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ARTICLE IN PRESSG ModelJAS-156; No. of Pages 8
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NJAS - Wageningen Journal of Life Sciences
jo ur nal homepage: www.elsev ier .co m/locate /n jas
frica and the Green Revolution A Global Historical Perspective
wout Frankema ∗
ageningen University Rural and Environmental History Hollandseweg, 1 P.O.Box 8130 6700 EW, Wageningen, Netherlands
r t i c l e i n f o
rticle history:eceived 11 October 2013eceived in revised form 22 January 2014ccepted 30 January 2014
a b s t r a c t
Two decades of substantial economic growth in Africa have challenged the deep-seated Afro-pessimismof the 1990s and 2000s and re-invigorated the academic debate on Africa’s ability to grow out of povertyin the 21st century. Although the opinions differ widely on how sustainable current African growth tra-jectories are, there is a widespread consensus that a fundamental agricultural transformation is key toconsolidate current and future welfare gains. This study interprets recent signs of agricultural productivitygrowth from a long term global historical context, arguing that the combination of present-day devel-
opments in information and communication technology, transport infrastructure, demographic growth,urbanization and in macro-economic governance form a fundamental break with African history. Thisbreak does not offer any guarantees, but it does raise the probability that Africa will complete a greenrevolution of its own.© 2014 Royal Netherlands Society for Agricultural Sciences. Published by Elsevier B.V. All rightsreserved.
. Introduction
After several centuries of rising global inequality during the so-alled era of the Great Divergence, our generation is witnessing aew epoch in world history, one of rapid economic convergence.1
merging economies such as China, India, Brazil and Turkey areeconfiguring the gravity centers of the global economy with aston-shing speed. Even in Sub-Saharan Africa, a region torn apart byecades of civil war and economic crises, hopeful signs of grow-
ng prosperity have emerged in recent years [1–3]. It remains toe seen, however, to which extent Africa’s current growth revivaluilds on a profound transformation of the social, political andconomic fabric. Is the region not just experiencing the inevitableecovery from an equally inevitable post-colonial collapse? Andhat sets this wave of growth apart from recurring African cycles ofatural resource booms and busts, driven by volatile world marketrices for tropical cash crops and mineral resources?
Please cite this article in press as: E. Frankema, Africa and the Green RLife Sci. (2014), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.njas.2014.01.003
The historical analogy that shores up the argument I will developn this study is that no civilization in the past has flourished for long,
ithout an effective strategy to gather, produce or trade food in
∗ Corresponding author. Tel.: +31 317484027.E-mail address: [email protected]
1 This study is a revised version of the inaugural lecture I gave upon taking up theost of professor of Rural and Environmental History at Wageningen University on3 May 2013. I am grateful to Katherine Frederick and Sanne Mirck for student assis-ance and text-editing and to the anonymous reviewers of this paper. All remainingrrors are mine.
ttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.njas.2014.01.003573-5214/© 2014 Royal Netherlands Society for Agricultural Sciences. Published by Else
sufficient quantity and quality. Food surpluses were needed to raisearmies, build cities and fill treasuries. In his monumental AgrarianHistory of Western-Europe Slicher van Bath - the first chair of RuralHistory in Wageningen and founding father of the ‘New EconomicHistory’ in the Netherlands – has demonstrated that the affluencewe enjoy at present, is rooted in millennia of agrarian change [4]. Ina similar vein, Bieleman’s analysis of Five Centuries of Dutch Farmingshows in detail how the rise of the Dutch urban economy in earlymodern times was rooted in a fertile exchange between city andcountryside [5].
The analogy does not stop here though. Although the Asianrenaissance of the late 20th century has primarily been associatedwith rapid industrialization, it has been preceded by impres-sive gains in agricultural output and productivity [6–9]. In thePhilippines, where the famous International Rice Research Insti-tute (IRRI) was established in 1960, rice yields doubled in no time.In Indonesia, the Suharto regime accomplished what the Dutch hadfailed to do before, namely, to turn the country from a net importerof rice into a net exporter in just one decade after the food crisisof the early 1970s [10]. And India, one of the most famine-proneregions of the world for centuries, managed to avert the Malthu-sian doom scenarios painted by many a respected scientist in thelate 1960s [11,12]. In Latin America productivity increases wereimpressive as well. In Mexico wheat yields started to rise at expo-
evolution A Global Historical Perspective, NJAS - Wageningen J.
nential rates in the 1950s. In Brazil maize output per hectare hasquadrupled since the early 1960s (see Fig. 1).
