FRENCH WHITE PAPER - globalsecurity.org · FRENCH WHITE PAPER DEFENCE AND NATIONAL SECURITY. 2013 FRENCH WHITE PAPER DEFENCE AND NATIONAL SECURITY. 23 A.FraFnc re:e 3 EAru 2 A. r:AurA:cnEA:orp

foreword byFrançois Hollande

President of the French Republic

2013

FRENCH WHITEPAPER

D E F E N C E AND NATIONAL

S E C U R I T Y

2013

FRENCH WHITEPAPER

D E F E N C E AND NATIONAL

S E C U R I T Y

FRENCH WHITE PAPER ON DEFENCE AND NATIONAL SECURITY - 2013

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Sommaire

Preface by the President of the Republic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7

Introduction: The case for a White Paper . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .9

Chapter 1 - France in the new strategic landscape . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .13 A.France:aEuropeanpowerwithglobalreach. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 B.Franceiscommittedtoinstitutionalstructuresthatenhanceits

securitybutalsoincreaseitsresponsibilities. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

Chapter 2 - The foundations of the strategy for defence and national security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .19 A.Preservingourindependenceandoursovereignty. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 B.Ensuringthelegitimacyofouractionsbothnationally

andinternationally. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

Chapter 3 - The State of the World . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .27 A.Strategicshiftsanddevelopments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 B.Threatsrelatedtopower. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 C.Risksofweakness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 D.Threatsandrisksintensifiedbyglobalisation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40

Chapter 4 - The strategic priorities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .47 A.ProtectthenationalterritoryandFrenchnationalsabroad,and

guaranteethecontinuityoftheNation'sessentialfunctions . . . . . . 47 B.GuaranteethesecurityofEuropeandtheNorthAtlanticspace,

withourpartnersandallies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 C.StabiliseEurope'snearenvironment,withourpartnersandallies. 53 D.ContributetothestabilityoftheMiddleEast

andtheArabo-PersianGulf . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55 E.Contributetopeaceintheworld . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56


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Chapter 5 - France's engagement in the Atlantic Alliance and in the European Union . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59

A.FranceinNATO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60 B.FranceintheEuropeanUnion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62

Chapter 6 - Implementing the strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67 A.Knowledgeandanticipation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68 B.Deterrence. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72 C.Protection. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74 D.Prevention. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77 E.Intervention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79

Chapter 7 - The resources required to implement the strategy . . . . . . . . . 83 A.Anoperationalcontractandanarmedforcesmodeladapted

tothenewcontext. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84 -Fourguidingprinciples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84 -Operationalcontract . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86 -Thearmedforcesmodel. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89 B.Theglobalapproachinmanagingexternalcrises. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93 C.Meansforpreventionandmanagementofcrises

inthenationalterritory. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96 -Riskassessment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96 -Protectionoftheterritoryanditssurroundings. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97 -Thefightagainstterrorism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99 -Guaranteeingthecontinuityofvitalfunctions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99 -Thefightagainstcyber-threats. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100 -Theprotectionofthenation'sscientificandtechnicalpotential. 102 -Thefightagainstweapons’proliferationandtrafficking. . . . . . . . 102 -Thefightagainstdrugtraffickingandhumantrafficking. . . . . . . 103 -Improvingthestate'scapacitytorespondtocrises. . . . . . . . . . . . 103 -Frenchoverseasterritories. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104 -Capacityobjectivesforthenationalterritory. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105 -TheEuropeandimensionofnationalsecurity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106 D.Thewomenandmenservingdefenceandnationalsecurity. . . . . . 107 E.Thedefenceandsecurityindustry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117


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Summary and conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125 -Protection. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126 -Deterrence. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127 -Intervention. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127 -Knowledgeandanticipation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129 -Prevention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129 -Abudgeteffortcommensuratewiththestrategy. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129 -Thearmedforcesmodel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130 -Themenandwomenservingdefenceandnationalsecurity. . . . . . . 131 -Thedefenceandsecurityindustry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132


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Preface by the President of the Republic

Shortlyaftermyelection,IcommissionedanewWhitePaperonDefenceandNationalSecurity,asIconsideredthatthestateoftheworldcalledfornewstrategicguidelines.Whoamongusdoesnotseethatthecontexthaschangedappreciablysince2008?Europeismovingtowardseconomicandfinancialintegration,butatthecostofstringentcontrolsonpublicspendingasintroducedbythemainEUmembercountries.TheUnitedStatesispreparingtobringadecadeofmilitaryengagementtoanendandisreviewingitspriorities,withthegoalofrestoringpublicaccounts.Theemergingpowers,especiallyChina,haveembarkedonarebalancingoftheireconomytorespondtotheaspirationsoftheirmiddleclasses.Lastly,theArabworldhasenteredintoanewphaseofhistory,aphasethatbringsbothpromiseandrisk,asthetragiceventsinSyriahaveshown.Atthesametime,thethreatsalreadyidentifiedin2008–terrorism,cyber-attacks,nuclearproliferation,pandemics,etc.–havebecomeevenmorepressing.Thevitalneedforinternationalcoordinationtorespondtothembecomesmoreapparenteveryday.

Franceisnotunpreparedforthissituation.Itshistoryhasalwaysbeencloselyintertwinedwiththehistoryoftheworld.Throughitseconomy,itsideas,itslanguage,itsdiplomaticandmilitarycapabilitiesanditsseatattheUnitedNationsSecurityCouncil,Franceisfullyengagedontheinternationalscene,inaccordancewithitsinterestsanditsvalues.ItactsincloseconcertwithitsEuropeanpartnersanditsallies,butretainsitscapacityforindependentinitiative.

IamgratefultotheCommissiontaskedwithwritingtheWhitePaperonDefenceandNationalSecurityforitscontributiontoinformingourchoices.Forthefirsttime,thisCommission,whichbringstogetherMPs,representativesofthestateandindependentexperts,hasalsoincludedtwoEuropeans,aGermanandaBritishrepresentative.Thisopening-upismeaningful.

TheWhitePaperhighlightsthethreeprioritiesofourdefencestrategy:protection,deterrenceandintervention.Theyreinforceeachotherandareinseparable.WemustguaranteetheprotectionofFrenchcitizens,includingagainstcyber-relatedthreats,preservethecredibilityofournucleardeterrenceandexplicitlyaffirmourrighttotaketheinitiativeinactionsthatdefendourinterestsandthoseoftheinternationalcommunity.OuraimistoguaranteeFrance’ssecurity


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bymobilisingallforcesinanation-wideeffort,whichmustitselfbeembeddedinthebroaderframeworkofbuildinganeffectiveEuropeandefencepolicy.

TheWhitePapertakesintoaccounttheevolutionofourdefencecapabilitiessetagainstthebudgetaryconstraintsweareexperiencingtoday.Itconveysaclearwilltoretainautonomous,swift-reactiondeploymentmilitarymeansrelyingonwell-trained,well-equippedandwell-informedforces.Theymustbeabletohaveadecisiveimpactinregionswherethegreatestthreatstoourinterestsandthoseofourpartnersandalliesarelocated.TheyenableFrancetoassumeitsresponsibilities,asitdidinMali.

Thismissionisnotonlytheresponsibilityofthestate.Itisalsotheresponsibility,inpart,oflocalandregionalgovernmentsand-wheretheirinterestsareontheline-thatofcompanies.In2008,thisobservationledtotheformulationoftheconceptofnationalsecurity.TheWhitePaperondefenceandnationalsecuritythereforeoutlinesablueprintforthefutureofourcountry’sdefence.Today,ifFranceistofulfilitspotential,thismissioncallsforthecommitmentofeverybody:militarypersonnel,intelligencepersonnel,thepolice,gendarmes,diplomats,publicagentsandvolunteers,aswellasordinarycitizens,forweareallactivelyresponsibleforournationalsecurity.

FrançoisHollande


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Introduction: The case for a White Paper

ItisfiveyearssincethelastWhitePaperwaspublished.Majoreventshaveoccurredintheinterveningperiodandthevolatilestrategiccontextalludedtointhe2008WhitePaperhasbeenconfirmed.Franceneedstoassesstheimplicationsofthisforitsdefenceandnationalsecuritystrategy.Inarapidlychangingworld,Franceneedstobeabletoreactswiftly,whilstensuringthatitsresponseispartofastrategicvision.ThetimeframeforthisWhitePaperisthusalong-termone,extendingoversome15years.Thedefenceandnationalsecuritystrategyaimstosetouttheprinciples,priorities,actionframeworksandresourcesneededtoensureFrance'ssecurityforthelongterm.Thestrategywillnowberevisedregularly,everyfiveyears,whilecontinuingtotakealong-termperspective.

ThefinancialcrisisthathasbefallentheworldmarksabreakwiththecontextdescribedinthepreviousWhitePaper,forcingmanyStatestoamendtheirsecurityanddefencearrangements.Ithashighlightedtheeconomicaspectofnationalsecurity:theNation’sindependenceisthreatenedifpublicdeficitsmakeitdependentonitscreditors.Decisionsrelatingtopublicexpenditureondefenceandsecuritymustnotonlytakeaccountofthethreatstowhichourforcesarerequiredtorespond,butalsotheriskstooureconomicindependence.Therightbalancemustbestruckbetweenthesetwoprioritiessothatourdefenceandsecurityarrangementsareconsistentwiththeneedforfiscalconsolidation,andtoensurethatourdefenceandnationalsecuritysystemiscompatibleinthelongtermwithourinternationalresponsibilitiesandthedevelopmentofourstrategicenvironment.

