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G20 Leaders’ Summit 2015

Assessment of the Physical Threat Environment

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G20 Summit 2015: Assessment of the Physical Threat Environment© 2015 Cyveillance

Executive Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Political Violence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

Social Unrest: Protests and Demonstrations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

Terrorism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

Kidnappings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

Natural Disasters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .20

Table of Contents

This report is based on open source findings. Therefore, the report is open source intelligence and does not constitute definitive evidence. Information found in the open source cannot necessarily be verified and is presented as intelligence and as additional information to enhance or expand current investigations.

G20 Summit 2015: Assessment of the Physical Threat Environment | © 2015 Cyveillance 3

The Group of Twenty (G20) – consisting of 19 countries and the European Union – hosts a series of annual meetings known as the G20 Leaders’ Summit to discuss international economic cooperation . Finance ministers, central bank governors, and other officials typically attend the Summit . The event is supported by the United Nations, the World Bank, the World Trade Organization, and other groups .

This year’s Summit will be held in the coastal city of Antalya, Turkey from November 15-16 . It is scheduled during a time when Turkey is experiencing increased political instability and an overarching threat of political violence and terrorism .

After analyzing the physical threat landscape, Cyveillance analysts have identified that political violence and social unrest will pose the biggest threats to the Summit and the Antalya region, with both having a medium to high likelihood of occurring . If the November 1 Parliamentary election results in the pro-Kurdish political party – the Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP) – losing the Parliamentary seats it gained in the June 7 election, Turkey’s security environment could be destabilized . These chances increase if the HDP finds itself excluded from political influence or has any suspicions of election fraud .

Though no protests have been announced against the Summit, there is still a medium to high chance that some form of physical protest will occur . Protests typically occur at Summits, as they provide an arena for activists to bring attention to national and global grievances that are not addressed at the meetings . Even if protests do not occur in Antalya, they could happen in other parts of the country, including business districts in Istanbul and Ankara . This could also impact multinational companies .

In addition, we have identified three threats that pose a lower risk to the Summit: terrorism, kidnapping, and natural disasters . While these may not be immediate risks to the G20 Leaders’ Summit, if they occur in other parts of the country, the repercussions will be felt at the event .

Executive Summary

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Currently, Turkey’s political conflict stems from the outcome of the June 7 Parliamentary election, where the

pro-Kurdish political party, the HDP, gained 13.1 percent of the vote from the ruling party at the time, the Jus-

tice and Development Party (AKP). This gave the Kurdish minority an unprecedented voice and majority in

Parliament for the first time.1 In response, Turkey’s president, and member of the AKP, Recep Tayyip Erdogan

attempted to form a coalition government with the opposition party, the Republic People’s Party (CHP), but

failed. As a result, President Erdogan called for a new Parliamentary election to be held on November 1.2

Depending on the outcome of the November election, Cyveillance believes there is a medium to high risk

of political violence affecting Turkey, including the province and city of Antalya from the HDP and Kurdis-

tan Workers’ Party (PKK). The HDP could perpetuate political violence if they fail to achieve 10 percent of

the votes required to gain seats in the Turkish Parliament, or if they become suspicious of election fraud.

Additionally, the PKK, a terrorist organization that supports the HDP, could lash out. On the other hand, if

the HDP increases its Parliamentary representation, there could be violent nationalist backlash targeting

the Kurdish community.

Political Violence

01SECTION

1. http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/turkey/177926?download=true 2. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/aug/21/turkey-to-form-interim-government-before-snap-election-on-november-1

5Toronto Pan American Games 2015: Assessment of the Physical Threat Environment | © 2015 Cyveillance

International organizations have voiced concern over political violence and shortcomings in the pre-election period. A delegation from the

Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) visited Turkey on October 5, 2015, and raised concern over political violence, in-

cluding attacks on 400 HDP offices and workplaces, along with some premises belonging to the AKP. PACE also showed concern over the

arrests and detention of HDP members and a sharp increase in prosecutions against critical voices against Turkey’s president.3

Significant Political Violence Incidents in 2015• On October 14, 40 lawyers from the Contemporary Lawyers’ Association Antalya Branch protested against the Ankara terrorist attacks

outside the courthouse in the city of Antalya. Riot police sprayed the lawyers with tear gas and some were taken to the hospital. Five

HDP members were also detained during the protest.4

• On September 8, Turkish nationalists staged rallies across Turkey. Protestors burnt down and ransacked approximately 130 HDP

offices, as well as set fire to office equipment in the HDP headquarters in Antalya.5, 6

Recommendations• Review Cyveillance daily threat intelligence reports and predictive intelligence reports that provide advanced knowledge of

demonstrations announced online.

