FSRU Terminal Risk Assessment - Cynergy

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CYNERGY PROJECT

FSRU Terminal Risk Assessment

Preliminary Site Evaluation Study

Our ref. 1708-0011

Rev. 1

August 2017

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Lloyd's Register Group Limited, its affiliates and subsidiaries and their respective officers, employees or agents are, individually and

collectively, referred to in this clause as 'Lloyd's Register'. Lloyd's Register assumes no responsibility and shall not be liable to any

person for any loss, damage or expense caused by reliance on the information or advice in this document or howsoever provided,

unless that person has signed a contract with the relevant Lloyd's Register entity for the provision of this information or advice and in

that case any responsibility or liability is exclusively on the terms and conditions set out in that contract.

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CYNERGY Project 1708-0011 Lloyd's Register EMEA August 2017March, 2015

1. Report No. 1708-0011

2. Report date August 2017

3. Revision date

4. Type of report Technical Rev. 1 Issued for Comments

5. Title & Subtitle CYnergy Project FSRU Terminal Risk Assessment Preliminary Site Evaluation Study

6. Security classification of this report Commercial in Confidence

7. Security classification of this page Commercial in Confidence

8. Author(s) Gemma Burton Risk Specialist Lloyd's Register EMEA Seyi Daniyan Risk Specialist Lloyd's Register EMEA

9. Authorisation

T Koliopulos Global Special Projects Manager Lloyd's Register EMEA

10. Reporting organisation name and address Lloyd’s Register EMEA 71 Fenchurch Street London EC3M 4BS

11. Reporting organisation reference(s) None

12. This report supersedes None

13. Sponsoring organisation name and address DEFA CYGAS

14. Sponsoring organisation reference(s)

15. No. of pages 37

16. Summary Lloyd’s Register EMEA (LR) has been engaged by the DEFA CYGAS to undertake the Risk Assessment work on the detailed Concept Definition Study of the LNG terminal site selection which will enable the award of the permit for the future development of Front-End Engineering Design phase.

17. Key words

LNGC, HAZID, HAZOP, FSRU

18. Distribution statement DEFA CYGAS CYNERGY Project Partners Lloyd’s Register EMEA

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This report details the results of the preliminary Site Evaluation Study incorporating a Hazard Identification (HAZID), which constitutes the first part of CYnergy Project’s Risk Assessment work for the development of a LNG Regasification Terminal at Vassilikos Port in Cyprus. The study undertook an examination of the proposed marine operations, the proposed lay-out of the jetty terminal and the FSRU gas export operations on site. The applied evaluation process was in compliance with Cyprus Ministry of Energy, Commerce, Industry and Tourism (ECIT) Guidance Notes and internationally accepted Formal Safety Assessment methodology in line with Seveso III compliance requirements.

The major events related to marine operations failure and/or gas export operations failure have been considered in all aspects of the proposed design and appropriate risk reduction measures have been proposed. The study identified a number of potential operational drawbacks and system conditions which could cause a reduction in operational safety. However, none of the identified hazards are thought to be unusual or to pose a level of risk which is higher from typical LNG marine terminal operations and all risk levels are expected to be further reduced by the implementation of design and operational measures proposed by the HAZID/HAZOP and QRA reports in the Front End Engineering Design (FEED) phase.

In conclusion based on the findings of this study Lloyd’s Register can confirm that the terminal design and site location has been found to be of sufficient safety and integrity to satisfy the required standards of operations by ECIT and Cyprus Port Authority.

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Contents

1. INTRODUCTION 6

1.1 General 6

1.2 Scope 6

1.3 LNG Regasification Terminal 7

1.4 Terminal Facilities 7

2. RISK ASSESSMENT 10

2.1 General 10

2.2 Objectives 10

2.3 Hazards of Natural Gas and Liquefied Natural Gas 10

2.3.1 Properties of Natural Gas 10

2.3.2 Fire and Explosion Hazards 11

2.3.3 Jet Fires 11

2.3.4 Flash Fires 12

2.3.5 Pool Fires 12

2.3.6 Vapour Cloud Explosions 12

2.3.7 Cryogenic Burns 12

2.3.7 Rapid Phase Transition 12

3. HAZARD IDENTIFICATION 13

3.1 HAZID Study 13

4. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 15

4.1 General 15

4.2 HAZID Recommendations 15

4.3 Recommendations Summary 17

5. References 23

Appendices

Appendix 1 HAZID Worksheets

Appendix 2 Plans and Typical LNG Carriers

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1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 General

Lloyd’s Register EMEA (LR) has been engaged by the Natural Gas Company of Cyprus DEFA (CYGAS) as part of its Synergy Partners group to address the Risk Assessment scope of the detailed Concept Definition Study of the LNG terminal site selection which will enable the award of the permit for the future development of Front-End Engineering Design phase with a single, well-defined concept study. The terminal comprises of a permanently moored Floating Storage and Regasification Unit (FSRU) and supporting jetty infrastructure able to accept LNG carrier (LNGC) delivery vessels to offload LNG supplies ensuring the continuous gas export operations of the FSRU.

1.2 Scope

The Project will involve two separate processes aiming to develop LNG import and gas supply in Cyprus: a) establishing an appropriate LNG supply chain and b) developing the necessary gas infrastructure in order to satisfy currently a power station and later able to address future demand requirements. The project development is expected to include the following assets:

A jetty for a Floating Storage and Regasification Unit (FSRU) berthing and LNG Ship-to-Ship (STS) transfer activities (refer to Figure 1)

A FSRU permanently moored in Vassilikos bay

An offshore pipeline connecting the FSRU with the receiving point onshore at Vassilikos

The development of a local buffer able to store Natural Gas in gaseous form in the required operational pressure ranges adjacent to Vassilikos power station

Extension of Limassol Port Terminal 2 (Vassiliko) in order to create emergency shelter for LNGC and FSRU. (refer to Figure 2, Appendix 2)

Any other facilities relating to the operational requirements of the system

Figure 1: FSRU Jetty Terminal Facility

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1.3 LNG Regasification Terminal

The terminal development will involve the construction of an offshore jetty, and the laying of a gas pipeline. The jetty facility will be able to berth one FSRU up to a size of 150,000 m3

It is proposed that the FSRU vessel will remain moored to the jetty for the period of up to 15 years with continuous high gas demand. Supply LNGCs, using STS cargo transfer, will periodically come alongside and unload LNG, which will be regasified and injected to the gas pipeline through two (2) high pressure unloading arms. One operating and one stand-by. Gas export is expected to be between 200-300 MMSCFD (approx.220 m

3/hr), being compatible with the send-

out capacity of the FSRU.

1.4 Terminal Facilities

Jetty/Mooring

A berthing jetty with mooring dolphins will be constructed. The jetty is located west of the main breakwater of Limassol Port – terminal 2 (Vassiliko), at a distance of about 1,3km. A 14m wide trestle runs offshore in a north – south direction for about 750 meters before turning south-west 430 meters to form the FSRU berth. A future extension of the jetty by another 310m, in order to accommodate an LNG carrier (LNGC) is foreseen.