Thecrisishashadasignificantimpactonourkeypartnersandallies.TheUnitedStatesarecuttingbackonmilitaryspendingandpartlyrefocusingtheirmilitaryeffortsontheAsia-Pacificregion.Consequently,ourUSalliesarelikelytobecomemoreselectivewithregardtotheirforeigncommitments.ItalsoputsmorepressureontheEuropeanstoshoulderresponsibilityforthesecurityissuesthatconcernthemmostdirectly.InEurope,thecrisishaspromptedtheEuropeanUniontotakemajoreconomicandfinancialstepstowardsmuchcloserintegration,whichcouldultimatelyopenupanewpoliticalperspective.


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However,withregardtosecurity,budgetaryconstraintshavesofarresultedinasteadyreductionindefencebudgets,intheabsenceofanyMemberStatecoordinationthatmightattenuateitsimpactontheEU’soveralldefenceeffort.

Thesechangesaretakingplaceasourdefenceandsecurityforcesarecalledupontodealwithahighlyunpredictablerangeofchallenges.Somesurprisesandperhapsevenstrategicshiftsarepossible,orevenprobable.Amongtherecentpoliticaleventsthathavemajor,unpredictableconsequencesforthestrategiclandscape,thepoliticalandsocialrevolutionsintheArabworldareofparticularsignificance.TheyhavepavedthewayforanewphaseofhistoryonEurope’sdoorstep,aphasethatbringsbothpromiseandrisk,asthesituationinLibyaandthetragiceventsinSyriahaveshown.ForFranceandforEurope,withtheirhistoriclinkstotheArabworld,thepeacefuldevelopmentofthisregionoftheworldisakeyissue.Insomerespects,theissueissimilartothechallengepresentedbythesuccessfulreturnoftheformercommunistcountriesintotheEuropeandemocraticfoldattheendoftheColdWar.

Militarythreatshavenotdisappeared.Therapidgrowthindefencebudgetsinmanycountries,particularlyinAsia,confirmsthis.Furthermore,thenumerousmilitaryoperationsinwhichFrancehasbeeninvolvedinrecentyears(Afghanistan,IvoryCoast,Libya,Mali)showthatmilitaryactionremainsanimportantpartofoursecurityefforts.Atthesametime,therisksandthreatsfacingtheNationaremorenumerousandmorediverse.Terrorism,cyberthreats,organisedcrime,thespreadofconventionalweapons,theproliferationofweaponsofmassdestruction,theriskofpandemicandtechnologicalandnaturalrisksmayallhaveseriousrepercussionsforthesecurityoftheNation.Thiswasalludedtointhe2008WhitePaperandhasbeenconfirmedbytheeventsofrecentyears.

Theconceptofnationalsecurity,introducedbythe2008WhitePaperandenshrinedintheLawof29July2009,isaresponsetothesechanges.InsteadofsimplyfocusingonprotectingourterritoriesandpopulationagainstexternalaggressionfromotherStates,itsscopehasbeenbroadenedtoincludetheneedforFrancetomanageanydirectorindirectrisksandthreatsthatmightimpactonthelifeoftheNation.Theterm“threat”,here,referstoanysituationinwhichFranceneedstodealwithapotentiallyhostileintent.Theterm“risk”referstoanydangerthatdoesnotincludeanyhostileintentbutwhichmightimpactonthesecurityofFrance:theythereforeincludepoliticaleventsaswellasnatural,industrial,healthandtechnologicalrisks.Inthecomplex,interconnectedworldinwhichwelive,itisunrealistictothinkthatabsenceofriskispossible.Theconceptofnationalsecurityexpressesanintentiontoadoptaholisticapproach


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toidentifyingrisksandthreats,aswellastotheresponserequired,usingacombinationoftoolsincludingknowledgeandforesight,protection,prevention,deterrenceandintervention.Infavouringthisapproach,FrancehasadoptedasimilarstancetothatofmostofitsmajorpartnersandtheEuropeanUnion.

Weliveinaworldinwhichthedevelopmentofnetworksandtheever-increasingcirculationofpeople,goods,capitalandinformationmakenationalborderslessrelevantandleadtogreaterinterdependence.Thesedevelopmentscouldbeafactorofvulnerabilitysincetheymakeitmorelikelythatcriseswillspreadaswellaspotentiallyincreasingtheirimpact.Theymayalsobeanassetsince,oncewehavetakenonboardalltheimplicationsofthefactthatoursecurityissuesarenotcircumscribedwithinourborders,wecanconstructjointresponseswithourpartnersandallies.Sincetheyfacethesamerisksandthreatsaswedo,wemustbuildonoursolidarityandseeksharedcapabilitiesthatreflectourmutualinterdependence.

Ourpartnersare,firstandforemost,theMemberStatesoftheEuropeanUnion,whosecommondestinyFrancehassharedformorethanhalfacentury.ForFrance,thisisafurtherreasontopaycarefulattentiontoitsownnationalcapabilities.InastrategiccontextinwhichEuropeisexpectedtoshouldergreaterresponsibilityforitsownsecurity,amovetowardsamorecollectiveEUresponsewillrequirepoolingofresourcesandstrong,coordinatedcommitmentfromallitsMemberStates;thefinancialcrisismakesthisevenmoreurgent.Foritspart,Francebelievesthatitwillbeabletocontributemoreeffectivelytoacollectiveresponseifitisabletoretainitscapacityforinitiativeandleadership.

Forwhileeveryplayermustbefullyengagedintheresponsetovariousthreatsandrisks,nosingleplayercanexpecttobeabletogoitalone.Atthenationallevel,responsibilitiesareincreasinglysharedbetweentheState,localandregionalgovernmentandoperatorsofessentialinfrastructure.AlthoughtheStateisstillresponsiblefororganisingandoperatingitsowncivilianandmilitarycapabilities,itnowalsohastoenableamuchwiderrangeofresourcestobemobilisedandcoordinated.ThedefenceandnationalsecuritystrategymustprovidegreaterorganisationalefficiencyandconsistencyinmobilisingallstakeholderstobolstertheresilienceoftheNation.AttheEuropeanlevel,inclarifyingthedirectionthatFrancehasdecidedtotakeinordertosafeguarditssecurity,theWhitePaperseekstoestablishanin-depthdialoguewiththeEUMemberStates,callingforanewambition.Thisdialogueaimstoreplacedefactointerdependencieswithorganisedinterdependencies,thusreconcilingsovereigntyandmutualdependence.Atthegloballevel,itseekstoexplainhow


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theFrenchstrategyfitsintothebroaderperspectiveofitscontributiontoaninternationalorderbasedonpeace,justiceandtheruleoflaw.

Whendealingwithrisksandthreats,successisprimarilydependentuponadeterminationtofaceuptothembytakingthenecessaryaction.ThedefenceandsecurityoftheNationareunderpinnedbyinterventionofpublicinstitutions(civilianandmilitary).Itrequiresawareness-buildingandtheinvolvementandsupportofallourfellowcitizens.TheFrenchpeopleareactivelyresponsiblefortheirownsecurity.Inthisrespect,a“defencemind-set”,inthebroadsense,isthefirstpillarofnationalsecurity.ItdemonstratesacollectiveresolvethatisunderpinnedbythecohesionoftheNation,andasharedvisionofitsdestiny.


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Chapter 1

France: a European power with global reach

A . France: a European power with global reach

Withoutwishingtounderestimatethepotentialofcertainstatesfordoingharm,orignoringtheriskofastrategicshift,Francenolongerfacesanydirect,explicitconventionalmilitarythreatagainstitsterritory.Unlikemanyothercountries,forthefirsttimeinitshistoryithasthegoodfortunetofinditself–alongwithitsEuropeanpartners–inanexceptionalclimateofpeaceandstability.ItisamemberoftheEuropeanUnion,apoliticalentitythathasmadeanyprospectofinternalconflictquiteunthinkable.Furthermore,sincetheendoftheColdWar,theEuropeancontinenthasceasedtobetheepicentreforglobalstrategicconfrontation.Thisiswithoutprecedentinthehistoryofourcontinent:formorethan500years,Europehasbeenattheheartofhistoricglobalpowerstruggles,eitherofitsownmakingthroughitscolonialventures,orwhichithassufferedduringthetwoworldwarsandthelongColdWarthatmarkedthelastcentury.Nowadays,Europecontributestocollectivesecuritybyhelpingtocontainregionalcrises.Itdoesthisbydefendinguniversalvalues.Itisdifficulttodaytoimaginethatitmightbethesourceofamajorconflict.ThisisanewsituationforEuropeandforFranceinparticular.

Inlightofitsgeography,itshistory,itslanguage,theopennessofitseconomyandthepoliticalrolethatitwishestocontinueplayingontheinternationalstage,France’sdestinyiscloselylinkedtothechangestakingplaceintheworld.Itsfutureanditsprosperitydependuponthem.

Franceispresentineveryoceanandinmostcontinents,thankstotheoverseasterritorieswhich–inadditiontotheireconomicandstrategicimportance–provideaspecialrelationshipwithcountriesfarawayfromEurope,makingusarecognisedpartner–andoftentheonlyEuropeanone–fornumerousregionalorganisations.TheFrenchexclusiveeconomiczone,whichcoverssome11millionkm2–i.e.3%ofthesurfaceoftheworld’sseas–issecondonlytothatofthe


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UnitedStates.Itcontainsnumerousfisheries,mineralandenergyresources,whoseexploitationconstitutesamajorassetforoureconomy.

Francemaintainsaglobalpresenceontheinternationalstage,whereithasthesecondlargestdiplomaticnetworkintheworld,aftertheUnitedStates.Arecognisedmilitarypower,itretainsacredibleinterventioncapability,whichithasusedonnumerousoccasions.

