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Managerial Reactions to Employee Dissent: The Impact of Grievance Activity on PerformanceRatingsAuthor(s): Brian S. Klaas and Angelo S. DeNisiSource: The Academy of Management Journal, Vol. 32, No. 4 (Dec., 1989), pp. 705-717Published by: Academy of ManagementStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/256565 .Accessed: 17/11/2014 09:19

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? Academy of Management Journal 1989, Vol. 32, No. 4, 705-717.

MANAGERIAL REACTIONS TO EMPLOYEE DISSENT: THE IMPACT OF GRIEVANCE

ACTIVITY ON PERFORMANCE RATINGS BRIAN S. KLAAS

University of South Carolina ANGELO S. DeNISI Rutgers University

This study explored whether managerial reactions to grievance activity introduced bias into the process of performance appraisal. Using panel data techniques and data on unionized employees in a public sector organization, we examined the relative impacts of grievances filed against supervisors and against organizational policy. The pattern of results obtained suggests that the relationship between grievance activity and performance ratings is due at least in part to bias triggered by employees' filing and winning grievances against supervisors.

To understand the role of grievance systems in protecting employee rights and providing an effective voice mechanism (Freeman & Medoff, 1984), it is necessary to examine how managers react to the filing and processing of grievances. If managers react negatively to grievance activity, they might discriminate against grievants when making decisions about disci- plinary issues, work assignments, and promotions and when evaluating performance. Negative managerial reactions to grievance activity may significantly affect the costs to employees associated with using a grievance system and, in turn, the perceived effectiveness of the voice mechanism it provides. Although managerial reactions to grievance activity may influence a variety of personnel decisions, this study focused on how the filing and processing of grievances affected employee performance evaluations.

PREVIOUS RESEARCH

Existing research on the appraisal process has suggested various ways in which the filing and processing of a grievance may result in a distorted evaluation of a grievant's performance. Given the importance of the categorization process in performance appraisal (DeNisi, Cafferty, & Meglino, 1984; Feldman, 1981), it is possible that grievance activity may cause an employee to be labeled a troublemaker, a categorization that will then be used as a framework for interpreting all other behavior the grievant exhibits. More- over, research has suggested that a supervisor's affect toward a ratee will have an effect on the processing of information about the ratee at the prere-

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706 Academy of Management Journal December

cognition stage (Alexander & Wilkens, 1982; Cardy & Dobbins, 1986; More- land & Zajonic, 1977; Wilson & Zajonic, 1980). If the filing and processing of a grievance influences a supervisor's affect toward an employee, that change in affect might result in unconscious bias, and thus, lower ratings for the grievant.

Managers may also intentionally distort the ratings they assign to a grievant. Longenecker, Gioia, and Sims (1987) found that under certain conditions managers were willing to intentionally deflate the ratings assigned to particular employees. According to those authors, if a manager sees an employee's behavior as personally threatening or offensive, the manager might attempt to modify the employee's behavior by intentionally deflating the rating given to the employee. Managers use the performance evaluation process as a means by which to enhance their personal control over employees. We expected, then, that if employees file grievances against their supervisors, those supervisors might intentionally deflate the employees' ratings in order to maintain control over the latter and discourage any such future behavior. And if the employees win their grievance proceedings at a level higher than the supervisory level, the supervisors might have additional incentives to deflate the employees' ratings intentionally. Doing so might show the employees that although they have won a battle, they certainly will not win the war.

Although different theoretical perspectives have suggested a possible link between grievance activity and performance appraisals, research examining this link has been somewhat limited. Lewin and Peterson (1987) found that grievants received lower performance evaluations in the year following the filing of a grievance than did nongrievants. They also found that those who won their grievance received lower evaluations than those who lost. In the only other study in this area, Klaas, Heneman, and Olson (1988) found that grievants received lower evaluations in the year that a grievance was filed than they did in other years that they were employed, although no relationship between appraisals and grievance outcomes emerged.

