7/30/2019 From Crisis to Cooperation Turkey’s Relations with Washington and NATO By Richard Outzen

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/from-crisis-to-cooperation-turkeys-relations-with-washington-and-nato-by 1/16

POLICY NOtes

Richard Outzen, a oreign area ocer in the U.S. Army, has served in a variety o command, sta, and liaison

 positions, including tours in Iraq, Aghanistan, Israel, Turkey, and Germany. His research ocuses on Middle East 

and Central Asian strategic aairs, language and culture, and civil-military relations.

The Washington Institute for Near East Policy • Number 12 • June 2012

From Crisis to CooperationTurkey’s Relations with Washington

and NATO

By Richard Outzen

 Te intervening year and a hal has brought a dra-

matic turnaround, however. Tree major actors—

the increasing clash between Iranian and urkish

regional interests, Ankara’s disillusionment with the Assad regime in Syria, and the NAO campaign in

Libya—have created a more promising landscape

or urkey’s return to a strategic posture generally 

aligned with the United States. o be sure, the shit

seen over the past year has not removed all major

irritants in urkey’s Western relationships; Prime

Minister Recep ayyip Erdogan’s strongman ten-

dencies are an example. Broadly speaking, though,

any strategic assessment o urkey rom the U.S.

and NAO perspective must recognize the major,

positive changes over the past eighteen months.In a relationship marked over the past decade

more by crisis management than by opportunity,

the United States now has important policy open-

ings with urkey. Te top priority should be lever-

aging Ankara’s commitment to NAO on missile

deense as a way o rearming both urkey’s role

as the alliance’s southern political anchor and the

notion that common threats should be met with

common action by democratic states (Iranian mis-siles having replaced Russian tanks as the threat in

question). Another key priority will be using that

anchor position to support democratic tendencies

in Arab countries undergoing uprisings. A third

 will be using the momentum rom Ankara’s posi-

tive shit to prevent crises related to the political

nexus o energy, territory, and identity currently 

enveloping urkey, Israel, Cyprus, and the Euro-

pean Union. Tis priority takes on growing impor-

tance at a time when Cyprus is assuming the rotat-

ing EU presidency. Against the backdrop o theMay 2012 NAO summit in Chicago, challenging

global and regional conditions demand vigorous

U.S. eorts to build on the urkey-NAO momen-

tum and ensure that strategic synergy between the

two remains durable and eective.

In January 2011, Te Washington Institute presented an in-depth assessment o political

and strategic trends in urkey’s relationship with the United States and NAO. At the

time, the ocus was necessarily on discord, disappointment, and growing concern: in the

 wake o a disastrous 2010, with memories o the Gaza otilla incident and urkish dissent on

Iran sanctions still resh, the horizon was clouded and turbulent.

7/30/2019 From Crisis to Cooperation Turkey’s Relations with Washington and NATO By Richard Outzen

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/from-crisis-to-cooperation-turkeys-relations-with-washington-and-nato-by 2/16

Policy Notes

2 www.washingtoninstitute.org 

Historical Perspective

 o understand the recent crisis and recovery in

 urkey’s relations with the West, one must bear in

mind the volatile nature o those relations in gen-

eral. Put in proper historical context, the disen-

chantment o 2010 and renewed commitment o  2012 are by no means anomalous:

1947–1952:  Washington recognizes Ankara’s

critical role in stemming Soviet expansionism as

the Cold War dawns and makes urkey a ocal

point o Marshall Plan aid. Te Joint American

Mission or Military Aid to urkey ( JAMMA,

later JUSMMA) is ormed to direct major con-

struction, equipping, and training programs. Te

United States unds and builds new airbases at

Diyarbakir, Eskisehir, and Adana (Incirlik), andupgrades about a dozen other major ground and

air bases. By 1952, urkey accedes to NAO and

becomes a major contributor o combat troops

to the UN orce fghting in Korea.1

1964–1967:  he irst serious deterioration in

 Ankara’s relations with Washington and NAO

occurs over violence between urkish and Greek 

communities on Cyprus. President Lyndon

 Johnson writes a letter threatening not to sup-

port urkey in any Cyprus-related clash with

the Soviets, and warning that urkey cannot

use NAO-provided equipment or resources

or any operation involving the island. By 1968,

 urkish students are holding anti-American and

anti-NAO protests, and some rioting occurs.

 Tis negative trend is reinorced by diplomatic

tension over the opium poppy trade. In the lat-

ter part o the decade, urkey tries to reduce its

 Western alignment and improve ties with the

Soviet Union and nonaligned nations. 2

1974–1975:  As the Soviets grow more asser-tive in the Eastern Mediterranean in the early 

1970s, Ankara comes to recognize the shared

 urkish-U.S.-NAO interest in mainta ining

robust deterrent capabilities on urkish soil.

By 1974, experts estimate that NAO orces

in urkey were orcing the Soviets to sta-

tion twenty-our ground divisions on or near

the border, decreasing the number o orces

available to threaten central Europe. Despite

occasional student protests, U.S. and NAO

military orces in urkey have essentially total

reedom o movement. urkey hosts these

orces at roughly twenty-six installations,

including intelligence-gathering sites, air bases,

missile launch detection acilities, naval sup-

port acilities or the Sixth Fleet, and custodial

units or a variety o nuclear weapons (see map

or the geographic distribution o these sites).

In addition, Ankara hosts the headquarters o 

the Central reaty Organization (CENO),

the West’s security cooperation ramework or

the area rom urkey to Iran and Pakistan. Tis

all changes with the greatest rupture in mod-

ern urkish-Western relations, the 1974 Cypruscrisis. Following urkey’s occupation o north-

ern Cyprus, the United States embargoes ur-

ther arms sales or military support to Ankara.

In retaliation, urkey shuts down U.S. mili-

tary acilities, veers toward nonaligned status,

and enters a period o growing political crisis.

 Ankara does not ully resume military coopera-

tion with Washington and NAO until ater

the coup o 1980. 3

1990–1991:  urkey’s commitment to NAOand the United States resurges in the 1980s—

an American-urkish Council is ormed in

1981, and a robust agenda o bilateral and alli-

ance exercises and support operations is back in

place by mid-decade.4 he time seems ripe or

an enterprising urkish leader to take the next

step o ully placing the country in the West-

ern policy mainstream, and urgut Ozal does

 just that in 1990, gambling that ull support o 

Operation Desert Storm will reap economic and

diplomatic gains commensurate with the risk he will incur. In response, NAO steps up to ur-

key’s side, conducting airborne early warning

(Operation Anchor Guard) and air deense (Ace

Guard) eorts on Ankara’s behal. 5 Ozal earns

 warm personal thanks rom President George

H. W. Bush, who comes to consider him a close

personal riend and urkey a great ally.

