From Idealism to Pragmatism: An Analysis of China's Policies toward the Middle East

China and the Middle East

(F Torn Idealism to Pragmatism: An Analysis of China‘s Policies toward the Middle East

bY Jiang Chen China Institute of International Studies, Beijing

Abstract

After World War 11, the Middle East stage attracted Beijing’s attention. While Israel and China proved at that time to be too di- verse, through the 1950s China made inroads with Arab countries. Egypt became the first to recognize the P.R.C., which, however, suffered rebuffs as anti-Communist forces generally prevailed in the Middle East. Beijing supported the people of Palestine. After the Soviet Union had become China’s enemy, China tried to unite the Third World against the two superpowers.

With Deng in 1978, China’s Middle Eastern policy became more pragmatic, tilting toward the developed countries and economic cooperation rather than ideology (e.g., with Yemen). China enhanced relations with Gulf states; cooperated with the United States in supporting the Afghan mujahedin; and declared neutrality in the Iran-Iraq War, although economic alliance with Iran grew.

The Gulf War affected Beijing’s attitudes toward weapons technology and toward the United Nations and China’s role in it. Israel is currently viewed as a channel for possible influence with the West. Overall, China’s basic policy now is to watch and wait.

The Mao Era (1949-78)

T h e People’s Republic of China’s Middle East policies can be analyzed from three periods: Mao Tse-Tung’s, Deng Xiaoping’s, and the post-Cold War era. The years 1949-78 constitute Mao’s era.’ In the middle of the 1960s and at the beginning of the 1970s, China tried to unite the Third World as a force against both imperialism and revi-

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sionism, in other words, the two superpowers. Although the Middle East was not a priority in Chinese foreign policy, it was considered an ideal arena for international Chinese strides. At that time, Beijing considered some of the countries in the region revolutionary and oth- ers reactionary. But taking all the nations in the region into consider- ation, there was indeed room for China’s struggle, because most of the nations in the region once had been ruled by the Ottoman Empire and had suffered from colonialism or the mandate of imperialism. After World War 11, the national liberation movement in this region grew tremendously. Thus, the Middle East became a battlefield for which China strove beyond its borders.

China Steps into the Region (1949-60)

After the formation of the People’s Republic of China (P.R.C.) in October 1949, China plunged into the socialist bloc. In 1950, China was involved in the Korean War. Imperialism logically became Chi- na’s major enemy. In order to gain recognition, China cast its eyes on various regions beyond its borders. The Middle East, lying strategi- cally between the East and West, became China’s immediate target for a diplomatic breakthrough. From the 1950s on, China searched for an opening there.

Beijing once considered Israel to be its point of intervention. At that time Israel was eager for recognition by the world’s most popu- lous nation. There were some secret contacts between the two countries, and they were on the edge of recognition. But basically the two were too diversified, both politically and socially. Also, at this time China was at war with the United States, and Israel could not attempt good relations with China at the expense of Israel-U.S. rapport. Meanwhile, from China’s perspective, the Arab-Israeli conflict was the leading issue in the region. If China had established relations with Israel, it might have been difficult for the Chinese to woo the Arab countries-a point of contradiction to China’s goal in that region. Therefore, both China and Israel tried to explore the possibilities of normalization, but the objective realities prevented them from reaching an agreement.

At the same time, China tried every means of contact with Arab countries. It first took the advantage of the Muslims within the border. Some distinguished mullahs were encouraged to establish relations with their counterparts in the Middle East. Secondly, China used propaganda to make itself known to the Arab countries. Some important documents (e.g., Mao speeches) were translated into Ara-


bic. Thirdly, China emphasized the fact that it shared similar views with many Arab countries.

the most important, not only the biggest in the Arab world, but also the leading country in North Africa. If China could establish relations with Egypt, it could make a breakthrough in the Middle East and pave the way for future relations with other African countries.

