FW Diocese Brief

8/17/2019 FW Diocese Brief

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Oral rgument Requested

AUS:698374.1

No. 02-15-00220-CV

IN THE SECOND COURT OF APPEALS

THE EPISCOPAL CHURCH, et al.

v.

FRANKLIN SALAZAR, et al.

On Appeal from the 141st District Court of Tarrant County, Texas, Cause No. 141-252083-11

APPELLEES’ RESPONSE BRIEF TO

THE EPISCOPAL CHURCH, et al.

Scott A. BristerState Bar # 00000024ANDREWS KURTH LLP111 Congress Ave., #1700Austin, TX 78701Tel: (512) 320-9200Fax: (512) [email protected]

Shelby SharpeState Bar # 18123000SHARPE & RECTOR , P.C.6100 Western Pl., #1000Fort Worth, TX 76107Tel: (817) 338-4900Fax: (817) [email protected]

R. David WeaverState Bar # 21010875 W EAVER & W EAVER , PLLC1601 E. Lamar Blvd., Suite 102Arlington, TX 76011Tel: 817-460-5900Fax: [email protected]

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES

A

02-15

SECOND COURT OF

FORT WORT

3/4/2016 5

DEBR

FILED IN2nd COURT OF APPEALS FORT WORTH, TEXAS

3/4/2016 5:04:16 PM DEBRA SPISAK Clerk


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IDENTITY OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL

Appellees/Defendants object to Plaintiffs’ Identity of Parties and

Counsel for its improper editorial comments about which parties are

the “former,” “wrongful,” etc. representatives of the entities at issue in

this litigation. Subject to that objection, that List should be

supplemented to add the following Appellees represented by the

Defendants below:

• All Saints Church (Fort Worth)

• St. Luke-in-the-Meadow Church (Fort Worth)

• St. Elisabeth’s Church (Fort Worth)

• St. Stephen’s Church (Wichita Falls)

• St. Christopher’s Church (Fort Worth)


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TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................... 1

STATEMENT OF FACTS ................................................................................. 2

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ......................................................................... 8

I. LAW AND FACTS TEC DOES NOT DISPUTE ............................................ 9

II. ALL COURTS SAY THIS IS NOT AN ECCLESIASTICAL DISPUTE ............... 11

A. The Texas Supreme Court held this isn’t an ecclesiastical case ..... 12

B. The Second Court didn’t treat this as an ecclesiastical case .......... 14

C. The U.S. Supreme Court says property suits aren’t ecclesiastical

unless the deeds incorporate a religious test ............................... 16

D. The trial court applied no ecclesiastical preference ...................... 19

E. Defendants have never said this is an ecclesiastical case .............. 21

III. LEADERSHIP AND WITHDRAWAL FROM A CHURCH AREN’T ISSUES .... 22

IV. THE PROPERTY IS HELD IN TRUST FOR THE DEFENDANT DIOCESE &

CONGREGATIONS .............................................................................. 25

CONCLUSION ............................................................................................ 27


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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page(s)

Cases

All Saints Parish Waccamaw v. Protestant Epis. Church inDiocese of S.C .,685 S.E.2d 163 (S.C. 2009) ..........................................................................2

Chen v. Tseng,No. 01-02-01005-CV, 2004 WL 35989 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Jan. 8, 2004, no pet.) ...............................................24

Dean v. Alford,994 S.W.2d 392 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1999, no pet.) ......................15

Episcopal Diocese of Fort Worth v. The Episcopal Church,422 S.W.3d 646 (Tex. 2013) .............................................................. passim

Fiess v. State Farm Lloyds,202 S.W.3d 744 (Tex. 2006) ......................................................................25

FPL Energy, LLC v. TXU Portfolio Mgmt. Co., L.P.,

426 S.W.3d 59 (Tex. 2014) ........................................................................25

Jones v. Wolf ,443 U.S. 595 (1979) ........................................................................... passim

Masterson v. The Diocese of Northwest Tex.,422 S.W.3d 594 (Tex. 2013) .............................................................. passim

Protestant Episcopal Church v. Barker ,171 Cal. Rptr. 541 (Cal. App. 1981) ..........................................................4

In re Salazar ,315 S.W.3d 279 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2010, orig.proceeding) .............................................................................. 7, 14, 15, 21

Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich,426 U.S. 696 (1976) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) .............................. 12, 17


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Smith v. N. Tex. Dist. Council of Assem. of God,No. 2-05-425-CV, 2006 WL 3438077 (Tex. App.—FortWorth Nov. 30, 2006, no pet.) .................................................................15

Toledo Soc. for Crippled Children v. Hickok,261 S.W.2d 692 (Tex. 1953) ........................................................................9

Statutes

TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE § 1.101 .........................................................................9

TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE § 1.103 .........................................................................9

TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE § 252.006 ...................................................................14

TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE § 402 ..........................................................................10

TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. art. 1396—70.01 ......................................................9, 14

TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. art. 1396-10.02 ...............................................................9

Other Authorities

BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 652 (10th ed. 2014) ............................................. 3

RESTATEMENT (2D) CONFLICT OF LAWS (1971) § 276 .....................................9

RESTATEMENT (3D) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW §§ 312 cmt. d,313(1), (3) (1987) .........................................................................................5

TEX. R. EVID. 202 ...............................................................................................9

WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THEENGLISH LANGUAGE UNABRIDGED 764 (2002) .......................................... 3

WHITE & DYKMAN, ANNOTATED CONSTITUTION AND CANONSFOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PROTESTANT EPISCOPALCHURCH IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 90 (ChurchPublishing Inc. 1981) .................................................................................3


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STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT

Appellees believe this case can be decided on the briefs without

oral argument. Nevertheless, Appellees would be pleased to present

oral argument should the Court request it.

REFERENCES TO THE PARTIES & RECORD

the Diocese Appellee The Episcopal Diocese of Fort Worth.

the Corporation Appellee Corporation of The Episcopal Dioceseof Fort Worth.

Plaintiffs All Appellants, real or purported, regardless ofhow they were designated in the trial court.

Defendants All Appellees, regardless of how they weredesignated in the trial court.

TEC The Episcopal Church and the Most Rev.Katharine Jefferts Schiori.

TEC Brief Brief of Appellants the Episcopal Church and

the Most Rev. Katharine Jefferts Schiori.

Local TEC Brief Brief of Appellants the Local Episcopal Parties

and Congregations.

Fort Worth at 650 Page 650 in Episcopal Diocese of Fort Worth v. The

Episcopal Church, 422 S.W.3d 646 (Tex. 2013).

Masterson at 613 Page 613 in Masterson v. The Diocese of

Northwest Tex., 422 S.W.3d 594 (Tex. 2013).


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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case: Suit by national religious association

against Texas religious association andrelated non-profit corporation to removeofficers, declare rights to possession anduse of property, for monetary damages,and for other declaratory and injunctiverelief.

Trial Court: 141st District Court of Tarrant County,the Hon. John Chupp presiding.

Course of Proceedings: The trial court initially granted summary judgment for Plaintiffs. On direct appeal,the Texas Supreme Court reversed andremanded for further proceedings. SeeEpiscopal Diocese of Fort Worth v. The

Episcopal Church, 422 S.W.3d 646

(Tex. 2013). On returning to the trial

court, all parties filed extensive motions

for summary judgment.

Trial Court Disposition: The trial court granted Defendants’motions and denied Plaintiffs’ motions,signing a Final Judgment to that effecton July 24, 2015 (CR39:14024-46).


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INTRODUCTION

This case is already a legal landmark. The Texas Supreme Court,

in its first church-property opinion in more than a century, said Texas

courts must use neutral principles of state law to decide such disputes.

But that doesn’t matter according to Appellants, The Episcopal

Church and the Most Rev. Katharine Jefferts Schiori (collectively

“TEC”). TEC says civil court cannot decide this dispute because it is an

ecclesiastical case. TEC made precisely the same argument in the

Texas Supreme Court four years ago—and lost . The Supreme Court

said that all Texas courts must “decide non-ecclesiastical issues such as

property ownership and whether trusts exist based on the same

neutral principles of secular law that apply to other entities.” Episcopal

Diocese of Fort Worth v. The Episcopal Church, 422 S.W.3d 646, 650 (Tex.

2013) (hereinafter “Fort Worth”). This Court cannot ignore that ruling.

This dispute is not about who TEC can recognize as a local

affiliate or who can attend TEC conventions. It is about who owns

property. Property disputes are not ecclesiastical disputes; property

rights are governed by legal rules no matter who the owner is. When a

church places property in a legal entity formed under Texas law, “that

law dictates” who can control and use it. See id. at 652. The trial courtcorrectly granted summary judgment for Defendants under neutral

principles of state law, and this Court should affirm.


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STATEMENT OF FACTS

The Episcopal Church. Whether TEC is hierarchical is

irrelevant, because courts applying neutral principles of state law do

not ask or consider whether a church is hierarchical or

congregational.1 But by way of background, the highest authority in

TEC on property issues is the local bishop, not TEC’s administrative

officers. Only four short clauses in TEC’s 200-page Constitution and

Canons relate to local property: two expressly granting authority over

property matters to local bishops and dioceses,2 and two (known as

“the Dennis Canon”3) imposing only a revocable trust.4 The historical

record shows that Episcopalian property disputes have always been

brought by individual bishops and dioceses, not TEC (see Tab E).5

TEC has recognized in its own courts and represented to the IRS

that its dioceses are autonomous, self-governing entities.6 Numerous

aspects of TEC polity show its hierarchy is not as Plaintiffs claim:

1 See Fort Worth at 650; All Saints Parish Waccamaw v. Protestant Epis. Church inDiocese of S.C ., 685 S.E.2d 163, 172 (S.C. 2009) (“Church disputes that are resolvedunder the neutral principles of law approach do not turn on the single question ofwhether a church is congregational or hierarchical.”).