The timing of the ‘Green Revolution’ could hardly have been bet-ter. It occurred exactly in the period when world population growth
vier B.V. All rights reserved.
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that most of the productivity gains in American agriculture dur-
ig. 1. The per capita production of food in Asia, Latin America and Sub-Saharanfrica, 1961-2011 Source: FOASTAT [14].
eached its peak. Except for Sub-Saharan Africa.2 In Africa, foodroduction did not keep pace with population growth. Certainly,gricultural production rose in absolute terms, but mainly becauserowing numbers of smallholders brought more land under cul-ivation [13]. In the majority of African countries the per capitaroduction of food declined from the 1960s through the 1990s.ccording to FAO statistics, even today some 30 out of 53 Africanountries produce less food per head of the population than theyid in the early 1960s [14]. Whereas historically food shortages hadeen of an incidental nature, caused by climate shocks, disease epi-emics or military conflict, in the late 20th century they became theesult of a structural mismatch between local demand and supply15]. Large-scale famines, a typically Asian phenomenon until the960s, became increasingly associated with Africa [16,17].
The recent catastrophe in the Horn of Africa has revived themages of the horrible famine of the mid-1980s. If anything, it indi-ates that amidst the present optimism, African growth experiencesemain highly differentiated. That structural food shortages haveot led to a much higher incidence of famine owes much to mod-rn means of transportation and communication, facilitating largecale food imports as well as improving the effectiveness of inter-ational food aid programs. In Ethiopia in the 1980s, as well asecently in Somalia, attempts to alleviate drought-induced harvestailures were frustrated by dirty wars, causing hundreds of thou-ands of excess deaths. More effective interventions of food aidvoided such dire consequences in countries like Niger and Malawi,hich were also coping with serious food crises in the past decade
18].According to the UN, the world population will grow from
oughly 7 billion at present to 10 billion at the end of this century.bout 70% of the projected increase, that is 2.3 billion, is expected
o occur in Sub-Saharan Africa alone (see Fig. 2). Yet, the challengeoes even beyond the need to improve food security in times ofapidly increasing demand. The challenge also involves the needo balance the growth of urban sectors with rising rural incomes19]. Since the majority of Africans is still employed in agricul-ure, improving rural living standards is the key to mitigate furtherncreases in socio-economic inequality, the key to raising domes-ic consumer demand and, eventually, the key to strengthening thescal basis of African societies.
Fortunately, there is a renewed focus of national and interna-
Please cite this article in press as: E. Frankema, Africa and the Green RLife Sci. (2014), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.njas.2014.01.003
ional agencies on rural development in Africa. The World Bank,fter a period of neglect during the structural adjustment pro-rams of the 1980s and 1990s [20,21], now increasingly recognizes
2 I will also use the shorter term ‘Africa’ as a substitute for ‘Sub-Saharan Africa’ereafter.
Fig. 2. Observed and expected population growth in Sub-Saharan Africa, 1950-2100(billions of people) Source: United Nations, World Population Database [23].
Africa’s economic, geographic and institutional diversity.3 In addi-tion, there is an outspoken ambition to avoid the environmentalcosts of the original green revolution in terms of water and soilpollution, land erosion and loss of biodiversity. Indeed, the call fora ‘doubly green revolution’ stresses the need to combine agricul-tural productivity growth with more sustainable forms of naturalresource management [22].
But while embarking on renewed investment and researchefforts, it is worthwhile to take the long-term picture into account.After all, why did Africa miss the green revolution in the first place?And what reasons do we have to think that this time is different? Inthe remainder of this study I argue that a global historical perspec-tive offers some insights that deserve to be heard in the presentdebate on Africa’s growth revival.