The orientation of the berth is about 220 degrees North, so that the ships are aligned into the prevailing direction of wind and waves. Thus, according to the proposed layout, the depth at the inner berth is between 15 and 18 meters while the outer (future) berth ends up being in about 22 meters.

The loading platform substructure and deck is supported by piles. Ships berth against four breasting dolphins. The breasting dolphins will be equipped with fenders and quick release mooring hooks to accommodate the LNGC’s spring lines.

The size of the jetty will be sufficient to provide berthing and mooring facility based on the FSRU and largest shuttle LNGC operating (Qflex length 345 m). The available area of the jetty proposed dimensions 30 m x 35 m should be appropriate to accommodate as a minimum the regasification arms, export gas pipeline/piping, ESD valve skid, metering system, power generation, Nitrogen generation and boarding facility.

Regasification/Export

A typical FSRU’s vaporisation facilities are designed to deliver up to 600 MMSCFD of vaporised LNG at a send-out pressure up to approximately 100 barg. The proposed system at Vassilikos will be operating with an anticipated normal rate of 200-300 MMSCFD for the power station requirements but able to provide send-out rates between 100 MMSCFD and 600 MMSCFD to fulfil offtake variations and future gas demand.

The regas cargo transfer will take place via high pressure (HP) gas unloading arms with the vessel moored at the terminal jetty.

The arms are an “S” type double counterweighted design which is fully balanced in all positions. Two independent counterweight systems are used to balance the inboard and outboard sections of the arm. The "S" or supported version is designed to separate the 12 inch diameter gas carrying line from the mechanical structure. The design of the arm is OCIMF compliant, the structure weights approximately 85 tonnes incorporating gas swivels rated for a design pressure of 134 barg.

STS LNG Transfer

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For continuous terminal operations it is proposed to provide shuttle LNGCs offloading LNG to FSRU berthed at the terminal jetty. During the initial operating period a double banked STS arrangement is proposed with the shuttle LNGCs moored and connected portside of the FSRU as this will enable both vessels’ manifolds to be in line, with a maximum tolerance of 2 m fore and aft.

The proposed transfer system is based on the use of standard 8" composite hoses. The following typical data apply:

-type: composite hose

-diameter: 8"

-bending radius: min 0.65m

-length: 15 m

-max. Capacity: 1,000 m3/h

-quantity: total 8 pieces

-supplier: GUTTELING

The hoses will be connected by spool pieces on both the LNGC and the FSRU manifolds. The spool pieces provide connection for two hoses on every liquid line (3 x 2 hoses) and for two (2) hoses on the vapour return line; this also allows one extra liquid line for redundancy.

A storage rack is normally provided on the deck of FSRU to allow for storage of the hoses (8 hoses, 15 m length) and also to facilitate easy handling by the vessel’s manifold crane.

Control Systems

The emergency system of the FSRU and the LNGC will be typically connected to the jetty’s system by the ship to shore interface which will drive the ESD system and works as Ship to Shore data communication Link (SSL). A typical programmable logic controller (PLC) with SCADA system may be installed. This system will allow operating the entire system from the control room.

A control room integrated with all gas pipeline main services will be provided, and it will typically include:

VHF/UHF communications

Telephone service and computer network

control system (PLC-SCADA)

Safety instrumented system for ESD

CCTV

Weather station with data record

Electrical equipment room

Instrumentation equipment room

UPS for critical services

fire system centre for the jetty and the export facilities in general

Operating/service room

Safety Systems

All LNG and gas piping will be equipped with safety valves. Process transmitters, alarms and push buttons connected with the process/safety system will be provided. The safety system for the jetty facilities will incorporate dedicated firewater pumps, water/foam deluge via two new monitors, F&G and low temperature detectors and an ESD system capable to trip transfer operations and to emergency disconnect the FSRU.

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Additional safety redundancy will be provided by the ship-to-shore ESD which can be activated both automatically and manually. The ESD system will shut-down the ship’s unloading pumps and close the LNG and gas flow valves both on the ship and shore within 30 seconds. In addition, the regasification unloading arm is typically fitted with emergency release couplings which allow for automatic disconnection. This disconnection can take place within 30 seconds limiting the amount of possible LNG spillage.

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2. RISK ASSESSMENT

2.1 General

The intended scope of the Lloyd’s Register’s Risk Assessment is to apply a rigorous examination of the proposed location and operability of the LNG Terminal Options in order to demonstrate that all credible accidental events have been considered, recommend appropriate mitigation actions for risk reduction and if possible identify best option for development.

The most appropriate format of examination for hazard identification of design and operability issues is provided by the application of Formal Safety Assessment and the most appropriate studies, Site Evaluation, Hazard Identification (HAZID), Hazard Operability (HAZOP) and Quantified Risk Assessment (QRA) will be undertaken as part of Lloyd’s Register’s Risk Assessment work. The preliminary QRA is intended to be updated after the HAZID/HAZOP and terminal location and lay-out finalisation in order to incorporate any additional critical hazard scenarios identified (if any).

2.2 Objectives

The main objectives of the proposed studies are to:

Identify and critically qualify all hazards and maritime operating issues related to FSRU gas export operations, LNG carrier (LNGC) approach/berth to terminal site and STS LNG cargo transfer operations.

Identify and critically qualify all hazards related to the proposed placement and lay-out of the LNG regasification terminal, gas export arms, jetty export, onshore pipeline and all associated utilities, controls and safety provisions

Undertake a preliminary QRA for the proposed site assess and model all major release scenarios, quantify and illustrate the extent of potential impact in the vicinity of the terminal.

Quantify and illustrate the risks to parties and the public from LNG / gas release scenarios for the location option;

2.3 Hazards of Natural Gas and Liquefied Natural Gas

2.3.1 Properties of Natural Gas

Natural gas (NG) is a mixture of methane (the main constituent) and other low molecular weight hydrocarbons (such ethane and propane). LNG is natural gas that is kept in liquid form at extremely low temperatures and pressures close to atmospheric. The liquefaction process requires that contaminants such as water and carbon dioxide are removed, so that the concentration of such contaminants in LNG, and natural gas produced by vaporising LNG, is extremely low. The physical properties of methane, ethane and propane are summarised in Table 1.

Property

Substance

Methane Ethane Propane

Chemical Formula CH4 C

2H

6 C

3H

8

Molecular weight 16.04 30.07 44.09

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Atmospheric boiling

point (C)

-161.5 -88.6 -42.1

Liquid specific gravity

(relative to water = 1)

0.422

(at -160C)

0.546

(at -88.6C)

0.590

(at -50C)

Gas specific gravity

(relative to air = 1)

0.55 1.1 1.5

Lower Flammable

Limit (% v/v)

5 2.9 2.1

Upper Flammable

Limit (% v/v)

15 13 9.5

Source: Cheremisinoff, N P (2000). Handbook of Hazardous Chemical

Properties

Table 1 : Physical Properties of Natural Gas Constituents

Natural gas’s hazards arise from its flammability and vapour dispersion properties. LNG presents an additional hazard in the form of extreme cold (being held at a temperature of approximately

-162C). Note that natural gas is not toxic (although it may act as an asphyxiant by displacing air).

