Furnish, T.R. 2013. Sufis v. Salafis- Winning Friends and Interdicting Enemies in Islamic Africa. RIMA Policy Papers, 1 1

8/11/2019 Furnish, T.R. 2013. Sufis v. Salafis- Winning Friends and Interdicting Enemies in Islamic Africa. RIMA Policy Papers,

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Furnish, T.R. 2013.Sufis v. Salafis: Winning Friends and Interdicting Enemies in Islamic

Africa. RIMA Policy Papers, 1 1

http://muslimsinafrica.wordpress.com/2013/04/11/sufis-v-salafis-winning-friends-and-interdicting-

enemies-in-islamic-africa-dr-timothy-r-furnish/

The Islamic world is at war. But while theatres such as Afghanistan-Pakistan, Syria and Yemen are

well-known, another major zone of conflict is not. This one is simultaneously transnational and

intersocietal, cutting across almost the entirety of the ummah, or Muslim community, yet also

cutting down into individual countries, especially in Islamic Africa. It is the struggle between the

fundamentalistic Salafis and the tolerant Sufis going on right now in Egypt, Libya, Mali, Somalia,

Nigeria, Sudan and Ethiopia. The US would do well to help the latter, as the fate of truly moderate

Islam hangs in the balance.

This paper will explicate the differences, and conflicts, between Salafis and Sufis in the modern

Islamic world in general, and in Africa in particular. There are four major sections: an introduction

to the issue and its manifestations; an overview of Sufismits history, major groups, beliefs and

locations; a similar synopsis of Salafism; and a conclusion that will examine possible avenues ofexploitation for the US.

1.

I. Introduction and Background

The Muslim world has been beset by sectarian conflict since shortly after the death of Islams

founder, Muhammad, in 632 ADclearly and unequivocally contra theHadithrubrics which quote

him forbidding such a conflict in the utterances if two Muslims take out their swords to fight one

another, then both of them shall be from the people of Hell fire,[1]and none of you should [even]

point out toward his Muslim brother with a weapon.[2] These prophetic prohibitions soon fellby the wayside and for some 1400 years the Islamic history of violence has been, in no small

measure, one of Muslim against Muslim; to name but the most notable: theRiddah(Apostasy)Wars waged by the Arab tribes tried to defect from Islam after Muhammads death; thefitan

(civil wars) a few decades later when the fourth caliph, Ali, was rebelled against by the

Umayyads of Damascus and, finally, killed by a sectarian from the ranks of the Khawarij;[3] the

wars a century later in which the Abbasid dynasty from Khurasan (eastern Iran/western

Afghanistan) supplanted those same Umayyads; the 250 years of bloody conflict, both conventional

and assassinations, between the Sunni Abbasid caliphs and the Sevener Shiì Fatimids of North

Africa and Egypt; the wars of conquest waged by the Sunni Ottoman Turks in the 16th-20th

centuries against other Muslims in Egypt, the Middle East, North Africa and Yemen; the viciousconflicts between the Ottomans and the Twelver Shiì Safavids in Persia/Iran during the 16th-18th

centuries; and the Iran-Iraq War, 1980-88. Muslims dont fight other Muslims is a piety, not ahistorical reality.

In the last three decades conflict in the Islamic world has been dominated by the sectarian kind,

often within individual countries but also many times spilling across borders, due to the intrinsically

transnational nature of many Islamic movements and ideologies. The Sunni v. Twelver Shiìstruggle has perhaps dominated the headlines[4]and the analytical world, as the Kingdom of Saudi

Arabia [KSA] and the Islamic Republic of Iran [IRI] each disseminate globally their respective

sectarian da`wat (calls, propaganda agendas) and posture for leadership of the ummah, as well as

wage a cold intelligence and covert war against one another. But while many other Muslim

denominational m!les could be adduced,[5]one of the most important today is that of Salafis v.

Sufis. Salafism will be fully explored in section III, below, and thus for now a succinct summarythereof will have to suffice. The term derives from the Arabic verbsalafa, to be over, to be past

and in its verbal noun formssalaf and aslaf refers to the Islamic predecessors or ancestors,[6]


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specifically of Muhammads timewho are deemed examples to be followed by modern

Muslims. This mode of thought really first developed in the late 18th/early 19th century with an

Arabian peninsula Muslim cleric, Muhammad b. Abd al-Wahhab (d. 1792), whose Wahhabi

doctrines were adopted by the leadership of the Saùd tribe in central Arabia and, eventually, madethe state ideology. Salafis such as al-Wahhab demanded that Muslims refer to only the Quran and

the Hadiths as sources of Muslim belief and practice, although they were divided on whether to do

so via ijtihad, independent reasoning, or whether it was necessary to stick to taqlid, imitation ofprevious interpretive decisions. Salafism, then, as well as its Wahhabi subset and the South Asian

variant known as Deobandism[7](whence spring the Taliban and their ilk) is primarily a mode of

Islamic thought that rejects Western (European-American) modes of thought and societal

organization, in particular the two main ideas stemming from the 18th century Enlightenment: a

secular (non-religious) state, and unbridled faith in science and technology to solve all humanitys

problems.[8] Over against Western ideals the Salafis contrapose Shariàh, Islamic law, as a

panacea. This rejectionist mode fully includes, today, groups such as the Taliban and BokoHaram and, to a certain extent, the al-Qaidah network [AQN], Hizb al-Tahrir, [9]Tablighi

Jamaàt[10]and the entire IRI.[11]

Sufis, on the other hand, are the mystics of Islam. The term derives from, most likely, the woolen

garments (suf) worn by the early practitioners. Their relevant historical development will beexplored more at length in section II, below, but for now the important facets of this movement are

as follows: it had developed by the late 8th century AD (although its adherents will claimMuhammad himself was a mystic); aimed at a mystical union of the individual Muslim believer

with Allah, via intense and often lengthy prayer and ceremony, called dhikr(remembrance of the

divine)which is deemed more important than the Shariàh; focuses on the esoteric or hidden

meaning of the Quranic revelation, as opposed to the exoteric or literal one; is divided into

hundreds of different turuq/tariqat (singular tariqah, order) across the Islamic world; and its

shaykhs and saints, both the living and the dead, are believed to possess barakah(blessing or

charisma).[12] For all these reasons, Sufis have historically been at loggerheads with thoseMuslims, particularly Sunnis, who foreground the Shariàh; and this acrimony was racheted up inparticular at two major junctures: by the great Sunni cleric Taqi al-Din Ahmad b. Taymiyah, or Ibn

Taymiyah (d. 1328), who detested Sufis in particular for their veneration of saints and shaykhs; andby the aforementioned Abd al-Wahhab, whose beliefs were largely those of Ibn Taymiyah

redux.

Ironically, considering the bad blood between Salafis and Sufis in the early 21st century, it is a

historical fact that from the late 18th to the early 20th centuries many Sufis exhibited the samerejectionist tendencies, and in fact Sufis manned and led some of the most violent jihads. [13] This

was because both trends were, in large measure, derived from a felt need for moral

reconstruction[14]on solidly Islamic grounds, without recourse to instrusive and unsettlinginfidel (i.e., European Christian) patterns and ideologies. But eventually, by the 20th century,

Sufis and Salafisfor the most partparted ways. And note: Sufis and Salafis are not really

separate sects of Islamas is the case with Sunnis and Shiìsbut are, rather, movements within

Islam that emphasize different aspects of that religions doctrines and practice.

Thus, the Islamic world finds itself, today, plagued by extremist[15]Salafi attacks on Sufisand

the latter have begun to respond, sometimes in kind. Sufi saints tombs have been desecrated and

destroyed in Mali by the newly-powerful, Salafist Ansar ud-Dine [Ansar al-Din]; the same thing

happened in Libya recently, as Salafis literally bulldozed Sufi tomb-shrines; in Muslim

Brotherhood-controlled Egypt, some 20 Sufizawiyas, or Sufi centers, have been destroyed sinceMubarak was overthrown; more than a dozen Sufi shrines have been bombed by the Taliban in

Pakistan in recent years; two Sufi shaykhs have been assassinated by suicide bombers in the


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Caucasus-region nation of Daghestan in the last year; and the Tehran regime in the IRI is waging a

war on its own Sufi population.[16] Let us examine these conflicts in more detail.