2. The Green Revolution
‘Timing’ is a crucial aspect of revolutions. To understand whatthe green revolution exactly entailed, we need to understand whyit occurred when it did. The standard tale portrays the green revo-lution as a technological breakthrough in the development of newhigh-yielding varieties of cereal grains, especially wheat, rice andmaize, between the early 1940s and the late 1970s [24]. Experi-ments with these new varieties started in Mexico in 1943 by theteam of Norman Borlaug, an American agronomist who won theNobel peace prize in 1970 for his path-breaking research. Thesenew varieties were designed to transform increasing inputs ofwater and artificial fertilizer into a larger number of kernels perear. Heavier ears were made to grow on shorter and stronger stemsin order to prevent the plants from lodging. The cultivation of newvarieties was complemented by an intensified use of machinery,irrigation, and a wide range of insecticides, pesticides and herbi-cides.
It is important to recognize, however, that most of the ‘techno-logical’ ingredients of the green revolution had been in the deliveryroom of history for quite some time. The increased use of fertil-izer had been part and parcel of expanding global trade in the19th century, when large quantities of Peruvian guano and Chileannitrates were shipped across the Atlantic and the Pacific to fertilizeEuropean and North American acres [25]. The economic historiansAlan Olmstead and Paul Rhode [26] have made a compelling case
evolution A Global Historical Perspective, NJAS - Wageningen J.
ing the 19th century stemmed from biological innovations in plantand animal disease control, including the experimentation with,
3 The Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa (AGRA), a joint initiative of theRockefeller and the Gates Foundations, also specifically aims to promote tailor-madeprojects.
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Fig. 3. Tsetse infested parts of Sub-Saharan Africa Source: Alsan [31]..
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nd application of, cross-breeding techniques. In other words, thegreen revolution’ was already gaining steam in the industrializingountries in the 19th century. Therefore, the real revolution was noto much about technological innovation, but much more about theapid diffusion of useful scientific knowledge across large parts ofhe Southern hemisphere.
If we pursue this argument, the question of timing redirectsttention to the role of state policy in overcoming certain marketmperfections. Asian governments channelled substantial publicesources into the development of rural infrastructure and creditacilities. They subsidized and coordinated technical support toarmers. They offered infant-industry protection to emerging fer-ilizer industries and, in some cases, Asian governments went as fars to distribute micro-packages of hybridized seed and fertilizer toncourage farmers to grow new cultivars [27].
The political momentum that pushed Asian governments intouch a pro-active role had been building up during the Cold War.he Americans, in particular, feared that the impoverished massesn Asia would act as a magnet to socialist propaganda. The termGreen Revolution” was introduced to contrast America’s foreignolicy with the violence associated with Red guerilla movements.4
Green”, as opposed to “Red”, was the color of peace. Peaceful scien-ific progress was presented as the capitalist alternative to combatunger, poverty and inequality [28]. Leaders like Marcos, Suhartond Indira Ghandi came to see ‘rice, roads and schools’ as crucialomponents of their attempt to centralize power and raise popularupport [10].
So when it comes to explaining agrarian transitions, there areeveral perspectives one may take, varying from a strictly tech-ological approach that emphasizes the specific opportunities andonstraints of local ecologies, to a political economy approach thatocuses on the incentive structures underlying specific forms ofuman cooperation, or lack thereof. These perspectives are notutually exclusive, on the contrary. In African history they are
eeply intertwined.
. Africa’s legacy of extensive agriculture
Modern genetic research suggests that our common ancestorsriginated in Africa and that they reached anatomical modernityome 200,000 years ago [29]. However, although the homo sapiensad been around in Africa for perhaps twice as long as in the restf the world, the first urban civilizations supported by sedentarygriculture emerged outside Africa. In fact, Africa has remained onef the least densely populated areas of the world until today, and its only in the second half of the 20th century that it was home to onef the biggest population booms ever recorded in human history.lthough the debate on the demographic impact of the African slave
rades is still unsettled [30], few scholars would dispute that Africaffered a comparatively inhospitable environment for sustainingarge concentrations of people. Apart from the high incidence ofropical diseases such as malaria, there were a number of barrierso the development of sedentary agriculture.
To begin with, Africa is not very well endowed with navigableaterways. Anyone who has some affinity with Dutch economicistory will recognize what this implies for the opportunities ofommercial development. When excluding the Sahara and Kala-ari deserts, where supporting large concentrations of people is
mpossible anyway, the lion’s share of Africa’s cultivable land lies
Please cite this article in press as: E. Frankema, Africa and the Green RLife Sci. (2014), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.njas.2014.01.003
n the tropics. Rain forests host a broad range of edible crops, butood cannot be stored for long in warm and moist climates. The pos-ibilities for the refinement, processing and trading of food items
4 USAID director William Gaud is credited with the invention of this term in 196828].
were therefore more limited than in temperate climates. Tropicalsoils are fertile, but also quickly exhausted, favouring systems ofextensive land use and day-to-day harvests of roots, tubers andstarchy fruit, such as plantain, for immediate consumption, alongwith the production of cereal grains.