• Monitor security developments in the post-election period, including preliminary reports by election observation missions from the

Council of Europe and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).

• Anticipate a significant security presence in the city of Antalya if violent protests erupt in the post-election environment.

• Be cautious of potential political gatherings in the post-election period, particularly around government buildings and political

party offices.

5

3 http://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/News/News-View-EN.asp?newsid=5820&cat=31 4 http://www.anatoliaturknews.com/ENG/Detail/Riot-Police-Harshly-Intervenes-Lawyers-Protest-Against-Ankara-Blast/10097#.ViUr9mSrSiA 5 http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-34193733 6 http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/thousands-across-turkey-protests-against-pkk-666574588

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Cyveillance believes there is a medium to high likelihood of some form of physical protests targeting the

G20 Leaders’ Summit as the event provides an opportunity for social movements to capitalize on global

news coverage and to bring attention to a variety of national and global grievances. While there have

been no references to protests or dissemination of protest material on social media or elsewhere on the

web yet, anti-capitalist groups and human rights advocates have frequently protested the Summit.

Since protests are known to occur at Summits, previous host-countries have shut down the towns where the

Summit was being held. For example, France sealed off Cannes from protestors during the 2011 G20 Summit.7

Following the October 10, 2015 Ankara terrorist attacks, Turkish authorities announced that security measures

will be taken in preparation for the Summit, but there is no indication that they have banned G20 protests in

Antalay or nearby towns.8 If activists are banned, they could move to other cities including the business dis-

tricts of Istanbul (Levent and Maslak) or the diplomatic district of Ankara (Gaziosmanpaşa, Çankaya).

Additionally, the outcome of the November election could spark violent protests against President Erdogan

and the AKP. If the HDP is unable to maintain its position in the Turkish Parliament, the Kurdish community will

likely give up on the political process and show its frustration through violent protests and demonstrations.

Social Unrest: Protests and Demonstrations

02SECTION

7 http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/nov/01/anti-g20-protests-confined-nice 8 http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3268842/Fears-G20-summit-Turkey-attack-leaves-128-dead-Huge-security-operation-planned-ahead-meeting-concerns-targeted.

html

Figure 3Source: Public Safety Canada –

Governement Operations Centre (GOC)

7Toronto Pan American Games 2015: Assessment of the Physical Threat Environment | © 2015 Cyveillance

Significant Social Unrest Incidents • On September 4, 2015, Turkish police arrested 17 members of the Socialist Democracy Party (SDP), which were protesting against the G20

meeting outside the Turkish Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges building in Ankara.9 SDP has not mentioned any upcoming

protests in Antalya.

• On November 15, 2014, approximately 2,000 people staged a protest march through Brisbane, Australia as the G20 Leaders’ Summit

took place in the South Bank district of Brisbane. Approximately 13 separate protests were scheduled on the first day of the G20 Summit.

Activists protested against a variety of issues, including mistreatment of refugees and indigenous rights, and called for the exclusion of

Russian President Vladimir Putin. A dozen people were arrested.10

• On September 5, 2013, a dozen human rights activists staged a protest on Nevsky Prospect, St. Petersburg’s major avenue, as world

leaders arrived for the G20 Leaders’ Summit. The activists attempted to draw attention to human rights violations in Russia.11

• On June 17, 2012, several thousand protesters marched through Mexico City to protest the G20 Leaders’ Summit held in Los Cabos,

Mexico. Additional protests occurred in La Paz against the economic and environmental policies of the G20. Activists were not allowed

into Los Cabos due to security regulations for the conference.

• On June 26, 2010, a small group of anarchists broke away from a protest march in downtown Toronto against the G20 Toronto Summit.

Clashes between protesters and police erupted. Police used tear gas to disperse the crowds and arrested approximately 1,000 over two days.

Recommendations• Provided there are no planned protests in Antalya, expect significant disruption and delays due to heightened security measures,

including checkpoints, spot-checks, road closures, and diversions.

• Corporations with offices in the Levent and Maslak Districts of Istanbul should maintain situational awareness in case any protests arise.

• Corporate offices in Istanbul and Ankara should identify nearby businesses and government buildings that could attract G20 protesters,

including embassies, consulates, and financial organizations.

