subject-centred

democratic ethos that is itself at odds with her conflictualist ontology in general and herpolitical ontology of hegemony in particular. It is unclear how the pernicious and


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exclusionary consequences of a strictly hegemonic logic (Rummens 2009: 387), which is

itself constitutive of her whole framework, can be alleviated by this appeal to an intentional

fiat (and what consequences this would have for the aspired genuinepluralism).

In sum, Mouffe cannot uphold with her political ontology any sensible notion of antagonism

and pluralism, not to mention pluralism as an axiological principle and her emancipatory

claims. In the following conclusion we will now turn to the question whether Nietzsches

dynamic ontology of conflict provides us with a more suitable political ontology that can

account for the insight that genuine pluralism is inextricably coalesced with antagonism5.

3.) Conclusion on the limits of Nietzsches and Mouffes agonism

Coming back to the question that was posed at the onset of this paper we can now conclude

that Mouffe fails to conceptualize plurality, identity and the problem of limits in the light of

the inherent antagonism she affirms. Mouffe weds Derridaean deconstructionism to the

Schmittian logic of the political in an overall anti-essentialist and conceptualist framework.

Eventually this theoretical melange falls short of her own claims and she can neither account

for the inherent antagonism of all social life nor for any mitigated logic of the political thatwould still reckon with unescapable antagonism. All these problems in Mouffes framework

are linked up with the ontological indeterminacy of her conceptualism; it is far from clear in

her texts how this conceptualism can underpin any notion of the political, let alone her

emancipatory ethics that are totally detached from the rest of her theory. The quest seems to

be to hold onto the thought that genuine pluralism triggers antagonism without falling into a

logic of differnce where no boundaries can be drawn anymore or the extreme determinacy

that is displayed in Schmitts theory of the political (Siemens, unpublished paper: 8).Nietzsches theory of the Agon seems to offer some means to address these shortcomings in a

more proper way, though there are equally troubles in his account. In Nietzsches theory of

the Agon we have an active notion of identity, pluralism and limitation that is not at odds with

his general commitment to antagonism. The Agon is a social setting of approximate

equilibrium kept in shape by certain institutional safeguards (ostracism). As such it is

encompassed by Nietzsches social ontology of tension, which is itself some sort of

application to the social realm of Nietzsches general ontology of struggle. In all this steps

5The paragraphs on the critique of Mouffe profited highly from an unpublished paper by Herman W. Siemens.See the bibliography.


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reality is affirmed as intrinsically dynamic and antagonistic and Nietzsches ethical

perfectionism is in line with these basic features of his ontology. However, Nietzsche himself

raises in Beyond Good and Evil the problem of the generalizability of the Agon; and it is far

from clear how, if at all, it could be implemented in modern-day democracies, especially as

Nietzsche sees in the long run a (latent) opposition between the Agon and its safeguards and

the general features of the will-to-power. Any present-day appropriation of the Agon would

have to engage with questions about the generalizability, the detachability and the

transferability of the Agon and it would also have to take Nietzsches fervent critique of the

democracy of his times very seriously (for an overview of his critique see Siemens 2009).

In the end of this paper some sort of democratic paradox remains: Can there be an agonistic

theorization and, a fortiori, an agonistic justification of modern democracy? The question

must remain unanswered in this breadth. Yet, one thing seems to be certain: For different

reasons there cannot be an agonistic theory of modern democracy in a straightforwardly

Mouffian or Nietzschean way. Nietzsche, however, offers a more sophisticated theory of

agonal interaction and Mouffes theory falls short of many of his crucial insights concerning

plurality, identity and the question of limits.


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