France’sinfluencecanalsobeseeninthewidespreaduseofitslanguageandthedisseminationofitscultureanditsvalues.Morethan220millionpeoplespeakFrenchonadailybasis–hencethepoliticalsignificanceoftheOrganisationInternationaledelaFrancophonie.Over10%ofallbooksintranslationaretranslatedfromtheFrench.Likewise,Franceisresponsiblefor4.2%oftheworld’sscientificpublications,whichputsitinsixthplaceglobally.Additionally,irrespectiveofthevagariesofinternationalpoliticalrelations,manynationsstillexpectFrance,thebirthplaceofthe1789DeclarationoftheRightsofManandoftheCitizen,toremaintrueitsbestvalues.

Furthermore,formanycenturiesFrancehasexperiencedaconstantinterminglingofitspopulation:itispresentallovertheworldandtheworldispresentinFrance.AlmosttwomillionFrenchcitizensliveabroad,includingover70,000youngstudents.TheyhelpustochannelFrenchinfluenceandenableFrancetobealivetotheworld.SomefourmillionforeignersliveinFrance,andalmostoneinfiveFrenchnationalshasatleastoneforeignparent.Thisintermingling,providingitiscontrolledanddoesnotputastrainonthesolidarityandvaluesthatbindthenationalcommunity,isanassettothecountry,whichhasalwaysbeenenrichedbythesedifferences.ItshowsthatFranceisstillabeaconofhopeformanyyoungpeople,whoseeinourcountrythepromiseofabetterlife.OneconsequenceofthisisthatFrancehasafaryoungerpopulationthantheEuropeanaverage–itmustbeabletofulfiltheirhopeandharnesstheirenthusiasm.

Althoughitrepresentslessthan1%oftheworld’spopulation,Francegenerates4%oftheworld’sGrossNationalProduct,whichputsitinfifthplaceintheworldrankings.Itseconomyisincreasinglydependentoninternationaltrade:despitetheincreasingimportanceofemergingcountries,Franceisstillthefifthlargestexporterofgoodsandaccountsfor3.4%ofworldtrade.

ThesocialsituationandeconomicpowerofFrancearethereforeinseparablefromworldaffairs.Thishasbeentrueforcenturiesandtheinternationalisation


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oftradeflowshasfurtherhighlightedtheintensityofthisinterdependence.Inpushingitstradeboundaries,ourcountryfindstheresourcesitneedsforadynamiceconomy.Throughitsopennesstothediversityoftheworld’speople,itgainsasourceofculturalenrichmentandvitalityforitssociety.Inreturn,thepoweritrepresents,theinterestitattractsanditscapacityforactiongiveFranceconsiderableabilitytoinfluenceitsenvironment.

France’snumerousstrategicpartnershipsand itsdefencepartnershipagreementswithseveralcountriesconfirmitsinfluentialstatusintheworld.Theseagreementsarepowermultipliersforthefurtheranceofglobalpeaceandstability.TheystemfromFrance’sdesiretonurture,deepenandconsolidatethelastingbilateralrelationsthatprovideFranceandeachandeveryoneofitspartnerswithopportunitiestostrengthentheirsecurity.

France’sopenapproachtotheworldisalsounderlinedbyitsactiveparticipationinnumerousmultilateralorganisations(theBrettonWoodsinstitutions,OrganisationforSecurityandCo-operationinEurope,InternationalLabourOrganisation,OrganisationInternationaledelaFrancophonie,etc.)and,particularlywithrespecttoitsdefenceandsecurity,itsmembershipofthreemajorinstitutionsthatwereestablishedintheaftermathoftheSecondWorldWar,namelytheUN,NATOandtheEuropeanUnion.

B . France is committed to institutional structures that enhance its security but also increase its responsibilities

AsapermanentmemberoftheUnitedNationsSecurityCouncil,Franceplaysanactiveroleincrisispreventionandmanagement.TheprivilegedpositionwhichitenjoysisallthemorevaluableinthattheSecurityCouncilremainsthekeybodyforcollectivesecurityandworldpeace.FranceisthefifthlargestfinancialcontributortotheUnitedNationsandhas,onmanyoccasions,demonstrateditsabilityasapolicydriver,whetherintermsofendingthewarintheLebanonin2006or,morerecently,itsinterventioninLibya,IvoryCoastandinMali.FrancebelievesthattheSecurityCouncil’slegitimacydependsonitsbeingbothrepresentativeandeffective;itisthereforeinfavourofareformofitsmembershipandstrivestoenhancetheeffectivenessofitswork.

TheUnitedStatesandFranceshareatwohundredyearlinkthathasproveditsworthonmanyoccasions,notleastoverthecourseoftwoworldwars.ThislinkacquiredaninstitutionaldimensionwiththecreationoftheAtlanticAlliance,


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whichexpressestheprofoundcommonalityofvaluesandinterestsbetweentheUnitedStates,CanadaandEurope.FrancehasplayedanactivepartinNATOoperations,particularlyintheformerYugoslavia,AfghanistanandLibya.Sincefullyre-joiningtheintegratedmilitarycommandstructure,ithasledoneofthetwomajorstrategiccommands.Itintendstomakeanactivecontributiontothevitalityandfutureoftheorganisation,whichisanessentialcollectivedefenceallianceand,assuch,amajorpartofitsdefenceandsecurity.

AsafoundermemberoftheEuropeanUnion,Francebelongstoacommunityof500millioncitizensunitedbysharedvaluesofdemocracy,justiceandpeace.TheEuropeanprojectwasmadepossiblebyFranco-Germanreconciliationandmarkedahistoricturningpointforourcountry,whichhaschosentolinkitsdestinytothatofitsEuropeanpartners.TheEuropeanUnionisauniqueventure:ajointprojectforademocratic,marketeconomy,itbringstogetheranumberofnationsthatwishtopreservetheirnationalidentitieswhilstremainingdeterminedtomanagetheirdifferencesbyfocusingonnegotiationandtheruleoflawratherthantheuseofforce.Byprovidingitsmemberswithanopportunitytohammerouttogethertheconditionsforasharedfuture,theEuropeanUnionenhancestheirabilitytoretaincontroloftheirdestinyinaglobalisedworld.Theprojecthasproveditsworthandrelevance,ashasbeendemonstratedbyitsabilitytowithstandtheseriouseurocrisis.TheworldcontinuestoexpectthingsofEurope–asituationfromwhichFrancecanonlybenefit:theEuropeanUnionisstillthebiggesteconomicandcommercialpowerintheworld,thesecondmonetarypowerandthefirstintermsofhumanitarianaidanddevelopmentpolicy.Despitethebackdropofeconomiccrisis,theEuropeanmodelremainsanexceptionalone.ForFrance,whichhasactivelycontributedtoforgingthevaluesthatdefinetheEuropeanUnion,andfortheotherMemberStates,theEU’sabilitytoremainaneffectiverolemodelisamajorissue.

Consequently,therecanbenolong-termprosperityfortheEuropeanUnioninaninternationalenvironmentthatrejectsthesevalues.Itsfuturedependsprimarilyonthereputationoftheproject,whosesuccesswilldeterminethewayotheraspectsofitspowerplayout.TheEuropeanprojectmustmakecontinuousprogressifthemodelitembodiesistoretainitscredibilityandinfluenceinothercountries,whethertheywishtojointheEUunderitsenlargementpolicyortousetheEuropeanmethodasatemplatetosetuptheirownregionalpoliticalbodies.TheinternalsuccessoftheEuropeanUnionisnotjustacrucialfactorforthepoliticalandeconomicfutureofFrance;itisalsoacornerstoneofitssecurity,asithelpstobuildaworldthatreflectsitsvalues.


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Thereisnodoubt,however,thatthecrisisofrecentyearshas,forthetimebeing,weakenedtheappealoftheEuropeanproject.ThecrisishashighlightedtheMemberStates’differenteconomicandfinancialsituationsandapproaches.Differencesalsoexistinthefieldofsecurity.AlthoughtheLisbonTreaty’sinclusionofsolidarityandcollectivedefenceclauseswasarecognitionofthefactthattheMemberStatesareequallyconcernedbymostthreats,theirperceptions,strategicculturesandnationalambitionsremainverydiverse.ThespecifichistoryofeachMemberStateisreflectedinthelinksforgedineverycontinent,andsometimesintheircontrastingvisionsoftheroleofmilitaryforceininternationalrelations.Thisdiversitycanbeanasset,inasmuchaseachcountrybringsitsownexperiencetothecommonproject,butitcanalsobeasourceofmutualsuspicionandmakeanyhopesofrapidintegrationappearunrealistic.Inthisrespect,theslowprogressoftheEuropeandefenceandsecuritypolicyshowsthatnationalperceptionscannotbetransformedbyinstitutionsalone.Thesupportofthepeopleisessential.Itcanonlybecreatedthroughdemocraticdebate,acommonpoliticalwill,sharedexperienceandanawarenessthatweallhaveinterestsandstrategicprioritiesincommon.Intheeconomicsphere,thecrisishasconfrontedtheEuropeanUnionwithdifficultchoices,givingrisetolivelydebateinallitsMemberStates.Underthepressureofevents,significantprogresstowardsgreaterintegrationnowstandstobeachievedinbudgetaryandfinancialmatters.Thiscloserpolicyintegrationshouldeventuallyextendtosecurityanddefence.Franceseesthisasakeyobjective,anditisinthisperspectivethatitenvisionsitsfutureandtheexerciseofitssovereignty.