2 CR12:4201 (Canon I.6.3 requiring bishop’s approval for encumbrance ofparish property); CR12:4212 (Canon II.7.2 requiring bishop’s consent to sellconsecrated property).

3 CR12:4201 (Canon I.6.4); CR12:4210 (Canon II.7.4).

4 See Fort Worth, 422 S.W.3d at 653 (citing Masterson, 422 S.W.3d at 613).

5 2SCR762.

6 1SCR174 (“The Episcopal Church is comprised of 117 autonomousdioceses”); 1SCR198 (TEC Court for the Trial of a Bishop holding it could not


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• the word “Episcopal” means “bishop”;7

• TEC was formed by the dioceses,8 and can be dissolved by thedioceses;9

• TEC’s Constitution and Canons define the term “EcclesiasticalAuthority” as “the Bishop of the Diocese”;10

• no one can perform “episcopal acts” in a diocese without thelocal bishop’s consent;11 and

• each diocese elects its own bishop, with the consent of amajority of the other dioceses (not TEC itself).12

Each bishop “solemnly engages” to conform to the doctrine, discipline,

and worship of TEC, a declaration relating to spiritual duties rather

compel Diocese of Los Angeles to produce documents, as the diocese was “awholly autonomous entity”).

7 See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 652 (10th ed. 2014) (“episcopacy . . . 1. Theoffice of a bishop”); see also WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF

THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE UNABRIDGED 764 (2002) (“fr. episcopus bishop . . . 1: of,being, or suited to a bishop.).

8 See WHITE & DYKMAN, ANNOTATED CONSTITUTION AND CANONS FOR THEGOVERNMENT OF THE PROTESTANT EPISCOPAL CHURCH IN THE UNITED STATES OFAMERICA, 90 (Church Publishing Inc. 1981) (hereinafter “ANNOTATEDCONSTITUTION AND CANONS”).

9 CR12:4258 (TEC Const., Art. XII) (allowing TEC Constitution to be altered oramended by a majority of all Bishops and Dioceses).

10 CR12:4420 (TEC Canon IV.15).

11 CR12:4356 (2006 TEC Canon III.12.3(e)); CR12:4252 (2006 TEC Const. Art. II, §3) (“A Bishop shall confine the exercise of such office to the Diocese in whichelected, unless requested to perform episcopal acts in another Diocese by theEcclesiastical Authority thereof [.]”); CR12:4187 (1979 TEC Constitution, Art. II, §3) (same).

12 CR12:4252 (Const. Art. I, §§ 1-2).


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than property rights.13 The founders of TEC had made similar solemn

engagements to the Church of England—but they certainly didn’t

forfeit church property in America when those churches separated.14

TEC’s highest body on many non-property issues is the General

Convention, which has never made any official decision about the

merits of this lawsuit or even whether to file it. 15 That call was made

by the former Presiding Bishop, who is not TEC’s highest authority.16

The Diocese. The Episcopal Diocese of Fort Worth (“the Diocese”)

is a Texas unincorporated association.17 It was created at a Primary

Convention in November 1982 after the Diocese of Dallas divided.18

Since an unqualified accession to TEC’s Constitution and Canons was

not required at that time,19 the Diocese qualified its accession by

prohibiting local properties from being “encumbered in any way”

13 CR34:11859 (¶4); CR12:4256 (2006 TEC Const., Art. VIII).

14 See Protestant Episcopal Church v. Barker , 171 Cal. Rptr. 541, 544 (Cal. App.1981) (noting that TEC churches retained their property through prior schismswith the Church of Rome and the Church of England).

15 2SCR618-19; 2SCR746.

16 There was no Presiding Bishop until 1925. See ANNOTATED CONSTITUTIONAND CANONS, supra note 7, at 26-28. The Presiding Bishop speaks for TEC only asauthorized by the General Convention. CR12:4277-78 (2006 TEC Canon I.2.4).

17 CR24:10168 (¶4).

18 CR17:6327-67 .

19 See CR29:10172-73 (¶15); ANNOTATED CONSTITUTION AND CANONS, supra note7, at 8; see also CR12:4190 (1979 TEC Const. Art. XI) (providing that amendments toTEC’s Constitution shall take effect on January 1 of the following year).


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without the written consent of each local church.20 On the basis of that

qualified accession, the Diocese was admitted into union with TEC’s

General Convention on December 31, 1982.21 Thereafter, nothing in

TEC’s charters prohibited the Diocese from amending its own charters

in ways that conflicted with those of TEC;22 as Plaintiffs’

representative admitted, dioceses need no permission from TEC to

amend their own charters.23

The Corporation. Corporation of The Episcopal Diocese of Fort

Worth (“the Corporation”) is a Texas non-profit corporation governed

by its articles of incorporation, bylaws, and a board of directors called

Trustees.24 The Corporation owns and controls all the real property in

the Diocese.25 The cost of buying, building, and maintaining those

properties is funded by local contributions; TEC never contributed or

20 CR17:6102 (1982 FW Const. Art. 13); CR17:6120 (1982 FW Canon 12.4).“Accession” is a term from the international law of treaties, which allows qualifiedaccessions to a treaty unless reservations are expressly forbidden or another partypromptly objects. See RESTATEMENT (3D) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW §§ 312 cmt. d,313(1), (3) (1987).

21 CR17:6052.

22 CR34:11860 (¶7).

23 2SCR358-59 (Gulick depo. pp. 52-53: “Based on your understanding asBishop, do you recall anything in the Constitution or Canons that required you to

submit that prior to annual convention to the Episcopal Church or the PresidingBishop for approval before annual convention could vote on it? A: No”).

24 CR30:10529 (¶4); CR17:6055-57 (1983 Articles); CR17:6059-63 (2006 Articles);CR6065-77 (1983 bylaws); CR17:6079-85–96 (2006 bylaws).

25 CR30:10530 (¶5); CR17:6254, CR17:6279-80 (2008); CR17:6102, CR17:6120 (1982).


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paid for any property the Corporation holds.26 Properties currently

held by the Corporation have an insured value exceeding $100 million

dollars.27 TEC did not create the Corporation, does not own or control

it, cannot elect or remove its officers, and has no affiliation or

contractual relationship with it.28

The Controversy . As one of Plaintiffs’ counsel wrote 20 years ago

when he represented the Defendant Corporation, many Episcopalians

have long shared “a deep dissatisfaction with the policies” of TEC. 29

Because those policies reflected “a substantial departure from the

biblical and historic faith,”30 the delegates to the Diocese’s 2007 annual

Convention voted overwhelmingly to remove references to TEC from

its Constitution (83% of clergy, 77% of lay delegates),31 and reaffirmed

that vote in 2008 by similar majorities (79% of clergy, 80% of lay

delegates).32 Plaintiffs represent the minority that lost those votes.33

The Diocese Attempts Conciliation. Recognizing that in a handful

of churches a majority of the members might want to remain affiliated

26 CR30:10530 (¶7).

27 CR30:10532 (¶11).

28 CR30:10531 (¶7).

29

CR20:7074.30 CR29:10299.

31 CR29:10170 (¶9); CR29:10344 (vote on Amendment D).

32 CR29:10170 (¶9); CR29:10397 (vote on Amendment to Article I).

33 See id.


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with TEC, the Diocese adopted procedures for amicable separation,

allowing them to keep church buildings if certain conditions were

met.34 Three parishes took advantage of the offer, and in February

2009 the Corporation transferred church property to them.35

TEC Files Suit . TEC soon put an end to any amicable separation.

On April 14, 2009, TEC and the minority group that had withdrawn

from the Diocese sued.36 The Plaintiffs demanded possession of over

50 churches in the Diocese, including 38 churches in which not one

member would appear as a representative of TEC.37

The Appeals. In a mandamus proceeding in 2010, this Court

reversed the trial court for failing to strike pleadings by Plaintiffs’

counsel purporting to represent the Diocese and the Corporation. See

In re Salazar , 315 S.W.3d 279, 287 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2010, orig.

proceeding). In a direct appeal in 2013, the Texas Supreme Court

reversed the trial court for failing to apply neutral principles of state

law to this case. See Fort Worth, 422 S.W.3d at 651. On remand, the

141st District Court, the Hon. John Chupp presiding, sided with the

Defendants this time and granted their motions for summary

34 CR29:10293, CR29:10324 (amendment to Canon 32).

35 CR30:10533 (¶13), CR30:10613-34.

36 2SCR146 et seq.

37 2SCR238 (listing 12 churches with individual representatives and 38without).


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judgment, awarding all church property, funds, and endowments to

them.38

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The Texas Supreme Court said this case should be decided by

applying neutral principles of state law to the deeds, church charters,

and other property documents in legally cognizable form. In defiance

of that mandate, Plaintiffs ask this Court to defer to TEC because the

issues are ecclesiastical. But none of the property documentsincorporate religious tests, and neither side has asked the courts to

decide who can lead worship or attend church conventions for either.