9 http://www.zie.nl/profile/Ruptly/overige/Turkey-17-SDP-members-arrested-at-protest-against-G20-summit/389z7lofdxwz10 http://www.abc.net.au/news/2014-11-15/hundreds-gather-in-brisbane-for-g20-protests/589371811 http://www.aparchive.com/metadata/Any/2696fd3c5ceb03e0d361bf5f24147064

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Depending on the post-election environment, the security situation in Turkey could quickly deteriorate in

the coming weeks and months. Cyveillance assesses that there is a low to medium risk of a terrorist attack

against the G20 Leaders’ Summit itself; though there is medium to high risk of a terrorist attack in other

parts of Turkey. This is due to the global media attention such an attack could bring to a terrorist cause. We

have identified three terrorist groups that have the motivation and capabilities to carry out terrorist attacks

in Turkey: the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), the Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party–Front (DHKP/C),

and the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL).

Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK)The security situation in Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia could deteriorate in the weeks leading up to

the G20 Summit due to renewed fighting between PKK militants and the Turkish army. The PKK will most

likely abstain from targeting the G20 Summit in order to prevent the backlash such an attack would inflict

on the group’s ideological goals and organizational capabilities. In fact, on October 10, the PKK declared a

unilateral ceasefire, or a state of inactivity, leading up to the November Parliamentary election. The group

will suspend all offensive actions unless their people and guerilla forces are attacked.14

Terrorism

03SECTION

14 http://www.france24.com/en/20151010-turkey-pkk-halts-militant-activity-ceasefire-turkey-elections-erdogan

9G20 Summit 2015: Assessment of the Physical Threat Environment | © 2015 Cyveillance

We believe the PKK’s ceasefire was a tactical move in an effort to increase popular support for the HDP in the upcoming election. Suspending

new terrorist attacks maximizes the PKK’s chances of winning over passive supporters and opponents, avoiding international condemnations, and

legitimizing a Turkish government crackdown on HDP politicians, ultimately weakening the HDP’s election campaign.

However, the ceasefire is fragile, and the HDP failing to keep its representation in Parliament could serve as a catalyst for a new PKK terrorism

campaign after the election. Frustrated Kurdish people may feel that terrorism is the only viable option if they believe they are again being de-

nied access to power. Terrorism often starts where there is an underlying grievance and a lack of opportunity for political participation or where

the opportunity for political participation has been deprived, and may be seen as a way to pressure decision makers to concede to the Kurdish

minority’s demands.15 The end result would be a deteriorating security situation prior to the G20 Leaders’ Summit.16

The PKK could also renew its terrorist campaign if they perceive that the Turkish government is passive in responding to possible ISIL terrorist attacks

against the Kurdish community. Two recent alleged ISIL attacks in Turkey have resulted in the PKK criticizing the Turkish government for allowing these

attacks to occur, and accused Turkish security forces of passiveness and collaborating with ISIL.

On July 20, an ISIL supporter launched an attack against a pro-Kurdish rally in the predominately Kurdish city of Suruc, close to the border of Syria. ISIL

never claimed responsibility for the attack, but media outlets reported that the suicide bomber had links to the terrorist organization.17 As a result, the

PKK ended its two-year ceasefire with the Turkish government (which was then resumed on October 2015 in preparation for the November election).18

On October 10, two suicide bombers attacked a pro-Kurdish rally in downtown Ankara. The rally called for a halt to the armed conflict between the

Turkish government and the PKK ahead of the November 1 election. The attack killed 102 people and injured several hundred. Media outlets reported

that DNA identified the attacker as an ISIL supporter and the brother of the suicide bomber that attacked the pro-Kurdish rally in Suruc.19 The pro-Kurd-

ish community accused the government of failing to protect the peace rally.20 Despite the PKK announcing a ceasefire leading up to the November 1

election, if ISIL continues to target the Kurdish community, the PKK’s constituency will likely retaliate.

15 Victoroff, J, (2005), The Mind of the Terrorist: A Review and Critique of Psychological Approaches, The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol.49, No.116 Crenshaw, M. “The Causes of Terrorism.” Comparative Politics, Vol. 13, No.4, 1981, Bjorgo, T, (2004), Root Causes of Terrorism: Myths, Reality and Ways Forward, Routledge17 http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/oct/14/turkish-police-brother-isis-suspect-ankara-bomber 18 http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-33667427 19 http://www.cnn.com/2015/10/19/world/turkey-suicide-bomber-identified/ 20 http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/15/world/europe/turkey-fires-security-officials-after-attack-in-ankara.html


Cyveillance reviewed close to 1,500 terrorist attacks perpetrated by the PKK over three de-cades. The PKK often selectively targets Turkish military, police, and government, and limits attacks to Turkey, Iraq, and Syria. Civilians and businesses have been targeted as well, but frequently these incidents involve kidnapping and can be defined as criminal acts for finan-cial purposes rather than terroristic aims. Cyveillance assesses that the PKK, like many other nationalist separatist groups, wants to be perceived as attacking legitimate targets and as a credible government alternative. Any chance of ever achieving international recognition for a Kurdish autonomous region or a seat at the negotiation table would be significantly reduced if the PKK launched an attack against the Summit. As such, an attack on an international confer-ence such as the G20 Summit would be an unprecedented shift in the PKK’s target selection.

The Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party–Front (DHKP/C) The ideological goal of the Marxist-Leninist group, DHKP/C, is to overthrow the Turkish government and replace the political, social, and economic system with a communist model of governance.21 DHKP/C also opposes both the United States and the North At-lantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Both organizations are perceived as “imperialists that control Turkey and influence Turkey’s foreign policy.”22

Cyveillance assesses that the DHKP/C lacks the capabilities to launch a sophisticated and successful attack against the G20 Summit. Discriminate terrorist attacks against the Turk-ish police, military, government premises, as well as U.S. diplomatic targets in Istanbul and Ankara, are more in line with the group’s capabilities, intentions, and target preferences.

The DHKP/C has no history of large-scale attacks and has not used advanced tactics and weapons, such as coordinated suicide attacks and vehicle-borne, improvised explosive devices.23 A review of recent DHKP/C attacks indicates that members lack training and

bomb making experience.

PKK Targets 1984-2015

21 http://www.nctc.gov/site/groups/turkey.html 22 Teymur, S. (2007). A Conceptual map for understanding the terrorist recruitment process: Observation and analysis of DHKP/C, PKK, and

Turkish Hezbollah terrorist organizations, 23 Worldwide Incidents Tracking System (WITS) Database and National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism

(START)–GTD

Military - 434Private Citizens - 266Business - 222Police - 207Government (General) - 95Transportation - 84Educational Institutions - 60Utilities - 32Religious Targets - 29Government (Diplomatic) - 20Unknown - 14Journalist, Media - 10Airports and Aircrafts - 9Violent Political Party - 7Tourists - 6Telecommunications - 5Food or Water Supply - 2Maritime - 2NGO - 2

Military

Private Citizens

Business

Government (General)

Transportation

The Worldwide Incidents Tracking System (WITS) and The Global Terrorism Database (GTD)


Attempted DHKP/C Incidents in 2015

• On August 10, two women used rifles to attack the U.S. Consulate in Istanbul. The

attack failed and one woman was wounded and detained.24

• On January 6, a female suicide bomber attacked a police station in Istanbul and

killed one police officer. The DHKP/C claimed responsibility but later withdrew this

claim, as the DHKP/C realized it was not one of their members.25

• On January 1, a member of DHKP/C threw two grenades against the police honor

guard outside the Dolmabahce Palace in Istanbul. However, both grenades failed

to explode.26

The capability of the group to plan and execute an attack against the G20 is further ham-

pered by possible recruitment difficulties. Witness testimony revealed that DHKP/C fails to re-

cruit new members, which has reduced the number of mid-level cadres tasked with planning

attacks. The DHKP/C has also reduced the number of low-level cadres carrying out attacks,

from three-member teams to two-member teams.27

Furthermore, the low number and sporadic attacks perpetrated by the DHKP/C are indicative

of a terrorist group that lacks significant capabilities to sustain an ongoing terrorist campaign.

The group has a history of perpetrating approximately two to three attacks per year, and has

launched about 30 attacks since 1994, although none took place between 2004 and 2008.

In general, a terrorist group’s target(s) reflect its intentions and motivations.28 Analysis of

the 30 terrorist attacks conducted by the DHKP/C between 1994-present indicates that

the leaders’ of the group favor attacks that are selective and discriminate, which is

24 http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-33844246 25 http://www.wsj.com/articles/jonathan-schanzer-and-merve-tahiroglu-a-resurgent-terrorist-threat-in-turkey-%20142307812726 http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/dhkp-c-claims-istanbul-palace-attack-%20bid.aspx?pageID=238&nID=76412&NewsCatID=509 27 http://www.dailysabah.com/nation/2014/04/30/indictment-sheds-light-on-terrorist-organization-dhkpc 28 Drake, C, J, M, The Role of Ideology in Terrorists’ Target Selection, Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 10, No.2, 1998

DHKP/C Target Type 1994-2015

Source: Worldwide Incidents Tracking System (WITS) Database and the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and

Responses to Terrorism (START)–GTD.

