Future Convergences: Technical Communication as Cognitive Science

8/7/2019 Future Convergences: Technical Communication as Cognitive Science

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FUTURE CONVERGENCES: TECHNICAL COMMUNICATION RESEARCH AS COGNITIVE

SCIENCE

ABSTRACTCognitive scientistAndyClark(2008)has argued, the studyofmindmight[]needtoembrace

avarietyofdifferentexplanatoryparadigms whosepointofconvergencelies intheproduction

ofintelligentbehavior (p. 95). This articleoffers uptechnical communicationresearch as just

such aparadigm. Itdescribes technical communicationresearch pastandpresenttoarguethat

ourdisciplinaryknowledgeoftools,workenvironments,andperformanceassessmentis a

necessary complementtoamorerobustscienceofthemind.

INTRODUCTION

InSupersizing the Mind: Embodiment, Action, and Cognitive Extension, cognitive scientistAndy

Clark(2008) arguedthatthe studyofmindmight[] needtoembraceavarietyofdifferent

explanatoryparadigms whosepointofconvergencelies intheproductionofintelligent

behavior (p. 95). I wouldliketotakeClarkathis wordandofferuptechnical communication

research as justsuch aparadigm. As a cognitive scientist,Clarkwants totreatexternal,

nonbiologicalelements as partofthe humanmind. AsClarkacknowledged,though, cognitive

scientists typicallytreatthe brainastheirprimaryobjectofstudy,and sotheyoftenlacka

theoreticalandresearch methodologyforunderstandingmanyofthenonbiologicalelements

thatarepartandparcelofthe humanmind.Clarkhas spentnearlytwodecades developing,

defending,andrefining his extendedmindmodel.Describingtheactofwritinginrelationto

thinking,forexample,Clarkargued, I wouldliketogofurtherand suggestthat[theindividual]

was actuallythinkingonthepaper (p.xxv). Thephysicaltaskofwritingthepencilandthe


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paperreliablyandrobustlyprovides afunctionalitywhich,wereitprovided bygoings-onin

the headalone,wewould haveno hesitationindesignatingas partofthe cognitive circuitry (p.

xxv).Movingfurtherindeveloping his modelofthemindas extended,Clarkconcluded, the

localmechanisms ofmind,ifthis is correct,arenotallinthe head (p.xxviii). Additionally,

Menary (2010) wrotethatintheextendedmindmodel some cognitiveprocessingis

constitutedbyactivefeatures oftheenvironment (p. 2),which Clarksees as comprisedof

brains, bodies, cultures,andtools. Theextendedmindmodel (Clark& Chalmers, 1998; Clark,

2003; Hurly, 2010; Logan, 2008; Menary, 2006, 2007, 2010; Ross & Ladyman, 2010; Sutton,

2010; Wheeler, 2010; Wilson, 2010) stands in starkcontrasttoavisionofhuman cognitionas

brainbound. Ratherthan seeingus as brainbound,Clark(2003) posits humans as creatures

whose minds are special precisely because they are tailored-made for multiple mergers and

coalitions (p. 7).

Clarks modelnecessarily challenges how a scienceofmindoughttolookandwhich

disciplines areallowedtoparticipateinit. I positiontechnical communicationresearch as a

necessary complementto cognitive science sothatourdisciplinemightimaginefuture,

mutually beneficialpoints ofconvergencewith cognitive science,andto seewhatthis

relationshipdoes forus and how itdraws onourmethodological strengths andtheoretical

sophistication.Clarks workconfronts the historical,theoretical,andempiricalobstacles to his

model: Technical communicationresearch provides arich understandingofthatmodelin

practicalandrhetoricalterms. Thatis,technical communicationresearch helps us ask, how can

wedescribeandexplainparticularextensions ofmind,and,mostimportantly, cultivateand

assess theseextendedminds?

After briefly summarizingthekeyelements ofClarks extendedmindmodelandthe

historyoftechnical communicationresearch from which thesepoints ofconvergenceemerge, I


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markthreepoints offuture convergencetodemonstrate how technical communication

researchers describe,explain, cultivate,andassess extendedminds. Thefirstpointof

convergenceaddresses theroleoftools intheextendedmindmodel.Clarkpersuasively

demonstrates how tools areoftenpartandparcelofthe humanmind; however, his modellacks

theparadigmatic powerto saywhythis orthattoolandnotanother. Researchers focusedon

usability (Van Ittersum, 2009; Whittemore, 2008) providetherequisiteexplanations for

particular,tool-drivenextensions ofminds. The secondpointofconvergencedeals with

environmentandtheroleitplays in scaffoldingand cultivatingextendedminds. Ifminds are

necessarilyextendedacross cultures andenvironments,thentheabilityoftechnical

communicationresearchers todocument,describe,anddiscerntheoperationandimpactof

environments (Winsor, 2001) as wellas theorizeandenactinstitutional change (Porteretal.,

2001) withinthoseenvironments is crucial.

Thethirdandfinalpointofconvergence centers onthethornyquestionofperformance

assessment. Oneofthe common concerns raisedinresponsetoClarks modelis thatof

evaluationorattributions ofresponsibility. Becausethe humanmindand, byextension,

humanmotivationand behaviorareextendedacross, bodies, brains, cultures,environments,

andtools,theargumentgoes,itwill becomedifficulttoassess or holdindividualpersons

accountablefortheiractions. Researchers exploringalternativemethods of

workplace/performanceassessments (Henry, 2010) andrhetorics ofdecisionmaking (Miller,

1990) provideways ofaddressingthese concerns.

I conclude bypointingtowardways thatwe canfacilitate such convergences through

interdisciplinaryendeavors. Interdisciplinary convergenceis notwithoutits difficulties and

pitfalls, however. Tolocatetheinterdisciplinarityofthis projectwithintechnical

communication scholarship, I relyon Johnsons (2004/1998) readingofKleins (1990) caveats


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aboutinterdisciplinarywork. I do so both todemonstratemyawareness ofsuch complications

andtoexplicate how thepresentprojectavoids thepitfalls identified by Klein,which often

hauntwhatJohnson called, thepracticeofinterdisciplinary borrowing (p. 27):

1. distortionandmisunderstandingofborrowedmaterial;2. useofdata,methods, concepts,andtheories outofcontext;3. useofborrowingoutoffavorintheoriginal context(includinganoverrelianceon

old chestnuts);

4. illusions ofcertaintyaboutphenomenatreatedwith cautionor skepticism intheiroriginaldisciplines;

5. overrelianceononeparticulartheoryorperspective; and6. atendencytodismiss contradictorytests,evidence,orexplanations. (p. 88)MeetingwhatKlein (1990), borrowingfrom Lauer, has called the burden of

comprehension (p. 88),and confrontingifnotexorcising such demons, I havefollowed several

courses ofaction. I have correspondedwith AndyClarkandMaarten Derksentoinsurethe

validityofmy claims andto cultivatepreciselytheinterdisciplinaryrelationships I suggest

here. Although I draw primarilyfrom Clarkhere,ourfields useofHutchinss workas wellas

thetraces ofHutchins inthis workareinsuranceenough from overrelianceononeparticular

theoryorperspective (p. 88). Additionally,ourfields comfortandfamiliaritywith Hutchins

means wearenotdeaftoothervoices in cognitive science. I wouldargue,as well,thatClarks

workitselfis a constantcontextualizationofitself. He builds his arguments around challenges

totheextendedmindmodel.

Inovercoming such hurdles, however,therewardis morethanmerelymeetingthe

burdenofcomprehension. Like Johnson (2004/1998), I likewiseaspiretothepromiseof

interdisciplinaryresearch thatinits bestofcircumstances leads towhatKlein calls an


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inductiveopenendedness (p. 93):thatinteresting spaceintheworldofresearch whenweend

upwith moreandevenmoreinterestingquestions (p. 28). A convergence between

technical communicationresearchers and cognitive scientists,alongthelines I suggesthere,

willasknew questions andexpandthelistofthosequalifiedtoanswerthem.

ACCEPTING CLARKS INVITATION

Distinguishing Clarks Project

Fornearlytwodecades,Clark(pastdirectoroftheCognitive Scienceprogram atIndiana

Universityandthe Philosophy-Neuroscience-Psychologyprogram atWashington

Universityand currentlya ProfessorofPhilosophyandChairin Logic andMetaphysics atthe

UniversityofEdinburgh in Scotland) has wrestledwith the humanmindataskmadeallthe

moredifficultgiven his positionthatthe humanmindexists beyondthe confines ofskinand

skull.Moving beyondthe homunculus visionofcognitionwherea tinymaninthe brain

controls anddirects humanthinkingandacting,Clark(2003) sees the brainemergingas a

new-style business managerwhoseroleis nottomicromanage somuch as setgoals andto

actively createandmaintainthekinds ofconditions inwhich various contributingelements can

perform best" (p. 135). This,forClark,defines thedistinctiveness ofhumanintelligence.