In order to gain Egypt’s recognition, China made every effort, even at the expense of losing profits in trade. From 1953 onward, China’s relations with Egypt became warmer. In 1954, bilateral trade increased following the meeting between Chou En-lai and Nasser at the Bandung Conference, which was considered a major achieve- ment in Chinese foreign affairs after the formation of the New China. In 1955, China offered to solve two serious problems facing Egypt by encouraging the Soviet Union to sell weapons to Egypt and by im- porting large quantities of cotton. In 1955, the cotton China imported was valued at $24.5 million, referred to as ”the biggest cotton deal in Egyptian history.”2 In addition, China offered to sell Egypt sixty thousand tons of steel, desperately needed in China itself for the first Five-Year Plan, at prices 20 percent lower than those on the world market price.3

With China’s persistence, a breakthrough was finally achieved in the Middle East. On May 16,1956, Egypt became the first Middle East country to recognize the People’s Republic of China. In August and September of the same year, Syria and Yemen followed suit.

With the outbreak of the Suez Canal crisis, China took the op- portunity to adhere to the Bandung spirit, and it stood firmly on the Egyptian side. During the crisis, China supported Egypt with 20 million Swiss francs in cash, accelerated the manufacture of goods for export to Egypt ahead of schedule; donated 170,000 Swiss francs from the Chinese Red Cross; and even registered 250,000 volunteers to help Egypt:

imperialists Britain and France had been greatly weakened after World War I1 and the United States had risen to be the leading power in the Western world. Asia and Africa, located between the social- ists and imperialists, would become the battlefield of the two camps. The Eisenhower Doctrine’s purpose was to legitimize U.S. interference in the Middle East. For Beijing the Middle East, like Taiwan, was another front in the struggle against imperialism.

Although there were high claims for supporting the struggles in the Middle East, it proved to be very difficult for China to succeed in

China was particularly interested in Egypt, which it considered

After the Suez crisis, China once again confirmed that the old

D@st ofMiddli? East Studies 3

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this region for three reasons. First, China, unlike France, Britain, or Russia, had no deep-rooted relations with the region and had little impact there in terms of politics, culture, and economy. Second, apart from its revolutionary rhetoric, China was not strong enough both internationally and domestically to be an influential power in the Middle East. Third, since 1957, China’s contact with the Communist parties in the region was considered an element of instability for the local governments, and Chinese efforts were eroded.

China exulted when the United Arab Republic (U.A.R.) was founded in 1958, but the rapport between Beijing and Cairo soon vanished. China’s involvement in the Arab Communist party affairs made Egypt uneasy. Nasser launched the campaign against Commu- nism and was arrogant in Sino-Egyptian relations. China was also displeased at Nasser’s hegemonic ambition over the Arab world. Sino-Egypt disagreement came out into the open when the Iraqi revolution broke out in 1958. China praised Kassem’s as the first genu- ine revolution in the Middle East, at which Egypt cocked a snoot. Af- ter having restrained itself for a while, China burst into rhetorical attack. China’s retaliation led to further anti-Communist movement in Egypt, and Egypt accused Chinese interference in Arab affairs, harming the independence, freedom, and security of Arab countries. In June of 1959, the U.A.R. ambassador in China was recalled. In September, Yemen warned Chinese workers working in Yemen not to interfere in the country’s internal affairs. And in November, it dis- closed that twenty-five Chinese experts had been e~pel led .~

revolution. Judging from the early stage of the Iraqi revolution, Chi- na treated the revolution as a victory for antiimperialism because it was a blow to the Baghdad Pact and increased the possibility of establishing a Maoist People’s Republic in the Middle East. But Kas- sem’s direction did not last very long. In the middle of 1959, the Communists in Iraq were arrested and propaganda materials from the Chinese Communist Party were banned. China’s enthusiasm for the region began to subside following this setback in Iraq.

ly backed by the Soviet Union and the socialist bloc. However, after the Twentieth Plenary Session of the U.S.S.R., China and the Soviet Union deviated both in international affairs and international Com- munist movement. The ”older brother” suddenly became the archen- emy threatening China’s northern border.

China placed great hope for the region in Iraq after Kassem’s

During this period, China’s entrance into the region was initial-

4


Revolutionary Expansion (1960-78)

China had to shift its keystone of defense strategy from protect- ing against U.S. imperialist expansion to curbing the socialist-imperialist encirclement and offsetting the Soviet revisionist influence internationally. China’s split with the Soviet Union occurred at the same period as the U.S. aggression in Vietnam, which China perceived as a great danger of encirclement by the reactionaries. In order to break the encirclement, China attempted to form a united front and adopt- ed an offensive foreign policy. Beijing strove to take the Third World as the basic tool against imperialism and revisionism. The Middle East was regarded as an intermediate region, important for Chinese expansion of influence, but most of the Arab countries were more interested in the Soviet Union, because it could afford to give them more economic and military aid, and, by contrast, Chinese motives were always considered suspicious.