Existing studies suggest, then, that there may be a relationship between grievance activity and performance evaluations. But because of the explor- atory nature of those studies, it is difficult to rule out alternative explana- tions for the findings obtained. Actual behavioral differences related to grievance activity may account for the relationships observed. As Ichniow- ski (1986) pointed out, employees may engage in grievance activity in response to feelings of inequity and may also search for other ways to respond to the perceived inequity that resulted in the filing of a grievance. Since much research has found a relationship between grievance activity and productivity or absenteeism (Ichniowski and Lewin [1987] reviews that research), this possibility seems particularly likely. As lowering performance is one way of responding to perceived inequity, the relationship between grievance activity and performance evaluation may simply be the result of actual changes in employee behavior that occur in association with grievance activity.


1989 Klaas and DeNisi 707

PURPOSE OF THE PRESENT STUDY

The present study was designed to examine the impact of grievance activity on performance appraisals in a way that would allow us to determine whether managerial reactions to grievance accounted for any relationship observed. One way to accomplish that end was to recognize that some grievances are more likely than others to elicit a negative reaction from management. Whereas existing studies have not distinguished between grievances likely to elicit hostile reactions and grievances not likely to do so, this study explored the relative effects of different types of grievance activity.

Specifically, we expected that grievances filed against immediate supervisors would be more likely to trigger a negative reaction from those supervisors than would grievances over some aspect of organizational policy. Presumably, supervisors are more likely to be offended or threatened by grievances aimed directly at their own actions and decisions. Similarly, we expected that when employees win their grievances, supervisors are more likely to react negatively if the grievances concerned a supervisory decision than if they concerned broader organizational policy. Therefore, if we observed a relationship between grievance activity against a supervisor and performance appraisals but not between grievance activity against organizational policy and appraisals, we might more confidently conclude that managerial reactions to grievance activity were affecting performance appraisals.

The present study was also designed to reduce the degree to which unmeasured differences in actual performance could bias parameter estimates for variables measuring grievance activity. To the extent that actual changes in performance-related behavior are controlled for, it becomes difficult to argue that actual changes in employee behavior are the cause of a relationship between grievance activity and appraisal scores. To that end, this study expanded on previous efforts by including performance-related control variables when estimating the impact of grievance activity on appraisal scores.

In sum, then, in order to gain insight into the impact of managerial reactions to grievance activity on performance evaluations, this study examined the following hypotheses:

Hypothesis 1: With performance-related behavior held constant, as the number of grievances an employee files against a supervisor increases, the subsequent evaluation of that employee's performance will decline.

Hypothesis 2: The number of grievances filed by an employee concerning organizational policy will have no impact on the subsequent evaluation of the employee.

Hypothesis 3: With performance-related behavior held constant, as the number of positive outcomes from grievances an employee has filed against a supervisor in-



creases, the subsequent evaluation of that employee's performance will decline. Hypothesis 4: The number of positive outcomes from grievances filed by an employee concerning organizational policy will have no impact on the subsequent evaluation of the employee.

RESEARCH DESIGN Data

In order to test these hypotheses, data were collected from a public sector organization for 1978 through 1985. The work performed in this organization was generally nonroutine and required employees to exercise some degree of both skill and discretion. In any given year, there were approximately 460 unionized employees in the organization. Since we were focusing on the effect of change in independent variables on change in the dependent variable, we were only interested in employees who had been employed for more than one year and whose grievance and performance behavior was not constant across the years they had been employed. As a practical matter, we were interested in only those who had been employed for at least two years and who had filed at least one grievance during the eight years from which the data were drawn. During the 1978-85 period, 217 employees met both criteria.

However, 44 of those employees had filed a grievance and then- because of transfers or because their supervisor quit-had been evaluated by a supervisor other than the one present at the time of the filing. Deleting those employees from the group studied resulted in a working data base of 173. Since we have one observation for each year that each grievant was employed from 1978 to 1985, the total number of observations is 1,001. The number of person-periods included for each employee depends solely on the number of years the employee had worked between 1978 and 1985. Thus, even though the 173 employees studied varied substantially on the total number of grievances filed, that variation had no impact on the number of person-periods included for a particular employee.

