Fuel Reliability Program - Amazon S3€¦ · 5. Silicon Carbide Composite BWR Channel Development (retain) 6. Development of Accident Tolerant Fuel Using Molybdenum Alloy Cladding

© 2016 Electric Power Research Institute, Inc. All rights reserved.

Robert Daum

Sr. Program Manager, Fuel Reliability

Wednesday, August 31, 2016

Fuel Reliability ProgramAction Plan Committee Meeting

Submitted: 8/26/2016

AM Session

2© 2016 Electric Power Research Institute, Inc. All rights reserved.

Fuel Reliability Program Action Plan Committee

Room Location: Orpheum Room (SL) Wednesday, August 31

Time Topic Lead

8:00 am Welcome, Introductions and Agenda Review S. Belcher, FENOC

8:15 amIntegration Committee Program Status Report (APC Action

Required)R. Borland, FENOC

9:00 am INPO Update J. Garcia, INPO

9:10 am NEI Update S. Geier, NEI

9:20 am Nuclear Promise Initiative Update S. Belcher, FENOC

9:30 am Fuel Cycle Optimization AssessmentF. Smith, EPRI

Consultant

10:00 am Morning Break All

10:15 am

Round Table with Technical Advisory Committee (TAC) Chairs

• Regulatory Issues Technical Advisory Committee (Reg-TAC) Update

• BWR Technical Advisory Committee (B-TAC)

• PWR Technical Advisory Committee (P-TAC)

T. Eichenberg. TVA

G. Storey, TVA

S. Hayes, Duke Energy

12:00 pm Lunch All


Action Item Update from Last APC Meeting

February 10, 2016

Austin, Texas


Last APC Meeting

Not a requirement for members to enter data into FRED, but any utility that desires access to it is required to enter data– Reinforced this message with non-U.S. utilities that are being visited this

year, and subsequent communications [ONGOING]

What we would do with any money saved by reducing Program’s administrative costs?– IC considered this in the 2017-2018 R&D portfolio but is awaiting

revisions to the Program’s administrative procedures to be proposed for the next portfolio planning cycle [ONGOING]

Assess fuel handling accidents and develop business case for inclusion into FRP research– Discussed at Reg-TAC sessions and survey is under development

[ONGOING]


Last APC Meeting (cont’d)

Implementation letter for fuel surveillance requirements needs to be updated to provide clearer guidance to those plants planning to permanently shutdown– Guideline drafting team is considering and will present a

recommendation on this and other items to the IC and then APC in 4th

Quarter [ONGOING]

Determine fretting wear resistance of SiC channel material– Experiments deferred until new coating is proven success for mitigating

corrosion [ONGOING]

Consider cost reduction measures for front-end of nuclear fuel production– NEI has lead and will present analysis [COMPLETE]

© 2016 Electric Power Research Institute, Inc. All rights reserved.© 2015 Electric Power Research Institute, Inc. All rights reserved.

Robb Borland, First Energy

IC Chairman

Phil Wengloski, Exelon

IC Vice-Chairman

Integration Committee

(IC) Report Out

2© 2016 Electric Power Research Institute, Inc. All rights reserved.© 2015 Electric Power Research Institute, Inc. All rights reserved.

Outline

Endorsement of FRP Leadership Changes [ACTION]

Program Status

Endorsement of Current, Sunsetted and New Roadmaps [ACTION]

Industry Review Teams (IRTs)

Compliance with Part 810 (U.S. Regulations)

Status of Fuel Failures

FRP Emissary Program

Fuel Surveillance and Inspection Guidance and Deviation

Separate Presentation later today

– Endorsement of 2017-2018 R&D Portfolio Proposal [ACTION]

– Endorsement of 2017 IC Reallocation Funds [ACTION]

Requested APC actions are noted – All other topics are for informational purposes only

APC ACTION REQUESTED


Program Status

Structure Action Plan Committee

Chair: Sam Belcher, FENOC

Vice-Chair: Bob Bement, APS

Rob Daum, EPRI

Fuel Margins & Sustainability

(Core-TAC)

ChairDavid Smith, Entergy

Vice-ChairsDavid Schrire, Vattenfall

Vicki Beavers,Southern Nuclear

John BealeEPRI

BWR Fuel

(B-TAC)

ChairGreg Storey, TVA

Vice-ChairsMichelle Mura, Exelon

TBD

Aylin KucukEPRI

PWR Fuel

(P-TAC)

ChairStan Hayes, Duke

Energy

Vice-ChairsTBDTBD

Dennis HusseyEPRI

Regulatory Issues

(Reg-TAC)

ChairTom Eichenberg, TVA

Vice-ChairPablo Garcia, UNESA

Ken YuehEPRI

Integration Committee

Chair: Robb Borland, FENOC

Vice-Chair: Phil Wengloski, Exelon

Rob Daum, EPRITechnical Advisory Committees (TACs)


FRP Leadership & Management Changes

Action Plan Committee (APC) – Bob Bement (APS) has replaced Fadi Diya (Ameren) who will become the

new Chair for the Materials APC

FRP Management– Rob Daum replaced Jeff Deshon who is now a Technical Executive in FRP

PWR Technical Advisory Committee (P-TAC)– Young-deog Kim (KHNP) nominated as non-U.S. Vice-Chair [ACTION]

Held positions in various fuel organizations within KHNP since 2012, and worked at numerous R&D organizations (DOE labs, Halden, AECL, KEPRI) since 1997.

– Gail Gary (Ameren) nominated as U.S. Vice-Chair [ACTION]

Currently Consulting Chemist with Ameren UE, with over 25 years of experience, and served previously as P-TAC advisor at the start of the Program into the late 2000s



FRP Leadership & Management Changes (cont’d)

BWR Technical Advisory Committee (B-TAC)

– Rosanne Carmean (Exelon) nominated as Chair with pending

retirement of Greg Storey (TVA) [ACTION]

Currently manager of BWR and PWR fuel reliability at Exelon for

the past two years, and also worked in Exelon’s spent fuel group

for eight years

– Need a non-U.S. Vice-Chair



FRP Staffing & Organization

Senior Program Manager

(APC / IC)

R. Daum

Senior Technical Executive

(RFA / ATF)

B. Cheng

BWR TACA. Kucuk

PWR TACD. Hussey

Reg-TACK. Yueh

Core TACJ. Beale

Technical Executive

(Technology Transfer)

J. Deshon

Principal / Senior Technical Leaders

Technical Support M. Pytel B. Mervin

Other Technical Executive Support

Fuels & Chemistry Department

S. Yagnik E. Mader

Technical Leader Project Engineer


Program Status


Program Status – Membership

Members from 18 Countries

Full FRP Members

Brazil

China (CGNPC)

France

Japan (TEPCO)

Mexico

South Korea

Spain

Sweden (Vattenfall)

Switzerland

Taiwan

United Arab Emirates

United Kingdom (EDF Energy, Horizon Nuclear (new))

United States

Partial (base) Members

Argentina

Canada

Czech Republic

Hungary

Japan (Chubu, Chugoku,

Kansai, Shikoku, Kyushu)

South Africa


Program Status – Funding

EPRI Technology Innovation: $1.1M for Mo-clad feasibility.