Facing these tough problems, China increased its aid to the Middle East. In 1964, China’s aid offers to the Middle East share reached 32 percent, compared with 8 percent in 1963.6 Also from this period on, China realized that the core of the Middle East issue lay in Palestine, which was the banner of the Arab world. Holding it aloft, China would have good pretext for approaching Arab countries. Just when the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) was founded in 1964, China declared its full support to the people of Palestine in re- storing their legitimate rights and in returning to their h~rneland.~ Beijing advocated armed struggle and considered that the only way to settle the Arab-Israeli conflicks China extended regular verbal, as well as material, support to the PLO.

In order to rival the Soviet Union, China contacted some of the Communist parties in the Middle East and tried to influence them with Chinese ideology. But these parties were assaulted by the local governments not long after China suffered a setback in Southeast Asia (e.g., in Indonesia). China appeared more radical in this period to the Middle Eastern countries than it had seemed previously.

Entering the new decade of 1970, China began to reassess the global environment and concluded that the Soviets, attempting to dominate Europe, channeled most of their efforts toward the countries of the intermediate zone, in an attempt to seize control particularly in the key areas such as the Middle East. In this region, China, as usual, devoted its attention to Egypt. Anwar Sadat’s accession to the presidency supplied Beijing with a fresh start, and Sino-Egyptian relations warmed up. In 1976, when the Soviet Union stood firmly

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against canceling Cairo’s arms debt, China stepped in and signed a historic arms protocol providing for the supply of spare parts to Egypt’s Mig-17 squadrons. China later promised to overhaul hun- dreds of grounded Sukhoi and Mig air~raft .~

Gulf in 1975, China stretched its hands to the vacuum. By showing its special interests in Iran, China hoped Iran could become a solid obstacle to Soviet expansion. The shah was invited to visit China, and Hua Kuo-feng, then the chairman of the party and People’s Lib- eration Army (PLA) and also the premier, paid a return visit to Teh- ran just before the shah was ousted. It was the first time a top leader of China had visited the region. China was interested in the other countries in the Gulf area as well, but because of its radical image, it took time to infiltrate the region.

On the other side, when Britain claimed to withdraw from the

The Deng Era (1978-89)

In 1978 China entered the Deng era. Deng Xiaoping ‘s philoso- phy was totally pragmatic. His famous phrase was that the cat, either white or black, that catches mice is a good cat. Or rather, if produc- tivity and living standards will be promoted, you can do everything by every fair means. Deng’s Cat Theory became the doctrine for Chi- nese domestic and foreign affairs.

wards the developed countries, and its political alliance with the developing countries shifted to economic cooperation. It pursued con- sensus rather than controversy, and doing business with rather than promoting revolution in the Third World. After normalization with the United States, China managed to play games between the United States and the Soviet Union, aspiring to form a ”Big Triangle” with the other two superpowers. China was quite proud of its position between East and West during the Cold War Era.

China’s policy toward the Middle East was also overwhelmed with pragmatism. Seeing several unsuccessful political infiltrations in the region, China, except for its lip-service to the PLO, emphasized little ideological element and tried to keep aloof politically. Mean- while, it worked hard to exploit the potential markets of the Middle East. China observed that great amounts of hard currency flew to these countries after the 1973 oil crisis, and some of the countries wanted to change their industrial structure. There were good oppor- tunities for Chinese merchandise and labor exports, and there were also possibilities for Chinese absorption of capital investment. Mean-

Since then, the priority of China’s foreign relations tilted to-


while, China hoped that the economic exchange could bring about political breakthrough.

