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Economics 1200, TH 9:30am-10:45am Prof. Duffy Class Number: 18362 Spring Term 2012 Game Theory Course Content and Objectives: This course is a rigorous introduction to game theory, the study of strategic behavior among parties having opposed, mixed or similar interests. The course will sharpen your understanding of strategic behavior in encounters with other individuals-- modeled as games--and as a participant in broader markets involving many individuals. You will learn how to recognize and model strategic situations, to predict when and how your actions will influence the decisions of others and to exploit strategic situations for your own benefit. Prerequisites are familiarity with algebra and calculus. Lectures: We will meet for lectures (and play games!) in the Pittsburgh Experimental Economics Laboratory, 2600 Posvar Hall, Tuesdays and Thursdays from 9:30-10:45am. There are no recitation sections for this course. My Office and Office Hours: 4929 Posvar Hall, Wednesdays 3-5pm Telephone: 412-648-1733 Email: [email protected] Course Web Page: http://www.pitt.edu/~jduffy/econ1200/ Requirements: There will be two exams: a midterm and a final examination. You will also have to complete a term project, and a number of homework assignments. The weights given to these requirements in determining your final grade for the course are: Homeworks 10% Midterm Exam 30% Term Project 30% Final Exam 30% Course Policies: Late homeworks and term projects are not accepted. Make-up exams are not offered. There is no extra credit. Textbook: Games of Strategy 3 rd Ed. by Avinash K. Dixit, Susan Skeath and David H. Reiley, Jr., New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 2009. This book is required and is available at the Book Center or on-line. It is also available as an e-book. Software: We will make use of the comlabgames software, available at http://www.comlabgames.com for classroom demonstrations of games. In addition, you can design the game you develop for your term project using this software. Grader: Hong Wu, Office: 4515 Posvar Hall, Office hours: Mondays, 2-5pm Tel: 412-648-1744, Email: [email protected].

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Economics 1200, TH 9:30am-10:45am Prof. Duffy Class Number: 18362 Spring Term 2012

Game Theory Course Content and Objectives: This course is a rigorous introduction to game theory, the study of strategic behavior among parties having opposed, mixed or similar interests. The course will sharpen your understanding of strategic behavior in encounters with other individuals--modeled as games--and as a participant in broader markets involving many individuals. You will learn how to recognize and model strategic situations, to predict when and how your actions will influence the decisions of others and to exploit strategic situations for your own benefit. Prerequisites are familiarity with algebra and calculus. Lectures: We will meet for lectures (and play games!) in the Pittsburgh Experimental Economics Laboratory, 2600 Posvar Hall, Tuesdays and Thursdays from 9:30-10:45am. There are no recitation sections for this course. My Office and Office Hours: 4929 Posvar Hall, Wednesdays 3-5pm Telephone: 412-648-1733 Email: [email protected] Course Web Page: http://www.pitt.edu/~jduffy/econ1200/ Requirements: There will be two exams: a midterm and a final examination. You will also have to complete a term project, and a number of homework assignments. The weights given to these requirements in determining your final grade for the course are: Homeworks 10% Midterm Exam 30% Term Project 30% Final Exam 30% Course Policies: Late homeworks and term projects are not accepted. Make-up exams are not offered. There is no extra credit. Textbook: Games of Strategy 3rd Ed. by Avinash K. Dixit, Susan Skeath and David H. Reiley, Jr., New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 2009. This book is required and is available at the Book Center or on-line. It is also available as an e-book. Software: We will make use of the comlabgames software, available at http://www.comlabgames.com for classroom demonstrations of games. In addition, you can design the game you develop for your term project using this software. Grader: Hong Wu, Office: 4515 Posvar Hall, Office hours: Mondays, 2-5pm Tel: 412-648-1744, Email: [email protected].

Course Outline, Exam Schedule and Reading Assignments (subject to change) 1/05-1/12: Elements of a Game, Thinking Strategically, Introduction to comlabgames software.

Dixit, Skeath and Reiley Chapters 1-2.

1/17-1/26: Sequential Move Games, Application to Bargaining

Dixit, Skeath and Reiley Chapter 3 and Chapter 18, pp. 703-720 only. 1/31-2/09: Simultaneous Move Games, Applications to Coordination Problems / Oligopoly

Dixit, Skeath and Reiley Chapters 4-5. 2/14-2/23: Probability, Expected Payoffs and Expected Utility, Application to Mixed Strategies

Dixit, Skeath and Reiley Chapters 7-8.

Midterm Exam, Tuesday, February 28, in class. Review answers on March 1. 3/06-3/08: Spring Recess: No Class 3/13-3/22: Subgame Perfection, Repeated Games, Evolution of Cooperation

Dixit, Skeath and Reiley Chapters 6 and 11.

3/27-4/05: Incomplete Information Games, Signaling Games, Strategic Moves

Dixit, Skeath and Reiley Chapters 9-10.

4/10-4/19: Strategic Behavior in Elections and Markets

Dixit, Skeath and Reiley Chapters 16 and 19.

Term Project due Tuesday, April 17.

Final Examination, Wednesday, April 25, 12:00-1:50pm, 2600 Posvar Hall.

