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The Case of Iceland The Case of Iceland Thorvaldur Gylfason Thorvaldur Gylfason Presentation at the Annual Meetings Presentation at the Annual Meetings of the American Economic Association of the American Economic Association in Denver 6-9 January 2011 in Denver 6-9 January 2011

From boom to bust

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From boom to bust. The Case of Iceland. Thorvaldur Gylfason Presentation at the Annual Meetings of the American Economic Association in Denver 6-9 January 2011. background. In 1904, Iceland was Ghana But, general literacy since 1800 Iceland caught up with Denmark - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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Page 1: From boom to bust

The Case of IcelandThe Case of Iceland

Thorvaldur GylfasonThorvaldur GylfasonPresentation at the Annual MeetingsPresentation at the Annual Meetings

of the American Economic Associationof the American Economic Associationin Denver 6-9 January 2011in Denver 6-9 January 2011

Page 2: From boom to bust

In 1904, Iceland was GhanaBut, general literacy since 1800

Iceland caught up with DenmarkShared with Norway first place on the UN

Human Development Index in 2006 With hard work, improved education,

and some fish, Iceland became a prosperous and egalitarian welfare stateUntil mid-1990s, income distribution

Iceland was about as equal as in Scandinavia and Finland; more on this later Source: Official estimates of Gini index

Page 3: From boom to bust

Even so, Iceland charted a course that was different from the Nordic norm Overrepresentation of rural areas in parliament

still imparts a provincial, protectionist bias to economic policy and organization Until 2003, rural areas kept their majority in parliament

even if nearly 2/3 of the people now live in Reykjavík This may help explain the Icelanders’

somewhat insular mentality … … and, with it, the current lack of enthusiasm

about joining the EU, even after the crash of 2008

… and why Iceland needs a new constitution

Page 4: From boom to bust

The electoral bias resulted in Slow and lopsided transition from a rigid,

quasi-planned economy toward a more flexible, mixed, social market economy

Reluctant and slow depolitization of economic life, including the banks that were privatized à la russe as late as 1998-2003, and crashed spectacularly in 2008

Foreign creditors needed to write off debts equivalent to about five times Iceland’s GDP In addition, domestic residents lost two times GDP

for a grand total of seven times GDPseven times GDP, a world record

Page 5: From boom to bust

Mid-2008

Page 6: From boom to bust

Giudotti-Greenspan Rule

Mid-2008

End 2008

Page 7: From boom to bust

How did they grow?

Icelandic banks copied each other’s business model, and took excessive risks Fine while the going was good But, if one fell, others were likely to fall as

well Banks faced an insignificant home market,

so their choice was essentially to “evolve (i.e., become international) or die”

Banks chose the former … They became international, deriving in 2007

half their earnings from abroad 31 subsidiaries in 21 countries (October 2007)

… only to suffer the latter

BEFOREBEFORE

Page 8: From boom to bust

“The Best Way to Rob a Bank is to Own One” When a senior officer deliberately causes bad loans

to be made he does not defraud himselfdoes not defraud himself He defrauds the bank’s creditors and shareholdersdefrauds the bank’s creditors and shareholders,

as a means of optimizing fictional accounting income

It pays to seek out bad loans because only those who have no intention of repaying are willing to offer the high loan fees and interest required

1. Grow really fast 2. Make really bad loans at higher yields 3. Pile up debts4. Put aside pitifully low loss reserves

Akerlof and Romer (1993):

“Looting: Bankruptcy for

Profit”

Four-point recipe

SIC report (2009)

AFTERAFTER

Page 9: From boom to bust

“The Best Way to Rob a Bank is to Own One” When a senior officer deliberately causes bad loans

to be made he does not defraud himselfdoes not defraud himself He defrauds the bank’s creditors and shareholdersdefrauds the bank’s creditors and shareholders,

as a means of optimizing fictional accounting income

It pays to seek out bad loans because only those who have no intention of repaying are willing to offer the high loan fees and interest required

1. Grow really fast 2. Make really bad loans at higher yields 3. Pile up debts4. Put aside pitifully low loss reserves

The script is from Mel

Brooks’s movie, The

Producers (1968):

A flop pays better than a hit

Page 10: From boom to bust

The euphoria that swept Iceland during the boom was not shared by all Of 182K families, over 100K have little or no debt

They were not invited, or chose not to attend At the other end of the scale, 244 families at end-

2008 had debts in excess of $1.2 million, with assets that fall short of their debts

Further, 440 families have debts in excess of their assets – that is, negative net worth – to the tune of $400K or more

Of the 182K families, 81K have assets below $40K, whereas 1,400 families have assets of $1.2 million or more

Page 11: From boom to bust

Inequality in distribution of disposable income increased sharply from approximate parity with Nordics in mid-1990s to parity with US in 2007 Dramatic change resulting from deliberate deliberate

shift of the tax burden shift of the tax burden from the rich to the rest

Before onset of crisis, increased disparity of income and wealth was one of several signs that Iceland was headed for trouble Self-dealing at top end of income scale

Increased inequality also preceded the Great Depression in the US 1929-39

Page 12: From boom to bust

Nordics cluster around 25 to 27

Source: Revenue Directorate