Police - 46%Government (General) - 27%Private Citizens - 9%Military - 6%Government (Diplomatic) - 3%Airports - 3%Tourist - 3%Unknown - 3%

Police

Government (General)

Private Citizens


common for terrorist groups with secular ideologies and non-reli-

gious goals. Additionally, the group’s primary targets of attack are

typically Turkish police, military, government officials, and govern-

ment buildings. The group has not carried out any attacks against

any other foreign governments or targets. A geospatial analysis of

the limited number of attacks indicates that most DHKP/C terrorist

attacks have occurred in Istanbul followed by Ankara.

Source: Worldwide Incidents Tracking System (WITS) Database and National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START)–GTD.

29 http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-10-10/turkey-terror-blasts-reflect-tensions-from-syria-s-war-next-door 30 http://www.dailysabah.com/politics/2015/09/11/isis-targets-turkey-in-magazine-says-it-serves-crusader-alliance

The Islamic State and the Levant (ISIL)Cyveillance has not identified any mention in the open source of specific

threats made by ISIL against the G20 Summit. ISIL has the capabilities to

operate inside Turkey and conduct large-scale attacks, as demonstrated

in previous attacks; however, a review of recent target selections by ISIL

inside Turkey, and the unwillingness of ISIL to claim responsibility for these

attacks, indicates that the group may be more interested in targeting the

Kurdish community. Terrorist attacks against the Turkish government are

also likely if Turkey steps up its support for U.S. strikes against ISIL targets

inside Syria, or launches additional unilateral strikes against ISIL.

Significant ISIL Incidents in Turkey in 2015:

• On October 10, two suicide bombers associated with ISIL attacked

a pro-Kurdish rally in Ankara. The attacks killed 102 people and

injured more than 200 people. The attacks coincided with the PKK’s

announcement of a ceasefire leading up to the November 1 election

and the PKK’s preparation of a Kurdish military offensive against

Raqqa, the ISIL self-declared capital in Syria.29 ISIL has not claimed

responsibility for the attacks.

• In September, ISIL issued its 11th edition of the online magazine

“Dabiq,” which accused the Turkish army of apostasy for serving in

the defense force of the “Crusader NATO alliance.” At the beginning

of September, a pro-ISIS social media account released a death

warrant for President Erdogan due to Turkey’s cooperation with the

United States.30


• On July 20, a suicide bomber attacked a pro-Kurdish rally in

Suruc, near the Syrian border. The attack killed 34 people. An

ISIL supporter was blamed for the attack, but ISIL never claimed

responsibility.31

• On June 5, an ISIL supporter detonated two bombs at a HDP

rally in Turkey’s southeastern province of Diyarbakir. The

attack killed two and injured 100, and occurred two days

before Turkey’s June 7 general election. ISIL never claimed

responsibility for the attack.32

ISIL will likely continue to attempt to exploit the conflict between

Turkey and the PKK by intentionally escalating tensions between the

PKK and the AKP. In doing so, it could weaken the PKK as a threat

to ISIL in Syria and destabilize Turkey. In hindsight, both the attacks

in Suruc and Ankara were successful from that perspective, as the

July attack in Suruc resulted in the PKK ending a two-year ceasefire

with the Turkish Army, and the October attack in Ankara increased

tensions between the pro-Kurdish community and the Turkish gov-

ernment. The tensions likely increased because ISIL did not claim

any responsibility for the attacks, which increased suspiciousness

and inflammatory accusations between the Turkish government and

the Kurdish community. Future attacks by ISIL supporters against the

Kurdish community, including political rallies and political party offices,

cannot be ruled out.

Recommendations• Monitor the outcome of the November 1 election and any

signs of escalating tensions between the PKK and the Turkish

government.

• Avoid traveling to Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia due to

a credible risk of terrorism and worsening security situation in

those areas.

• Exercise increased vigilance if traveling outside Antalya,

particularly around potential insurgent and terrorist targets,

including political party offices, government buildings, public

transportation networks, police stations, security forces, and

diplomatic missions.

• Maintain awareness around curfews Turkish authorities may put

in place, as well as the possibility of them declaring a state of

emergency should there be a credible risk of terrorist attacks.

Carry identification papers in the event that authorities introduce

security checkpoints.

• Anticipate localized disruptions due to heightened security,

road closures, and security checkpoints in the event of a

terrorist attack.

31 http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/ankara-bombing-dna-tests-reveal-suicide-bombers-link-to-isis-a6694556.html32 http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jun/05/two-explosions-kurdish-peoples-democratic-party-rally-turkey

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Cyveillance assesses that there is a low risk of kidnappings in the city of Antalya. However, any visitors

attending the G20 Leaders’ Summit and planning to travel throughout Turkey before or after the Summit

should avoid Southeastern Anatolia and parts of Eastern Anatolia. ISIL has a presence along the northern

Syrian border and is capable of conducting kidnappings from across the border into Turkey. ISIL has both

the intention and a history of abducting Westerners and using them for propaganda purposes and kid-

nap-for-ransom schemes.