DOE: $0.41M via Areva ATF Program participation

Additional 2016 Funding Sources


Program Status – Distribution by Units across Membership


Program Status2016 Products (1/2)

Product ID Title Item Type Completion Date

1 3002008154 Material Modeling of Electrical Conductivity Effects Technical Report 06/15/2016

2 3002006740 Fuel Performance Modeling Assessment using High Performance Computing Technical Report 06/30/2016

3 3002008085Effect of Long Term OLNC on Fuel Performance at Nine Mile Point 1/2 Crud Analysis

Results and AssessmentTechnical Report 08/26/2016

4 3002008086 ATRIUM-10XM Shadow Corrosion Measurements at Brunswick Unit 2 Technical Report 08/26/2016

5 3002008152 Demonstration of F-SECT on Cofrentes Channel materials Technical Report 08/30/2016

6 3002008155 2016 Hot Cell PIE of OPT ZIRLO Fuel Cladding in Ringhals Unit 3 Technical Report 08/30/2016

7 3002008156 2016 Optimized ZIRLO Cladding Performance from VC Summer-NDE Results Technical Report 09/16/2016

8 3002008151 Falcon Fuel Performance Code: Verification and Validation Summary for Version 1.3 Technical Update 09/20/2016

9 3002008150 2016 FRED 4.2 Software 09/30/2016

10 3002008153 Guided Wave Sensor Design Assessment Technical Report 09/30/2016

11 30020081592016 Aqueous Speciation and Liquid-Liquid Phase Separation of Boric Acid at

Temperatures up to 350 oCTechnical Report 09/30/2016

12 3002008161 2016 Characterization of PWR Steam Generator Manway Cover Insert Oxide Films Technical Report 09/30/2016

13 3002008214 High Burnup Fuel Grain Boundary Fission Gas Distribution Phase I Technical Report 09/30/2016

Note: List includes FRP reports and other programs’ reports with FRP co-funding


Program Status2016 Products (2/2)

No. Product ID Title Item Type Completion Date

14 3002008241 Modified Burst Testing of Irradiated Boiling Water Reactor Cladding: Supplemental Technical Report 09/30/2016

15 3002008243 Parametric Study on Fuel Fragmentation and Dispersal Phase III Technical Report 09/30/2016

16 3002008709 Fuel Reliability Database (FRED) Version 4.2 User Manual Technical Report 09/30/2016

17 3002008157 2016 Progress on NDE Initiatives Technical Update 10/16/2016

18 3002008158 2016 Fuel Fabrication Surveillance Notes-Beta (FFSN-Beta) Software 10/20/2016

19 3002008087 Demonstration of BWR Crud Deposition in a Laboratory Technical Update 11/04/2016

20 3002008146 Analysis of BWR Pellet-Cladding Interaction Susceptibility After Extended Low-Power Technical Report 11/20/2016

21 3002008088 BWR Inconel X-750 Spacer Corrosion Model Technical Report 12/02/2016

22 30020081602016 Estimation of Fuel Corrosion Product Residence Time and Ultrasonic Fuel Cleaning

Efficiency Using Radioisotopic DataTechnical Report 12/18/2016

23 3002008162 2016 PWR Fuel Deposit Sourcebook Technical Report 12/18/2016

24 30020081632016 Multiscale Modeling of the Corrosion Product Source Term in Pressurized Water

ReactorsTechnical Report 12/18/2016

Note: List includes FRP reports and other programs’ reports with FRP co-funding


Upcoming Meetings

Summer All-TAC / IC Meeting

July 2017 (dates TBD)

EPRI Charlotte Office (tentative)

Charlotte, North Carolina, USA

Summer APC Meeting

August 30, 2017

The Hilton Diplomat

Hollywood, Florida, USA

Winter APC Meeting

February 1, 2017

The Sheraton Hotel

Charlotte, North Carolina, USA

Winter All TAC / IC Meeting

February 20-24, 2017

The Marriott Marquis

Atlanta, Georgia, USA


FRP Roadmaps


Roadmaps

We Currently have SIX roadmaps (TAC and IC Recommendations)

1. Mitigation of Fuel Failures Caused by Foreign Material (retain)

2. Mitigation of PWR Fuel Failures Caused by Corrosion and Crud (sunset)

3. Mitigation of BWR Fuel Failures Caused by Corrosion and Crud (sunset)

4. Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) Regulation (retain)

5. Silicon Carbide Composite BWR Channel Development (retain)

6. Development of Accident Tolerant Fuel Using Molybdenum Alloy Cladding (retain)

Review - What is a roadmap?

– Clear drivers in terms of safety, operational impact, cost savings, lack of coordinated approach, etc.

– Definable implementation strategy and project plan

– Risk definition and avoidance

– Multiple stakeholder roles and responsibilities (“swim lanes”)

Each roadmap is a living document but has a finite lifetime

– Discuss to maintain or sunset [ACTION]

– Discuss adding any new roadmaps [ACTION]



Roadmaps (continued)

IC Recommendation for New Roadmaps [ACTION]

1. Hydrogen Impact on Zirconium Alloy Materials (SHIZAM)

2. Fuel Cycle Optimization (FCO)

Burnup extension and/or Enrichment extension


Action Plans are under development and Roadmaps will be presented to

the APC prior to February 2017 meeting.


Industry Review Teams (IRTs)


Active IRT – BWR Control Rod Blades

Comprised of 12 utilities (U.S. and non-U.S.), BWROG representatives, INPO,

both CRB suppliers, and FRP staff

Prioritized six “gap areas” with discussions of knowledge and data gaps; see next

slide for current prioritization

Preliminary meetings with all IRT Members over past six months, but separated

into “dual tracks” along supplier lines

– Westinghouse IRT Meeting held on August 19-20, 2015

– GE-Hitachi IRT Meeting held on October 20-21, 2015

Final product to inform IC of gaps/proposals for prioritizing new RFA under B-

TAC and allocating funds in 2017-2018

– To be completed by 3rd quarter 2016


Pending IRT

Utilities and EPRI staff have been communicating with KKL and

suppliers/vendors concerning the apparent dry-out event (2014)

– After root cause is complete, utility will call for an IRT to review the root cause and other

issues emanating from the report

Other notable meeting, but not an IRT

– Utilities and EPRI staff have been communicating with Areva regarding bundle

component failures at Chinshan (2014) and Gundremmingen (2015)

Targeting a meeting in early September 2016


Compliance with Part 810 (U.S. Regulations)


Part 810 ComplianceDriving-to-Zero Monthly Conference Calls

Initiated by Exelon in 2006 to support Zero-by-Ten Initiative

– emphasized sharing operating experience

Endorsed by Fuel Reliability APC in 2007

– all U.S. utilities to participate, INPO and fuel suppliers also invited

– all non-U.S. FRP member utilities invited

– Exelon continued coordinating and administering calls

– transitioned to Driving-to-Zero call after 2010

10CFR810 Export Control concerns raised in 2016

– Solution to concerns being pursuedTitle 10 Code of Federal Regulations, Chapter III, Part 810, “Assistance to Foreign Atomic Energy Activities

http://www.ecfr.gov/cgi-bin/text-idx?tpl=/ecfrbrowse/Title10/10cfr810_main_02.tpl

http://www.ecfr.gov/cgi-bin/text-idx?tpl=/ecfrbrowse/Title10/10cfr810_main_02.tpl


Status of Fuel Failures


Driving To Zero Plot

Courtesy Mike Reitmeyer (Exelon); June 2016

81%

79%

74%

71%

75%

80%

83%

88%

85%

87%

87%

89%

87%

90%

90%

93% 94%

93%

92%

91%

93%

97%

96% 97%

94%

98%

96%

95%

93% 94%

96% 97%

94% 95%

91% 92%

91%

91%

90%

90%

90%

94%

94%

50%

55%

60%

65%

70%

75%

80%

85%

90%

95%

100%

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

Jan

-07

Ap

r-07

Ju

l-07

Oct-0

7

Jan

-08

Ap

r-08

Ju

l-08

Oct-0

8

Jan

-09

Ap

r-09

Ju

l-09

Oct-0

9

Jan

-10

Ap

r-10

Ju

l-10

Oct-1

0

Jan

-11

Ap

r-11

Ju

l-11

Oct-1

1

Jan

-12

Ap

r-12

Ju

l-12

Oct-1

2

Jan

-13

Ap

r-13

Ju

l-13

Oct-1

3

Jan

-14

Ap

r-14

Ju

l-14

Oct-1

4

Jan

-15

Ap

r-15

Ju

l-15

Oct-1

5

Jan

-16

Ap

r-16

Ju

l-16

Oct-1

6

Jan

-17

% o

f D

efe

ct-

Fre

e U

nit

s

Nu

mb

er

of

100 U

.S.