Economics 1200, TH 11:00am-12:15pm Prof. Duffy Class Number: 25223 Spring Term 2012

Game Theory Course Content and Objectives: This course is a rigorous introduction to game theory, the study of strategic behavior among parties having opposed, mixed or similar interests. The course will sharpen your understanding of strategic behavior in encounters with other individuals--modeled as games--and as a participant in broader markets involving many individuals. You will learn how to recognize and model strategic situations, to predict when and how your actions will influence the decisions of others and to exploit strategic situations for your own benefit. Prerequisites are familiarity with algebra and calculus. Lectures: We will meet for lectures (and play games!) in the Pittsburgh Experimental Economics Laboratory, 2600 Posvar Hall, Tuesdays and Thursdays from 11:00am-12:15pm. There are no recitation sections for this course. My Office and Office Hours: 4929 Posvar Hall, Wednesdays 3-5pm Telephone: 412-648-1733 Email: [email protected] Course Web Page: http://www.pitt.edu/~jduffy/econ1200/ Requirements: There will be two exams: a midterm and a final examination. You will also have to complete a term project, and a number of homework assignments. The weights given to these requirements in determining your final grade for the course are: Homeworks 10% Midterm Exam 30% Term Project 30% Final Exam 30% Course Policies: Late homeworks and term projects are not accepted. Make-up exams are not offered. There is no extra credit. Textbook: Games of Strategy 3rd Ed. by Avinash K. Dixit, Susan Skeath and David H. Reiley, Jr., New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 2009. This book is required and is available at the Book Center or on-line. It is also available as an e-book. Software: We will make use of the comlabgames software, available at http://www.comlabgames.com for classroom demonstrations of games. In addition, you can design the game you develop for your term project using this software. Grader: Hong Wu, Office: 4515 Posvar Hall, Office hours: Mondays, 2-5pm Tel: 412-648-1744, Email: [email protected].

Course Outline, Exam Schedule and Reading Assignments (subject to change) 1/05-1/12: Elements of a Game, Thinking Strategically, Introduction to comlabgames software.

Dixit, Skeath and Reiley Chapters 1-2.

1/17-1/26: Sequential Move Games, Application to Bargaining

Dixit, Skeath and Reiley Chapter 3 and Chapter 18, pp. 703-720 only. 1/31-2/09: Simultaneous Move Games, Applications to Coordination Problems / Oligopoly

Dixit, Skeath and Reiley Chapters 4-5. 2/14-2/23: Probability, Expected Payoffs and Expected Utility, Application to Mixed Strategies

Dixit, Skeath and Reiley Chapters 7-8.

Midterm Exam, Tuesday, February 28, in class. Review answers on March 1. 3/06-3/08: Spring Recess: No Class 3/13-3/22: Subgame Perfection, Repeated Games, Evolution of Cooperation

Dixit, Skeath and Reiley Chapters 6 and 11.

3/27-4/05: Incomplete Information Games, Signaling Games, Strategic Moves

Dixit, Skeath and Reiley Chapters 9-10.

4/10-4/19: Strategic Behavior in Elections and Markets

Dixit, Skeath and Reiley Chapters 16 and 19.

Term Project due Tuesday, April 17.

Final Examination, Monday, April 23, 12:00-1:50pm, 2600 Posvar Hall.

ECON 1200 Game Theory Summer 2012

Instructor: Martin Saavedra E-mail: [email protected] Office: 4523 Posvar Office hours: Tuesday 3:00-4:00 Mailbox: 4900 Posvar Course Description: This course is an introduction to game theory, which studies the strategic interaction of individuals attempting to achieve goals (which may or may not be similar). The goal of this course is for you to learn how to analyze and model such situations. We will focus on applications in not only economics, but also political science and other disciplines. Prerequisites: Math 0120 or Math 0220 Grades: There will be a midterm and final exam, which will be worth 35 percent each, and two quizzes which will be worth 10 percent each. Class participation will be worth 10 percent of your grade. Lectures: The lectures will be Tuesdays and Thursdays from 6:00 pm to 9:15 pm in Posvar 2600. Homework: I will recommend problems from the textbook, and will solve them during the following lecture. I suggest you solve these problems before the lecture, but they will not be collected nor graded. Exams and Quizzes: The first exam is scheduled for May 29 and the final exam is scheduled for June 21, both during class time. I will announce the quiz dates at least a week in advance. Exams and quizzes are cumulative. Textbook: Games of Strategy, 3rd Ed. by Avinash Dixit, Susan Skeath and David Reiley, New York: W.W. Norton & Co. 2009. Academic Integrity: Violations of the University’s academic integrity policy will not be tolerated. Information on academic integrity can be found at: http://www.provost.pitt.edu/info/ai1.html Disabilities and Accommodations: If you have a disability, please contact Disability Resource Services so that accommodations can be made.

ECON 1200: Game Theory

Alistair J. Wilson

Spring 2013

Course GoalsThis course is an introduction to game theory, the study of strategic behavior among parties having opposed,mixed or similar interests. This course will sharpen your understanding of strategic behavior in encounterswith other individuals. You will learn how to recognize and model strategic situations, to predict whenand how your actions will influence the decisions of others and to exploit strategic situations for your ownbenefit. The course aims to provide students with a basic understanding of the language and concepts ofgame theory, as well as providing some surveys of important theoretical models within the field.

Course Outline1. Overview Class

2. Decision Theory and Math review:

(a) Utility representations of preferences

(b) Math review of functions and notation.

(c) Probability and Expectations

(d) von Neumann-Morgenstern representation

(e) Choice, and revealed preference

(f) Examples

(g) Sequences (reviewed as needed for new material)

(h) Calculus and Optimization (reviewed as needed for new material)

3. Game Theory, basics and canonical models

(a) Dominance

(b) Equilibrium: pure strategies

(c) Equilibrium: Mixed Strategies

(d) Basic games: Prisoner’s Dilemma, Matching Pennies, Battle of the Sexes, Stag Hunt, Dove-Hawk

(e) Continuous Games: Cournot & Bertrand; Public Goods

4. Extensive-Form Games

(a) Game trees

(b) Sub-game perfection

(c) Forgetful driver game

1

(d) Stackelberg & other illustrations

(e) Refinements (maybe)

5. Repeated Games

(a) Finitely repeated games

(b) Infinitely repeated Games

(c) Folk theorems

6. Incomplete Information

(a) Bayesian games

(b) Auctions

(c) Signaling

(d) Voting

(e) Cheap Talk & Strategic Communication

7. Cooperative Game Theory & Social Choice

(a) Coalitions

(b) The core

8. Bargaining

(a) Rubinstein’s model

(b) Nash bargaining

9. Extensions (If time allows)

(a) Rationalizability

(b) Evolutionary Game Theory

Assessment:• There will be two midterms and an optional final examination, as well as 5 homework assignments.