Livestock breeding broadens the opportunities to store wealth,mediate risks and raise land productivity in pre-industrial soci-eties. However, the presence of the tsetse fly in the African tropicalforest belt has rendered large tracts of cultivable land unsuitableto the development of mixed farming systems [31,32]. The tsetsefly is the principle biological vector of African trypanosomiasis,better known as sleeping sickness (see Fig. 3). Apart from threat-ening human lives, it kills cattle and horses. Tsetse has hamperedthe intensification and commercialisation of African agriculture inseveral ways. It impeded the development of ox-plough cultiva-tion, it reduced the animal manure available for soil regeneration,it limited sources of animal protein, and it impeded the use ofcattle and horses for transportation purposes. Hence, whereas inEurasia a considerable part of the energy required for soil prepara-tion and transportation was supplied by animals, in tropical Africathe energy had to be supplied by scarce human labour. The hoethus remained the principle tool for soil preparation and humanporterage the principle method for moving goods over large dis-tances.
Large parts of the African savannah outside the tsetse-infestedforest zone cope with prolonged periods of drought. The highlyerratic rainfall patterns caused by the Asian-Australian monsoonsystem, turn the cultivation decisions of many East African farmersinto a repeated gamble [33]. Interestingly, there is archaeologi-cal evidence of various pockets of intensive agriculture in EastAfrica, none of which have withstood the test of time. Historians areunsure about the causes of their disappearance, but it seems likelythat climate shocks have played an important role [34]. In the mostarid parts of the West African Sahel and East African coastal regions,nomadic pastoralism has proven to be the only way to sustain aliving.
A map of current population densities reveals how environmen-tal conditions have shaped human settlement patterns in Africanhistory. Large concentrations of people can be found along the riverNile in Egypt and the Niger river system in present-day Nigeria.Other spots of high concentration can be found in the African riftvalley, stretching from Ethiopia in the North all the way Southinto the Shire highlands of present-day Malawi. This area con-
evolution A Global Historical Perspective, NJAS - Wageningen J.
tains fertile land at higher altitudes where tsetse flies and malariamosquitos fail to thrive.
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. Environmental determinism?
We may safely conclude that the widespread practice of exten-ive agriculture did not create optimal conditions for the typef intensification that characterised the green revolution in Asia.owever, before reading a strong version of environmental deter-inism into African history, I would like to put forward three
rguments against over-simplifying conclusions.First, we should not dismiss African agriculture as a ‘primi-
ive’ undertaking. Shifting cultivation was a logical response toong regeneration periods of tropical soils that were poorly under-tood by European colonizers, who often regarded this waste ofand as a sign of laziness or African irrationality. If we dig deepernto the historical record of African agriculture, the terms ‘adap-ive’ or ‘responsive’ offer a much more adequate conception of itsong-term evolution. After all, maize and cassava, the two biggesttaple crops of Sub-Saharan Africa, did not originate in the region,ut were adopted from the New World [35,36]. The same goesor potatoes, beans, peanuts and a large range of cash-crops suchs tobacco, cocoa, cotton, and rubber [37]. In fact, there is littleistorical ground for the idea that African farmers fail to see theotential of new crops or new crop varieties. There is a much bet-er case to make that seemingly conservative cultivation decisionsre guided by deep-seated strategies of risk-minimization, ratherhan income-maximization [38].
Second, we should not conclude without further empiricalnvestigation, that extensive agriculture left the average Africanubsistence farmer worse off than his counterparts elsewhere inhe world.5 Recent research into historical African living standardsuggests that during the colonial era nutritional conditions haveeen considerably better in West Africa than they were in East-rn and Southern Asia. And there are reasons to believe that thislso holds for earlier periods. Yes, there existed competition overcarce water resources and high-value land, which also played outn violent confrontations, but such conflicts were fought out in theontext of an open land frontier where Malthusian pressures wereargely absent.