Un

its w

ith

Fu

el

Defe

cts

w/ no future

failures

PWRs

BWRs

BWR+PWR

Driving to Zero

June 2016PWRs w/ Defects (removal)

ANO 1 (9/2016)

DC Cook 2 (10/2016)

Sequoyah 1 (10/2016)

St. Lucie 2 (3/2017)

Surry 2 (5/2017)

BWRs w/ Defects (removal)

Columbia (5/2017)

Duane Arnold (10/2016)

Fermi (3/2017)

LaSalle 2 (2/2017)

River Bend (1/2017)

90%


U.S. Industry Snapshot

Increase in the number of leakers

over the past couple years

Table includes failures with outages

in 2015 or later

– 12 BWRs (5 still in operation)

– 9 PWRs (5 still in operation)

Two main issues

– Debris/debris fretting

– Baffle-related

Highlighted plants are currently operating

“~” signifies information not from FRED

US PlantPlant Type

Cycle Shutdown Fuel In Core Failure

LaSalle 2 BWR (PFD) 15 Feb. 2015 GNF2, ATRIUM 10 (F) ~Debris

River Bend BWR (PFD) 18 Feb. 2015 GNF2 ~Debris

Hope Creek BWR (Casc.) 19 Apr. 2015 GE14 Debris

Perry BWR (PFD) 15 Apr. 2015 GE14 Debris

Dresden 3 BWR (Casc.) 24A Nov. 2015 Optima2, SVEA-96 (F) ~Debris

River Bend BWR (PFD) 19A Jan. 2016 GNF2, GNF3 Debris

Grand Gulf BWR (PFD) 20 Feb. 2016 GNF2, GE14 ~Debris

Duane Arnold BWR (Casc.) 25 Fall 2016 GNF2, GE14 ~Debris

LaSalle 2 BWR (PFD) 16 Feb. 2017 GNF2, ATRIUM 10, GNF3 ?

Fermi 2 BWR (PFD) 17 Spring 2017 GE14 ?

Columbia BWR (Casc.) 23 May 2017 GE14 ?

River Bend BWR (PFD) 19B May 2017 GNF2, GNF3 ~Debris

St Lucie 2 PWR 21 Fall 2015 CE Grid/Baffle

Catawba 1 PWR 22 Nov. 2015 RFA Fabrication

DC Cook 1 PWR 26 Mar. 2016 Upgrade DRFA ~Debris

Salem 1 PWR 24 Spring 2016 RFA ~Grid/Baffle

DC Cook 2 PWR 22 Fall 2016 OFA Balanced Vane ?

ANO 1 PWR 26 Fall 2016 Mk-B-HTP ~Debris

Sequoyah 1 PWR 21 Fall 2016 Mk-BW, HTP ~Debris

St. Lucie 2 PWR 22 Mar. 2017 CE ?

Surry 2 PWR 27 Spring 2017 15UPG ?

(F) Signifies failed fuel type


Notable Fuel Failures in Non-U.S. Fleet

KKL (Switzerland) – C30 dryout failure & C31 elevated corrosion

indications

Cofrentes (Spain) – two debris failures requiring mid-cycle outage

discharge; one in current cycle

Ringhals PWR (Sweden) – unknown requiring mid-cycle outage discharge

due to EPU requirements

Angra-2 (Brazil) – unknown

Asco-1 (Spain) – unknown

Bruce (Canada) – unknown or otherwise not disclosed

Paks (Hungary) – five unknown failures in the last three annual cycles

Notable handling events at Chinshan & GundremmingenSource: FRED and direct communications with utilities


Gain more insight via future inspections and analysis through the fuel failure handbook revision

BWR Rootcause Mechanisms (2011 – 2015)Global Membership


More variability in PWR failures compared to BWRs

PWR Rootcause Mechanism (2011 – 2015)Global Membership


0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

2011 2012 2013 2014 2015

PWRs

<=2 3 4 >=5

Sustainability (consecutive cycles without failure)

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

2011 2012 2013 2014 2015

BWRs

<=2 3 4 >=5

≥5 grew slightly to ~40%

≤2 shrunk slightly to ~38%

≥5 grew slightly to ~50%

≤2 shrunk to just above 20%


FRP Emissary Program


Completed / Planned Emissary Visits in 2015-2017

Location Dates NSSSVisiting Utility

Personnel

Japan (TEPCO, Chubu, Shikoku, Kansai,

Chugoku) & Taiwan (TaiPower)October 2015 BWRs & PWRs

Chris Hoffman(Talen Energy)

Czech Republic

(Axpo, CEZ, EDF, EDF Energy, ENEC,

Eskom, PAKS, UNESA, Vattenfall)

November 2015BWRs, PWRs &

VVERs

Miguel Armenta(Energy Northwest)

&

Mike Brown(Ameren-FuelCo)

Mexico – CFE / Laguna Verde January 2016 BWRsMiguel Armenta

(Energy Northwest)

South Korea (KHNP) & China (CGNPC) March 2016 PWRs N/A

Japan (TEPCO, Chubu, Shikoku, Kansai,

Chugoku) & Taiwan (TaiPower)September 2016 BWRs, PWRs

Patricia Henry(Exelon)

Brazil – ETN / Angra TBD 2016 / 2017 PWRs TBD

Mexico – CFE / Laguna Verde TBD 2017 BWRs TBD


Testimonials from Recent Emissary Visits

From Michael Brown (Ameren – Fuelco)

"The EPRI Fuel Reliability Program Emissary visit was an amazing opportunity to share recent OE from Fuelco member

sites with European utilities. The exchange of information, as well as developing new contacts with European utilities, will

prove to be a valuable new asset.“

From Miguel Armenta (Energy Northwest)

“Being an emissary enabled me to share US BWR and Columbia specific operating experience and lessons learned that I

think were valuable to the international utilities. These visits were helpful to me and the Columbia team since I took the

opportunity to benchmark topics that are of current importance for us at CGS.

Each visit provided an opportunity to network and get to know how others approach nuclear fuel related

challenges….Also the breadth and depth of actions taken by a utility that has experienced fuel defects during consecutive

cycles provided valuable insights into additional actions we can apply at Columbia to address our [current] fuel

defects. My experience as an utility emissary was just outstanding. I would highly recommend it to any of my colleagues

in the FRP.”


Fuel Surveillance and Inspection Guidance and Deviation


Deviation Notice from PSEG

Salem-1 investigated fuel failure in April 2016 and

found fretting wear due to degraded baffle bolts

Baseline Assessment

– Salem-1 listed as a bounding GTRF units within list

of sister units by PWROG

– RFA fuel design and no other obvious indications of

GTRF-induced wear or rod failures demonstrates

adequate margin

No further intrusive GTRF inspection will be

conducted given this and the DNP initiative, with

the following outcomes:

– FSIG deviation

– Challenge to revise industry inspection guidance to

be consistent with current state of the industry


Fuel Surveillance & Inspection Guideline(FSIG), Revision 2

EPRI Report No. 3002002877 (April 2014)

– Original issued in 2008 and Revision 1 issued in 2011

Last Drafting Team Meeting

– Synchronized with revisions to BWR/PWR Water Chemistry

and Fuel Corrosion/Crud guidelines

– Continued emphasis on first technical assessments and

sharing of inspection data to quantify margins, which may or

may not lead to an inspection

Industry Inspection Cost Analyses

– Approximately $30M cost savings over 15 years


FSIG Roundtable (input for next revision in ~2017 or 2018)

How effective is the revised FSIG guidance for performing unit-specific margin assessments

(e.g., baseline, change management, anomalous event) that may or may not lead to

inspection(s)? Frequency every 10 years?

How effective has the concept of “Sister plants/units” been implemented in the revised

guidance?

Has the non-intrusive visual inspection every six years been of value?

FSIG does not address inspecting fuel for debris—the dominant failure mechanism—should

the next revision attempt to capture such guidance?

Are current FSIG recommendations in-line with the “Delivering the Nuclear Promise”

initiative?

Should implementation guidance be specific to plants that are shutting down (permanently)?