• The homeworks will count for 10% of your grade, and each homework will be assessed coarsely outof 2%. However, exam questions will be similar to, and at the same level as homework questions, sodoing the homeworks is fairly important.

– 2 means perfect.

– 1 means a fair effort was made, but not everything was correct.

– 0 if the homework was not turned in, or was very incomplete/incorrect.

– Solutions will be provided to allow you to see where you went wrong.

– Late homeworks are not accepted, and will receive a 0.

• If you choose not to take the final then the two midterms will count for 40% and 50% of your finalgrade.

2

• If you choose to take the optional final the midterms will count for 20% and 25% of your final grade,with the final counting for the remaining 45%.

– If you turn in the final examination it will count for 45% of your final grade.

– If you do not turn in the final examination only the two midterms will count at 40% and 50%,respectively.

• There are no make-up exams, and there is no extra credit for this course.

Additional Information:

Lecture LocationsThe course has two sections both meeting Tuesdays and Thursdays: Section 1 meets 9:30am to 10:45am inLawrence Hall 207, while section 2 meets 1:00pm to 2:15pm in Benedum Hall G20.

Contact Details• Alistair Wilson, Dept. of Economics, University of Pittsburgh

• Office Location: 4907 Wesley W. Posvar Hall

• Telephone: 412-383-8152

• Email: [email protected]

Grader• Evan Piermont, Dept. of Economics, University of Pittsburgh.

• Email: [email protected]

• Homeworks are handed into to his mailbox before 5pm on the due date, or handed in during class.

Office HoursMy office hours are: Tuesdays and Thursdays, 11:15am to 12:15pm.

Text Book• An Introduction to Game Theory, by Martin J. Osborne, Oxford University Press, 2004.

– Available from Pitt Bookstore, Amazon, etc.

• Additionally you might find the following useful for supplementary reading:

– Games of Strategy, 3rd Edition, by Avinash Dixit, Susan Skeath and David Reiley, W.W. Norton& Co, 2009. Hillman HB144.D59

• For more advanced texts at the graduate level, see the below texts in the library:

– A Course in Game Theory, by Martin J. Osbourne and Ariel Rubinstein, MIT Press, 1994.Hillman Library, HB144.O733 (see Martin Osbourne’s site too)

– Game Theory, by Drew Fudenberg and Jean Tirole, MIT Press, 1991. Hillman Library, HB144.F83

3

Academic IntegrityStudents in this course will be expected to comply with the University of Pittsburgh’s Policy on AcademicIntegrity. Any student suspected of violating this obligation for any reason during the semester will berequired to participate in the procedural process, initiated at the instructor level, as outlined in the Uni-versity Guidelines on Academic Integrity. This may include, but is not limited to, the confiscation of theexamination of any individual suspected of violating University Policy. Furthermore, no student may bringany unauthorized materials to an exam, including dictionaries and programmable calculators.

Disability InformationIf you have a disability that requires special testing accommodations or other classroom modifications, youneed to notify both the instructor and the Disability Resources and Servicesno later than the 2nd week ofthe term. You may be asked to provide documentation of your disability to determine the appropriatenessof accommodations. To notify Disability Resources and Services, call 648-7890 (Voice or TTD) to schedulean appointment. The Office is located in 140 William Pitt Union.

Statement on Classroom RecordingTo ensure the free and open discussion of ideas, students may not record classroom lectures, discussionand/or activities without the advance written permission of the instructor, and any such recording properlyapproved in advance can be used solely for the student’s own private use.

4

ECON 1200: Game Theory

Alistair J. Wilson

Fall 2013

Course Goals

This course is an introduction to game theory, the study of strategic behavior among parties having opposed,mixed or similar interests. This course will sharpen your understanding of strategic behavior in encounterswith other individuals. You will learn how to recognize and model strategic situations, to predict whenand how your actions will in�uence the decisions of others and to exploit strategic situations for your ownbene�t. The course aims to provide students with a basic understanding of the language and concepts ofgame theory, as well as providing some surveys of important theoretical models within the �eld.

Course Outline

1. Overview Class

2. Decision Theory and Math review:

(a) Utility representations of preferences

(b) Math review of functions and notation.

(c) Probability and Expectations

(d) von Neumann-Morgenstern representation

(e) Choice, and revealed preference

(f) Examples

(g) Sequences (reviewed as needed for new material)

(h) Calculus and Optimization (reviewed as needed for new material)

3. Game Theory, basics and canonical models

(a) Dominance

(b) Equilibrium: pure strategies

(c) Equilibrium: Mixed Strategies

(d) Basic games: Prisoner's Dilemma, Matching Pennies, Battle of the Sexes, Stag Hunt, Dove-Hawk

(e) Continuous Games: Cournot & Bertrand; Public Goods

4. Extensive-Form Games

(a) Game trees

(b) Sub-game perfection

(c) Forgetful driver game

1

(d) Stackelberg & other illustrations

(e) Re�nements (maybe)

5. Repeated Games

(a) Finitely repeated games

(b) In�nitely repeated Games

(c) Folk theorems

6. Incomplete Information

(a) Bayesian games

(b) Auctions

(c) Signaling

(d) Voting

(e) Cheap Talk & Strategic Communication

7. Cooperative Game Theory & Social Choice

(a) Coalitions

(b) The core

8. Bargaining

(a) Rubinstein's model

(b) Nash bargaining

9. Extensions (If time allows)

(a) Rationalizability

(b) Evolutionary Game Theory

Assessment:

• There will be two midterms and an optional �nal examination, as well as 5 homework assignments.