2.3.2 Fire and Explosion Hazards

Natural gas, when released from containment as a gas, or when generated by vaporisation of a release of LNG, forms flammable mixtures in air between concentrations of 5 and 15 % vol/vol. Although natural gas at ambient temperature is less dense than air, the natural gas vapour

generated by LNG at -162C is approximately 1.5 times denser than air at 25C. Hence natural gas as a gas under pressure at ambient temperature rapidly becomes buoyant upon release. However, the cold vapour generated by vaporisation of LNG behaves as a dense cloud. Although as the cold vapour mixes with air it becomes warmer and less dense, the cloud will tend to remain negatively buoyant until after it has dispersed below its lower flammability limit (LFL).

Different types of fire hazard may arise, depending on whether it is gaseous natural gas or LNG that is released. These fire hazards include jet fires, flash fires and pool fires. In certain circumstances, vapour cloud explosions (VCEs) may also occur.

2.3.3 Jet Fires

A jet fire is a strongly directional flame caused by burning of a continuous release of pressurised flammable gas (in this case natural gas) close to the point of release. Ignition may occur soon after the release begins; or may be delayed, with the flame burning back through the cloud (i.e. as a flash fire, see below) to the source. Jet fires may result from ignited leaks from process equipment (vessels, pipes, gaskets etc.) and pipelines.

A jet fire may be directed horizontally or vertically (or at some angle in between). A jet fire may impinge on structures or other process equipment, giving a potential for escalation of the incident. The intensity of thermal radiation emitted by jet fires can be sufficient to cause harm to exposed persons.

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2.3.4 Flash Fires

Flash fires result from ignition of a cloud of flammable gas or vapour, when the concentration of gas within the cloud is within the flammable limits. In this case, the flammable cloud may be generated by:

A release of pressurised flammable gas (i.e. natural gas); or,

Vaporisation of a pool of volatile flammable liquid (i.e., LNG). Typically a flash fire occurs as a result of delayed ignition, once the flammable cloud has had time to grow and reach an ignition source. In the absence of confinement or congestion, burning within the cloud takes place relatively slowly, without significant over-pressure. It is assumed that thermal effects are generally limited to within the flame envelope where there is a very high probability of death.

2.3.5 Pool Fires

Ignited releases of flammable liquids (including LNG) tend to give rise to pool fires. As with jet fires, ignition of the liquid pool may occur soon after the release begins, or may occur as a result of flashback from a remote ignition source if the liquid is sufficiently volatile to generate a cloud of flammable vapour.

2.3.6 Vapour Cloud Explosions

When a cloud of flammable gas occupies a region which is confined or congested, and is ignited, a vapour cloud explosion results. The presence of confinement (in the form of walls, floors and / or a roof) or congestion (such as the pipes, vessels and other items associated with process plant) in and around the flammable cloud results in acceleration of the flame upon ignition. This flame acceleration generates blast over-pressure. The strength of the blast depends on a number of factors, including:

The reactivity of the fuel;

The degree of confinement or congestion;

The size of the congested / confined region occupied by the flammable cloud; and,

The strength of the ignition source. It should be noted that a variety of objects may act as confinement / congestion, in addition to those normally encountered on process plant. Investigation of the explosion and fire at Buncefield, UK, in 2005 suggested that areas of dense vegetation bordering the site had provided sufficient congestion to result in flame acceleration and generation of damaging levels of overpressure.

2.3.7 Cryogenic Burns

The extremely low (cryogenic) temperature of LNG means that it can cause burns if it comes into contact with exposed skin. Furthermore, inhalation of the cold vapours generated by LNG can cause damage to the lungs (so-called ‘frosting of the lungs’).

2.3.7 Rapid Phase Transition

If LNG is spilt on to water it usually forms a boiling pool on the water surface. However, under certain circumstances, LNG can released on to water can change from liquid to vapour virtually instantaneously. The effect has been observed in some experiments involving LNG but is not well understood. A Rapid Phase Transition (RPT) can generate overpressure and a ‘puff’ of dispersing vapour. Any damage from the overpressure generated tends to be quite localised. Rapid phase changes have not resulted in any known major incidents involving LNG.

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3. HAZARD IDENTIFICATION

3.1 HAZID Study

A preliminary HAZID study workshop took place in DEFA’s CYGAS venue in Nicosia, Cyprus. The team workshop review was led by a Chairman assisted by a Recorder. The remainder of the HAZID team comprised of DEFA project management team, civil engineers (Rogan Associates), process terminal designers (WSP), representatives of Ministry of Energy, Commerce, Industry and Tourism (MECIT), project financial consultants (Ocean Finance), Port Authority representatives (CPA) and LR supporting specialists (see Appendix 1 for attendees).

The objectives of the preliminary HAZID study were:

Identify potential hazards associated with the FSRU and LNGC port approach and berthing operations at the proposed jetty facility site. Provide recommendations for risk reduction as part of the EIA on the site.

Identify potential hazards associated with the aspects of the jetty design, gas export installation, pipeline and supporting utilities on the proposed terminal and provide recommendations for risk reduction as part of the EIA on the site

Assess the adequacy of the proposed marine facilities, terminal layout design, port operations and supporting services for ensuring the ongoing integrity of the installation

Identify potential hazards associated with the aspects of the marine operations and specific provisions for undertaking STS LNG cargo transfer on site. Provide recommendations for risk reduction as part of the EIA on the site.

Identify and assess the adequacy of the existing safeguards to prevent or control the hazards.

Perform a round table discussion of potential failure mode scenarios and emergency response procedures and update lay-out design (if required) in order to further reduce any potential hazards and minimise risks.

Chairman’s main responsibilities were:

Produce procedure schedule and plans study sequence to achieve the scope of the HAZID.

Run and progress the study using an appropriate format of guide words. Achieve the scope and schedule whilst limiting individual sessions to the recommended duration.

Summarize the main study findings and issue a HAZID Report providing input to the preliminary QRA.

The Chairman was assisted by a Recorder who suitably ‘word processed’ all actions, recommendations and clarifications raised by the review. HAZID specific software PHA-Pro8 was used.

The following HAZID ‘nodes’ were examined:

FSRU/LNGC approach, berthing, STS mooring

LNG cargo transfer operations

Jetty terminal facility

The team discussions were recorded on the HAZID work sheets, which are presented in Appendix 1. The work sheets are divided into the following categories:

Hazard

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Cause (of Hazard)

Consequence (of Hazard)

Effective Safeguards

Recommendations (Action allocation)

Responsibility (for Action)

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4. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

4.1 General

DEFA CYGAS proposed FSRU regasification operation supported by LNG STS cargo transfer and export gas jetty pipeline have been assessed for their suitability to handle major hazards and based on the findings of the preliminary Site Evaluation HAZID, is judged not to present any intolerable risks with risks identified to be smaller than those found to be acceptable for conventional LNG onshore terminals.

The major hazard events related to insufficient jetty site design, marine operations failure and /or gas export operations failure have been considered in all aspects of the proposed design and appropriate risk reduction measures have been proposed.

The detailed recommendations and actions identified are presented in the HAZID Summary Table 1, Section 4.3 and detailed Work Sheets in Appendix 1 of this report. The main recommendations are summarised in Section 4.2 below.

