Full Text Cases in Torts

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TORTS and DAMAGES 1 | P a g e

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 74431. November 6, 1989.]

PURITA MIRANDA VESTIL and AGUSTIN VESTIL,petitioners,vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT,

DAVID UY and TERESITA UY, respondents.

Pablo P. Garcia for petitioners.

Roberto R. Palmares for private respondents.

SYLLABUS

1.REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; WEIGHT AND SUFFICIENCY; DEATH

CERTIFICATE NOT CONCLUSIVE PROOF OF CAUSE OF DEATH BUT ONLY OF

FACT OF DEATH. The Court finds that the link between the dog bites and the

certified cause of death has been satisfactorily established. We also reiterate

our ruling in Sison v. Sun Life Assurance Company of Canada, that the death

certificate is not conclusive proof of the cause of death but only of the fact of

death. Indeed, the evidence of the child's hydrophobia is sufficient to convince

us that she died because she was bitten by the dog even if the death certificate

stated a different cause of death.

2.CIVIL LAW; QUASI-DELICTS; ARTICLE 2183 OF CIVIL CODE; POSSESSOR

LIABLE EVEN IF ANIMAL SHOULD "ESCAPE OR BE LOST" AND BE REMOVEDFROM HIS CONTROL; THAT DOG WAS TAME AND WAS MERELY PROVOKED

BY CHILD INTO BITING HER, IMMATERIAL. Article 2183 of the Civil Code

holds the possessor liable even if the animal should "escape or be lost" and so

be removed from his control. And it does not matter either that as the

petitioners also contend, the dog was tame and was merely provoked by the

child into biting her. The law does not speak only of vicious animals but covers

even tame ones as long as they cause injury. As for the alleged provocation, the

petitioners forget that Theness was only three years old at the time she was

attacked and can hardly be faulted for whatever she might have done to the

animal.

3.ID.; ID.; ID.; BASIS THEREOF. According to Manresa, the obligation imposed

by Article 2183 of the Civil Code is not based on the negligence or on the

presumed lack of vigilance of the possessor or user of the animal causing the

damage. It is based on natural equity and on the principle of social interest that

he who possesses animals for his utility, pleasure or service must answer for

the damage which such animal may cause.

4.ID.; DAMAGES; ACTUAL DAMAGES; MEDICAL AND HOSPITALIZATION

EXPENSES, REDUCED.We sustain the findings of the Court of Appeals and

approve the monetary awards except only as to the medical and hospitalization

expenses, which are reduced to P2,026.69, as prayed for in the complaint.

While there is no recompense that can bring back to the private respondents

the child they have lost, their pain should at least be assuaged by the civil

damages to which they are entitled.

D E C I S I O N

CRUZ,Jp:

Little Theness Tan Uy was dead at the age of three. Her parents said she died

because she was bi tten by a dog of the petitioners, but the latter denied this,

claiming they had nothing to do with the dog. The Uys sued the Vestils, who

were sustained by the trial court. On appeal, the decision of the courta quo was

reversed in favor of the Uys. The Vestils are now before vs. They ask us to set

aside the judgment of the respondent court and to reinstate that of the trial

court. prcd

On July 29, 1975, Theness was bitten by a dog while she was playing with achild of the petitioners in the house of the late Vicente Miranda, the father of

Purita Vestil, at F. Ramos Street in Cebu City. She was rushed to the Cebu

General Hospital, where she was treated for "multiple lacerated wounds on theforehead" 1 and administered an anti-rabies vaccine by Dr. Antonio Tautjo. She

was discharged after nine days but was re-admitted one week later due to

"vomiting of saliva." 2 The following day, on August 15, 1975, the child died.

The cause of death was certified as broncho-pneumonia. 3

Seven months later, the Uys sued for damages, alleging that the Vestils were

liable to them as the possessors of "Andoy," the dog that bit and eventually
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killed their daughter. The Vestils rejected the charge, insisting that the dog

belonged to the deceased Vicente Miranda, that it was a tame animal, and that

in any case no one had witnessed it bite Theness. After trial, Judge Jose R.

Ramolete of the Court of First Instance of Cebu sustained the defendants and

dismissed the complaint. 4

The respondent court arrived at a different conclusion when the case was

appealed. 5 It found that the Vestils were in possession of the house and the

dog and so should be responsible under Article 2183 of the Civil Code for the

injuries caused by the dog. It also held that the child had died as a result of the

dog bites and not for causes independent thereof as submitted by the appellees.

Accordingly, the Vestils were ordered to pay the Uys damages in the amount of

P30,000.00 for the death of Theness, P12,000.00 for medical and

hospitalization expenses, and P2,000.00 as attorney's fees.

In the proceedings now before us, Purita Vestil insists that she is not the owner

of the house or of the dog left by her father as his estate has not yet been

partitioned and there are other heirs to the property. Pursuing the logic of the

Uys, she claims, even her sister living in Canada would be held responsible forthe acts of the dog simply because she is one of Miranda's heirs. However, that

is hardly the point. What must be determined is thepossession of the dog that

admittedly was staying in the house in question, regardless of the ownership of

the dog or of the house.

Article 2183 reads as follows:

The possessor of an animal or whoever may make use of

the same is responsible for the damage which it may

cause, although it may escape or be lost. This

responsibility shall cease only in case the damage should

come from force majeure or from the fault of the person

who has suffered damage.

Thus, inAfialda v. Hisole, 6 a person hired as caretaker of a carabao gored him

to death and his heirs thereupon sued the owner of the animal for damages.

The complaint was dismissed on the ground that it was the caretaker's duty to

prevent the carabao from causing injury to any one, including himself.

Purita Vestil's testimony that she was not in possession of Miranda's house is

hardly credible. She said that the occupants of the house left by her father were

related to him ("one way or the other") and maintained themselves out of a

common fund or by some kind of arrangement (on which, however, she did not

elaborate). 7 She mentioned as many as ten of such relatives who had stayed in

the house at one time or another although they did not appear to be close kin. 8

She at least implied that they did not pay any rent, presumably because of their

relation with Vicente Miranda notwithstanding that she herself did not seem to

know them very well. Cdpr

There is contrary evidence that the occupants of the house were boarders (or

more of boarders than relatives) who paid the petitioners for providing them

with meals and accommodations. It also appears that Purita Vestil had hired a

maid, Dolores Jumao-as, who did the cooking and cleaning in the said house for

its occupants. 9 Her mother, Pacita, who was a nursemaid of Purita herself,

categorically declared that the petitioners were maintaining boarders in the

house where Theness was bitten by a dog. 10 Another witness, Marcial Lao,

testified that he was indeed a boarder and that the Vestils were maintaining the

house for business purposes. 11 And although Purita denied paying the water

bills for the house, the private respondents submitted documentary evidence of

her application for water connection with the Cebu Water District, which

strongly suggested that she was administering the house in question. 12

While it is true that she is not really the owner of the house, which was still part

of Vicente Miranda's estate, there is no doubt that she and her husband were its

possessors at the time of the incident in question. She was the only heir

residing in Cebu City and the most logical person to take care of the property,

which was only six kilometers from her own house. 13 Moreover, there is

evidence showing that she and her family regularly went to the house, once or

twice weekly, according to at least one witness, 14 and used it virtually as a

second house. Interestingly, her own daughter was playing in the house with

Theness when the little girl was bitten by the dog. 15 The dog itself remained inthe house even after the death of Vicente Miranda in 1973 and until 1975, when

the incident in question occurred. It is also noteworthy that the petitioners

offered to assist the Uys with their hospitalization expenses although Purita

said she knew them only casually. 16

The petitioners also argue that even assuming that they were the possessors of

the dog that bit Theness, there was no clear showing that she died as a result

thereof. On the contrary, the death certificate 17 declared that she died of

broncho-pneumonia, which had nothing to do with the dog bites for which she

had been previously hospitalized.