However, one point should not be neglected. From a global perspective, China’s overall goal to contain the Soviet southward movement, protect against Moscow’s further expansion, and crush Soviet attempts to encircle China, did not change. With the relaxation of Sino-U.S. relations and the outbreak of the Afghanistan War, Chi- na and the United States shared common interests in containing the Soviet Union. China, more or less, supported the Carter Doctrine to repel any attempt of procurement of the Gulf. Actually, China cooperated with the United States in supporting the Afghan rnzijahedin.

In 1979, when Israel and Egypt signed a peace accord, China expressed cautious support. Although the peace agreement, from Beijing’s perspective, lessened the possibility of massive war in the Middle East, it also caused rifts among Arab countries. China was interested in cooperation with countries like Egypt which were influential both in the Arab world and Africa. China also wanted to keep good relations with other Arab countries, like Iraq and Syria. Al- though Israel was keen on establishing relations with the P.R.C., China, also interested in Israel’s technology, appeared cool towards Israel. Some officials and analysts at that time believed that any de- velopment with Israel would be at the expense of losing 200 million Arabs and the markets in that region, and Chinese around the world would be the targets for terrorism. This, in turn, might spoil long- lasting Chinese efforts.

Another Chinese focus in the Middle East was the Gulf region. First, geopolitically speaking, China, like the United States, was worried about Soviet control of the oil route and easy access to the Indi- an Ocean. Second, the amount of oil production and the rise and fall of the oil prices in the Gulf could influence Chinese economy indi- rectly. And third, there was the attraction of hard currency, as mentioned above.

China’s Gulf Policy

China’s Gulf policy in this period could be analyzed from three angles.

First, policies toward the northern Gulf countries, Iran and Iraq. Iraq was the first country to recognize the P.R.C., though its close ties with the Soviet Union somewhat worried Beijing. The P.R.C.’s incli- nation toward Iran reflected a desire to curb the Soviet Union and to balance Iraq’s regional expansion. China, however, was shocked by

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the fall of the shah in 1979 shortly after Sino-Iranian relations reached their peak. Although China recognized the new Islamic Re- public two days after its birth, both China and Iran were cautious in developing mutual relations at the early stage of the Islamic Repub- lic. After 1983, the two countries’ exchange increased. Iranians, who were conducting the policy of “neither East nor West,“ regarded Chi- na, which was carrying out an independent foreign policy, as a reli- able power with no threat to themselves. In 1985, Rafsanjani visited China and signed an economic trade agreement with his counterpart. Rafsanjani said, ”China is Iran’s best cooperative partner. We are confident in political cooperation with China, which has proved to be no colonialism.”10 The greatest problem facing Iran after the Islamic revolution was reconstruction. Iran showed its special interest in Chi- nese economic reform and treated China as a major trade partner. China was also considered Iran’s great-power ally. Yet, after the ex- perience of the shah, China was more interested in the economic field rather than political alliance with the radical Islamic regime.

politically neutral. Economically, Beijing made a fortune from the war by increasing its exports to both countries. In 1988 alone Chinese exports to Iran amounted to $223 million.” China also gained plenti- ful construction contracts. It contracted 580 programs worth $1,900 million in Iraq by 1988.12 Here, one point must be mentioned. As far as the economic cooperation between China and Iran and Iraq is con- cerned, the Sino-Iranian case proved to be more successful than the Sino-Iraqi. Iran enjoyed good credibility in payment, while Iraq’s lia- bility was poor. The Iraqis’ amount of contracts appeared fairly large, but they were always behind in payment, which annoyed Chi- na very much. During the Gulf crisis, when Iraq was blockaded by the United Nations, it sent a special envoy to China, expressing its willingness to pay the debts with oil if China dispatched tanks to Iraq. This was merely a part of Iraq’s unrealistic strategy to break through the blockade.

Second, Chinese policy toward the Gulf kingdoms. From the beginning of the Deng era, China was very interested in these kingdoms, especially in Saudi Arabia. Apart from commercial signifi- cance, these states were also important to China because they were Taiwan’s last sphere of influence in the region. One of the P.R.C.’s long-lasting concerns in foreign affairs is the Taiwan issue. The P.R.C. tried to expel Taiwan out of the region, but the Gulf kingdoms maintained that Communist regimes were threatening elements of their rule, and they were reluctant to develop relations with the P.R.C.