Next Steps in FSIG Revision

Webcast with the FSIG Drafting Team in August 2016

– Review previous Team deliberations

– Review latest OE and research results, including input from utilities, Owner Groups,

fuel suppliers, and INPO

– Review previous deviations and State of the Industry

Form recommendation to revise or not to revise for FRP Integration and Action

Plan Committees’ consideration

– Present recommendation(s) in January 2017

– Begin listing revision needs and bases

– Begin coordination with other industry stakeholders


Questions?


Rate of change in the # of failures per year (2011 – 2015)

Failure

CategoryBWRs PWRs Total

Debris -0.2 -0.8 -1.0

Grid Fretting - -0.4 -0.4

Duty-Related +0.1 0.0 +0.1

Fabrication -0.1 -0.7 -0.8

Unknown +0.2 -0.1 +0.1

Total 0.0 -1.8 -1.8

PWR fuel reliability is showing incremental improvements

– Transition to GTRF-resistant designs evident

BWR fuel reliability is stagnant, showing little to no improvements

© 2016 Institute of Nuclear Power Operations

INPO Fuel Reliability Update

August 2016

Jose GarciaSenior Evaluator

Engineering & Configuration Management

INPO


Agenda

• Sustainability Trend Update

• Fuel Failure Trends & Causes

• Fuel Trend INPO Event Report (IER) Status

• Conclusion


Sustainability Trends

20

33

3839

4039 39

41 42 42

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%%

of

Un

its

Achieving Failure-Free Fuel Performance

Fuel Failure in Previous Cycle

Completed >2 Cycles Clean

9

75

Percent of units completing > 5cycles without a fuel failure

7

9Fuel Failure in Current Cycle

Completed 1 Cycle Clean

"0x10" began

Percent of units completing > 5cycles without a fuel failure


Fuel Failure Trends

• Rolling fuel failure average has been steady at 9 failures for the last 6 months.

• Six cores with failures identified in 2016

– Three late into the cycle and removed during Spring outages

• One station requiring 2 mid-cycle outages to remove failed fuel in 2016

• Four stations scheduled to remove failed fuel during Fall outages



Fuel Failure Causes

• Most of the failures related to debris

• One station with baffle bolt induced failure (debris)

• One station observed a manufacturing defect leading to a failure

• Couple of stations still addressing repeated grid-to-rod-fretting failures


Trend IER on Fuel Integrity

• IER L4-16-5 “Adverse Trend in Debris-Related Nuclear Fuel Failures” issued on March 2016

• Level 4 – does not require a response

• Focuses on adverse fuel failure trend and causes

– Predominant cause being debris fretting


Conclusion• Starting in mid-2014, an adverse trend developed

• During the 4th quarter of 2015, 10 reactors were operating with fuel failures, up from 5 during the 4th quarter of 2014

– This trend has continued in 2016, with 6 new failures in clean cores in the first half of the year

• The majority of these failures are believed to be caused by debris fretting

• Station leadership should refocus on effectively maintaining foreign material exclusion practices and debris removal


Questions

NEI Update

Stephen Geier, PE

Senior Project ManagerEPRI Fuel Reliability Program Meeting

August 2016 • New Orleans

1

Topics

• Front-end processing costs

• 10 CFR 50.46c Rulemaking Update

2

Current State of Front-End Uranium Costs

• Current State of Uranium Supply:- Oversupply primarily driven by plant closures (e.g. Japan)

and high inventories built up in response to previous supply disruptions

- Includes mining, conversion, and enrichment

• Price Impacts:- Front-end prices are currently depressed

- Expected to remain low for next several years

3

Front-End: Industry Initiatives

• DNP team looked at reducing fuel costs as an initiative

• Fuel prices are already declining over this period thus no specific initiative was chartered

• NEI is not currently pursuing any policy changes relating to front-end fuel costs

- Continue to monitor issues relating to front-end fuel supply

4

50.46c Final Rulemaking

• 10 CFR 50.46c: “Emergency core cooling system performance during loss-of-coolant accidents.”- Long Term Cooling remains consistent with existing rule- Vendor quality programs for Breakaway Oxidation Testing are

accepted- Allowance is made for fuel manufactured prior to 46c vendor

program- Debris related issues (e.g., GSI-191 or sump suction) are

addressed; risk-informed methodology is an approved alternate method

5

Rulemaking Status• NEI and NRC agree no safety issue exists; plants currently have sufficient margin of

safety

• Final ACRS Review of Rule Package (except RG 1.229) was in February

• NEI issued letter on 2/25/16 to NRC Chairman requesting a Conditional Compliance process be added for Rule Implementation

• Rulemaking Package submitted to Commissioners on March 16, 2016 (SECY-16-0033)

• RG 1.229, “Risk-Informed Approach for Addressing the Effects of Debris on Post-Accident Long-Term Cooling” separated from package

- Primarily applicable for GSI-191 resolution for PWR plants using RI approach- ACRS Full Committee Reviewed on April 7 with comment letter issued April 19

• Awaiting Commissioner vote; timing unknown but not expected until 2017

6

Rule Implementation

• Implementation would move forward upon approval by Commissioners

• EPRI RegTAC and NEI supporting implementation guidance and template development- Implementation Plan templates will ensure submittal consistency- Schedule coordination with NRC for full implementation- Shared and discussed with NRC at July 20 Public Meeting

7

Questions?

8


Sam Belcher, First Energy

APC Chairman

Nuclear Promise Update


Fred H. SmithVice President, NFAS

Fuel Cycle Optimization

Assessment


Core Design Relationships

Safety & Fuel Reliability

Core DesignOperational Flexibility


Fuel Cycle Economics

Core Design Process

– Meet Nuclear safety, fuel reliability and operational constraints

– Optimize fuel cycle cost or other desirable features

Fuel Cycle Economic Components

– Cost of Enriched Uranium Product (EUP)

– Quantities of EUP - Core Design Efficiency

Core Design Efficiency = Reload Costs/Cycle Energy ($K/GWD)

– Simple to apply

– Applicable to wide range of core and fuel designs

– Most effective when applied to quasi-equilibrium core designs


Fuel Design Efficiency Project Strategy

Characterize the performance of the fleet

– Variations in performance

– Economic value

Identify design factors that influence the variation between units

– Ability to influence these factors

– Relative importance

Core Design Assessment

– Identify key sites for deep dive assessment

– Identify target constraint relaxations

– Best practice core design strategies

Develop guidance to support improvement activities


Utility Participants

Duke

Exelon

Entergy

FENOC

Dominion

Talen

TVA

Xcel

42 PWR Units

24 BWR Units


Actions to Date

Initial design data verified/updated by utilities

Initial survey of design factors that impact core design efficiency

Team review of analysis methodology and interim results

– Address data inconsistencies

– Expand design factor survey

– Request additional utility participation

Conference call scheduled to finalize design factor survey


PWR Core Design Efficiency Variation


BWR Core Design Efficiency Variation


Primary Factors associated with differences in PWR Core Design Efficiency

High Medium Low Insignificant

Cycle Length X

Power Density X

Discharge Burnup X

Batch Fraction X

Enrichment X

Uranium Mass per Assembly X


Secondary Factors contributing to differences in PWR Core Design Efficiency


Batch Carryover Fraction X

Fuel Type X

Split Uranium Feed X

Radial Zone Design X

NSSS Supplier X

Enrichment X

Reserve Margins X

Poison Type X

Blankets X

EOC Reactivity Maneuver X

EOC Boron X

Chemistry Limits X

Peaking Limits X

Vendor/In-house Designer X


Measured vs. Prediction of Efficiency using identified factors


Primary Factors associated with differences in BWR Core Design Efficiency


Cycle Length X

Power Density X

Discharge Burnup X

Batch Fraction X

Enrichment X

Mass per Assembly X

Enrichment Split X

Power Uprate X

BWR Type X


Remaining Actions

Finalize list of performance factors

Update survey and finalize database

Core Design Assessment

– Identify key units for deep dive assessment

– Identify target constraint relaxations

– Best practice Core Design strategies

Develop guidance to support improvement activities


Questions?