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Chapter 2

The foundations of the strategy for defence and national security

SovereigntyisdependentontheState’sautonomytomakedecisionsandtakeaction.Inaninterdependentworld,itcanonlybegenuineifaNationretainsitsabilitytoinfluenceanexternalenvironmentfromwhichitcannotinsulateitself.ButtheNationcanonlycontributesustainablytowardsinternationalsecurityiftheactionsundertakenarerecognisedaslegitimate.RespectfortheruleoflawenhancesthesovereigntyofStates.Franceintendstopreserveitssovereignty,byprovidingitselfwiththeresourcestoactandinfluenceevents,andcontributetointernationalsecurity,byensuringitsactionenjoysnationalandinternationallegitimacy.Sovereigntyandinternationallegitimacyarethereforetwoessentialandcomplementarypillarsofitsstrategyfordefenceandnationalsecurity.

A . Preserving our independence and our sovereignty

AsanessentialattributeoftheNation,sovereigntyisakeypillarofnationalsecurity.Article3oftheDeclarationoftheRightsofManandoftheCitizenstatesthat“ThesourceofallsovereigntyliesessentiallyintheNation.Nocorporatebody,noindividualmayexerciseanyauthoritythatdoesnotexpresslyemanatefromit”,thusunderliningthepointthatpreservationofnationalsovereigntyisabasicresponsibilityofthepoliticalauthorities.Itunderpinsthemissionofthearmedforcesandcanjustifymobilisationofotherpublicresourceswheneverthesituationsorequires.IftheNationceasestobeabletoprotectitssovereignty,itlosescontrolofitsdestiny,andthedemocraticnatureofitsnationalprojectisputinjeopardy.

ThedefenceandnationalsecuritystrategyhelpstoensuretheNationcandecideitsfuturewithintheframeworkoftheinterdependenciestowhichithasfreelyconsented.

Theeffectivenessoftheactionundertakentothatendbythedefenceandsecurityforcesdepends,inallcircumstances,ontheretentionofanautonomousability


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toassesssituations,totalindependenceindecision-makingandfreedomofaction.Nucleardeterrenceistheultimateguaranteeofoursovereignty.

Ourabilitytopreserveoursovereignty,inFranceandinouroverseasterritories,isneverdefinitivelyguaranteed.Forcenturies,Francehasworkedtobuildandmaintainit.Itisrootedinourabilitytowieldinfluenceontheinternationalstageandtomobilisethequantitativeandqualitativeresourcesneededtodealwithrisksandthreats.Itdepends,firstandforemost,onnationalcohesionandadynamiceconomy–thereservoirofourresourcesandexpertise.Italsodependsonourabilitytodevelopthescientificskills,appropriatetechnologiesandcomplexweaponsystemsthatwillenableFrancetodealwithpotentialadversaries.Consequently,italsodependsonthehighlyskilledmenandwomenwhoworktoproducetheseinstruments,implementthemoroperatethem.Giventherapidpaceofchangeinscienceandtechnology,theseskillscanonlybemaintainedandenhancedthroughconstantinvestmentintheindustrialandtechnologicalbasethatdeliverstheresourcesunderpinningoursovereignty,especiallyequipmentforintelligencegathering,nucleardeterrenceandthesecurityofourinformationsystems.

Intheabsenceoftheseresourcesandwithoutaproactivenationalwilltoacquirethem,sovereigntybecomesmeaningless,reducedtoamerestatementofintentdevoidofanypracticalsignificance.Inadditiontohelpingguaranteeourpolicymakingautonomyingeneral,theeconomicandfinancialrecoveryofthenationiskeytoournationalindependence.

France’sstrategicautonomyisunderpinnedbynationalownershipofitsessentialdefenceandsecuritycapabilities.Itscurrentcapabilitiestogetherwiththeactionitenvisagestomaintainthemenableittomeetitscollectivesecuritycommitments,notleastinthecontextoftheWashingtonTreaty,whichestablishedtheAtlanticAlliance.ThiswholeheartedcommitmenttoNATOisfullycompatiblewiththepreservationofFrance’sdecision-makingautonomyandfreedomofaction,promotingtheFrenchvisionofanAllianceofresponsiblenationsincontroloftheirdestinyandacceptingtheirnationalresponsibilities.

France’scapabilityalsoenablesittocommittopoliciesofmutualdependencewithitsEUpartners.FranceisdeterminedtoretainitsowncapacityforinitiativeandleadershipandbelievesthatbettercoordinationbetweentheEUMemberStateswillremoveanycapacitydeficienciesandduplication.ThesefreelyagreedinterdependencieswillstrengthenthesovereigntyofeachMemberStatebyincreasingtheresourcesavailableattheEuropeanlevel.Thisvisionunderpins


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ourEuropeanchoiceandthemutualdependenciestowhichweshallcontinuetocommitwithourclosestpartners.

TheÉlyséeTreatysignedwithGermany50yearsagoisanactofhistoricimportance:itpavedthewayforunprecedentedcooperationbetweentwogreatEuropeannationsthathadlongbeenenemies.ItsimplementationhasledtomanyjointinitiativesthathavemarkedtheprogressoftheEuropeanproject,culminatingintheestablishmentofcommonstructuressuchasEurocorps,whichhasgraduallybeenopeneduptoothercountries.Theevolutionofthestrategiccontextandtheon-goingchangestotheGermandefencesystem,notleasttheprofessionalizationofitsarmedforces,makeitpossibletoenvisagefreshprogressbetweenourtwonations,aspartofthesamelogicofmutuallyagreeddependence.FrancesupportsareformoftheUnitedNationsSecurityCouncilthatwouldmakeroomfornewpermanentmembers,includingGermany.

Withtheestablishmentin1992ofajointcommissiononnuclearpolicyanddoctrine,FranceandtheUnitedKingdomdeclaredthattherecouldbenosituationinwhichthevitalinterestsofonepartycouldbethreatenedwithoutthevitalinterestsoftheotherpartybeingthreatenedtoo.TheSaintMalo(1998)andLeTouquet(2003)summits,followedbytheLancasterHouseagreements(2010)havegraduallyledtoclosecooperationbetweenFranceandtheUnitedKingdomindefencematters,andrequired–particularlyinhighlysensitiveareassuchasnucleardeterrence,missilesanddrones–jointprogrammes,sharedfacilitiesandreciprocaltechnologicaltransfers.Ontheoperationalfront,theincreaseinstrengthofacombinedjointexpeditionaryforceisasignofthedeepeningcooperationbetweenourtwocountries.TheseagreementsconfirmthehighlevelofmutualtrustthathasbeenestablishedwithourBritishallies.

TheseprivilegedpartnershipsareintendedtobeopeneduptootherEUMemberStates,asillustratedbytheapproachwhichledtothecreationoftheWeimartrianglebetweenGermany,PolandandFrance,aswellastheextensionofthediscussionstoincludeItaly,SpainandtheVisegradcountries1.FrancesharescommonsecurityinterestswithallEUMemberStatesandhasappropriatedefenceandsecuritylinkswitheachofthem.Theseinter-StatepartnershipscontributetoconsolidationofaEuropeandefencestrategyandareconductedincomplementaritywithEuropeanUnioninitiatives.

1 Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia


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Thechangedgeopolitical,economicandbudgetarycontextcallsforamorein-depthapproachtotheproactivedevelopmentofstrategicconvergencebetweenEUMemberStates.TherefocusingofAmericanpolicy,thedeteriorationinpublicfinancesinEuropeandthecommonnatureofthethreatsandriskstowhichweareexposedincreasestheneedforEUMemberStatestotakethecollectiveactionenablingthemtowieldgreaterinfluenceontheirenvironment.Theymustthereforetakeadvantageofthecurrentsituationtoaddressthecapabilitiesthattheycannolongerdevelopormaintainonapurelynationalbasis,andconsequentlytoorganisemutuallyagreedcapabilityinterdependencies.

Thisapproachisparticularlyappropriateforthedefenceindustries.FranceisreadytosupportgreaterspecialisationinEurope,basedontherecognitionofcentresofexcellence,inordertoavoidtheduplicationofeffortandpiecemealapproachthatcanleadtowaste.ThebilateralframeworkandformatofthesixsignatorynationstotheLetterofIntent(LoI)2,togetherwithallappropriatesolidarityinitiatives,mustbefullymobilisedinordertodevelopstrongerpartnershipsbetweennationsthatsharethisapproach.TheEuropeanDefenceAgency(EDA)shouldalsoplayaleadingroleinimplementingsuchanapproach.

B . Ensuring the legitimacy of our actions both nationally and internationally

Therecanbenoeffectivedefenceandsecuritywithoutthesupportofthenation,whichlegitimiseseffortsinthisfieldandguaranteescommonresilience.

DefenceandnationalsecurityaretheconcernofallFrenchpeople;theyneedtohaveconfidenceintheactionofthepublicauthoritiesandbeconvincedthatthelatteraredoingalltheycantoguaranteetheindependenceofFranceandprotectitspopulation.

UndertheaegisofthePresidentoftheRepublic,allthepublicauthoritiesareinvolvedinshapingandimplementingthedefenceandnationalsecuritystrategy,thusensuringthatitexpressesthewilloftheNation.ItsmainarchitectistheState,byvirtueofitsinter-ministerialaction,anditisthePrimeMinister’sresponsibilitytoseetoitsexecution,ensuringthattheresourcescommittedareconsistentwiththeobjectives.SinceitinvolvesasetofpublicpoliciesandcallsintoplaythefundamentalinterestsoftheNation,thedefenceandnational

2 Letter of Intent: signed by the Defence Ministers of the six main arms manufacturing nations in Europe (France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom) with a view to establishing a favourable climate for an integrated defence industry.


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securitystrategyisapprovedbythePresidentoftheRepublic.ItspresentationtoParliamentestablishesitslegitimacyandopensthenecessarypublicdiscussiononthechoicestowhichtheNation,inallitscomponents,commits.