Measures

Dependent variable. The dependent variable of interest was the annual performance rating each employee received at the beginning of each year. The organization rated employees on ten performance dimensions, with each rating made on a 5-point scale that it had developed.' Since the orga-

1 The ten dimensions were as follows: attendance, equipment operation, human relations skills, initiative and performance of duties, knowledge of responsibilities, appearance, practical judgment, problem-solving capacity, report writing, and response to supervision. The average correlation among the dimensions in a random sample of 200 evaluations was .34, suggesting the evaluations contained relatively little halo error.



nization weighted each dimension equally in producing a total score, it summed ratings for the individual dimensions, which resulted in a range of possible ratings from a low of 10 to a high of 50. The organization used this total score in making various personnel decisions. The performance ratings heavily influenced movement through six labor grades and decisions on promotions to supervisory positions. Additionally, when evaluation scores were relevant, the organization used them to support decisions to terminate individuals' employment.

Independent variables. We counted the number of grievances each employee had filed against his or her supervisor and against an organizational policy during each year studied. We determined whether a grievance was aimed at the decision of a supervisor or at organizational policy on the basis of summaries provided in the grievance log as to the nature of the violation and the remedy requested. For example, a typical grievance against a supervisor might refer to the manner in which the latter assigned overtime among subordinates or to the supervisor's refusal to schedule a day off for an employee. Alternatively, a typical grievance against organizational policy might refer to the organization's policy on the use of compensatory time or to its policy on shift differentials. We then counted the number of rulings of either type made at the second stage of the grievance process or later that were in favor of an employee. We determined if an employee had received a positive outcome on the basis of the responses the official responsible for the decision had provided in the grievance log. If an official indicated that a grievance was granted at the last stage to which it was appealed, we coded the grievant as having received a positive outcome on the date the decision was rendered.

In addition to data on grievance activity, we collected data on variables that were likely to be related to both grievance activity and temporary changes in performance. Inclusion of such variables as controls better en- abled us to assess managerial reaction to grievances independent of actual changes in employee behavior. The three variables considered were absenteeism, measured as the number of hours an employee had been absent from work in a given year; tenure, the number of years an employee had worked for the organization; and production hours, the number of hours in the year an employee had spent on primary production activities divided by the total number of hours worked. The production-hours ratio reflects time spent on primary production activities as opposed to, for example, travel time, down- time for equipment repair, report writing, and other ancillary activities. Al- though the need to perform such activities is to some extent beyond the control of employees, they have substantial discretion over how efficiently they complete them. We included absenteeism and the production-hours ratio as control variables because they reflected actual behavioral change that might occur in association with grievance activity. Absenteeism and the production-hours ratio do not completely capture all aspects of performance, but they are reasonable proxies for employee behavioral response in association with grievance activity. Tenure was included because experi-



ence may be correlated to skill acquisition and, in turn, to performance (Becker, 1975) as well as to supervisory perceptions of performance. And given that tenure may also affect both an employee's propensity to file a grievance and the type of grievance filed, its inclusion was appropriate. Estimation

Because grievance activity varies over time, we used panel data techniques-specifically, fixed-effect regression analysis-to explore whether change over time in individuals' grievance activity was related to change in their performance ratings. Because we examined the effect of change in the independent variable on change in the dependent variable, omitted variables that were stable over time could not influence the estimates obtained (Cham- berlain, 1982). For example, it may be that grievants have deeper feelings of hostility toward management than do other employees and that this hostility influences both grievance activity and performance. The present approach, then, should allow for estimates of the effects of grievance activity on performance, unbiased by omitted variables such as a stable level of hostility.

The following equation illustrates the structure of the fixed-effect approach. If, for example, we were interested in simply examining the effect of grievances filed against a supervisor on performance ratings, we would estimate this model:

Yit - Yi= f[a + B1(Xlit - Xli) + (eit - ei)] and i = 1 ... N; t = 1 ... T,

where Yit is the performance rating that the ith employee received in period t and Yi is the mean value of Y for the ith individual averaged across the T periods. Xlit indicates the number of grievances filed against a supervisor during period t by the ith employee, and X1, is the average number of grievances against supervisors that the ith individual filed across the T periods. We also differenced the residual (eit - ij.

This fixed-effect approach was used to estimate a model that included the predictor variables we have described. With T equal to one year, we calculated individual means by averaging each variable for each employee across the number of years of employment between 1978 and 1985. Addi- tionally, we estimated a second model that included the predictor variables and the four grievance activity variables lagged by one year.