The distinguished British historian Tony Hopkins recently notedhat according to dependency theorists life in the African coloniesas “nasty, British and short”.6 A new generation of historians is
rying to break out of the ideological chains of neo-Marxist history,nd the Eurocentric explanations of African history it has forged,y simply acknowledging that the experiences of the Kuba in theongo Free State during the rubber terror in the 1890s contrastedharply with those of the Asante cocoa farmers in the Gold Coasturing the 1920s [45–47]. Research of Alexander Moradi and othersoints out that, if anything, average human stature rose during theolonial era [48–50]. In several studies conducted together witharlous van Waijenburg we document a rise in urban real wages
tarting in the 1880s and continuing until the late 1960s [41,51].hese welfare gains were more impressive in some places than inthers and much research remains to be done in documenting andxplaining these varying trajectories of welfare development (seeig. 4).
However, in anticipation of a better empirical foundation Iemain sympathetic to John Iliffe’s qualification of historical African
Please cite this article in press as: E. Frankema, Africa and the Green RLife Sci. (2014), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.njas.2014.01.003
overty as “land-rich poverty” [15]. African poverty was rootedn a high exposure to tropical diseases and pre-mature death, buthose who survived had access to a comparatively rich nutritional
5 See for expressions of what may be called “the persistent poverty view” Bloomnd Sachs [39] or Allen [40]. See for a critique Frankema and Waijenburg [41].6 Walter Rodney’s How Europe Underdeveloped Africa [42] is the classic study, butuch of what has been written between the 1970s and 2000s contains traces of
ependency theory. See also Gareth Austin’s critique [43] of Acemoglu et al. [44].
Fig. 4. Real wages of urban unskilled workers in Calcutta, New Delhi and Accra,1870-2000 (1 = subsistence level) Source: Frankema and van Waijenburg [41,51].
environment. African cattle herders, who had access to animal pro-tein and dairy in exceptional quantities, were exceptionally tallfor pre-industrial standards [49]. Yet, the rinderpest epidemic thatswept across East and Southern Africa in the 1890s killed approx-imately 90% of all cattle. Pastoral groups such as the Masai inKenya, who were generally regarded as a healthy and wealthy tribe,starved to death in large numbers along with their animals [52].
But the most important argument against environmental deter-minism is the enormous potential of industrial technology andmechanical power that has become available in the past twocenturies. Railways have cut back transportation costs. Artificialfertilizers can compensate for a lack of animal manure, tractorsfor a lack of animal draft power. There has also become availablea broad range of new crop varieties that are specifically tailoredto local African ecologies. Examples of technological innovationand knowledge improvements can be discussed at length, but theargument can also be framed into a more fundamental question: ifthe advances in modern medical technology and knowledge haveallowed the African population to quadruple since 1950, why thenwould similar gains be inconceivable in African agriculture?
5. African state formation in retrospective
Some studies suggest that the 11% food shortfall in Niger in 2005could have been prevented by a simple program of distributingmicro-doses of fertilizer to farmers and that such a program, evenapart from the long-term knowledge spill-overs, would have costonly a quarter of the actual incurred emergency aid expenses [18].If we accept that states have played a critical role in the spreadof the green revolution in Asia, namely by addressing a number ofmarket failures in the supply of rural infrastructure, credit facilities,education and access to intermediate inputs, we should also paysome attention to the historical features of African state formation.
Early independent African states were fiscally underdeveloped,their bureaucracies were understaffed and undereducated, andthere was a widespread incapacity to support economic policy-making with reliable statistical information [53–55]. State policiesdesigned to serve ‘national interests’ were paralyzed by a mosaic ofethnic, religious and tribal identities. If early independent Africanstates were able to secure a monopoly on the use of violence in thefirst place, it tended to be an unstable monopoly at best. ObafemiAwolowo, one of the founding fathers of independent Nigeria, hasput it as follows: “Nigeria is not a nation. It is a mere geographicalexpression. There are no ‘Nigerians’ in the same sense as there are
evolution A Global Historical Perspective, NJAS - Wageningen J.