• The homeworks will count for 15% of your grade, and each homework will be assessed coarsely outof 3%. However, exam questions will be similar to, and at the same level as homework questions, sodoing the homeworks is fairly important. For each question on the homeworks

� 1 means perfect.

� 12 means a fair e�ort was made, but not everything was correct.

� 0 if the homework was not turned in, or was very incomplete/incorrect.

� Solutions will be provided to allow you to see where you went wrong.

� Late homeworks are not accepted, and will receive a 0.

• If you choose not to take the �nal then the two midterms will count for 40% and 45% of your �nalgrade.

2

• If you choose to take the optional �nal the midterms will count for 20% and 20% of your �nal grade,with the �nal counting for the remaining 45%.

� If you turn in the �nal examination it will count for 45% of your �nal grade.

� If you do not turn in the �nal examination only the two midterms will count at 40% and 45%,respectively.

• There are no make-up exams, and there is no extra credit for this course.

Additional Information:

Lecture Locations

The course has two sections both meeting Tuesdays and Thursdays in Cathedral of Learning, G13: Section1 meets 9:30am to 10:45am , while section 2 meets 1:00pm to 2:15pm.

Contact Details

• Alistair Wilson, Dept. of Economics, University of Pittsburgh

• O�ce Location: 4907 Wesley W. Posvar Hall

• Telephone: 412-383-8152

• Email: [email protected]

O�ce Hours

My o�ce hours are: Tuesdays, 4:15pm to 5:15pm, and Thursdays, 11:15am to 12:15pm.

Text Book

• An Introduction to Game Theory, by Martin J. Osborne, Oxford University Press, 2004.

� Available from Pitt Bookstore, Amazon, etc.

• Additionally you might �nd the following useful for supplementary reading:

� Games of Strategy, 3rd Edition, by Avinash Dixit, Susan Skeath and David Reiley, W.W. Norton& Co, 2009. Hillman HB144.D59

• For more advanced texts at the graduate level, see the below texts in the library:

� A Course in Game Theory, by Martin J. Osbourne and Ariel Rubinstein, MIT Press, 1994.Hillman Library, HB144.O733 (see Martin Osbourne's site too)

� Game Theory, by Drew Fudenberg and Jean Tirole, MIT Press, 1991. Hillman Library, HB144.F83

Academic Integrity

Students in this course will be expected to comply with the University of Pittsburgh's Policy on AcademicIntegrity. Any student suspected of violating this obligation for any reason during the semester will berequired to participate in the procedural process, initiated at the instructor level, as outlined in the Uni-versity Guidelines on Academic Integrity. This may include, but is not limited to, the con�scation of theexamination of any individual suspected of violating University Policy. Furthermore, no student may bringany unauthorized materials to an exam, including dictionaries and programmable calculators.

3

Disability Information

If you have a disability that requires special testing accommodations or other classroom modi�cations, youneed to notify both the instructor and the Disability Resources and Servicesno later than the 2nd week ofthe term. You may be asked to provide documentation of your disability to determine the appropriatenessof accommodations. To notify Disability Resources and Services, call 648-7890 (Voice or TTD) to schedulean appointment. The O�ce is located in 140 William Pitt Union.

Statement on Classroom Recording

To ensure the free and open discussion of ideas, students may not record classroom lectures, discussionand/or activities without the advance written permission of the instructor, and any such recording properlyapproved in advance can be used solely for the student's own private use.

4

Economics 1200, TH 9:30am-10:45am Prof. Duffy Class Number: 17034 Spring Term 2014

Game Theory Course Content and Objectives: This course is a rigorous introduction to game theory, the study of strategic behavior among parties having opposed, mixed or similar interests. The course will sharpen your understanding of strategic behavior in encounters with other individuals--modeled as games--and as a participant in broader markets involving many individuals. You will learn how to recognize and model strategic situations, to predict when and how your actions will influence the decisions of others and to exploit strategic situations for your own benefit. Prerequisites are familiarity with algebra and calculus. Lectures: We will meet for lectures (and play games!) in the Pittsburgh Experimental Economics Laboratory, 2600 Posvar Hall, Tuesdays and Thursdays from 9:30-10:45am. There are no recitation sections for this course. My Office and Office Hours: 4932 Posvar Hall, Wednesdays 9-11am Telephone: 412-648-1733 Email: [email protected] Course Web Page: http://www.pitt.edu/~jduffy/econ1200/ Requirements: There will be two exams: a midterm and a final examination. You will also have to complete a term project, and a number of homework assignments. The weights given to these requirements in determining your final grade for the course are: Homeworks 10% Midterm Exam 30% Term Project 30% Final Exam 30% Course Policies: Late homeworks and term projects are not accepted. Make-up exams are not offered. There is no extra credit. Textbook: Games of Strategy 3rd Ed. by Avinash K. Dixit, Susan Skeath and David H. Reiley, Jr., New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 2009. This book is recommended and is available at the Book Center or on-line. It is also available as an e-book. Software: We will make use of the comlabgames software, available at http://www.comlabgames.com for classroom demonstrations of games. In addition, you can design the game you develop for your term project using this software. Grader: Martin Saavedra. Email: [email protected]. Office: 4523 Posvar Hall. Office hours: Mondays, 9-11am. Please see Martin if you have questions about homework and/or grading.

Course Outline, Exam Schedule and Reading Assignments (subject to change) 1/07-1/16: Elements of a Game, Thinking Strategically, Introduction to comlabgames software.

Dixit, Skeath and Reiley Chapters 1-2.