7/30/2019 From Crisis to Cooperation Turkey’s Relations with Washington and NATO By Richard Outzen

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/from-crisis-to-cooperation-turkeys-relations-with-washington-and-nato-by 3/16

  I  r  a  n

  I  r  a  q

  S

  y  r  i  a

  C  y  p  r  u  s

  B  u  l  g  a  r  i  a

  B  l  a  c  k  S  e  a

   L  u   l  e   b  u  r  g  a  z

   M  a   l  a   t  y

  a

   E  r   h  a  c

   I  n  c   i  r   l   i   k

   Y  u  m  u  r   t  a   l   i   k

   A   d  a  n  a

   M  a  r   d   i  n

   K  a  r  g  a  p  a  z  a  r   i

   P  a  z  a  r

   P  e  r  s  e

  m   b  e

   A  n   k  a  r  a

   B  e   l   b  a  s   i

   M  e  r  z   i   f  o  n

   S  a  m  s  u  n

   S   i  n  o  p

   M  u  r   t  e   d

   B  a  r   t   i  n

   I  z  m   i   t

E  s   k   i  s  e   h   i  r

   C   i  g   l   i

   B  a   l  e   k   i  s   i  r

   C  a  n  a   k   k  a   l  e

   K  a  r  a  m  u  r  s

  e   l

   T  a  r  z  a   b  u  r  u

  n

   O  r   t  a   k

  o  y

   I  s   t  a  n   b  u   l

   C  o  r   l  u

   S  a  r   k   i  s   l  a

   S   i  v  a  s

   N   A   T   O    H

  e  a   d  q  u  a  r   t  e  r  s

   C  a   k  m  a   k

   I  z  m   i  r

   E   l  m  a   d  a  g

   E  r  z  u  r  u  m

   P   i  r   i  n  c   l   i   k

   D   i  y  a  r   b  a   k   i  r

  M  e  d  i  t  e  r  r  a  n  e  a  n  S  e  a

    N    A    T    O    A    I    R

    B    A    S    E

    U .    S .

    C    O    M    M    U    N    I    C    A    T    I    O    N    S

    S    T    A    T    I    O    N

    U .    S .

    M    I    S    S    I    L    E    &    N    U    C    L    E    A    R

    T    E    S    T    M    O    N    I    T    O    R    I    N    G    S    I    T    E

    N    A    T    O    R    A    D    A    R    E    A    R    L    Y    W    A    R    N    I    N    G    &    T    R    A    C    K    I    N    G    S    T    A    T    I    O    N

    U .    S .

    N    U    C    L    E    A    R    W    E    A    P    O    N    S

    S    T    O    R    A    G    E    S    I    T    E

   P  a  s   t  a  n   d   P  r

  e  s  e  n   t   N   A   T   O

   I  n  s   t  a   l   l  a   t   i  o  n  s   i  n

   T  u  r   k  e  y

7/30/2019 From Crisis to Cooperation Turkey’s Relations with Washington and NATO By Richard Outzen

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/from-crisis-to-cooperation-turkeys-relations-with-washington-and-nato-by 4/16

Policy Notes

4 www.washingtoninstitute.org 

1998–2003: Events over the next decade do

not pan out as Ozal had hoped, and urkey is

let holding the bag. As the 1990s unold, the

country suers escalating terrorist violence in the

southeast, economic damage that contributes to

a major crisis in 1994, a domestically unpopu-lar legacy operation in northern Iraq, increased

political polarization, and an apparent decrease

in Western interest and support amid troubled

times.6 Ozal does not live to see the worst o it,

but many urks remember 1991, rather than 2003,

as the year the wheels came o the relationship. 7 

It is not diicult to see why urks in the 1990s

might have developed serious buyer’s remorse or

previous support o the United States and NAO.

In addition to balking at “out o NAO area” oper-ations near urkey’s volatile southern and eastern

borders in the wake o the Gul War, the alliance’s

European members increasingly dismissed ur-

key’s security concerns altogether. Much o Europe

reused to treat the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK)

as a terrorist organization, with several giving sub-

stantial tacit support to the group.8 And in February 

 2003, as another invasion o Iraq loomed, Europe

explicitly rejected urkish appeals under Article IV 

o the NAO treaty or protection against possible

retaliation rom Saddam Hussein’s orces.9 Instead,EU leaders enthusiastically ocused their deense

planning eorts on ormulating a common secu-

rity identity or Europe—one that did not include

 urkey.10 Tese signals naturally ed Ankara’s incli-

nations toward a more muscular, unilateral security 

approach, maniested most clearly in the 1998 ulti-

matum to Syria that resulted in the ight and cap-

ture o PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan.11 Although

 urkey supported NAO operations in Bosnia and

Kosovo during this period, these were special cases

 with historical resonance or the urkish publicrather than signs o rapprochement.

In light o Gul War disappointments, Europe’s

exclusionary post-Cold War security arrangements,

and the success o unilateralism in bringing down

Ocalan, urkey’s reusal to play the good soldier

during Operation Iraqi Freedom should not have

caught the press and public o guard. Even so, the

 urkish parliament ’s reusal to authorize ground

and air combat operations rom its soil marked a

stark breach with the ity-year pattern o U.S.-

 urkish relations. his was not simply a mes-

sage about lingering unhappiness rom a dicult

decade—it was the defnitive end o an era in ur-key’s commitment to security collectivism with the

 West under Washington’s lead. he ailed parlia-

mentary resolution (or tezkere ) chilled U.S.-urkish

military and diplomatic relations or the better part

o a decade. urkey would go on to provide modest

support in Iraq (e.g., restricted overight access and

transit or noncombat supplies via ground convoy),

but its abstention greatly complicated the Ameri-

can-led war eort. Te ugly twin sister to the legis-

lative fasco was the Sulaymaniyah incident o July 

 2003, in which U.S. soldiers detained, blindolded,and handcued urkish special orces conducting a

longstanding liaison and intelligence mission under

 joint agreement with regional Kurdish authorities.

 Te incident was deeply embarrassing or the urks,

sparking widespread outrage and causing a precipi-

tous drop in support or the United States and the

 West among the urkish public.12

In short, urkey’s relationship with the West has

long been—and remains—a cyclical process. Even

in the post-2003 chill, President George W. Bushand Prime Minister Erdogan ound a modus

 vivendi or Iraq and the broader relationship. And

Bush established a positive trend in 2007 when he

agreed to provide enhanced support to anti-PKK 

eorts at a time o crisis or the urkish security and

political establishments. New elements entered the

equation in 2010, though—chiey Iran and Israel—

and gave even longtime urkey watchers reason to

ear that the relationship was headed o a cli.

Touching Bottom Again

in 2010-2011

In terms o urkey’s relations with the West, 2010

 was not a good year, and prospects remained airly 

bleak throughout early 2011.13 Tere were grounds

to suspect that a long-term rit was opening as an

intentional product o urkey’s desire or a new 

strategic identity. In particular, Ankara proved

7/30/2019 From Crisis to Cooperation Turkey’s Relations with Washington and NATO By Richard Outzen

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/from-crisis-to-cooperation-turkeys-relations-with-washington-and-nato-by 5/16

From Crisis to Cooperation Outzen

www.washingtoninstitute.org 5

intransigent on a key American policy initiative

or the region: sanctions against the Iranian nuclear

program. It was also obstinate in demanding an

Israeli apology in the wake o the May 2010 Gaza

otilla incident. Polling data was bad and getting

 worse: the ransatlantic rends survey conductedby the German Marshall Fund o the U.S. indi-

cated that only 6 percent o the urkish public sup-

ported close cooperation with the United States, 43

percent saw NAO as inessential, and 20 percent

preerred that Ankara align with the Middle East

rather than the EU. Public support or the abra-

sive international approach o the ruling Justice

and Development Party (AKP) seemed evident

in popular backing or the government’s domestic

initiatives: 58 percent o urks approved the AKP-

drated constitutional reerendum, and both Erdo-gan and his party remained well liked. None o this

augured well or improving urkish cooperation

 with the West. Former U.S. ambassador James Je-

rey summed up the 2010 situation neatly : urkey 

under the AKP had “a special yen or destructive

drama and rhetoric,” “Rolls Royce ambitions but

[Land] Rover resources,” and a habit o present-

ing itsel as the Islamic conscience o NAO—a

role that cast a long shadow on its accession talks

 with the EU.14

On a personal note, the author spent most o  2010 in Kabul, Aghanistan, serving with the urk-

ish brigade in charge o security there and watch-

ing with urkish colleagues as press accounts o the

Gaza otilla crisis rolled in. Subsequent discussions

lent an appreciation or why the bloom was o the

 Western rose or urkey. Not just soldiers, but urk-

ish businessmen, diplomats, and visiting political

leaders weighed in with sharp remarks on the inci-

dent specifcally, and urkey’s treatment rom the

 West more generally. In their view, urkey had stood

by NAO and the United States or decades whilesimultaneously chasing an evasive EU with unre-

quited ardor. Meanwhile, Western leadership had

purportedly led the world to global economic crisis,

messy wars in Muslim lands, a growing Muslim-

 Western cultural divide, and the apparent impunity 

o “rogue” actions that resulted in the death o urk-

ish citizens—or so the otilla incident was depicted

in these circles. Particularly in a place like Aghani-

stan—where the limits o Western and American

power were so evident and the urks well regarded

by Aghans o nearly every stripe—the paradigm

o “loyal (but dysunctional) urkey” seemed anti-

quated and irrelevant. With impressive unanimity among individuals with Kemalist, religious, or lib-

eral nationalist inclinations, these urks had already 

leaned toward endorsing a more independent and

less reexively accommodating strategic alignment;

the otilla was just the last straw.