‘English’, ‘Welsh’ or ‘French’.” [56].It has become a commonplace to argue that the creation of
‘states without nations’ was among the worst long-term legaciesof European colonial rule in Africa, and I fully subscribe to this
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oint. Few people realize, however, that the effective broadcast-ng of power by colonial governments was complicated by similaronditions that had hampered state centralisation in pre-colonialimes. The crux of the problem was how to integrate relativelysolated and mobile groups of people, scattered across vast ruralinterlands, into the structures of a central state administration?
n a context of shifting cultivation and nomadic pastoralism it isirtually impossible, and prohibitively expensive, to impose taxesn land or agricultural output. African state development was thusound to the extraction of rents from trade and human captives.et, for the maintenance of courts, bureaucracies and armies, thesere comparatively instable sources of revenue. Moreover, the prac-ice of slave raiding to generate revenue created a highly adverseynamic of violence, fugitive conduct and counter-insurgencies57].
Since control over people, rather than land, was key to achiev-ng political ambitions, there were little incentives to formalizenstitutions for land tenure. The imposition of the European stateoncept in Africa, in which delineated territorial borders were aentral part of the political logic, thus caused a rupture in the his-orical evolution of the African state [58]. Yet, colonial borders wererimarily designed to prevent intra-European conflicts on Africanoil, without having to overstretch limited government resources toctually control these territories. Frederick Cooper aptly depictedhese colonial constructs as ‘gatekeeper states’ [59].
Colonial arrangements with respect to land tenure differedidely. In the settler colonies of Southern and Eastern Africa, landas alienated at a considerable scale to facilitate the settlement of
uropean farmers. In Central Africa large tracts of land were givenn concession to private companies and missionaries. In parts of
est Africa, however, European land ownership was discouragedr even prohibited [60]. Although the colonial state managed toxtract some revenue from land grants, it primarily relied on a com-ination of trade, hut and head taxes [61,62]. These tax revenuesere re-invested in the exploitation of mines and the facilitation of
ash-crop exports. The improvement of subsistence agriculture wasiven no priority, and in some cases also suffered from the labourhat was withdrawn from it to spur the more profitable sectorsf the colonial economy. Yet, in many landlocked regions colo-ial tax revenues remained insufficient to finance even the lightestkeleton of a state administration. To accommodate this problem,he French created large federations in West and Equatorial Africao redistribute revenues from the richer coastal colonies such asabon, Senegal and Dahomey towards the poor periphery consist-
ng of present-day countries like Niger, Chad and the Central Africanepublic [63].
Environmental constraints to state formation also show up inhe history of African warfare [64]. Since the use of horses wasssential to military operations in the open savannah lands, butseless in the tsetse-infested forest zone, it proved difficult to
ntegrate both areas into an overarching state structure. The largeslamic states that emerged in the West African Sudan, such as the
edieval and early-modern empires of Mali and Songhai, wereept together by armies of horseback warriors that were ableo cover large distances. The political challenge of these empiresas to keep the military elite, who had made significant invest-ents in their equipment, united and prevent disintegration by
stablishing a monopoly on the Trans-Saharan trade in horses31,64]. In the forest zone the reach of foot soldier armies wasonsiderably smaller. The slave states that arose along the Westfrican coast, such as Dahomey, Asante and Oyo, were more com-act and often incorporated women and children in their armies
Please cite this article in press as: E. Frankema, Africa and the Green RLife Sci. (2014), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.njas.2014.01.003
or logistic purposes [64]. Moreover, to avoid being raided byeighbouring peoples, it was crucial for these states to maintainheir advantage in the African-European trade of slaves for guns65,66].
PRESS of Life Sciences xxx (2014) xxx–xxx 5
This is not to suggest that the process of African state forma-tion was caged in an iron law of population scarcity and populationmobility. The Sokoto caliphate in Northern Nigeria actively pro-moted the construction of ribats, small fortified towns that provideda basic level of security, schooling and market exchange. In orderto settle the pastoral Fulani people and underpin the fiscal basis ofthe state, a network of agricultural plantations was established. TheSokoto caliphate was eventually swallowed up by colonial Nigeria,but it had amassed sufficient power to inspire Frederick Lugard informulating his famous principle of indirect rule [67]. The mostobvious aberration of the aforementioned pattern, however, wasEthiopia. This country was ruled by the Solomonic dynasty forseven centuries in a row, until the military coup of 1974 deposedits last emperor, Haile Selassie. Interestingly, the ox-drawn ploughhad been used in this region for millennia and the Abyssinians hadalso developed their own scripture for recording state affairs [68].And yes, European powers tried, but never succeeded, to colonizeEthiopia.