Mali is a large northwestern African nation of some 15 million people, 90% of whom are

Muslims.[17]The country is currently torn by a de facto civil war, following a coup in April 2012

caused by a separatist movement of northern Tuaregs agitating for an independent nation of

Azawad, and a Salafist group, the aforementioned Ansar ud-Dine [AD],[18]which wants a morestrictly-Sharià observant state in Mali.[19]

The Azawadians and their NMLA (National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad), or MNLA in

French, are primarily separatist/nationalist and, as such, anathema to Iyad Ag Ghali and the

staunchly-Salafi AD. In addition, the former are more Sufi-influenced and disposed than the

latter. Furthermore, the situation is complicated by the varying tribal allegiances to each

movement. AD also appears to be cooperating with al-Qaìdah in the Islamic Maghrib [AQIM],

going so far as to rule jointly with the latter in Timbuktu,[20]although there are also reports of pro-

Sufi, anti-AD/AQIM protests and marches there.[21]Algeria is also possibly involved in stirring up

these groups against one another, since the leadership of that country looks unfavorably on aTuareg-Berber state that could siphon off support from Algerias population.[22] Other factors toconsider are the outflow of weapons and fighters following al-Qadhafis ouster in Libya,[23]as

well as perhaps even climate change and quickening desertification in the Sahel. [24] But whatever

the reasons, AD and its Salafi sympathizers are increasing their induced strict Shariàh compliance,

to include amputating limbs, whipping people in the streets and stoning to death a couple accused

of adultery.[25]They are even reported to be recruiting and deploying child soldiers,[26]and of

course their war on the Sufiswhose existence in that part of Africa long predates Salafisms

continues apace: last week, also, Salafists razed the tomb of Almirou Mahamane Assidiki, near

Timbuktu, using shovels and pick-axes.[27]

Large but thinly-populated Libya[28]was already the stage for Salafist and jihadist activityeven before US Ambassador Chris Stevens and three other embassy personnel were killed on

September 11, 2012a result of the ongoing failure of the post-Qadhafi government there to

consolidate, get a handle on the various militias and, in general, to provide security. Libya has a

long history of political and military activity by Sufis, particularly the Sanusi order, and while

during Muàmmar al-Qadhafis rule (1969-2011) both Salafists and Sufis were suppressed,[29]internecine warfare between the two strands of Islam has resurfaced. That Salafis re-commenced

activity in Libya even before al-Qadhafis overthrow and execution was obvious to anyone with

eyes to see,[30]and in the past few months the Salafis and/or jihadists have thrown off their

moderate masks and exhibited their anti-Sufi tendencies, in activities such as desecrating and

destroying Sufi shrine-tombsincluding the 400-year old one of Abd al-Salam al-Asmar in Zlitan,

and the mosque-shrine-tomb complex of Abd Allah al-Shaàb in downtown Tripoli.[31]Many

Libyans suspect the arch-SalafiKatibah Ansar al-Shariàh (Battalion of the Defenders of Islamic

Law) [KAS] is behind both the attacks on the Sufi centers, and the killing of the US Ambassador

and the other Americans in September 2012.[32] And while KAS may have dispersed, or gone to

ground, since those attacks[33]it remains a clear and present danger to Libyans in general, and toSufis and Americans in particular.

Nigeria, Africas most populous nation whose 160 million people[34]are almost evenly

divided between Muslims in the north and Christians in the south, is home to perhaps the most

dangerous Salafi movement on the continent: Boko Haram [BH].[35]

BH is even making inroads into neighboring Niger, and perhaps Chad,[36]propelled by the same

factors that have helped AD in Mali. But while like Ansar al-Din and Katibah Ansar al-Shariàh,


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Boko Haram is vehemently opposed to any and all Sufis, unlike them it has so far focused the vast

majority of its attacks on Christians (perhaps because, comprising close to half of Nigerias huge

population, they are seen as a greater threat than heretical Muslims). In late September 2012

Nigerian Federal Government forces in Kano and Maiduguri killed a number of BH members inshootouts, and arrested dozens more, following BH bombings of churches and, curiously, cell

phone towers.[37]

On the opposite African coast from Nigeria, Somalias 10 million people are beginning to

emerge from several decades of civil war and de facto anarchy with the help of Ethiopian, African

Union and Kenyan forcesthe latter of which, in early October 2012, occupied Kismayo[38]at

the behest of the US. This is a far cry from just a few years ago, when the latest incarnation ofviolent and intolerant Salafism, al-Shabab, was in control of much of the country and advancing an

austere, anti-Sufi agenda. The Sufis of Somalia, led by the shaykhs of the Qadiriyah, Idrisiyah and

Salihiyah orders, came together and created a Pan-Sufi political and, eventually, military

organization calledAhl al-Sunnah wa-al-Jamaàh [ASJ], Family of the Sunnah and

Community.[39]While the ASJ was not loathe to actually take up arms against al-Shabab, whose

members razed Sufi tomb-shrines and practiced suicide bombings and beheadings of those Muslims

deemed insufficiently Shariàh-compliant, the movement would not be enjoying the success it has

were it not for the fact that al-Shababs vision is anathema to many, if not most, in thispredominantly-Sufi country. However, while al-Shabab may be down,[40]it might not be knocked

out but simply transmogrifying into a rural, rather than an urban, Salafi-Takfiri[41]movement[42]which prefers staging hit-and-run attacks rather than attempting to hold citiesand which will

likely move some operations into Kenya.

In Ethiopia, Africas second-largest nation in population (some 91 million, majority

Christian but 1/3 Muslim),[43]the relationship between Salafis and Sufis is rather different from allthe previously-examined cases, in that the Sufis of Ethiopia (assisted by the government) created an

anti-Salafi organization prophylactically, rather than in response to Salafi attacks; furthermore, theydid so by importing back into Ethiopia an offshoot of the Rifaìyah and Qadiriyah orders, known as

al-Ahbash (the Ethiopians), which merged withJamìyat al-Mashari` al-Khayriyah al-Islamiyah,

or Association of Islamic Charitable Projects in 1983 in Lebanon under the leadership of the

Ethiopian shaykh, Muhammad b. Abd Allah b. Yusuf al-Harari al-Shibi al-Abdari, also called al-

Habashi (the Ethiopian). AICP, or the Ahbash, as they are more popularly know,

syncretistically blend Sunni, Shiì and Sufi doctrines, and present themselves as apostles of

moderationa desirable alternative to the Islamists doctrinal strictness and political

militancy.[44] At least one US-based Ethiopian Muslim organization, the First HijrahFoundation, is strongly opposed to Addis Ababas support for the Ahbash,[45]but no less a figure

than former Prime Minister Meles Zenawi defended Ahbashs tacit alliance with the Ethiopian

government, prior to his death in August 2012.[46] This deterrent deployment of a Sufi group tohead off Salafi influence and encroachment might be a feasible path to be followed in other

venuesas will be explored in IV, below.

Egypt, the most populous Arab country with some 84 million (90% Muslim),[47]iscurrently ruled, post-Arab Spring and toppling of Mubarak, by an Islamist government dominated

by the Muslim Brotherhood but with a large minority of Salafis. The Sufis of Egyptwho have an

ancient presence there and may number between 7-10 million[48]are not (yet) experiencing the

sort of persecution and pressure that has manifested in other North African states, but in June 2012

the Shakyk Zuwayed Mausoleum in North Sinai was completely destroyed in a third attack, which

the Sufis blamed on Salafis.[49] And some analysts believe that Egypts Sinai Peninsula is a newjihadist haven, posing a threat not just to Sufis but to Israel,[50]in the form ofAnsar Bayt al-

Maqdis (Defenders of Jerusalem), the members of which are both Sinai Bedouin and Egyptians


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from the Nile Delta region.

Even in Sudan, which has had a large Sufi presence for centuries, there have been violent

clashes between the SalafiAnsar al-Sunnahand Sufis, most notably on the occasion of the latter

celebrating Muhammads birthday.[51]Despite the fact that Sudan has an Islamist government

the National Islamic Front, a more severe version of the Muslim Brotherhood, akin to Salafi, in

factthe Sufis have fought back against Ansar al-Sunnah, throwing stones and even burning theirmeeting tents.

Out of Africa, two major salients of Salafi intransigence are South Asia and the Caucasus. In

Pakistan, where 17%[52]of the 191 million population[53]identifies with a Sufi order, the South

Asian version of Salafisknown as Deobandisare often not just opposed to, but engaged in

shootings and assassinations of, the main Sufi group, the Barelvis.[54] And in the Muslim-majority

Caucasus regions of Dagestan as well as Tatarstan, Sufi shaykhs are being attacked and assassinated

because of their outspoken opposition to Salafism.[55]

In order to understand Sufism well enough to assess which of its many variants might besuitable for working with as an antidote (or perhaps vaccine) for Salafism, it is necessary to

examine in some detail the range of Sufi dissemination, organization and doctrines. It is that to

which we now turn.

1.II. The Major Sufi Orders and Relevant Background

Sufism may be a relatively new aspect of Islam for military and intelligence analysts, but it has forcenturies been a favorite topic of Western, especially European, scholars.[56]The extensive corpus

of writing on Sufism and its myriad tariqat/turuq(orders) contains much on Sufi doctrines and

mystical practices that is frankly superfluous to the purpose at hand. Accordingly, this section will

plumb more relevant information, such as which orders are located where and whether they have ahistory of jihadist violence, or are historically more prone to quietism and peaceful articulation of

Islamic beliefs. In addition, since herein the target areas of Sufi-Salafi conflict are all African,[57]

the Sufis of Mali, Nigeria, Libya, Somalia, Ethiopia, Egypt and Sudan will be the focus. A final

preliminary word on the differences between Sufi orders: they are not of the same magnitude as, say,those between different sects of Islam (Sunni and the various Shi`i subsects) or even between the

four major interpretive schools of Sunni Islamic law (Hanafi, Hanbali, Shafi`i, Maliki). [58]Butthey are real, nonetheless, and while all Sufis do share certain basic mystical proclivities[59]there

are discernible, and sometimes quite important, variations between orders which could very well

impinge on whether any particular order and its members might oppose Salafisand if so, to what

degree. So in discussing, much more so in approaching and working with, Sufis it is incumbent

upon the interlocutor to know WHICH Sufis one is dealing with, and what their positions are oncertain issues (which, yes, will often include their beliefs and doctrinesthere is no way of getting

around that inconvenient truth). And that is possible only if one grasps at least the rough outlines of

Sufi history.