Thiscollectiveownershipofthedefenceandnationalsecuritystrategyisthepre-requisitefortheresilienceoftheNation.Inadditiontotheroleoftherelevantministriesinimplementingthestrategy,theStatemustalsoinvolveotherplayers,withoutwhomcrisismanagementcannotbeenvisaged.Localandregionalauthoritieshaveskills,resourcesandlocalknowledgethatmayhelptoprotectthepopulationandrallythepublicintimesofcrisis.Itisimportantforlocalpoliticiansandadministratorstobefullyinvolvedinthecollectiveeffort.Similarly,thenationcannotreturntonormalactivitywithoutinvolvingtheessentialinfrastructureandnetworkoperators.

Internationallegitimacyisthenecessarycomplementtonationallegitimacyintheimplementationofadefenceandnationalsecuritystrategy.LiketheothermembersoftheEuropeanUnion,Francebelievesthataninternationalorderbasedontheruleoflawratherthanontheuseofforceisanessentialconditionforinternationalsecurity.ItthereforeconsidersthelegalregulationofrelationshipsbetweenStatesasacornerstoneofitssecurity.Similarly,itseesthefactthattheinternaloperationofStatesisalsograduallybeingsubjectedtointernationalstandardsasasignofprogresstowardsinternationalsecurity.

FranceiscommittedtoconsolidatingtheprinciplesenshrinedintheUnitedNationsCharterthatprohibitthreatsortheuseofforceinrelationsbetweenStates,otherthaninself-defenceandapplicationofSecurityCouncilresolutions.CompliancewithinternationallawisanintangibleprerequisiteforanyuseofforcebyFrance,whetheractingonapurelynationalbasisorwithintheframeworkofitsalliancesanddefenceagreements.Itreaffirmsitsdeterminationtomaintainthecapabilitiesnecessaryforitsself-defenceandforthedefenceofitsallies,andtocontributetooperationsauthorisedordecidedbytheSecurityCouncil.

ThecreationoftheInternationalCriminalCourtandtheemergenceofnewinternationalprinciplessuchasthe“ResponsibilitytoProtect”areindicationsofethicalprogressandrepresentastrategicshift.ThegrowingnumberofStatespartytothetreatythatcreatedtheInternationalCriminalCourt,theprogressmadebytheCourtindefiningthecrimeofaggressionandthedeterrenteffectproducedwhenwarcriminalsorperpetratorsofcrimesagainsthumanityareconvicted,areallcontributionstointernationalsecurity.TheconsensusontheResponsibilitytoProtect,asexpressedattheUNWorldSummitin2005,


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remainsfragile,butFranceintendstomakeconsolidationofthisprincipleapriorityofitsexternalaction.

More generally, consolidation of international legitimacy calls for thestrengtheninganddevelopmentofstandardscorrespondingtoaworldthatisbothmoreinterdependentandmoremutuallysupportive.Respectforandpromotionofinternationalhumanitarianlaw,theprotectionofwomenandchildren,thefightagainstsexualviolenceandthebanonrecruitingminorstoserveinarmedforcesandgroupsareallobligationsthatadvancepeaceandinternationalsecurity.Treatiesandconventionsprohibitingtheuseofcertainweapons3,aswellasthoseconcerningtheprotectionofcertaincategoriesofpeopleandproperty4,alsocontributetowardsachievingthisobjective.

TheUN,aswellasotherregionalandsub-regionalorganisations,willbecalledupontoplayanincreasingroleinthelegitimisationandstrategicconductofexternaloperations.Inthisregard,thesuccessoftheoperationisoftenpartlylinkedtothelegitimacyoftheinstitutionthatpromotesit.Inaworldwheregreatinequalitiesofpowerandresourcespersist,externalinterventionmustnotbesuspectedofbeinganewinstrumentfortheabusiveprojectionofpower.Inordertoobtainthesupportessentialtotheirsuccess,theymustrespondtotheexpectationsofthepopulationsconcernedandbepilotedbyorganisationswithwhichthesepopulationscanidentifythemselves.InAfrica,theAfricanUnionandthesub-regionalorganisationshavethusbecomeplayersinthesecurityofthecontinent,makingamajorcontributiontowardspeaceandinternationalsecurity.

Francefullyunderstandstheimplicationsofthesedevelopmentsandtheoperationsinwhichittakespartwill,asfaraspossible,beconductedwithina

3 Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, of 17 June 1925; Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction of 10 April 1972; Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects of 10 October 1980 and its 5 protocols; Convention on the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons and on their destruction of 13 January 1993; Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction of 18 September 1997; Convention on Cluster Munitions of 30 May 2008.

4 Four Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and their two Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977;

the Convention on the Rights of the Child of 20 November 1989; Protocol on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict of 25 May 2000; Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict of 14 May 1954.


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multilateralframework.Itwillensurethattheseoperationsaresubject,undertheaegisoftheUN,toawide-rangingagreementontheirpoliticalobjectivesandthattheyarepartoffocused,coordinatedactioninvolvingtheappropriatemultilateralorganisations,inparticulartheregionalorsub-regionalorganisationsconcerned.

Furthermore,Francebelievesthatcollectivesecurityanddisarmamentarelinked.Itthereforeconsidersthatasustainedeffortisnecessaryinsupportofdisarmament,enhancedmonitoringoftechnologicaltransfersandconventionalequipment,thefightagainstproliferationofweaponsofmassdestructionandtheirmeansofdelivery,likewisethecombatagainstarmsandammunitiontrafficking.TheinternationalinstrumentsavailableinalltheseareasarekeyregulatorsfornationalandinternationalsecuritywhendealingwithState-levelthreatsandalsothoseposedbynon-Statearmedgroupsandpotentiallyterroristorganisations.Francewillthereforecontinuetobeanactivememberofalltheinternationalorganisationsandforumsworkingfordisarmament,withoutrestrictingitseffortstoanyspecificcategoryofweapon.Itwillsupporteffectiveinspectionregimesandsanctionsforviolations.


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Chapter 3

The State of the World

ThepreviousWhitePapergaveprideofplacetoglobalisation,whichitdefinedasasituationofwidespreadinteractionsandinterdependenciesbetweenamultitudeofStateandnon-Stateplayers,furtheredbythedisseminationofnewtechnologies.Thisassessment,madein2008,haslostnoneofitsrelevance,butinterveningeventshaverevealed,withanewintensity,theambivalentnatureofthetransformationsinprogress,andtheshiftsthattheyhavecausedconfirmthedifficultyingeneralisingfromthetrendsobserved.

A . Strategic shifts and developments

Thefirstshiftonaglobalscalecamewiththeeconomicandfinancialcrisis.Mainlyaffectingdevelopedeconomies,ithasnotcompromisedtheascentofemergingeconomies,inparticularBrazil,IndiaandChina.Thelatter,whichisalreadyamajorpowereconomically,scientificallyandmilitarily,iswellonthewaytobecomingthebiggesteconomyintheworldby2030.ItcontinuestoaccumulatetradesurplusesbutitsuffersfromtheimpactofthedownturninEuropeandtheUnitedStates.ThenewChineseleadershipisfacedwithcomplexpoliticalchoicesandtheneedtocontroltheexpressionofitspower–militaryinparticular.Itneedstoinventaneconomicstrategythatcansatisfytheaspirationsofarapidlyexpandingmiddleclassandrethinkitsdevelopmentmodel,whichislargelybasedonexportsandontheimpetusprovidedbythebigstate-controlledcorporations.Italsoneedstoaddresstheissueofarapidlyageingpopulationfrom2020onwards.Strategicshiftsarethereforestillpossible,andthepoliticalimplicationsaredifficulttopredict.

Asaresultoftheeconomiccrisis,theUnitedStatesandEuropehaveseenareductionintheirroomformanoeuvre,thuscontributingtotheirrelativelossofinfluence.Followingseveraldecadesduringwhichtheirgrowthwaslargelyfuelledbydebt–bothpublicandprivate–theyarenowforcedtochangetackandmakepainfulcompromiseswithregardtoseveralimperatives:support


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foreconomicactivity,preservationofasocialsecuritysystem,preventionofsystemiccrisesandtheriskofalossoffinancialcredibilityiftheirpublicfinancesarenotstraightenedoutintheshortterm.Thischangeofdirectionoftengivesrisetonegativereactions:therejectionofunbridledglobalisationbycertainquartersofWesternopinionencouragesapopulistreflexthathamperstheconstructionofapoliticalconsensus.

AsecondmajorchangewasprovidedbytheArabrevolutions,whichhavedemonstratedtheuncertaintyandcomplexityofthestrategiclandscape,togetherwiththedifficultyofinfluencingdevelopments.Thecountriesconcernedhaveenteredintoaprotractedrevolutionaryperiod,againstabackdropofsocialunrestandprotestsagainstinequality.Ontheonehand,theseon-goingrevolutionsareaglobalphenomenon,atestamenttothepowerofthenotionsofjusticeanddemocracyinaninterconnectedworldinwhichnoregimecanbepermanentlyisolatedfromthegeneralflowofideas.Theyexpressthedissatisfactionofpeoplewhofeeltheyhavebeenbetrayedbythepowersthatbe,andwhoarenowchallengingtheirlegitimacy–achallengethatderivesspecialsignificancefromthefactthat,inmostArabStates,betweentwothirdsandthreequartersofthepopulationareunder30yearsold.But,ontheotherhand,everynationalsituationisunique,andtheoutcomewillbedeterminedbythespecificcharacteristicsofthecountry–itsethnicandreligiousmake-up,anyeconomicandsocialreformsthatarecarriedout,andthenatureoftheregime.