Extendedminds explain how we humans can beso very specialwhileatthe sametime being

notsoverydifferent, biologically speaking,from otheranimals with whom we share both the

planetandmostofourgenes (p.10). Itis notjustthatwecanusetools to solveproblems outin

theworld, butthatthosetools andthatworldarealways part and parceloftheminditself.

Tothoseintechnical communication cognizantofHutchinss(1993, 1995) work,this

modelofthemindmightsoundfamiliar. InCognition in the Wild,Hutchins (1995) argued, in

watchingpeoplethinkinthewild,wemay belearningmoreabouttheirenvironmentfor


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thinkingthanaboutwhatis insidethem (p. 169). Thereare,then,many commonalities across

theirwork. However,we should seeClarks modelas moreambitious thanHutchinss inthe

boundaries itimagines forwhatcounts as mind. InClarks words,

Distributed cognitionoftennames aless ambitious thesis,thatcognitioninvolves many

neuralareas workinginparallel,oritcannameworkthatshows how tasks are spread

aroundwithingroups etc,as in Hutchinsworkon shipnavigation.Manyfans of

cognitionas (inthose senses) distributed stillthinkallofanindividuals mental

equipmentis inthe head. (Clark,personal communication, April 14, 2010)

Describingtheemploymentofnavigation charts, Hutchins wrote, Nonavigator has ever had,

norwilloneever have,alltheknowledgethatis inthe chart (p. 111). Goingfurtherthanthe

distributed cognitionmodel,Clarks (2003) extendedmindmodel holds that, Thereis no

informationally constituteduserrelativetowhom alltherestis justtools. Itis [] tools all the

way down (p. 192).Clarkargued, wemustneverunderestimatetheextenttowhich ourown

abilities as artists,poets,mathematicians,andthelike can beinformed byouruseofexternal

props andmedia (p. 77). Usingeven strongerlanguagethan inform,which suggests the

possibilityofart,poetry,andmath withoutprops andmedia,Clarkwrote, the sketch padis not

justa conveniencefortheartist[] Instead,theiteratedprocess ofexternalizingandre-

perceivingturns outto beintegraltotheprocess ofartistic cognitionitself(p. 77).

This is nottoargue,atleastinthe contextofthis article,thatonemodelis more

accuratethantheother.We shouldavoid both illusions ofcertaintyandthe tendencyto

dismiss contradictory [] explanations (Klein, 1990,p. 88). I argueonlythatClarks model

draws ourattentiontotheways inwhich externalelements such as tools andenvironments are

notsimplyemployed byourminds butactivelyconstitute ourminds. This raises the stakes for

both cognitive scientists andtechnical communicationresearchers.


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Converging with Clarks Project

Beginningwith his earlierworkBeing There: Putting Brain, Body, and World Together Again,

Clark(1998) has tacitlyunderstoodthe (inter)disciplinaryimplications ofhis work. First,Clark

himselfdraws onvarious scientific disciplines as wellas social sciences, science studies,and

philosophy (pp.xvii-xix). Second, his modelofthemind creates challenges forthose scientists

studying cognitionandthe brain.Clark(2008) explicitly confrontedtheproblem inthis way:

Forthewiderapplicabilityofthe [extendedmindmodel] [] requires us to beopentotreating

moretransientexternalprops andaids,assumingtheyareatleasttypicallyavailablein some

problem-solving contexts,as aspects ofhuman cognitiveprocessing (p. 113).Moreover, the

neuralinnovations andthe structured cognitiveniches arebothdifferences thatmakea

difference. Theproperfociofour cognitive scientific attentionarethus multipleand

nonexclusive (p. 149). Sutton (2010),alsoin cognitive science, has explicitly calledfor

interdisciplinaryefforts inmuch the samevein. Firstasking, whatwould cognitive science be

like, how coulditcontinue,ifits objects includenotebooks, sketchpads,andtattoos as wellas

embodied brains (p. 214), Sutton concluded byarguingthat[extendedmind] canthus tapand

inturninfluencetheenormous anddiverse scholarshiponmemory,perception,emotion,and

soonin humanities disciplines,to seewhatmighthappenifwetryto study cognition

scientificallyand culturallyatonce (p. 215).

Clark(2008) and Sutton have both acknowledgedthatthis requirementopens upa

huge canofmethodologicalanddisciplinaryworms,inparticular,forthose cognitive scientists

whotakethe brainas their soleobjectofstudy.Addressing justsuch aresistantaudience,Clark

wrote, the sciences ofthemind,itthus seems, simply cannotaffordtoidentify human

cognitiveprocessingwith theactivityofvarious short-lived coupled systems comprising

neural, bodily,andworldlyelements (p. 113). Inrespondingto such resistance,Clark


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createdpoints ofconvergence betweentheworkthattechnical communicationresearchers do

with externalprops andaids.

Additionally,Clark(2008) arguedthatnoteveryexternalproporaidworks toforge

larger hybridwholes (p. 115),andthatsuch nonbiologicalelements are sometimes integrated

and sometimes not. This also creates a spaceforthosewho studypreciselythosemoments

whenandwherenonbiologicalelements transitthe boundaryofskinand skulltoextendthe

humanmind. Framedthis way,technical communicationresearchers domorethandraw on

models ofdistributed cognition; they contributetotheongoing studyofhuman cognitionitself.

In seekingtounderstand,forinstance,whyandwhenand how somegraduate studentwriters

employ EndNoteorWordPad, Van Ittersum (2009) (discussedinthefollowing section) adds

notjusttothefields bodyofknowledge but,inClarks words,toa nascentscience both ofthe

recruitment(ofsets ofneuralandextraneuralresources) andofthefine-tunedunfoldingof

activityin justsuch heterogeneous ensembles (p. 121). Inmyown collaborativeefforts with a

colleagueinpsychology (describedlater),ithas becomeincreasingly clearto both ofus that

technical communicationresearchers both canand should contributetothis understanding.

Technical communicationresearch thatseeks todescribeandproduce (more) intelligent

behavioronthepartofindividuals andorganizations is informed byas it informs cognitive

science. This articleis thus stronglyfocusedoninterdisciplinarityandtheworkwe (can) dofor

others andourselves.

A Brief History of ConvergencesThepoints ofconvergence I hereidentifyareneitherwithoutprecedentintheliteratureof

technical communicationresearch norare such research projects theonlyways we converge

with cognitive science. Thereis arich historyofemploying cognitive scienceintechnical


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communicationresearch,andtheresearch I treathere haveemergedfrom several corners of

technical communicationresearch andfrom relatedfields such as composition.

Technical communicationresearchers andresearchers inrelateddisciplines havea

longstandingrelationshipwith cognitive science. FlowerandHayes (1980) suggestedthatthe

process ofdiscoveryis notfinding some hidden stores ofinsightandready-madeideas but

is instead a complicatedintellectualprocess (p. 21). Such language has morethanfaint

echoes ofthe cognitive scienceperspectiverepresented byClarkandHutchins. Flowerand

Hayes (1977, 1980, 1981, 1994) and Flower (1989) haveexploredwritingand cognitionas

complexactivities. Itis this focus onactivitythatresonates with Clarks andothersarguments

thatcognitionis notsome biologicalobjectorpossession butis insteada complexinteraction

among brain, body,andworld. Subsequentcritiques ofFlowerandHayes (Bizzell, 1982; Brand,

1987; Faigley, 1986) haveaddednuancetotheapplicationofcognitive sciencetothe studyof

communication.

Advances in cognitive science have continuedto bearticulatedwithintechnical

communicationresearch (Geisler, 1994; Freedman& Smart, 1997; Medway, 1996; Mirel, 1992,

1998; MirelandOlsen, 1998; Prior, 1998; Richardson, 2005; Witte, 1992). Haas (1996)

addressedwritingandtechnology,arguingthattheyare inextricablylinked (p.

xii).Theevidencethatshemarshaledmarks a strongpointofconvergencefortechnical

communicationresearchers and cognitive scientists. Equallyvaluableis herassertionthat

culturaltools and cognitiveactivity constituteoneanotherina symbiotic relationship (p.xiii).

Intunewith this assertionis therobustsetofresearch methods Haas employed,which would

beequallyvaluablefor cognitive scientists toadoptandadapt: videotapedwriting sessions,

textualanalysis ofwrittenartifacts producedwith penandpaperandwith computers,


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interviews with computerwriters,and longitudinalparticipant-observer studies (p.xiv). In

the contextofClarks extendedmindmodel,all such methods aredesirable.