Besides the aforementioned Sufi doctrinal and worship practice disputes with Salafis, Wahhabis and

Deobandis,[60]the aspect of Sufi history most relevant to the issue at hand is that for almost half a

millennium (the 16th through the early 20th century), the main source of revolutionary resistance

ideology in the Islamic world was Sufism.[61]And these mystical jihads were fought not just

against encroaching Portuguese, Dutch, Spanish, British and French forcesbut against Islamic

rulers deemed insufficiently pious (secular) or even heretical; for example, in 19th century Indiathe Naqshabandiyah Sufis fought not only against the British but against the Muslim Mughal

Empire. The following map,[62]while hyperbolic and overly pro-Naqshbandi, gives some idea of


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this phenomenon:

The Naqshbandi-Mujaddadi order, originally of Tajikistan and quite popular in the Middle Ages

among both the Seljuk and Ottoman Turks and later in the Indian subcontinent,[63]was perhaps the

jihadist Sufi orderpar excellencein the Islamic heartlandsand not just in the past, either, as

Naqshbandis took up arms against US forces during our post-Saddam occupation of Iraq.[64] But

in Africa in the 18th and 19th centuries, jihad was waged extensively by certain leaders andmembers of other Sufi orders: the Qadiriyah, Tijaniyah, Sanusiyah, Khatmiyah and Salihiyah, to

name but the most prominent.[65] Prominent in sub-Saharan western Africa were jihadist leaders

such as: al-Hajj Umar(d. 1864), a jihadist who deemed himself charged with the duty to

imposeperfection on the imperfect Islam of the Sudan[66]and thus led the creation of a SufiJihad state in what is now Mali and Mauritania; Maba Diakhou(d. 1867), who fomented his own

jihad in Gambia; Shaykh Amadu Ba orCheikhou(d. 1875), who preached and led jihad against

the infidel French in Mali; and al-Hajj Muhammad al-Amin(d. 1887), leader of Islamic holy

war against impious Muslims and the French in what is now Senegal and Mali.[67]All four of these

men were members of the Tijaniyah order. However, their jihadswere intellectual as well as

military movements.,[68]aimed not just at military conquest but at revitalizing Islamic society

by reviving the ostensibly correct doctrines and practices of the Islamic prophets time.

Outside of west Africa, there were two major Sufi-led jihads in the early 20th century. In

what is now Libya, the Sanusi order based in the eastern (Cyrenaica) and southern (Fezzan) regions

of that country fought a guerrilla war between 1923 and 1937 against the occupying Italians, led for

many years by one Umar al-Mukhtar(d. 1931).[69]And in the east African Horn, a Salihi Sufi

shaykh, Muhammad b. Abd AllahHassan (d. 1920), preached and led a jihad against the colonial

occupiers (mainly British, but also Italian) from the late 1890s until his death. [70]

Two other African Sufi jihadist leaders of the 19th century towered over all these others:

Muhammad Ahmad(d. 1885) of Sudan, the self-styled Mahdi[71]eschatological rightly-guided one who will create Islamic rule over the entire planet, according to Muslim beliefsand

Usman don Fodio(d. 1817) of what is now Nigeria, creator of the Sufi-based Sokoto Caliphate

which encompassed modern day northern Nigeria and Cameroon. Muhammad Ahmad was a

Sammani Sufi who, by 1880-81, was convinced by dreams and visions that he himself was the

Mahdi, whereupon he led not just a pan-Sufi but an apocalyptic jihad against the occupyingOttoman Egyptians and their allies the British, defeating them and establishing a jihad state that

included most of modern Sudan and part of Ethiopia and that would last until 1898 (although the

Mahdi died, probably of malaria, in 1885). On the other side of the African continent, Shaykh don

Fodio was a member of three Sufi ordersQadiriyah, Khalwatiyah and Shadhaliyahand led an

ultimately successful Hausa[72]jihad against other Muslims and ethnolinguistic groups of that

West African region, resulting in the creation of the Sokoto Caliphate.[73]Unlike Muhammad

Ahmad, Shaykh don Fodio claimed notthe Mahdiyah but rather merely the office of mujaddid

(arenewer of Islam predicted in some Islamic hadiths to come every century)this despite the

fact that belief in such a renewer clearly had end-of-time overtones.[74]

Thus between ~1850 and 1920, the African region encompassing the target countries of this

studyMali, Nigeria, Libya, Somalia, Ethiopia and Sudanwitnessed at least eight major Sufi-led

jihads, proving the vacuuity of the conventional wisdom which claims Sufism is inveterately

peaceful and quietist. (Note that while Egypt is the lone exception, it was intimately involved in the

Sudanese Mahdism affair, not least because Muhammad Ahmad declared more than once his

designs on Egypt and the Mahdists periodically raided north.[75]) Five of the eightal-Hajj Umar,Maba Diakhou, al-Hajj Muhammad al-Amin, Shaykh Don Fodio and the Sudanese Mahdidirected their ire in whole or in part against other Muslims. So an Islamic African tradition of Sufis


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engaging in both literal and rhetorical combat against co-religionists has deep roots. To this day

many Africans in general, and Sufis in particular, are quite aware of this Sufi oppositional history.

No one knows how many Sufis, or Sufi orders, there are today in the Islamic worldalthough

millions and hundreds are good ballpark estimates, respectively. And no global map of Sufism

and Sufi orders existsunlike the Sunni v. Shi`i population concentrations, for example. However,

some reasonable extrapolation can be made using the aforementioned Pew data,[76]whichsurveyed Muslims in 38 different countries as to whether they belong to a Sufi order. The overall

average for these 38 was 18.7%, which comes out to about 300 million Muslims who say they are

Sufi in some fashion. This includes Egypt, where 9% of the population identifies as such. But for

the 15 sub-Saharan African countries surveyed, the Sufi numbers are much greatersome 35.6% oftheir populations say they belong to a Sufi order, ranging from a high of 92% in Senegal to a low

of 8% in Mali. Two other nations currently at issue, Nigeria and Ethiopia, register 37% and 18%

Sufi, respectivelymeaning about 56 million Nigerians[77]and 16 million Ethiopians[78]are

Sufis. Certainly, these numbers indicate that in Nigeria, Ethiopia and Egypt Sufis are, or should be,

a force we can do business with.[79]Even Malis 1.2 million or so Sufis could prove a valuable

counterweight to the likes of Ansar al-Din. And while no quantitative data exists for Sufi numbers

in Libya and Sudan, reliable qualitative information from historical sources clearly shows that Sufi

orders have been hugely influential in both those countries, and could very well be again, especiallyconsidering that both the Libyan Sufis and the Sudanese ones were famed and loved for their wars

against, respectively, Italian colonial occupiers and Ottoman/British oneslegacies and martialproclivities which could be deployed against Salafis (if they arent being so already).

Malis Sufi orders include the Qadiriyah,[80]its offshoot the Mukhtariya,[81]and the

Hamalliyah[82]branch of the famous Tijaniyah.[83]Even today, despite Malis aforementioned

rather low percentage of actual Sufi population, certain practices tied to Sufism, Sufi orders andtheir leaders, including the veneration of certain persons with reputations as saints and the use of the

Islamic esoteric sciencesremain central to what it means to be Muslim for many MalianMuslims[84]as the newly-regnant Salafi/AQIM-affiliated Ansar al-Din is finding out

there. Mali is striking because traditional Sufism is taking on new forms there: on the one hand,

leaders like Cheick (Shaykh) Soufi Bilal are syncretistically blending older Qadiri and Tijani

forms and practices and using modern marketing to promote them;[85]even more novel, Sufis like

Adama Yalcouye who calls himself a Sufi but is not a member of any Sufi order [86]preaches a

strict moral code of conduct and calls for the unity of all peopleMuslims, Christians and other

non-Muslims.[87] Both of these neo-Sufi leaders in Mali are avowedly apolitical,[88]but it is

quite safe to assume that neither would be looked upon kindly by Salafis.

Nigerialikewise has long had a sizable Qadiri[89]and Tijani presence, as well as two major Tijani

sub-orders: the Salgwa[90]and the even larger and more imporant Niassiyya.[91]Post-World War

II the Qadiri and Tijani orders to a large extent transformed into mass movements, and Sufi

networks [became] conveyor belts of political activity, especially voter registration.[92] Also, a

fused Tijani-Nasiri[93]network was created by Shaykh Ibrahim Salih of Maiguguiri (Borno) and

came to extend across not just northern Nigeria but parts of Chad, Central African Republic, andeastward to the country of Sudan. Nigerias Qadiriyah, from the 1980s, led the struggle against the

anti-Sufi Yan Izala,[94]the first real Salafi threat to them there. Sectarian strife in Nigeria has thus

gone through three major phases: the aforementioned Sufi jihad of Shaykh Don Fodio; a subsequent

period of Qadiri v. Tijani struggle that lasted until independence from Britain in 1960; and the

modern period of Sufism v. Salafism that kicked off with Yan Izalas emergence in the

1980s,[95] in which the formerly-feuding Tijanis and Qadiris largely buried their differences in theface of the Salafi threat. Sectarian disputes in Nigeria, post-Sokoto Caliphate and up to modern

times, have often taken place in polemics about Islamic doctrines[96]although these have


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sometimes led to violent literal clashes as epitomized today by the attacks of the neo-Salafi Boko

Haram on allegedly-miscreant Muslims such as Sufis (when they are not blowing up Christian

churches).

Libyais almost exclusively the province of the Sanusiyah,[97]and in fact when Libya was created

as a separate nation after World War II the head of the order, Sayyid Muhammad Idris b.

Muhammad al-Mahdi al-Sanusi (d. 1983), was made king, in large measure because of the orderscachet stemming from its long battles against Italian occupation, 1923-37and ruled until al-

Qadhafis military coup in 1969. The Sanusis were pan-Islamists and supporters, in general, of the

Ottomansalthough they did favor a non-Turkish, preferably Arab/Berber caliph (probably

someone much like the head of the Sanusi order). After he came to power in 1969 ColonelMuammar al-Qadhdhafi [Qadhafi] repressed the Sanusis as well as the Muslim Brotherhood and

the Salafists in the name of his heterodox, self-indulgent Green Book and its quasi-socialist

teachings. But shortly before his ouster and death in 2011, Libyas dictator was espousing Sufism

and in fact hosting pro-Sufi conferences (as he did in February 2011)hoping thereby, most likely,

to succor favor among Libyas populace and undermine the growing Salafi/MB influence. However,

as noted above, since Qadhafis overthrow Sufi sites in Libya have been attacked.