The Court need not involve itself in an extended scientific discussion of the

causal connection between the dog bites and the certified cause of death except

to note that, first, Theness developed hydrophobia, a symptom of rabies, as a
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result of the dog bites, and second, that asphyxia broncho-pneumonia, which

ultimately caused her death, was a complication of rabies.

That Theness became afraid of water after she was bitten by the dog isestablished by the following testimony of Dr. Tautjo: LLphil

COURT:I think there was mention of rabies in the report in

the second admission?

A:Now, the child was continuously vomiting just before I

referred to Dr. Co earlier in the morning and

then the father, because the child was asking for

water, the father tried to give the child water and

this child went under the bed, she did not like to

drink the water and there was fright in her

eyeballs. For this reason, because I was in danger

there was rabies, I called Dr. Co.

Q:In other words, the child had hydrophobia?

A:Yes, sir. 18

As for the link between rabies and broncho-pneumonia, the doctor had the

following to say under oath:

A:Now, as I said before, broncho-pneumonia can result

from physical, chemical and bacterial means . . .

It can be the result of infection, now, so if you

have any other disease which can lower your

resistance you can also get pneumonia.

xxx xxx xxx

Q:Would you say that a person who has rabies may die of

complication which is broncho-pneumonia?

A:Yes.

Q:For the record, I am manifesting that this book shown

the witness is known as CURRENT DIANOSIS &

TREATMENT, 1968 by Henry Brainerd, Sheldon

Margen and Milton Chaton. Now, I invite your

attention, doctor, to page 751 of this book under

the title "Rabies." There is on this page,

"Prognosis" as a result of rabies and it says:

Once the symptoms have appeared death inevitably

occurs after 2-3 days as a result of cardiac or

respiratory failure or generalized paralysis.

After a positive diagnosis of rabies or after a bite by a

suspected animal if the animal cannot be

observed or if the bite is on the head, give rabies

vaccine (duck embryo). Do you believe in this

statement?

A:Yes.

Q:Would you say therefore that persons who have rabies

may die of respiratory failure which leave in the

form of broncho-pneumonia?

A:Broncho-pneumonia can be a complication of rabies. 19

On the strength of the foregoing testimony, the Court finds that the linkbetween the dog bites and the certified cause of death has been satisfactorily

established. We also reiterate our ruling in Sison v. Sun Life Assurance

Company of Canada, 20 that the death certificate is not conclusive proof of the

cause of death but only of the fact of death. Indeed, the evidence of the child'shydrophobia is sufficient to convince us that she died because she was bitten by

the dog even if the death certificate stated a different cause of death.

The petitioner's contention that they could not be expected to exercise remote

control of the dog is not acceptable. In fact, Article 2183 of the Civil Code holds

the possessor liable even if the animal should "escape or be lost" and so beremoved from his control. And it does not matter either that as the petitioners

also contend, the dog was tame and was merely provoked by the child into

biting her. The law does not speak only of vicious animals but covers even tame

ones as long as they cause injury. As for the alleged provocation, the petitioners
http://www.cdasiaonline.com/search/show_article/20559?search=%28date%3A%5B1989+1990%5D+AND+title%3A+%28vestil%29+AND+title%3A+%28iac%29%29+OR+%28date%3A%5B1989+1990%5D+AND+title%3A+%28vestil%29+AND+title%3A+%28%22Intermediate+Appellate+Court%22%29%29#footnoteshttp://www.cdasiaonline.com/search/show_article/20559?search=%28date%3A%5B1989+1990%5D+AND+title%3A+%28vestil%29+AND+title%3A+%28iac%29%29+OR+%28date%3A%5B1989+1990%5D+AND+title%3A+%28vestil%29+AND+title%3A+%28%22Intermediate+Appellate+Court%22%29%29#footnoteshttp://www.cdasiaonline.com/search/show_article/20559?search=%28date%3A%5B1989+1990%5D+AND+title%3A+%28vestil%29+AND+title%3A+%28iac%29%29+OR+%28date%3A%5B1989+1990%5D+AND+title%3A+%28vestil%29+AND+title%3A+%28%22Intermediate+Appellate+Court%22%29%29#footnoteshttp://www.cdasiaonline.com/search/show_article/20559?search=%28date%3A%5B1989+1990%5D+AND+title%3A+%28vestil%29+AND+title%3A+%28iac%29%29+OR+%28date%3A%5B1989+1990%5D+AND+title%3A+%28vestil%29+AND+title%3A+%28%22Intermediate+Appellate+Court%22%29%29#footnoteshttp://www.cdasiaonline.com/search/show_article/20559?search=%28date%3A%5B1989+1990%5D+AND+title%3A+%28vestil%29+AND+title%3A+%28iac%29%29+OR+%28date%3A%5B1989+1990%5D+AND+title%3A+%28vestil%29+AND+title%3A+%28%22Intermediate+Appellate+Court%22%29%29#footnoteshttp://www.cdasiaonline.com/search/show_article/20559?search=%28date%3A%5B1989+1990%5D+AND+title%3A+%28vestil%29+AND+title%3A+%28iac%29%29+OR+%28date%3A%5B1989+1990%5D+AND+title%3A+%28vestil%29+AND+title%3A+%28%22Intermediate+Appellate+Court%22%29%29#footnotes


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forget that Theness was only three years old at the time she was attacked and

can hardly be faulted for whatever she might have done to the animal. LexLib

It is worth observing that the above defenses of the petitioners are an impliedrejection of their original posture that there was no proof that it was the dog in

their father's house that bit Theness.

According to Manresa, the obligation imposed by Article 2183 of the Civil Code

is not based on the negligence or on the presumed lack of vigilance of the

possessor or user of the animal causing the damage. It is based on natural

equity and on the principle of social interest that he who possesses animals for

his utility, pleasure or service must answer for the damage which such animal

may cause. 21

We sustain the findings of the Court of Appeals and approve the monetary

awards except only as to the medical and hospitalization expenses, which are

reduced to P2,026.69, as prayed for in the complaint. While there is no

recompense that can bring back to the private respondents the child they have

lost, their pain should at least be assuaged by the civil damages to which theyare entitled.

WHEREFORE, the challenged decision is AFFIRMED as above modified. The

petition is DENIED, with costs against the petitioners. It is so ordered.

Narvasa, Gancayco, Grio-Aquino andMedialdea, JJ., concur.

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 36858. March 6, 1933.]

JUSTA AFABLE and the minors POTENCIANOMADLANGBAYAN and ROSA MADLANGBAYAN, by

JUSTA AFABLE, as guardian ad litem, plaintiffs-

appellants, vs. SINGER SEWING MACHINE COMPANY,

defendant-appellee.

Bernabe Butalidand Teofilo Mendoza, for appellants.

William F. Mueller, for appellee.