This case concerns property only, as the Defendants have always

maintained, and as every court involved in this case has held.

The courts have not been asked to decide who can lead any

religious body, or whether dioceses can withdraw from TEC. The

issues are who controls two legal entities: a Texas nonprofit

unincorporated association (the Diocese) and a Texas nonprofit

corporation (the Corporation). Since these legal entities were both

formed under Texas law, that law dictates whether their officers have

been legally elected or replaced.

The Diocese’s Constitution and Canons require the Corporation

to hold property for the “Parish” and “Mission” using them, terms

38 CR39:14024-46.


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that are defined as unincorporated associations “in union” with the

Diocese’s Convention. It is undisputed that Defendants represent the

congregations in union with that Convention, and the Plaintiffs do not.

The trial court properly granted summary judgment for Defendants.

ARGUMENT

I. LAW AND FACTS TEC DOES NOT DISPUTE

Nobody disputes that Texas law governs all issues in this suit.39

Specifically, the Texas Uniform Unincorporated Nonprofit Association

Act governs the Diocese (see Tab B),40 the Texas Non-Profit

Corporation Act governs the Corporation (see Tab C ),41 and the Texas

Trust Code governs all actual or alleged trusts (see Tab D).42 These

statutes have been recodified without little change as part of the Texas

39 See TEX. R. EVID. 202 (requiring party asserting that other law applies tosupply the court “with the necessary information” to do so).

40 See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. art. 1396—70.01; see also TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE § 1.103(providing that Texas law governs internal affairs of entities formed in Texaswithout necessity of filing with the state).

41 See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. art. 1396-10.02(A) (stating Legislature may provideregulations, provisions, and limitations that are binding upon corporations subjectto the Act”); Fort Worth at 652 (“The [C]orporation was incorporated pursuant to

Texas corporation law and that law dictates how the corporation can be operated,including determining the terms of office of corporate directors”); see also TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE § 1.101 (providing that Texas law governs internal affairs of entitiesformed by certificate of formation from Texas).

42 Trusts holding Texas land are governed by Texas law. See Toledo Soc. forCrippled Children v. Hickok, 261 S.W.2d 692, 697 (Tex. 1953); RESTATEMENT (2D) CONFLICT OF LAWS (1971) § 276.


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Business Organizations Code; although that Code does not apply here

because suit was filed and all transactions occurred before January 1,

2010,43 it is cited in the footnotes for the Court’s convenience.

TEC’s brief also does not dispute (despite years of denials) that:

(1) neutral principles of Texas law govern this suit;

(2) the Corporation holds legal title to all property; and

(3) the property is held in trust for the Diocese and itscongregations.44

Thus, declarations (1), (2), and (3) in the trial court’s Final Judgment

are not contested.45 Nor does TEC contest declaration (7) concerning

funds and endowments, which are governed by the same rules as the

other property.46 Finally, TEC has abandoned any trust claim for itself

based on the Dennis Canon, which the Texas Supreme Court

definitively held was revocable under Texas law,47 and which the

43 See TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE § 402.006 (“[P]rior law governs the acts, contracts,or transactions of the entity or its managerial officials, owners, or members thatoccur before the mandatory application date” of January 1, 2010); id. at § 402.014(“Except as expressly provided by this title, this code does not apply to an actionor proceeding commenced before [January 1, 2010]. Prior law applies to the actionor proceeding.”).

44 See TEC Br. at 11, 17.

45 CR39:14026.

46 See also Local TEC Br. at 41 n.17 (stating that diocesan funds and endowmentsare governed by “[t]he same holdings” as real property).

47 See Fort Worth at 653 (citing TEX. PROP. CODE § 112.051).


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Diocese unquestionably revoked in 1989,48 long before this dispute

arose.

On declarations (4) through (6) in the Final Judgment, TEC briefs

a single issue: whether control of the Diocese is an ecclesiastical issue

courts cannot decide.49 That ignores everything that has happened in

this landmark case.

II. ALL COURTS SAY THIS IS NOT AN

ECCLESIASTICAL DISPUTE

The Texas Supreme Court said this case should be decided by

reviewing the deeds and church charters: “Under the neutral

principles methodology, ownership of disputed property is to be

determined by considering evidence such as deeds to the properties,

terms of the local church charter (including articles of incorporation

and bylaws, if any), and relevant provisions of governing documentsof the general church.”50 In defiance of that mandate, Plaintiffs ask this

Court to forget all that and defer to TEC because the issues are

ecclesiastical. Yet neither side has asked the courts to decide who can

lead worship or attend conventions for either. This case concerns

property, and in those states that apply neutral principles (which is

48 CR29:10133-34; CR29:10169 (¶7); CR17:6202 (Canon 18.4: “No adverse claimto such beneficial interest by The Episcopal Church of the United States ofAmerica is acknowledged, but rather is expressly denied.”).

49 See TEC Br. at xii.

50 See Fort Worth at 651.


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most of them), property disputes are decided from the documents in

“legally cognizable form.”51 Those documents support judgment for

Defendants as a matter of law.

TEC continues to insist on deference because it cannot win under

neutral principles of state law. This is no coincidence; the only time the

deference and neutral principles methodolgies reach different results

is when a church must disregard the church documents to win. Churches

can draft their property documents so that either the local or national

leaders always win; but if they don’t, they cannot arbitrarily declare a

winner contrary to what those documents say. As former Chief Justice

Rehnquist wrote: “If the civil courts are to be bound by any sheet of

parchment bearing the ecclesiastical seal and purporting to be a decree

of a church court, they can easily be converted into handmaidens of

arbitrary lawlessness.”52

A. The Texas Supreme Court held this isn’t an ecclesiastical case

In the direct appeal, the Texas Supreme Court said that neutral

principles of state law “determin[e] which faction of a religious

organization is entitled to the property when the organization

51 See Jones v. Wolf , 443 U.S. 595, 606 (1979) (“And the civil courts will be boundto give effect to the result indicated by the parties, provided it is embodied insome legally cognizable form.”).

52 See Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 727 (1976)(Rehnquist, J., dissenting).


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splits.”53 That is Texas law in general, and the law of this case in

particular.

TEC still insists that deference is required because the issues

here are ecclesiastical. TEC made that same argument in the Texas

Supreme Court—and lost. In its brief filed in that Court in March of

2012, TEC told the Court that the identity of the leaders and members

of the Diocese were ecclesiastical issues requiring deference:

• “The identity of a church’s clergy, leaders, and members are

core ecclesiastical issues”;54

• “There is no dispute that the Local Episcopalians are thepersons who have remained ‘loyal’ to the Church and arerecognized by the Church as such, and that the Diocese theylead has been recognized by the Church as its continuingDiocese”;55 and

• “[T]hese determinations resolve the property dispute, anddictate that the Local Episcopalians are entitled to control theDiocese and its assets.”56

If these claims are “ecclesiastical” now, they would have been

“ecclesiastical” then too, and the Texas Supreme Court would have

deferred to TEC. But they weren’t, and the Court didn’t. The Court

said this case must be decided by considering the deeds, church


54 Brief for Appellee at 28, Fort Worth.

55 Id. at 27.

56 Id. at 15.


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charters, and state laws.57 None of those involve ecclesiastical

questions.

The Supreme Court also said the identity of the Corporation’s

trustees must be decided by state law, not deference to TEC.58 The

same rule applies to the Diocese, as it also is a legal entity formed

under and governed by Texas law.59 Since a dispute about the officers

of a Texas corporation is not ecclesiastical, then a dispute about the

officers of a Texas unincorporated association isn’t either. Courts

cannot defer to TEC on these issues.

B. The Second Court didn’t treat this as an ecclesiastical case

Five years ago, this Court rejected TEC’s argument that it must

defer to the church about which attorneys represented the Diocese and

the Corporation, deciding that issue by neutral principles of Texas

court rules. See In re Salazar , 315 S.W.3d 279, 285-86 (Tex. App.―FortWorth 2010, no pet.). If which attorneys represent those entities is not

an ecclesiastical issue, which officers represent those entities isn’t

either.

57 Fort Worth at 650, 651.

58 Id. at 652 (“[N]eutral principles courts do not defer to TEC’s decisions aboutnon-ecclesiastical matters such as the identity of the trustees of the Fort WorthCorporation.”).

59 TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. art. 1396—70.01, § 7(a) (“A nonprofit association is a legalentity separate from its members”) (currently TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE § 252.006).


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The facts are beyond dispute: the Diocese is governed by its

Convention,60 the Convention is governed by majority vote of its

delegates,61 and the Plaintiffs represent the small minority that lost at

that Convention.62 The issue here is whether a minority group can

walk out after losing, hold a rump convention, and declare themselves

to be the “true” diocese entitled to all church property. As this Court

said in 2010: “There is a single Fort Worth Diocese and Corporation,

which both a majority and a minority faction claim to control…. We

are aware of no statute or common law rule allowing attorneys to

prosecute a suit in the name of a corporation or other entity on behalf

of only one faction or part of that corporation or entity against another

part or faction.”63 Nor is there any statute or common law rule

allowing a minority faction to claim they represent the “true”

association. As this Court noted in a footnote, a minority that decamps

to hold a rump convention has simply started a new association.64

60 CR17:6163 (2006); CR17:6091 (1982).

61 CR17:6169 (2006); CR17:6097 (1982).

62 CR29:10170 (¶9); CR29:10397 (amending Art. I).

63 315 S.W.3d at 285.