 Judged rom that perspective, urkey ’s strate-

gic alignment seemed headed or, at best, a sort

o Gaullist “hold your nose” relationship with the

 West or, at worst, active alignment with authoritar-

ian regimes seeking to neutralize Western power.

 Although grateul or urkish participation in theInternational Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in

 Aghanistan, many personnel rom other NAO

countries downplayed the actual contributions o 

the urkish contingent and made no secret o the

prevailing view that these troops had more in com-

mon with the Aghans than with the French or

British. And at the oicial level, urkish-NAO

relations were mired in the complications o Cyprus,

the EU’s Common Security and Deence Policy,

 urkey ’s political irtation with Iran and military 

irtation with China, and urkish discussions o an“axis shit.”15

 Another reversal soon set in, however, as 2011

saw the allure o Ankara’s strategic ree agency 

shatter against the practical limits o urkish

power. Erdogan and Foreign Minister Ahmet

Davutoglu learned in succession that urkish

mediation in Libya, Syria, and Iraq did not create

space or compromise or negotiation as they had

hoped. Tey also learned that regional organiza-

tions such as the Arab League still saw Western

leadership as indispensable or resolving impor-tant regional issues, and i urkey did not stand

 with the West , it might be marginal ized alto-

gether. Te year was so transormative that by late

 2011 and ear ly 2012, President Obama was cal l-

ing Erdogan one o his fve closest international

allies and praising urkey as “a NAO ally and

a great riend and partner on NAO issues.”16

7/30/2019 From Crisis to Cooperation Turkey’s Relations with Washington and NATO By Richard Outzen

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/from-crisis-to-cooperation-turkeys-relations-with-washington-and-nato-by 6/16

Policy Notes

6 www.washingtoninstitute.org 

Similarly, the urkish press began describing 2012

as the “golden age” o U.S.-urkish relations, and

the shine o that gold could only bolster urkey’s

attachment to its NAO identity.17 

Changed Dynamics

in 2011–2012

 When considering the changed horizon or urkish

relations with Washington and NAO as o early 

 2012, it is useul to frst consider what did not occur

in mid-to-late 2011. For one thing, while urkey’s

leaders did not pursue conciliatory policies toward

Israel, neither did they markedly exacerbate the di-

fcult, wounded relationship. Tis relative restraint

 was especially notable given urkey ’s clear unhap-

piness over both the UN report on the lotilla

incident and unsettling Israeli-Cypriot gas explo-ration in the eastern Mediterranean.18 Ankara also

avoided reprising high-profle, poorly coordinated

diplomatic initiatives such as the abortive May 

 2010 attempt to partner with Brazil on mediating

the Iranian nuclear issue.19

Furthermore, urkish public opinion toward the

 West did not seem to worsen appreciably in 2011.

Mid-year polls by Pew Research Center showed

that the majority o urks did not see Middle East-

ern orientation or identity as a replacement or the

 West and still avored EU membership. 20

 Te rans-atlantic rends survey showed a mixed but improv-

ing picture. 21 urkish approval o Obama’s oreign

policies improved rom 23 to 30 percent (though still

 well below the 2009 level o 50 percent), and public

support or EU accession rebounded to 48 percent, a

level not seen since 2006. Te number o urks sup-

porting cooperation with the EU and Washington

increased slightly, while the number advocating a

unilateralist oreign policy decreased signifcantly. In

general, then, polling data indicated that the wounds

between urkey and the West, while not ully healed,had stopped bleeding and begun to show some signs

o recovery.

O more immediate importance, perhaps,

 Ankara’s commitment to collective action through

NAO increased rather than decreased throughout

 2011. urkey continued to play a major, active role

in the alliance’s political and command structures

and actually increased its operational tempo within

NAO as the year wore on. A quick tour d’horizon

may be instructive.

Political structure and politics.  urkish par-

ticipation in the North Atlantic Council (NAC),

NAO’s political wing, has not encountered sig-

niicant disruption despite negative trends in

 urkish public regard or the alliance. According

to one observer, “On the issue o the continuation

o membership in an updated NAO, a eeling o 

disconnectedness and emptiness is prevalent in the

majority o the urkish public.” 22 Yet the perma-

nence o this disenchantment is not preordained:

in the wake o the turmoil brought on by the Arab

 Awakening, Prime Minister Erdogan need only 

praise urkey’s membership and NAO overall ina sustained manner in order to measurably reverse

the negative sentiment. 23 In this regard, it is worth

noting the tone o Foreign Minister Davutoglu’s

press remarks ollowing his visit to the NAC to

commemorate the sixtieth anniversary o urkey’s

accession to NAO. He spoke o Ankara’s con-

tinued commitment to NAO as a story o two

partners who had both transormed since the Cold

 War—but remained mutually committed. 24

Command structure. NAO’s military com-mand structure includes a supreme headquarters and

overall command node in Belgium, three subordinate

operational commands, and roughly a dozen tactical

commands o various stripes. wo o these major tac-

tical headquarters—an air headquarters in Izmir and

a ground corps headquarters in Istanbul—are based

in urkey, and NAO’s plans call or these sites to

play a continued robust role in command-and-con-

trol arrangements. 25 Te air headquarters will report-

edly be shut down this year and its responsibilities

transerred to Ramstein, Germany; thereater, how-ever, Izmir will host the new NAO Land Forces

Headquarters, to be commanded by an American

three-star general who will oversee standardization

and training o all NAO ground orces. 26 urkey 

also hosts one o NAO’s fteen accredited Centers

o Excellence, the COE or Deense Against error-

ism (COE-DA) in Ankara. 27 

7/30/2019 From Crisis to Cooperation Turkey’s Relations with Washington and NATO By Richard Outzen

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/from-crisis-to-cooperation-turkeys-relations-with-washington-and-nato-by 7/16

www.washingtoninstitute.org 7

From Crisis to Cooperation Outzen

Operations.  urkey’s major contributions to

NAO’s various combat operations have continued

despite the tensions o 2010–2011:

 ISAF Aghanistan. Nearly 2,000 urkish troops

support Regional Command–Capital in Kabul

as well as Provincial Reconstruction eams in

 Wardak and Jawzjan.

Counterpiracy operations in the Gul o Aden. ur-

key is currently in command o the six-ship

Standing NAO Maritime Group 2 in Opera-

tion Ocean Shield, and over the past several

 years it has regularly provided a rigate to the

operation on a rotational basis. 28

Security and counterterrorism eorts in the Medi-

terranean. urkey contributes naval assets toNAO’s Operation Active Endeavor. 29

 NATO mission in Kosovo. urkey contributes 318

o the 5,790 soldiers in Kosovo Force (KFOR)

and has been a major troop contributor over the

lie o the mission.