Although nottreated hereas apointofconvergence,activitytheoryis yetanother

strength thattechnical communicationresearchers bringtothetable. Spinuzzi (2003); Russell

(1997a, 1997b); Haas (1996); Mirel (1992, 1998); Winsor (1996); Medway (1996); Prior

(2004);Berkenkotter,Huckin,andAckerman (1991); andBazermanand Prior (2004) haveall

incorporatedactivitytheory (orits antecedents) andoftenin concertwith cognitive scienceto

describeliterateactivity,its development,operation,andassessmentacross arangeofcontexts

including both the classroom andtheworkplace. Russell (1997a, 1997b),inparticular,

provides a comprehensive surveyofhow activitytheory has beenemployed bytechnical

communicationresearchers.

Spinuzzi (2003),inlightoftheresearch projects I describe here,provides atreatmentof

activitytheoryparticularlyemployableinthis workofconvergence. Spinuzzis genretracing

marks how workers innovatewithintheirworkenvironments toimprovetheirworklives. Any

cognitive scientistembarkingupona studyofintelligentbehaviorwoulddowelltotracewhat

Spinuzzi called ephemeral,invisible,ubiquitous innovations (p.x). Soundinglikea cognitive

scientisthimself, Spinuzziwrote, genretracing seeks toforefront[theseinnovations] as

organic andnecessaryways thatworkers adaptinformationto supporttheirownefforts (p.

x).Clarks interestin cognitivenicheslikewiseresonates with Spinuzzis claim thatGenre

tracingprovides awayto highlightusersexperiences with officialandunofficialgenres andto

comparethem across communities orworkplaces (p. 22). This methodology, Spinuzziargued,

allows us toproducemore completeandnuancedunderstandings ofhumanactivity (p. 57). It

is easyto see how a cognitive scientistinterestedin how particularnonbiologicalelements


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extend cognitionwould beinterestedin how differentgenres,officialandunofficial,extendthe

minds ofusers.

I will continuetoforeground both Clarks projectandtechnical communicationresearch

methodologythroughoutthis article. Ourmethodologywhich Sullivanand Porter (1997)

definedas anexplicitorimplicittheoryofhumanrelations which guides theoperationof

methods (p. 11)ofcountingas equallyvaluabletheoften-disparateelements (e.g.,tools,

environments,documentdesign,discursivepractices,andmethods ofassessment) that

cultivateintelligentbehavioris applicableandpossiblygenerativeofnew research methods. In

suggestingpoints ofinterdisciplinary convergence, I necessarilyadmitthatalthough technical

communicationresearch provides anecessary complementtothe studyofintelligentbehavior,

itcertainlywillnotbethewhole show.Clarks workwill continuetoappearinthearticle side-

by-sidewith technical communicationresearch ratherthanpurelypriortoorafterit.My hope

is thatthis structureallows us toimaginewhattechnical communicationresearchers and

cognitive scientists workingtogethermightactuallylooklike.

CONVERGENCE #1: TOOLSInanearlyformulationoftheextendedmindmodel,ClarkandChalmers (1998) proposed

criteriaforwhen someartifactwould countas apartofthemind. Oneoftheseis whetherthe

artifacthas been consciouslyendorsedatsomepointinthepast (p. 17). How this

endorsementproceeds, however,is notquiteexplained.Mostofthe studies Clarkhas drawnon

areofindividuals usingtools selectedforthem bytheexperiment, soitis oftendifficultto

understandthis process ofendorsementas itworks outsideofthelab. Evenanimportant

exception,the studyofTetris players andtheiruseofthe controls ofthegameitselftothink

aboutthegame,is silentonwhyindividuals play Tetris inthefirstplace.Whatgoes


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unexplored,then,is why someonewould,forinstance,endorsea smallnotebookoraniPhone?

This section surveys tworecentstudies ofmemorytools andpractices to sketch how such

questions couldto beaskedandanswered.

Likethefieldoftechnical communication,Clarkhas aflexibledefinitionoftools,which

for him canincludelanguage,pencils,notebooks,virtualworlds,andtheinternet. Infocusing

this firstconvergenceon toolsratherthan technologies, I am followingHaass (1996)

definitionoftechnology as a complexofobjects,actions,people,motives,anduses. A

technologyis notanobject, butratheravital system thatis boundtotheworldoftimeand

space (p.xii).Clarks projectis aparticularly strongpointofconvergence betweentechnical

communicationresearch and cognitive science because his understandingoftools and

environments is similartoourown. I thinkweare betteredattunedtotherhetoric (andthus

ethics) oftechnology, butClarknevertheless sees tools andenvironments as integralto human

activityandintelligentbehavior.

Van Ittersum (2009) preciselyarticulatedwhattechnical communicationresearchers

bringtoanincreasinglyinterdisciplinaryunderstandingofhuman cognitionatthelevelof

tools. Ratherthanfocusingon whetherawriterknows how tousediscretefeatures specific to

a softwareprogram, Van Ittersum claimeditis moreprofitableto askabouttheproperties of

functional systems thatallow writers toflexiblymeetthedemands oftheirliterateactivity (p.

259). This distinctionis importantgiventhat, notallphysicalgoings-on [] areplausibly cast

as parts ofthemachineryofmind (Clark, 2008,p.xxviii). Ifnoteverytool canoris castin such

away,thenitis necessarytoaskwhynotand how mightthey bealteredto bemaderightfor

thepart.

Van Ittersum (2009) investigated theways writers madeuseofcomputertechnology

fortheirmemorywork (p. 263). Forinstance,participants wereobservedas theyusedvarious


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notetaking software (p. 264).Clarknecessarilytreats such interactions,once started,as

relatively seamless,which theyoftenare. Van Ittersum is interestedinthe seams,thetradeoffs:

writers seekingtointegratethesetools intotheirexistingwritingpractices oftenrequire

significantcosts notmentionedalongwith thetouted benefits (p. 264).Whatarethereasons

behindanddrivingparticularendorsements and,thus,potentialextensions ofmind?

Drawingonresearch indistributedmemoryand softwaredesign, Van Ittersum (2009)

pointedto

the conscious effortand commitmentthatwriters and computerusers mustmakewhen

theydelegate someoftheirmemorytasks to softwareprograms. Ratherthanaknack

(havinga goodmemory) orautomatic recall (the encyclopediainthe sky),a

computer-supportedmemory [] constitutes a complexactivityrequiring careful

analysis inordertotracewhat,exactly,is done bypeopleandartifacts engagedin

memorywork. (pp. 260-261)

Manyfactors influencetheendorsementoftools andthe complexactivityofmemorythatthey

enable. Positioningmemorythis way, Van Ittersum echoes much ofClarks arguments about

theextendedmind. Theonly caveatwemightaddis thatsomethingmorethan delegation

could beatworkhere.Clarksuggests thatratherthan delegation,wearediscussing

potentiallyintimate mergers,anextensionofthemind beyondthe confines ofthe skull.

Whatwealreadyare,Clark(2003) argued,is creatures whose minds are special precisely

because they are tailored made for multiple mergers and coalitions (p. 7). Andwith mergers,the

influence cuts both ways. We createthese supportiveenvironments, butthey createus too

(Clark,p. 11).Regardless ofthelevelofintimacywearewillingtogranttoany such mergeror

delegation,itis imperativetounderstandwhyand how such choices orendorsements are

madeinorderto create bettertools.


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Van Ittersums (2009) discussionoftheworkofMaryusingEndNoteis instructivein

tworegards. First,thereis thetimeandenergy shedevotedtousingEndNoteusefully. Second,

thereis Marys desiretousefullyincorporate EndNoteinto hermemorypractice. Trade-offs,

time,anddesire,Marys story suggests,impacttheendorsementoftools as partoftheextended

mind.Mary,whotooktwomonths tolearn EndNote,now uses theprogram withouthavingto

thinkaboutit(Van Ittersum,p. 267). Van Ittersum arguedthatthis outcomeis predicted by

Hutchinss modelofdistributed cognition. I wouldadd,drawingonClark(1998, 2003, 2008),

thatitis notsomuch thatMaryis notthinking butratherthathermind has beenextended

through thetoolandthattoolis now wherepartofherthinkingtakes place. Theresults of

Marys worklikewise sync with Clarks extendedmindmodel,which accounts forthe skilland

activityinvolvedin such extensions. LikeVan Ittersum,Clark(1998) suggestedthatsuch

extensions arenotautomatic andthatwork,practice,and skillareimportantfactors: [The

brain] mustlearntointerfacewith theexternalmediainways thatmaximallyexploittheir

peculiarvirtues (p. 220).