RESULTS Table 1 shows means and standard deviations for each variable for

1978-85 and intercorrelations among the deviated variables. The latter suggest that the productivity proxies are, as expected, related to performance evaluations. Absenteeism is significantly correlated to all forms of grievance activity and tenure is significantly correlated to organizational policy grievances. Also, there is a significant correlation between grievances against a supervisor and grievances concerning organizational policy. The distribu- tion of grievance activity across the person-periods studied was as follows:



TABLE 1 Means, Standard Deviations, and Intercorrelationsa

Variables Means s.d. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

1. Performance evaluation 33.33 7.59 2. Grievances against

supervisor 0.12 0.41 -.10 3. Grievances about

organizational policy 0.12 0.41 - .07 .52 4. Positive outcomes,

grievances against supervisors 0.07 0.32 -.07 .10 .04

5. Positive outcomes, policy grievances 0.07 0.27 -.03 .20 .06 .54

6. Hours absent 73.27 57.88 - .08 .10 .09 .14 .07 7. Production hours 0.62 0.25 .10 -.04 -.03 -.03 - .02 .04 8. Tenure 11.50 5.96 .07 .04 .12 .01 .05 .12 .04

a r = .064 is significant at p < .01. All variables are values averaged across 1,001 person- periods.

one or more grievances against a supervisor were filed in 92 of the person- periods; one or more organizational policy grievances were filed in 95 of the person-periods; one or more grievances against a supervisor were granted in 54 of the person-periods; and one or more grievances against organizational policy were granted in 63 of the person-periods.

Table 2 presents the results of the two fixed-effect models estimated, one synchronous and one lagged. In the synchronous model, the coefficient for grievances filed against supervisors and the coefficient for the positive outcomes from such grievances are statistically significant and negative, indicating that, as hypothesized, (1) as the number of grievances an employee filed against a supervisor increased within a period, the evaluation assigned to that employee declined and (2) as the number of positive outcomes from such grievances increased within a period, the evaluation assigned to that employee declined. Conversely, no relationship emerged between grievances over organizational policy and performance evaluations. Neither the coefficient for grievances filed against organizational policy nor the coefficient for positive outcomes from such grievances is significant.2 The coefficients for the control variables, absenteeism, production hours, and tenure, are all significant and in the direction expected.

The results for the lagged model are virtually identical to those for the synchronous model: coefficients that are significant in the synchronous model are also significant in the lagged model. The coefficient for the num-

2 Given the possibility that employees may respond to low performance evaluations by filing grievances against their supervisors, we examined the impact of appraisal scores, lagged by one year, on subsequent grievance activity. No relationship emerged. Thus, it is doubtful the results obtained are due to reverse causation.



TABLE 2 Fixed-Effect Coefficient Estimatesa

Synchronous Lagged Variables Model Model

Constant -0.501 - 0.496 (0.165) (0.165)

Grievances against supervisors - 1.090* - 1.166* (0.531) (0.532)

Grievances about organizational policy 0.565 0.508 (0.656) (0.663)

Positive outcomes, grievances against supervisors - 0.848* 0.953* (0.510) (0.522)

Positive outcomes, policy grievances - 0.732 0.934 (0.823) (0.842)

Hours absent -0.012** -0.012** (0.005) (0.005)

Production hours 9.060** 8.823** (3.033) (3.038)

Tenure 0.223** 0.241** (0.085) (0.086)

Grievances against supervisors, T - 1 - 1.036* (0.561)

Grievances about policy, T - 1 0.577 (0.724)

Positive outcomes, grievances against supervisors, T - 1 -0.780t (0.566)

Positive outcomes, policy grievances, T - 1 0.683 (0.915)

F 5.028** 3.705** R2 .03 .04 N 1,001 1,001

a Standard errors are in parentheses. tp < .10 * p < .05

** p < .01

ber of grievances filed against supervisors, lagged by one year, is both negative and significant. The coefficient for the number of positive outcomes from supervisory grievances is negative but significant only at .10. Neither the coefficient for grievances against organizational policy lagged by one year nor the lagged coefficient for the number of positive outcomes from policy grievances is significant. This pattern of results suggests that the effects of grievance activity against supervisors may extend beyond the year in which a grievance is filed.