Libya . Despite its initial reluctance, urkey 

agreed to support military operations to pro-

tect civilians rom the Qadhaf regime’s attacks

beginning on March 22, 2011. For example, it

assented to NAO use o the Allied Air Com-mand in Izmir to provide command and con-

trol or the air campaign over Libya, supporting

Operation Uniied Protector through its com-

pletion in October o that year. 30 In addition, the

 urkish navy provided NAO with our rigates,

one submarine, and one tanker ship. 31 (For more

on Ankara’s Libya strategy, see the separate sec-

tion on that subject below.)

 Missile deense . Perhaps most surprising, ur-

key agreed in 2011 to play a central role in the

deployment o NAO’s missile deense shield.Participation was not a oregone conclusion

given the likelihood o damage to urkey’s rela-

tions with neighbors Russia and Iran. Te deci-

sion makes urkey one o only a handul o 

countries hosting components o the multilat-

eral shield.

 Te United States and urkey also have signifcant

bilateral military ties beyond the NAO ramework.

U.S. European Command (EUCOM) maintains

a ity-person Oice o Deense Cooperation in

 Ankara to acilitate training exchanges and military 

equipment sales. Other units acilitate liaison andinormation sharing related to Iraq and the region

as a whole. And U.S. orces still conduct a variety o 

missions out o Incirlik Air Base in southern urkey.

 While military cooperation may be lower in profle

than during the Cold War, it continues apace.

 urkey has also been supportive o NAO’s

eorts to update its capabilities and methods or

the twenty-irst century. he alliance has sought

to maintain relevance by becoming global in ocus,

more mobile and exible in deployment and opera-

tional capabilities, and more attuned to nontradi-tional threats and emerging political and strategic

realities. 32 Accordingly, urkey has transitioned to a

smaller, technically modernized orce structure over

the past two decades, one centered on smaller bri-

gades and special units rather than the large divi-

sional ormations o the Cold War. At the same

time, it has kept deense spending near 4 percent

o its gross domestic product, unlike most NAO

partners, who have sunk to the 2 percent range. Te

military has also accepted increased subordination

to civilian control—a trend that emerged beore thesupposed Ergenekon/Balyoz conspiracies against

the military. 33 

 his is not to say that NAO and urkey are

getting all they want out o the relationship. Euro-

peans remain rustrated over the wall o separation

 Ankara maintains between its EU and NAO roles.

 Te urks have scrupulously guarded that wall since

 2004, believing that the EU reneged on a prom-

ise not to admit Cyprus into the union until the

island’s political division had been resolved. Cypriot

accession put urkey in the position o occupyingorce on an EU member’s territory, with a host o 

negative implications or Ankara’s security and dip-

lomatic interests. Tereore, urkish acceptance o 

overlapping EU and NAO security roles is not

conceivable until Cyprus is resolved. 34 In addition,

polling data indicates that many urks still view 

7/30/2019 From Crisis to Cooperation Turkey’s Relations with Washington and NATO By Richard Outzen

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/from-crisis-to-cooperation-turkeys-relations-with-washington-and-nato-by 8/16

Policy Notes

8 www.washingtoninstitute.org 

NAO as more benefcial to the Christian nations

o Europe than to the average urk. 35 Concern over

this seemingly lagging public support led NAO to

undertake a media blitz commemorating the sixti-

eth anniversary o urkish accession to NAO ear-

lier this year. 36

Despite these areas o concern, urkey’s com-

mitment to NAO has proven more durable than

some eared. Ankara remains one o the alliance’s

pillars, and the alliance certainly remains the most

respected and eective orum or urkey to pursue

its national interests.

 Why did the specter o urkish unilateralism

give way so quickly to renewed policy and opera-

tional collaboration? One part o the explanation

might be the emergence o an apparently sincere

and durable riendship between Obama and Erdo-gan; as mentioned previously, the president num-

bered the prime minister as one o his fve closest

oreign counterparts in a January 2012 interview 

 with Fareed Zakaria. 37  Another part may be the

lack o clear political beneit rom policies that

raise Washington’s ire. Unlike conrontations with

Israel over Palestinian rights, which play well at

home, dierences with the United States are not a

guaranteed hit with the urkish electorate. In act,

or generations o urkish voters raised to think o 

managing the bilateral relationship as a primary jobskill or their national leaders, riction with Wash-

ington could indicate that Erdogan is out o his

depth. Appearing close to the United States with-

out becoming a junior partner has long been the

“sweet spot” o urkish oreign policy.

Most important, events on the ground proved

that Erdogan’s ambitions to make urkey a leading

regional player could not be realized without a team

eort that involved the United States and NAO.

 A series o regional crises unolded in a complex,

interrelated manner throughout 2011, demonstrat-ing both the utility o unilateral measures and the

ecacy o common action. Foremost among these

 were the all o the Qadhaf regime in Libya, the

eruption against the Assad regime in Syria, and

the continuing struggle over Iran’s nuclear pro-

gram. Each o these crises contributed to urkey’s

movement away rom an autonomous path and

back toward joint action with the United States.

Strategic Evolution on Libya

One o last year’s most dramatic turnarounds in

 urkish oreign policy was on Libya. As late asmid-March 2011, urkey was still arguing against

a NAO role o any kind in the Libyan crisis. 38 Yet

 when a stalemate emerged between the regime and

the rebels, Erdogan came under increasing domes-

tic and international pressure to stop blocking more

decisive action. He proceeded careully, mindul

both o the thousands o urkish workers slowly 

fltering out o Libya and o his pious political sup-

port base at home, which was skeptical o West-

ern-led interventions. 39 Ankara had both regional

credibility and signiicant commercial and diplo-matic interests at stake in the crisis, and it began

to realize the danger o being let on the periphery 

as a postwar order ormed—France in particular

seemed poised to preempt urkey’s role.

 Ater careul NAO negotiations on modalities,

 urkey agreed by late March not only to approve

and participate in air and naval operations aimed

at blunting the Qadhaf regime’s attacks, but also

to allow activation o the NAO command node

in Izmir to coordinate air operations.40 Beore this

course change, grumbling against the urks couldbe heard in Brussels and Libya alike; by August,

however, Foreign Minister Davutoglu was back 

 within the inner circ les o NAO consultat ions

about Libya’s uture as well as the good graces o 

the opposition leadership in Benghazi.41 Te wis-

dom o operating with the blessing and ull weight

o NAO had borne ruit.

The Long, Slow Burn in Syria

 urkish policy toward the Syria crisis also changed

dramatically in mid-2011. Te results have yet toully play out, but the shit placed Ankara frmly 

 within the Euro-American policy mainstream.

 urkey ’s init ial strategy was ambitious and

autonomous: an evenhanded appeal to both the

 Assad regime and the opposition groups, seeking

gradual transition toward a democratic opening

7/30/2019 From Crisis to Cooperation Turkey’s Relations with Washington and NATO By Richard Outzen