Van Ittersum (2009), however,treatingtools as rhetoricaland contestable,exploredthe

interaction betweenuserandtoolinterms ofboth theusabilityofthetoolandthe skillofthe

user.Whereas Clarkstudies onlytheworkoftheuser,the cognitiveagent,technical

communicationresearchers likewiseaddress thetools themselvestheextraneural

resourcesdescribed byClark(2008,p. 121). Inthis vein, Van Ittersum identifiedfeatures of

theusers experienceandtheirgoals thatdesigners shouldaccountforinassessingthe

constraints andaffordances oftools. Thesedifferentgoals, hewrote, ledthem torespond

differentlytoits affordances andtothe constraints thatarisewhen coordinatingtheirwriting

activityto EndNote (p. 269).Inaddressingthegoals ofthewriterinrelationtothe constraints

andaffordances ofthetoolitself, Van Ittersum productivelyaugments Clarks owntreatmentof


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themergers minds make: Thesewriters wereallawarethatcoordinatingtheir citationwork

with EndNoterequiredthatthey committoworkingwithintheaffordances oftheprogram

(Van Ittersum,p. 274). [Staceys] commitmentto EndNote, Van Ittersum

observed,constrained hertofiguringoutafixintheprogram,ratherthan simplyabandoningit

andreturningtoworkinginWordalone (p. 274). Thus, Van Ittersum complicates Clarks

assertionthathumans,as canny cognizers, [tend] to recruit, on the spot, whatever mix of

problem-solving resources will yield an acceptable result with a minimum of effort (Clark, 2008,

p. 13). Humans oftenworkquite hardtoendorseandincorporateatool. Theminimizingof

usereffortis oftentheendresultofmuch effortonthepartoftheuser.

Whatis importanthereis thatendorsingtools is difficultandoftendriven bydesire,

goals,andtheaffordances ofthetools themselves.Wearedrawnas canny cognizers,inany

particularinstance, bya complexmixofusabilityanddesire,and,even,as oneofVan Ittersums

participants indicated, the colors,andthedesignoftheprograms interface (p. 270). As

Clarks useofendorsement,as aplaceholderofsorts, canonlyimply,thereis rhetoric afootin

such extensions ofmind.Canny cognizers areusers,audiences,anddesiringindividuals with

worktodo.

FleshingoutClarkandChalmerss(1998) flatnotionofendorsement, Van Ittersum

(2009) argued, writers face severalquestions as theyinteractwith new rhetorical situations:

whenand how shouldnew technologies be created, selectedoradopted (p. 276)? Following

his lead, I wouldarguethatanymomentofmindextension,ofaugmenting human cognition

artifactuallyandenvironmentally,is arhetoricalsituation. Extensions ofmindarenecessary

butnotautomatic: This means thatarguments are beingmade byusers anddesigners about

how ourminds oughtto beextended. Van Ittersum likewise concludedthatsuch situations,as

rhetorical,arenotirrevocableordeterministic. Hethus gives tools theirduewithoutmaking


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users merely subjecttothem. Moreresearch intotheways writers worktointegratenew tools

intotheirprocesses (acting with thesetechnologies ratherthan simplyacting on them or being

acted upon bythem) will helpdispelfears thatnew tools requireall-or-nothingirrevocable

commitments (Van Ittersum,pp. 277-278). Such research also serves amorepragmatic

function: itcouldeventually bedevelopedintoa heuristic thatwould suggestfruitful

questions toaskbeforeadoptingnew tools (Van Ittersum,p. 278).

Whittemores (2008) treatmentofhow visualizations canimprovememoryinorderto

aidwriters workingin contentmanagementsystems (CMS) likewisedemonstrates technical

communicationresearchersabilitytonotonlydescribeandexplainparticularextensions of

theminds butto cultivateandassess them as well.Connectingtherhetorical canonofmemory

to studies inmemory,Whittemore has enactedthegenerativearticulationoftechnical

communicationresearch and cognitive sciencethatI herepropose. Alongwith Van Ittersum,

Whittemores rhetoricallygroundedunderstandingoftechnical communicationas itrelates to

memoryallows us toargue justhow thetools with which weextendoutminds oughtto be

designedinordertoproduceintelligentbehavior. Toreturntothequestionofwhypeople

choosewhich tools,Whittemore suggested how CMSs mightbedesignedtoaccountfor

extendedminds inmoregenerativeways. Specifically,Whittemorewasconcernedwith the

ways inwhich memory can beenhancedtoaidthetacticalretrievalofstoredknowledgeduring

acts ofcomposing (p. 95). This system ofartificialmemory,towhich Cicero ascribes the

poweroftheorator (Whittemore,p. 95), comes quite closetotheedificial, scaffolded cognition

described byClark.

As we seefrom thetreatmentofendorsement,notjustanytoolor scaffoldwilldothe

job.Whittemores (2008) ownemploymentofcognitive science (manyofhis sources are

likewiseClarks sources) demonstrates how the brainboundmodels Clarkrejects areexactly


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thosemodels thatundergirdtheCMSs thatplaguemanytechnical communicators.Whittemore

addressedthephenomenonofsingle sourcingwhere writers composegranular chunks of

text,which are storedina contentdatabase before beingrepurposedandreassembledto

createavarietyofinformationproducts by someoneotherthanthetechnicalwriter (p. 89)

as [sources] ofdifficultyin contentdatabases (p. 89).Whittemorearguedthatmetadata

(dataaboutdata) is crucialtotheworkofatechnicalwriter: Forinstance, whattypeof

informationthetextconstitutes, how largeor smalleach chunkofthetextshould be,

dependingonits potentialforreuse,and how thepotentialaudiences mightinterpretthis

text (p. 93).

This metadatais importantforinvention, butaccess toitis hampered byCMSs thatare

predicatedupon single sourcing(Whittemore, 2008). Havingaccess toonlyone chunkoftextat

atimeimpairs acts ofcomposingbecauseitdivorces thewriterfrom themetadatanecessary

forinvention.Whittemoreframes this as aproblem ofmemory. Ratherthanretrievingthe

necessarymetadata (from thetextin context) as they compose,writers areassumedto be (or

forcedto be) ableto havememorized (intheir head) such metadata. Eitherthat,oritis

assumedthatsuch metadatais notstrictlynecessary. Thetechnicalwritermustthen struggle

justtokeeptrackofherowngoals andpurposes for hertext-in-progress inanessentially

decontextualizedwritinginterface (p. 94).

Indecontextualizingthe composingprocess, single sourcingpresumes memoryand

cognitionto be brainbound,with negative consequences formanytechnicalwriters. Inthis

way,Whittemores (2008) research notonlyadds valuetotheextendedmindmodel,itadds

weightto critiques ofcompetingmodels bydemonstratingtheirpernicious effects onusers.

CMSs ofthe stripeWhittemorewouldliketo changeverymuch assumethe humanmind,and

thus the composingprocess andmemory,aretrappedwithin human skinand skull.


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Whittemorethus bolsters Clarks argumentbydemonstratingthenegative consequences ofthe

brainboundview ofcognition.

Whittemore (2008)inquiredwhatsorts ofvisualizationtools shouldfutureCMSs offer

inorderto helpwriters make connections among contentandengageintrulyinventional

activities (p. 101). Theimportantthingis thatany such method should leverage human

visual-spatial sense-making capabilities (p. 101). Insteadofbrowsingfolders and searching

through filenames (See Figure 1),awriter couldtakeadvantageofthekinds ofvisualizations

availablein,forinstance,Second Life,which wouldallow herto seetheimage,inthe caseofan

arrow icon,alongwith other collectedicons (See Figure2). Additionally,the spatialaspects of

Second Life wouldallow herto narrow the scopeofsearch basedon her placelearning (p.

102),a conceptWhittemore borrows from Barres andMcNaughtonandwhich indicates the

location where sheencounteredtheicons. Additionallyimportant,thewriter should beable to

interactandreorganizethosevisualizations as needed (p. 103).

Insert Figure 1 here.

Insert Figure 2 here.

Drawingon Quintilians argument, Forapersons memorywillalways beassisted by

certain circumstances upontheveryfaceofthepaperitself (as citedis Quintilian, 11.31,p.

439),Whittemore (2008) arguedthatmemoryis continuallyaided bythewriting surface.

Writers refer backtotheirowntexts as theywritetotrackmetadataabout[their] own

immediategoals andpurposes (p. 104).Whittemoreadditionallydraws on Flowers andHayes

(1981) inmakingthis argument: Writers needto begivenlargerdesignviews oftheirtexts-in-

progress sothatthey cankeeptrackoftheirlargerdiscursivegoals through explorationand

consolidationand sothatthey canmeettheneeds ofrealusers inreal situations ofuse (p.

106).Whittemore,as amodeltechnical communicationresearcher,follows this lineofthought


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andthenproposes enactmentbasedontheworkofparticularindividuals engagedin cognition

with andthrough tools.