64 See 315 S.W.3d at 285 n.2 (citing De Zavala v. Daughters of the Repub. of Tex.,124 S.W. 160, 164 (Tex. Civ. App.—Galveston 1909, writ ref’d).


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16AUS:698374.1

For 17 years, this Court has said neutral principles of state law

should govern church property disputes.65 Just as this Court applied

neutral principles from the Texas court rules in the mandamus appeal,

it should apply neutral principles from Texas corporate, association,

and property law in this appeal.

C. The U.S. Supreme Court says property suits aren’t

ecclesiastical unless the deeds incorporate a religious test

Property issues do not become ecclesiastical issues just because

the property belongs to a church. In Jones v. Wolf , the United States

Supreme Court stated: “The only question presented by this case is

which faction of the formerly united Vineville congregation is entitled

to possess and enjoy the property located at 2193 Vineville Avenue in

Macon, Ga. There can be little doubt about the general authority of civil

courts to resolve this question.”66 The Court held this was a legal issue

rather than an ecclesiastical issue, so long as the property documents

incorporated no religious tests.67 The property documents here do not.

That distinguishes the three cases discussed at length in TEC’s

brief. In Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral of Russian Orthodox Church, the

deed granted use of a cathedral to the ruling archbishop of the Russian

65 See Smith v. N. Tex. Dist. Council of Assem. of God, No. 2-05-425-CV, 2006 WL3438077, at *2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Nov. 30, 2006, no pet.); Dean v. Alford, 994S.W.2d 392, 395 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1999, no pet.).

66 See Jones v. Wolf , 443 U.S. 595, 602 (1979) (emphasis added).

67 See id. at 604.


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17AUS:698374.1

Orthodox Church “in accordance with the doctrine, discipline and

worship of the Holy Apostolic Catholic Church of Eastern Confession

as taught by the holy scriptures, holy tradition, seven ecumenical

councils and holy fathers of that church.”68 That deed incorporated a

religious test, so the property issue turned on an ecclesiastical issue. 69

There is no deed like that here.

In Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, corporate

documents stated that a property-holding corporation was to be

controlled by the diocesan bishop of the Serbian Orthodox Church.70

The Court held that case “essentially involves not a church property

dispute, but a religious dispute,”71 since the Mother Church had

exclusive authority to appoint or remove bishops.72 There is no

corporate document like that here. One member of the Corporation’s

board is the local bishop, but the corporate documents give the board

68

See 344 U.S. 94, 95 & n.1 (1952).69 Id. at 120-21.

70 See 426 U.S. 696, 709 (1976).

71 Id. at 709.

72 Id. at 699.


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18AUS:698374.1

“sole authority” to determine who that is,73 and nothing in the

Corporation’s bylaw gives TEC any right to supplant him.74

Finally, Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v.

EEOC was an employment dispute about firing a minister rather than

a property dispute about using church buildings.75 The present case is

not an employment dispute: no Defendants work for or represent TEC,

and no Plaintiffs work for or represent the Diocese. The only issue is

which faction can use the property, which is not an ecclesiastical

issue.76

Church splits often occur because of ecclesiastical differences,

but Jones v. Wolf urged churches to “structure relationships involving

church property so as not to require the civil courts to resolve

ecclesiastical questions.”77 That is true here: the deeds and church

charters state no religious tests for property ownership or control.

Absent such tests, this lawsuit is governed by law, not ecclesiology.

73 CR30:10532 (¶10); CR17:6062 (articles of incorporation) (“In the event of adispute or challenge regarding the identity of the Bishop of the body now knownas the Episcopal Diocese of Fort Worth, the Elected Trustees shall have the soleauthority to determine the identity and authority of the Bishop[.]”); CR17:6079 (bylaws) (same).

74 CR30:10531 (¶7).

75 See 132 S. Ct. 694, 699 (2012).

76 Masterson at 607 (noting that relationship between church groups is anecclesiastical matter, “[b]ut what happens to the property is not”).

77 Jones v. Wolf , 443 U.S. 595, 604 (1979) (internal quotations omitted) (quotingPresbyterian Church v. Hull Church, 393 U.S. 440, 449 (1969)).


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19AUS:698374.1

D. The trial court applied no ecclesiastical preference

Plaintiffs complain that the trial court “imposed its own

philosophical preference on how churches ought to be structured.”78

This bald charge of bias is insupportable. The trial court deferred to

the Plaintiffs’ arguments twice in previous years, and was reversed

both times. As the trial judge pointed out, if Plaintiffs’ arguments were

right, they would not be back in his courtroom:

THE COURT: And I ruled for you.

MR. TOBEY: Correct.

THE COURT: And the Supreme Court, if they thought thatwas the law, it would have been an easydecision to give your people the property.

MR. TOBEY: Right, and they’ve articulated --

THE COURT: Why didn’t they just uphold it? . . . Why wouldthey waste their time changing a law if they

agreed with you the whole time?79

The hearing transcript on the summary judgments shows the

trial court was focused on the votes taken at a convention governed by

majority vote, not on his personal views of church polity:

THE COURT: But why shouldn’t I -- why should I notdefer to what they did, what the diocesedid in their vote?

78 See Local TEC Br. at 18 (internal quotations omitted).

79 8RR22-23, 24.


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20AUS:698374.1

MR. LEATHERBURY: Well, because the Episcopal Church is ahierarchical organization, and the TexasSupreme Court recognized that….

THE COURT: How come they get to decide thatelection?

MR. LEATHERBURY: Because of hundreds of years of history,Your Honor.

THE COURT: So every time they have a --

MR. LEATHERBURY: In terms of the relationship with thehierarchical church organization and the

three-tiered structure, it’s the EpiscopalChurch as a hierarchical organization thatgets to determine who is the diocese andwho are the congregations….

THE COURT: Why don’t I defer to the diocese’sdetermination?

MR. LEATHERBURY: Because the diocese is subordinate to theEpiscopal Church, and it’s a question for

the Episcopal Church to determine who isthe diocese.80

Plaintiffs’ arguments are always the same: forget about the deeds,

charters, and state laws, and pay attention only to what TEC and its

lawyers say. The trial judge rejected that, as should this Court.

80 8RR11-15.


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21AUS:698374.1

E. Defendants have never said this is an ecclesiastical case

It has never been Defendants’ position that this case involves an

ecclesiastical dispute. Defendants have argued in every court duringthis lengthy litigation that no doctrinal controversy is involved:

• Defendants told the U.S. Supreme Court : “ Jones [v. Wolf ] simplyrecognized that in many cases—like this one—no issue ofdoctrinal controversy is involved in resolving church-property disputes under neutral principles of state law.Notably, [Plaintiffs’] petition does not allege that thisproperty dispute will require the state court to interpret

religious concepts or referee religious controversies in anyrelevant legal documents.”81

• Defendants told the Texas Supreme Court : “The exception for‘inherently religious’ issues could apply to a property suit inthe rare instance when a deed or charter provisionincorporates doctrinal standards. But there are no doctrinalstandards in the deeds or property provisions here.”82

• Defendants told the Second Court of Appeals: “[D]eference maybe required if a church’s governing documents employreligious terms such as the ‘custom and practices of thechurch,’ or if a church has no governing documents toconstrue. But the governing documents here require noinquiry into religious doctrine[.]”83

81 1SCR144-45 (internal quotations and citation omitted).

82 Appellant’s Brief at 14; Fort Worth.

83 See Relator’s Reply in Support of Petition for Mandamus at 10; In re Salazar ,315 S.W.3d 279 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth, no pet.) (No. 02-09-00405-CV).


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22AUS:698374.1

• Defendants told the 141st District Court : “This dispute haddoctrinal origins, but there are no doctrinal deeds orbylaws…. This case presents no doctrinal questions.”84

Given these clear and unequivocal statements, no reasonable person

could conclude from a sentence plucked out of context from the

voluminous record means the Defendants do believe this case involves

doctrinal issues.

III. LEADERSHIP AND WITHDRAWAL FROM A

CHURCH AREN’T ISSUES

TEC concedes “that the Diocesan Corporation holds all property

on behalf of and in trust for the Diocese and its parishes and

missions.”85 But it argues that identifying the “true” diocese and

“true” congregations is an ecclesiastical matter for TEC.86 That is not

what the Texas Supreme Court said when it held this was a legal issue

to be decided by the courts under neutral principles of state law.87

TEC claims two ecclesiastical questions are “at the core of this

dispute”: (1) who can lead the Diocese as a religious body, and (2)

whether the Diocese had authority to withdraw from TEC. But nobody

has asked the courts to decide those issues. The property documents

84 CR35:12587-88.

85 See TEC Br. at 27 (“[T]he ‘conclusive proof’ in this case shows that ‘title’ to theproperty at issue is held by the Diocesan Corporation ‘in its capacity’ as property-holding corporation for the ecclesiastical Diocese and its parishes and missions.”).

86 See id. at 30-33.



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23AUS:698374.1

don’t incorporate them, and the trial court’s Final Judgment says

nothing about them. TEC cannot avoid neutral principles of state law

by claiming this case involves ecclesiastical issues it doesn’t.