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/from-crisis-to-cooperation-turkeys-relations-with-washington-and-nato-by 9/16

www.washingtoninstitute.org 9

From Crisis to Cooperation

in line with Ankara’s “zero problems with neigh-

bors” approach to oreign policy. his appears to

have been a serious miscalculation, one based on

a misunderstanding o Syrian politics and Bashar

al-Assad’s relationship with ehran.42 Erdogan was

 willing to incur Western ire with this approach, buthe was ultimately shamed into a more aggressive

position when Assad ignored urkish appeals and

began hammering the population.43 Remarkably,

 Ankara began to openly advocate regime change

by late 2011, believing that diplomatic avenues had

been exhausted. As one observer noted, “Tough

reraining rom backing military intervention, ur-

key supported the Western-initiated unilateral

sanctions, which were vetoed in October 2011 by 

Russia and China, despite the act that this attitude

contravened urkey’s policy o not acting outsidethe UN-endorsed legitimate platorms.”44 In act,

 urkey has quietly hosted and protected portions o 

the Free Syrian Army, one o several armed groups

ighting the Assad regime.45 By late March 2012,

 urkey was reportedly even considering imposi-

tion o a security buer zone to protect civilians in

northern Syria.46 

Indeed, 2011 seems to have taught Ankara the

limits o the “zero problems” approach and the

utility o uniied action with the West. he cost

o this lesson was high—had urkey tethered itsSyria policy to the West’s earlier, Assad and his Ira-

nian patrons might not have had time to organize

the crushing counterorce that has been applied

throughout 2012. he international community’s

slow and disjointed response gave Assad breath-

ing room, and gave Iran enough time to provide

the weapons, ammunition, and technical experts

needed to support his onslaught against Homs and

other opposition strongholds.47 

Turkish-Iranian Regional TensionsLast year was also the moment when the AKP gov-

ernment scanned the strategic horizon—Iraq, Syria,

the Arab Awakening, Aghanistan, relations with

the West—and realized that in nearly every case

Iran was a competitor rather than a partner.48 In

Iraq, competition centered on Shiite-Sunni power

sharing, with ehran supporting Prime Minister

Nouri al-Maliki and urkey advocating inclu-

sion o the Sunni-oriented Iraqiyah bloc. In Syria,

 Ankara bristled at ehran’s aggressive arming and

sustaining o the Assad regime, as well as its appar-

ent contempt or urkish attempts to achieve a

negotiated solution. As or relations with the West,Iran tried to dissuade urkey rom playing a role in

the NAO missile shield, even delivering a veiled

threat to attack the radar installation ater urkey 

agreed to host it.49 Tese three actors made clear

by late 2011 that urkey’s ancient rivalry with Iran

 was alive and well.

Meanwhile, the gains urkey had expected

rom closer Iranian ties never really materialized.

 Although bilateral trade increased to over $15 bil-

lion, the growth was almost entirely limited to gas

and oil sales. 50 In act, urkish and Iranian busi-nesses have been locked in cutthroat competition

throughout the region, especially Iraq; in Basra,

or example, urkish companies are direct rivals to

businesses owned by Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary 

Guard Corps. 51 On the security ront, tactical coop-

eration with Iran against the PKK and the Party 

or a Free Lie in Kurdistan (PJAK) did not sig-

nifcantly hinder their activities in southeast ur-

key. 52 On the strategic ront, simmering tensions

over competing interests in the Caucasus—regard-

ing energy routes, Azerbaijan’s strategic orientation,and shared Russo-Iranian unease over Western

inluence in Georgia and the broader region —

remained an underlying problem. And despite ur-

key’s nuanced position on Iran’s nuclear program,

the specter o ehran acquiring nuclear weapons

likely troubles Ankara no less than others in the

region. urkey still hosts a small number o NAO

nuclear weapons and thereore has no incentive to

develop its own such program. 53 Instead, it would

like to see transparent and verifable nuclear energy 

programs or itsel and its neighbors, and probably  views the NAO weapons and deense shield as

good leverage toward that end.

Given these and other areas o riction, compe-

tition, and concern, the cooling o urkish-Iranian

relations seems inevitable—it is dicult to imagine

that not being the case when two ambitious coun-

tries share a neighborhood. Erdogan’s urkey may 

7/30/2019 From Crisis to Cooperation Turkey’s Relations with Washington and NATO By Richard Outzen

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/from-crisis-to-cooperation-turkeys-relations-with-washington-and-nato-by 10/16

Policy Notes

10 www.washingtoninstitute.org 

once have entertained the notion o being a bridge-

head to the West or Iran and the Muslim world, but

it now appears to have resumed something like the

more traditional role o the West’s bridgehead in the

other direction. According to recent reports, urkish

diplomats have been quietly talking to Iran aboutstepping back its support or Assad, potentially in

exchange or consideration o a deal with the West

on a ormally recognized, peaceul nuclear program. 54 

I successul, such talks would ease several conicts

at once while reinorcing urkey’s nested role within

NAO and the West. And even i they ail, urkey 

appears frmly ensconced in the Western camp or

any tumult to ollow.

From Sudan to South Sudan

 Another irritant between Ankara and the West—ties with the Omar al-Bashir regime in Sudan—was also

greatly reduced in 2011. Previously, Erdogan had

drawn much criticism or his warm ties with Bashir

and his related assertion that Muslims could not

commit genocide in Darur or anywhere else. 55 Tis

unortunate association led to a acile linking o ur-

key, Muslims, and genocide at a time when Europe

 was debating ormal recognition o the 1915 “Arme-

nian genocide”—a complication that was hardly in

 urkey’s interest.

 urkey’s behavior since then has smoothed thesetensions. Ater the South Sudanese voted or inde-

pendence in January 2011 and declared statehood

in July 2011, Ankara was one o the frst capitals to

ormally recognize the new government. 56 urk-

ish businessmen soon began showing an interest

in investing in South Sudan, and one major proj-

ect has already been approved—the same approach

that helped catalyze positive relations with the

Kurds o northern Iraq ollowing the Iraq war. 57  

 And in May 2012, urkey agreed to start a health

sector assistance program, to include training orSouth Sudanese doctors in urkey. 58 Ankara has not

entirely abandoned Sudan proper, o course; most

recently, it attempted to organize an international

conerence on Sudanese development ollowing the

loss o southern oil reserves (the conerence been

postponed once and looks likely to be postponed a

second time). 59 

Implications

Last year, some urks began joking that Erdogan

and Davutoglu should adjust their oreign policy 

terminology to recognize the shit rom sifr prob-

lems to süper problems (in English, zero problems

to super problems). Indeed, the zero problems pol-icy—to the extent that it involved pursuing unilat-

eral approaches, not taking sides, and seeking incre-

mental solutions that pleased all parties—no longer

seems to reect urkey’s neighborhood or mindset.

In its place has emerged a more nuanced policy: one

that still seeks to remedy decades o neglect in ur-

key’s Eastern ties, but with less ambivalence about

 working with Western partners and institutions.

 What does this mean or the next ew years o 

 urkey-NAO and urkey-U.S. relat ions? One

must begin by clariying what the reversal doesnot mean. It certainly does not mean that concerns

over urkey’s strategic reliability have disappeared.

Erdogan remains a deeply passionate, populist, and

ideologically ocused leader, one who is tremen-

dously popular in both urkey and the region. He

is no longer constrained by a politically powerul

Kemalist security establishment, a bad economy,

a straightjacket constitution, a ully independent

media, or a comparable opposition party. his

dominance is also tied to the troubling use o extra-

legal methods (e.g., abricated evidence, threats,extended investigations and detentions) to punish

and demoralize critics in the military, press, and

civil society.60 Although many applaud Erdogan or

stripping the military o its priveleged praetorian

role, the institution had previously orged a strong,

three-decade record o support or modernization,

EU accession, and reorm while providing insur-

ance against strategic ailure or reorientation.61 Te

politically neutered military has no apparent suc-

cessor in that role.

 Te AKP’s uture leadership is another wild card.Erdogan is expected to run or the presidency in

 2014, and his political base includes components

ocused on business, nationalism, political reorm,

and Islam. But the urkish constitution stipu-

lates that the prime minister cease his ailiation

 with the AKP to assume the post o nonpartisan

presidency, and his exit rom the AKP could expose

7/30/2019 From Crisis to Cooperation Turkey’s Relations with Washington and NATO By Richard Outzen

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/from-crisis-to-cooperation-turkeys-relations-with-washington-and-nato-by 11/16

From Crisis to Cooperation Outzen

www.washingtoninstitute.org 11

sharp edges o this disparate coalition, resulting in

political turmoil and oreign policy volatility. Exter-

nal complications—such as a regional war involving

Iran and Israel, open conict with Cyprus and/or

Israel over Eastern Mediterranean gas felds, or a

crisis in northern Iraq—could also disrupt the gen-erally positive trend o greater strategic harmoniza-

tion between urkey, Washington, and NAO.