4.2 HAZID Recommendations

The following marine standards have been used to consider the layout and operational aspects of approaches Vassilikos port and LNG terminal site:

International Navigation Association (PIANC) standards; and

Society of International Gas Tankers and Terminal Operators (SIGTTO) standards.

The specific aim of these standards is to minimise associated risks of the navigation and berthing to ALARP (As Low As Reasonably Practical) levels. Both PIANC and SIGTTO requirements assume that ship(s) is navigating independently without tug support.

Based on SIGGTO and PIANC recommendations the following apply:

In order to be able to finalise maximum design requirements for marine jetty systems and marine operation utilities, it is important for project to establish the maximum size of LNGC carrier expected to be performing STS operations at Vassilikos. Based on both current and future LNG carrier spot trading it is recommended that the jetty facility to be designed able to accommodate up to Qflex size of LNGC carrier (refer to Figure 3, Appendix 2).

Berthing manoeuvres at terminal jetty should be supported by tugs, the number and size of tugs will need to be assessed by real time manoeuvring simulations. This would also finalise the location and size of the required turning basin for maritime operations at jetty.

Emergency disconnection operations of either LNGC or FSRU due to adverse weather conditions would require the ships passage to the dedicated shelter at Terminal 2 east of the existing basin at Vassilikos port. Due to tugs operating limitations the berthing approach can only be supported by tugs inside a proposed breakwater facility and the ship will be berthed and depart only by the use of tugs without the need for a turning basin inside port. The final verification of the proposed new port entry and the extent

of the required turning basin should take place by real time manoeuvring simulations for the maximum LNGC type proposed (Qflex).

The extent of required dredging would need to be established for the new port shelter channel entry and port basin based on PIANC’s recommended calculations taking into effect the laden draught of the maximum size of ship (Qflex : 12.20 m) and the anticipated ship speed (m/s) at entry.

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Project to apply PIANC recommended methodology to establish the width of the entrance at shelter port. Manoeuvring simulations would need to verify the safety of port entry and speed limitations through the approach channel during adverse weather conditions to minimise any potential risk of grounding.

Project to verify the integrity of the mooring system design for FSRU continuous operations for a

50 year storm survival condition. It is noted from the environmental data that Hs values appear

to be high and this may have a detrimental impact on the integrity of the mooring system

components and the ability of ERC regasification unloading arm to be maintained connected. As

the project philosophy is for continuous operations without interruption, the exposed ‘open

water’ position of the FSRU may not be able to fulfil exact requirements.

Project to address maritime climate, wind and waves study for local conditions and undertake an

Operability Analysis in order to define the limit of local operations and establish window of

operations available with time (window % per year).

Project to undertake mooring analysis studies to address and finalise the following:

size position and number of dolphins

actual mooring lines configuration for double banked option up to Qflex size of LNGC

load requirements and proposed size of hooks (single wire per hook recommended)

load requirements and proposed fendering system

wind current impact on to double bank mooring arrangement

line pretension requirements

verify mooring integrity with loss of one line as per Class requirements

Project to address potential of sloshing loads impact on LNGCs containment system due to partial cargo loads in tanks. Based on the DSME design of 138K membrane (NO96 tanks), Hs <2.0 m, Tp < 8 sec and roll angle max 2 deg., is the limit to prevent sloshing. For this size of LNGC the time required for levelling the tanks out of the sloshing range is approximate 5 hours based on transfer from largest tanks (2 or 3 tank capacity 40,000 m

3, to tank 4 capacity 36,500 m

3). Future

LNGC operators would need to provide data for their ships containment systems especially with the objective to minimise rolling around the transverse resonance period of tanks which may especially occur for Tp between 8 and 14 secs. Class would need to address and issue a statement on “Sloshing Relaxation for loading conditions within barred filling range Applicable for the ‘Specific Geographic Location’

It is noted that sloshing loads limitations also apply to the FSRU. However, FSRUs are designed with additional strengthening of the cargo tanks in order to eliminate impact of sloshing loads allowing continuous field operations. For membrane tanks LNGC conversion to FSRU additional costs on structural work need to be accounted for by the Cost Benefits Analysis (CBA).

Project to address and finalise process design, pipeline design layout and sizing both on jetty and onshore and provide set of layout drawings and P&IDs which are a requirement in order to undertake HAZID, HAZOP and QRA during FEED phase.

As part of the required input to the EIA study for the terminal site permit a preliminary QRA, to be undertaken to address and quantify the potential extent of impact of unignited and/or ignited LNG or gas releases on-board the FSRU, the LNGC at STS and the gas exporting jetty pipeline. The following release scenarios identified by HAZID:

LNG release from FSRU cargo transfer system

LNG release at Regasification system

High Pressure (HP) gas release at regasification system and export manifold.

HP gas release at unloading arm

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HP gas release on jetty pipeline up to Jetty ESDV

LNG release during STS

Gas release during STS vapour return

LNG release on-board the LNGC

Project to establish an Escape Evacuation and Rescue plan (EER) and address:

max number of operating personnel on the jetty during commissioning

the number of personnel during normal operation and address the available means of evacuation from the proposed jetty facility;

Provide alternative jetty evacuation route via the dolphins and by a support vessel from the port facility. If dolphins are not connected design to address evacuation to sea by provision of life raft facilities on dolphins.

If the attending vessel is not available the provision of the davit launched jetty lifeboat or fast craft should be considered in order to recover people from the sea.

4.3 Recommendations Summary

A total of thirty five (35) recommended actions were identified by HAZID/HAZOP and these are presented in detail on the Work Sheets Appendix 1 of this Report. The Table 2 Summary of Recommendations with allocated responsibilities for actions is presented below:

Recommendations Responsibility

1. Standard operating procedures (SOP) for commissioning terminal will apply

CYGAS/CPA

2. In order to be able to finalise maximum design requirements for marine system and marine operation utilities, it is important for project to establish the maximum size of LNGC carrier expected to be performing STS operations at Vassilikos jetty. It is noted that the maximum FSRU size requirements are set for a vessel of 150k m

3 capacity. Based

on life cycle requirements of the project and the current LNGC's active in the LNG spot market it is recommended that the maximum, LNGC size to be able to be berthed at jetty throughout the life cycle to be defined as the Qmax vessel.

CYGAS/ROGAN

3. Typical limiting operations for sloshing for 138k m3 N0 96

Membrane tank LNGC are Hs > 2, roll angle >2 degrees and period Tp >

8. LNGC's would have to undertake sloshing

analysis for the particular site and project would have to establish operability window and emergency response procedures to eliminate sloshing operations during STS.

LNGC OWNER

4. It is noted that sloshing loads limitations also apply to the FSRU. However, FSRU's are designed with additional strengthening of the cargo tanks in order to eliminate impact of sloshing loads allowing continuous field operations, the following apply: 1) New construction FSRU will include tank strengthening as appropriate. 2) LNGC conversion to FSRU needs to include for specific structural improvement in order to address sloshing loads impact. This applies to widely used membrane LNGC's which offer best deck space for regasification system. 3) Moss type LNGC's tanks do not require additional strengthening to address typical sloshing loads. However,

CYGAS/OCEAN FINANCE

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Moss type LNGC's offer less useable deck space for regasification system installation. 4) Project to address above requirements as part of the FSRU specification and LNGC vessel nomination for conversion.