The bottom-line, however, is that a process of strenuous inter-state competition, which had spurred the build-up of fiscal andmilitary capacity in early modern Europe [69], remained largelyabsent in Sub-Saharan Africa. Nor did there emerge an African ver-sion of the Chinese state. The physical support structures of Africanstates were too porous. The recent war in Mali has demonstratedthat even for modern African states it can be very difficult to con-trol vast empty hinterlands. After all, where did these insurgentscome from and where did they go? Furthermore, the lack of well-defined rules of land tenure resulted in increasing conflicts withthe rapid closing of the land frontier in the 20th century. Multipleoverlapping claims to land complicated the investments neededto intensify production [70,71]. Hence, at the time the green rev-olution conquered Asia, African states faced problems of a morefundamental nature, problems that were difficult to resolve quickly,and especially so without stable institutions of conflict resolutionat the central political level.
6. Relative prices
That early independent African states were weak, does notmean that its leaders neglected food crop agriculture. Foodself-sufficiency aligned very well with anti-colonial ideologiesemphasising Africa’s newly won political and economic indepen-dence. In Tanzania a comprehensive program of rural developmentwas implemented, which ran aground due to an overdose of ill-directed state intervention, not because of neglect. In Zimbabwe,Kenya and Nigeria, groups of well-connected large farmers wereable to articulate their demands to the central government and suc-cessfully adopted high-yielding varieties of maize. In many othercountries productivity gains were also recorded in the smallholdersector during the 1960s and 1970s, but most of these were notsustained.
Let me discuss one more factor that highlights the added value ofa global historical perspective: the green revolution itself. Similar tohow former European and present-day Asian textile manufactureshave hampered the development of local textile industries in Africa,the increasing supply of food grains, and especially rice, floodingthe world market in the wake of the green revolution supressedthe profit-margins of African farmers. The price declines caused bythe green revolution were taking effect within a long-term trendof falling food prices since the mid-19th century (see Fig. 5). In thesecond half of the 20th century world trade in agricultural products
evolution A Global Historical Perspective, NJAS - Wageningen J.
grew at an annual rate of 3.2 percent [72], while real food pricesdropped by 10 to 15 percent between the 1967 and 1992 [73,74].This effect was further compounded by the structural overvaluationof African currencies [75]. Importing food became cheaper than it
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Fig. 5. Historical price index of wheat in the US and UK (1901-05 = 100) Source:Data from Koning and van Ittersum [76].
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experienced the setbacks. But not today. Average levels of govern-
Fig. 6. FAO Food Price Index, 1990-2013 Source: FAOSTAT [14].8.
ad ever been. Of course, cheap food imports were beneficial for theapidly increasing number of urban poor. But they also relieved theressure on African governments to endure their agrarian develop-ent programs under difficult circumstances. The food price hikes
f recent years (see Fig. 6), which led to food riots in for instanceozambique, not to mention the Arab world, are a wake-up call
hat the era of cheap food may have come to an end. Despite theegative consequences in the short run, a higher equilibrium price
or food may turn out to be a blessing in disguise for African foodroducers in the long run.
. Conclusion: will this time be different?
There are increasing signs of an acceleration in the diffusion ofodern agricultural technology and structural improvements in
rop yields in Africa [1]. For example, rice yields in Benin started torow in the early 1990s and quickened the pace after 2007, reaching
level that exceeds 4 tonnes per hectare at present. In Rwandahere has been a break in the long-run pattern from the turn of theentury onwards, with yields exceeding 5 tonnes per hectare todaysee Fig. 7). Similar upshots have been recorded in cassava yieldsn Malawi, following the introduction of a new variety around theurn of the century [77]. Moreover, at the micro-level there are
any more examples of rapid change [18,19,21], which may soonhow up in the aggregate statistics as well. But we have seen phases
Please cite this article in press as: E. Frankema, Africa and the Green RLife Sci. (2014), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.njas.2014.01.003
f agricultural growth before, especially in the 1920s and 1950s to970s, and most of these were not sustained. What reasons do weave to believe that this time is different?
8 The FAO has constructed the real food price index by deflating its basketf nominal food prices by the World Bank Manufactures Unit Value Index. See:ww.fao.org/worldfoodsituation/wfs-home/foodpricesindex/en/.