1/21-1/30: Sequential Move Games, Application to Bargaining

Dixit, Skeath and Reiley Chapter 3 and Chapter 18, pp. 703-720 only. 2/04-2/13: Simultaneous Move Games, Applications to Coordination Problems / Oligopoly

Dixit, Skeath and Reiley Chapters 4-5. 2/18-2/27: Probability, Expected Payoffs and Expected Utility, Application to Mixed Strategies

Dixit, Skeath and Reiley Chapters 7-8.

Midterm Exam, Tuesday, March 4, in class. Review answers on March 6. 3/11-3/13: Spring Recess: No Class 3/18-3/27: Subgame Perfection, Repeated Games, Evolution of Cooperation

Dixit, Skeath and Reiley Chapters 6 and 11.

4/01-4/10: Incomplete Information Games, Signaling Games, Strategic Moves

Dixit, Skeath and Reiley Chapters 9-10.

4/15-4/17: Strategic Behavior in Elections and Markets

Dixit, Skeath and Reiley Chapters 16 and 19.

Term Project due Tuesday, April 15.

Final Examination, Tuesday, April 22, 4:00pm-5:50pm, 2600 Posvar Hall.

Economics 1200, TH 11:00am-12:15pm Prof. Duffy Class Number: 21830 Spring Term 2014

Game Theory Course Content and Objectives: This course is a rigorous introduction to game theory, the study of strategic behavior among parties having opposed, mixed or similar interests. The course will sharpen your understanding of strategic behavior in encounters with other individuals--modeled as games--and as a participant in broader markets involving many individuals. You will learn how to recognize and model strategic situations, to predict when and how your actions will influence the decisions of others and to exploit strategic situations for your own benefit. Prerequisites are familiarity with algebra and calculus. Lectures: We will meet for lectures (and play games!) in the Pittsburgh Experimental Economics Laboratory, 2600 Posvar Hall, Tuesdays and Thursdays from 11:00am-12:15pm. There are no recitation sections for this course. My Office and Office Hours: 4932 Posvar Hall, Wednesdays 9-11am Telephone: 412-648-1733 Email: [email protected] Course Web Page: http://www.pitt.edu/~jduffy/econ1200/ Requirements: There will be two exams: a midterm and a final examination. You will also have to complete a term project, and a number of homework assignments. The weights given to these requirements in determining your final grade for the course are: Homeworks 10% Midterm Exam 30% Term Project 30% Final Exam 30% Course Policies: Late homeworks and term projects are not accepted. Make-up exams are not offered. There is no extra credit. Textbook: Games of Strategy 3rd Ed. by Avinash K. Dixit, Susan Skeath and David H. Reiley, Jr., New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 2009. This book is recommended and is available at the Book Center or on-line. It is also available as an e-book. Software: We will make use of the comlabgames software, available at http://www.comlabgames.com for classroom demonstrations of games. In addition, you can design the game you develop for your term project using this software. Grader: Martin Saavedra. Email: [email protected]. Office: 4523 Posvar Hall. Office hours: Mondays, 9-11am. Please see Martin if you have questions about homework and/or grading.

Course Outline, Exam Schedule and Reading Assignments (subject to change) 1/07-1/16: Elements of a Game, Thinking Strategically, Introduction to comlabgames software.

Dixit, Skeath and Reiley Chapters 1-2.

1/21-1/30: Sequential Move Games, Application to Bargaining

Dixit, Skeath and Reiley Chapter 3 and Chapter 18, pp. 703-720 only. 2/04-2/13: Simultaneous Move Games, Applications to Coordination Problems / Oligopoly

Dixit, Skeath and Reiley Chapters 4-5. 2/18-2/27: Probability, Expected Payoffs and Expected Utility, Application to Mixed Strategies

Dixit, Skeath and Reiley Chapters 7-8.

Midterm Exam, Tuesday, March 4, in class. Review answers on March 6. 3/11-3/13: Spring Recess: No Class 3/18-3/27: Subgame Perfection, Repeated Games, Evolution of Cooperation

Dixit, Skeath and Reiley Chapters 6 and 11.

4/01-4/10: Incomplete Information Games, Signaling Games, Strategic Moves

Dixit, Skeath and Reiley Chapters 9-10.

4/15-4/17: Strategic Behavior in Elections and Markets

Dixit, Skeath and Reiley Chapters 16 and 19.

Term Project due Tuesday, April 15.

Final Examination, Saturday, April 26, 10:00am-11:50am, 2600 Posvar Hall.

ECON 1200: Game Theory

Evan Piermont

Summer 2014

Overview

Instructor Evan Piermont

Office 4521 W.W. Posvar Hall

Email [email protected]

Website http://www.pitt.edu/~ehp5/#econ1200

Class Meeting Time Tuesdays and Thursdays

6:00PM - 9:15PM

Lecture Location 4716 W.W. Posvar Hall

Office Hours Tuesdays 2:00PM - 4:00PM

Course Goals: This course is an introduction to game theory, the study of strategic behavior among

parties having opposed, mixed or similar interests. This course will sharpen your understanding of strategic

behavior in encounters with other individuals. You will learn how to recognize and model strategic situations,

to predict when and how your actions will influence the decisions of others and to exploit strategic situations

for your own benefit. The course aims to provide a basic understanding of the language and concepts of

game theory, as well as providing some surveys of important theoretical models within the field.

Textbook: We will be following the textbook “An Introduction to Game Theory” by Martin J. Osborne,

Oxford University Press, 2004. It is available on Amazon and elsewhere.

Requirements

Assement: The final grade will be based on the following:

Homework 30%

Midterm Exam 30%

Final Exam 40%

Homework: There will be 5 homework assignments. They will be posted on Thursday and will be due the

following Tuesday at the beginning of class. Each assignment will be coarsely graded out of 6. Solutions will

be provided, so that you can see where you went wrong. Late homework assignments will not be accepted.