5. Project to address and clarify the requirement of pilot usage imposed by the Vasilikos Port Authority. Examine pilot boarding operations and whether any operational drawbacks exist if the pilot vessel is used instead the existing terminal tugs.

CPA

6. Project to identify what would be the best area of entry for the laden vessel to approach the FSRU due to weather conditions. Project to undertake a Maneuverability Simulation to ensure no operational constraints for the LNGC during berthing manoeuvre. Typically LNGC operations will require approach against prevailing wind at an angle to enable feasible parallel body berthing operations with the FSRU. It is noted that the LNGC entry cannot cross the 500m radius safety zone of the SPM Diesel buoy in the area.

LR/CPA/ROGAN

7. It is expected that Maneuverability Simulation will finalise the size (bollard pull) and number of tugs required in order to perform LNGC berthing alongside the FSRU. Typically for 135-150 K m

3 range of vessels, three 60 ton bollard tugs

would be required as a minimum. Note that N+1 tugs would be the safest number required in order to address tug availability. Project to address with port Authority for appropriate provision of tug services.

LR/CPA

8. It is expected that Maneuverability Simulation will establish and finalise the turning circle position and size for the LNGC berthing at terminal. It is noted that guidance in-line with SIGTTO and PIANC recommendations with regards to the diameter of the turning circle will need to apply for the maximum LNGC size considered by project. Project to address and also assess potential impact requiring area dredging.

LR/CPA/ROGAN

9. Project to verify the integrity of mooring system design for FSRU continuous operations on a 50 year storm conditions. It is noted from the environmental data that Hs appears to be quite high at location throughout the year. This may have a detrimental effect on the integrity of the mooring system components and the ability of ERC regasification unloading arm to maintain connected. As the project philosophy is for continuous operations without interruption, the exposed position of the FSRU may not be able to fulfil requirements.

CYGAS/ROGAN

10.Compatibility study would be required between FSRU and LNGC prior to contract arrangements for shuttle STS operations. This would include but not limited to: 1) Mooring Analysis for STS 2) Mooring lines type, size deployment 3) Manifold compatibility 4) Cargo system compatibility etc. (incorporate ESD). It is noted that standard FLNG/LNGC procedures with checklists should be put in place

ROGAN (Mooring analysis)/LR (Compatibility Study)/ FSRU/ LNGC

OWNERS

11.Mooring analysis to be issued to the LNGC for review and approval as part of the sloshing risk assessment work.

CYGAS

12.In-line with Lloyd's Register Class requirements, mooring ROGAN

CYNERGY PROJECT



analysis needs to be performed considering the failure of single mooring line in order to verify the survivability of the mooring system during worst case scenario.

13.It is noted that in line with similar worldwide practices for FSRU installations at port, project has identified a risk assessment process in order to establish that all risks related to FSRU & STS operations will be addressed and documented. This currently consists of Marine Operations HAZID (Preliminary HAZID), FSRU Terminal HAZID, HAZOP, QRA and STS operation review.

CYGAS/LR

14.Project to address the requirement for a standby tug at the field location throughout STS operations, type and size of tug to be decided by project.

CYGAS/CPA

15.Participating LNGC's would have to provide a GTT sloshing analysis report dedicated to their own storage tanks in order for project to establish cargo unloading operating procedures to ensure the capability to internally transfer cargo in the LNGC's in order to eliminate the effects of sloshing. It is a Class requirement to provide 'Sloshing Relaxation for Loading conditions with barred filling rates' for the specific Vasilikos site location in order for LNGC to be able to undertake STS.

LNGC/LR

16.Electrical/ Pneumatic cable connection to be provided between LNGC and FSRU able to initiate ESD1 during certain conditions during of exceeding vessel separation. In addition ESD 1 could be initiated by a number of push buttons located at cargo manifold and bridge areas. HAZOP to address.

FSRU/CYGAS/LR

17.Mooring system to be provided with remotely released hooks. HAZID to address.

ROGAN/FSRU

18.Initiation of ESD2 to result in operation of the ERC, disconnection of the arm which would return to the "safe" mode position. HAZOP to address

FSRU/LR

19.An Emergency Response Procedure should be put in place and agreed between LNGC and FSRU. The procedure should include all activities required for asset protection/personnel safety, all actions from FSRU or LNGC crew to address specific emergency scenarios on their separate vessels and also address appropriate 'mutual aid' provided from one vessel to another to address an emergency during STS. Project to review emergency disconnection and accept action plans and include appropriate drills. Project to address.

FSRU/LNGC/CPA/LR

20.It is recommended that during an event of emergency disconnection the LNGC would require to release mooring lines and to proceed to a dedicated anchorage area (within a natural area or port) where conditions are benign and emergency cargo transfer operation can take place to avoid sloshing within tanks. A similar emergency case could also apply to FSRU during a hazard event related to jetty operations (e.g. fire event on the jetty) The following apply: 1) It is noted that one such area identified maybe developed by the extension of windward and leeside breakwater adjacent to Limassol Port, Terminal 2, Vassilikos. The sailing distance from FSRU terminal is very

CPA/ROGAN/LR

CYNERGY PROJECT



close, approx. 10 minutes, ensuring minimum sloshing impact. 2) Project to address proposed Port facility development to ensure the safe approach and entry of both FSRU and LNGC's 3) Manoeuvring Simulations to address ships passage using own power during high weather conditions to the proposed location and the berthing via the assistance of tugs. 4) Project to examine emergency response procedure of FSRU in order to line up with emergency response procedure of LNGC. HAZOP to address. 5) Refer to operational scenarios in action 23 below.

21.Emergency response procedures to clarify whether for weather conditions Hs=2m and over, loading operations will stop and LNGC will initiate departure procedures or will remain at STS position, berthed. Mooring analysis to address.

ROGAN/CPA/LR

22.Maneuverability simulations will need to address the ability of standby tug to ensure LNGC departure alongside FSRU during an emergency departure scenario. It is noted that during this case, the sailing off through the adjacent safety zone area of the diesel loading buoy facility would be allowed.

CPA/LR

23.It is noted that during the emergency departure the following should apply: 1) LNGC disconnects mooring lines (standby tug opens up vessel from FSRU) and proceeds under own propulsion to new safe facility proposed near dry bulk cargo pier. 2) Tugs meet LNGC at Port entrance and safely berth LNGC at dedicated quay. 3) On departure tugs take out LNGC (at zero own speed from the port) 4) LNGC continues on tugs assistance to the FSRU berth or depending on operations sails off from Vasilikos using own power. Based on the above operational procedures, there is no requirement to establish a turning circle for the FSRU berthing within the new proposed safe port location.

LR (Manoeuvring Simulation)/ ROGAN (Design of Port entry)

24.Project to address minimum time requirements for tugs arrival at location for de-berthing operations and that Operating Procedures are in place.

CYGAS/CPA

25.Project to clarify the maximum acceptable scenario for normal departure and time for the tugs to arrive for departure (emergency and normal)

CYGAS/CPA

26.Project to ensure that sea bed integrity, foundation design and bathymetric studies are in line with jetty specification requirements. Integrity of design of jetty to include seismic loads, side impact loads (ship), corrosion aspects and environmental loads.