Tom Eichenberg, TVA

TAC Chair

Reg-TAC UpdateRegulatory Issues

Technical Advisory Committee


RIA Regulatory Status

Appendix B of SRP 4.2 to be deleted

New Regulatory Guide DG-1327 being reviewed

Public comment period depending on ACRS– Reg-TAC needs to prepare


Research Status

Key research is mostly complete

– New findings since NRC published their technical bases document

– Results published and key conclusions to be included in comment package

Two research projects initiated in 2016

– Mechanical behavior of low hydrogen concentration Zircaloy-2

– Fuel behavior under DNB conditions

ASTM Test Standard for qualification of new alloys


Zircaloy-2 Mechanical Property

Generate test data at low hydrogen concentrations

– Test material identified and tests to be conducted near end of 2016

Approximately 100 ppm hydrogen

NSRR Database of BWR rods

0 50 100 150 200 250 300

Fu

el E

nth

alp

y R

ise

(c

al/

gm

)

200

0

175

150

125

100

75

50

25

Nonfailed NSRR BWR Fuel

Failed NSRR BWR Fuel

BWR Failure Criteria

Hydrogen Content ( ppm )

-

NSRR Database of BWR rods

0 50 100 150 200 250 3000 50 100 150 200 250 300

Fu

el E

nth

alp

y R

ise

(c

al/

gm

)

200

0

175

150

125

100

75

50

25

Nonfailed NSRR BWR FuelNonfailed NSRR BWR Fuel

Failed NSRR BWR FuelFailed NSRR BWR Fuel

BWR Failure CriteriaBWR Failure Criteria

Hydrogen Content ( ppm )

Mechanical

test data

available

NO

mechanical

test data

Is this drop due to cladding

property change or fuel rod

design


RIA DNB Exposure at Partial Power 1/2

Proposed RIA regulation assumes rod failure upon entering DNB

Partial power events may lead to DNB - Low energy deposition, low thermal margin

Limited evaluation based on published AREVA Scenarios indicated

fuel cladding temperature is not high enough for failure

Expand evaluation

– To include wider range of conditions (energy deposition and thermal margin)

– Gauge extent of issue

If results indicate, building support to justify alternative acceptance

criteria


RIA DNB Exposure at Partial Power 2/2

IC reallocated funds to pursue project in 2016

Utilize core design/tools from DOE CASL program

– University Michigan’s MPACT transient neutron transport code

– Existing Watts Bar core design

– Evaluate 5, 25, 50, 75 and 100% power levels

– Rod worth and thermal margin adjustment may be necessary

Utilize EPRI Falcon code for fuel rod thermal calculation


RIA Test Standard

For a given fuel material the fuel rod RIA PCMI performance is

basically a function of the cladding property

NRC staff stated, ~2009, the need for a standard to qualify new alloys

for RIA performance

At the time the NRC consultant was not happy with existing tests

– Reg-TAC developed the Modified Burst Test (MBT)


MBT Data Compared to Calculated NSRR Tests

MBT test results predicting most of the NSRR tests well, burst strain

used directly

0.0

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

1.0

1.2

1.4

1.6

1.8

2.0

0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 1.2 1.4 1.6

NSR

R C

alcu

late

d

Measured Cladding Ductility

PWR

BWR

1:1 Correlation

If pellet temperature

reaches greater 2500°C test

sample likely to survive


Discussion with ASTM B10.02 Committee

NRC prefers an ASTM standard they could endorse

A new ASTM standard normally requires a round robin to be

conducted to evaluate test repeatability

– Not feasible with irradiated cladding

– B10.02 suggested a proposal could be considered if enough interest exists

NRC staff attended the last ASTM B10.02 Committee meeting where

the subject was discussed - NRC staff agreed to review proposal

A proposal will be drafted using CABRI and NSRR test results to

benchmark the MBT results


50.46c LOCA Rule Approval Status

Final draft rule provided to the NRC Commissioners

Commissioner Ostendorff term ended without vote

Final vote indeterminate and likely delayed for one year


50.46c Implementation Preparations

Public meeting held in July

Implementation plan (Reg-TAC initiated)

– Plans submitted within 6 months, fleet wide compliance within 84 months

Long term core cooling (PWROG initiated)

Open areas (PWROG initiating joint OG effort)

– LAR guidance template(s)

– Generic FSAR change package

– TSTF Traveler to address TS 4.2

– Reporting Guidance

– Review Standard


LOCA Research Status

EPRI research moving toward supporting 50.46c compliance

demonstration

– Breakaway oxidation

– Long term core cooling

Fuel fragmentation will not be part of the current 50.46c rulemaking

– Results could have significant impact on burnup extension initiatives

– Reg-TAC conducting complementary fuel fragmentation research to

understand mechanisms and modeling


LOCA Research

Testing in progress to evaluate quenched cladding performance

under long term core cooling conditions (to be completed in Summer 2017)

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

18

20

0 200 400 600 800 1000

Equ

ival

en

t C

lad

din

g R

eac

ted

(%

)

Hydrogen Concentration (ppm)

Embrittlement ECR

Zry-4 Brittle

Zirc-4 Marginally ductile

Zry-2 Ductile

Zry-2 Marginally Ductile

– Slightly delayed due to difficulty

establishing baseline

Faster heat-up and thin cladding provided by

fuel vendor

Breakaway oxidation testing

– Delayed due to LTCC delay

– Searching for an alternative laboratory to

perform the work


Fuel Fragmentation Status

Fuel fragmentation burnup threshold is moving into the current

licensed burnup limitHalden SCIPIII

Larger concern is the

large balloon and burst

opening

– Large chunks of fuel

relocated to outside of rod

– Potentially supersedes the

fragmentation threshold

Characterizing balloon

and burst will be difficult

61 GWd/MTU Rod

Average


Reg-TAC Research

Focused on establishing the fragmentation threshold

– Indication of pre-transient power dependence

Investigating fuel fragmentation drivers/mechanism

– Fission gas

– Thermal stress


Pre-Transient Power Dependence

Initial plots based

on rod average

power

Later tests were

based on local

power

Later tests

consistent with

other SCIPIII

tests0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

50 60 70 80 90

Last

Cyc

le P

ow

er (

kw/m

)

Burn-up (GWd/MTU)

EPRI

Halden

NRC

No

fragmentation

Severe fragmentation

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

50 60 70 80 90

Last

Cyc

le P

ow

er (

kw/m

)

Burn-up (GWd/MTU)

EPRI

Halden

NRC

No

fragmentation

Severe fragmentation

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

50 60 70 80 90

Last

Cyc

le P

ow

er (

kw/m

)

Burn-up (GWd/MTU)

EPRI

Halden

NRC

No

fragmentation

Severe fragmentationLikely threshold

New test results support a pre-transient power threshold


Fuel Fragmentation Mechanisms

What causes fuel to be susceptible to fragmentation

– Grain boundary fission gas content generally accepted as the key player

– Reg-TAC Test result showed no difference in grain boundary fission gas inventory

between samples above and below the threshold

– Moving to evaluate pellet thermal stress from temperature reversal during a LOCA

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

50 60 70 80 90

Last

Cyc

le P

ow

er (

kw/m

)

Burn-up (GWd/MTU)

Close to 50% of fission gas

inventory in the grain boundary


Future Research Plans

Fission gas distribution

– More detailed look at fission gas distribution

– Verify initial scoping test results

Balloon and burst evaluation

– One test planned, but many are needed

– Will propose to SCIPIII program to pickup task so Reg-TAC could focus more

on understanding

Working with DOE/National labs

– Evaluate fuel reconditioning using ATR

– Verification using TREAT


Questions?


