Frustration of Employment Contracts and Wrongful Dismissal

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  • 7/29/2019 Frustration of Employment Contracts and Wrongful Dismissal

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    Frustration of Employment Contracts and Wrongful Dismissal

    An interesting, though complicated issue is whether (and when) a contract of

    employment becomes frustrated by reason of a long-term and permanent disability. Such

    was the issue that recently confronted the Court in Fraser v. UBS. The case did not

    consider any human rights issues.

    The Background

    In this case, the plaintiff was a long-service employee of some 20.5 years service with the

    employer. She commenced employment with the employer at age 20. She became ill in

    2005 and was off work for 6 months collecting short term disability benefits (STD) bywhich time, according to the Court, her illness had evolved".

    She returned to work for 4 months, and then went off again for 6 months on STD.

    Despite a somewhat positive prognosis regarding a further return to work from an

    independent medical assessment in 2007, the plaintiff was not able to return to work atthe conclusion of the STD period and she applied for long-term disability (LTD)

    benefits, through RBC insurance.

    The RBC policy provided that LTD benefits were available for 24 months if a personwas disabled, in the context of being unable to perform any of the material and

    substantial duties of regular employment. After 24 months, disability payments would be

    determined on the basis of an inability to perform the duties of any gainful occupation.

    RBC approved the LTD benefits from March 2007 until January 2009 and terminatedthese on January 31, 2009, according to the court:

    . on the basis that the plaintiff did not follow medically recommended treatment to

    assist in her recovery or at least did not provide proof of such as required under the

    policy. There is a separate lawsuit outstanding related to that decision by RBCinsurance.

    The plaintiff, according to the court, did not advise UBS of any change in her medical

    prognosis. She did not return to work and did not indicate that she had ceased receiving

    medical treatment for disability.

    On June 5, 2009, the employer wrote to her advising that her employment was

    terminated. The letter provided as follows:

    UBS has been advised that your long-term disability insurance payments ceased on

    January 31, 2009. Our understanding is that this is as a result of a sufficient lack ofmedical evidence for continuing disability payments. Following this, you have had no

    communications with UBS about your return to work and have not advised that you are

    able to return to work.

    http://www.canlii.org/eliisa/highlight.do?text=%22wrongful+dismissal%22&language=en&searchTitle=Search+all+CanLII+Databases&path=/en/on/onsc/doc/2011/2011onsc5448/2011onsc5448.htmlhttp://www.canlii.org/eliisa/highlight.do?text=%22wrongful+dismissal%22&language=en&searchTitle=Search+all+CanLII+Databases&path=/en/on/onsc/doc/2011/2011onsc5448/2011onsc5448.html
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    Based on the above, the assumption of UBS is eitherthat you do not wish to return to

    work and have effectively resigned oryou believe that you continue to be totally

    disabled. In any event, UBS has no alternative but to confirm the termination of youremployment, either as a result of your resignation or the fact that your contract of

    employment has become impossible to perform and has been frustrated. The effective

    date of your termination of employment will be today, that is, June 5, 2009.

    The employer, as required under the Employment Standards Act, 2000 (the Act), paidher entitlement to termination and severance pay. In addition, UBS continued her

    medical, dental and life insurance for an additional three months, in excess of the eight

    week requirement under theAct. It was acknowledged that the company complied fullywith its obligations under theAct.

    The Issue

    The central issue was whether the dismissal was occasioned by frustration of the

    employment contract (as alleged by the employer) or whether it was a wrongfuldismissal entitling the plaintiff to damages (as alleged by the employee).

    Although, as the court observed, this is a fact specific analysis, some helpful legal

    principles have developed over a long period of time. The court goes through a really

    nice review of the cases.

    According to the Court:

    In relation to employment contracts, where an employee is unable to work because of a

    disabling illness, the doctrine applies because the permanent disability renders

    performance of the employment contract impossible, such that the obligations of theparties are discharged without penalty. If there is frustration of contract, the terminationis said to be by law, or automatic. Nothing need be done to terminate the contract.

    SeeFazekas v. Ault Foods Ltd., [1989] O.J. No. 913 (S.C.).

    The trial judge in Duong v. Linamar Corporation (affirmed by the Court of Appeal) putthe matter as follows:

    Frustration of a contract occurs whenever the law recognizes that without default of

    either party a contractual obligation has become incapable of being performed because

    the circumstances in which performance is called for would render it a thing radically

    different from that which was undertaken by the contract. SeeDavis Contractors Ltd. v.Fareham Urban District Council, [1956] A.C. 696 at 728, per Lord Radcliffe.

    This decision was reviewed extensively inFraser.

    The Court found that Ms. Fraser:

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    . was and continues to be permanently disabled. She has admitted in both this action

    and the action against the insurance company that her illness and disability pre-date the

    termination of her employment that her disability has been continuous and ongoing, thatshe is totally disabled and her disability is permanent such that she will never be able to

    work again.

    There was some dispute about the medical reports that ought to be relied upon and the

    timing:

    It is acknowledged that the only medical information that the employer UBS had at the

    time of the termination was the January 2007 report of Dr. Kerin. Counsel for the

    plaintiff termed this report very optimistic and suggested that the subsequent reportscould not be taken into account in assessing UBS decision to terminate. However, it is

    clear that UBS was in possession of additional information at the time of termination.

    This included the reality that Ms Fraser had not worked for three and a half years, that

    there was no updated medical prognosis or reasonable prospect for being able to return to

    work, that she had taken no further steps to provide information to her employer tosubstantiate her illness, and that according to the insurer, she had not participated in or at

    least reported on her ongoing medical treatment. As well, in the months following thecessation of long-term disability benefits in January 2009, she had taken no steps to

    appeal the insurers decision.

    The Court went on:

    In my view, the plaintiff cannot simply rely on a medical report dated over two yearsprior to termination, and ignore the other facts known to her employer at the time of the

    dismissal. While additional medical reports were disclosed after termination, they relate

    to the time of termination, as well as to subsequent periods of time. The case law in anyevent supports the reliance on evidence subsequently disclosed: see Dartmouth, supra, atpp. 374-5, Trevitt v. Blanche Equipment Rentals Ltd.,2006 BCSC 94 (CanLII), [2006]

    B.C.S.C. 94 (S.C.) at para. 37; 2006 BCSC 94 andMacLellan v. H.B. Contracting

    Ltd., [1990] B.C.J. No. 935 (S.C.) at pp. 9-10; 32 C.C.E.L. 103.

    The Court found that, on the facts of this case, the contract of employment had becomefrustrated. As such, there was no obligation on the part of the employer to provide notice

    or pay in lieu of notice.

    http://www.canlii.org/en/bc/bcsc/doc/2006/2006bcsc94/2006bcsc94.htmlhttp://www.canlii.org/en/bc/bcsc/doc/2006/2006bcsc94/2006bcsc94.html