In addition, observers recognize that urkey has

at least two strategic alternatives to NAO. he

frst is remaining ideologically agnostic, grouping

 with other emerging economic powers to maintain

a truly nonaligned and balanced strategic approach.

 his entails acting in unison with the “BRICs”—

Brazil, Russia, India, and China.62 he second

alternative is to recognize that urkey has more in

common with other emerging democracies than with economically dynamic authoritarian regimes.

 Tis orm o nonalignment would place urkey in

a wider group reerred to as “IBSAI”—India, Bra-

zil, South Arica, urkey, and Indonesia. Although

IBSAI would leave more room or urkish coop-

eration with the West than BRIC alignment, it

could still entail a pace and modality o action

that precludes truly joint action.63 For now, BRIC

remains an analytic tool or investors more than or

geostrategists, and IBSAI more o a pipe dream—

nevertheless, NAO should jealously promote and

guard its “Leading Acronym” status in Ankara.64 

 he dramatic eects o the global economic

crisis deserve mention as well. Many o urkey’s

Mediterranean neighbors are experiencing severe

dislocations due to problems with debt, budgets,

capital markets, and currency. Greece stands out

as the primary example, but Spain, Italy, and sev-

eral others might be added to the list. Te possible

political allout rom these troubles could signif-

cantly alter urkey’s relations with its NAO part-

ners. For example, what i nationalist backlash to

budgetary austerity vaults xenophobic parties into

power in these states, bringing anti-urkish senti-

ment to the ore? What i socialist resurgence in

France and elsewhere leads some states to abjure

oreign military participation, rendering common

NAO approaches impractical or irrelevant? urk-

ish leadership in NAO might actually become

more important under those conditions, but amid

generally diminished capabilities or the alliance as

a whole.

 Tese concerns highlight the cyclical nature o 

 urkey’s attachment to the West and how sensitive

that attachment is to regional events. In responseto this broad lesson, Washington should proceed

cautiously. At the same time, however, the ground

seems ertile or a high degree o policy and opera-

tional collaboration moving orward.

Is the Missile Shielda Watershed?

In this most uncertain period or NAO, missile

deense could prove to be the opening chapter

o a “golden age” or urkey’s role in the alliance.

 Although Erdogan did not immediately agree to

the stationing o antimissile systems in urkey, he

subsequently appeared to recognize the huge con-

sequences attendant to the choice. Regional trends

seemed to convince him that NAO’s good graces

 were more important than the ability to portray his

country as nonaligned. By November 2010, when

the alliance held a summit in Lisbon, the concep-

tual groundwork or a compromise had been laid.

Details were hammered out in the frst hal o 2011,

and by mid-September, urkey had agreed to the

stationing o a U.S. radar system to complement

interceptor missiles in Romania and Poland, along

 with seaborne components.65 By February 2012, the

 X-band radar installation was installed and oper-

ating at Kurecik near Malatya, roughly 435 miles

rom the Iranian border.66 

 Te missile shield deployment may prove to be

a oundational event or NAO in the twenty-frst

century. Te alliance has struggled to clearly articu-

late purpose and relevance since the demise o the

Soviet bloc, and the Aghanistan mission gave only 

a temporary reprieve, but missile deense oersthe prospect o a undamental resuscitation. As

the agenda or NAO’s May 2012 Chicago sum-

mit indicates, the shield is the alliance’s main area

o ocus outside Aghanistan.67  Te West needed an

unambiguous statement that urkey’s leaders still

see their destiny tied to NAO more than to their

authoritarian neighbors. Ankara’s commitment to

play a major role in the missile shield ft the bill.

7/30/2019 From Crisis to Cooperation Turkey’s Relations with Washington and NATO By Richard Outzen

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/from-crisis-to-cooperation-turkeys-relations-with-washington-and-nato-by 12/16

Policy Notes

12 www.washingtoninstitute.org 

Policy Openings

 Te current situation calls or a ew prudent initia-

tives to both sustain Ankara’s westward policy tilt

and maximize urkish contributions to regional

stability, development, and democratization:

NAO should design a program or new 

democracies in the Arab world similar to its

post-Soviet Partnership or Peace initiative,

assigning urkey as the lead nation. A NAO

mechanism with a heavy urkish avor would

excite ar ewer antibodies than bilateral security 

cooperation programs run by individual Western

nations. It would also give NAO an opportu-

nity to invest in urkey through expanded train-

ing and exchange capacity without a large armed

presence.

 Te United States should cement the sine qua

non o Ankara’s commitment to NAO by 

protecting urkey’s vulnerable security lanks:

Cyprus and the PKK. On Cyprus, Washington

should use proactive, balanced diplomacy to

keep the urks at the table and bring the Cypri-

ots there too. Although Ankara believes in the

undamental justice o its cause in Cyprus—sup-

porting the island’s urkish-speaking commu-

nity and preventing urkey’s own geostrategicencirclement—it is still open to a negotiated

settlement. I the EU overplays its diplomatic

and economic leverage, however, urkey may 

do something rash like annex northern Cyprus,

undoing the good work o the past year. As or

the PKK, the United States should continue

low-proile, high-value-added support to ur-

key against that group as well as all other violent

extremist organizations. Whenever Washington

or Europe have proven tone dea to urkish con-

cerns over Kurdish separatism and terrorism, asin the run-up to the Iraq war, Ankara’s response

has been predictably bad.

 Te United States must take the lead in reconcil-

ing urkey and Israel. It is dicult to imagine

ull rapprochement happening without strong

Israeli-Palestinian recommitment to two-state

negotiations, since the conict drives much o 

the rancor between Israel and Ankara. Te wis-

est policy step Washington can take would be to

arrange the ollowing trade: Erdogan agrees tospeak about and with the Israelis in the manner

and tone o serious diplomacy, and the United

States and Israel agree to treat urkey as an

interested and capable player in the process. Tis

 would require Erdogan to reduce the amount o 

anti-Israeli rhetoric in his domestic politicking

and to end his reliance on opposition to Israel as

the main support or his aspiration to regional

leadership. For Israel and the United States,

opportunities outweigh the costs o such a trade.

 Ater all , the moribund Quartet process was

always a bit o a non sequitur, including as it did

a remote, troubled Russia while excluding nearby,

surging urkey. Call it a “Quintet” i necessary,

but any new eort to orge a durable Israeli-

Palestinian peace process must fnd a construc-

tive role or a newly assertive urkey. Te pros-

pects or a two-state solution would improve

 with urkey’s support, but may suer greatly i 

 Ankara is let to the role o outside agitator.

In the inal analysis, things are back to normalbetween urkey and the United States—“normal”

meaning a stable period o conditional cooperation

and intermittent solidarity sandwiched between

periodic crises and disappointments. During the

recent NAO summit in Chicago, urkey ea-

tured prominently in discussions o NAO’s uture

strategic posture and deense capabilities.68 ur-

key remains a necessary, i dynamic, cornerstone o 

the alliance as much in 2012 as it did in 1952, and

 Washington should maintain the current, posi-

tive momentum to ensure the cornerstone remains

frmly seated. Otherwise, the next crisis or misun-

derstanding may do more than cast a pall on bilat-

eral relations: it may reeze NAO’s orward move-

ment altogether.