The trial court held as a matter of law that “Defendants are the

proper representatives of the Episcopal Diocese of Fort Worth, the

Texas unincorporated association formed in 1982.”88 Who controls a legal

entity is a legal question; the Supreme Court of Texas said civil courts

must decide that question in church property cases by applying state

law.89 The only dispute here concerns the lawful officers of two

entities: a Texas nonprofit unincorporated association (the Diocese)

and a Texas nonprofit corporation (the Corporation). Since these legal

entities were formed under Texas law, “that law dictates” how their

officers can be elected or replaced.90

Nor is there any dispute about who has withdrawn from

affiliation with any church conventions. Defendants do not attend

TEC’s General Convention, and Plaintiffs cannot attend the Diocese’s

Annual Convention.91 No right to property turns on whether a diocese

can withdraw from TEC. The Corporation amended its bylaws in 2006

88 CR39:14026 (¶6) (emphasis added).


90 See id. at 652.

91 2SCR190 (¶¶66-67); CR13555-56 (at 72:25-73:5); CR13565 (at 110:8-18); see alsoCR7019-61.


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24AUS:698374.1

to drop any reference to TEC,92 and the Diocese did the same in 2008.93

Texas law governs those amendments,94 and TEC cannot challenge

them on “ecclesiastical” grounds “absent specific, lawful provision in

the corporate documents.”95 Nothing in the governing documents ever

granted TEC any authority to approve or veto such amendments, 96 so

they are perfectly valid. Since nothing in the documents of either

entity requires affiliation with TEC, affiliation or disaffiliation is

irrelevant to this property dispute.

It is easy to separate ecclesiastical and property disputes in most

cases. For example, in 2004 the First Court of Appeals decided who

were the lawful directors of a corporation that owned a temple, but

declined to decide which minister could preside at the temple’s altar. 97

Nobody here has asked the courts to decide who can worship, preach,

pray, attend conventions, or do any other religious acts. Those are

92 CR17:6079 (Art. I).

93 CR29:10170 (¶9).

94 See Fort Worth at 652 (holding Texas law governs how Texas entities canamend their governing documents); see also Masterson at 608.

95 See Masterson at 609-10 (“Absent specific, lawful provisions in a corporation’sarticles of incorporation or bylaws otherwise, whether and how a corporation’sdirectors or those entitled to control its affairs can change its articles of

incorporation and bylaws are secular, not ecclesiastical, matters…. [U]nder neitherthe former nor the current statute is an external entity empowered to amend themabsent specific, lawful provision in the corporate documents.”).

96 CR34:11860 (¶7).

97 Chen v. Tseng, No. 01-02-01005-CV, 2004 WL 35989, at *6 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Jan. 8, 2004, no pet.)


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25AUS:698374.1

“ecclesiastical matter[s] over which civil courts generally do not have

jurisdiction. But what happens to the property is not ,” as the Texas

Supreme Court said.98 Since the issue is what happens to property,

that is not an ecclesiastical matter.

IV. THE PROPERTY IS HELD IN TRUST FOR THE

DEFENDANT DIOCESE & CONGREGATIONS

The Diocese’s Constitution and Canons have always required

that the Corporation “hold real property acquired for the use of a

particular Parish or Mission in trust for the use and benefit of such

Parish or Mission.”99 The capitalized terms “Parish” and “Mission”

have a specific meaning in the Diocese’s Constitution and Canons, as

defined by a provision relating to congregational corporations:

CANON 31

CORPORATIONS

Sec. 31.1 Any Parish, Mission or Diocesan Institutionwhich desires to organize a corporation to use inconnection with the administration of its affairs may do soupon compliance with the following requirements.

(a) If organized by a Parish or Mission, any suchcorporation shall be merely an adjunct orinstrumentality of such Parish or Mission; the

98 Masterson at 607 (internal citation omitted).

99 CR6102 (1982); CR6175 (2001); CR6254 (2008); see also CR6120 (1982); CR6201 (2001); CR6279 (2008).


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26AUS:698374.1

Parish or Mission itself, being the body in unionwith Convention , shall not be incorporated.100

This definition of “Parish” and “Mission” ─ the only one in theDiocese’s charters ─ is perfectly clear: “Parish” and “Mission” mean

the unincorporated associations in union with the Diocese’s

Convention. Any congregation not in union with that Convention is

not a “Parish” or “Mission” for which the Corporation holds property.

These have been the rules for over 30 years, and no court can re-write

them,101 or apply a different definition.102

According to the Diocese’s Constitution, only those “in union”

with the Diocese can attend its annual Convention.103 Who attended a

Convention requires no theologian; it is a matter of record.104 Plaintiffs

concede they have not attended the Diocese’s Convention since 2008,

and have been attending a different convention since then.105

100 CR6144 (1982), CR6216 (2006), CR6294 (2008).

101 See, e.g., Fiess v. State Farm Lloyds, 202 S.W.3d 744, 753 (Tex. 2006) (“[C]ourtsmust enforce the contract as made by the parties, and cannot make a new contractfor them, nor change that which they have made under the guise ofconstruction.”).

102 See FPL Energy, LLC v. TXU Portfolio Mgmt. Co., L.P., 426 S.W.3d 59, 63 (Tex.2014) (holding court must “consider the entire writing to harmonize and effectuateall provisions such that none are rendered meaningless.”).

103 CR17:6242 (2008); CR17:6163 (2006); CR17:6091 (1982).104 CR29:10171-72 (¶¶ 10-14); 29:10441-92.

105 CR38:13555-56 (Jambor depo. at 72:25-73:5: “Q. Again, it’s because you do notconsider yourself or the parish to be affiliated with the Episcopal Diocese of FortWorth under the Episcopal oversight of Bishop Jack Iker; is that correct? … A.True. We’re not affiliated with him.”); CR13565 (Jambor depo. at 110:8-18): “Q. …You said repeatedly that All Saints’, your parish, your affiliated congregation is


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28AUS:698374.1

As the Texas Supreme Court made clear, Texas courts must

“fulfill their constitutional obligation to exercise jurisdiction where it

exists, yet refrain from exercising jurisdiction where it does not

exist.”109 And they have a “constitutional duty” to decide property

disputes.110 As the U.S. Supreme Court said in Jones v. Wolf : “The State

has an obvious and legitimate interest in the peaceful resolution of

property disputes, and in providing a civil forum where the

ownership of church property can be determined conclusively.”111 The

record here conclusively shows that Defendants are entitled to

ownership and use of church property in the Diocese, so this Court

should affirm.

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Scott A. Brister

Scott A. Brister – SBN 00000024ANDREWS KURTH LLP111 Congress Ave., Suite 1700Austin, Texas 78701(512) 320-9200 (tel.); (512) 320-9292 (fax)[email protected]

J. Shelby Sharpe – SBN 18123000SHARPE TILLMAN & MELTON

109 Masterson at 606.

110 See id. at 596.

111 443 U.S. at 602.


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29AUS:698374.1

6100 Western Place, Suite 1000Fort Worth, Texas 76107(817) 338-4900 (tel.); (817) 332-6818 (fax)

R. David Weaver – SBN 21010875WEAVER & WEAVER, PLLC

1601 E. Lamar Blvd., Suite 102Arlington, Texas 76011

(817) 460-5900 (tel.); (817) 460-5908(fax)Email – [email protected]

ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANTS

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

I certify that this Appellees’ Brief contains 6,271 words ascalculated per Rule 9.4(i)(1) of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure.

/s/ Scott Brister

Scott Brister

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on March 4th, 2016, a true and correct copyof the foregoing Defendants’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment was forwarded to all counsel of record via electronic transmission.

Sandra Liser

Naman Howell Smith & Lee, PLLCFort Worth Club Building306 West 7th Street, Suite 405Fort Worth, Texas [email protected]

William D. Sims, Jr.

Thomas S. LeatherburyDaniel L. TobeyVINSON & ELKINS LLP2001 Ross Avenue, Suite 3700Dallas, Texas [email protected] @velaw.com


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30AUS:698374.1

Mary E. KostelThe Episcopal Churchc/o Goodwin|Procter LLP901 New York Ave., N.W.Washington, D.C. [email protected]

Jonathan D.F. Nelson1400 W. Abrams StreetArlington, TX 76013-1705 [email protected]

David Booth BeersGoodwin|Procter LLP901 New York Ave., N.W.Washington, D.C. [email protected]

Frank HillHILL GILSTRAP, P.C.1400 W. Abram StreetArlington, Texas 76013-1705 [email protected]

Kathleen WellsP.O. Box 101714Fort Worth, Texas [email protected]@episcopaldiocesefortworth.org

/s/ Scott A. BristerScott A. Brister


38/6714024

TAB A

141 252083 11

NO. 141-252083-11

THE EPISCOPAL CHURCH

et

al. § IN THE DISTRICT COURT

§

v

§

TARRANT COUNTY TEXAS

§

FRANKLIN SALAZAR et al. § 141sT JUDICIAL DISTRICT

FINAL JUDGMENT

This Final Judgment merges and supersedes the Court s orders o March 2,

2015, and June 10, 2015. In accordance with those orders, and having considered all

the parties pleadings, motions, responses, replies, evidence on file, governing law,

and arguments

o

counsel, the Court issues this Final Judgment.

The Court hereby

ORDERS

that Defendants Second Motion for Partial

Summary Judgment filed December 1 2014, is GRANTED except with respect to

claims relating to All Saints Episcopal Church (Fort Worth), and Plaintiffs Motion

for Partial Summary Judgment filed December 1 2014, is DENIED.