Additionally, Kurdish militants operate in the Southeastern and Eastern Anatolia Regions and have kid-

naped Turkish officials, soldiers, and civilians in the past. The PKK kidnappings are particularly prevalent in

the Tunceli Province in Eastern Anatolia and along the northern Syrian border. The PKK often engages in

kidnappings as a means to finance terrorist operations. However, there is no current trend of foreigners or

Westerners being targeted by terrorist groups or criminal organizations in Turkey for opportunistic short-

term express kidnapping and kidnap-for-ransom.

Kidnappings

04SECTION

33 http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/ISIS%20Sanctuary%2015%20SEPT%202015-01_4.png 34 Hansen-Lewis, J, Shapiro, J, N, Understanding the Daesh Economy, Perspectives on Terrorism, Vol.9, No.4, 201535 Süleyman Özeren et al, Whom Do They Recruit? Profiling and Recruitment in the PKK/KCK, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Vol.37, No.4, 201436 Roth, Mitchel, Murat Severe, The Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) as Criminal Syndicate: Funding Terrorism through Organized Crime, A Case Study, Studies in Conflict and

Terrorism, Vol. 30. No. 10, 2007, Makarenko Tamara, The Crime-Terror Continuum: Tracing the Interplay between Transnational Organized Crime and Terrorism, Global Crime, Vol.6, No.1 2004


• On October 3, PKK militants kidnapped two Turkish soldiers after

intercepting a passenger bus on a highway between the Tunceli

and Erzincan provinces.37

• On September 28, PKK militants set up a roadblock in the

eastern Tunceli province that resulted in the abduction of a

Turkish soldier. 38

• On August 29, PKK militants kidnapped Süleyman Canpolat, the

district head of the AKP’s Mazgirt branch in the eastern province

of Tunceli. PKK militants blocked a road near the Mazgirt district

and conducted ID checks when they determined that Canpolat

was in the area. 39

• On October 19, 2014, a Syrian rebel commander was shot and

wounded in a failed kidnapping attempt in the Turkish city of

Urfa in Southeastern Anatolia. ISIL militants were allegedly

behind the kidnapping, which failed when a smuggler working

with ISIL failed to show up. ISIL planned to smuggle the rebel

commander back into Syria through an ISIL crossing point in the

town of Ackakale. 40

• On September 8, 2014, PKK militants allegedly abducted 10

children in the eastern province of Mus. Approximately 30 PKK

militants asked locals to show their support for PKK and then left

with 10 children between the ages of 12 and 15. 41

Recent Kidnapping Incidents

37 http://www.presstv.ir/Detail/2015/10/03/431866/Turkey-PKK-Kurdish-militants-Tunceli-province-Erzincan-province-kidnapping 38 http://www.dailysabah.com/nation/2015/09/18/pkk-terrorists-kidnap-sergeant-in-eastern-turkey 39 http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/akp-district-head-kidnapped-by-pkk-members-in-turkeys-east-.aspx?PageID=238&NID=87706&NewsCatID=509 40 http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/syria/11173013/Islamic-State-foiled-in-attempt-to-kidnap-Syrian-rebel-leader-in-Turkey.html 41 http://www.todayszaman.com/anasayfa_media-pkk-reportedly-kidnaps-10-children-in-eastern-turkey_358072.html

Very high risk of kidnapping Advise against all travel

High risk of kidnapping Advise against all but essential travel

Monitor developments and trends before traveling


Recommendations

• Although the likelihood of kidnappings in the Antalya region is low, visitors

should be aware that Turkey has a high rate of kidnappings overall.

• Review your crisis management plan, specifically, how to react to a

kidnapping for ransom case. Understand the role your staff will play

should a kidnapping occur, particularly when responding to media

inquiries and addressing concerns by employees.

• If your corporation plans on operating in, or sending staff to, high-risk

areas, consider engaging a response company that specializes in

kidnappings and has the capability to react immediately.

• Remain vigilant and keep a low profile. Be aware of casual acquaintances

and strangers that may have ulterior motives, including apparent

emergencies, traffic incidents, and roadblocks.

• Protect information and prevent threat actors from finding out anything

that could make you a target. Be cautious of conversations in public and

disclosing any documents that could reveal your schedule, appointments,

and absences.42

42 https://www.europol.europa.eu/content/prevention-and-coping-strategies-kidnapping-hostage-taking-extortion

17


Visitors to the G20 Leaders’ Summit should be aware that unexpected natural disasters could occur in the

Antalya Province and could disrupt travel routes, cause power outages, and interrupt telecommunications

networks before and during the Summit.