Somalia[98]has long been home to not just the ubiquitous Qadiris and the Idrisiyah[99]but also

the Salihiyah[100]and the Ahmadiyah,[101]both of which by the late 19th/early 20th century

overshadowed the older Qadiriyah there. The Salihiyah in particular, much like the Sanusis in Libya,

are famous for fighting colonial (British and, to a lesser extent, Italian) occupation under the

leadership of the so-called Mad Mullah, Muhammad Abdille Hassan (d. 1920)although Hassan

also detested the Qadiryah and even ordered the assassination of one of their leaders. [102]

Ultimately, Muhammad Hassans impact on the Somali was essentially political rather than

religious[103]quite likely because his teachings stemmed in large part from Wahhabi Salafism,which he imbibed on hajj in 1886: [104]besides opposing Christian (British and Italian) incursions,

Hassan preached against tea, coffee and qat, as well as lax Islam; he also advocated rebellionagainst instituted authority.[105] In these latter areas Hassans Dervishes are comparable to the

Sudanese Mahdists and Don Fodios jihadists, as well as the Wahhabis.[106]

Several of the same Sufi orders are extant in Ethiopia as in Sudan:[107]the Tijaniyah,

Mirghaniyah (or, sometimes, Khatmiyah in Sudan[108]), Sammaniyah,[109]Shadhiliyah[110]andMadjhubiyah.[111] Sudan also has at least one order unique to it: the Ismailiyah.[112]Strangely,

Qadiris are present in Ethiopia but not in Sudan, however. And, as mentioned previously, a 20th

century-created order, the Ahbash[iyah], is also influential in Ethiopia. Interestingly, and relevantly,

after Muhammad Ahmads followers brought him to power in 1880s Sudan, he began to lay

emphasis on the ideas of the Salafiyya movement. He abolished the madhhabs [interpretive schools

of Islamic law] and called for a return to the origins (usul) of the faith, the Quran and thesunna, as

the basis of the Islamic community.[113]And the Sudanese Mahdi went even further; although

himself an ardent Sufi, he ordered the dismantling of all Sufi orders in Sudan (and those parts of

Ethiopia he ruled).[114]

As for Egypt,the question is not really which orders exist there, as which ones do notso

intertwined is the history of Egypt with Islamic mystical orders. The largest Arab nation is home

(at a minimum) to the following orders:[115]Arusiyah, Azmiyah, Badawiyah, Baziyah, Habibiyah,

Hamidiyah, Hanifiyah, Hasihmiyah, Idrisyah, Jawhariyah, Khalwatiyah[116]as well as its offshoot

the Bakriyah,[117]Makiyah, Mawlawiyahs Whirling Dervishes,[118]Muhammadiyah,

Qadimiyah, Qawuqiyah, Rifa`iyah,[119]Sabtiyah, Shaibaniyah, Shadhiliyah, Sha`raniyah (orSha`rawiyah), and Wafa`iyah-Shunbukiyah. In modern Egypt[120]the most influential ordersatleast as measured by such metrics as membership by professionals, perceived integrity and personal


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pietyare the Rifaìyah, Badawiyah and Shadhaliyah. There are also regional variations, with

different orders popular in, for example, Cairo and Alexandria. In all, the members of Sufi orders

outnumber the members of Egyptian political parties. Some researchers estimate membership of

Sufi orders at 10 million.[121] (This figure is higher than Pews aforementioned 9% Sufipopulation of Egypt, which would mean some 7.38 millionassuming a population of 80 million

that is 90% Muslim. It is considerably lower, however, than other estimates, which peg Egypts

Sufis at 20% of the Muslims.[122]) Whatever the number of Sufis, it is certain that EgyptsIslamic religious establishment is strongly Sufi in character and that, since Mubaraks ouster, Sufis

identify with the [this] state-controlled religious establishment and are driven by a consuming fear

of Salafis and Islamists in general.[123] In Egypt in recent decades Sufism is appealing to many

because it is tolerant, in a society in which religious loyalties are increasingly expressed as

intolerance and even violence.[124]

Who are these Salafis that oppose, and even strike fear into the hearts of, Islams Sufis?

1.III. Salafism: Relevant Historical Background

As noted earlier, one of the major bones of contention between Sufis and Salafis is

Quranic exegesis, or interpretation, and the degree to which Muslims canif at allutilize tawil,

esoteric or non-literal readings of Quranic verses.[125] Many, if not most (albeit not all) Salafis

dislike this, and prefer instead following taqlid: imitation of previously-determinedinterpretations. Salafi clerics thus insist on reading the Islamic scriptures solely through a zahiri,

surface or literatlist lens; many Sufis, on the other hand, allow and even encourage ascertaining

the batini, inward or esoteric meaning. (Sufis are joined in this byrather ironicallyTwelver

Shiìs and many members of Islamic sects such as Alevis, Druze, and Ismailis, or Sevener

Shiìs.)

This matters because Quranic interpretation directly affects how the violent passages of the

Quran are understood and deployed.[126]For example, there are two passages in the Quran than

enjoin beheading of unbelievers: Sura Muhammad [XLVII]:3ff, when you encounter the

unbelievers on the battlefield, strike off their heads; and Sura al-Anfal [VIII]:12ff, I [Allah] willstrike dread into the hearts of the unbelievers. Strike off their heads, then. No Muslim cleric

Sunni or otherwisehas ever, to date, explicated those passages to mean anything other than whatthe text literally says.[127] Likewise, the predominant Sunni (and Salafi) exegetical view is a

literalist one of the Quranic ayas, verses, that promote violence against non-Muslims,[128]

violence against women,[129]and afterlife rewards for dying as ashahid, martyr[130]

primarily because mainstream Sunni Islam has never developed an exegetical paradigm which

allows for allegorical, historical-critical, or any of the other myriad of hermeneuticalinterpretiveapproaches that have long been applied to the Bible by both Jews and

Christians.[131] Thus, a Sunni Muslim is unable, and a Salafi unwilling, to explain away the

aforementioned beheading directives as only applicable in Muhammads time, or mandating onlyrhetorical decapitation. The only choices, according to Salafism, are either total, literalist

acceptance of the Quranor total rejection of it.[132] By contrast, a Christian reading, forexample, Luke 10:19wherein Jesus grants the 72 Disciples power over snakes, scorpions and evil

spiritshas a centuries-long tradition of non-literalist understanding of that text to call upon

(although there are some few churches which still take it literally[133]). Furthermore, apparently

peaceful passages in the Quran are often deemed superseded by those parts allegedly revealed to

Muhammad later in time, under the millennium-old doctrine of naskh, abrogation.[134] Thus, in

the paradigmatic example, Sura al-Tawbah [IX]:5, when the sacred months have passed,

killcapturebesiegeambush the polytheists[135]wherever you find them, supplants

chronologically-earlier verses revealed to Muhammad advising being friends with Christians,


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etc. Both of these hermeneutical imperatives in Sunni Islamtaqlid and naskhempower the

Salafis in their dual quest to present themselves as true Muslims and to impose strict

interpretations ofshariàhlaw. The Salafis, in effect treat the Quran as a wooden legal

documentwhereas the Sufis deal with it more spiritually[136]and tend to see their opponents asrepresentative of mere power-seeking Islam.[137]

It should be noted that the politicization of Quranic exegesis is not a development ofmodern times,[138]but rather has existed since the text of Islams holy book was first

redacted.[139] The Sunni dynasty of the Umayyads cherry-picked certain texts, and practiced

tendentious interpretation, to support their reign over against theshiàt Ali, faction of Alithe

early Shiìs. The same was done by the Abbasid dynasty, which supplanted the Umayyads in the8th c. AD, as well as the Sunni Ottomans vis--vis the Twelver Shiì Safavids of Iran, 16th-18th

centuries. Likewise, Saddam Hussein and Ayatollah Khomeini practiced dueling exegesisor at

least their minions didvia competing fatwas over who was truly descended from Muhammad. In

fact, Quranic exegesis has become point-scoring. By quoting a well-known exegete, you can

back up your politico-religious standpoint.[140] One major position held by a majority of both

mainstream (Sunni and even Shiì) and Salafi exegetes is the punishment for al-riddah, apostasy

from Islam. Maliki, Shafiì, Hanbali and Twelve Shiì interpreters of Sura al-Maidah [V]:54[141]

have long since deemed the punishment for converting out of Islam to be deatha position shared(sometimes gleefully, it seems) by Salafis and their ilk. Only the Hanafis disagree, holding the

position that the punishment for apostasy can be delivered by God alone in thehereafter.[142] Likewise for the rather important issue of jihad: all the Sunni exegetical schools,

as well as the Twelver Shiì one, understand the relevant verses of the Quran as mandating jihad to

be afard kifayah, communal duty, that can be carried out by duly-appointed Muslim

representatives (the caliphal army, for example); or afard àyn, individual duty, which is

incumbent upon every individual mature Muslim anda sin if a Muslim does not take part in

it.[143] Some Sufi orders are fond of reading the Quranic sword verses through the prism of a

hadith (alleged utterance of Muhammad, outside the Quranic revelation) in which the founder ofIslam differentiated between the greater jihad (struggle against ones own sins) and the lesserone (holy war). This idea still holds sway among some Sufis, despite having two strikes against it:

its absence from any of the six authoritative hadith collections, and its ranking, even in the onewhere it does appear, as suspect in terms of historical legitimacy.[144]