The results of these analyses clearly support our hypotheses. In order, however, to reduce the plausibility of any alternative explanation for these findings more effectively, we performed additional analyses. These analyses used data on employees who filed grievances and then, within the same



period, were evaluated by different supervisors.3 (Recall that these individuals were deleted from the original group studied.) Presumably, a supervisor who was not the one present at the time of grievance activity would be less likely to be biased by that activity when evaluating employee performance. We again estimated both the synchronous and the lagged model, using this smaller group (N = 252). In these models, production hours and tenure were significant and in the direction expected, but none of the grievance activity variables were significant.

Finally, as Table 2 indicates, although the value of F for both models is significant, the amount of explained variance in each case is relatively small. However, as Abelson (1985) pointed out, under certain conditions the per- cent variance explained may not be an appropriate index by which to judge the explanatory value of a model. With the fixed-effect models estimated here, we attempted to explain deviations from individuals' mean ratings, thus controlling for stable differences across ratees. Although much of the variation in performance level across individuals is likely to be due to stable differences between individuals, much of the variation in an individual's rating over time is likely to be random. Moreover, by looking at changes over time, we are likely to see less variance in the dependent variable than we would if we looked at differences between individuals. Both of these factors restrict the magnitude of the R2.

DISCUSSION

The results of this study suggest that supervisors' reactions to employees involved in grievance activity may influence performance ratings. Spe- cifically, supervisors seem to react negatively to employees who file grievances when those grievances are filed against the supervisors, and they do so especially when those grievances are decided in favor of the employee. On the other hand, filing grievances concerning organizational policies appeared to have little impact on employees' evaluations, regardless of the outcome of the grievances. Further, among employees who were rated by a supervisor who was not the one present at the time of the grievance activity in question, there was no relationship between the grievance activity and ratings. Our use of the fixed-effect approach combined with the inclusion of relevant control variables reduced the potential for omitted variable bias and thus further supports the suggestion that managerial reactions to grievance activity, not actual changes in behavior, account for the results reported.

Although earlier studies (e.g., Lewin & Peterson, 1987; Klaas et al., 1988)

3 Some of the individuals included in this group, however, also filed grievances during a different time period and were then evaluated by the supervisor present at the time of these other grievances. We deleted these person-periods from the second group studied.



have also found negative relationships between grievance activity and performance ratings, those studies could not rule out behavioral change as an explanation for the relationships. Several aspects of the present results, however, speak against this alternative explanation.

First, filing a grievance against a supervisor was the only type of grievance activity that significantly affected appraisals. It would be difficult to argue that those grievants felt a strong sense of inequity but that those who filed grievances against organizational policies did not. Second, as noted above, employees who were rated by a supervisor other than the one who was involved in the grievance did not receive lower evaluations following grievance activity, even though the productivity proxies clearly influenced their ratings. If the relationship between grievance activity and performance evaluation were simply due to behavioral change, subsequent performance appraisals would presumably reflect that change, regardless of who com- pleted an evaluation. The fact that we observed a relationship only when the raters were the supervisors against whom grievances had been filed suggests that grievance activity may cause supervisors to distort their evaluation of grievants. Finally, if reduced effort represents an expression of inequity, we would expect that if an employee won a grievance, the person's sense of equity would be restored and he or she would again increase efforts. How- ever, as noted earlier, our results suggested that winning a grievance against a supervisor was also related to lower ratings. Moreover, the results also suggest that employees who win their grievances will still receive lower evaluations in the year following the year in which the grievance occurred; even if employees lower performance in response to inequity felt at the time of filing a grievance, it seems unlikely that they would continue to do so more than a year after receiving a positive outcome from that grievance.

On a practical level, the overall pattern of results suggests that the value of the voice provided by grievance systems may be limited, given that filing and winning grievances may impose costs upon employees. These costs may discourage employees from using the voice mechanism that their grievance system provides. Thus, they might turn to other channels to express their discontent-channels that include quitting, absenteeism, and sabotage. A potential implication is that a grievance system might cease to serve as a mechanism through which workers and managers can freely communicate. Moreover, negative managerial reactions to grievance activity might even exacerbate a conflict that originally led to the filing of a grievance.