SYLLABUS

1.MASTER AND SERVANT; WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT;INJURIES SUFFERED BY EMPLOYEE IN THE COURSE OF THE

EMPLOYMENT. The employer is not an insurer "against all accidental

injuries which might happen to an employee while in the course of the

employment", and as a general rule an employee is not entitled to recover

from personal injuries resulting from an accident that befalls him while

going to or returning from his place of employment, because such an

accident does not arise out of and in the course of his employment. This

does not imply that an employee can never recover for injuries suffered

while on his way to or from work. That depends on the nature of his

employment.

D E C I S I O N

VICKERS, Jp:

This is an appeal by the plaintiffs from a decision of Judge Pedro

Concepcion of the Court of First Instance of Manila dismissing the

complaint, without a special finding as to costs.

The appellants make the following assignments of error:

"I.El Juzgado a quo incurrio en error al

considerar que los hechos probados por los demandantescaen fuera de las disposiciones del artculo 2 de dicha Ley

No. 3428 tal como ha sido enmendada por la Ley No. 3812

de la Legislatura Filipina;

"II.Erro tambin al sobreseer de una manera

definitiva la demanda;

"III.Incurrio finalmente en error al no conceder

la compensacion reclamada en la demanda a que tienen

derecho los demandantes, segn las disposiciones de

dicha Ley."
http://www.cdasiaonline.com/search/show_article/20559?search=%28date%3A%5B1989+1990%5D+AND+title%3A+%28vestil%29+AND+title%3A+%28iac%29%29+OR+%28date%3A%5B1989+1990%5D+AND+title%3A+%28vestil%29+AND+title%3A+%28%22Intermediate+Appellate+Court%22%29%29#footnoteshttp://www.cdasiaonline.com/search/show_article/20559?search=%28date%3A%5B1989+1990%5D+AND+title%3A+%28vestil%29+AND+title%3A+%28iac%29%29+OR+%28date%3A%5B1989+1990%5D+AND+title%3A+%28vestil%29+AND+title%3A+%28%22Intermediate+Appellate+Court%22%29%29#footnotes


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It appears from the evidence that Leopoldo Madlangbayan was a

collector for the Singer Sewing Machine Company in the district of San

Francisco del Monte, outside of the limits of the City of Manila, and he was

supposed to be residing in his district according to the records of the

company. His compensation was a commission of eight per cent on all

collections made by him. On the afternoon of Sunday, November 16, 1930,

Leopoldo Madlangbayan while riding a bicycle was run over and fatallyinjured at the corner of O'Donnell and Zurbaran streets in the City of

Manila by a truck driven by Vitaliano Sumoay. It appears that

Madlangbayan had moved to Teodora Alonso Street in Manila without

notifying the company, and that at the time of his death he was returning

home after making some collections in San Francisco del Monte. According

to the practice of the company, if collectors made collections on Sunday

they were required to deliver the amount collected to the company the

next morning.

On November 21, 1930, Vitaliano Sumoay, the driver of the truck

which caused the death of Leopoldo Madlangbayan, was convicted for thecrime of homicide through reckless negligence, and was sentenced to

imprisonment for one year and one day, and to indemnify the heirs of

Leopoldo Madlangbayan in the sum of P1,000.

On February 19, 1931, the widow and children of Leopoldo

Madlangbayan brought the present action to recover from the defendant

corporation under Act No. 3428, as amended by Act No. 3812, P100 for

burial expenses and P1,745.12 for compensation. Plaintiffs' complaint was

subsequently amended, and they sought to recover under sections 8 and

10 of Act No. 3428 fifty per cent of P16.78 for 208 weeks or P1,745.12, plusP100 for burial expenses.

In its answer to the plaintiffs' last amended complaint, the

defendant denied all the allegations thereof, and as special defenses

alleged that prior to the filing of this complaint the plaintiffs had obtained

a judgment against Vitaliano Sumoay for the damages caused by him; that

Leopoldo Madlangbayan at the time that he sustained the injuries resultingin his death was violating an ordinance of the City of Manila which

prohibits work on Sunday; and that Act No. 3428, as amended, is

unconstitutional and void because it denies the defendant the equal

protection of the law, and impairs the obligation of the contract between

the defendant and Leopoldo Madlangbayan, and deprives the Courts of

First Instance of their probate jurisdiction over the estate of deceased

persons and nullifies Chapters XXIX, XXX, XXXI, XXXII, XXXIII, and XXXIV of

the Code of Civil Procedure and related articles of the Civil Code.

As the deceased Leopoldo Madlangbayan was killed on

November 16, 1930, and Act No. 3812 was not approved until December 8,

1930, it is apparent that the law which is applicable is Act No. 3428,

section 2 of which reads as follows:

"When any employee receives a personal injury

from any accident due to and in the pursuance of the

employment, or contracts any illness directly caused by

such employment or the result of the nature of suchemployment, his employer shall pay compensation in the

sums and to the persons hereinafter specified."

The accident which caused the death of the employee was not

due to and in pursuance of his employment. At the time that he was run

over by the truck Leopoldo Madlangbayan was not in the pursuance of his

employment with the defendant corporation, but was on his way homeafter he had finished his work for the day and had left the territory where

he was authorized to make collections for the defendant. The employer is

not an insurer "against all accidental injuries which might happen to an

employee while in the course of the employment", and as a general rule an

employee is not entitled to recover from personal injuries resulting from

an accident that befalls him while going to or returning from his place of

employment, because such an accident does not arise out of and in thecourse of his employment.

The phrase "due to and in the pursuance of" used in section 2 ofAct No. 3428 was changed in Act No. 3812 to "arising out of and in the

course of". Discussing this phrase, the Supreme Court of Illinois in the case

of Mueller Construction Co. vs. Industrial Board (288 Ill., 148; 118 N. E.,

1028; 1 W. C. L., 943), said:

"The words 'arising out of' refer to the origin or

cause of the accident, and are descriptive of its character,

while the words 'in the course of' refer to the time, place,

and circumstances under which the accident takes place.

(Fitzgerald vs. Clarke & Sons, 1 B. W. C. C., 197; Dietzen Co.

vs. Industrial Board, 279 Ill., 11; 116 N. E., 684.) By the useof these words it was not the intention of the legislature to

make the employer an insurer against all accidental

injuries which might happen to an employee while in the

course of the employment, but only for such injuries

arising from or growing out of the risks peculiar to the

nature of the work in the scope of the workman's

employment or incidental to such employment, and

accidents in which it is possible to trace the injury to some

risk or hazard to which the employee is exposed in a

special degree by reason of such employment. Risks to

which all persons similarly situated are equally exposed


6/21


and not traceable in some special degree to the particular

employment are excluded."

Although some courts have held otherwise, we think the better

rule is as we have stated it. We do not of course mean to imply that an

employee can never recover for injuries suffered while on his way to or

from work. That depends on the nature of his employment. In the case atbar, if the deceased had been killed while going from house to house in San

Francisco del Monte in the pursuance of his employment, the plaintiffs

would undoubtedly have the right, prima facie, to recover.

The appellants cite the syllabus in Stacy's case (225 Mass., 174),

in support of their contention, but an examination of that case shows that

it differs materially from the case at bar. Stacy was drowned by reason ofbreaking through the ice of Colburn's Pond while on his way home from

work. Up to the time of his death he had been employed in the ice-house, in

the work of storing ice which was cut from the pond. The ice-house was

situated at the southerly end of the pond and the deceased lived directly

north from the ice-house, across the pond. He followed the reasonable and

customary way of leaving his employer's premises. The path around the

pond was not used in winter. He was on his employer's premises when hemet his death and was leaving those premises by a reasonable way. There

was no other convenient way of going home. The pond was the premises of

his employer, under his employer's control. It was as a result of the

working operations of his employer that he met his death. The court said.