ROGAN

27.Civil engineering design of the jetty to provide available layout area to include the following typical equipment: ·Regas export arms (2 x 65t weight, 2 x10m foot area), ·ESD valve skid ·Gas metering skid ·Power Generation ·Pipe rack to include gas export pipeline, utilities piping to

ROGAN/WSP

CYNERGY PROJECT



FSRU (fuel, water) ·Crane pedestal with lay down area for heavy equipment. ·Two (2) independent fire pumps. ·Min Two (2) tower fire monitors ·Gangway to FSRU.

28.Project Preliminarily QRA to evaluate and quantify the following release scenarios: · LNG release from FSRU cargo transfer system · LNG release at Regasification system · HP gas release at regasification system and export manifold. · HP gas release at unloading arm · HP gas release on jetty pipeline up to Jetty ESDV · LNG release during STS · Gas release during STS vapour return · LNG release onboard LNGC

LR

29.In-line with similar terminals, project to address the following safety system provisions: ·Arm coupling area surrounded by water spray deluge system from the FSRU aimed at the Emergency Release System (ERS) system. ·Dedicated remote control fire monitors positioned on both sides of the jetty in accordance to OCIMF requirements to ensure cooling water coverage of the ship’s hull area under the regas manifolds

WSP

30.Project to establish a Fire Protection Philosophy. The philosophy should identify the following as a minimum: ·Size of fire pumps based on max. Firewater requirement. ·Deluge system coverage ·Size/coverage of remote controlled water monitors

WSP/LR

31.Preliminary QRA to address Refer to action 28 above.

LR 32.Project to establish an Escape Evacuation and Rescue plan

(EER) and address: ·Max number of operating personnel on the jetty during commissioning ·The number of personnel during normal operation and address the available means of evacuation from the jetty facility; ·Provide alternative jetty evacuation route via the dolphins and by a support vessel from the port facility. If dolphins are not connected design to address evacuation to sea by provision of life raft facilities on dolphins. ·If the attending vessel is not available the provision of the davit launched jetty lifeboat or fast craft should be considered in order to recover people from the sea.

ROGAN/LR/FSRU

33.Project to address and finalise process system design integrity, safe control and isolation by appropriate HAZOP at detailed design phase.

WSP

34.Project to address and finalise process design, pipeline design layout and sizing both on jetty and onshore and provide set of layout drawings and P&IDs which are a requirement in order to undertake HAZID, HAZOP and QRA

WSP

CYNERGY PROJECT



during FEED phase.

35.It is noted that the layout and sizing of pipeline system will take place within FEED design. Based on this it is expected that pipeline release scenarios onshore will be addressed by both HAZID/HAZOP and QRA study. Any potential impact identified will be mitigated by design and operational means.

WSP/LR

CYNERGY PROJECT


References

1. DEFA Vassilikos- PCI Cynergy LNG Project EIA Submission Report Rev 3 70036368-CYP-

REP-002

2. Cyrpus LNG Project Berthing and Manoeuvring Study Noble Document No. EML-SL-ESA-

MAR-RPT-1005 Rev. B

3. ISO/TS 16901:2015 Guidance on performing risk assessment of onshore LNG

installations including ship/ shore interface

4. Cyprus LNG Project QRA Report Noble Document No. EML-SL-ESA-SAF-RPT-1003 Rev. B

5. Draft Layout of Jetty/FSRU – Emergency Shelter – July 2017 – Rogan Associates

6. Preliminary Process Flow Diagram – Vasilikos LNG Receiving Facility – WSP August 2017

Rev B

CYNERGY PROJECT


Appendices


Appendix 1 HAZID Worksheets


Node: 1. FSRU/ LNGC approach, berthing, STS mooring


Node: 1. FSRU/ LNGC approach, berthing, STS mooring

Drawings / References:

Hazard Cause CONSEQUENCE Effective Safeguards Recommendations Action By

1. FSRU inability to approach Jetty

Weather conditions 1. Unable to meet scheduling deadlines for Terminal commissioning activities

1. FSRU berthing operations at jetty will only occur one time in order to commence terminal operations. Project will plan for the most favourable environmental conditions to apply at the time of commencing FSRU approach operations.

1. Standard operating procedures (SOP) for commissioning terminal will apply

CYGAS/CPA

2. LNGC Inability to approach moored FSRU

Pilot/tug unavailability. Operations outside weather window or daylight conditions.

1. Unable to complete approach manoeuvre. Unable to STS berth.

1. Approach and berthing operations will take place during the approved conditions outside sloshing operations inside LNGC tanks. Appropriate reference should be given GTT CCS Sloshing Analysis Report for the LNGC.

2. In order to be able to finalise maximum design requirements for marine system and marine operation utilities, it is important for project to establish the maximum size of LNGC carrier expected to be performing STS operations at Vasilikos jetty. It is noted that the maximum FSRU size requirements are set for a vessel of 150k m

3

capacity. Based on life cycle requirements of the project and the current LNGC's active in the LNG spot market it is recommended that the maximum, LNGC size to be able to be berthed at jetty throughout the life cycle to be defined as the Qmax vessel.

CYGAS/ROGAN

2. The LNGC coming for STS, normally notifies port 48 hrs in advance and in pre-agreed intervals throughout the approach . Pilot operations is servicing within a defined area in Vasilikos Port.

3. Typical limiting operations for sloshing for 138k m3 N0 96

Membrane tank LNGC are Hs > 2, roll angle >2 degrees and period Tp = 8. LNGC's would have to undertake sloshing analysis for the particular site and project would have to establish operability window and emergency response procedures to eliminate sloshing operations during STS.

LNGC OWNER

3. The pilot boarding operations are normally limited up to the conditions of significant wave height of 2m Hs. A dedicated pilot vessel will have to meet the LNGC on a pre assigned location depending on best LNGC entering direction onto field site which is also dependent on the FSRU heading.

4. It is noted that sloshing loads limitations also apply to the FSRU. However, FSRU's are designed with additional strengthening of the cargo tanks in order to eliminate impact of sloshing loads allowing continuous field operations, the following apply: 1) New construction FSRU will include tank strengthening as appropriate. 2) LNGC conversion to FSRU needs to include for specific structural improvement in order to address sloshing loads impact. This applies to widely used membrane LNGC's which offer best deck space for regasification system. 3) Moss type LNGC's tanks do not require additional strengthening to address typical sloshing loads. However, Moss type LNGC's offer less useable deck space for regasification system installation. 4) Project to address above requirements as part of the FSRU specification and LNGC vessel nomination for conversion.

CYGAS/OCEAN FINANCE

5. Project to address and clarify the requirement of pilot usage imposed by the Vasilikos Port Authority. Examine pilot boarding operations and whether any operational drawbacks exist if the pilot vessel is used instead the existing terminal tugs.

CPA

6. Project to identify what would be the best area of entry for the laden vessel to approach the FSRU due to weather conditions. Project to undertake a Maneuverability Simulation to ensure no operational constraints for the LNGC during berthing manoeuvre. Typically LNGC operations will require approach against prevailing wind at an angle to enable feasible parallel body berthing operations with the FSRU. It is noted that the LNGC entry cannot cross the 500m radius safety zone of the SPM Diesel buoy in the area.