InthecaseoftheMiddleEast,thesenationalcharacteristicsarecompoundedbyintercommunityandinter-faithtensions,whicharecurrentlyfeedingthedestructiveescalationinSyria.DespitetheprogressmadebytheUN,thelackofasolutiontotheArab-IsraeliconflictthatwouldallowthecreationofaPalestinianStatelivinginpeaceandsecuritywithIsraelanditsneighboursfurthercomplicatethefragilesituationintheregion.Itisthereforeverydifficulttopredicttheoutcomeoftheseon-goingrevolutions,orthefutureofregimesthathavethusfarescapedtherevolutionarywave;theycouldresultinpeacefultransitions,civilwar,theinstallationofextremistregimesortherestorationofmilitarydictatorshipsareallpossibilities.

ThestrategicdevelopmentoftheUnitedStatesisathirddeterminingfactorforinternationalsecurity.ConfirmedbytheendoftheColdWar,theUS’sunparalleledmilitaryadvantageissettolastforsometimeyet,giventhesheersize,inabsoluteterms,ofitsdefencebudget(41%ofglobaldefencespendingin2012)andthescaleofitsinvestmentinResearchandDevelopment,whichhavewideneditstechnologicalleadovertherestoftheworld.TheUS


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economy,whichisbeginningtorecoverfromthe2008crisis,hasconsiderablestrengths,notleasttheexploitationofshalegasandunconventionalfuels,whichcouldmaketheUnitedStatesenergyindependentwithinthenextfewyears.Nevertheless,returningthenation’sfinancestohealthisamajorchallenge.Allinall,despitebroadpoliticalsupportformilitaryspending,itseemssettoreceiveadecliningshareofthefederalbudget,withimplicationsfortheUnitedStates’strategicposture.

ThefirstsignsofthesepotentialchangesarebeginningtoappearastheUnitedStatesrefocusesitsgeopoliticalpriorities.Otherthaninthecaseofthelegitimatedefenceofanally,theUScouldbecomemoreselectiveaboutitsexternalcommitmentsasaresultoffinancialconstraints,butalsoowingtothedoubtstheconflictsinIraqandAfghanistanhaveraisedabouttheeffectivenessoflong-term,heavy-footprintforeignintervention.

FortheUnitedStates,Europeremainsazoneofprimeimportance,butitunderstandstheimplicationsofthefactthatthecontinentisnolongerattheheartofglobalstrategicconfrontation.IthasthereforebeguntoreduceitsmilitaryandnavalpresenceinEurope,whilstitsanti-missiledefencesystemisbeingsetup.ThislowermilitarypriorityalsoextendstotheMediterraneanandtoAfrica.TheUnitedStatescontinuestohaveaninterestinthearea,aswitnessthecreationofaspecialisedAFRICOMcommandandbytheassistanceitprovidesintermsoftrainingandequipment.Itbelieves,however,thattheEuropeansmustplayagreaterroleinitssecurity,sincetheyaremoredirectlyconcernedbyitsstabilityandhavetheresourcesneededtotakeonthisresponsibility.

Ontheotherhand,thestrategicimportanceofAsiaandthePacifictotheUnitedStatescontinuestoincrease,asdefencebudgetsswellintheregionandtensionescalatesbetweenStatesinnorth-eastandsouth-eastAsia.ThecurrentrebalancingoftheUSmilitarytowardstheAsia-Pacificregionisthereforelikelytocontinue,andwillbeanimportantfactorforFrance’scommitmentasasovereignpowerandaplayerinthesecurityoftheIndianOceanandthePacific.

TurningtotheMiddleEast,theUSstancewillprobablybedrivenbytheneedtoensurethesecurityoftheregion.FacedwiththethreatfromIranwhich,inviolationofitsinternationalundertakingsandofsixUnitedNationsSecurityCouncilresolutions,continuesitsnuclearenrichmentprogrammewithoutanycivilianjustificationwiththeobjectiveofmasteringamilitarynuclearcapability,theUnitedStateshassteppedupitspresenceinthearea,whereithaspermanentbasesandhasinstalledanti-missilesystems.Thestrategic


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alliancewithIsraelandtheUnitedStates’economicinterestinfreecirculationofgoodsandhydrocarbonsinthisareaare,inanycase,sufficientreasonfortheUStomaintainastrongpresence.

Financialconstraintsandthelessonslearnedfromrecentconflictswillalsohaveastronginfluenceonmethodsofintervention:theUnitedStateswillprobablyseekmoresystematicallytosharetheburdenofforeignoperationswithitsEuropeanallies,evenifthismeans,insomecases,cedingpowerofinitiativeandcommandtothem.ThecircumstancesoftheoperationsconductedinLibyaandinMalicouldprovideatemplateforsituationswhereAmericaninterestsarelessdirectlyinvolved.Althoughnotinthefrontlinepoliticallyandmilitarilyinsuchsituations,theUnitedStatescouldsupportEuropeanaction,althoughEuropeanswouldnothaveanyguaranteeastothecapabilitiesthatmightbemadeavailabletothem.

Wheninterveningthemselves,theAmericanswilldoubtlessbekeenertoensurethatthescaleoftheirinvolvementandcommitmentofgroundforcesisproportionatetotheextenttowhichtheirinterestsarethreatened.Inthiscontext,itislikelythatrapidoperationsandindirectactionwillbepreferredtoheavy,extendedcampaigns.Targetedoperationsconductedbyspecialforcesandremotestrikes–cybernetic,whereapplicable-arelikelytobecomemorefrequent,giventheirflexibilityinacontextinwhichconventionalinterventionwillcontinuetobemoredifficultpoliticallyandsometimeslesseffective.

ThemultifacetedcrisisthathasbefallentheEuropeanUnionisalsoamajorfactor.Asaresultoftheeurocrisisthatfollowedinthewakeofthe2008financialcrisis,Europehastemporarilylostsomeofitsappealandinfluence,inacontextcharacterisedbystubbornlylowgrowthratesandageingpopulations.Whereasitusedtobeseenasamodelbymanycountries,theoriginalityofitssystemofgovernancehasattimesbeenseenasabarriertosolvingitsproblems.Thecrisishashighlightedtheeconomicfragilityofsomecountriesandtheneedforstructuralchange.ExperiencedtovariousdegreesbyitsMemberStates,itaffectsthepoliticalequilibriumwithintheEuropeanUnionandputsitsmutualsolidaritytothetest,underminingpublicsupportforEuropeanintegration.

Europedoesnotyetseemwillingtotakeonagreatershareofresponsibilityforthesecurityofthecontinentandthewiderworld,despiteencouragementinthisdirectionfromtheUnitedStates.Onthecontrary,inseveralEuropeancountriesthedefenceefforthasdroppedbelowthebarof1%ofGDP.DespitetherealprogressmadeundertheCommonSecurityandDefencePolicy,some


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tenyearsafteritsintroductiontheEuropeanUnionisstrugglingtotakethenextstep,whichwouldenableittomakeamoredecisiveimpactonachangingworld.

ThischangeofcircumstancesintheUnitedStatesandEuropehasimplicationsforcrisismanagementpoliciesandfortheinstitutionsresponsibleforinternationalsecurity.Whethertheresultofagrowingaversiontorisk-taking,doubtsabouttheeffectivenessofrecentoperationsortheimpactoffinancialconstraints,EuropeandtheUnitedStateshavegreatermisgivingsaboutcommittingtolarge-scale,extendedforeignintervention.Furthermore,despitethedevelopmentofregionalorganisations,theinternationalinstitutionsarestrugglingtopickupthebaton:theyreflectthewilloftheirmembersanditisincreasinglydifficultforthemtoforgeaconsensus.Thisimpactsontheirlegitimacyandeffectiveness,whilsttheattemptsatreformlaunchedinthefirstdecadeofthe21stcenturyhavenotachievedtheexpectedresults.UNreformhasthusfarbeenafailure.TheG20hasmanagedtoimproveeconomicandfinancialcoordination,butitwasneverintendedtoplayaroleinsecurity.TheambitionsupportedbyFrancetooverhaulthefoundationsofglobalgovernanceistodaystymiedbyreducedinternationalmobilisation.SomeWesternpowershaveinfactsuccumbedtofatigueorpoliticalrealism,whilethemajoremergingnationsarenotalwaysreadytoassumetheglobalresponsibilitiesthatgowiththeirgrowingdemographicandeconomicstrength.

Thisrelativeinadequacyoftheinstrumentsofglobalgovernancehasbecomeapparentatatimewhentheprinciplesunderpinningtheinternationalorderneedtobeclarifiedandconsolidated.SomeofthequestionscurrentlyraisedcallforamorefocusedinternationaldebateattheUnitedNations:howshouldself-defenceunderArticle51oftheUNCharterbeinterpretedinrelationtocyber-attacksorterrorismconductedbynon-StategroupsfromStatesthataretooweaktocontroltheirterritoryeffectively?Howcanwereconciletheurgencywhich,incertainsituations,appliestotheimplementationoftheResponsibilitytoProtect,withthepatiencethatisessentialtoachievinganinternationalconsensus?Howcanwecombinesuchurgentactionwithamorelong-termpoliticalstrategythataimstoconsolidatetheauthorityofaStateastheonlylegitimateandlastingguarantoroftheprotectionofitspopulation?Theanswertothesequestionsemergesalltooslowlyincrisissituations,whentheseprinciplesareputtothetest.Theinternationalconsensusthatcouldsupportandchannelthenecessarychangesremainsinadequate,whilenewsituationsrapidlytransformthestrategiclandscapeandopenuptherangeofpossibilities.