Whittemores (2008) recommendations demonstrate how technical communication

research complements Clarks model.Notonly his recommendations for butalso his

orientationto cognition strikemeas necessaryadditions to currentcognitive science

endeavors.Whatis itaboutextended cognitivenetworks thathelpus actintelligentlyinthe

world? As Clark(2003) argued,nothingpurelyon boardand brainbound canexplainthis

ability. Weexist,as thethinkingthings weare,Clarkargued, onlythanks toa bafflingdance

ofbrains, bodies,and culturalandtechnological scaffolding (p. 11). Itis,as Whittemore

remindedus inthe contextofcomposing, ad-hoc structures [] thatenablewriters to

interactwith thetexts-in-progress inflexibleyettemporaryways (p. 106).

CONVERGENCE #2: ENVIRONMENTS

Whittemores (2008) workobviously blurs anyneatboundary betweentoolandenvironment:

Tools can becomeenvironments andenvironments canworkas tools. Additionally,tools often

work(ordonot) withinanenvironmentaland cultural context. Thatis,environments and

cultures canworktoenabletheeffectiveuseoftools.Winsors (2001) studyofnewcomers at

AgriCorp,apseudonym forthe companyWinsor studied,adds nuancetoClarks treatmentof

environmentaland cultural scaffoldsaterm Clark(2008),drawingonVygotsky, has usedto

describeexternal structures weexploitinextendingourminds (pp 43-47)as vitalelements

ofanecessarilyextendedmind.Winsors workalsodemonstrates thatcombiningworkplace

ethnographies anddistributed cognitionprovides apowerful conceptualtoolfor studying

intelligentbehavior.Workplaceethnographies ontechnical communicationandliteracyin

general (Doheny-Farina, 1986, 1989, 1992; Lutz, 1989; Rose, 1989, 2004; Smart, 2000; Winsor,


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1996) addvaluetoClarks extendedmindmodelintheirattentiontothelocations and

activities thatconstitute,inpart, human cognitionand behavior. This sectionlikewisepositions

Porter, Sullivan, Blythe, Grabill,andMiless (2001) methodologyofinstitutional critiqueas a

practiceofthis modelofmind. Givenwhatweknow ofthe humanmindas extendedandofthe

environments itis extendedthrough, how mightwetreatenvironments practicallyand

rhetoricallyas partandparcelofourminds?

Winsor (2001) investigated someofthe specific means bywhich [newcomers at

AgriCorp] gainedaccess toknowledgeinthis workplace (p. 6). As Van Ittersum (2009)

exploredwhyindividuals chose certaintools with which toextendtheirminds as writers,

Winsorexplored how individuals integratethemselves intolarger culturalandenvironmental

scaffolds to successfullydotheir job. If,then,as Clarkhas argued, humanminds aremade

possible bya bafflingdanceoftools,environments,and cultures,then how aretheprocesses by

which peopleareincorporated,managed,andorganized? How dowegainorfacilitateaccess to

theenvironmentaland cultural scaffolds thatmakeminds as weknow orneedthem to be

possible? Workplaceethnographies such as Winsors address justthesequestions.

Winsors (2001) findings suggestthatthereareafew primaryways thatnewcomers

gainnecessaryaccess toworkplace scaffolds. Formaltrainingis notoneofthese.Workplace

knowledge cannotsimply beloadedintothe brains ofnewcomers as data. As with theCMSs

critiqued byWhittemore, such aneducationalmodelpresupposes amind bounded bythe

brain. Knowledge,instead,is outintheworkplaceitself. Indeed, AgriCorpseemedtorecognize

this andofferedformaltraining onlywhennomoreexperientialwayoflearningwas

available (p. 12). Mentoring, hands-onlearning,and fiddlingaround,allendorsed bythe

company,proved betteraccess points fornewcomers.

Hands-onlearningis allowingnewcomers tounderstand somethingby literally


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touchingandmanipulatingthetechnicalobjects theyworkedwith (p. 14). As Winsor (2001)

argued, Theextenttowhich both interns andregularemployees value hands-onlearningis a

signofhow cognitionwas distributedintotheirphysical surroundings ratherthantakingplace

solelyintheir heads (p. 15). Justas important,placingvalueon such learningpromotes its

enactment,which,inturn,develops cognitioninmeaningfulandwork-directed/required ways.

Fiddlingaround,though very similarto hands-onlearning,marks notthemasteringofan

objectbutofexperimentingwith it. Although Winsordidnotmentionitexplicitly,fiddling

aroundis moreinventionthandiscoveryoriented.

Whatis importantabouttheseaspects ofonthe job learningis thattheyarenotsimply

aboutmasteringworkonceandforallofstoringitallonboardthe biological brainas a

complete catalogueandrepresentationoftheworkenvironmentandthetasks to be completed

there.Winsor (2001) arguedthatnewcomers areinstead learningtolearn,aprocess thatlead

totheir havingaccess tothedistributed cognitionineffectatthe AgriCorpengineering center

(pp. 16-17). Everything cannotand shouldnotbe broughton boardifminds areextended.

Environments andtools arepartandparcelofcognition,andwhatbecomes importantis

learningtoaccess andmanipulate scaffolds inordertothinkandworkthrough them. As

Winsorobserved, Pluggingintothis system is adifficulttaskbecausethe system is in constant

flux sothatevenmore-experiencedemployees spendagreatdealoftimelearning (p. 25).

Again,themindis necessarily butnotautomaticallyextended.With minds madeformergers

and coalitions,wemuststillactivelyfoster such extensions.

Winsor (2001) offeredapractical,rhetoricalfleshingoutofthetheoreticalimplications

ofClarks model.Clark(1999) has movedinthis direction,forexample,ina chapter he

contributedtothe collectionThe Biology ofBusiness,where hewrote, theimmediatetaskin

such new knowledge-intensiveandinformation-drivenventures is to createtheinternal


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conditions thatallow the creationandmaintenanceofmultiple collaborativeendeavors (pp.

58-59). Although focusedon collaborativeworkintechnology-drivenentrepreneurialefforts,

ClarkclearlyenvisionedwhatWinsoris abletodeliver:a setofpractices thatmakemanifest

the scaffoldingpotentialofworkenvironments.

AgriCorpis engaged,as allorganizations necessarilyare,in building (better) people.We

can byallmeans questionand subsequently challengetowhatendandwhois buildingpeople

inanygivenorganizational context, butweneednotignorethe challengeandresponsibilityto

do so.Clark(2003) arguedthatwe resistthetemptationtodefineourselvesin brutal

oppositiontotheveryworlds inwhich manyofus now live,love,andwork (p.142). This focus

onaccess becomes anecessaryarticulationoftechnical communicationresearch andthose

scientific disciplines thatconfrontquestions ofworkplaceethics andassessment,which is the

thirdpointofconvergence.

Buildingtowards adiscussionofworkplaceassessmentwithinthepresentdiscussionof

environments,theworkofinstitutional critiqueprovides yetanotherpointofthe convergence

betweentechnical communicationresearch and cognitive science. Institutional critique,

described below,asks us to considerwhatwemightdo with Clarks modelandits implication

thatweare,moreorless, building thekinds ofpeople we chooseto be (Clark, 2003,p. 195).

ForClark,thereis nowayaroundthis question: wewerealways hybrid beings, jointproducts

ofour biologicalnatureandmultilayeredlinguistic, cultural,andtechnologicalwebs (p. 195).

Scaffolds necessarilyworktoenable cognition; however,itis vitaltotreatthem as contestable,

negotiable,and changeable. Ifweareindeed buildingpeopleas Clarksuggests,andifwe hold

the basic tenets ofdemocracyas valuable,thenwemusthave complementaryrhetorical

strategies notjustfordiscerninganddescribingenvironments butfor changingthem as well.


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InstitutionalCritique: A RhetoricalMethodologyforChangeprovides justsuch an

understandingofhumanenvironments as contestable. Porteretal., (2000) statedtheir core

argumentthis way:

Though institutions are certainlypowerful,theyarenotmonoliths; theyarerhetorically

constructed humandesigns (whosepoweris reinforced by buildings,laws,traditions,

andknowledge-makingpractices) and soare changeable. Inotherwords,wemade em,

we canfix em. Institutions R Us. (p. 611)

Theplayfulexpression Institutions R Usresonates stronglywith Clarks caseforthevital

importanceofscaffolds in human cognition.ComplicatingClarks model, however, Porteretal.,

implicitlyweaveintoitquestions ofrhetoricaleffectiveness andpower bytreatinginstitutions

as rhetorical systems ofdecisionmakingthatexercisepowerthrough thedesignofspace

(both materialanddiscursive) (p. 621). Humandecision-makingalways occurs inthe context

ofdesigned space,which, Porteretal.,remindus,is alsoalways anexerciseofpower.Whois

choosingthekinds ofpeopleoremployees to buildandwhy?