"The finding that the pond was in the control of the employer and that

crossing over it upon the ice was the 'reasonable and customary way' for

the deceased to reach his home, and that he and other employees wholived in the same direction 'crossed by this way regularly', warranted the

further finding that the injury occurred in the course of the employment."

The court added: "It also could have been found that the death of the

employee was due to his employment as a contributing proximate cause,

incidental to the nature of the work in which he was engaged. There was

evidence from which the board could have found that Stacy's deathoccurred by reason of the special hazard incident to the work which it was

his duty to perform." The court said that Stacy's case was clearly

distinguishable from Fumiciello's case (219 Mass., 488):

Fumiciello was employed by Lathrop & Shea, who were doing

some contract work for the Boston & Albany Railroad Company near

Middlefield. He lived about one mile west where he was employed, and it

was necessary for him to pass over the tracks of the Boston & Albany

Railroad Company to go from his work to his home. While returning home

at the close of the day's work, Fumiciello entered upon the railroad track

where he was struck by a train and killed. The question for decision was

whether the injury arose out of and in the course of his employment. The

court said: "It is plain that if, as the record states, it was necessary for him

to pass over the railroad location, it formed no part of the employers'

plant; nor was it in any way connected therewith or in their control as was

the common stairway used by employees in Sundine's Case, 218 Mass., 1.

The contract of employment did not provide for transportation or that the

employee should be paid for the time taken in going and returning to hisplace of employment, and when the day's work had ended the employee

was free to do as he pleased. If he had chosen to use the public ways and

had been injured by a defect or passing vehicle the administrator could not

recover against the employer because there would be no causal connection

between the conditions of employment and the injuries suffered."

This subject is considered at length in Workmen's Compensation

Law by Schneider, Second Edition, pp. 745 et seq.

In the case at bar the deceased was going from work in his own

conveyance.

"An employee quit work, mounted hismotorcycle and started for home. When riding down the

street he collided with an automobile driven by another

employee. He sustained injuries which resulted in his

death. In holding that the accident did not arise out of or

in the course of the employment, the court said: 'To come

within the term "injury received in the course of

employment" it must be shown that the injury originated

in the work, and, further, that it was received by the

employee while engaged in or about the furtherance of the

affairs of the employer. If it be conceded that the injury

originated in the work, it would still be necessary, in our

opinion, to show that the employee was engaged in the

furtherance of his employer's business.' (Indemnity Co. vs.Dinkins [Tex. Civ. App.], 211 S. W., 949 [1919]; 18 N. C. C.

A., 1034; 4 W. C. L. J., 294; In re Peter S. Winchester, 2nd A.

R. U. S. C. C., 262; In re Julius Rosenberg, 2nd A. R. U. S. C.

C., 263; Kirby Lumber Co. vs. Scurlock, Tex. Civ. App.-

[1921], 229 S. W., 975.)"

"An employee who was paid by the hour was

furnished a bicycle for his work, and while riding home

one evening on the main road he was run into and killedby a motor lorry. It was held that, since it was no part of

his duty to ride home on the bicycle the accident did not


7/21


arise in the course of his employment. (Edwards vs.

Wingham Agriculture & Imp. Co. [1913], W. C. & Ins. Rep.,

642; 109 L. T. Rep., 50; 82 L. J. K. B., 998; 6 B. W. C. C., 511;

4 N. C. C. A., 115; Cook vs. Owners of 'Montreal,' 108 L. T.

Rep., 164; 29 T. L. Rep., 233; 6 B. W. C. C., 220 [1913], 4 N.

C. C. A., 115.)"

"An employee had quit work and left the

premises. He was sitting in his buggy waiting for his son,

when the horse took fright and ran away. It was held that

the injury sustained in the runaway did not arise out of or

in the course of employment. (In re McCall, Ohio I. C. No.

121401, Nov. 4, 1915; Hilding vs. Dept. of Labor & Ind.

[Wash.], 298 Pac., 321 [1931].)"

Furthermore, it appears that the deceased had never notified the

defendant corporation of his removal from San Francisco del Monte to

Manila, and that the company did not know that he was living in Manila on

the day of the accident; that the defendant company did not require its

employees to work on Sunday, or furnish or require its agents to use

bicycles. These are additional reasons for holding that the accident was notdue to and in pursuance of the employment of the deceased. If the

deceased saw fit to change his residence from San Francisco del Monte to

Manila and to make use of a bicycle in going back and forth, he did so at his

own risk, as the defendant company did not furnish him a bicycle or

require him to use one; and if he made collections on Sunday, he did not do

so in pursuance of his employment, and his employer is not liable for any

injury sustained by him.

For the foregoing reasons, the decision appealed from is affirmed,

with the costs against the appellants.

Villamor, Villa-Real, Hulland Imperial,JJ., concur.

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 110295. October 18, 1993.]

COCA-COLA BOTTLERS PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner,

vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS (Fifth

Division) and MS. LYDIA GERONIMO, respondents.

Angara, Abello, Concepcion, Regala & Cruz Law Offices for petitioner.

Alejandro M. Villamilfor private respondent.

SYLLABUS

1.CIVIL LAW; PRESCRIPTION OF ACTIONS; RULE IN CASE OF ACTION

FOUNDED ON QUASI-DELICT. The public respondent's conclusion that the

cause of action in Civil Case No. D-9629 is founded on quasi-delict and that,

therefore, pursuant to Article 1146 of the Civil Code, it prescribes in four (4)

years is supported by the allegations in the complaint, more particularly

paragraph 12 thereof, which makes reference to the reckless and negligent

manufacture of "adulterated food items intended to be sold for public

consumption."

2.ID.; SPECIAL CONTRACTS; SALE; WARRANTY AGAINST HIDDEN DEFECTS;

REMEDIES OF VENDEE IN RESPECT THERETO. The vendee's remedies

against a vendor with respect to the warranties against hidden defects of or

encumbrances upon the thing sold are not limited to those prescribed in Article

1567 of the Civil Code which provides: "Art. 1567. In the case of Articles 1561,

1562, 1564, 1565 and 1566, the vendee may elect between withdrawing from

the contract and demanding a proportionate reduction of the price, with

damages in either case." The vendee may also ask for the annulment of the

contract upon proof of error or fraud, in which case the ordinary rule on

obligations shall be applicable. Under the law on obligations, responsibilityarising from fraud is demandable in all obligations and any waiver of an action

for future fraud is void. Responsibility arising from negligence is also

demandable in any obligation, but such liability may be regulated by the courts,

according to the circumstances. Those guilty of fraud, negligence, or delay in

the performance of their obligations and those who in any manner contravene

the tenor thereof are liable for damages.