7/30/2019 From Crisis to Cooperation Turkey’s Relations with Washington and NATO By Richard Outzen

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/from-crisis-to-cooperation-turkeys-relations-with-washington-and-nato-by 13/16

From Crisis to Cooperation Outzen

www.washingtoninstitute.org 13

Notes

1. Robert Grothwol and Donita Moorhus, Bricks, Sand, and Marble: U.S. Army Corps o Engineers Construction inthe Mediterranean and Middle East 1947–1991 (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center or Military History, 2009), pp.17–27.

 2. Fusun Doskaya, “urkish-American Relations Concerning the Cyprus Question,” Dokuz Eylul University website,accessed March 30, 2012, http://web.deu.edu.tr/kibris/articles/hist.html.

 3. James rinnaman, urkey: A est Case in the Future o Alliances (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army Strategic Studies Institute,1976), pp. 12–15, 19–20.

4. Paul Wolowitz, remarks at the American urkish Council’s twentieth anniversary conerence, March 26, 2001, http:// www.deense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=338.

 5. “NAO’s Operations,” NAO website, accessed May 13, 2012, http://www.aco.nato.int/resources/21/NAO%20Operations,%201949-Present.pd .

6. Haldun Canci and Sevket Serdan Sen, “urkish Dilemma ater Operation Desert Storm (1990–1991): An Analysis o ‘Negative Consequences,’” European Journal o Social Science Research 23, no. 3 (2010), pp. 279–292.

7. F. Stephen Larrabee, roubled Partnership: U.S.-urkish Relations in an Era o Global Geopolitical Change (Santa

Monica, CA: Project Air Force/RAND, 2010), pp. 7–9.

8. Soner Cagaptay, “Can the PKK Renounce Violence?” Middle East Quarterly (Winter 2007), pp. 45–52.

9. Gokhan Bacik and Bulent Aras, “urkey’s Inescapable Dilemma: Te U.S. or Europe?” Alternatives: urkish Journal o International Relations 3, no. 4 (Spring 2004), pp. 67–68.

10. William Johnsen, “urkey and Europe: Expectations and Complications,” in urkey’s Strategic Position at the Cross-roads o World Aairs, ed. Stephen Blank and Stephen Pelletiere (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army Strategic Studies Institute,1993), pp. 7–15.

11. Ely Karmon, “A Solution to Syrian errorism,” Middle East Quarterly (June 1999), pp. 23–32.

12. Mark Parris, “Allergic Partners: Can U.S.-urkish Relations Be Saved?” urkish Policy Quarterly 4, no. 1, (Spring 2005),http://www.turkishpolicy.com/article/184/allergic-partners-can-the-relations-be-saved.

13. Soner Cagaptay, Svante Cornell, Ian Lesser, and Omer aspinar, “urkish Foreign Policy under the AKP: Te Rit with Washington,” Policy Notes no. 3 (Washington Institute or Near East Policy, January 2011), http://www.washing-toninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/turkish-oreign-policy-under-the-akp-the-rit-with-washington.

14. David Kenner, “Te Long wilight o the U.S.-urkish Alliance,” Foreign Policy, November 29, 2010, http://blog.or-eignpolicy.com/posts/2010/11/29/the_long_twilight_o_the_us_turkey_alliance.

15. Oya Durs un-Ozk anca, “urkey-NAO Relations at a Crossro ads ahead o NAO’s New Strat e-gic Concept,” Hurriyet Daily News, October 15, 2010, http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/deault.aspx?pageid=438&n=turkey-nato-relations-at-a-crossroads-ahead-o-nato8217s-new-strategic-concept-2010-10-14.

16. “Erdogan ‘Like a Rock Star,’ Obama’s rade Guru Says,” Stonegate Institute website, September 22, 2011, http://www.stonegateinstitute.org/2443/erdogan-like-a-rock-star-obama-trade-guru-says. See also “Obama Names urkey’s Erdo-gan among op Five International Friends,” oday’s Zaman, January 20, 2012.

17. Author conversations with several leading urkish journalists in Ankara, May 7–9, 2012.

18. Jonathan Head, “urkey to Escort Gaza Aid Ships amid Row with Israel,” BBC News Europe, September 8 2011,http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-14844902.

19. James Reinl, “U.S. Rejects Iran Nuclear Deal Brokered by urkey and Brazil and Sets Up New Sanctions,” May 20, 2010, Te National, http://www.thenational.ae/news/world/us-rejects-iran-nuclear-deal-brokered-by-turkey-and-bra-zil-and-sets-up-new-sanctions.

 20. “On Eve o Elections, A More Upbeat Mood in urkey,” Pew Global Attitudes Project, Pew Research Center, June7, 2011.

7/30/2019 From Crisis to Cooperation Turkey’s Relations with Washington and NATO By Richard Outzen

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/from-crisis-to-cooperation-turkeys-relations-with-washington-and-nato-by 14/16

Policy Notes

14 www.washingtoninstitute.org 

 21. “2011 Key Findings,” ransatlantic rends Project, German Marshall Fund o the United States, Washingon, D.C.,accessed March 8, 2012, http://www.transatlantictrends.org.

 22. Kadri Gursel, “Only Erdogan Can Save NAO,” Hurriyet Daily News, November 27, 2011 http://www.hurriyetdaily-news.com/deault.aspx?pageid=438&n=only-erdogan-can-save-nato-2011-11-27 .

 23. Ibid.

 24. urkish Ministry o Foreign Aairs, “Foreign Minister Davutoglu Paid a Visit to NAO HQ on the Occasion o the 60th Anniversary o urkey’s Membership to NAO,” January 18, 2012, accessed March 9, 2012, http://www.ma.gov.tr/oriegn-minister-davutoglu-paid-a-visi-to-nato-headquarters-on-the-occasion-o-the-60th-anniversary-o-turkeys-membership-to-nato.en.ma.

 25. “Allied Command Operations,” NAO website, accessed March 9, 2012, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/top-ics_52091.htm. 

 26. Linda Karadaku, “NAO Members, Partners Meet to Discuss Shaping the Region’s Peaceul Future,” SEimes.com,May 11, 2012, http://www.setimes.com/cocoon/setimes/xhtml/en_GB/eatures/setimes/eatures/2012/05/11/eature-02.

 27. “NAO Organization,” NAO website, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/structure.htm, accessed May 13, 2012.

 28. “Counter-Piracy Operations,” NAO website, accessed March 9, 2012, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/top-ics_48815.htm.

 29. “Operation Active Endeavour,” NAO website, accessed March 9, 2012, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/top-ics_7932.htm.

 30. “NAO and Libya,” NAO website, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_71652.htm. See also “Operation Uni-fed Protector: NAO Arms Embargo, NAO No-Fly Zone,” GlobalSecurity.org, http://www.globalsecurity.org/mili-tary/world/war/unifed-protector.htm.

 31. “urkish Contribution to NAO Operations o Libya akes Shape,” Bosphorus Naval News blog, March 24, 2011,http://turkishnavy.blogspot.com/2011/03/-243-tcg-yldrm.html.

 32. NAO ransormed (Brussels: NAO Public Diplomacy Division, 2004), pp. 4–8, 15.

 33. Nil Satana, “ransormation o the urkish Military and the Path to Democracy,” Armed Forces and Society 34, no. 3

(April 2008).

 34. Judy Dempsey, “Between the European Union and NAO, Many Walls,” New York imes, November 24, 2010, http:// www.nytimes.com/2010/11/25/world/europe/25iht-letter.html.

 35. Menekse okyay, “urkey and NAO: 60 Years On,” urkish Weekly, February 15, 2012, http://www.turkishweekly.net/news/131373/turkey-and-nato-60-years-on.html.