Itis through theirformulationofinstitutional critiquethatwe seerhetoricalactionas

the waythattheinstitutions and scaffolds withinandwith which weare cultivated can be

changed. As Porteretal., (2000) argued, institutional critiqueis unabashedlyrhetorical

practicemediatingmacro-level structures andmicro-levelactions rootedinaparticular space

andtime (p. 612). Themacrofocus is onewaytodiscuss how ourpublic lives areorganized

and conducted (both forus and byus) (p. 620). Themacrofocus thus corresponds nicelyto

Clarks useofscaffoldingtodescribeexternal supportsystems. Porteretal.,addedthemicro

focus topreventaview ofinstitutions as static,glacial,orevenunchangeable (p. 621). The

macroview couldfosterthe beliefthatchangerequires large-scaleactionthatfew canenact

(p. 621). Themicrofocus allows us to seeinstitutions andClarks scaffolds, as alsooperating


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locally (p. 621). Themediationofmacroandmicroas awayofcritiquinginstitutions provides

animportantconceptualtoolforunderstanding scaffolds. Itallows us toenvision how

particular scaffolds operatelocally,which furtherallows forlocalactors toworktowards

changingthem.

Clark(1999) argued, Thegoalofmanagementis nottodraw updetailed blueprints for

performanceor change buttofosterdecentralizedadaptationand createthe broad conditions

necessaryforderivingmaximum benefitfrom multiple sources ofenvironmentalorderand

opportunity (p. 59).Clarks approach tomanagementmakes senseinthe contextofhis work:

createanenvironmentthatscaffolds creativeactivities anorganizationdesires. Developingthe

rhetoricalwherewithaltomakemanifestthesegoals inthemacro-level structures andmicro-

levelactions oftheorganizationis anotherquestionentirely.WhatPorteretal., (2000)

proposedis amethodofinterventionintothe scaffolds thatpromoteorundermineparticular

modes ofthinkingandacting. Forinstance, Porteretal.,toldofMaryDieli,theusability

manageratMicrosoftwho successfullyintegratedtheterm usabilityintothedesignprocess

(p. 610). Although a simple graphic revision,this changewas animportantpoliticalmove,

establishingusers andusertestingas amoreintegralpartofthe softwaredevelopment

process (p. 611). This rhetoricalworkconsists ofexploitingthe spaces,withininstitutions,for

reflection,resistance,revision,andproductiveaction (p. 613).With this methodologyfor

institutional change, Porteretal.,implicitlypointedtoavisionoftechnical communication

researchers informed byanawareness oftheextendedandemergentqualities ofthe human

mind.


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CONVERGENCE #3: PERFORMANCE ASSESSMENT

Inthe conclusionofNatural-Born Cyborgs,Clark(2003) presentedalistofpotentially serious

concerns highlighted by his argument. Namely,thatwith extendedminds therearisequestions

of,forinstance,inequality,intrusion,uncontrollability,overload,alienation,deceit,

degradation,anddisembodiment(p. 167). These specters thathaunt,"manyofwhich revolve

aroundthethornyissueofjudgment,arenotchallenges to his thesis butquestions Clarkargues

areraised byit(p. 167).How dowe holdoneanotheraccountable? How doweattribute

responsibility? How dowediscernorassignmotive? How doweassess,inotherwords,minds

extendedacross brains, bodies, cultures,environments,andtools? Inthis thirdandfinalpoint

ofconvergence, I arguethattechnical communicationresearchers,whilenotoffering solutions,

provideways ofacting,deciding,andadjudicatingwithintheworldofextendedminds.I resist

thelanguageofsolutions becauseforthequestions raised byClarks modelthereareno

definitiveanswers,only strategies andtechniques fornegotiatingthe complexityofhuman

cognition. As Rivers andTirrell (inpress) havearguedinarecentattempttoarticulatethe

extendedmindmodelandrhetoricaltheorymoregenerally,

Wedonotclaim thatrhetoric solves theseproblems.Whatrhetoric offers is themeans

toreinterpretsuch strife [awordused heretodesignatetheextendednatureofthe

humanmind] as aproductiveelementofagenerativeagonism,allowingus tonavigate

through theworldthatmoves through us,inandoutofthe bodyandmind.

Tothis indefiniteend I forwardHenrys (2010) repurposingofperformanceappraisals.

Henrys posthuman critiqueandrefiguringofperformanceappraisals generates aform of

assessmentless focusedonobjective,afterthefactanalyses ofdiscreteandautonomous

agents,andonemoreinvestedingenerating supportive,improvableworkenvironments.

Henryarguedthatassessmentshould beongoingandorientedtowardimprovingthe scaffolds


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andtools through andwith which individuals dotheirwork. Henrytooktechnical

communicationresearchersestablishedrelationshipwith distributed cognitionfurther,using

ittoaddress notonly theinteractions thatdistribute cognition butalso theevaluationof

workaccomplishedquaorganizationalperformance (p. 12). Henrythus tacitlyaddressed

concerns abouttheextendedmindtowhich Clarkonlygavevoice. ToHenrys treatmentof

performanceappraisals I addMillers (1990) critiqueofdecision science. I incorporateMiller

because herearlyinterventionintodecision scienceproblematizedanyattempttoresolve

issues ofjudgmentorassessmentfrom withinthe bounds ofscienceandits discourseof

objectivity.Millerimplicitlyrevealedextensions ofthemindas always value-ladenprocesses

byreintroducingrhetoric tothe scienceofdecision-making.

Beforedeploying Henry (2010) andMiller (1990),itis worthwhiletoexamine justhow

Clarkhimselfhas addressed such concerns inorderto seewhereexactlywithin his workthe

possibilities for convergences lie.Clarks treatmentoftheskinbagas atenuous andproblematic

boundaryforwhatoughtto countas partofthemindis notwithoutits critics (Adams &Aizawa,

2001; Preston, 2010; Rupert, 2004). Ostensibly critiquingClarks argumentfrom the

standpointofethics, SelingerandEngstrm (2007) argued thatwhenagencynolongerends

atthe skinbag,thenneitherdoattributions ofresponsibilityandirresponsibility (p. 579). To

drivethepointhometheyimagine A futureClarence Darrow mightbeabletomitigatethe

sentenceofaguilty clientbyarguing his or herpathologicalprofileis theresultofher

dispositions being shaped byfaultyormaliciouslyuseddataminers,the conditions ofwhich

theagentwas unawareatthetimeofinfluence (p. 579).

Clark(2007) respondedfrankly: I agree (p. 586).Clarkpersuasivelyacknowledged

whatshould beobvious: Such attributions arealready contested. Itis surelynomore

problematic to holdanextended cognitiveagentresponsiblefortheiractions, choices and


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desires thanitis to holda skinboundone (p. 586). Accountability has always been hard.Clark

continued, And justas a bare biologicalagent(ifthereeverwas such athing) can be coarsely

manipulated byexternalinterests oragencies inways thatabsolve herofblamefor some

specific act,goal,ordesire, somighttheaugmentedorotherwiseextendedone (p. 586).

IncorporatingClarks persuasivepointaboutthedifficultyofany such attribution,we could

easilyarguethatanydefenseattorneytodayworth his or her saltcouldmakethis defensewith

noknowledgeofClark(andwould be justifiedinzealouslyrepresenting his or her client). Allof

which is toarguethatClarks modelofthemindonlymakes salientproblems as oldas the

human species itself.

WhatI findproblematic is thatClark(2007) himselfseems to begthequestion.Clark

rightlyarguedthatsuch attributions arealways already contested. However,inacknowledging

thathis modelmakes itdifficulttoimagineattributions ofresponsibilityinthe contextofthe

extendedmind, he still countedas giventhatwe haveonlyapost hoc mechanism fordoing so.

Ratherthanreimaginingordevelopingamethodofassessmentbetterintunewith the

extendedmindmodel,Clarkmaintainedtheextendedmindina system ofadjudication

predicateduponthe bare biologicalagent.

Henrys (2010) appraisal system,which does notwaituntiltheendtoadjudicatewho

didwhatandunderwhoseinfluence,does notbegthequestion: Itexamines theworkof

embodimentandextendedmindinprocess soas tointervene beforetherapacious dataminer

shapes individualdispositions for criminalends.Theproblem with Selingerand Engstrms

(2007) argumentbyanalogyis thatitenvisions alegal system stillworkingwith an

understandingofthe humanagentas discreteandautonomous inthewaythatTaylorist

managementscience,towhich Henrytracedmany contemporaryworkappraisals,alsodoes.