3.ID.; QUASI-DELICT; LIABILITY THERETO MAY STILL EXIST DESPITE THE

PRESENCE OF CONTRACTUAL RELATION. The vendor could likewise be

liable for quasi-delict under Article 2176 of the Civil Code, and an action based

thereon may be brought by the vendee. While it may be true that the pre-

existing contract between the parties may, as a general rule, bar the

applicability of the law on quasi-delict, the liability may itself be deemed to

arise from quasi-delict, i.e., the act which breaks the contract may also be a

quasi-delict. Thus, in Singson vs. Bank of the Philippine Islands, (23 SCRA 1117

[1968]) this Court stated: "We have repeatedly held, however, that the


8/21


existence of a contract between the parties does not bar the commission of a

tort by the one against the other and the consequent recovery of damages

therefor. Indeed, this view has been, in effect, reiterated in a comparatively

recent case. Thus, in Air France vs. Carrascoso, involving an airplane passenger

who, despite his first-class ticket, had been illegally ousted from his first-class

accommodation and compelled to take a seat in the tourist compartment, was

held entitled to recover damages from the air-carrier, upon the ground or torton the latter's part, for, although the relation between the passenger and a

carrier is 'contractual both in origin and nature . . . the act that breaks the

contract may also be a tort.'" Otherwise put, liability for quasi-delict may still

exist despite the presence of contractual relations.

4.ID.; ID.; BASIS OF LIABILITIES OF MANUFACTURER OR SELLER OF INJURY-

CAUSING PRODUCTS; RULE.Under American law, the liabilities of the

manufacturer or seller of injury-causing products may be based on negligence,

breach of warranty, tort, or other grounds such as fraud, deceit, or

misrepresentation. Quasi-delict, as defined in Article 2176 of the Civil Code,

(which is known in Spanish legal treatises as culpa aquiliana, culpa extra-

contractualor cuasi-delitos) is homologous but not identical to tortunder the

common law, which includes not only negligence, but also intentional criminalacts, such as assault and battery, false imprisonment, and deceit.

D E C I S I O N

DAVIDE, JR.,Jp:

This case concerns the proprietress of a school canteen which had to close

down as a consequence of the big drop in its sales of soft drinks triggered by

the discovery of foreign substances in certain beverages sold by it. The

interesting issue posed is whether the subsequent action for damages by the

proprietress against the soft drinks manufacturer should be treated as one for

breach of implied warranty against hidden defects or merchantability, as

claimed by the manufacturer, the petitioner herein, which must therefore be

filed within six months from the delivery of the thing sold pursuant to Article

1571 of the Civil Code, or one for quasi-delict, as held by the public respondent,

which can be filed within four years pursuant to Article 1146 of the same Code.

prLL

On 7 May 1990, Lydia L. Geronimo, the herein private respondent, filed a

complaint for damages against petitioner with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of

Dagupan City. 1 The case was docketed as Civil Case No. D-9629. She alleges in

her complaint that she was the proprietress of Kindergarten Wonderland

Canteen located in Dagupan City, an enterprise engaged in the sale of soft

drinks (including Coke and Sprite) and other goods to the students of

Kindergarten Wonderland and to the public; on or about 12 August 1989, someparents of the students complained to her that the Coke and Sprite soft drinks

sold by her contained fiber-like matter and other foreign substances or

particles; she then went over her stock of soft drinks and discovered the

presence of some fiber-like substances in the contents of some unopened Coke

bottles and a plastic matter in the contents of an unopened Sprite bottle; she

brought the said bottles to the Regional Health Office of the Department of

Health at San Fernando, La Union, for examination; subsequently, she received

a letter from the Department of Health informing her that the samples she

submitted "are adulterated;" as a consequence of the discovery of the foreign

substances in the beverages, her sales of soft drinks severely plummeted from

the usual 10 cases per day to as low as 2 to 3 cases per day resulting in losses of

from P200.00 to P300.00 per day, and not long after that she had to close shop

on 12 December 1989; she became jobless and destitute; she demanded fromthe petitioner the payment of damages but was rebuffed by it. She prayed forjudgment ordering the petitioner to pay her P5,000.00 as actual damages,

P72,000.00 as compensatory damages, P500,000.00 as moral damages,

P10,000.00 as exemplary damages, the amount equal to 30% of the damages

awarded as attorney's fees, and the costs. 2

The petitioner moved to dismiss 3 the complaint on the grounds of failure to

exhaust administrative remedies and prescription. Anent the latter ground, the

petitioner argued that since the complaint is for breach of warranty under

Article 1561 of the Civil Code, i t should have been brought within six months

from the delivery of the goods pursuant Article 1571 of the said Code. In her

Comment4 thereto, private respondent alleged that the complaint is one for

damages which does not involve an administrative action and that her cause ofaction is based on an injury to plaintiff's right which can be brought within four

years pursuant to Article 1146 of the Civil Code; hence, the complaint was

seasonably filed. Subsequent related pleadings were thereafter filed by the

parties. 5

In its Order of 23 January 1991, 6 the trial court granted the motion to dismiss.

It ruled that the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies does not

apply as the existing administrative remedy is not adequate. It also stated thatthe complaint is based on a contract, and not on quasi-delict, as there exists a

pre-existing contractual relation between the parties; thus, on the basis of
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Article 1571, in relation to Article 1562, the complaint should have been filed

within six months from the delivery of the thing sold.

Her motion for the reconsideration of the order having been denied by the trialcourt in its Order of 17 April 1991, 7 the private respondent came to this Court

via a petition for review on certiorari which we referred to the public

respondent "for proper determination and disposition." 8 The public

respondent docketed the case as CA-G.R. SP No. 25391.

In a decision promulgated on 28 January 1992, 9 the public respondent

annulled the questioned orders of the RTC and directed it to conduct further

proceedings in Civil Case No. D-9629. In holding for the private respondent, it

ruled that:

"Petitioner's complaint being one for quasi-delict, and not

for breach of warranty as respondent contends, the

applicable prescriptive period is four years.

It should be stressed that the allegations in the complaintplainly show that it is an action for damages arising from

respondent's act of 'recklessly and negligently

manufacturing adulterated food items intended to be sold

for public consumption' (p. 25, rollo). It is a truism in legal

procedure that what determines the nature of an action

are the facts alleged in the complaint and not those

averred as a defense in the defendant's answer (I Moran

126; Calo v. Roldan, 76 Phil. 445; Alger Electric, Inc. v. CA,

135 SCRA 340).

Secondly, despite the literal wording of Article 2176 of the

Civil Code, the existence of contractual relations betweenthe parties does not absolutely preclude an action by one

against the other for quasi-delict arising from negligence

in the performance of a contract.

In Singson v. Court of Appeals (23 SCRA 1117), the

Supreme Court ruled:

'It has been repeatedly held: that the existence of

a contract between the parties does not bar the

commission of a tort by the one against the other

and the consequent recovery of damages

therefor . . . Thus in Air France vs. Carrascoso, . . .

(it was held that) although the relation between

a passenger and a carrier is "contractual both in

origin and nature the act that breaks the contract

may also be a tort.'

Significantly, in American jurisprudence, from which Our

law on Sales was taken, the authorities are one in saying

that the availability of an action for breach of warranty

does not bar an action for torts in a sale of defective

goods." 10

Its motion for the reconsideration of the decision having been denied by the

public respondent in its Resolution of 14 May 1993, 11 the petitioner took this

recourse under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court. It alleges in its petition

that:

"I

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A

GRAVE AND REVERSIBLE ERROR IN RULING THAT

ARTICLE 2176, THE GENERAL PROVISION ON QUASI-

DELICTS, IS APPLICABLE IN THIS CASE WHEN THE

ALLEGATIONS OF THE COMPLAINT CLEARLY SHOW

THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENT'S CAUSE OF ACTION IS

BASED ON BREACH OF A SELLER'S IMPLIED

WARRANTIES UNDER OUR LAW ON SALES.