One of the major opponents of the idea of greater jihad being personal Muslim striving for

piety and purification, and a proponent rather that it means primarily taking up the sword against

non-Muslims, was the influential Sunni cleric Taqi al-Din Ahmad b. Taymiyah (d. 1328 AD), orIbn Taymiyahthe intellectual godfather of modern Salafism, as his views were taken up, recast

and eventually disseminated by the aforementioned Ibn Abd al-Wahhab and the Saudi

Wahhabis.[145] While all Salafis are not Wahhabis, it is safe to say that all Wahhabis areSalafis. As noted earlier (p.3), Salafism is the attempt to practice Islam in what is believed to be the

same fashion as was done in Muhammads time by the Islamic ancestorsthe Islamic version, if

you will, of those fundamentalist Christians (usually Protestant) who belong to Apostolic or

Primitive churches. As such, it is not so much as modern innovation in Islam as a re-pietization

movement that wishes to institute rather puritanical Islamic norms, binding on all Muslims (and, via

imposition of the dhimmahsystem, on non-Muslimsparticularly Jews and Christiansas

well). The early Islamic community, under Muhammad and then the first caliphs, was clearly atheocracy of sorts, in which very little, if any, distinction was made between religion and

politics.[146] A few centuries after Muhammad lived Ahmad b. Hanbal (d. 855 AD), founder ofthe Hanbali school of interpretation and deemed perhaps the greatest Sunni theologian ever, who

over against the Islamic rationalists[147]denied that the Quran was created and affirmed the

transcendent authority of the written word for whom the Caliph was merely the executor of the

Islamic community, subservient in matters of Islamic law to the scholars and clerics.[148]


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Some four centuries later these proto-Salafi views would be re-articulated and disseminated by Ibn

Taymiyah (who lived in Damascus, then Cairo: his [Ibn Taymiyahs] whole endeavor was

designed to cleanse Islam of the dross accumulated during centuries of decline: in theology (toward

a more literalperception of the deityas against pantheistic mystics); in matters of ritual (againstpilgrimages.); as well as in legal affairs (stricter application of the Sharià.This brought him

into collision, above all, with the religious establishmentrationalistic theologians, lax judges,

Sufis and dervishes.[149]But while it is true that [n]ever did Ibn Taymiyya challenge thelegitimacy of any particular sultan,[150]it is clearly the case that he considered as murtadun

(apostates) those rulers who called themselves Muslim but failed to uphold shariàh, contravened

Islamic teachings on non-Muslims (by not enforcing the second-class citizenship for Jews and

Muslims required under dhimmahrubrics) and, most of all, neglected jihad as holy

war.[151] Likewise, while he never condemned Sufism in itself, Ibn Taymiyah nonetheless

portrayed Islamic mysticism as ipso factobeyond the pale because of what he saw as inadmissible

deviations in doctrine, ritual or morals.[152] Regarding Quranic interpretation, Ibn Taymiyah didin theory allow for ijtihad, or independent judgement,but in practice his insistence on the

absolute supremacy of the Quranic or Hadith text[153]meant that a literalist reading of those

sources would be binding. The role of the Islamic state, according to Ibn Taymiyah, is to follow

such a reading in enforcing Islam because without the coercive powerof the State, religion is indanger.[154] It is impossible to overestimate just how influential Ibn Taymiyah remains, almost

700 years after his death; in fact, hes very likely one of the three most important thinkers in Islamic

history (after Muhammad).[155]

Ibn Taymiyahs major conceptsopposition to impious rulers; fusion of mosque and state;

state enforcement of shariàh; Quranic (and Hadith) literalism; anti-Sufism; and militant jihad

were influential but rarely state policy for the next four centuries. That changed with the founder of

Wahhabism, Ibn Abd al-Wahhab who, from central Arabia beginning in the mid-18th century,

resurrected Ibn Taymiyahs critique of the ummah, and asserted that the overwhelming majority of

Muslimsin the whole Muslim world, had fallen into state of religious ignorance[156]whichcould only be rectified by a reassertion and recommitment to tawhid, the unity of Allah as laiddown in the Quran without interpretation.[157] Tawhid was vitiated by unislamic practices,

which he deemed abda` (singular bidà), innovations, such as almost anything done by the Sufis,as well as by Ottoman Turks (the rulers of Arabia at the time), like alchohol and hukkahtobacco

smoking. Eventually al-Wahhab gained the support of the ruler of Najd, Muhammad b. Saùd (d.

1765), and was put in charge of religious instruction there. After al-Wahhabs death, and into the

19th century, the Saudi state, and Saudi Wahhabi da`wah, missionary, activities increased

despite Ottoman opposition, sometimes militaryand after World War I the newly-created,

peninsular Saudi state made Wahhabism its official Islamic ideology. Then Wahhabism went

global after 1979 when, in the wake of the abortive Mahdist revolution that year of Juhayman al-

Utaybi and Muhammad al-Qahtani, the Wahhabi clerical establishment demanded, and got, a statecommitment to massive funding for, in effect, planetary Wahhabi da`wah.[158]

The biggest influences on modern non-jihadist Salafism are both 20th century Egyptian

Islamic thinkers: the founder of al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin, the Muslim Brotherhood [MB][159],

Hassan al-Banna (d. 1949); and the modern MB martyr, Sayyid Qutb (d. 1966).

The former was an inclusive Fundamentalist who wanted to rehabilitate society from

within by making it more Islamic and accepted the theoretical possibility of reconciling Islamic and

Western political theory.His ideological offspring was Qutb, an exclusive Fundamentalist, who

wished to overthrow society and create an Islamic state; he rejected the coexistence of Islamwith Western ideas like multiparty democracy. Al-Banna was assassinated and Qutb was executed

by the Egyptian government.[160]


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In essence, the modern Muslim Brotherhoodparticularly in its current ruling form in

Egyptseems to adhere more closely to al-Bannas idea that Islam and democracy are compatible,

while the Salafis (in Egypt and elsewhere) are devotees of Qutbs concept of hakimiyah, rulership

or dominion of Allah aloneover against which Qutb, borrowing from Ibn Taymiyah, setjahiliyahliterally the pre-Islamic period of ignorance that Qutb now posited as regnant

wherever Islamic law is not paramount.[161]

Finally, jihadist Salafis have been greatly influenced by Abu Muhammad al-

Maqdisi,[162]born in the West Bank in 1959; while before him Salafism had mostly been a

quietist version of Islam whose adherents were subservient to their rulers, al-Maqdisi used the tools

that Salafism offered him against those very same rulers. This way, he turned the seeminglyobedient Salafi ideology upside-down and revolutionised it.[163] Usama bin Ladin, Anwar al-

Awlaki and Ayman al-Zawahiri have really only fine-tuned this approach, most notably in their zeal

for attacking the far enemy (mainly the Crusader US, the font of all the ummahs problems)

rather than the near one (faux Muslim rulers).[164]

In sum, the differences between the Wahhabis, MB and Salafis are largely ones ofdegree, not kind. In varying degrees, all three support Ibn Taymiyahs agenda:

1) Opposition to impious (insufficiently Muslim) rulers

2) Islamic polities, leading eventually to a re-established caliphate.

3) State enforcement of shariàh

4) Quranic (and Hadith) literalism

5) Jihad as holy war as well as personal piety

6) Distate for Sufism, often presented as a Wahhabi-esque obsession with tawhid.

Wahhabis tend to be seen as intimately tied to the Saudi regime, and thus corruptgiving

Wahhabismper sethe cachet of a general Arab, and specifically tribal Saudi, movement for many(but certainly not all) non-Arab Muslims. The transnational MB, while also Arab, nevertheless

manifests a wider range of attitudes and is partly for that reason seen as more pluralistic and

cosmopolitan: striving for an Islamic brand of democracy (albeit with shariàh overtones), which

shades into Salafism on the peaceful side of the spectrum while, on the other, remains clearly

distinguishable from those Salafis who support (and engage in) militant jihad against non-Muslims

and apostate Muslims (Sufi and otherwise), as well as call for implementation of harsher shariàh

punishments. (Thus, those commentators who describe the MB as terrorist clearly do not know

what theyre talking about.) Salafis sometimes deride MB members for putting politics ahead of

Islam; the latter return the favor by pointing out that a narrow focus on religion is nave and

ineffective.