A review of 151 major natural disaster incidents recorded in the Emergency Events Database (EM-DAT) and

maintained by the Center for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED) indicates that over the past

100 years, earthquakes, flooding, and landslides have been the most common major natural disasters in Tur-

key.43 The Inter-Agency Standing Committee Task Team for Preparedness and Resilience and the European

Commission rate natural disasters as the number one risk to Turkey followed by the risk of armed conflicts.44

Earthquakes have by far caused the highest number of mortality and economic losses in Turkey. The most

earthquake-prone regions of Turkey are considered to be Marmara, the northwestern region of Turkey, the

Black Sea Region in the north, and the Eastern Anatolia region bordering Iran.45 The World Health Organi-

zation’s (WHO) Regional Office in Europe estimates that there is a high risk of earthquakes in the Antalya

Province and earthquakes can range from 5.0 to 5.9 on the Richter Scale.46 The WHO’s Regional Office in

Europe identifies East Anatolia, South Anatolia, and the Black Sea regions of Turkey as high-risk areas for

flooding. The risk of flooding in the city of Antalya ranges from low to high.47

43 http://www.emdat.be/country_profile/index.html 44 http://www.inform-index.org/Results/Country-profiles?iso3=TUR45 See, Meltem, Oral Aynil et al, (2015), Earthquake experience and preparedness in Turkey, Disaster Prevention and Management, Vol. 24, Issue. 146 http://data.euro.who.int/e-atlas/europe/images/map/turkey/tur-seismic.pdf 47 http://data.euro.who.int/e-atlas/europe/countries/turkey/turkey-flood-map.html

Natural Disasters

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Recent Earthquake and Flooding Incidents in the Antalya Province• On October 7, an earthquake with the magnitude of 5.2 struck the Demre District of the southern Antalya Province. There were no reports of

damages to life or property.48

• On February 16, a 4.7 magnitude earthquake struck the resort city of Antalya. The epicenter was located in the town of Korkuteli, near

Antalya. There were no reports of damages to life or property. 49

• On January 13, severe storms and flooding blocked traffic between the city center of Antalya and Kemer. Power was also interrupted for

several hours in Antalya where winds reached 95 miles per hour.50

• On December 9, 2014, Turkey’s southern province of Antalya experienced severe flooding. Central Antalya was hit hardest.51 A large number

of shops and houses in the area were flooded and floodwaters inundated the main streets. Heavy rain also caused power outages in the

city. Hundreds of cars were reportedly stranded.52

• On October 26, 2014, the Turkish State Meteorological Service reported that the city of Antalya had received 93.4mm of rain within 24 hours.53

Businesses and roads in the city center were inundated.54

48 http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/52-earthquake-shakes-turkeys-antalya.aspx?pageID=238&nID=89519&NewsCatID=341 49 http://national.bgnnews.com/earthquake-shakes-mediterranean-coastal-province-of-antalya-haberi/3560 50 http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/floods-hit-turkeys-southwestern-coast-killing-one.aspx?pageID=238&nID=76946&NewsCatID=341 51 http://national.bgnnews.com/heavy-rain-paralyzes-life-in-southern-antalya-haberi/2091 52 http://www.dailysabah.com/nation/2014/12/09/izmir-and-antalya-grapple-with-flash-floods 53 http://floodlist.com/europe/athens-antalya-inundated-floods-strike-southern-europe 54 http://en.cihan.com.tr/en/flash-flood-hit-turkeys-southern-tourist-resort-of-manavgat-1558285.htm?language=en


Recommendations • Monitor the Turkish State Meteorological Service website for up-to-date

weather information and weather watches and warnings.

• Plan ahead and know your surroundings and structures. Familiarize yourself

with any emergency and evacuation plans and the location of shelters in

the area.

• Plan how to communicate with family members, employer, and key contacts

in the aftermath of an earthquake or severe flooding.

• Expect cell phone networks to overload in the event of an anomaly such as

an earthquake. Telecommunications networks sometimes cannot handle

a sharp and unexpected increase in call volume as people are trying to

contact family members and friends in impacted areas.

• Anticipate traffic disruption as people attempt to drive home from work

during work hours or to schools. The traffic situation can become more

congested if there are cracks and debris on roads.

• In the event of a medical emergency, U.S. citizens can call the U.S.

Embassy in Ankara at +90-312-455-5555 or the U.S. Consulate General

in Istanbul at +90-212-335-9000. The countrywide number for ambulance

service is 112 and the fire department can be contacted at 110.