II

COROLLARILY, THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS

COMMITTED A GRAVE AND REVERSIBLE ERROR IN

OVERRULING PETITIONER'S ARGUMENT THAT PRIVATE

RESPONDENT'S CAUSE OF ACTION HAD PRESCRIBED

UNDER ARTICLE 1571 OF THE CIVIL CODE." 12

The petitioner insists that a cursory reading of the complaint will reveal that

the primary legal basis for private respondent's cause of action is not Article

2176 of the Civil Code on quasi-delict for the complaint does not ascribe any

tortious or wrongful conduct on its part but Articles 1561 and 1562 thereof

on breach of a seller's implied warranties under the law on sales. It contends

that the existence of a contractual relation between the parties (arising from
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the contract of sale) bars the application of the law on quasi-delicts and that

since private respondent's cause of action arose from the breach of implied

warranties, the complaint should have been filed within six months from

delivery of the soft drinks pursuant to Article 1571 of the Civil Code. prcd

In her Comment the private respondent argues that in case of breach of the

seller's implied warranties, the vendee may, under Article 1567 of the Civil

Code, elect between withdrawing from the contract or demanding a

proportionate reduction of the price, with damages in ei ther case. She asserts

that Civil Case No. D-9629 is neither an action for rescission nor for

proportionate reduction of the price, but for damages arising from a quasi-

delict and that the public respondent was correct in ruling that the existence of

a contract did not preclude the action for quasi-delict. As to the issue of

prescription, the private respondent insists that since her cause of action is

based on a quasi-delict, the prescriptive period therefor is four (4) years in

accordance with Article 1144 of the Civil Code and thus the filing of the

complaint was well within the said period. prLL

We find no merit in the petition. The public respondent's conclusion that the

cause of action in Civil Case No. D-9629 is founded on quasi-delict and that,

therefore, pursuant to Article 1146 of the Civil Code, it prescribes in four (4)

years is supported by the allegations in the complaint, more particularly

paragraph 12 thereof, which makes reference to the reckless and negligent

manufacture of "adulterated food items intended to be sold for public

consumption."

The vendee's remedies against a vendor with respect to the warranties against

hidden defects of or encumbrances upon the thing sold are not limited to those

prescribed in Article 1567 of the Civil Code which provides:

"ART. 1567.In the case of Articles 1561, 1562, 1564, 1565

and 1566, the vendee may elect between withdrawingfrom the contract and demanding a proportionate

reduction of the price, with damages in either case." 13

The vendee may also ask for the annulment of the contract upon proof of

error or fraud, in which case the ordinary rule on obligations shall be

applicable. 14 Under the law on obligations, responsibility arising from

fraud is demandable in all obligations and any waiver of an action for

future fraud is void. Responsibility arising from negligence is also

demandable in any obligation, but such liability may be regulated by the

courts, according to the circumstances. 15 Those guilty of fraud,

negligence, or delay in the performance of their obligations and those who

in any manner contravene the tenor thereof are liable f or damages. 16

The vendor could likewise be liable for quasi-delict under Article 2176 of theCivil Code, and an action based thereon may be brought by the vendee. While it

may be true that the pre-existing contract between the parties may, as a general

rule, bar the applicability of the law on quasi-delict, the liability may itself be

deemed to arise from quasi-delict, i.e., the act which breaks the contract may

also be a quasi-delict. Thus, in Singson vs. Bank of the Philippine Islands, 17 this

Court stated:

"We have repeatedly held, however, that the existence of a

contract between the parties does not bar the commission

of a tort by the one against the other and the consequent

recovery of damages therefor. 1 8 Indeed, this view has

been, in effect, reiterated in a comparatively recent case.

Thus, in Air France vs. Carrascoso, 19 involving an

airplane passenger who, despite his first-class ticket, had

been illegally ousted from his first-class accommodation

and compelled to take a seat in the tourist compartment,

was held entitled to recover damages from the air-carrier,

upon the ground of tort on the latter's part, for, although

the relation between the passenger and a carrier is

'contractual both in origin and nature . . . the act that

breaks the contract may also be a tort.' "

Otherwise put, liability for quasi-delict may still exist despite the presence of

contractual relations. 20

Under American law, the liabilities of the manufacturer or seller of injury-

causing products may be based on negligence, 21 breach of warranty, 22 tort,

23 or other grounds such as fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation. 24 Quasi-delict,as defined in Article 2176 of the Civil Code, (which is known in Spanish legal

treatises as culpa aquiliana, culpa extra-contractualor cuasi-delitos) 25 is

homologous but not identical to tortunder the common law, 26 which includes

not only negligence, but also intentional criminal acts, such as assault and

battery, false imprisonment, and deceit. 27

It must be made clear that our affirmance of the decision of the public

respondent should by no means be understood as suggesting that the private

respondent's claims for moral damages have sufficient factual and legal basis.
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IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is hereby DENIED for

lack of merit, with costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Cruz, Bellosillo and Quiason, JJ., concur.

Grio-Aquino, J., is on leave.

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 9356. February 18, 1915.]

C. S. GILCHRIST, plaintiff-appellee, vs. E. A. CUDDY ETAL., defendants. JOSE FERNANDEZ ESPEJO and

MARIANO ZALDARRIAGA, appellants.

C. Lozano, for appellants.

Bruce, Lawrence, Ross & Block, for appellee.

SYLLABUS

1.DAMAGES; INTERFERENCE WITH CONTRACTS BY STRANGERS

The interference with lawful contracts by strangers thereto gives rise to

an action for damages in favor of the injured person. The law does notrequire that the responsible person have known the identity of the injuredperson.

2.INJUNCTION; WHEN IT ISSUES; GENERAL DOCTRINE. The

general doctrine as to when injunction issues, as stated in Devesa vs. Arbes

(13 Phil. Rep., 273), affirmed.

3.ID.; INTERFERENCE WITH CONTRACTS BY STRANGERS. The

interference with lawful contracts by strangers thereto does not of itself

give the injured person a remedy by injunction.

4.ID.; WHEN INJUNCTION ISSUES. Courts usually grant an

injunction where the profits of the injured person are derived from his

contractual relations with a large and indefinite number of individuals,

thus reducing him to the necessity of proving in an action against the tort-

feasor that the latter is responsible in each case for the broken contract, or

else obliging him to institute individual suits against each contracting

party, and so exposing him to a multiplicity of suits.

5.ID., ID.; FACTS OF THIS CASE. The defendants induced the

owner of a cinematograph film to break his contract of lease with a theater

owner and lease the film to them, with the avowed purpose of exhibiting it

in another theater in the same city. As the profits of the lessee depended

upon the patronage of the public and hence the task of estimating his

damages with accuracy would be quite difficult if not impossible: Held,

That injunction against further interference with the contract was properly

issued.

6.APPEAL; REVIEW OF EVIDENCE. In order that this court may

review the evidence on appeal, it is necessary that all the evidence be

brought up. This is the duty of the appellant. and upon his failure to

perform it, we decline to review the evidence, but rely entirely upon thepleadings and findings of fact of the trial court and examine only assigned

errors of law. This rule is subject to some exceptions, but the present case

is not within any of them.

7.EVIDENCE; JUDICIAL NOTICE; CINEMATOGRAPH. Judicial

notice taken of the general character of a cinematograph or motion picture

theater.

D E C I S I O N

TRENT, Jp:

An appeal by the defendants, Jose Fernandez Espejo and Mariano

Zaldarriaga, from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo,

dismissing their cross-complaint upon the merits for damages against the

plaintiff for the alleged wrongful issuance of a mandatory and a

preliminary injunction.