LR/CPA/ROGAN

7. It is expected that Maneuverability Simulation will finalise the size (bollard pull) and number of tugs required in order to perform LNGC berthing alongside the FSRU. Typically for 135-150 K m

3

LR/CPA


range of vessels, three 60 ton bollard tugs would be required as a minimum. Note that N+1 tugs would be the safest number required in order to address tug availability. Project to address with port Authority for appropriate provision of tug services.

8. It is expected that Maneuverability Simulation will establish and finalise the turning circle position and size for the LNGC berthing at terminal. It is noted that guidance in line with SIGTTO and PIANC recommendations with regards to the diameter of the turning circle will need to apply for the maximum LNGC size considered by project. Project to address and also assess potential impact requiring area dredging.

LR/CPA/ROGAN

3. Loss of mooring lines, loss of tension, loss of fender, both apply to FSRU at location and LNGC during STS.

Excessive mooring loads, inadequate mooring line specification and line numbers, inadequate fender provision, incompatible mooring equipment

1. Loss of berthing, side impact collision with FSRU, emergency disconnection of ERC, potential of small LNG release at manifolds. Potential of gas export interruption from FSRU.

1. Mooring analysis design basis. Mooring system design, including loads for STS operations (mooring line loads, mooring line spread plan and mooring line specification).

9. Project to verify the integrity of mooring system design for FSRU continuous operations on a 50 year storm condition. It is noted from the environmental data that Hs appears to be quite high at location throughout the year. This may have a detrimental effect on the integrity of the mooring system components and the ability of ERC regasification unloading arm to maintain connected. As the project philosophy is for continuous operations without interruption, the exposed position of the FSRU may not be able to fulfil requirements.

CYGAS/ROGAN

2. Fender system design including fender specification, load impact analysis.

10. Compatibility study would be required between FSRU and LNGC prior to contract arrangements for shuttle STS operations. This would include but not limited to: 1) Mooring Analysis for STS 2) Mooring lines type, size deployment 3) Manifold compatibility 4) Cargo system compatibility etc. (incorporate ESD). It is noted that standard FLNG/LNGC procedures with checklists should be put in place

ROGAN (Mooring analysis)/LR (Compatibility Study)/ FSRU/ LNGC OWNERS

11. Mooring analysis to be issued to the LNGC for review and approval as part of the sloshing risk assessment work.

CYGAS


Node: 2. LNG Cargo Transfer Operations



1. Potential tank sloshing during LNGC STS operations

Impact of exceeding weather conditions 1. Partial loss of STS arrangement, excessive movement of LNGC, potential sloshing loads within tank.

1. Mooring system design number and size of lines together with the continuous survey of fender position, angle of roll, line tension ensure that in the event of loss of a single mooring line there is ample time for the line to be replaced without taking any additional necessary isolation action or without activating ESD I manually or because of ESD link break

12. In line with Lloyd's Register Class requirements, mooring analysis needs to be performed considering the failure of single mooring line in order to verify the survivability of the mooring system during worst case scenario.

ROGAN

2. Normal unmooring operations would commence with a repeat mooring masters meeting together with the assistance of the field tugs which will enable LNGC unberthing and sail off.

13. It is noted that in line with similar worldwide practices for FSRU installations at port, project has identified a risk assessment process in order to establish that all risks related to FSRU & STS operations will be addressed and documented. This currently consists of Marine Operations HAZID (Preliminary HAZID), FSRU Terminal HAZID,HAZOP, QRA and STS operation review.

CYGAS/LR

3. Emergency procedures are agreed to prior to operation commencing and include emergency disconnection of hoses and mooring lines.

14. Project to address the requirement for a standby tug at the field location throughout STS operations. type and size of tug to be decided by project.

CYGAS/CPA

4. Emergency Procedures which cover asset protection, escape evacuation and rescue, emergency communications, disconnection from the buoy etc. These procedures need to be developed by FSRU and reviewed and agreed by participating LNGC owners.

15. Participating LNGC's would have to provide a GTT sloshing analysis report dedicated to their own storage tanks in order for project to establish cargo unloading operating procedures to ensure the capability to internally transfer cargo in the LNGC's in order to eliminate the effects of sloshing. It is a Class requirement to provide 'Sloshing Relaxation for Loading conditions with barred filling rates’ for the specific Vasilikos site location in order for LNGC to be able to undertake STS.

LNGC/LR

2. Emergency disconnection

Excessive weather conditions and/or sloshing loads within tanks

1. Excessive movement of LNGC, potential sloshing loads within tank, emergency disconnection

1. It is noted that various wind loading conditions were identified in order to establish the max applicable operational conditions for the tugs to assist berthing and unmooring. According to typical operations we can conclude that tug operational limit is at Hs =2m.

16. Electrical/ Pneumatic cable connection to be provided between LNGC and FSRU able to initiate ESD1 during certain conditions during of exceeding vessel separation. In addition ESD 1 could be initiated by a number of push buttons located at cargo manifold and bridge areas. HAZOP to address.

FSRU/CYGAS/LR

2. CCTV is provided; Mooring Master and assistant crew are present to monitor STS operations.

17. Mooring system to be provided with remotely released hooks. HAZID to address.

ROGAN/FSRU

18. Initiation of ESD2 to result in operation of the ERC, disconnection of the arm which would return to the "safe" mode position. HAZOP to address

FSRU/LR

19. An Emergency Response Procedure should be put in place and agreed between LNGC and FSRU. The procedure should include all activities required for asset protection/personnel safety, all actions from FSRU or LNGC crew to address specific emergency scenarios on their separate vessels and also address appropriate 'mutual aid' provided from one vessel to another to address an emergency during STS. Project to review emergency disconnection and accept action plans and include appropriate drills. Project to address.

FSRU/LNGC/CPA/LR

20. It is recommended that during an event of emergency disconnection the LNGC would require to release mooring lines and to proceed to a dedicated anchorage area (within a natural area or port) where conditions are benign and emergency cargo transfer operation can take place to avoid sloshing within tanks. A similar emergency case could also apply to FSRU during a hazard event related to jetty operations (e.g. fire event on the

CPA/ROGAN/LR


Node: 2. LNG Cargo Transfer Operations


Hazard Cause CONSEQUENCE Effective Safeguards Recommendations Action By jetty) The following apply: 1) It is noted that one such area identified maybe developed by the extension of windward and leeside breakwater adjacent to Limassol Port, Terminal 2, Vasilikos. The sailing distance from FSRU terminal is very close, approx. 10 minutes, ensuring minimum sloshing impact. 2) Project to address proposed Port facility development to ensure the safe approach and entry of both FSRU and LNGC's 3) Manoeuvring Simulations to address ships passage using own power during high weather conditions to the proposed location and the berthing via the assistance of tugs. 4) Project to examine emergency response procedure of FSRU in order to line up with emergency response procedure of LNGC. HAZOP to address. 5) Refer to operational scenarios in action 23 below.

21. Emergency response procedures to clarify whether for weather conditions Hs=2m and over, loading operations will stop and LNGC will initiate departure procedures or will remain at STS position, berthed. Mooring analysis to address.