Withinthese systems theextendedmindis atough nutto crack: A system thatwaits untilthe


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endtopass judgment(pseudo)objectivelyonthe bare biologicalagentwillnecessarily havea

hardtimewith agents thatarefarfrom bare. Ifwewere, however,to confrontSelingerand

Engstrm with Henrys modelofperformanceappraisalas alooseanalogueforthelegal

system,Clarks (2007) limitedresponseis now persuasivelyaugmented.

Henrys (2010) system ofcontinuous feedbackis betterattunedtotheperformances of

anindividualas anelementoflarger,more complex setofrelations (p. 22). Inthemodelof

assessmentSelingerandEngstrm (2007) assume, such relations mustbetreatedas noise

ratherthanas integral, constitutive components ofagents themselves.Nothavingwaiteduntil

theendoftheyearto sortthrough whois responsibleforwhatandwhy, such a system would

beinplacethroughouttheperformanceofwork.Henrys posthumanperformanceappraisal

wouldnotputthe caseinthe hands ofClarence Darrow afterthefact; itwouldentail

representationandrecoursethroughouttheprocess.Workers andmanagers alikewould

continually beattuned,viafeedbackloops,tothe conditions ofthemergers and coalitions from

which workactivelyemerges.Clarks treatmentofthe skinbag shifts thefocus from objective,

afterthefactassessmentto continualfeedbackandefforts topromote bettermergers and

coalitions inmedia res.

Equallyimportant,theappraisals Henry (2010) critiques assumewhatClark(2003) has

calledthe bare biologicalagent. As with Whittemores (2008) critiqueofsingle sourcingCMSs

andWinsors (2001) evidenceoftheineffectiveness offormalworkplacetraining, Henrys

critiqueofworkplaceappraisals bolsters Clarks efforts bydemonstratingthetroublewith the

brainboundmodelmademanifest. InHenry,assessmentbecomes notaproblematic toolfor

measuringagency butaproductive (and,perhaps, still contested) toolforgenerating (new

forms of) intelligentbehavior.Byallmeans holdnefarious agents accountablefortheiractions,

butbyallothermeans acknowledgeandaddress the conditions thatcultivate such activity.


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Having confrontedthe humanistsubjectand how the Tayloristmodel soughttoassess

its performance, Henry (2010) makes anargumentfor justhow,inthe contextofthework

environment,wemightachieveamorefeedback-oriented,posthumanappraisal system.

Instructivelyfollowingkeytenets ofposthumanism, Henrysets outtoremaketheappraisalin

the spiritnotjustofreflectinguponautonomous agents butofactivelyimproving technical

communicatorsworklives (p. 13). Thefirstmove concerns embodimentoverandagainstthe

traditionalview ofthe body as a supportsystem forthemind (p. 19). Ratherthantreatingthe

bodyas mere container, Henryarguedthatwe shouldacknowledgethatembodimentimplies

a humanwith a history,agender,anethnicity,anage,and sofortha culturally shapedagent

whoperforms indifficultsites andfrom varying statuses indiscursiveformations (p. 19).

Henry calledonembodimentsothatwemightattend,inassessment,tothe educational

systems [inplaceatanyorganization] shaping human bodies andminds (p. 19).Whenwe

ignorethe bodyoftheworkerwe counterproductivelyleaveun-appraisedthe culturaland

technological scaffoldingthatcultivates thatworkers embodiment,and, hence,their

performance. Henrys repurposedappraisalwouldthus acknowledgeandgenerate continual

feedbackfor bodies as integraltotheworkofextendedminds.

Henry (2010) arguedthattechnical communicators should monitorperformances

whileinthemidstofthem ratherthanaccountingforthem afterthefact (p. 19). The benefitof

acknowledging human cognitionas distributedorthemindas extendedis thatfirstit

acknowledges the complexityofwork,agency,andproducts. Second,andmoreimportantly,

Henryargued, this new accountabilitywouldenhancethedistributionofcognition

significantly byincorporationor buildingfeedbackmechanisms throughoutthe system (p.

20). Such feedbackwouldworkto continuallyassess theactivities oftheseloops themselves

ratherthanwaitingtoexaminetheendresults ofsuch looping.


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Thereis anopportunity heretoextend cognitionotherways giventhatthe humanmind

is necessarilyextendedandthe human subjectis aless secure,discrete,andautonomous

startingpoint. Ratherthan shunningthe complexityofassessing such a cognitiveagent, Henry

(2010) runs with it,followingimplicitlytheleads created butnotdeveloped byClark.

Addressingfears thathis modelwillleadto,forinstance,disembodiment(thatthe bodywillno

longermatter) or socialisolation (fears thatonlineenvironments moveus fartherandfarther

apart),Clark(2003) wrotethathe anticipates multiple embodimentand socialcomplexity (p.

194).Clarkarguedthatratherthanrejectingoutrightthe conditions ofhumanityas he

describedthem,which is,quitefrankly,difficulttoimagine, thetaskis tomergegracefully,to

mergeinways thatarevirtuous,thatbringus closertooneanother,makeus moretolerant,

enhanceunderstanding, celebrateembodiment,andencouragemutualrespect (p. 194)we

can actively structurethekindofworld,technology,and culturethatwill buildthekinds of

people we choseto be (p. 195). Although soundingpie-in-the-skyto someanddownright

terrifyingtoothers,thesearepreciselytheissues wealways already have beforeus (hencethe

persuasiveandpervasiveprophylactic aroundthe humanistself). IfClarkis rightand human

cognitionandembodimentarenecessarilyextendedand cultivated,thenwe simply cannot

avoid buildingpeople.

This necessarily changes thegoals andvalueofperformanceappraisals. Ratherthan

whatHenry (2010) called the (pseudo)objectivism oftheperformanceappraisal, his

repurposedversionwouldenacta reflexiveepistemology (p. 21). This epistemologywould

aim tooperate from theperspectiveofany systems imbalanceintheways inwhich it

distributesand collects,filters,andarchivescognition (p. 21). Individualagents arenot

measuredagainstan (pseudo)objective standard butwithinareflexiveepistemological

appraisalthatwouldlocateagency (and hereHenry borrows from HerndlandLicona [2007])


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as, the conjunctionofa setofsocialand subjectiverelations thatconstitutethepossibilityof

action (as citedinHerndland Licona,p. 135). Performanceappraisals from such a

perspectivewouldentailongoingmonitoring bytechnical communicators andtheirallied

agents ofthis (remarkably complex) setofrelations toperceivemorepossibilities foraction

andtoquestion constraints onagency (p. 22).

Oncetheneedforareflexiveepistemologyis recognized,as I thinkitverymuch is in

technical communicationresearch,thenwe can begintoflesh outtheimplications ofClarks

arguments:todescribe how humans inhabitandnavigatemergers and coalitions thatextend

themind. Ourfields attentionandorientationto communication,organizations,andtools as

wellas ourgroundinginrhetoricaltheory, situates us to contributeintheseways. Henry

(2010) arguedthattechnical communicators atworkinthesemergers and coalitions style

themselves as ethnographers who canleverage theirembodiedexperiences andtheir histories

as culturally shapedagentsand collaboratewith technical communication specialists from the

academytoenhanceanorganizations performance (p. 23). Henryargued, as the sole

academic disciplineprobingorganizationalperformances, culturalperformances,and

technologicalperformances simultaneously,we can begintomarshalourknowledge [] to

revealvitalpowers (andperils) ofdiscourseinforums thatperhaps onlywe, collectively, can

discern (pp. 23-24).

From his placewithinthedisciplineofcognitive science,Clark(2003)ends his

generativeandprovocativeworks with arguments like, Thepossibilitythus exists foranopen-

endedvarietyofnew andpotentforms ofswarm intelligence [adramatic metaphorfor

extendedmind],with meta-feedbackreconfiguringourfilteringroutines to suitthedifferent

types,ofmoods,ofusers (p. 189). Technical communicationresearcherscanwriteand

generatewhatcomes next:namely,repurposinggenres and shapingperformances toensure


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thatsuch forms ofswarm intelligencearemademanifest. Theextendedqualities ofthe

humanmind surelyraisethe stakes ofrhetoricalperformances ofanykind.

Speakinginterms ofstakes brings us squarelytoMillers (1990) criticalresponseto

decision science.Miller confrontedthosewhowouldofferthefirm groundofscienceto

adjudicatedecision-making byrevealingtheassumptionofpre-existingvalues thatoperatein

such approaches. Millerrespondedtoamove,which continues tothis day, by some social

sciences to conceive ofdecisionmakingas a scienceratherthananart,as apodictic procedure

thatimports theforceofnecessityintotherealm oftheuncertain (p. 163). Anexampleofthis

would beonlydebatingtheeconomic feasibilityofa corporatemoveandeschewinga

discussionofwhetherthemoveoughtto bemadeatall. This move,Miller claimed, reversesthe

rhetoricalturn (p. 163), bywhich Millermeanttheextensionofuncertaintytomatters other

than Athenian civic affairsbeyondethics andpolitics tophilosophy, science,andtheacademic

disciplines ingeneral (p. 162).