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ThestrategicimplicationsofthesechangesimpactprofoundlyonthesecurityofFranceanditsEUpartners.AlthoughthespectreofamajorconflagrationinEuropehasreceded,Europeanscannotaffordtoignoretheunstableworldaroundthemandtowhichtheyareinextricablylinked.Bothstakeholdersinandmajorbeneficiariesoftheglobalisationprocess,theyhavetodealwithasystematicincreaseinmajorrisksandthevulnerabilityoftheEuropeanUniontothreatsfrombeyonditsborders.Forexample,amajorcrisisinAsiawouldhaveconsiderableeconomic,commercialandfinancialconsequencesforEurope.

Allthemore,owingtogeographicproximity,tothedepthofthehumanrelationsandtothestrengthoftheeconomicandenergytiesbetweenEuropeandthesouthernshoresoftheMediterranean,theArabrevolutionsposeanevengreaterchallengeforEurope.Inthelongterm,Europe’ssecuritywillbeenhancedifitsMediterraneanneighboursaredemocraticandprosperous.Intheshortterm,thetransitionsmaynonethelessgiverisetotensionsandtheactionsofextremistforcesmayencourageEuropeanopiniontopreferthestatusquo.Inanycase,externalplayerscanhaveonlylimitedinfluenceovertheoutcomeofevents,whichessentiallyplayoutalongnationallines.

Intheabsenceofasharedvisionandcommonprinciples,nopower,nocoalitionandnointernationalinstitutionhastheabilitytocontrolglobaldevelopments.Theworldhasbecomegenuinelymultipolar,butalsomorefragmented.ForFrance,thistransformationhassomepositiveaspects:itmeansthatwhilecertaineventsareinfluencedandsometimestriggeredbyglobaldevelopments,everysituationmustbeassessedaccordingtoitsspecificcharacteristics.Thisleadstoamoreregionalapproachtocrisismanagement.Butgiventheabsenceofanysystemtocontrolglobalevents,thelackofglobalregulationmayalsoleadtochaoticsituations.

Futurescenariosthereforeremainwideopenanditwouldbesimplistictoreducetheanalysistoover-generalisations.Inordertogiveeveryopportunityforchangetobepositive,weneedtoconductadifferentiatedprospectiveanalysisthataddressesthedifferenttypesofrisksandthreatsthatmightstandinitsway.

B . Threats related to power

Throughoutitshistory,Francehashadtofaceuptopowersthatchallengeditspositionandposedathreattoitsterritoryandsecurity.Ithashadtomatchpowerwithpower,forgingalliancesanddevelopingitsmilitarycapabilitiesin


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proportiontothethreatswithwhichitwasconfronted.ThankstothecreationoftheEuropeanUnion,itsrelationshipwithitswesternEuropeanneighboursisnolongerbasedonthebalanceofpowerasameansofguaranteeingpeace.WiththecollapseoftheSovietUnion,Americanpowerwentunrivalledfortwodecades.Thisparticularsituationmayhavehelpedturnthepageonthebalancesofpoweronwhichworldorderhadbeenbasedforcenturies,especiallyinEurope,wheretheEuropeanprojectwasadvancedanddevelopedwithitssuccessfulenlargementtoincludecentralEurope.Nevertheless,peaceisoftenstillunderpinnedbythebalanceofpowerbetweennations,andtheEuropeansituationisexceptionalinthisrespect.ThelargeandrapidincreaseinmilitaryspendingandconventionalarsenalsinsomeregionsoftheworldisastarkreminderthattherecouldbearesurgenceofconflictbetweenStatesandthatFranceandEuropecannotaffordtoignorethreatsrelatedtopower.

Anyassessmentofthesethreatsrelatedtopowermustnotunderestimatetheroleplayedbynationalsentiment.Inthoseregionsoftheworldwheretheambitiontobuildanationgoeshand-in-handwithaburningdesiretoescapefrompoverty,thissentimentremainsabroadlypositivedriver,rallyingtheenergiesofthepopulationandcontributingtowardstheirdevelopment:memoriesofbygonehumiliationsunderforeignoccupationorduringacolonialpastfadeasprideisrecoveredthroughrapideconomicgrowth.However,thejourneyfromthispatriotismtoadangerousnationalismisashortone:ifgrowthslowsandthesocialandpoliticalstructuresfailtokeeppacewitheconomicchange,anaggressivenationalismmaybecomeaconvenientoutletfortheirfrustration.

Asthemainareaofeconomicgrowthintheworldoverthelastthirtyyears,Asiahasenjoyedsignificanteconomicdevelopment.Whileitaccountedforlessthan20%ofglobalGDPin1980,by2030itshouldbecomethemainsourceofwealthcreationandscientific,likewisetechnicalinnovation,accountingforoverathirdofglobalGDP.

Thiseconomicgrowthhastakenplaceinapoliticalcontextthatremainsfragile.Unlikeotherregionsthatarecharacterisedbyrelativelyhomogeneouspoliticalorganisationsandsocialstructures,Asiahasawidevarietyofpoliticalsystemsandarrangementsforeconomicactivity.Inaddition,itisalsothesceneofsometimesquiteancientgeopoliticaldisputeswhichfeedtensionandrecurringconflicts.

TheKoreanpeninsula,forexample,remainsdividedbyoneofthelastbordersresultingfromtheColdWar.Itisthemostheavilymilitarisedborderintheworld


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andonewhereincidentsoccurmostfrequently.TheChinaSeaisalsoamajorsourceoftension,withcompetingterritorialclaimsfromseveralborderingStates.TheresurgenceofaSino-JapanesedisputeoverthesovereigntyoftheSenkaku/Diaoyuislandsisonlythelatestmanifestationofthistypeofdisagreement,andshouldnotbeallowedtoovershadowotherstubbornareasofcontentionintheregion:theTaiwanStraits,China’sclaimtosovereigntyovertheentireSouthChinaSea,theterritorialdisputeovertheKurilIslands/NorthernTerritoriesbetweenRussiaandJapan,andthetensionbetweenSouthKoreaandJapan,inparticularovertheLiancourtRocks.

IntheIndiansub-continent,theabsenceofanylastingsolutiontotheIndo-PakistanidisputeoverKashmirremainsadestabilisingfactorinaregionthatincludesseveralnuclearpowers.AlthoughrelationsremainextremelystrainedinthewakeoftheMumbaiattacksinNovember2008andoccasionalincidentsalongtheLineofControl,IndiaandPakistanareshowingrestraintandnowseemtopreferdialogueasameanstoresolvetheirdisputes.India,whoseclosecooperationwithFrancehasbeenformalisedinastrategicpartnership,providesanelementofstabilityintheregion.

Withthewithdrawalofcoalitionforces,replacedbyalimitedinternationalmilitarypresence,thepresidentialelectionsin2014andthegeneralelectionsin2015,Afghanistanispreparingforadefiningmomentinitshistory.However,thefutureofthenationisstillcurrentlydependentonasuccessfulreconciliationprocessandthesecuritysituation.ItisinthiscontextthatFrancehasconcludeda20-yearFriendshipandPartnershipTreatywithAfghanistan,whichcommitsittoprovidinglong-termsupport.Meanwhile,severalStatesintheregionarestrengtheningtheirbilateralrelationswithAfghanistanandsteppinguptheireffortstopromotesecurityandcooperationintheregion.

ItisdifficulttopredictthewaygeopoliticaltensionswillevolveinAsia.Theeconomicdynamicsarerapidlyalteringthebalanceofpowerthroughoutthewholeregion.Moreover,despitesomemajorprogress,notablybytheAssociationofSouth-EastAsianNations(ASEAN),theAsianregionalcooperationorganisationsdonotasyethavethemeanstotakeeffectiveactiontodefusecrisisrisksandconflictsoversovereignty.

Economicdevelopmentandcontinuinggeopoliticaltensionarecausingasignificantpushtowardsarmament.Overthepastdecade,militaryspendingintheAsiancountrieshasdoubled,withasignificantincreaseinpacesince2005.Chinainparticularhaspushedaheadwithdefencemodernisationatan


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evenfasterrate,especiallyasregardsdevelopingandmodernisingitsnucleararsenalanditspowerprojectionandcyber-attackcapabilities.In2012,thetotalmilitarybudgetsofthefourlargestcountriesintheregion-China,India,JapanandSouthKorea–overtook,forthefirsttime,thoseofallthecountriesoftheEuropeanUnionputtogether.

However,thisincreaseinmilitaryexpenditureneedstobequalified,sincesomeofthemodernisationinvolvesarmedforceswhoseinitialequipmentlevelswereconsiderablybehindthoseofwesternarmies.Neitherisitalwaysaggressiveinscope:inenhancingtheirnavalcapabilities,thecountriesintheregionmayalsobehelpingtosecureourshippinglanes,whicharecrucialtoourindustrialsuppliesandourtrade.However,theintensityofthearmsraceinAsiaisprimarilyareflectionoftheantagonismsthatdividethecontinent.Inthatrespect,onecannotentirelyexcludethehypothesisthatthecombinationofpersistentsovereigntyconflicts,thesharpincreaseinmilitaryexpenditureandtheriseofnationalismcouldposeariskofinstabilityinAsia;ariskwhichcouldbeexacerbatedifeconomicgrowth,whichhasmadetheregionadriveroftheworldeconomy,weretoslowdramatically.

LikeitsEuropeanpartners,FranceisnotdirectlythreatenedbypotentialconflictsbetweenAsianpowers,butitisneverthelessverydirectlyconcerned,forseveralreasons:itisapermanentmemberoftheUNSecurityCouncilandofUNCMAC(UnitedNationsCommandMilitaryArmisticeCommission,Korea)andapowerwithapresenceintheIndianOceanandthePacific.ItisalsoaUSallythatplaysakeyroleinthesecurityofthisstrategicpartoftheworld.ItscompaniesanditscitizensarepresentinincreasingnumbersintheregionanditsprosperityisnowinseparablefromthatoftheAsia-Pacificregion.