 36. International Strategic Research Organization, “NAO on the 60th Anniversary o urkish Membership,” February  28, 2012, http://www.usak.org.tr/EN/myazdir.asp?id=2495.

 37. Fareed Zaka ri a, “I ns ide Obama’s Wor ld : he Pre sident alks to I ME about the Changi ng Natu reo American Power,” ime Magazine, January 12, 2012, http://swampland.time.com/2012/01/19/inside-obamas-world-the-president-talks-to-time-about-the-changing-nature-o-american-power/?iid=sl-main-lede. 

 38. Akin Unver, “NAO’s Libya Operation Unpopular in urkey,” Foreign Policy Blogs, May 20, 2011, http://oreignpoli-cyblogs.com/2011/05/12/natos-libya-operation-unpopular-in-turkey .

 39. “Erdogan’s Lament,” Economist, April 7, 2011.

40. Akin Unver, “NAO’s Libya Air Operations Center Moves to urkey,” Foreign Policy Blogs, March 25, 2011, http://oreignpolicyblogs.com/2011/03/25/natos-libya-air-operations-center-moves-to-turkey .

41. Darren Butler and David Stamp, “urkish Foreign Minister in Benghazi,” Reuters Arica, August 23, 2011, http://a.reuters.com/article/tunisiaNews/idAFL5E7JN0VO20110823.

7/30/2019 From Crisis to Cooperation Turkey’s Relations with Washington and NATO By Richard Outzen

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/from-crisis-to-cooperation-turkeys-relations-with-washington-and-nato-by 15/16

From Crisis to Cooperation Outzen

www.washingtoninstitute.org 15

42. Michael Kennedy, “urkey Falters as a Power Broker,” Los Angeles imes, March 12, 2012.

43. Saban Kardas, urkey’s Syria Policy: Te Challenge o Coalition Building (Washington, DC: German Marshall Fund o the U.SFebruary 17, 2012), p. 1.

44. Ibid.

45. Oliver renkamp, “Deserters Battle Assad rom urkey,” Spiegel Online, February 24, 2012, http://www.spiegel.de/international/

 world/0,1518,817225,00.html.

46. Adrian Blomfeld, “urkey Urges Nationals to Leave Syria as It Considers Buer Zone,” London elegraph, March 16, 2012.

47. Joby Warrick and Liz Sly, “U.S. Ocials: Iran Is Stepping Up Lethal Aid to Syria,” Washington Post, March 3, 2012, http://www

 washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/us-ocials-iran-is-stepping-up-lethal-aid-to-syria/2012/03/02/gIQAGR9XpR_story

html.

48. Yigal Sch leier, “urkey and Iran: he Rivalry o r Dominance o the Middle East,” Eurasianet.org , February 12, 2012, accessed at the Atlantic website, http://www.theatlantic .com/international/archive/2012/02turkey-vs-iran-the-rivalry-or-dominance-o-the-middle-east/253567 .

49. “Iran Says Could arget urkey Missile Shield,” Reuters Arica, November 26, 2011, http://a.reuters.com/article/worldNewsidAFRE7AP0PH20111126.

 50. Yig al Sc hl ei er, “urke y an d Ir an : h e Ri va lr y o r Do mi nanc e o the Mi dd le Ea st ,” Eu ra si an et .o rg , Febr uary 12, 2012, accessed at the Atlantic website, http://www.theatlantic .com/international/archive/2012/02turkey-vs-iran-the-rivalry-or-dominance-o-the-middle-east/253567 .

 51. Abdullah Bozkurt, “urkey akes Fight to Iran over Iraqi South,” oday’s Zaman, March 12, 2012, http://www.todayszaman.comcolumnistDetail_getNewsById.action?newsId=274017 .

 52. Sebnem Arsu, “urkey and Iran Agree to Cooperate against Kurdish Rebels on Border,” New York imes, October 21, 2011, http:/ www.nytimes.com/2011/10/22/world/europe/turkey-and-iran-agree-to-cooperate-against-kurdish-rebels.html.

 53. Sinan Ulgen, “urkey and the Bomb,” Carnegie Papers on Nuclear Policy (Washington, D.C., February 2012), p. 1.

 54. Rick Gladstone, “Diplomatic Moves Increase Pressure on Assad,” New York imes, March 29, 2012, http://www.nytimecom/2012/03/29/world/middleeast/assad-seems-to-mimic-iranian-strategy-or-survival.html.

 55. “Sudanese President Bashir’s Visit to urkey in Limbo,” Hurriyet Daily News, August 11, 2009, http://www.hurriyetdailynews.comdeault.aspx?pageid=438&n=a-muslim-can-never-commit-genocide-erdogan-deends-bashir-2009-11-08.

 56. “U.S., urkey Recognize New Nation o South Sudan,” oday’s Zaman, July 9, 2011, http://www.todayszaman.com/newsDetail_getNewsById.action?newsId=249978.

 57. “urkish Businessman Will Build a Hotel in South Sudan,” Porturkey.com, December 26, 2011, http://www.portturkey.comreal-estate/331-turkish-businessman-will-build-a-hotel-in-south-sudan.

 58. “South Sudan: urkey to rain Local Medical Doctors,” SudaneseOnline.com, October 4, 2011, http://www.sudaneseonline.comenglish/press-releases/4268-south-sudan-turkey-to-train-local-medical-doctors.html.

 59. “Sudan Hints at Postponement o the urkey Economic Conerence amid U.S. Pressure,” Sudan ribune, March 7, 2012, http:/ www.sudantribune.com/Sudan-hints-at-postponement-the,41836.

60. Dani Rodrik, “Democracy in urkey,” National Inte rest, February 11, 2012, http://nationalinterest.org/print/commentarydemocracy-turkey-4857?page=1.

61. Ersel Aydinli, Nihat Ali Ozcan, and Dogan Akyaz, “Te urkish Military’s March toward Europe,” Foreign Aairs ( JanuaryFebruary 2006), http://www.oreignaairs.com/articles/61379/ersel-aydinli-nihat-ali-%C3%83%C2%B6zcan-and-dogan-akyazthe-turkish-militarys-march-toward-europe. 

62. “BRIC Father to Include urkey in New Grouping,” Hurriyet Daily News, January 17, 2011, http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/deault.aspx?pageid=438&n=8216bric-ather-to-include-turkey-in-new-grouping-2011-01-17 .

7/30/2019 From Crisis to Cooperation Turkey’s Relations with Washington and NATO By Richard Outzen

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/from-crisis-to-cooperation-turkeys-relations-with-washington-and-nato-by 16/16

Policy NotesPolicy Notes

1828 L Street NW, Suite 1050 • Washington, DC 20036

63. ed Piccone and Emily Aliniko, “Rising Democracies ake On Russia and China,” National Interest, February 17, 2012, http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/rising-democracies-take-russia-china-6525.

64. Sadanand Dhume, “Failure 2.0,” Foreign Policy, March 16, 2012, http://www.oreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/03/16/india_nonalignment_2.0_ailure.

65. Tom Shanker, “U.S. Hails Deal with urkey on Missile Shield,” New York imes, September 15, 2011, www.nytimes.com/2011/09/16/world/europe/turkey-accepts-missile-radar-or-nato-deense-against-iran.html. 

66. Dusan Stojanovic, “U.S. Has Missile Radar Site in urkey,” Boston Globe, February 27, 2012.

67. “NAO Deence Ministers Pave the Way to the Chicago Summit,” NAO website, February 2, 2012, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_83986.htm.

68. Elizabeth Sherwood-Randall, “NAO Summit Outcomes,” Remarks to the Atlantic Council, Washington, D.C., May  24, 2012, http://www.acus.org/event/nato-chicago-summit-outcomes-and-way-ahead/transcript.