Greg Storey, TVA

B-TAC Chairman

B-TAC UpdateBWR Fuel Technical Advisory Committee


Outline

B-TAC Leadership

Objectives

BWR Control Rod Blade Integrity

Control Blade Assessment Database

Control Blade Hot Cell Examination

BWR Corrosion Issues

– Fuel Cladding Shadow Corrosion Measurements in Brunswick Unit 2

– KKL Dryout Fuel Failure Rootcause Investigation

BWR Fuel Assembly Structural Component Integrity

– BWR Fuel Water Channel Margin Assessment


B-TAC Leadership and Structure

BWR Technical Advisory

Committee (B-TAC)

Chairman: Greg Storey, TVA

Vice Chair: Michelle Mura, Exelon

Aylin Kucuk (TAC Owner)

BWR Fuel Cladding Corrosion and Crud

RFA Lead: Aylin Kucuk

Research Focus Areas (RFA)

BWR Channel Distortion Mitigation

RFA Lead: Erik Mader

BWR Control Blade Integrity

RFA Lead: Rob Daum

Fuel Assembly Structural Component

Integrity

RFA Lead: John Beale

NDE Steering

Committee


BWR Technical Advisory Committee (B-TAC)

Objective

Perform research that addresses BWR-specific issues related to fuel cladding, fuel assembly structural

components, control rod blade integrity, and channel performance in modern operating conditions

BWR Fuel Cladding

Corrosion and Crud

Understand the

relationship between

BWR fuel cladding

performance, fuel

duty and water

chemistry in order to

maintain fuel

cladding integrity

margins in modern

operating

environments

BWR Channel

Distortion

Mitigation

Improve

understanding of

channel distortion

mechanisms of

current and new

materials

BWR Control Rod Blade

Integrity

• Improve general

understanding of BWR

control rod blade integrity and

exposure under various

operating histories and

management strategies

• Inform utilities and other

stakeholders on research

results for improving CRB

performance and reliability

guidance

Fuel Assembly

Structural Component

Integrity

• Determine margin of fuel

component structural

materials for corrosion

and mechanical

performance

• Determine rootcause of

any issues related to

fuel assembly structural

components


BWR Control Rod Blade Integrity

Research Focus Area


Control Blade Assessment Database – On-going

Objective Create a Control Rod Blade Assessment Database (CBAD) with compiled operating experience

information and data on BWR control rod blade reliability

Monitor fleet-wide information to determine:

– Extent of unexpected CRB cracking

– CRB aging status to determine vulnerability to cracking

– Correlate water chemistry indicators with degree of observed blade cracking

Onset and extent of cracking

Neutronics impact as an indicator for absorber washout

Provide data to support IRT Gap Areas:

– Compilation of Operating Experience (OE)

– Leaking CRB detection and identification

– CRB management guidance


Control Blade Assessment Database – On-going

Benefits

OE reference for use by participants

– Operational events, linked to attributes and indicators

– Centralization of industry control blade inventory

– Standardize reporting for CRB status assessments (B-10 depletion or equivalent)

Status

CBAD received funding from FRP IC reallocation for 2016

Database structure is being developed

Initial structure and templates provided to team members proved to be somewhat incompatible

with what some plants can easily provide

Brunswick 1 & 2 were chosen as pilot plant to test CBAD structure

A survey has been developed to identify different ways plants collect data to track CRB

inventories and methods used to estimate B-10 depletion


Control Blade Hot Cell Examination and Laboratory

Studies – Planned

Objective

Harvest CRB materials (structures and absorbers) for

detailed nondestructive examination (NDE) and

destructive examination (DE)

Approach

Laboratory scoping study to understand B4C absorber

washout during long-term autoclave testing

–Follow-on study of irradiated absorber materials if

needed

Hot cell PIE of failed OEM CRB handles (including

advanced characterization techniques) to understand

cracking mechanism and inform existing supplier guidance


CRB Hot Cell Examination and Laboratory Studies –

Planned

Benefits

Involves a collaborative industry effort to provide additional resources to support root cause

assessments:

– Suspected leaking CRBs potentially with gross absorber washout

– Failed CRB handles to update guidance within supplier notice

Broad collaborations with all industry and research stakeholders and leveraging resources,

including those from utilities, INPO, BWROG, suppliers, vendors, DOE, and multiple EPRI

programs

Status

Under negotiations with utilities, two suppliers, vendors/contractors and DOE Light Water

Reactor Sustainability program

Expect contracts in place later in 3rd quarter


BWR Corrosion Issues

Research Focus Area


Fuel Cladding Shadow Corrosion Measurements in Brunswick

Unit 2 – Recently Completed

Background

All fuel vendors have transitioned into fuel

designs with Inconel spacers

– Significant benefit on fuel economics and

channel removal issues but…

– Reduces fuel reliability margin

Shadow corrosion-resulted fuel failures in the

past at KKL and caused thick shadow oxide

spallation at Vattenfall units recently.

– Oxide spallation results in corrosion margin

reduction

Objective

Assess shadow corrosion margin on a US

BWR and establish whether any unusual

conditions, such as those observed in Europe,

were observed.

Cladding

failures at

the spacer

contact

points

Vattenfall Spacer shadow oxide layer spallation*

*D. Schrire et al. Top Fuel 2015, Zurich, Switzerland

KKL Enhanced Spacer Shadow

Corrosion Failures

Zinc Silicate crud deposition between ZrO2 oxide

layers near spalled areas (Provided by KKL)

Hydride blister may forma at oxide

spallation sites


KKL Dryout Failure

• KKL (BWR6) experienced a fuel failure

due to dryout

• Rootcause investigation could only

identify apparent causes: hidden system

response causing intermittent unsteady

inlet flow condition to fuel assemblies.

• More investigations are ongoing at KKL

and WSE.

• IRT will be conducted in 2017

‒ WSE (fuel supplier) and GEH (NSSS

supplier)

‒ Several utilities, EPRI, industry experts


KKL Dryout FailureHot Cell Examination of a Fuel Rod with a Dryout Indication - Planned

Objectives

Determine extent of dryout conditions (length and temperature)

Investigate local power tilt condition on a fuel rod next to 1/3 corner

part length rod

Approach

Transfer one sound rod with dryout indication from KKL to hotcell

A larger hot cell program is already planned by KKL for another

project (hydrogen pickup). One more fuel rod will be added to the

shipment.

Benefits

If the length of dryout and clad temperature can be determined,

this may help correlate it to limiting CPR values.

Provide insights to industry regarding the extent of local power

conditions above the 1/3 part length corner rods.

Very cost effective since the fuel rod shipment from KKL is already

planned for another project.

Sound rod

with dryout

indication


KKL Dryout FailureSearching for Dryout Indications at Cofrentes - Planned

Objective

Investigate if fuel operating in similar BWR6 unit

shows dryout indications

– Cofrentes operates with both Optima-2 and

GE14/GNF2 fuel bundles

Approach

Perform visual inpections on select bundles

operated at the corner of the cross beam support

plate operated at limiting CPRs

– Identified 37 bundles operated at position 3 with

MCPR<1.42

Inspection will be conducted in Fall 2016.

Benefits

If a similar dryout indication is observed at

Cofrentes, it will confirm that other BWR/6 and

ABWR plants may be at risk for a similar fuel

failures

1 Side Entry Central / adjacent support beams: 0



4 Side Entry Peripheral

5 Bottom Entry Peripheral

01 03 05 07 09 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27 29 31 33 35 37 39 41 43 45 47 49 51 53 55 57 59