In order to understand more fully the practical significance of our findings, it is necessary to explore the potential magnitude of the costs associated with grievance activity. To this end, we examined employees who had filed a grievance against a supervisor but who had not engaged in any other grievance activity for four years prior to filing that grievance. We plotted the ratings these employees received during the four years prior to the grievance activity (T - 1 to T - 4) and during the year (T) in which the grievance activity occurred (Figure 1). Figure 1 also shows the ratings received by a comparison group of employees who filed no grievances during this period.



FIGURE 1 Performance Ratings Across Time: Nongrievants Versus Employees Filing

Grievances Against Supervisors Performance

Ratings

44-

42-

40-

38-

36-

34 -.

32 -*

30

28-

26-

T-4 T-3 T-2 T-1 T

Nongrievants (N = 707)

? - - -- - - Grievances against supervisors (N 30)

. Grievances against supervisors with positive outcomes (N = 10)

As can be seen, despite some fluctuations, a substantial drop occurred in the average rating received in the year during which a grievance was filed. The average drop for all persons filing grievances against their supervisors was 5.1 (on a scale of 50 points), and the average drop for grievants who won their grievances was 5.5 points. Nongrievants' ratings remained essentially constant over the period. The average reduction, given that the average overall rating during the period was 33, represents a drop of just under one standard deviation. It is important to note, though, that there was some fluctuation over time in the ratings received by grievants; that fluctuation is perhaps to be expected given the number of observations.

The present findings also have implications for theory-building in the area of performance appraisal. Researchers have paid considerable attention to how ratee characteristics affect ratee decisions (cf. Landy & Farr, 1980) but relatively little to the role of employee dissent. As noted in our introduction, although two studies have found a relationship between grievance activity and performance evaluations, our ability to interpret that relationship is



limited because it may be due to actual behavior change, stable behavioral differences, or managerial reactions to grievance activity. The present study suggests that specific types of grievance activity, especially when successful, can influence ratings beyond any effects attributable to behavioral change.

Further research is needed, however, to determine whether conscious or unconscious bias accounted for the lower ratings grievants received. Do supervisors consciously give lower ratings to grievants in order to get even or to discourage future grievance activity? Or is it that when employees file grievances, raters categorize them as troublemakers? This categorization process could then affect what performance information supervisors perceive and how they process it (cf. DeNisi et al., 1984, and Feldman, 1981). Under such circumstances, supervisors would not necessarily be aware of any bias. Nonetheless, they would be making what appeared to be an unbiased decision on the basis of biased information.

Finally, it is important that future researchers investigate the conditions under which appraisal bias toward grievants is likely to arise. For example, as noted earlier, there may well be observable differences between unionized and nonunionized organizations. Perhaps the presence of a union serves as a counter to serious rater bias. On the other hand, an organization that adopts a formal grievance procedure voluntarily rather than because a collective bargaining agreement mandates such adoption may be more committed to fair administration of the procedure. It would also be interesting to see if the frequency of grievance activity has any effect on the process. Perhaps when grievances are filed infrequently, supervisors who are the targets of grievances take the filings personally and thus react especially harshly. It is also possible that supervisors with low commitment to values like fairness and honesty (Ravlin & Meglino, 1987) will be more likely to take action against grievants.

Clearly, there is a need for further research in this area. For now, however, the present study shows that filing and winning a grievance against a supervisor can diminish subsequent appraisals. Moreover, given the pattern of these results, it is difficult to attribute this relationship simply to changes in ratee behavior. To the extent that organizations use ratings to make decisions about pay, promotions, and discipline, the implications of these findings are indeed important.

REFERENCES Abelson, R. P. 1985. A variance explanation paradox: When a little is a lot. Psychological

Bulletin, 97: 129-133. Alexander, E. R., & Wilkens, R. D. 1982. Performance rating validity: The relationship between

objective and subjective measures of performance. Group and Organization Studies, 7: 485-496.