When the Iran-Iraq war broke out in 1980, China claimed to be


Among the Gulf states, China first established relations with Kuwait in 1971. Not until 1975, however, did Kuwait dispatch its first ambassador to Beijing, and not until 1977 did the countries con- clude their first trade agreement. Since then, China used Kuwait as a fortress to expand its influence to other Gulf states. Kuwait became one of China’s major trading partners in the Middle East. In 1980, Sino-Kuwaiti trade amounted to $194 million. From 1981 on, China began to export labor services to Kuwait, and there were nearly ten thousand Chinese workers and technicians working in Kuwait before the Gulf crisis. Kuwait is the first Arab country to grant low-interest loans and to start joint ventures in mainland China.

Standing firmly in Kuwait, China began to knock on the doors of the other Gulf kingdoms. In 1978,1984, and 1988 China normalized its relations with Oman, the United Arab Emirates, and Qatar. Next, Beijing began to focus on Saudi Arabia. China perceived that Saudi Arabia was the leading country among the Gulf kingdoms. For the P.R.C, opening relations with Saudi Arabia could not only be a political success, but it could also be advantageous by entering the most important labor market in the region and making it possible to absorb the oil currency. China tried every means to woo the Saudis, carefully trying to avoid arousing the royal family and attempting to decrease the Saudis‘ fear of socialism. In April 1990 China finally achieved its goal.

ed Yemen as a base for the national liberation movement in the Gulf, and as an outpost for competing with the Soviet Union’s presence in the region. But in Deng’s era China intended to change its radical image. Its relations with Yemen shifted from somewhat special to normal. It no longer mentioned the national liberation movement and paid more attention to economic cooperation with the two Yemens. As in other countries in the region, China exported labor forces, tex- tiles, agricultural products, and low-level technologies to the Ye- mens. There were also cultural and sports exchanges, instead of political alliance.

Last, it is worthwhile to discuss the P.R.C.’s relations with the PLO. In Deng’s time, as in Mao’s, China regarded the Palestinian cause as the banner of the Arab world, repeating its support for the organization. However, Chinese terminology changed. In Mao’s era, Beijing proclaimed its full support of the ”Palestine People’s armed struggle.” It was then changed into the ”justice struggle,” paying only lip service and providing limited economic and material support to the PLO. Having been associated with the PLO for decades,

Third, China’s policy toward Yemen. In Mao’s time China treat-

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China was somewhat disappointed at the separation within the organization, and occasionally even pessimistic about its future. In 1984 when Arafat visited Beijing, Deng said to him, "It is correct for the PLO to lay its priority on the unity within the organization and the unity with other Arab countries. Though it is a tough job, there is no other choice. If you are persistent, it will certainly produce result^."'^

The Post-Cold War Period

In 1990 the Cold War was proclaimed to be over, and its unpre- dicted conclusion heavily influenced China's foreign policy, marking the end of China's games between the two superpowers. The so- called Triangle Theory was fading from the horizon. The long-lasting world order was broken, while the new world order was vague. Chi- na dug hard to seek its role in the new world pattern.

Another event which struck China's Middle East policy heavily was the Gulf crisis. When Iraq invaded Kuwait in August 1990, Chi- na's first reaction was still the reflection of Cold War mentality (i.e., opposition to both Iraq's invasion and the involvement of a super- power). When the United States began to build up its military forces in the region, some officials concluded that the nature of the Gulf crisis was a small hegemony (Iraq) confronting a big hegemony (the United States). With the end of the Cold War, the world would never again see such tranquillity. Some contradictions concealed in the Cold War era finally were revealed and a new vacuum appeared. This might lead to more fierce conflicts. When the Gulf War erupted, some Chinese predicted it would be a long-lasting war. According to the Korean War and the Vietnam War, air strikes could not win a war. The "real phase" would be ground warfare. As long as the casualties increased on the battlefield, it would be difficult for the Bush Administration to bolster public support. It was quite possible for the United States to be dragged into another Vietnam-like war.

lican Guard proved itself to be a paper tiger. Iraq was completely de- feated by the U.S.-led coalition both in the air and on the ground.