The Court further

ORDERS

that Defendants Third Motion for Partial

Summary Judgment Relating to All Saints Episcopal Church filed May 6, 2015,

is

GRANTED

and Plaintiffs Supplemental Motion for Partial Summary Judgment

on Claims Relating to All Saints Episcopal Church filed May 6, 2015,

is DENIED.

COURrS I N U T E ~ : < .

7...

TRANSACTION

/l.)...J._)

Jg E-MAJ'm '

md I

02 /l'Z'J

C


39/6714026

TAB A

141-252083-11

The Court further issues a DECL R TORY JUDGMENT pursuant

to

Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code§§ 37.001,

et seq.

declaring that:

1. Neutral principles o Texas law govern this case, and applying such law

is not unconstitutionally retroactive;

2. The Corporation o he Episcopal Diocese o Fort Worth and Defendant

Congregations hold legal title to all the properties listed on Exhibit 1 attached to this

Order, subject to control by the Corporation pursuant to the Diocese s charters.

3. The Episcopal Diocese o Fort Worth and the Defendant Congregations

in union with that Diocese hold beneficial title to all the properties listed on Exhibit

I attached to this Order.

4. Defendants Dr. Franklin Salazar, Jo Ann Patton, Walter Virden, III,

Rod Barber, and Chad Bates are, and have been since 2005, the properly elected

Trustees o the Corporation for the Episcopal Diocese o Fort Worth.

5.

Defendant Jack Iker

is

and has been since 2005, the proper Chairman

o the board and one o the Trustees o the Corporation for the Episcopal Diocese o

Fort Worth.

6. Defendants are the proper representatives o the Episcopal Diocese o

Fort Worth, the Texas unincorporated association formed in 1982.


40/6714025

TAB A

141-252083-11

7. The Defendants hold legal title and control o the funds and

endowments listed on Exhibit 2 attached to this Order, subject to the terms

o

each.

8 Plaintiffs have no express, implied, or constructive trust in the

properties or funds listed in the Exhibits attached to this Order.

9. Defendants have not breached any fiduciary duty to or special

relationship with any Plaintiffs.

The Court further

ORDERS

that the following listed claims and defenses

remain pending in Cause No. 141-23 7105-09, and to the extent they are also pending

in this cause arc hereby

DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDI E

and preserved for

litigation in Cause No. 141-237105-09: claims for attorneys fees in both causes,

Conversion, Texas Business Commercial Code

§

16.29, damages for Breach o

Fiduciary Duty (as opposed to as a predicate o constructive trust), Action to Quiet

Title, and for an Accounting.

The Court further ORDERS that Plaintiffs take nothing, and that Defendants

recover costs o court in this cause.

The Court further ORDERS that Plaintiffs are to cancel all is pendens filed

as to properties listed on Exhibits I and 2, and surrender possession thereof, to the

Defendants 30 days after this Judgment becomes final.


41/6714027

TAB A

141-252083-11

The Court further OR ERS the Plaintiffs to desist from holding themselves

out

s

leaders

o

the Diocese or the Corporation when this Order becomes final and

appealable.

All relief not expressly granted herein

is

denied. This judgment disposes o

all parties and claims in the above-referenced case and is a final and appealable

judgment.

Signed this z fday ofJuly 2015.

~

~ s i i n g


42/67

14028

TAB A41-252083-11

EXHI IT

Joint

Property Description

Original Grantee

Appendix

Locator

6.0 acre tract out

of

Block 2, Irrigation Subdivision, John A. Scott Survey No.7 Abstract 297, and

Bishop C. Avery Mason

JA00876

the O.H.P. Davis Survey, Abstract 65, Wichita County, Texas

JA00877

A part of Survey No. 16 for 640 acres patented to John A. Scott, Assignee, on March 21st, 1855, and

Bishop Alexander C.

JA00890

being the East 70 feet

of

Lots (9) and (10) in Block No. One Hundred Ninety (190), in the town

of

Wichita Falls, in Wichita County, as shown by the recorded map or plat there of

Garret

JA00892

The West Fifty (50) feet

of

Lots Nos. I and 2, and the West Fifty (50) feet

of

the North Ten (10) feet

3

of Lot

No.3

in Block No. 190

of

he original Town of Wichita Falls, Texas, and being the same


JA00896

property described in a deed from John M. Barnard, et al, to K.W . Anderson, et al, dated August 15,

JA00897

1947, and recorded in Volume 463; page 163 of the Deed Records of Wichita County, Texas

The North Forty ( 40) feet

of

Lot No. 7 and the south ten

I

0) feet of Lot No. 8 in Block No. 190 in

JA00901

4

the original city of Wichita Falls, Texas according to the plat thereofof record in the Deed records

of


JA00902

Wichita County, Texas

The North ninety-five (95) feet of Lots Nos. four (4), five (5) and six (6), Block No. thirteen (13),

.

5

East Breckenridge Addition to the City of Breckenridge, a plat of said Addition being on tile in the


JA00908

office of the Stephens Countv Clerk

JA00910

Lot 12, Block 215, Dalworth Park Addition to the City of Grand Prairie, Dallas County, Texas,

Bishop A. Donald JA00953

6

commonly known as 734 Colle ge St. College St., Grand Prairie, Texas, according to the plat thereof

as recorded in Volume I PaRes 546 and 547

of

the Map Records

of

Dallas Countv, Texas

Davies

JA00956

Part of Block Number Thirty-Two (32)

of

he Wiggins Addition to the City of Mineral Wells, Palo

7

Pinto, Texas; being the same property described in the Deed from Betty

J.

Wall, et vir, to Tom

A.

Bishop trustees

of

St. JA00991

Whitley, dated March 29, 1972; recorded in Vol. 406, Page 218 of the Deed Records of Palo Pinto

Luke s

JA00993

County, Texas

Being a 0.687 Acre tract of land in T E L Co Survey No 2856, A-784, Montague County, Texas,

Bishop A. Donald

JA00999

8

and being a part of a 170 acre tract described in deed from Lancaster Ould to J.C. Baccus recorded in

Vol.

R.

Page 411, Deed Records, Montague County, Texas

Davies JA00/001

9

Out of the M.E. Chuck survey of 640 acres and a part of Lots 5, 6, 7 and 8 of Block II Lindsay s

Bishop Alexander C. JA0/02/

Addition to the City of Gainesville

Garret

JA0/024


43/67

14029

TAB A

141-252083-11

EXHI IT

Joint

Property Description Original Grantee

Appendix

Locator

Three tracts of land situated in Block 21, Denton County School Lands, Wichita County, Texas, and

containing 4.6 acres, more or less. TRACT NO.

1:

Being the Northwest comer of Lot I, Block I,

Section E-1, University Park Addition to the City of Wichital Falls, Texas. TRACT NO.2: Being

JA01040-

1

located southerly along said East right-of-way line 259.00 feet from the South right-of-way line

of


JAOJ046

Lindale Drive, said point also being the Northwest corner

of

the above described tract. TRACT NO.

3: Beginning at the point of intersection

of

the southwesterly right-of-way line

of

Lindale Drive with

Northwest boundary of Section T-I University Park Addition to the City of Wichita Fails, Texas

Being a part of Ambrose Crain Survey, Abstract No. 83

Bishop

C.

Avery Mason

JAOI072-

JA01073

2

Part of Lot Number 3, in Block Number 8 of the Original Town of Weatherford Bishop Harry T. Moore

JA01074-

JA01076

All

of

Block 14 Chamberlin Arlington Heights, First Filing, an Addition

to

the City of Fort Worth,

JA01103-

13

Tarrant County, Texas , according to the plat ther eof recorded in Volume 63, Page 21, Deed Records, Bishop C. Avery Mason

JA01105

Tarrant Countv, Texas

Lots 6, 7, 8, the West

15

feet of Lot 5 and the East 20 feet of Lot 9, Block 26, Chamberlin Arlington

JA01116-

14

Heights First Filing, and Addition to the City

of

fort Worth, Tarrant County, Texas, according to the Bishop C. Avery Mason

JA01120

plat thereof recorded in Volume 63, Page 21, Deed Records, Tarrant County, Texas

Being a tract of land out of the John McCoy Survey, Abstract No. 381, Hood County, Texas, a

Bishop

A.

Donald

. A01205-

15

portion

of

the tract

of

land described in the deed, to J.R. Hopkins and wife, Mary Alice Hopkins,

recorded on Page 497 in Volume 105 of the Deed Records of Hood County, Texas

Davies

JA01208

Being all that certain tract or lot

of

land, lying and situated in the City of Cleburne, Johnson County,

16

Texas being Lots Number One

I )

and Three 3) in Block Nineteen 19), the same being the lots Bishop Alexander

C.