Exams: There will be two exams: a midterm and a final. The tentative dates are July 10th for the Midterm

and July 31st for the Final. Both will be in class at the normal time and location. The midterm will be

1 12 hours (half a class) and the final will be 3 hours (a full class). The exams will be in similar style to the

homework questions.

1

Course Outline

The tentative schedule of lectures is as follows:

Tuesday, June 24 Introduction, Math Review, Utility Representations of Preference, Definition

of a Game, Game Theoretic Notation

Thursday, June 26 Best Response, Domination, Nash Equilibrium

Tuesday, July 1 HW1 Due Beliefs, Mixed Strategies, Expected Payoff

Thursday, July 3 Extensive Form Games, Information Sets and Normal Form Equivalence

Tuesday, July 8 HW2 Due Backwards Induction, Subgame Perfection, Applications

Thursday, July 10 Midterm Exam

Tuesday, July 15 HW3 Due Repeated Games, Infinitely Repeated Games, Folk Theorems

Thursday, July 17 Games of Incomplete Information: Motivations and Theory

Tuesday, July 22 HW4 Due Games of Incomplete Information: Signaling and Strategic Com-

munication

Thursday, July 24 Social Choice, Cooperative Game Theory, Voting

Tuesday, July 29 HW5 Due Behavioral Considerations and Extensions, Review for Final

Thursday, July 31 Final Exam

Course Policy

Academic Integrity: Students in this course will be expected to comply with the University of Pittsburghs

Policy on Academic Integrity. Any student suspected of violating this obligation for any reason during the

semester will be required to participate in the procedural process, initiated at the instructor level, as outlined

in the University Guidelines on Academic Integrity. This may include, but is not limited to, the confiscation

of the examination of any individual suspected of violating University Policy.

Disability Information: If you have a disability that requires special testing accommodations or other

classroom modifications, you need to notify both the instructor and the Disability Resources and Services

no later than the 2nd week of the term. You may be asked to provide documentation of your disability to

determine the appropriateness of accommodations. To notify Disability Resources and Services, call 648-7890

(Voice or TTD) to schedule an appointment. The Office is located in 140 William Pitt Union.

2

ECON 1200: Game Theory

Alistair J. Wilson

Spring 2015

Course Goals

This course is an introduction to game theory, the study of strategic behavior among parties having opposed,mixed or similar interests. This course will sharpen your understanding of strategic behavior in encounterswith other individuals. You will learn how to recognize and model strategic situations, to predict whenand how your actions will in�uence the decisions of others and to exploit strategic situations for your ownbene�t. The course aims to provide students with a basic understanding of the language and concepts ofgame theory, as well as providing some surveys of important theoretical models within the �eld.

Course Outline

1. Overview Class

2. Decision Theory and Math review:

(a) Utility representations of preferences

(b) Math review of functions and notation.

(c) Probability and Expectations

(d) von Neumann-Morgenstern representation

(e) Choice, and revealed preference

(f) Examples

(g) Sequences (reviewed as needed for new material)

(h) Calculus and Optimization (reviewed as needed for new material)

3. Game Theory, basics and canonical models

(a) Dominance

(b) Equilibrium: Pure strategies

(c) Equilibrium: Mixed Strategies

(d) Basic games: Prisoner's Dilemma, Matching Pennies, Battle of the Sexes, Stag Hunt, Dove-Hawk

(e) Continuous Games: Cournot & Bertrand; Public Goods

4. Extensive-Form Games

(a) Game trees

(b) Sub-game perfection

(c) Forgetful driver game

1

(d) Stackelberg & other illustrations

(e) Re�nements (maybe)

5. Repeated Games

(a) Finitely repeated games

(b) In�nitely repeated Games

(c) Folk theorems

6. Incomplete Information

(a) Bayesian games

(b) Auctions

(c) Signaling

(d) Voting

(e) Cheap Talk & Strategic Communication

7. Cooperative Game Theory & Social Choice

(a) Coalitions

(b) The core

8. Bargaining

(a) Rubinstein's model

(b) Nash bargaining

9. Extensions (If time allows)

(a) Rationalizability

(b) Evolutionary Game Theory

Assessment:

• There will be two midterms and an optional �nal examination, as well as 5 homework assignments.

• The homeworks will count for 15% of your grade, and each homework will be assessed coarsely outof 3%. However, exam questions will be similar to, and at the same level as homework questions, sodoing the homeworks is fairly important. For each question on the homeworks

� 1 means perfect.

� 12 means a fair e�ort was made, but not everything was correct.

� 0 if the homework was not turned in, or was very incomplete/incorrect.

� Solutions will be provided to allow you to see where you went wrong.

� Late homeworks are not accepted, and will receive a 0.

• If you choose not to take the �nal then the two midterms will count for 40% and 45% of your �nalgrade.

2

• If you choose to take the optional �nal the midterms will count for 20% and 20% of your �nal grade,with the �nal counting for the remaining 45%.

� If you turn in the �nal examination it will count for 45% of your �nal grade.

� If you do not turn in the �nal examination only the two midterms will count at 40% and 45%,respectively.

• There are no make-up exams, and there is no extra credit for this course.

Additional Information:

Lecture Locations

The course has two sections both meeting Tuesdays and Thursdays in Posvar, 1640: Section 1 meets 1pmto 2:15am , while section 2 meets 2:30pm to 3:45pm.

Contact Details

• Alistair Wilson, Dept. of Economics, University of Pittsburgh

• O�ce Location: 4907 Wesley W. Posvar Hall

• Telephone: 412-383-8152

• Email: [email protected]

O�ce Hours

My o�ce hours are: Tuesdays, 10:45am to 11:45am, and Thursdays, 09:00am to 10:00am.

Text Book

• An Introduction to Game Theory, by Martin J. Osborne, Oxford University Press, 2004.

� Available from Pitt Bookstore, Amazon, etc.