Becker, G. S. 1975. Human capital (2d ed.). New York: National Bureau of Economic Research. Cardy, R. L., & Dobbins, G. H. 1986. Affect and appraisal accuracy: Liking as an integral dimen-

sion in evaluating performance. Journal of Applied Psychology, 71: 672-678. Chamberlain, G. 1982. Multivariate regression models for panel data. Journal of Econometrics,

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DeNisi, A. S., Cafferty, T. P., & Meglino, B. M. 1984. A cognitive view of the performance appraisal process: A model and research propositions. Organizational Behavior and Hu- man Performance, 33: 360-396.

Feldman, J. M. 1981. Beyond attribution theory: Cognitive processes in performance appraisal. Journal of Applied Psychology, 66: 127-148.

Freeman, R. B., & Medoff, J. 1984. What do unions do? New York: Basic Books. Ichniowski, C. 1986. The effects of grievance activity on productivity. Industrial and Labor

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(Ed.), Human resources and the performance of the firm: 159-193. Madison, Wisc.: IRRA.

Klaas, B. S., Heneman, H. G. III, & Olson, C. A. 1988. Grievance activity and its consequences: A study of the grievance system and its impact on employee behavior. Working paper, University of South Carolina, Columbia.

Landy, F. S., & Farr, J. L. 1980. Performance rating. Psychological Bulletin, 80: 72-107. Lewin, D., & Peterson, R. B. 1987. Behavioral outcomes of grievance activity. Working paper,

Columbia University, New York. Longenecker, C. O., Gioia, D. A., & Sims, H. P., Jr. 1987. Behind the mask: The politics of

employee appraisal. Academy of Management Executive, 1: 183-194. Moreland, R. L., & Zajonic, R. B. 1977. Is stimulus recognition a necessary condition for the

occurrence of exposure effects? Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 35: 191- 199.

Ravlin, E. C., & Meglino, B. M. 1987. Effect of values on perception and decision making: A study of alternative work values measures. Journal of Applied Psychology, 72: 666-673.

Wilson, W. R., & Zajonic, R. B. 1980. Affective discrimination of stimuli that cannot be recog- nized. Science, 207: 557-558.

Brian S. Klaas earned his Ph.D. degree from the Industrial Relations Research Institute at the University of Wisconsin. He is an assistant professor of management at the University of South Carolina. His current research interests include the role of grievance systems, employee discipline, and the interaction between performance appraisals and merit pay. Angelo S. DeNisi earned his Ph.D. degree in industrial-organizational psychology from Purdue University; he is a professor of human resources management at the Institute for Management and Labor Relations, Rutgers University. His current research interests include cognitive processes in performance appraisal, job analysis, and the role of values in determining workplace behavior.


Article Contentsp. 705p. 706p. 707p. 708p. 709p. 710p. 711p. 712p. 713p. 714p. 715p. 716p. 717

Issue Table of ContentsThe Academy of Management Journal, Vol. 32, No. 4 (Dec., 1989), pp. 681-928Volume Information [pp. 900 - 905]Front Matter [pp. 681 - 684]From the Editor [pp. 685 - 686]Managers Handling Disputes: Third-Party Roles and Perceptions of Fairness [pp. 687 - 704]Managerial Reactions to Employee Dissent: The Impact of Grievance Activity on Performance Ratings [pp. 705 - 717]CEO Succession and Stockholder Reaction: The Influence of Organizational Context and Event Content [pp. 718 - 744]Experiential Effects of Dialectical Inquiry, Devil's Advocacy, and Consensus Approaches to Strategic Decision Making [pp. 745 - 772]Interaction Patterns in Organic and Mechanistic Systems [pp. 773 - 802]Content, Causes, and Consequences of Job Insecurity: A Theory-Based Measure and Substantive Test [pp. 803 - 829]Defining Sexual Harassment in Workplaces: A Policy-Capturing Approach [pp. 830 - 850]Workplace Justice and Job Satisfaction as Predictors of Satisfaction with Union and Management [pp. 851 - 866]Research NotesCharacterizing Environmental Variation [pp. 867 - 882]Specific and General Beliefs in Union Voting Models [pp. 883 - 897]

Back Matter [pp. 898 - 928]

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