Fig. 7. Rice yields (paddy) in Benin and Rwanda, tonnes per hectare, 1961-2011Source: FAOSTAT [14].
First, Africa is currently experiencing nothing short of atransportation and communication revolution. As I have argued,throughout African history physical distances have hampered thecommercialization of agriculture and the formation of centralstates. Colonial investments in railways and harbours connectedlocal economic enclaves to European markets, but today’s invest-ments in road infrastructure, transport equipment, electricity andICT infrastructure allow for a much more fine-grained process ofdomestic market integration. To illustrate this, in 1990, only 1 per-cent of Africans had a subscription to a mobile or fixed telephoneconnection. Today nearly every African adult has one [78]. Newcommunication technologies offer real time market information tofarmers at very low costs. They enable instant financial transac-tions and facilitate new forms of credit, saving and insurance. Thetyranny of distance in Africa dissolves as we speak.
Second, current rates of population growth and urbanization arewidely regarded as one of Africa’s biggest problems today. Somefifty years ago similar concerns were raised about Asian popula-tion growth. However, if we take serious the argument that lowpopulation densities and high population mobility have impairedthe development of sedentary agriculture and the growth of urbancentres, Africa’s current demographic transition is bound to changethe parameters of agrarian production. Growing urban demand incombination with higher food prices, makes investing in local foodproduction systems much more attractive than it was even a decadeago.7 The problem with African demography is not the growth ofthe population itself, nor its growing concentration. It’s the speedof it that puts pressure on the adaptive capacity of African societies.
Third, the current macro-economic outlook is far better thanin the last quarter of the 20th century. There is controlled infla-tion and exchange rates are more in balance with the economy.Notwithstanding the aforementioned diversity, the majority ofAfrican economies grows at rates of 3 to 6 percent per year despitethe severe financial and economic crisis in the industrialized world[79]. This is an important observation. In previous periods of globaleconomic crisis, for instance during the Great Depression of the1930s or the oil crises of the 1970s, African economies immediately
evolution A Global Historical Perspective, NJAS - Wageningen J.
ment debt in Africa hover around 40% of GDP, half the rate of Dutchgovernment debt, not to mention Southern European levels [79].
7 I have deliberately refrained from the discussion whether such investmentsshould be channelled to smallholders or large-scale farmers. I believe this issuedepends very much on local conditions and history suggests that bi-modal produc-tion systems can be fruitful as long as institutions do not systematically favour oneover the other.
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Fourth and finally, I would argue that the rapid transitions infrican settlement patterns and the open access to worldwideedia and useful knowledge is bound to change the rules of the
olitical game. Of course, the formation of social identities, personaloyalties and political machinations has always been in flux, but theurrent rise of African urban culture goes against a long historicalendency of ethnic and social fractionalization. Moreover, with theressure building up, African politicians face increasing incentiveso concern themselves with the lot of the urban ánd the rural poor,hether they are democratically elected or not.
Having said this, it would be good to remark that there will beo repetition of the Asian green revolution in Africa. The variety infrica’s ecological conditions and historical development trajecto-ies is too large. One can be more optimistic perhaps about Westfrican coastal countries such as Ghana, Senegal and Benin, with aomparatively strong historical record of commercialization. Oneay be less optimistic about landlocked countries in the interior
uch as Niger, Chad, or the Central African Republic. In addition, theore compact African countries with a historical legacy of agrar-
an intensification, such as Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda are in aore favourable position than giant colonial constructs such as theemocratic Republic of Congo. If anything, the effects of climatehange are likely to deepen intra-African disparities and enhancentra-African migration. For these reasons it is not inconceivablehat the Great Divergence that has evolved at the global scale in theast five centuries, will be repeated within Sub-Saharan Africa inhe 21st century.
cknowledgements
I gratefully acknowledge financial support from the Euro-ean Research Council under the European Community’s Seventhramework Programme (ERC Grant Agreement n◦ 313114) forhe project Is Poverty Destiny? A New Empirical Foundation forong-Term African Welfare Analysis, and from the Netherlandsrganisation for Scientific Research (NWO) for the VIDI-project Isoverty Destiny? Exploring Long Term Changes in African Livingtandards in Global Perspective.
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