The Salafi situation in Africa is even more complicated.[165] Despite a paucity of empirical

data on numbers, Africa is rife with Islamist/Salafist organization; yet, at the same time, probably

an overwhelming majority of sub-Saharan Africans are still Sufis[166]many of whom, incolonial times, cooperated with colonial authorities, a point which Salafis make to their advantage

in places like Nigeria. In fact, West Africa in general and Nigeria and Mali in particular have been


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remarkably receptive to Wahhabi-Salafi da`wah,[167]disseminated by students returning from the

hajj and/or from studying in KSA.[168] Salafism is seen as something new, exciting and part of

the larger Muslim world, in contradistinction to Sufism, which because of its long history in Africa

is often deemed parochial and old schoolalbeit still worthy of respect. A major strength of theIslamist Salafis is their organizational ability, rivalling (or even surpassing) that of the African Sufi

orders andironicallyoften modeled on Christian missionary organizations and which work

independently (and are thus often opposed to the official state-sponsored organs, such as NigeriasSupreme Council for Islamic Affairs, which are heavily-Sufi-staffed).[169] Salafis are also often

seen as very pious, unlike wealthy, polygamous Sufi shaykhs; and they are also often highly-

educated laymen, again quite in contrast to the traditional Sufi clerics of sub-Saharan Africa. And

they feel no qualms about using Western-style mass media, another drawing card for them. Salafi

knowledge of Arabic also helps African Muslims tap into the wider Islamic world, even as it

undercuts the Sufis influence and cachet. [170] However, the support that some Salafis receive

from KSA creates some doubts among African Muslims, because the Wahhabis are seen as tooconservative, and the Kingdoms ties to the US are also suspect.[171] Likewise, the historical

memory of Arab involvement in the slave trade sometimes tamps down pro-Salafi fervor and

reminds many Africans, particularly in West and East Africa, that Sufism counteracted [such]

Arab dominance and racialism.[172] In response to the Salafi encroachment, indigenous Sufisstarted forming pan-Sufi organizations, like, in Nigeria, Usmanyiyah (composed of Qadiris and

Tijani) and Fityan al-Islam (made up of Sufi youth from several orders). As a general rule in sub-

Saharan, particularly West, Africa, the Salafis are seen as more modernizing, while the Sufis are

deemed more conservative.[173] Such Purist Salafism in the Sahel and the Maghreb [sic] as a

whole stems from the eastern Salafist movement, especially the movement of Imam Muhammad

bin Abdul Wahhab and its different branches, influenced byIbn Taymiyyah.It is still difficult todetermine whether [this] Purist Salafism represents a marginal backyard of extremism, or the

primary branch of increasingly combatant organisations. It is likewise difficult[174]to detach

theologically based Salafist thought from thejustifications for Islamist militants attacks.[175]

Egypt, of course, is the modern wellspring of Salafi and MB thought and influence in Africa(and elsewhere)[176] and, considering the high proportion of Sufi orders in that country, it should

come as no surprise that Salafis and Sufis have clashed thereintellectually, rhetorically and, attimes, even literally. Even a century ago, the great and powerful Egyptian Islamic reformer

Muhammad Abdud (d. 1905), who was for a time rector of al-Azhar (Sunni Islams highest

institution of learning), criticized the Sufis and their pursuit of ilham, direct inspiration from

Allah.[177] Abduh was counter-attacked by some Sufi shaykhs for being a Wahhabi, although it

was not until the eve of World War I that Wahhabism became the most important challenge facing

Sufism.[178] Between the world wars Abduhs student Rashid Rida (d. 1935), although himself a

Naqshbandi, was a formidable critic of Sufism in Egypt[179]although he was careful to attack

only what he called false Sufism: for example, the Tijani claim that some of their prayers, havingbeen imparted to their founder in a dream, were more effective for salvation than the normal

Muslim ones. Rida famously and caustically observed, regarding Sufis, that if you see a manflying, do not place any confidence in him until you know whether or not he obeys the

Shari`ah.[180]

After World War II King Faruq appointed a non-Sufi (and in fact a former student of Abduhs) as

chief shaykh of the Sufi orders in Egypt, and the kings man, Ahmad al-Sawi, set about reformingSufism in Egypt.[181] The Council created to oversee this reform process was dominated by MB

members, and in 1952 the head of the MB Hasan Ismail al-Hudaybi, declared that theCouncil had presented proposals to the Ministry of the Interior concerning a general prohibition of

the Sufi orders in Egypt, which needless to say brought about the most acute confrontation

between the Sufis orders and the Brothers.[182] The mufti (chief religious authority) of Egypt

issued a fatwa in favor of the Sufi orders and the Revolutionary Governmentwhich


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deposed King Faruq in 1953dissolved this Council, right before banning the MB in

1954.[183] Starting in 1955 the Revolutionary Government became aware of the use that could be

made of mystical Islam and of the administrative organization of the Sufi orders to combat the

opposition inspired by the Brothers as well as to strengthen and widen its own base ofsupport.[184]thus kicking off a period of official Revolutionary Government support for

Sufism, in the form of funded conferences, Sufi publications, and public Sufi ceremonies,

etc.[185] This regime support for mystical Islam continued through the ascendancy of the famousArab Socialist leader Jamal Abd al-Nasir [Nasser] and continued under his successsor Anwar al-

Sadat[186](who was assassinated in 1981)a situation which contributed to the growing

cleavage between mystical [Sufi] and anti-mystical [Salafi/MB] Islam in Egypt from the nineteen-

seventies onwards.[187] However, under the rule of Hosni Mubarak (1981-2011), the

involvement of Sufi orders in political life was limited, as they were encouraged by their leaders to

remain apolitical and non-confrontational toward the regime.[188] With Mubaraks removal from

power, that has changed (again) as Sufis, in reaction to the political power of MB and, in particular,Salafis, have re-entered the public square through entities such as the pan-Sufi Hizb al-Tahrir al-

Misri, Party of Egyptian Liberation.HTM has even publicly denounced Salafis for their

destruction of Sufi shrines in Egypt. The founder of HTM is the head of the Azmiya order in Egypt,

Muhammad Ala al-Dine Abu al-Zayem, who has often been critical of the stances of the MuslimBrotherhood and Salafist movements vis--vis other religious communities, including Christians

and Muslim minorities. The current chair of HTM is a layman, Ibrahim Zahran, an international

expert on petroleum and natural gas and a strong opponent of Egyptian gas exports to

Israel.[189] HTM was a resounding failure in the latest elections in Egypt, however, as the

Freedom and Justice Partya front for the MBtook 38% of theMajlisseats, while the allied al-

Nour Partythat of the Salafistook another 28%. And of course the MB candidate, MuhammadMorsi, was elected President. As long as the MB and the Salafis remain the dominant political

ideology in Egypt, Salafism will appeal to many in Africa because of Egypts cachet on the

continent. But Egypt is also, as noted, a bastion of Sufism.

While in Egypt the battles between Salafism and Sufism are largely still rhetorical, in Mali there isa full-fledged civil war which, currently, Salafis were winningat least in the northern and eastern

2/3 of the countryuntil the French intervened with some 4,000 soldiers in February, 2013,effectively halting the Salafi-al-Qa`idah advance. Although France is now (April 2013) beginning

to withdraw its forces,[190]Mali remains effectively partitioned between Salafists, led by Iyad ag

Ghalis Ansar al-Din, and the provisional government of President Traore, who (for now) has the

backing of the Malian military and the French in Bamako. Ansar al-Din, along with the Movement

for Unity and Jihad in West Africa and AQIM,[191] effectively hijacked the Tuareg nationalist-

separatist National Movement for the Liberation of Azwad and has begun imposing strict Salafi

strictures, including limb amputations for theft,[192] on large swathes of Mali.[193]

Also active in Mali are the following militant Salafist organizations: the Algerian-based GSPC

(Groupe Salafiste pour la Prdication et le Combat); the Masked Battalion; the al-Furqan

Squadron; and the Tariq b. Ziyad Battalion, the most fundamentalist and radical.[194]However,

over against these militant Salafists stands there is another group called Ansar al-Din, which is

decidedly non-Salafi and Sufi, headed by the respected cleric Shaykh Ousmane Madani

Haidara[195]who even has a Facebook page!

Nigeria of course is home to the ber-Salafi Boko Haram [BH] movement, founded by

Muhammad Yusuf, an eccentric and conservative but non-violent imam, who demanded strict

adherence to the Koran [sic], rejected Darwinian evolution and taught that the earth isflat.[196] He built up a disciplined sect that provided free food, education and hope to its

followers, only to be attacked by the governmentwhich some see as the reason for BHs


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transmogrification into a jihadist group. Yusuf himself was killed in 2009 and by the next year

[w]hat had started as a religious protest movement turned into a full-blown insurgency,

committed to the imposition of severeshari`ah. And while there are those who insist that BH is

mainly a product of economic inequality,[197]its undeniable that BHs Salafi agenda andaspirations are nothing new in Nigeriaalthough its level of violence against Christians may

be. All the way back in 1978 a similar organization,Jama`at Izalat al-Bida wa-Iqamat al-Sunnah,

Society for the Eradication of Innovation and the Establishment of the Sunnah, or Yan Izala, wascreated by the prominent cleric Abubakr Gumi (d. 1992).[198] While not as extreme as BHYan

Izala grudgingly approved Western-style education, for exampleYan Izala was puritanical and

Quran-literalist. Regarding the populaces view of such movements, unlike in Mali, it seems that

many Nigerian Muslims support the goals, if not the methods, of such Salafi groupsbased on data

from Pew:[199]88% say its good that Islam plays a large role in politics; 48% hold a favorable

view of AQ; 58% identify themselves as fundamentalists, over against modernizers (only in

Egypt was the percentage self-identifying as part of the former group larger); and regarding crimeand punishment, 56% support stoning for adultery, 65% whipping and/or amputation for theft and

51% the death penalty for apostasy from Islam. Thus, the alleged extremism of BH might be

overblownit may be that that group accurately reflects the views of a substantial number of

Nigerian Muslims. It seems that in Nigeria, since independence (1960), Wahhabi [Salafi]influences [have] gradually diminished the power of Sufism, in contradistinction to another West

African nation, Senegal, where the centrality of Sufism has apparently confined the influence of

the Wahhabis to the margins.[200] Of course, Senegals population is 92% Sufi, while Nigerias

is only 37%[201](although, since Nigerias Muslim population is some 80 million, and Senegals is

about 12 million, the real number of Nigerian Sufis is far higher).