Decision science,likethoseunsettledresponses toClark,presumes a certainorientation

tovalues (inasmuch as itassumes atranscendentsetofvalues) thatis problematic both for

Clarks brandofcognitive scienceandfortechnical communicationresearch.Miller (1990) first

applied Booths chargeofmotivismaninabilitytoreasonaboutvaluesquitepersuasively

here. Indiscussingtheextendedmind,giventhe consequences or stakes oftools and

environments ithighlights,wemustbefullypreparedtoreasonaboutvalues,which are

implicitinthetools we build,theenvironments we construct,andthemodes ofassessmentwe

create.MillernextappliedPerelmans claim thatproblems ofaction [are] sometimes reduced

toproblems ofknowledge (as citedin Perelman, 1982,p. 7). Interms ofextendedminds,this

means askingifthis orthattoolworks toextendthemindratherthanasking shouldthis orthat

tool beincorporatedgiventhepossibleoutcomes ofsuch anendorsement? Whereas Porteret


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al. (2000),underscoredtherhetorically constructedand contestedfeatures ofinstitutions,

Millerdrove homethe stilllargerargumentaboutthevalues thatunderscoreanyenvironment

ortool,andthus anyextensionofthe humanmind. Itis inthis veinthatMiller,quotingGarver,

remindedus thatitis rhetoric thatis concernedwith the essentially contestable (p. 162).

Oneofthereasons Henrys (2010) pieceis sopersuasiveis thathis proposed system of

accountability seems designedtoavoidmotivism. Towaittotheendtoassess apresumably

discreteandautonomous individualis to both ignore how thatindividual works through the

organizationandtheresources itmakes available,anditis topassupopportunities toimprove

how this reciprocalandemergentrelationshipfunctions. This is notsimplyaboutrecognizing

theposthumanintheworkoftechnical communication; itis aboutreorganizing workinways

thatimproveit.Clark(2003) wrote, As feedbacklinks becomericherandmorevaried,our

experiencewillrather becomeoneofmultiple ways of being embodied (p.194). Towaituntil

afterthefactofactivityis likewisetoleaveunexaminedthevalues thatmotivateit: Itis to

replacethequestionis this how we ought to have worked? withdid you accomplish this or that

task?

Thelongand shortofit,then,inresponsetothe challenges Clarks brandofcognitive

science confronts,is thatwemustmakearguments,andwemustmakethem persuasivelyand

continually. Ifthe humanmindis nolonger brainbound,thenitcanlonger bearhetoricaleither.

Oncethemindis morethanneurons andgraymatterandis instead comprisedofneuronaland

extraneuronal,nonbiological,and culturalelements,decisions mustbeassessedinterms of

values andeffects andmadeinways thatpromoteandprovide constantfeedbackdesignedto

continually (re)assess and (re)cultivate.With no biological-cognitive coretoappealto,we have

toassess continuallyand constantly: Itis such activitythatproduces theverythings that(will)

mattertous. This is whatClarkgrapples with andwhatMiller, Henry,andmanyothertechnical


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communicationresearchers arewillingandableto supply:themeans torhetoricallyand

productivelyengageuncertaintythrough theoryandpracticeandwith research methodologies

groundedinthelivedexperienceofbeings possessedofextendedminds.

CONCLUSION: MOMENTS OF CONVERGENCE

Thesethreepoints ofconvergence suggestthattheworkI proposefortechnical

communicationresearchers is alreadyunderway.Thefieldoftechnical communication,with

its robustresearch agendaand sophisticatedarrayoftheoreticalperspectives, cannothelp but

contributetorelatedand complementarydisciplines. Theframeworkforinterdisciplinary

workcreated by Klein (1990) andadvocatedfor by Johnson (1998/2004)is morethanarubric

forassessinginterdisciplinaryefforts afterthefact. Itisanactionplanforgeneratingparticular

kinds ofinterdisciplinaryprojectsspots ofinductiveopenness (Klein,p. 93). Additionally,

theworkI describe hereis nottheonlywayforwardfortechnical communicationresearchers;

itis alsonolongerthe casethatweneedalways speakofways forward. Thefield,as I

experienceitin journals,onlitservs,andatconferences,is healthyandrobust(eveninthe

agonism wefindinallthree). Neitherdo I wish to suggestthatourlegitimacymustcome

through articulatingourselves with other,apparentlymoreprestigious disciplines. I offerup

this argumentas partofour continualtweakingoftechnical communicationas adisciplineand

as afield,andto suggestthatalldisciplines oweittooneanothertotalktoeach other. The

future I proposeis oneofcontinuingourtraditionalworkbutdoing soinnew places andwith

new people,andwith anunderstandingthatsuch work,whileambitious,mustalso be cautious

andpatient.

First, several conferences existaroundintersections ofthe humanities and cognitive

scienceandprovidenew places forourwork.Clarkwas aplenary speakerataneuroscience


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and humanities conferenceatBucknell Universityinthe springof2007. Duringmanyofthe

Q&A sessions itbecameincreasingly clearthatneither sidewas fullyprepared (evenwhile

being committed) totalktooneanother. Theylackedaperspectivethatmighthaveallowed

them tomorefruitfullyengageeach other. Technical communicationresearchers,existingas

theydoinaliminal space betweentechnology, science,andthe humanities,areuniquely

positionedtomediate such paradigmatic differences. Indeed,arecenttechrhetdiscussion

centeredpreciselyaround how thefieldoftechnical communication sees itselfin such

intersections as the humanities anddigitaltechnologies andnew media.Whatbettervenueto

shareouruniquepositionthan conferences dedicatedto constructing such bridges? As Knievel

(2006) has argued,technical communications uniquerelationshipto both technologyandthe

humanities affords theopportunitytomakethe casefor takinganticipatory,developmental

responsibilityfortools,aview thatoften seems incongruous with the humanitiesnotionof

self (p. 77).

Second, several journals existaroundtheseissues,forinstanceJanus Head. These

outlets,oftendealingwith anareaofscholarshipknownas philosophyofmind,makeitclear

thattherearepublishingvenues friendlyto scholars interestedinaskingquestions about

cognitionandthe humanmindfrom withinparadigms previouslyignored bythe sciences of

mind (Rivers & Tirrell,inpress).

Finally, such convergences canproductivelyengageindividual scholars from

complementarydisciplines. As I mentionedintheintroduction, I am currently collaborating

with thepsychologistMaarten Derksenin creatingatheoreticalframeworkforunderstanding

experimentalpsychology, cognitive science,and communicationas allimplicatedin complex

rhetoricalecologies ratherthanas securedindiscrete, bounded situations. This is relevantin

psychology,forinstance,forthoseinterestedinunderstandingthedynamics andethical


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implications oftheplaceboeffectandtheuseofpriminginexperimental conditions, both of

which requiredeceptiononthepartoftheexperimenter. Itis alsoofvalueforthosein

cognitive scienceexploring how beliefs cometo subtly (re)constitute human cognition. In

terms oftechnical communicationresearch,this projectnecessarily confronts issues of

usabilityandthepersuasiveworkofsecuringendorsements onthepartofusers. Itis alsowork

thatdraws equallyonallthreedisciplines. Such collaborations bringtechnical communication

research tootherdisciplines inmutually beneficialways.

Clarks workimplicitlyandexplicitly calls forthekindofbroad convergence I have

sketched here.Motivatedandmarshaledintheways I describe,technical communication

researchers areuniquelypositionedtoparticipateina still-emergingandlargelyunsettledarea

ofthe studyofintelligentbehavior.Cognitive science,which fordecades treatedminds ina

vacuum, has turnedtotreatcognitioninthewild. Oncethemindis recognizedas necessarily

extendedintoamessyand complexworld,paradigms alreadyengagedin such environs must

beincluded:Clarkmakes this callexplicit. I arguethatourdisciplineoffers justsuch a

paradigm,andthatinthe spiritofinterdisciplinarydiscourseand committedtothegoalof

improvingtools,environments,andmethods ofassessment,we shouldmakeitavailableto

others inthefutureto come.


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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTSThankyouto both AndyClarkandMaarten Derksenfortheirgenerous feedbackthroughout

this project. They helpedmythinkingaboutspecific aspects ofmyargument,and,more

importantly,they convincedmewith their collegialitythatsuch convergences areindeed

possible.

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Nathaniel A. Rivers is anassistantprofessorofEnglish atGeorgetown University. His current

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Writing and Communication,Kairos,andJanus Head.

Documents

Future Convergences: Technical Communication as Cognitive Science