20


Overall, Cyveillance assesses that the main threats to the G20 Leaders’ Summit will come from political violence

and social unrest, which hinge on the outcome of the November 1 Parliamentary election. If the pro-Kurdish HDP

loses its seats in the Turkish Parliament that it initially gained in the June 7 election, it could increase frustration

among the Kurdish community and result in violent protests against the AKP and President Erdogan. The probability

of violent protests increases if there are speculations of election fraud or attempts to deliberately exclude the HDP

from having representation in the Turkish government. On the other hand, a wave of violent nationalist protests tar-

geting the Kurdish community could also erupt nationwide should the HDP gain more seats than it did in the June

election.

The PKK could also engage in political violence or violent protests against the Turkish government if the HDP does

not regain the seats it won in the June 2015 election, as the PKK supports the HDP. A loss of HDP Parliament seats

would likely result in a complete loss of faith in the political process and Kurdish demands ever being resolved

politically, ultimately leading to a less secure Turkey in the coming weeks.

Additionally, while no specific protests have been identified, G20 Leaders’ Summits have previously been attractive

targets for activists who wish to bring global attention to their causes.

Visitors traveling to and from the G20 Summit should also be aware of threats to Turkey as a whole, which may not

specifically target the Summit, but could impact the event if something were to occur. This includes terrorism, kid-

napping, and natural hazards. The PKK will likely avoid targeting the G20 Summit (aside from political motivations)

as it is such a high profile event that could be counterproductive to their cause. The DHKP/C may have the inten-

tions to attack the G20 Summit or its vicinity, but lack the capabilities. ISIL may also have intentions to attack the

Summit, but the terrorist organization’s recent focus appears to be attacking the Kurdish community to escalate ten-

sions between the PKK and the Turkish government, with the aim of weakening the PKK and destabilizing Turkey.

Lastly, there is always a chance of a natural disaster, especially flooding and earthquakes in the Antalya region

where the Summit is being held. Natural disasters are difficult to predict in advance, but can cause significant travel

disruption, power outages, and telecommunication disruptions.

Summary

06SECTION

While your network may be secure, do you have visibility beyond the perimeter? Security is no longer about what you can see. What you can’t see is where the true threats hide.

Cyveillance offers an easy-to-use platform that enables security professionals the ability to see beyond the perimeter. Our solutions identify cyber and physical threats and risks across the globe, allowing you to mitigate and eliminate them before they disrupt your business.

We go beyond data to provide the threat intelligence that you need to achieve your organization’s business goals. Contact us today to learn more and get a free trial.

Using security intelligence technology can save companies up to $2.6 million when compared to companies not using security intelligence technologies. “2014 Global Report on the Cost of Cyber Crime.” Ponemon Institute; HP. 3 Dec. 2014. http://www8.hp.com/us/en/software-solutions/ponemon-cyber-security-reportA study by Verizon has shown that the targets of 85 percent attacks are small businesses with less than 1,000 employees. Verizon, “2012 Data Breach Investigations Report,” http://www.verizonenterprise.com/resources/reports/ rp_data-breach-investigations-report-2012-ebk_en_xg.pdf

Cyber Threat Center

www.cyveillance.com/cyberthreatcenter

11091 Sunset Hills Road, Suite 210 Reston, Virginia 20190 888.243.0097 | 703.351.1000www.cyveillance.com [email protected]

Copyright © 2015 Cyveillance, Inc. All rights reserved. Cyveillance is a registered trademark of Cyveillance, Inc. All other names are

trademarks or registered trademarks of their respective owners

Cyveillance is the leading provider of cyber threat intelligence, enabling organizations to protect their information, infrastructure, and employees from physical and online threats found outside the network perimeter. Founded in 1997, Cyveillance delivers an intelligence-led approach to security through continuous, comprehensive monitoring of millions of online data sources, along with sophisticated technical and human analysis. The Cyveillance Cyber Threat Center, a cloud-based platform, combines web search, social media monitoring, underground channel information, and global intelligence with investigative tools and databases of threat actors, domain names and IP data, phishing activity, and malware. Cyveillance serves the Global 2000 and the majority of the Fortune 50 – as well as global leaders in finance, technology, and energy – along with data partners and resellers. For more information, visit www.cyveillance.com.

Cyveillance is a wholly-owned subsidiary of QinetiQ, a FTSE250 company which uses its domain knowledge to provide technical support and know-how to customers in the global aerospace, defense and security markets. For more information, visit www.qinetiq.com.

Documents

G20 Leaders’ Summit 2015 · Activists protested against a variety of issues, including mistreatment of refugees and indigenous rights, and called for the exclusion of Russian President