Salafism in Libya[202]has come out of the shadows since al-Qadhafis ouster. The several

Islamist groups in the country, both pre- and post-Arab Spring, are divided between Salafis

willing to work within a democratic system and those who would rather fight than run and

vote. Its fortunate that the Salafi trend in Libya, despite being larger in size than the [Libyan]Muslim Brotherhood and the LIFG [Libyan Islamic Fighting Group],[203]suffers from a lack ofleadership and organizational structure[204]quite unlike the Salafis in neighboring

Egypt.[205] Ansar al-Din does not seem to have existed until after the revolution, although itshares views and methods with militant Salafis in the National Front for the Salvation of Libya

(NFSL), the Islamic Rally Movement (IRM) and The Martyrs (al-Shuhada).[206] Currently in

Libya much of the violence suggests a movement in search of a cause; failing to achieve local

resonance, Libyan Salafis have expanded beyond their traditional turf of social issues and are now

grasping at foreign causes they believe will excite Libyans emotions.[207] However, Salafis in

Libya seem to have a hard time gaining traction in no small measure because of the long history of

Sanusi Sufi influence there, as aforementioned. And note that the Sanusis in Libya are also seen,

quite accurately, as progenitors of Libyan nationalism, in fighting colonialist Italians, as well assupporters of orthodox Islam. In fact, Sanusi and Wahhabi/Salafi doctrines share enough overlap

such that the usual criticisms levied by the latter at the former hardly seem credible in Libya. Forexample, Sanusis: adhere closely to the Quran alone as interpreted without recourse to the ijma,

consensus opinion, of scholars; reject the more outlandish Sufi orders views about direct unity

with Allah, opting instead for spiritual identification with the Prophet Muhammad; downplay the

veneration of saints tombs as shrines; and disapprove of music, dancing, singing, tobacco and

coffee. [208] And both Wahhabis/Salafis and Sanusis have been quite political, even

jihadist. Therefore, the usual Salafi censure suspects have tended not to work when directed at

Libyas Sanusi Sufis.

Salafism in the Horn of AfricaSudan, Somalia and Ethiopiashares many similarities,

albeit with country-specific aspects.[209] The areas closer proximity to both the MB center of

Egypt, as well as the Wahhabi nexus in KSA, made it more easily penetrated by agents of


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each. Sudans National Islamic Front is arguably closer, ideologically, to the MB than to the Salafis

and, while its leader Hassan al-Turabi has sometime held high political office, Khartoums de facto

alliance with the Twelver Shiì Islamic Republic of Iran shows that Sudanese Sunni political

Islamists are limited in power and influence.[210] Also, well over half of Sudans people areaffiliated with Sufi orders, while perhaps only 10% are involved with Salafism, so although

Wahhabism was in Sudan by the 1930s at the latest (in the form of Ansar al-Sunnah al-

Muhammadiyah [ASM], which still has ties with Riyadh),[211]Sufism proved to be something of avaccine against its spread. In recent decades ASM has spun off two other Wahhabi-Salafi groups:

Jamaàt al-La Jamàh [JLJ], the Non-Group Group; and Ansar al-Sunnah al-Islah [ASI]. The

former is dedicated to being apolitical and the rather abstruse topic of eradicating spurious Hadith

collections thereof. The latter is a takfiri[212]organization that criticizes the NIF/MB. There is

also in Sudan a moderate Salafi party, the Islamic Centrist Party, which eschews political

involvement and yet promoted democracy and womens rights. While this group derides the

aforementioned as extremists, it itself is seen by many Sudanese as merely dilutedSalafism.[213] And over against all these groups there exists jihadist Salafism, largely the product

of Usama Bin Ladins tenure in the country in the 1990s and the attendant influence of jihadists

returning from Afghanistan. This mode combine[s] the doctrinal content and approach of Salafism

and organisational models from Muslim Brotherhood organisations.[214] Jihadist Salafi clericsregularly issue fatwas calling for the death of Hassan al-Turabi, Shiìs, Sadiq al-Mahdi (great-

grandson of the Sudanese Mahdi, and head of the Ummah Party) and Communists.

Next door to Sudan, MB ideas were first brought to Ethiopia by Shakyh Muhammad Qatiba

in the 1940s; after having studied at al-Azhar for many years, he tried to reform some of the more

excessive Sufi practices and although he is today regarded as an icon for the Salafi movementit

would be incorrect to label him a Salafi, not least because he never sought to abolish Sufism as

such.[215] Salafism-Wahhabism actually came to Ethiopia in the early 1960s, with the Saudi

establishment of the Muslim World League and the bringing of Ethiopian Muslim students to

matriculate at the Islamic University in Medina. A former student, Shaykh Abubakr Muhammad,returned to Bale, Ethiopia in 1969 and made it his mission in life to reform Islam there alongWahhabi lines.[216] In subsequent years, he has been joined by other like-minded Salafis

although these have not gone uncountered. Perhaps the most outspoken opponent of Wahhabismand Salafism in Ethiopia is the aforementioned Sufi group al-Ahbash, and in return Salafis there

have charged its members with being not just Sufis who practice shirk(idolatry or polytheism)

but crypto-Shiìs (perhaps hoping to exploit the fact that al-Ahbashs founder lived for many years

in Lebanon, a predominantly Shiì country). The al-Ahbash are also accused of colluding with the

United States. (Much of this debate is carried out on various Internet sites. ) Otherwise, the usual

suspects of Salafi-Sufi polemics come into play: createdness/uncreateness of the Quran; the issue

anthropomorphizing Allah; whether its acceptable to visit shrines and tombs; and whether Muslims

in non-Muslim-ruled/majority countries should abide by the laws of the infidels (al-Ahbash sayyes; Wahhabis-Salafis say no).[217] The confrontation between the Ahbash and the Wahhabiyya

is arguably harsher than the clash between Muslims and non-Muslims. The Ahbash represents amoderate interpretation that developed in countries[218]where Muslims experienced lengthy

dialogs with Christians. The Wahhabis developed their puritan concepts in the desert and recently

have combined with branches of the Muslim Brothers to reemerge as leaders of transnational

fundamentalism.[219] And finally, it is worthy of note that Salafi movements in Ethiopia (and

Eritrea) are looked down upon as step-brothers by the MB and Salafi groups in places like Egypt,

because they are operating in a majority-Christian context and so are perceived as having little

chance of ever obtaining political power in the near- or mid-term.[220]

Much like in Ethiopia, Wahhabi-Salafi ideology came to Somalia in the 1960s and 1970s

thanks to returning Somalis funded by the MWL to study in Saudi Islamic universities.[221] And

although an undetermined, but anecdotally high, percentage of Somalis Muslims are Sufi-affiliated,


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Salafism has made powerful inroads into that countryperhaps because of its two-decade-long

failed state status, which has allowed the better organized (and funded) Salafists like al-Shabab to

gain the upper hand politically and militarily.

1.IV. Conclusion

The prominent American convert to Islam and Sufism, Stephen Sleyman Schwartz, contends thatSufism isan indispensable element in any real solution to confrontation between Islam and the

West, and that while Sufis will not serve as Western mercenariesthey can promote intellectual

diversity, a renaissance of Islamic thought, and an Islam of liberty, along with genuine andtransparent cooperation with Christians, Jews, and other believers.[222] Another very influential

Sufi living in America, Shaykh Hisham Kabbanihead of the of the Islamic Supreme Council of

America and a shaykh of the Naqshbandi-Haqqani orderis ever more blunt: it is very simple: the

United States must reach out to non-Wahhabi Muslims if it wants to succeed in this battle. Its a

no-lose proposition![223]Rather than working with Wahhabis and Salafis, the US should ask the

right people to find individuals who are moderate Muslim scholars and see their policy relevant

suggestions.[224] The eminent scholar of Islam Bernard Lewis agrees, white cautioning that

Sufism is peaceful but it is not pacifist.[225]

Indeed, as the many examples of Sufi jihad delineated earlier in this paper demonstrate, seemingly

peaceful Sufi shaykhshave the potential to provided a religio-dogmatic legitimization for jihad

under appropriate circumstances.[226] Thus, Sufism may very well prove a mode of Islam that

the West in general, and the US in particular, can do business with in both the kinetic and non-

kinetic realms; Schwartz is very likely correct that Sufis cannot be enlisted as mercenaries, but that

is not to say they will not fight on their own behalfand in fact they are already, as the example of

the ASJ in Somalia clearly shows.

Western policy makers heretofore have advanced the idea of helping Sufi orders overagainst Salafi-Wahhabi-extremist groups,[227] but such advice is usually limited to the

socioeconomic dimension (help fund the Sufis to out-charity the Salafis). That avenue is useful,

but a more effective approach would range from merely helping Sufis disseminate their Islamic

ideology, on one end of the spectrum, to possibly funding and actively supporting them, on the

other. For example, the aforementioned Sufi Ahmad b. Idris (d. 1837) wrote extensive Arabic

critiques of Wahhabism.[228] Why not make sure this work is available to any `alim or imam who

wants it, in Timbuktu, Mogadishu, Kano and Khartoum? Likewise for a book by the aformentionedliving Sufi, Kabbani. His seven-volumeEncyclopedia of Islamic Doctrine might be a bit much for

a lesser-educated cleric in Mogadishu or Benghazi, but surely editors could be found to pare itdown to one-volume size, or at least to put out pamphlets delineating the Shaykhs systematic

doctrinal challenge based on Quran and Hadith that counteracts the Salafis?[229]

A number of Islamic countries already promote Sufism as both an antidote to, and vaccine for,

Salafism. In Morocco, the government supports Sufism by airing dhikrs, or Sufi memory services,and sponsoring public lectures on Islamic mysticism as well as Sufi music

performances.[230] Algeria does much of the same, encouraging Sufis to help take care oforphans, teach the Koran [sic] and distribute charitable donations. And Sufism has a much longer

history in Algeria than Salafism, which is seen by many as a foreign import. [231] Mauritania,

too, sponsors forums for Sufi shaykhs to disseminate their views.[232]