• Additionally you might �nd the following useful for supplementary reading:

� Games of Strategy, 3rd Edition, by Avinash Dixit, Susan Skeath and David Reiley, W.W. Norton& Co, 2009. Hillman HB144.D59

• For more advanced texts at the graduate level, see the below texts in the library:

� A Course in Game Theory, by Martin J. Osbourne and Ariel Rubinstein, MIT Press, 1994.Hillman Library, HB144.O733 (see Martin Osbourne's site too)

� Game Theory, by Drew Fudenberg and Jean Tirole, MIT Press, 1991. Hillman Library, HB144.F83

Academic Integrity

Students in this course will be expected to comply with the University of Pittsburgh's Policy on AcademicIntegrity. Any student suspected of violating this obligation for any reason during the semester will berequired to participate in the procedural process, initiated at the instructor level, as outlined in the Uni-versity Guidelines on Academic Integrity. This may include, but is not limited to, the con�scation of theexamination of any individual suspected of violating University Policy. Furthermore, no student may bringany unauthorized materials to an exam, including dictionaries and programmable calculators.

3

Disability Information

If you have a disability that requires special testing accommodations or other classroom modi�cations, youneed to notify both the instructor and the Disability Resources and Servicesno later than the 2nd week ofthe term. You may be asked to provide documentation of your disability to determine the appropriatenessof accommodations. To notify Disability Resources and Services, call 648-7890 (Voice or TTD) to schedulean appointment. The O�ce is located in 140 William Pitt Union.

Statement on Classroom Recording

To ensure the free and open discussion of ideas, students may not record classroom lectures, discussionand/or activities without the advance written permission of the instructor, and any such recording properlyapproved in advance can be used solely for the student's own private use.

4

ECON 1200: Game Theory

Alistair J. Wilson

Fall 2015

Course Goals

This course is an introduction to game theory, the study of strategic behavior among parties having opposed,mixed or similar interests. This course will sharpen your understanding of strategic behavior in encounterswith other individuals. You will learn how to recognize and model strategic situations, to predict whenand how your actions will in�uence the decisions of others and to exploit strategic situations for your ownbene�t. The course aims to provide students with a basic understanding of the language and concepts ofgame theory, as well as providing some surveys of important theoretical models within the �eld.

Course Outline

1. Overview Class

2. Decision Theory and Math review:

(a) Utility representations of preferences

(b) Math review of functions and notation.

(c) Probability and Expectations

(d) von Neumann-Morgenstern representation

(e) Choice, and revealed preference

(f) Examples

(g) Sequences (reviewed as needed for new material)

(h) Calculus and Optimization (reviewed as needed for new material)

3. Game Theory, basics and canonical models

(a) Dominance

(b) Equilibrium: Pure strategies

(c) Equilibrium: Mixed Strategies

(d) Basic games: Prisoner's Dilemma, Matching Pennies, Battle of the Sexes, Stag Hunt, Dove-Hawk

(e) Continuous Games: Cournot & Bertrand; Public Goods

4. Extensive-Form Games

(a) Game trees

(b) Sub-game perfection

(c) Forgetful driver game

1

(d) Stackelberg & other illustrations

(e) Re�nements (maybe)

5. Repeated Games

(a) Finitely repeated games

(b) Rubinstein Bargaining

(c) In�nitely repeated Games

(d) Folk theorems

6. Incomplete Information

(a) Bayesian games

(b) Auctions

(c) Signaling

(d) Voting

(e) Cheap Talk & Strategic Communication

7. Extensions (If time allows)

(a) Rationalizability

(b) Evolutionary Game Theory

Assessment:

• There will be two midterms and an optional �nal examination, as well as 5 homework assignments.

• The homeworks will count for 15% of your grade, and each homework will be assessed coarsely outof 3%. However, exam questions will be similar to, and at the same level as homework questions, sodoing the homeworks is fairly important. For each question on the homeworks

� 1 means perfect.

� 12 means a fair e�ort was made, but not everything was correct.

� 0 if the homework was not turned in, or was very incomplete/incorrect.

� Solutions will be provided to allow you to see where you went wrong.

� Late homeworks are not accepted, and will receive a 0.

• Participation in class will count for 5% of your grade.

• If you choose not to take the �nal then the two midterms will count for 40% and 40% of your �nalgrade.

• If you choose to take the optional �nal the midterms will count for 20% and 20% of your �nal grade,with the �nal counting for the remaining 40%.

� If you turn in the �nal examination it will count for 40% of your �nal grade.

� If you do not turn in the �nal examination only the two midterms will count at 40% and 40%,respectively.

• There are no make-up exams, and there is no extra credit for this course.

2

Additional Information:

Lecture Locations

The course meets Tuesdays and Thursdays in Posvar, 4940: 2:30pm to 3:45pm.

Contact Details

• Alistair Wilson, Dept. of Economics, University of Pittsburgh

• O�ce Location: 4907 Wesley W. Posvar Hall

• Telephone: 412-383-8152

• Email: [email protected]

O�ce Hours

TBA.

Text Book

• An Introduction to Game Theory, by Martin J. Osborne, Oxford University Press, 2004.

� Available from Pitt Bookstore, Amazon, etc.

• Additionally you might �nd the following useful for supplementary reading:

� Games of Strategy, 3rd Edition, by Avinash Dixit, Susan Skeath and David Reiley, W.W. Norton& Co, 2009. Hillman HB144.D59

• For more advanced texts at the graduate level, see the below texts in the library:

� A Course in Game Theory, by Martin J. Osbourne and Ariel Rubinstein, MIT Press, 1994.Hillman Library, HB144.O733 (see Martin Osbourne's site too)

� Game Theory, by Drew Fudenberg and Jean Tirole, MIT Press, 1991. Hillman Library, HB144.F83

Academic Integrity

Students in this course will be expected to comply with the University of Pittsburgh's Policy on AcademicIntegrity. Any student suspected of violating this obligation for any reason during the semester will berequired to participate in the procedural process, initiated at the instructor level, as outlined in the Uni-versity Guidelines on Academic Integrity. This may include, but is not limited to, the con�scation of theexamination of any individual suspected of violating University Policy. Furthermore, no student may bringany unauthorized materials to an exam, including dictionaries and programmable calculators.