60 4 4 4 4 4 4 60

58 5 5 1 2 2 1 1 2 5 5 58

56 5 2 1 1 2 2 1 1 2 2 1 5 56

54 5 5 5 3 2 2 3 3 2 2 3 3 2 5 5 5 54

52 4 2 2 3 3 2 2 3 3 2 2 3 3 2 2 3 3 4 52

50 5 2 1 1 2 2 1 1 2 2 1 1 2 2 1 1 2 2 1 5 50

48 4 2 2 1 1 2 2 1 1 2 2 1 1 2 2 1 1 2 2 1 1 4 48

46 5 2 3 3 2 2 3 3 2 2 3 3 2 2 3 3 2 2 3 3 2 2 3 46

44 5 2 3 3 2 2 3 3 2 2 3 3 2 2 3 3 2 2 3 3 2 2 3 5 44

42 5 5 1 2 2 1 1 2 2 1 1 2 2 1 1 2 2 1 1 2 2 1 1 2 5 5 42

40 5 2 1 1 2 2 1 1 2 2 1 1 2 2 1 1 2 2 1 1 2 2 1 1 2 2 1 5 40

38 5 3 2 2 3 3 2 2 3 3 2 2 3 3 2 2 3 3 2 2 3 3 2 2 3 3 2 5 38

36 4 3 3 2 2 3 3 2 2 3 3 2 2 3 3 2 2 3 3 2 2 3 3 2 2 3 3 2 2 4 36

34 4 2 2 1 1 2 2 1 1 2 2 1 1 2 2 1 1 2 2 1 1 2 2 1 1 2 2 1 1 4 34

32 4 2 2 1 1 2 2 1 1 2 2 1 1 2 2 1 1 2 2 1 1 2 2 1 1 2 2 1 1 4 32

30 4 3 3 2 2 3 3 2 2 3 3 2 2 3 3 2 2 3 3 2 2 3 3 2 2 3 3 2 2 4 30

28 4 3 3 2 2 3 3 2 2 3 3 2 2 3 3 2 2 3 3 2 2 3 3 2 2 3 3 2 2 4 28

26 4 2 2 1 1 2 2 1 1 2 2 1 1 2 2 1 1 2 2 1 1 2 2 1 1 2 2 1 1 4 26

24 5 2 1 1 2 2 1 1 2 2 1 1 2 2 1 1 2 2 1 1 2 2 1 1 2 2 1 5 24

22 5 3 2 2 3 3 2 2 3 3 2 2 3 3 2 2 3 3 2 2 3 3 2 2 3 3 2 5 22

20 5 5 2 3 3 2 2 3 3 2 2 3 3 2 2 3 3 2 2 3 3 2 2 3 5 5 20

18 5 1 2 2 1 1 2 2 1 1 2 2 1 1 2 2 1 1 2 2 1 1 2 5 18

16 5 1 2 2 1 1 2 2 1 1 2 2 1 1 2 2 1 1 2 2 1 1 2 5 16

14 4 3 3 2 2 3 3 2 2 3 3 2 2 3 3 2 2 3 3 2 2 4 14

12 5 3 2 2 3 3 2 2 3 3 2 2 3 3 2 2 3 3 2 5 12

10 4 1 1 2 2 1 1 2 2 1 1 2 2 1 1 2 2 4 10

08 5 5 5 2 1 1 2 2 1 1 2 2 1 5 5 5 08

06 5 3 2 2 3 3 2 2 3 3 2 5 06

04 5 5 2 3 3 2 2 3 5 5 04

02 4 4 4 4 4 4 Orific - Arrangement - Inspected FA.xlsx 02

01 03 05 07 09 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27 29 31 33 35 37 39 41 43 45 47 49 51 53 55 57 59

AVA027 ATA022 AVB084

AUB104 AUB074 ATA012

ATC115

AUA015

C29

ASC103

C31

C31 C30 AUB095C30

AUB101 AUB066 AVA001

ATA018

ATA003

C30 C31

AUB085 ATB057 AUA014 AUB103

C29

ATB037

14.23 (+20%)

75.07

75.21

C31 C29

Factorcore

positione Typ

9.78 (-20%)

11.57 (orig)

KKL Core Map and Visual Inspection Results


BWR Assembly Structural Component Integrity

Research Focus Area


BWR Fuel Water Channel Margin Assessment

Background

Load chain failures have occurred in Europe and Asia during fuel handling

– Asian unit had a complete fracture of a stainless steel component in 2014

– European unit had a complete fracture of a Zircaloy-2 component in 2015

Objective

Determine load chain margin to

fracture in BWR fuel for a variety

of design considerations

– Flaw generation

– Fracture toughness/mechanical

Hydrogen

Irradiation

Materials

Verify vendor data in

relation to historic

data and compare for

different materials


BWR Fuel Water Channel Margin Assessment

Benefits

Understand European failure in

Zircaloy-2

– Hydrogen and irradiation

Zircaloy 4 used in US designs is

considered less susceptible than

Zircaloy-2 for most conditions

– Determine margin compared to Zircaloy-2

– Mechanical properties

– Hydrogen determination of same

components


Questions?


Stan Hayes, Duke Energy

P-TAC Chairman

P-TAC UpdatePWR Fuel Technical Advisory Committee


Contents

P-TAC Objectives and Research Focus Areas (RFAs)

P-TAC Topics/Issues

– Elevated Lithium/Zinc Demonstration Program

– Zinc Model Addition to BOA

– BOA Monte Carlo Method

– CILC Risk Assessment

– Assembly Structural Components


P-TAC Objectives

To understand PWR fuel cladding

and assembly/control rod

performance and its relationship to

water chemistry in order to maintain

fuel cladding integrity and achieve

maximum fuel performance in more

demanding and changing reactor

environments.

PWR Fuel Performance

PWR Fuel Crud

Issues

PWR Fuel Clad

CorrosionIssues

PWR Assembly Structural / Control Rod

IntegrityImproving and sustaining reliable fuel

performance by developing tools and

guidelines to make risk informed decisions


P-TAC Organization

PWR Technical Advisory

Committee (P- TAC)Chairman: Stan Hayes – Duke Energy

Vice-Chairman: Dr. Yongdeog Kim

Vice-Chairman: TBD*

Dennis Hussey (TAC Owner)

PWR Fuel Crud

RFA Lead: Dennis Hussey

Research Focus Area (RFA)

PWR Fuel Assembly Structural / Control Rod

Component Integrity

RFA Lead: Rob Daum

PWR Fuel Cladding Corrosion

RFA Lead: Dennis Hussey

*Seeking United States chemistry vice-chair


P-TAC Challenges


P-TAC ChallengesCrud Induced Power Shift (CIPS)

Crud Induced Power Shift frequency has been reduced greatly, but…

– Hanul-4 is currently operating at 75% power for the final 100 days of the cycle to meet next

cycle reload requirements

– Several utilities have noted current risk assessment strategies have associated fuel costs

Understanding CIPS margin more accurately may save $1M USD or more per cycleAxial Offset Cycle Trend

-16

-12

-8

-4

0

4

8

12

0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22

Burnup (GWD/MTU)

AO

(%

)

Predicted Axial Offset

Measured Axial Offset


P-TAC ChallengesCorrosion Issues

Fuel changes could accelerate corrosion if not

understood and controlled

– Uprating significantly changes core boiling

– Component replacements generate new crud

sources

– Load following/flexible operation impacts crud

transport

– Newly built plants (large cores) could be different

– Chemistry changes (KOH?)

(a) (b)

(c) (d)

(a) (b)

(c) (d)

Issue Date

Crud Induced Localized Corrosion Events

TMI-1 Cycle 9 1995

Seabrook Cycle 5 1997

Palo Verde 2 Cycle 9 2000

Calvert Cliffs 1 Cycle 17 2006

Corrosion Observations

Davis Besse Cycle 15 2007

Crystal River 3 Cycle 16 2009

TMI-1 Cycle 17 2009

Ginna Cycle 35 2011


Continuing P-TAC ChallengesStructural Component Issues

Operating Experience shows instances of:

– Fuel assembly (and rod) distortion, with/without

control rod interference

– Zr- and Ni-alloy grid cracking

– Ni-alloy hold-down spring cracking

– Corrosion and/or hydrogen pickup

– Long-term storage stability – back-end handling

Management and mitigation of these issues:

– Improved skeleton/component designs

– Advanced alloys, materials and processing

– Control/Limit hydraulic and mechanical forces

– Core unloading/reloading procedures

– Repair or early discharge

Project areas to improve understanding:

– Root cause analysis support

– Margin assessments

– Application of nondestructive evaluation (NDE)

technologies and techniques

– Modeling and simulation

Fuel Reliability Database (FRED), Ver. 4.1


P-TAC R&D Project PlansAssessing the Impact of Chemistry


Assessing the Impact of ChemistryElevated Lithium/Zinc Host Site

Objective

Raise lithium concentration limit for much of

the industry by inspecting assemblies

exposed to higher lithium concentrations

Minimize pH changes and reduce crud

mobility

Benefits

Provide core designers with flexibility by

relaxing lithium concentration constraint

Potentially save money by reducing

burnable absorbers

7

7.05

7.1

7.15

7.2

7.25

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

176

5

168

5

160

5

152

5

144

5

136

5

128

5

120

5

112

5

104

5

965

885

805

725

645

565

485

405

325

245

165

85 5

pH

t

Lithiu

m c

oncentr

ation (

ppm

)

Boron concentration (ppm)

B-Li Curve, 6.0 ppm Li maximum

Li Target (ppm) pH(t)

7

7.05

7.1

7.15

7.2

7.25

0

0.5

1

1.5

2

2.5

3

3.5

4

176

5

168

5

160

5

152

5

144

5

136

5

128

5

120

5

112

5

104

5

965

885

805

725

645

565

485

405

325

245

165

85 5

pH

t

Lithiu

m c

oncentr

ation (

ppm

)

Boron concentration (ppm)

B-Li Curve, 3.5 ppm Li maximum

Li Target (ppm) pH(t)

Non-

constant

pH needed

because of

lithium limit

Constant

pH possible

because of

increased

lithium limit


Assessing the Impact of ChemistryPlant Demonstration of Elevated pH and Zn

“Required” Criteria for Selection

– Maximum mass evaporation rate that bounds at least

half of the plants operating with similar chemistry (target

530-540 lbm/ft2-hr)

– Fuel cladding of an advanced Zirc-4 production cladding

– Cycle maximum lithium concentration of 6 ppm with high

exposure

“Desirable” Criteria for Selection

– Cycle zinc exposure 5 ppb or greater for 90% of the cycle length

– Ability to support fuel inspections (visuals, oxide measurements, and crud scrapes)

– Adequate chemistry sampling equipment and program

– Shutdown chemistry monitoring program to assess total iron, nickel, and cobalt releases during oxygenation

CPSES-2 Demo (2001-2007)

• Final Report (2007, 1015022)

Ginna 2011 PIE

• WEC P-TAC presentation (2012)

Ringhals-2 2012 PIE

• Final Report (2012, 1025183)

CPSES-2 2013 PIE

• Final Report (2013, 3002000693)

Ringhals-3 2014 PIE

• Elevated pH and hydrogen operation.

New Plant Demo

• Higher duty – and/or –

• AREVA Fuel– and/or –

• Zinc Injection

Criteria for Continued Demonstrations

– Planned coolant pHT that requires significant Li exposure (i.e. ≥ 6 GWD/MTU) above 4.0 ppm Li

– and –


Assessing the Impact of ChemistryPlant Demonstration of Elevated pH and Zn - Callaway

Highest rated project in 2015

– Facilitates core design flexibility

– Unable to implement at Comanche Peak

given several constraints

Callaway considering to host

– Bounds many plants for fuel vendor

26 U.S. reactors are bounded (to be

reviewed, +34 EDF 900 MW reactors)

Beaver Valley 1 McGuire 1

Beaver Valley 2 McGuire 2

Braidwood 2 Millstone 3

Byron 2 North Anna 1

Catawba 1 North Anna 2

Catawba 2 Salem 1

Comanche Peak 1 Salem 2

Comanche Peak 2 Seabrook

Callaway Vogtle 1

DC Cook 2 Vogtle 2

Diablo Canyon 1 Watts Bar 1

Diablo Canyon 2 Watts Bar 2

Farley 1 Wolf Creek

Farley 2

Bounded plants (+34 EDF 900 MW plants)


Assessing the Impact of ChemistryPlant Demonstration of Elevated pH and Zn - Callaway

Callaway Cycle 23 starts November, 2017

– Measurements needed at EOC Cycle 23 (~March 2019)

– Fuel engineering and design plans needed in 2017-2018

Core design planning starts September 2016

– Boron curve is a key part of the core design

– pHT must remain above 7.0

At a minimum, two oxide measurement campaigns are needed

– Funding will be needed for 2019-2020

Utility can provide site support, but cannot contribute to campaign costs


P-TAC R&D Project PlansBOA version 4.0/Zinc Model Addition


BOA version 4.0/Zinc Model AdditionDevelopment Plan

Current BOA Zn Model

Zn metal not explicitly modelled in BOA

Impact of accounted for by increasing Ni

content of system

– Conservatively captures increased crud

source term from injected Zn metal

New Zn Model

Explicit model for Zn behavior

– Transport throughout the primary loop

– Deposition and incorporation into out-of-core

oxides

– Precipitation of ZnFe2O4, ZnO, and ZnSiO4

• Benefits: Improved definition of margin for cores

operated with zinc chemistry

V4.0 Planned for July 2017 Release

• Crud interactions with zinc

• Out-of-core surface interactions

Specific Zinc Model

• SG Tubing Analysis

• Manway inserts

Improved Basis for Crud Source

Term and Species

• Boric Acid Speciation

• Elevated Hydrogen and CIPSImproved Chemistry


P-TAC R&D Project PlansDevelopment of BOA Monte Carlo Methodology


Development of BOA Monte Carlo MethodologyBOA Predictions and Core Behavior from Selected Cycles

Challenge

FRP APC members asked for a confidence interval for CIPS risk assessments

– Expensive fuel decisions were made with single core boron value

– BOA method is conservative by design

Objectives

Define the uncertainty in a BOA risk assessment

Provide confidence interval and clear guidance about threshold results

Benefits

Fuel decisions can be made with more certainty about CIPS risk

0.0

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0.0 100.0 200.0 300.0 400.0 500.0

Esti

mat

ed

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m C

ore

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hav

ior

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)

BOA V3.1 Prediction (gm)

Observed CIPS No CIPS


BOA Monte Carlo Method Summary and Next Steps

Results Summary

– Monte Carlo method establishes an uncertainty

and confidence level for the BOA prediction

– Provides a way that cycles with predictions

greater than threshold can be accepted with some

manageable increase in CIPS risk

– Monte Carlo results depend strongly on input

distributions used

Next steps

– BOA code already has most of the needed

functionality

– Method to be refined with several beta testers

– Training module to be developed

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14

0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5

FREQ

UEN

CY

BORON MASS (LB)

PLANT A: 59 RUNS

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0.90

1.00

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FRA

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BORON MASS (LB)

PLANT A (CYCLE 9): 59 RUNS


P-TAC R&D Project PlansCILC Risk Assessment


CILC Fine Mesh MethodologyCorrosion Concerns to Fuel Reliability

Project Objectives

Extend CIPS risk assessment method to

identify high CILC risk fuel rods

Verify CILC risk assessment method with

known failure cases

Benefits

Fuel/core design changes can be made with

greater confidence that CILC risk is quantified

Provides opportunities for fuel savings with

more clearly defined margins

Enhanced

heat

transfer

from crud


P-TAC R&D Project PlansAssembly Structural Components


Assembly Structural ComponentsNi-based Alloy 718 Laboratory Campaigns

Objective

Identify material parameters that have lower stress-

corrosion cracking susceptibility in irradiated

environments

Compare performance of ‘standard’ and ‘optimized’

material processes in laboratory environments

Benefits

Improve understanding of SCC initiation

mechanisms at microstructure level

Provide options to fuel vendors for Alloy 718

applications

Next Steps

Collaboration with Halden for irradiation

experiments

Technology transfer of results to fuel vendors

Preliminary results only.

Groups I-IV defined by thermal

treatment and mechanical processes

Group I results are statistically equal


Summary

Modeling solutions and data are needed for CIPS and CILC

risk assessment

– Accurate CIPS risk assessment is needed for optimized fuel

decisions

– CILC risk assessment strategy is approaching requirements for

Level IV analysis

Assembly structural component research continues with in-

pile tests at HRP


Questions?

Documents

Fuel Reliability Program - Amazon S3€¦ · 5. Silicon Carbide Composite BWR Channel Development (retain) 6. Development of Accident Tolerant Fuel Using Molybdenum Alloy Cladding