The Gulf War aroused great reaction from various fields in Chi- na. First, China realized that the Cold War theory was out of date. In the past decades, the Soviets competed fiercely with the United States in the Middle East, and contained U.S. action there. During the Gulf War, it proved that the Soviet Union was more willing to coop- erate with the United States than to contain it. Actually, the U. s. and the Soviet Union allied to interfere in a Third-World country, which

Yet Iraq was too weak to resist the coalition forces. The Repub-

10 DoMa


was the first such case since the Cold War. China viewed it as a great challenge. It also raised questions with the Chinese leaders regarding Beijing’s response if the United States and Soviet Union should ally to intervene in China’s affairs.

ple’s war is no longer useful. Mao’s famous thesis was that the deter- minant of warfare is not weapons, but people; and since his time that was the dominant theory. During the Gulf War, China witnessed that the people’s war was ineffective in the face of modern technology.

Third, the exhibit of U.S. military technology in the Gulf War amazed the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). Some analysts argued that U.S. performance in the Gulf represented the military trend for the next century. Advanced technologies will be widely applied in warfare with the consequences of heavy explosion, higher accuracy, and less casualties. In contrast, China ’s military equipment proved inefficient for modem warfare. Once again, there were cries to strengthen scientific research and to import technology and exper- tise.

a more important role in dealing with regional disturbance in the post-Cold War era. The Gulf crisis may well be a model for solving regional disputes. In the near future, the United States’s role in the United Nations will be more noticeable and will take full advantage of legitimate UN cover and make greater use of allied contributions to intervene in regional conflicts. China’s role in the United Nations is another issue which has resulted from the Gulf War.

Fifth, the Gulf crisis made China realize that the Middle East is a place for China to exert its indirect influence on Western countries. China keeps traditionally good relations with most of the Arab countries. After the Cold War there were voices among some radical Mid- dle East countries calling for China’s challenge to Western countries, especially to the United States. Should China respond, there would probably appear a new adverse current in the international arena. In the Middle East, there are three powers China can exploit: Iran, radical Arab countries, and Israel. Iran and radical Arab countries are the available powers for Chinese alliance to confront the Western influence in the region. Iran once showed its eagerness to ally with China. Israel is a channel for the P.R.C. to extend its influence to the United States. But China is taking domestic establishment as the central target and is reluctant to take the position of a challenger. After the Gulf War, China reacted favorably to Israel. Beijing’s hesitation was re- duced when it saw that the Soviet Union and some former Eastern

Second, the Gulf War also proved that the theory of the peo-

Fourth, the Gulf War showed that the United Nations will play

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European socialist countries improved their relations with Israel without harrning their relations with Arab countries. Besides, China regarded the multilateral talks of the Middle East peace process as an entrance for returning to the international community. In February of 1992, the P.R.C. normalized its relations with Israel.

According to Deng’s instruction, in view of the fast-changing world, China should watch silently, handle with tranquillity, hide capacities, and bide time.

Notes

1. Although Mao died in September 1976, his successor, Hua Kuo-feng, still carried out Mao’s line until he was ousted in 1978.

2. Yitzhak Shichor, The Middle East in China‘s Foreign Policy, 2949-2977 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 42.

3. Ibid.,43.

4. Ibid., 50-51.

5. Shichor, 82.

6. Ibid., 114.

7. ”Premier Chou En-lai’s Press Conference,” People’s Daily (Beijing), December 27,1963.

8. Bid.

9. Asian Survey 9, September 1990.

10. Annual Survey of Chinese Foreign Affairs: 1987 (Beijing: Shi- jiezhishi Chubanshe, 1987), 104.

11. Annual Survey of Chinese Foreign Affairs: 2989 (Beijing: Shi- jiezhishi Chubanshe, 1989), 99.

12

12. Ibid, 107.


13. Annual Survey of Chinese Foreign Afairs: 1987, 116.

Jiang Chen has been a resident associate at the Carnegie Endow- ment for International Peace in Washington, D.C.,from October 1992 through August 1993, and as of September 1993 a Warren Weaver fellow at the Rockefeller Foundation in New York City.

This article is based on two lectures given at the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee in April 1993 sponsored by the UWMI Marquette University Center for International Studies, which will publish it as an occasional paper.

The contents appearing in this publication are indexed by

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From Idealism to Pragmatism: An Analysis of China's Policies toward the Middle East