Disability Information

If you have a disability that requires special testing accommodations or other classroom modi�cations, youneed to notify both the instructor and the Disability Resources and Servicesno later than the 2nd week ofthe term. You may be asked to provide documentation of your disability to determine the appropriatenessof accommodations. To notify Disability Resources and Services, call 648-7890 (Voice or TTD) to schedulean appointment. The O�ce is located in 140 William Pitt Union.

3

Statement on Classroom Recording

To ensure the free and open discussion of ideas, students may not record classroom lectures, discussionand/or activities without the advance written permission of the instructor, and any such recording properlyapproved in advance can be used solely for the student's own private use.

4

ECON 1200: Game Theory

Roee Teper

Spring 2016

Course's webpage: http://www.pitt.edu/∼rteper/Teaching/Econ1200/Econ1200.htm

Course Goals

This course is an introduction to game theory, the study of strategic behavior among parties having opposed,mixed or similar interests. This course will sharpen your understanding of strategic behavior in encounterswith other individuals. You will learn how to recognize and model strategic situations, to predict when andhow your actions will in�uence the decisions of others and to exploit strategic situations for your own bene�t.The course aims to provide students with a basic understanding of the language and concepts of game theory,as well as providing some surveys of important theoretical models within the �eld. Game theory, like anyformal theory, relies on Mathematics to make progress and exact statements. When necessary we will reviewthe needed mathematical tools for each topic.

Course Outline

1. Overview Class

2. Decision Theory

(a) Utility representations of preferences

(b) Probability and expectations

(c) von Neumann and Morgenstern expected utility representation

(d) �Paradoxes"

3. Game Theory, basics and canonical models

(a) Dominance

(b) Equilibrium: Pure strategies

(c) Equilibrium: Mixed Strategies

(d) Basic games: Prisoner's Dilemma, Matching Pennies, Battle of the Sexes, Stag Hunt, Dove-Hawk

(e) Continuous Games: Cournot & Bertrand; Public Goods

4. Extensive-Form Games

(a) Game trees and information

(b) Sub-game perfection

(c) Forgetful driver game

1

(d) Stackelberg & other illustrations

(e) Re�nements (maybe)

5. Repeated Games

(a) Finitely repeated games

(b) Rubinstein bargaining

(c) In�nitely repeated games

(d) Folk theorems

6. Incomplete Information

(a) Bayesian games

(b) Auctions

(c) Signaling

(d) Voting

(e) Cheap talk & strategic communication

7. Extensions (If time allows)

(a) Rationalizability

(b) Evolutionary Game Theory

Assessment

• The �nal grade will be based on your performance in homework assignments and exams.

• Participation in class is not mandatory but highly recommended.

• There will be 5 homework assignments, which will count for 20% of your grade. Each homework willbe assessed coarsely. However, exam questions will be similar to, and at the same level as homeworkquestions, so doing the homeworks is fairly important. For each question on the homeworks

� 4 means perfect.

� 2 means a fair e�ort was made, but not everything was correct.

� 0 if the homework was not turned in, or was very incomplete/incorrect. Late homeworks are notaccepted, and will receive a 0.

Solutions will be provided to allow you to see where you went wrong.

• There will be 3 comulative exams. You may take as many exams as you choose to. Only the two examswith the highest scores will count (40% each) for the �nal grade.

• The exams will take place roughly once every 5 weeks. The exact dates will be announced in duecourse.

• There are no make-up exams, and there is no extra credit for this course.

2

General Information

Lecture Locations

The course meets Tuesdays and Thursdays in 358 Cathedral of Learning. Section 1 meets 9:30 to 10:45, andsection 2 meets 11:00-12:15.

Instructors and O�ce Hours

• Instructor: Roee Teper, Dept. of Economics, University of Pittsburgh

• O�ce Location: 4530 Wesley W. Posvar Hall

• Email: [email protected]

• O�ce hours: TBA

• Teaching Assistant: Felipe Araujo, Dept. of Economics, University of Pittsburgh.

� Felipe will hold recitations and additional o�ce hours (on top of mine) before each of the exams.

Text Book

An Introduction to Game Theory, by Martin J. Osborne, Oxford University Press, 2004.

• Available from Pitt Bookstore, Amazon, etc.

Academic Integrity

Students in this course will be expected to comply with the University of Pittsburgh's Policy on AcademicIntegrity. Any student suspected of violating this obligation for any reason during the semester will berequired to participate in the procedural process, initiated at the instructor level, as outlined in the Uni-versity Guidelines on Academic Integrity. This may include, but is not limited to, the con�scation of theexamination of any individual suspected of violating University Policy. Furthermore, no student may bringany unauthorized materials to an exam, including dictionaries and programmable calculators.

Disability Information

If you have a disability that requires special testing accommodations or other classroom modi�cations, youneed to notify both the instructor and the Disability Resources and Servicesno later than the 2nd week ofthe term. You may be asked to provide documentation of your disability to determine the appropriatenessof accommodations. To notify Disability Resources and Services, call 648-7890 (Voice or TTD) to schedulean appointment. The O�ce is located in 140 William Pitt Union.

Statement on Classroom Recording

To ensure the free and open discussion of ideas, students may not record classroom lectures, discussionand/or activities without the advance written permission of the instructor, and any such recording properlyapproved in advance can be used solely for the student's own private use.

3