JAOJ219-

conveyed by O.J., J.A. and O.P. Arnold to Mrs. M.A. McNeece by deed dated February II 1892 of Garret

JA01220

record

in

Volume 47, Page 541, Johnson County Record of deeds

17

Lot No. Two 2) in Block No. Eleven 11) of the Airport Addition to the City of Graham, Young


JA01235-

Countv, Texas

. A01236

FIRST TRACT: Being all of Lot No. I in Block No. II of the Airport Addition to the City of

JA01240-

18

Graham, Texas SECOND TRACT: Being

1.2

acre, more or less, out

of

the B.F. Dudney Survey, Bishop C. Avery Mason

JAOJ243

Abstract No. 1406, and the William McLeoud Survey, Abstract No. 1481, Young Countv, Texas

2


44/67


45/67

14031

TAB A41-252083-11

EXHI IT

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Original Grantee Appendix

Locator

7

A 5.32 acre tract ofland situated in the Robert Always Survey, Abstract No.4, Hood County, Texas


JA0/753

and commonly known as Camp Crucis, 2100 Loop 567, Granbury, Texas

JA0/759

28

A 154.383 acre tract of land situated in the Robert Always Survey, Abstract No.4, Hood County,


JA0/768

Texas and commonly known as Camp Crucis, 2100 Loop 567, Granbury, Texas

JA0/770

A part of Survey No. 16 for 640 acres patented to John A. Scott, Assignee, on March 21st 1855, and

being Eighty feet

off

of the Southwest end

of

Lots No. Nine (9) and Ten

(I

0) in Block No. One

Bishop Alexander C.

JA0/873

9

Hundred and Ninety (190) in the town of Wichita Falls, in said County being the same property

conveyed to me J.C. Zeigler and wife on January 23rd 1913, by deed recorded in Vol. 63, Page 609 of

Garret

JA0/876

the Deed Records of Wichita County

Seventeen and one-half (17 1/2') feet off

of

the West side of Lot No. Two (2) and all

of

Lots

JA0/894

3

No. Three (3) and Four (4) in Block No. Twelve (12) of the Onstott Addition to the town

of

Hubbard

Bishop Harry T. Moore

City, Hill County, Texas

JA0/897

Block D, COLLEGE HILLS ADDITION BLOCKS C D being a Revision

of

a Portion of Block A,

Block

B

and Abandoned Portion of University Drive,

an

Addition to the City

of

Arlington, Tarrant

County, Texas, according to the plat thereof recorded in Volume 388-195, Page 34, as amended by

plat recorded in Volume 388-211, Page 8 Plat Records

of

Tarrant County, Texas, said Block D being

comprised of all

oft

he following tracts of land: TRACT I: Block "B" COLLEGE HILLS

ADDITION, an Addition to the City

of

Arlington, Tarrant County, Texas, according to the plat

thereo f recorded in Volume 388-C, Page 182, Plat Records, Tarrant County, Texas as conveyed by

JA0/902

3

C.H. Wilemon, Jr.

to

C. Avery Mason, as Bishop

of

he Protestant Episcopal Church, for the Diocese

Bishop C. A very Mason

JA0/904

of Dallas, in the State of Texas, his successors in office and assigns, recorded in Volume 2264, Page

600, Deed Records, Tarrant County, Texas Tract 2: Pan of Block A", COLLEGE HILLS

ADDITION, an Addition to the City of Arlington, Tarrant County, Texas, according to the plat

thereof recorded in Volume 388-C, Page 182, Plat Records, Tarrant County, Texas, as conveyed by

C.H. Wilemon, C.H. Wilemon, Jr., and Stewart W. DeVore to C. Avery Mason, as Bishop of the

Protestant Episcopal Church for the Diocese ofDa Ias, in the State of Texas, his successors in office

and assigns, recorded in Volume 2692, Page 441, Deed Records, Tarrant County, Texas

3

Being

pan

of Block "A" of COLLEGE HILLS ADDITION to the City of Arlington, Tarrant County,

Bishop

C.

Avery Mason

JA0/906

Texas JA0/908

4


46/67

14032

TAB A -------

141-252083-11

EXHI IT

Joint


Original Grantee Appendix

Locator

33

All of Lots

One

I), Two(2), and Th ree (3), in Block Twelve ( 12), East Breckenridge Addition to the


JAOJ994

City of Breckenridge, Stephens Countv, Texas

JA01995

34

Being a part

of

Block

4,

Hirshfield's Addition, to the City

of

Fort Worth


JA02031

JA02033

35

The North 56 1/2 feet, Lot 6, Block 4, Hirschfield Addition to the City of Fort Worth, Tarrant


JA02034

Countv, Texas

JA02044

A tract or parcel ofland out of he C. Brown Survey, Abstract 157, situated in Tarrant County,

Texas, and more particularly the same tract of Land conveyed by Fort Worth National Bank, Trustee,

36

to C. Avery Mason, Bishop of the Diocese

of

Dallas

of

he Protestant Episcopal Church in the United


JA02107

States

of

America, as recorded in Volume 3815, Page 647, Deed Records, Tarrant County, Texas,

JA02111

legal description in said deed being later corrected by Correction Warranty Deed recorded in Volume

7067, Page 1864, Deed Records of Tarrant County, Texas

Being a 3.938 acre tract or parcel of land, more or less, out of the N.H. CARROLL SURVEY situated

in Tarrant County, Texas and being more particularly the south part

of

a tract known as Tract 25 as

recorded in Vol. 2823, Page 387; the south part of a tract known as Trac t 24 as recorded in Vol. 2598,

Page 103; the south part

of

a tract known as Tract 24 as recorded in Vol. 2598, Page 103; the south

37

part of a trac t known as Tract 23 as recorded in Vol. 2196, Page 374, all in the Deed Records of


JA02115

Tarrant County, Texas, said part

of

he three Trac ts being described as one by metes and bounds in

JA02117

Deed Recorded as Volume 3901, Page 525, Deed Records, Tarrant County, Texas. Said tract being

platted into Lots 23B, 24B and 25B, SAINT ELIZABETH'S SUBDIVISION,

an

addition to the City

of

River Oaks, Tarrant County, Texas according

to

the plat recorded in Volume 388-28, Page 33, Plat

Records, Tarrant County, Texas

38

Being the East I 00 feet of Lots I and 2, in Block 4; and being a portion of lots I and 2 in Block 4 of


JA02123

the R. M. Page Addition

to

the City

of

Fort Worth, Tarrant County, Texas

JA02124

Parts of Lots No.4 and in Block 4

of

R M. Page's Addition to the City of Fort Worth in Tarrant

JA02126

39

County, Texas, according to his Second Revised Plat, which plat is

of

record in Vol. 63, Page 142 of Bishop C. Avery Mason

JA02127

the Plat Records of Tarrant County

4

Lot

No.5,

in Block No. 8, Ryao Place Addition,

to

the City of Fort Worth, Tarran t County, Texas,


JA02163

according to plat recorded in Volume 310, Page 80, Deed Records of Tarrant County, Texas

JA02165

5


47/67

14033

TAB A · · · · ·

·

·

141-252083-11

EXHI IT

Joint


Original Grantee

Appendix

Locator

41

Lot Eighteen (18), NORTH WOODS ADDITION (Repla t) to the City

of

Mineral Wells, Texas as Bishop A. Donald

JA02201

shown bv the Plat of record in Volume 2, Page 109, Plat Records of Palo Pinto County, Texas;

Davies

.JA02210

Lots

l

2, 3, 17

18

and 19, in Block No. l

of

Meadowbrook Addition to the City

of

Fort Worth, in

Tarrant County, Texas, according to the recorded plat there of

of

record in Volume 1944, Pages 43-44

4

of the Plat Records of Tarrant County, Texas, and subject to the easements and building lines shown


JA02254

in

said plat. Being Replatted into Tract

A

Block 1 Meadowbrook Addition to the City of Fort Worth,

JA02256

Tarrant County, Texas, according to the recorded plat in Volume 388-16, Page 261 of the Plat

Records of Tarrant County, Texas

BEING a4.837 acre tract of land and a part of the JAMES HYDEN SURVEY, AbstractNo.712,

Tarrant County, Texa•, and part

of

a 46.36 acre tract described in deed to J.J. Randol by Jane Sutton,

43

of

record in Volume 2718, Page 216, Deed Records

of

Tarrant County, Texas. Said 4.837 acres later


JA02283

platted into Lot l Block A, ST. MARK S ADDITION, an addition to the City

of

Arlington, Tarrant

JA02284

County, Texas according

to

the plat thereof recorded in Volume 388-82, Page 50, Plat Records,

Tarrant Countv, Texas

Lots Sixteen (16) and Seventeen (17),

n

Block Seventeen (17) of RICHLAND HILLS, THIRD

JA02325

44

FILING an addition to the City of Fort Worth, Tarrant County, Texas, (now to Richland Hills)


JA02326

according to plat records in Book

18.16

Page 539, Deed Records of Tarrant County, Texas

Being a4.784 acre tract of land out of the S.D. Kelly Survey, Abstract No. 916, and Lot 13, S.D.

KELLY ADDITION, an Addition to the City

of

Arlington, Tarrant County, Texas said tract ofland

45

being more fully described in Warranty Deed in Volume 7231, Page 1009, Deed Records of Tarrant Bishop A. Donald

JA02330

County, Texas, said 4.784 acre tract having since been replatted and is now know as: Lot 13, S.D.

Davies

JA02331

KELLY ADDITION, an addition to the City of Arlington, Tarrant County, Texas, according to the

plat recorded in Volume 388-154, Page 55 Plat Records, Tarrant County, Texas

LOT 22 in Block 29, Rosedale Park

No.2

an addition to the City of Fort Worth, Tarrant County,

46

Texas, same being a replat of Block 15 21, 22, 27, 28 and 29, and parts of Blocks 14 20 and 26 of Bishop

A.