Upon the application of the appellee an ex parte mandatory

injunction was issued on the 22d of May, 1913, direct ing the defendant, E.

A. Cuddy, to send to the appellee a certain cinematograph film called


12/21


"Zigomar" in compliance with an alleged contract which had been entered

into between these two parties, and at the same time an ex parte

preliminary injunction was issued restraining the appellants from

receiving and exhibiting in their theater the Zigomar until further orders of

the court. On the 26th of that month the appellants appeared and moved

the court to dissolve the preliminary injunction. This motion was denied,

after hearing, on the same day. On June 5 the appellants filed their answer,wherein they denied all of the allegations in the complaint and by way of a

cross-complaint asked for damages in the sum of P800 for the wrongful

issuance of the preliminary injunction. When the case was called for trial

on August 6, the appellee moved for the dismissal of the complaint "for the

reason that there is no further necessity for the maintenance of the

injunction. "The motion was granted without objection as to Cuddy and

denied as to the appellants in order to give them an opportunity to prove

that the injunctions were wrongfully issued and the amount of damages

suffered by reason thereof.

The pertinent part of the trial court's findings of fact in this caseis as follows:

"It appears in this case that Cuddy was theowner of the film Zigomar and that on the 24th of April he

rented it to C. S. Gilchrist for a week for P125, and it was to

be delivered on the 26th of May, the week beginning that

day. A few days prior to this Cuddy sent the money back to

Gilchrist, which he had forwarded to him in Manila, saying

that he had made other arrangements with his film. The

other arrangements was the rental to these defendantsEspejo and his partner for P350 for the week and the

injunction was asked by Gilchrist against these parties

from showing it for the week beginning the 26th of May.

"It appears from the testimony in this case,

conclusively, that Cuddy willfuly violated his contract, he

being the owner of the picture, with Gilchrist because thedefendants had offered him more for the same period. Mr.

Espejo at the trial on the permanent injunction on the

26th of May admitted that he knew that Cuddy was the

owner of the film. He was trying to get it through his

agents Pathe Brothers in Manila. He is the agent of the

same concern in Iloilo. There is in evidence in this case on

the trial today as well as on the 26th of May, letters

showing that the Pathe Brothers in Manila advised this

man on two different occasions not to contend for this film

Zigomar because the rental price was prohibitive and

assured him also that he could not get the film for about six

weeks. The last of these letters was written on the 26th of

April, which showed conclusively that he knew they had to

get this film from Cuddy and from this letter that the agent

in Manila could not get it, but he made Cuddy an offer

himself and Cuddy accepted it because he was paying

about three times as much as he had contracted withGilchrist for. Therefore, in the opinion of this court, the

defendants failed signally to show the injunction against

the defendants was wrongfully procured."

The appellants duly excepted to the order of the court denying

their motion for new trial on the ground that the evidence was insufficient

to justify the decision rendered. There is lacking from the record before us

the deposition of the defendant Cuddy, which apparently throws light

upon a contract entered into between him and the plaintiff Gilchrist. The

contents of this deposition are discussed at length in the brief of the

appellants and an endeavor is made to show that no such contract wasentered into. The trial court, which had this deposition before it, found that

there was a contract between Cuddy and Gilchrist. Not having the

deposition in question before- us, it is impossible to say how strongly itmilitates against this finding of fact. By a series of decisions we have

construed sections 143 and 497 (2) of the Code of Civil Procedure to

require the production of all the evidence in this court. This is the duty of

the appellant and, upon his failure to perform it, we decline to proceed

with a review of the evidence In such cases we rely entirely upon the

pleadings and the findings of fact of the trial court and examine only such

assigned errors as raise questions of law. (Ferrer vs. Neri Abejuela, 9 Phil.

Rep., 324; Valle vs. Galera, 10 Phil. Rep., 619; Salvacion vs. Salvacion, 13

Phil Re 366; Breta vs. Smith, Bell & Co., 15 Phil. Rep, 446 Arroyo vs. Yulo, 18

Phil. Rep., 236; Olsen & Co. vs. Matson, Lord & Belser Co., 19 Phil. Rep., 102;Blum vs. Barretto, 19 Phil. Rep., 161; Cuyugan vs. Aguas, 19 Phil Rep., 379;

Mapa vs. Chaves, 20 Phil. Rep., 147; Mans vs. Garry, 20 Phil. Rep., 134.) It is

true that some of the more recent of these cases make exceptions to thegeneral rule. Thus, in Olsen & Co. vs. Matson, Lord & Belser Co. (19 Phil.

Rep., 102), that portion of the evidence before us tended to show that

grave injustice might result from a strict reliance upon the findings of fact

contained in the judgment appealed from. We, therefore, gave the

appellant an opportunity to explain the omission. But we required that

such explanation must show a satisfactory reason for the omission, and

that the missing portion of the evidence must be submitted within sixty

days or cause shown for failing to do so. The other cases making

exceptions to the rule are based upon peculiar circumstances which will

seldom arise in practice and need not here be set forth, for the reason that


13/21


they are wholly inapplicable to the present case. The appellants would be

entitled to indulgence only under the doctrine of the Olsen case. But from

that portion of the record before us, we are not inclined to believe that the

missing deposition would be sufficient to justify us in reversing the

findings of fact of the trial court that the contract in question had been

made. There is in the record not only the positive and detailed testimony of

Gilchrist to this effect, but there is also a letter of apology from Cuddy toGilchrist in which the former enters into a lengthy explanation of his

reasons for leasing the film to another party. The latter could only have

been called forth by a broken contract with Gilchrist to lease the film to

him. We, therefore, fail to find any reason for overlooking the omission of

the defendants to bring up the missing portion of the evidence and,

adhering to the general rule above referred to, proceed to examine the

questions of law raised by the appellants.

From the above-quoted findings of fact it is clear that Cuddy, a

resident of Manila, was the owner of the "Zigomar;" that Gilchrist was the

owner of a cinematograph theater in Iloilo; that in accordance with theterms of the contract entered into between Cuddy and Gilchrist the former

leased to the latter the "Zigomar" for exhibition in his (Gilchrist's) theater

for the week beginning May 26, 1913; and that Cuddy willfully violated hiscontract in order that he might accept the appellants' offer of P350 for the

film for the same period. Did the appellants know that they were inducing

Cuddy to violate his contract with a third party when they induced him to

accept the P350? Espejo admitted that he knew that Cuddy was the owner

of the film. He received a letter from his agents in Manila dated April 26,

assuring him that he could not get the film for about six weeks. The

arrangements between Cuddy and the appellants for the exhibition of the

film by the latter on the 26th of May were perfected after April 26, 90 that

the six weeks would include and extend beyond May 26. The appellants

must necessarily have known at the time they made their offer to Cuddythat the latter had booked or contracted the film for six weeks from April

26. Therefore, the inevitable conclusion is that the appellants knowingly

induced Cuddy to violate his contract with another person. But there is nospecific finding that the appellants knew the identity of the other party. So

we must assume that they did not know that Gilchrist was the person who

had contracted for the film.

The appellants take the position that if the preliminary injunction

had not been issued against them they could have exhibited the film in

their theater for a number of days be ginning May 26, and could have also

subleased it to other theater owners in the nearby towns and, by so doing,

could have cleared, during the life of their contract with Cuddy, the amount

claimed as damages. Taking this view of the case, it will be unnecessary for

us to inquire whether the mandatory injunction against Cuddy was

properly issued or not. No question is raised with reference to the issuance

of that injunction.