ROGAN/CPA/LR

22. Maneuverability simulations will need to address the ability of standby tug to ensure LNGC departure alongside FSRU during an emergency departure scenario. It is noted that during this case, the sailing off through the adjacent safety zone area of the diesel loading buoy facility would be allowed.

CPA/LR

23. It is noted that during the emergency departure the following should apply: 1) LNGC disconnects mooring lines (standby tug opens up vessel from FSRU) and proceeds under own propulsion to new safe facility proposed near dry bulk cargo pier. 2) Tugs meet LNGC at Port entrance and safely berth LNGC at dedicated quay. 3) On departure tugs take out LNGC (at zero own speed from the port) 4) LNGC continues on tugs assistance to the FSRU berth or depending on operations sails off from Vasilikos using own power. Based on the above operational procedures, there is no requirement to establish a turning circle for the FSRU berthing within the new proposed safe port location.

LR (Manoeuvring Simulation)/ ROGAN (Design of Port entry)

3. Conditions of departure

Conclusion of cargo transfer operations or ESD 2 disconnection with emergency response.

24. Project to address minimum time requirements for tugs arrival at location for de-berthing operations and that Operating Procedures are in place.

CYGAS/CPA

25. Project to clarify the maximum acceptable scenario for normal departure and time for the tugs to arrive for departure (emergency and normal)

CYGAS/CPA


Node: 3. Jetty Terminal Facility



1. Integrity loss due to impact loads, Inadequacy in civil's specification Deficiency in platform lay-out design

Inadequate safe distances between gas transfer equipment and piping Inadequate Access and Escape facilities Inadequate vessel utilities provisions for FSRU

1. Impact on emergency response, impact on Escape, Evacuation Rescue, impact on F&G detection and fire protection

1. The FSRU jetty will be a new construction with new fendering and mooring dolphins system. Dolphins and fendering capacity design will comply with OCIMF requirements

26. Project to ensure that sea bed integrity, foundation design and bathymetric studies are in line with jetty specification requirements. Integrity of design of jetty to include seismic loads, side impact loads (ship), corrosion aspects and environmental loads.

ROGAN

27. Civil engineering design of the jetty to provide available layout area to include the following typical equipment:

Regas export arms (2 x 85t weight, 2 x10m foot area),

ESD valve skid

Gas metering skid

Power Generation

Pipe rack to include gas export pipeline, utilities piping to FSRU (fuel, water)

Crane pedestal with lay down area for heavy equipment.

Two (2) independent fire pumps.

Min Two (2) tower fire monitors

Gangway to FSRU.

ROGAN/WSP

2. Hydrocarbon release on board ships or jetty. Integrity of firewater pump station layout. Integrity of switchgear and control room

Leakage with high pressure gas release at jetty, FSRU tank emergency venting with plume impact on jetty and LNGC, impact collision with cargo LNG release, hose failure with LNG release etc.

1. Potential ignition leading to jet fire, flash fire Potential LNG release on water leading to RPT or LNG thermal on ship’s hull structure Requirement for jetty operating personnel evacuation Impact on escape routes Impact on switchgear/control room Fire pump integrity and availability

1. Any gas release from arm and jetty piping leading to jet fire will be of very short duration due to small isolatable sections.

28. Project Preliminarily QRA to evaluate and quantify the following release scenarios:

LNG release from FSRU cargo transfer system

LNG release at Regasification system

HP gas release at regasification system and export manifold.

HP gas release at unloading arm

HP gas release on jetty pipeline up to Jetty ESDV

LNG release during STS

Gas release during STS vapour return

LNG release onboard LNGC

LR

2. Appropriate mitigation will be implemented by adoption of risk reducing design, the undertaking of FEED design HAZID, HAZOPS and QRA together with compliance to Class and International Regulation requirements.

29. In line with similar terminals, project to address the following safety system provisions:

Arm coupling area surrounded by water spray deluge system from the FSRU aimed at the Emergency Release System (ERS) system.

Dedicated remote control fire monitors positioned on both sides of the jetty in accordance to OCIMF requirements to ensure cooling water coverage of the ship’s hull area under the regas manifolds

WSP

30. Project to establish a Fire Protection Philosophy. The philosophy should identify the following as a minimum:

Size of fire pumps based on max. Firewater requirement.

Deluge system coverage

Size/coverage of remote controlled water monitors

WSP/LR

3. Hydrocarbon release on board ships or jetty

Leakage with high pressure gas release at jetty, FSRU tank emergency venting

1. Potential of ignition, jet fire, flash fire

1. Any gas release from arm and jetty piping leading to jet fire will be of very short duration due to small isolatable sections.

31. Preliminary QRA to address Refer to action 28 above.

LR

2. Appropriate mitigation will be implemented by 32. Project to establish an Escape Evacuation and Rescue plan (EER) ROGAN/LR/FSRU


Node: 3. Jetty Terminal Facility


Hazard Cause CONSEQUENCE Effective Safeguards Recommendations Action By adoption of risk reducing design, the undertaking of FEED design HAZID, HAZOPS and QRA together with compliance to Class and International Regulation requirements.

and address:

max number of operating personnel on the jetty during commissioning

the number of personnel during normal operation and address the available means of evacuation from the jetty facility;

Provide alternative jetty evacuation route via the dolphins and by a support vessel from the port facility. If dolphins are not connected design to address evacuation to sea by provision of life raft facilities on dolphins.

If the attending vessel is not available the provision of the davit launched jetty lifeboat or fast craft should be considered in order to recover people from the sea.

4. Process system design integrity

Leakage with high pressure gas release at jetty, FSRU tank emergency venting

1. Potential of ignition, jet fire, flash fire


33. Project to address and finalise process system design integrity, safe control and isolation by appropriate HAZOP at detailed design phase.

WSP

34. Project to address and finalise process design, pipeline design layout and sizing both on jetty and onshore and provide set of layout drawings and P&IDs which are a requirement in order to undertake HAZID, HAZOP and QRA during FEED phase.

WSP

5. Pipeline System design integrity

Majority of pipeline will be buried underground with potential leakage only at gas buffer station area

1. Potential of ignition, jet fire, flash fire.


35. It is noted that the layout and sizing of pipeline system will take place within FEED design. Based on this it is expected that pipeline release scenarios onshore will be addressed by both HAZID/HAZOP and QRA study. Any potential impact identified will be mitigated by design and operational means.

WSP/LR


Appendix 2 Plans and LNG Carriers


Figure 2: CYnergy Project area development



Length Overall 315.0 m

Beam 50.0 m

Depth 26.0 m

Design Draft 12.2 m

Capacity 210,000 cbm

DWT 87,300 tonnes

Displacement 123,700 tonnes

Speed 20.0 Kts

Complement 28

Figure 3: Qflex LNG Carrier particulars

Length Overall 283.0 m

Beam 43.4 m

Depth 27.0 m

Design Draft 11.5 m

Capacity 148,000 cbm

DWT 77,351 tonnes

Displacement 107,000 tonnes

Speed 19.5 Kts

Complement 28

Figure 4: Typical 148 K LNG Moss Type Carrier particulars

March, 2015

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Documents

FSRU Terminal Risk Assessment - Cynergy