Donald

JA02344

Rosedale Park

No.2

according to the plat thereof recorded in Volume 388-V, Page

l

Plat Records, Davies

JA02346

Tarrant County Texas

47

LOTS 20 and 21, Rosedale Park No.2 an addition to the City

of


Bishop A. Donald

JA02347

Davies

JA02354

6


48/67

14034

TAB A- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1 4 1 - 2 5 2 0 8 3 - 1 1 - - - - - - · - - - - ~ - - - - - - - - - - · - - -

EXHI IT

Joint


Original Grantee

Appendix

Locator

Being a portion of Stalcup Road right-of-way to be closed, adjacent to Lot 22, Block 29, ROSEDALE

Bishop A. Donald

JA02358

48

PARK NO.2 an Addition to the City of Fort Worth, Tarrant County, Texas, according to the Plat

ther eof recorded in Volume 388-V, Page 1

of

the Plat Records

of

said Tarrant County

Davies

JA02361

Lot 2, St. Stephens Subdivision of Wichita Falls, Wichita County, Texas, commonly known as 5023

JA02365

49 Lindale, Wichita Falls, Texas 76310. Being a portion

of

the Final Plat recorded in Volume 22, Page


JA02370

145-146, Plat Records of Wichita County, Texas, dated September 16, 1974

Being a part of Lot 6, Block

2,

Trueland Addition to the City

of

Fort Worth, Tarrant County, Texas,

and being more particularly described by metes and bounds found in Volume 3932, Page 232, Deed

5

Records, Tarrant County,

Texas;

Said portion

of

Lot 6,

is

combined with Lot 3, Block 2,


JA02383

TRUELAND ADDITION, and platted into Lot 3R, Block 2, TRUELAND ADDITION, an addition to

JA02399

the City of Fort Worth, Tarrant County, Texas, according to the plat the reof recorded in Volume 388-

93, Page 971, Plat Records, Tarrant County, Texas

Part of Lots 4 and 5, in Block 2, TRUELAND ADDITION, an Addition to the City of

fort

Worth,

5

Tarrant County, Texas, being that land shown in deed dated August II 1977, in Book 6324, Page

Bishop A. Donald

JA02390

629, Deed Records

of

Tarrant County, Texas from Edward Joyce to Ruth

L.

Joyce, as her sole and

Davies

JA02391

separate property

Lot 3, Block 2, TRUELAND ADDITION, and A pan of Lot 6, Block 2, TRUELAND ADDITION,

an Addition to the City

of

Fort Worth, Ta rrant County, Texas, according to the plat thereof recorded

JA02395

52

in Volume 348, Page 587, Plat Records, Tarrant County, Texas. BOTH OF THE ABOVE mentioned


JA2397

tracts of land were replatted in 1976 and are now known as: Lot JR Block 2, TRUELAND

ADDITION, an Addition to the City of Fort Worth, Tarrant County, Texas

53

3.791 Acres of he H H Hall Survey 49, Abstra ct 400, in Brown County, Texas, commonly known as


JA02484

1800 Good Shepherd Dr., Brownwood, Texas 76801

JA02485

54

Being all

oflots

I, 2, and

4,

the East one-half 112)oflot 3, and the East one-half 112)

of

Lot 6, all in


JA02489

Block 4, Slaughter Barber West Addition to the City of Mineral Wells, Palo Pinto County, Texas

JA02491

7


49/67

14035

TAB A

141-252083-11

EXHI IT

Joint


Original Grantee

Appendix

Locator

Being part

of

Block Four, Slaughter Barbar's West Addition, to the City

of

Mineral Wells, Palo

55

Pinto County, Texas; according to plat recorded in Volume I , Page 450, of the Deed Records of

Bishop

A.

Donald

JA02499

Palo Pinto County, Texas; being part

of

a certain tract described in Volume 485, Page 490,

of

the

Davies

JA02502

Deed Records

of

Palo Pinto County, Texas

All that certain lot and parcel

of

land situated in the City of Gainesville, Cooke County, Texas, being

JA02506

56

part

of

Lots No. Five (5) and Six (6) in Block No. Thirty-one (31)

of

Lindsay's Addition to the said

Bishop

C.

A very Mason

City

of

Gainesville. Texas

JA02507

Being the South 30 feet of Lots II through

15

inclusive, all in Block D , East Breckenridge

Wardens and Vestry

of

JA00920

57

Addition to the City

of

Breckenridge, Stephens County, Texas

St. Andrew's Episcopal

JA00921

Church, Breckenridge

A part

of

Block 2

of

June Smith Addition in Fort Worth in Tarrant County, Texas, and embracing the

Rector Wardens and

58

tract conveyed to Aardvark Oil Company by a deed recorded in Volume 3230, Page 249 of the Deed

Vestry

of

St. Andrew's

JAOJ301

Records

of

Tarrant County, Texas

Episcopal Church, Fort

JAOJ306

Worth

Rector, Wardens, and

59

That tract

or

parcel

of

land out

of

Block 2, Junius W. Smith Addition to the City

ofF

ort Worth,

Vestry

of

St. Andrew's

J OJ 310

Tarrant County, Texas, known also as June Smith Addition


JAOJ313

Worth

Lots 9 and I 0, Block

10 ofRIDGLE

ADD[TJQN, an Addition to the City

of

Fort Worth, Tarrant

Trustee

of

1985

Permanent fund, St.

JA01317

6

County, Texas, according to map or plat thereof recorded in Volume 1321, Page 273, of the Plat

Andrew's Episcopal

JAOJ319

Records

of

Tarrant County, Texas

Church, Fort Worth

61

Lot No. Four (4) in Block No. Four (4)

of

Hirshfield Addition to the City of Fort Worth, Tarrant

St. Andrew's Parish

JAOJ732

County, Texas

Episcopal, Fort Worth

JAOJ733

Seven (7) tracts, being 144.081 acres more or less, located in the MEP and PRR Co. Survey, Abstract

All Saints' Episcopal

JA01868

62

No.937 and the

HR

Moss Survey, Abstract No. 888, Parker County, Texas

Church, Weatherford,

JAOJ869

Texas

8


50/67

14036

TAB A41-252083-11

EXHI IT

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Original Grantee

Appendix

Locator

All of Block 4

of

HIRSHFIELD ADDITION, an Addition to the City of Fort Worth, Tarrant County,

St. Andrew s Episcopal

63

Texas. Said Block 4

of

HIRSHFIELD ADDITION, is revised and platted in to Block 4R,

Church

ofF

ort Worth,

JA02026

HIRSHFIELD ADDITION, an Addition to the City of Fort Worth, Tarrant County, Texas, according

Texas

JA02027

to the plat the reof recorded in Volume 388-207, Page , Plat Records, Tarrant County, Texas

The north fifty-six and one-ha lf feet

of

lot six in block four

of

Hirschfield Addition to the City

of

Fort

Rector and Wardens of

JA02039

64

St. Andrew s Parish, Fort

Worth, Tarrant County, Texas

Worth, Texas

JA02040

Rector, Wardens and

65

Lot I, Block 4, Hirschfield Addition to the City of

Vestry of St. Andrew s

JA02049



JA02077

Worth, Texas

Rector, Wardens and

66

Being the North one-half of Lot 2, Block 4, Hirschfield Addition, to the City of Fort Worth, Tarrant Vestry, St. Andrew s

JA02079

County, Texas


JA02095

Worth

Lot 8, Block4, Hirshfield (Hirschfield) Addition, to the City of Fort Worth, Tarrant County,

Texas,

Rector, Wardens and

67

as

described in the deed to Allright Properties, Inc. recorded in Volume 6959, Page

251

of the Tarrant

Vestry, St. Andrew s

JA02096

County Deed Records


JA02099

Worth

Rector, Wardens and

68

Being the South I 01.5 feet of Lot 3, Block 4, Hirshfield Addition, to the City of Fort Worth, Tarrant Vestry, St. Andrew s

JA02100

County, Texas Episcopal Church, Fort

JA02103

Worth

Lot 1-A, Block

II,

GLEN GARDEN ADDITION, First Filing, to the City

of

Fort Worth, Tarrant

St. Timothy s

JA02405

69

County, Texas, according to the Plat recorded in Volume 388-F, Page 395, Plat Records, Tarrant

County, Texas

Episcopal Church

JA02407

Lot

12

Block 12, Hillcrest Addition to the City of

Permanent Fund of St.

7

Andrew s Episcopal


Church

9


51/67

14037

TAB A41-252083-11

EXHIBIT

Joint


Original Grantee

Appendix

Locator

Surface of Lot 5, Block 6, Waldon Estate, an addition to the City of Breckenridge in Stephens

Corporation of Episcopal

JA00914

7

County, Texas as shown on the amended map or plat

of

said addition

of

record in the office of the

County Clerk of Stephens County, Texas

Diocese

of

Fort Worth

JA00916

Being LOT

II

in the Block 215

of

DALWORTH PARK ADDITION, an addition to the City

of

Corporation

of

Episcopal

JA00925

7

Grand Prairie, Dallas County, Texas according to the map thereof recorded in Volume I, Page 546 of

the Map Records of Dallas County, Texas

Diocese

of

Fort Worth

JA00928

Being Lots

13

and 14 in Block 215

ofDALWORTH

PARK ADDITION, an addition to the City of

73

Grand Prairie, Dallas County, Texas according to the map ther eof recorded in

Documents

FW Diocese Brief