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Game Theory: What you need to know... By Komi!a Chadha April 2012 Tuesday, 10 April 12

Game Theory PPT by Komilla Chadha

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Revision pack on oligopoly theory and game theory

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Page 1: Game Theory PPT by Komilla Chadha

Game Theory: What you need to know...

By Komi!a ChadhaApril 2012

Tuesday, 10 April 12

Page 2: Game Theory PPT by Komilla Chadha

Outline Cartels and colluding - why do it?

Prisoner’s Dilemma: What is it? What are the strategies and games? Mathematical proof? What is the Nash equilibrium?

Cournot Model

Bertrand Model

Stackelberg Model

Chamberlin Model, is it relevant to oligopolies?

Tuesday, 10 April 12

Page 3: Game Theory PPT by Komilla Chadha

Cartels and Collusions

Given the concentrated nature of the oligopolistic market, firms may seek to co!ude so that they can benefit #om supernormal profits that monopolies earn.

They may do this by forming a cartel which is essentia!y explicit co!usions but these

are i!egal

Thus they may co!ude i!icitly and this is known as tacit

co!usion and an example of this is price leadership

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Page 5: Game Theory PPT by Komilla Chadha

Which strategy?

Dominant : Where the strategy of the player is not reliant upon the strategy of

the other player.

Non-dominant: where your strategy is based on the strategy of the other player.

Maximin: When you chose

the highest yielding option from your worst possible

outcomes.

Tit-for-tat: you don’t know how

many times you will encounter, but you cooperate the first time and every

other turn after is a copy of what the other player did.

Sequential games: These are games where you are allowed to make your strategy decision after viewing the activity of the

other player.

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Page 6: Game Theory PPT by Komilla Chadha

With prisoner’s dilemma it is quite clear that firms are better off to cheat in the short-run, so what is the mathematical

proof for this statement? Look above!

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Page 7: Game Theory PPT by Komilla Chadha

Nash equilibrium: Where the players may not individually be

at optimal equilibriums but they nevertheless have no incentive to change their

current strategy.

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Page 8: Game Theory PPT by Komilla Chadha

Cournot ModelThis is a model which suggests that oligopolies compete on

quantity/output.

The main assumption is that each firm takes the other firm’s output as constant and thus derives it’s demand as D-qb

The reactive function is a key part of the model and

suggests that if firm B changes its output then firm A will do

so subsequently.

The model has been criticized for being too naive and

assuming a closed market.

Tuesday, 10 April 12

Page 9: Game Theory PPT by Komilla Chadha

Mathematics can be used to show that each firms reaction function (which is the derivative of the profit function) is based upon the output of the

other firm.

Graphically the reactive curves, with firm A and B on each axis, show what happens when one firm

changes output.

The intersection is the output they will operate at.

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Page 10: Game Theory PPT by Komilla Chadha

Bertrand Model

Whereas, the Cournot model explore output competition, the Betrand model suggests price competition exists .

Again each firm assumes the other firms price is constant - the Betrand assumption!

Tuesday, 10 April 12

Page 11: Game Theory PPT by Komilla Chadha

This model argues that the price competition between the firms results in an oligopoly which achieves the perfectly competitive output of P=MC, as

firms are constantly undercutting one another to gain market share.

Bertrand Model II

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Page 12: Game Theory PPT by Komilla Chadha

Stackelberg ModelThis model is more similar to Cournot, advocating for quantity competition - so to speak.

However, the key difference is that it sugegsting an oligopoly is an example of a sequential game i.e. that players make their output decisions after seeing what the other players do. Also, output is much more higher in this model.

It is like the output version of price leadership.

The first-mover or quantity setter however always benefits the most.

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Page 13: Game Theory PPT by Komilla Chadha

Comparison of prices and profits

BERTRAND < STACKELBERG < COURNOT < MONOPOLY

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Page 14: Game Theory PPT by Komilla Chadha

Chamberlin ModelThe Chamberlin model isn’t very important for oligopoly theory, it is merely the idea of monopolistic competition. That is that firms can have inelastic demand and differentiated goods yet operate in a competitive market.

For more info pleasesee my posts and

booklets/videos onmonopolistic competition.

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Page 15: Game Theory PPT by Komilla Chadha

End

Thank you for reading!

By Komi!a Chadha

Tuesday, 10 April 12