How might such activities transfer to the target countries of this study? Regarding Egypt, whatharm could there be in inviting, for example, Muhammad Ala al-Din Abu al-Zayem, the head of

the Azmiyah order and the founder of the HTM (Sufi) party, to speak at a high-profile venue in the


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US, Britain or France? It makes perfect sense, especially if his topic were something along the lines

of a critique of the recent and risible call by the Salafi Murgan al-Guhari to destroy the Pyramids

and Sphinx as idols.[233] Or, in a more theatre-specific activity, meetings could be arranged

between Western military chaplains and, specifically, Sufi-adherent analog chaplains in theEgyptian (or any other) militaryas was done recently between US Army chaplains and South

Sudanese ones.[234] And perhaps the State Department, US Agency for International Development

or US Institute of Peace could find a way to at least rhetorically support the burgeoning Sufi-CopticChristian alliance in Egypt (which is also being spearheaded by the Azmiyah order), as both groups

have a common, vested interest in opposing Salafi attacks on their sites of worship. [235]

In Libya, the nationalist bona fidesof the Sanusi Sufi order, as well as its Islamic orthodoxyeven the Tawhid movement of Muhammad ibn `Abd al-Wahhab and his followersnever

objected to the Sanusis ideology[236]make it a logical anti-Salafi vehicle in that country. The

Sanusis historical connections to the Ottomans, and thus to their heirs the Turks, also might make

for another aspect of the counter-Salafi transnational front. In fact, the Turksthe mild Islamists

par excellencehave repeatedly expressed concern over attacks on Sufi shrines in Libya, thereby

highlighting and reminding the Libyan government that that area of North Africa was once under

the Turkish ambit.[237] If NATO member Turkey cannot convince the new Libyan government of

the advisability of heeding the Sanusis, perhaps Western military advisement and aid could beparceled out only to those areas and/or groups in Libya where these Sufis are extant and clearly

involved in governance and security. And British SAS or US Special Ops teams operating in thefar south of Libya, in surveillance and pursuit of AQIM, might consider working with Sanusis from

the oasiszawiyas in locales such as al-Jawf and al-Qatrun.

A number of excellent ideas for enlisting Nigerias Sufis in the struggle against Salafism have

already been laid out:[238]promoting improved economic conditions for all in the region; assistingthe Qadiris and Tijanis by, concretely, setting up a permanent consulate in Kano, that would not

only serve as a constant reminder of the U.S. commitment to both the country and the region, butprovide a focal point through which aid, development assistance, and military training could be

channeled;[239]funding Sufi educational programs; encouraging US colleges and universities to

establish exchange programs.[240] Also, the U.S. military canhelp by offering to reform

Nigerias security sector[241]not just improving its efficiency but also its professionalism,

thereby cutting down on the brutality which helps drive northern Muslims into the open arms of

radical Islamic groups.[242]

Mali might be the country on this target list which has, currently, the most interesting and

promising cadre of anti-Salafi Sufis. In Bamako and southern Mali, many young people are

enamored of new forms of Sufism,[243]even more so than of Salafism. And one of the most

appealing new Sufis is Shaykh Cherif Ousmane Madani Haidara, head of the original Ansar al-

Din (whence the Salafist group pilfered the name). He is on record as saying We dont need their

[Salafist Ansar al-Dins] shari`a. We have been Muslim here for centurieshere in Mali, we live

with Christians, we live with Jews, we live with animists.[244] Open Western approval of, if

not support for, Shaykh Haidara would be worth considering. At the same time, Haidarasadmirable ecumenism is unlikely to dislodge the more militant Salafist Ansar al-Din of Iyad al-

Ghali from his lairwhich is why, prior to French intervention, the Obama Administration floated

the idea of a consortium of West African nations sending troops to do so.[245] However Mali,

recall, has one of the lowest participation rates in Sufism in all of sub-Saharan Africaso it may be

more difficult here than elsewhere to take advantage of Islamic mysticism. Perhaps one of the

greatest rallying points for all anti-Salafists, Sufi or otherwise, in Mali is the great Arabicmanuscript library in Timbuktu, which is a UNESCO World Cultural Heritage site. Malians have

already expressed alarm that Ansar al-Din members threatened to destroy any manuscripts which


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are not religious,[246]and any Western efforts to defend and preserve Malis cultural patrimony, as

French forces tried to do,[247]would only win friends and influence non-Salafis there.

Sudan, unlike any of the other African countries treated herein, has a government that is on the

official US State Department state sponsors of terrorism listjoining Iran, Syria and (curiously)

Cuba. Thus, the US options for open involvement there are rather more limited than in the other

cases and the US aim might well be to degrade (if not destabilize) the regime, rather than help it tomoderate. And unlike, for example, Jundullah in Iran, there is currently no religious-based

organization that is hoping to bring down the government. That said, it is true that one of the most

significant results of the Islamist strategy towards Sufi orders [in Sudan] is the emergence of a new

notion of jihad in Sufi circles.a willingness of the people of remembrance to embrace theIslamist understanding of jihad.[248] Whether that means jihad against Islamists/Salafists, or

against non-Muslims (such as the newly-minted Christian South Sudanese), is an open

question. But recall that the greatest political mass movement in Sudanese historythat of the

Mahdi, Muhammad Ahmadwas one of charismatic Sufism writ large. Even a much smaller

politicized Sufi slice of the Sudanese population would prove a major problem for Khartoum and its

Iranian allies. One would think that the West could work with South Sudanese and/or Ethiopian

elements in order to funnel support to those Sufis in Sudan who would be willing to stand up,

criticize, and perhaps even take up arms against the ruling Salafis. Umar al-Bashirs government iscurrently experiencing an Arab Spring-driven crisis of confidence, which it is attempting to

defuse by holding conferences to co-opt the reformers.[249]

Somalia already has an active anti-Salafi Sufi organization, the much-referenced ASJ, which seems

to be recapitulating in some ways the century-old success of Muhammad Hassan and his jihad

leveraging organizational strength and leaders authority over against al-Shababs jihadist

Salafism. Western powers at the very least indirectly supported ASJ, via the African Union missionin that country. That should continue, and include insistence that as Somalia rises from the ranks of

failed states the Sufis there have a place at the government table (as we should have done with theSanusis in Libya). Perhaps the al-Ahbash Sufi organization across the border in Ethiopia could be

prevailed upon to assist their co-religionists in opposing (militant) Salafis, and in getting along with

non-Muslimsespecially those who come bearing foreign aid. And al-Ahbash should be included

in Addis Ababas calculations, because while Ethiopia might still be a majority-Christian country, it

is just barely soand that nation is flanked by Islamists in Sudan and Somalia, and within easy

reach of Salafi-Wahhabi influence from the Arabian peninsula.

Islamic Africa is probably the part of the ummahleast amenable to Salafism and extremist Islamic

ideologies, in part because of different historical and political factors but, also, owing in no small

measure to the very real religious influence of the many Sufi orders extant there. While Sufism is

not a panacea for all the ills afflicting Islam, it is certainly much more than a placebo, often (but,

admittedly, not always) promoting tolerance, non-violent jihad and respect for the Other

(particularly the Christian kindof whom there are many in Africa). In this regard, let us hope

mystical African Islam can burgeon not just on the continent, but increase its influence out of

Africa.

[1]Sahih Bukhari, Kitab al-Fitan, Volume 9, Book 88, #204.

[2]Ibid., #193.

[3]Khawarij (singular khariji) means those who went out, dissenters and refers to radical and (obviously) militant egalitarians of

the time who thought the most pious male Muslim should be caliph, regardless of family affiliation or even relationship to

Muhammad (Ali was the Islamic prophets son-in-law and cousin).[4]For one recent example focusing on Sunnis v. Shiìs, see The Prophets Curse: Islams Ancient Divide Fuels Middle East

Conflicts, Spiegelonline, September 6, 2012.[5]To name but a few: Wahhabis v. Twelver Shiìs within KSA; Sunnis v. Twelver Shiìs in Lebanon; Alawis (pseudo-Shiìs) v.

Sunnis in Syria; Deobandis v. Barelvis in Pakistan and India; Sunnis v. Ahmadis in Pakistan and Indonesia.


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[6]Literally al-salaf al-salih, the pious ancestors.

[7]Deobandism originated in the Islamic madrasah of Deoband (north of Delhi, India) in 1867 and, while perhaps influenced by

Wahhabism, was largely a separate movement that espoused the same means and ends to an Islamic societyalthough being slightly

less antagonistic toward Sufim, publicly claiming to be against Sufi excesses, not Sufism per se. See Usha Sanyal,Ahmad Riza

Khan Barelwi: in the Path of the Prophet (Oxford: One World, 2005), pp. 35-37.

[8]On this topic see my entry on Islamic Fundamentalism, in Brenda E. Brasher, ed., Encyclopedia of Fundamentalism (New York

and London: Routledge, 2001), pp. 235-240.[9]Party of liberation, a transnational Islamic group dedicated to resurrecting the caliphate (see my blogreporting on my trip to

their American conference in greater Chicago this past June).[10]TJ is the Transmission or Dissemination Group, the worlds largest Islamic one which, from its headquarters in India, seeks

to re-pietize Muslims along mostly conservative Sunni lines; see my entry Tablighi Jama`at in the World Almanac of

Islamism. However, paradoxically, TJ ideology includes some Sufi-like practices.

[11]The other two modes, broadly speaking, of Islamic responses to Western intellectual, military and political dominance over the

last several centuries have been emula

Documents

Furnish, T.R. 2013. Sufis v. Salafis- Winning Friends and Interdicting Enemies in Islamic Africa. RIMA Policy Papers, 1 1