The right on the part of Gilchrist to enter into a contract with

Cuddy for the lease of the film must be fully recognized and admitted by

all. That Cuddy was liable in an action for damages for the breach of that

contract, there can be no doubt. Were the appellants likewise liable for

interfering with the contract between Gilchrist and Cuddy, they not

knowing at the time the identity of one of the contracting parties? The

appellants claim that they had a right to do what they did. The ground

upon which the appellants base this contention is, that there was no valid

and binding contract between Cuddy and Gilchrist and that, therefore, they

had a right to compete with Gilchrist for the lease of the film, the right to

compete being a justification for their acts. If there had been no contract

between Cuddy and Gilchrist this defense would be tenable, but the mere

right to compete could not justify the appellants in intentionally inducingCuddy to take away the appellee's contractual rights.

Chief Justice Wells in Walker vs. Cronin (107 Mass., 555), said:"Everyone has a right to enjoy the fruits and advantages of his own

enterprise, industry, skill and credit, He has no right to be protected

against competition; but he has a right to be free from malicious and

wanton interference, disturbance or annoyance. If disturbance or loss

come as a result of competition, or the exercise of like rights by others, it is

damum absque injuria, unless some superior right by contract or otherwise

is interfered with."

In Read vs. Friendly Society of Operative Stonemasons ([1902] 2

K. B., 88), Darling, J., said: "I think the plaintiff has a cause of action against

the defendants, unless the court is satisfied that, when they interfered with

the contractual rights of plaintiff, the defendants had a sufficient

justification for their interference; . . .for it is not a justification that 'they

acted bona fide in the best interests of the society of masons,' i. e., in theirown interests. Nor is it enough that 'they were not actuated by improper

motives. I think their sufficient justification for interference with plaintiff's

right must be an equal or superior right in themselves, and that no one can

legally excuse himself to a man, of whose contract he has procured the

breach, on the ground that he acted on a wrong understanding of his own

rights, or without malice, or bona fide, or in the best interests of himself, or

even that he acted as an altruist, seeking only the good of another and

careless of his own advantage." (Quoted with approval in Beekman vs.

Marsters, 195 Mass., 205.)


14/21


It is said that the ground on which the liability of a third party for

interfering with a contract between others rests, is that the interference

was malicious. The contrary view, however, is taken by the Supreme Court

of the United States in the case of Angle vs. Railway Co. (151 U. S., 1). The

only motive for interference by the third party in that case was the desire

to make a profit to the injury of one of the parties of the contract. There

was no malice in the case beyond the desire to make an unlawful gain tothe detriment of one of the contracting parties.

In the case at bar the only motive for the interference with the

Gilchrist-Cuddy contract on the part of the appellants was a desire to make

a profit by exhibiting the film in their theater. There was no malice beyond

this desire; but this fact does not relieve them of the legal liability for

interfering with that contract and causing its breach. It is, therefore, clear,

under the above authorities, that they were liable to Gilchrist for the

damages caused by their acts, unless they are relieved from such liability

by reason of the fact that they did not know at the time the identity of the

original lessee (Gilchrist) of the film.

The liability of the appellants arises from unlawful acts and not

from contractual obligations, as they were under no such obligations toinduce Cuddy to violate his contract with Gilchrist. So that if the action of

Gilchrist had been one for damages, it would be governed by chapter 2,

title 16 book 4 of the Civil Code. Article 1902 of that code provides that a

person who, by act or omission, causes damage to another when there is

fault or negligence, shall be obliged to repair the damage so done. There is

nothing in this article which requires as a condition precedent to the

liability of a tort feasor that he must know the identity of a person towhom he causes damage. In fact, the chapter wherein this article is found

clearly shows that no such knowledge is required in order that the injured

party may recover for the damage suffered.

But the fact that the appellants' interference with the Gilchrist

contract was actionable did not of itself entitle Gilchrist to sue out an

injunction against them. The allowance of this remedy must be justifiedunder section 164 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which specifies the

circumstances under which an injunction may issue. Upon the general

doctrine of injunction we said in Devesa vs. Arbes (13 Phil. Rep., 273):

"An injunction is a 'special remedy' adopted in

that code (Act No. 190) from American practice, and

originally borrowed from English legal procedure, which

was there issued by the authority and under the seal of a

court of equity, and limited, as in other cases where

equitable relief is sought, to cases where there is no 'plain,

adequate, and complete remedy at law,' which 'will not be

granted while the rights between the parties are

undetermined, except in extraordinary cases where

material and irreparable injury will be done,' which cannot

be compensated in damages, and where there will be no

adequate remedy, and which will not, as a rule, be granted,

to take property out of the possession of one party and put it

into that of another whose title has not been established bylaw."

We subsequently affirmed the doctrine of the Devesa case in

Palafox vs. Madamba (19 Phil. Rep., 444), and we take this occasion of

again affirming it, believing, as we do, that the indiscriminate use of

injunctions should be discouraged.

Does the fact that the appellants did not know at the time the

identity of the original lessee of the film militate against Gilchrist's right to

a preliminary injunction, although the appellants incurred civil liability for

damages for such interference? In the examination of the adjudicated

cases, where in injunctions have been issued to restrain wrongful

interference with contracts by strangers to such contracts, we have been

unable to find any case where this precise question was involved, as in allof those cases which we have examined, the identity of both of the

contracting parties was known to the tort-feasors. We might say, however,

that this fact does not seem to have been a controlling feature in those

cases. There is nothing in section 164 of the Code of Civil Procedure which

indicates, even remotely, that before an injunction may issue restraining

the wrongful interference with contracts by strangers, the strangers must

know the identity of both parties. It would seem that this is not essential,as injunctions frequently issue against municipal corporations, public

service corporations, public officers, and others to restrain the commission

of acts which would tend to injuriously affect the rights of persons whose

identity the respondents could not possibly have known beforehand. This

court has held that in a proper case injunction will issue at the instance of a

private citizen to restrain ultra vires acts of public officials. (Severino vs.Governor General, 16 Phil. Rep., 366.) So we proceed to the determination

of the main question of whether or not the preliminary injunction ought to

have been issued in this case.

As a rule, injunctions are denied to those who have an adequate

remedy at law. Where the choice is between the ordinary and the

extraordinary processes of law, and the former are sufficient, the rule will

not permit the use of the latter. (In re Debs, 158 U. S., 564.) If the injury is

irreparable, the ordinary process is inadequate. In Wahle vs. Reinbach (76

Ill., 322), the supreme court of Illinois approved a definition of the term

"irreparable injury" in the following language: "By 'irreparable injury' is


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not meant such in jury as is beyond the possibility of repair, or beyond

possible compensation in damages, nor necessarily great injury or great

damage, but that species of injury, whether great or small, that ought not

to be submitted to on the one hand or inflicted on the other; and, because it

is so large on the one hand, or so small on the other, is of such constant and

frequent recurrence that no fair or reasonable redress can be had therefor

in a court of law." (Quoted with approval in Nashville R. R. Co. vs.McConnell, 82 Fed., 65.)

The case at bar is somewhat novel, as the only contract which

was broken was that between Cuddy and Gilchrist, and the profits of the

appellee depended upon the patronage of the public, for which it is

conceded the appellants were at liberty to compete by a ll fair and

legitimate means. As remarked in the case of the "ticket scalpers" (82 Fed.,

65), the novelty o

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