Russia’smilitarybudgetisgrowingrapidly.Itismodernisingitsnucleararsenalandworkingtoprovideitsconventionalforceswithenhancedinterventioncapabilities.Thisrearmamentistakingplaceagainstabackdrop-since2006-ofincreasingdisplaysofstrengthinvolving,forexample,thepoliticalexploitationofitsenergyresources,pressureonitsneighbouringenvironmentandrecognitionofsecessionistentitiesinGeorgia.Atthesametime,warmerrelationswiththeUnitedStatesandotherwesternnationshavenotachievedallthedeclaredobjectives,aswitnessthecontinuingdisputesoverNATO,disarmamentandtheresolutionoftheSyriancrisiswithintheUNSecurityCouncil.

TheenergyissuehasbecomeakeyplankinRussia’sforeignpolicy.Russiaisseekingtoestablishamonopolyoversupplyroutes,thuscomplicatingEuropean


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effortstodiversifytheirimports.In2010,onethirdofthecrudeoilandnaturalgasimportedbyEUcountriescamefromthecountriesoftheformerUSSR.

ThesedevelopmentsshowthatRussiaisequippingitselfwiththeeconomicandmilitarycloutthatwillenableittoengageinpowerpolitics.Theoutcomeofthisplan,however,remainsuncertain.The2008crisisandthedevelopmentofnon-conventionalfuelsaresubjectingRussiatothevagariesoftheenergymarket,whilstexportsofenergyandrawmaterialscontinuetobeanimportantpartoftheRussianeconomy.

Inacontextsuchasthis,relationswithEUcountriescanonlybemixed.WithFrance,relationsincludeaspectsofcooperation(militaryequipment,logisticssupportduringthewithdrawalfromAfghanistan),agreements(Mali,Afghanistan)anddisagreements(Syria).ForFrance,asfortherestofEurope,thedelicatebalancethatcurrentlyexistsbetweenalltheseaspectsofitsrelationswithRussiaisprobablysettocontinue.FrancehasmadeclosecooperationwithMoscowoneofitspoliticalobjectivesfortheNATOSummitDeclarationinChicago.

Thenon-proliferationpolicyinitiatedin1968bytheTreatyontheNon-ProliferationofNuclearWeaponshas,thusfar,disprovedthepessimisticpredictionsthatforesawaworldconsistingoftwentynuclearpowersbytheyear2000.However,recentdevelopments,whichglobalisationhasfacilitatedbyprovidingeasieraccesstothetechnologiesandmaterialsrequiredtomanufactureweaponsofmassdestruction,givelegitimatecauseforconcern.TheabilityofsomeStatestouseillegalprivatenetworkstoobtaintransfersofknowledgeandknow-howincreasestheriskofcircumventinginternationalnon-proliferationpolicies.

Atthestrategiclevel,nuclearproliferationisdevelopinginanareathatextendsfromtheMiddleEasttoNorthKorea.Theriskstemsfromthefactthatpre-existingregionalcrisesarecompoundedbytheacquisitionoforattemptstoacquirenuclearweapons.Asaresultitwillbeverydifficulttoresolvetheseproliferationcriseswithoutfirstorsimultaneouslyresolvingtheregionalproblemsthatcausedthem.Furthermore,itiscertainthatanyincreaseinthenumberofStatespossessingnuclearweaponsinthosepoliticallyunstableregionswillfurthercomplicatetheresolutionoftheunderlyingcrises.IfIran,aStatepartytotheNPT,weretoacquireamilitarynuclearcapability,notonlywouldtheNPTbeseriouslyweakened,butotherStatesintheregion,whicharealsopartiestotheNPT,couldbepersuadedtodothesame.ThiswouldunderminetheNon-ProliferationTreatyandpermanentlydenttheprospectsofreducingtension.Inaddition,itwouldincreasetheriskofuncontrolled


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escalationleadingtoacollapseofthenucleartaboo.Ifnuclearweaponsbecomemorecommon,somenationscouldstarttoseethemasbattlefieldweapons.Finally,thecollapseofaStatewithanuclearcapabilitywouldpavethewayforparticularlydangerousscenarios.

Thisincreasedriskalsoconcernstheproliferationofdeliverysystems,whichhasintensifiedsince2008.Iran,PakistanandNorthKoreahavebeenworkingtoincreasetheirrange.IranalreadypossessesballisticmissileswithsufficientrangetoreachEUandNATOterritory.Someofourforcescurrentlydeployedinforeignoperations(LebanonandAfghanistan),severalofourstagingpostsandmilitarybasesaswellassomecountrieswithwhichwehavetiesthroughdefenceagreements(Djibouti,Kuwait,Qatar,UnitedArabEmirates)arecurrentlywithintherangeofshort-andmedium-rangeballisticmissilesthatcouldbelaunchedbycertainregionalplayers.Butafocusonballisticthreatsmustnotdivertourattentionfromthethreatposedbycruisemissiles.TheStatesconcernedareseekingtodiversifytheirrangeofdeliverysystemsinviewoftheversatilityandprecisionaffordedbythesemissiles.

AstheSyriancrisisdemonstrates,thethreatposedbychemicalweaponsisaveryrealone.Chemicalweaponproliferationisdifficulttodetect,duetotheeasewithwhichtheciviliancapabilitiesofarapidlyevolvingglobalchemicalindustrycanbeusedformilitarypurposes,andtothefactthatitsdevelopmentonaninternationalscaleisgraduallychangingthegeographyofrisk.Inthepast,severalcountrieshavelaunchedoffensivechemicalweaponsprogrammes,whileothersaresuspectedofdoingsotoday.Inthebiologicalfield,severalcountriesarebelievedtobeconductingoffensiveResearchandDevelopmentprogrammes,althoughnonehasofficiallyadmittedtodoingsothusfar.Thedualnatureofthebiologicalfieldisevengreaterthanthatofthechemicalfield:biotechnologyR&Dprogrammesmayhavelegitimateapplicationsforpublichealthortheagri-foodsector,buttheyarejustaslikelytobeexploitedformilitarypurposes.

Inaddition,someStatesaredevelopingoffensiveITcapabilitiesthatalreadyposeadirectthreattoessentialinstitutions,companiesandsectorsfortheNations’life.

Behindpowerrationalesbasedonthealwaysuncertainsearchforabalanceofpower,theprospectofanotherkindoffuturefortheworldcouldtakeshape-onethatrunscountertotheworldoforganisedinterdependenciesforwhichtheEuropeanprojectisabeacon.Consequently,Francecannotaffordtogive


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theimpressionthatitisnotconcernedbythreatstouseforcewithoutrunningtheriskoflosingitscredibilityandthusunderminingitssecurity.

C . Risks of weakness

ThefactthataState’sweaknesscanbecomeathreatisanew,strategicallyimportantfactor:forcenturies,thepowerfulsawweaknessasanopportunitytoextendtheirterritoryandexpandtheirdomination.Thisnolongerapplieswhentheprogressoftheruleoflawandthelegitimatedesireofpopulationstodecidetheirowndestinymakestatesovereigntythelinchpinofinternationalorder.Thisassumeshowever,thatStateshavetheabilitytoexercisetheirsovereignty,whichmeanstheabilitytodefendtheirborders,ensurethesecurityoftheirpopulationandmaintainorderwithintheirterritory.

IfStatesareseentobeincapableofexercisingtheirsovereignresponsibilities,theveryfoundationsoftheinternationalorderonwhichwebaseourownsecurityarethreatened.Therisksandthreatsthattheyareunabletodealwithontheirterritorymayquicklyspilloverandundermineourownsecurity.Evenifwestepuptheprotectionofourborders,nobordercanbecompletelyimpermeable,especiallyinaglobalisedworldwithitsconstantflowsofpeople,goodsandinformation.Anepidemiccanquicklyturnintoapandemicifitisnoteradicatedatsource.Hostage-takinginvolvingournationalscanbecomeatypeofremoteaggressions.AStatethatcannolongercontrolitsbordersanditsterritorycanbecomeahavenforcriminalgroups,atransitplatformfortrafficking,orarear-guardbasewhereterroristgroupscanplanactiononalargescale.Theseactivitiesfuelcrimeandrebelmovementsintheareaswheretheydevelop,andmaygiverisetoconflictbetweenStates.InternationalorderrequireseveryStatetoguarditssovereignterritory,notjustonbehalfofitsownpeople,butonbehalfoftheinternationalcommunityaswell.Whendealingwiththreatsandrisks,theStateisthefirstlineofdefence,thefirstlevelofresponse.Ifthatlevelisfoundwanting,ifitisbreached,thentheproblemimmediatelytakesonanew,muchlessmanageabledimension.

Thefirstdecadeofthe21stcenturyhasshownthatthefailureofmanyStatestoexercisethebasicfunctionsofsovereigntyisalasting,widespreadphenomenon.ThisfailureconcernsStatesofvaryinglevelsofdevelopmentandsizeandappliestoallorpartoftheirterritory.Itaffects,forexample,areasthatarefarfromthecapitalandwhichescapethecontrolofcentralgovernment,asintheSahel,Yemen,PakistanandAfghanistan.Inmanycountries,theirpartial


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inclusionininternationaltradeflowshasweakenedtraditionalsolidarities,whilenewlegitimatestructureshaveyettobeproperlyconsolidated.Meanwhile,growthinalltypesoftraffickingontheterritoryoffragileStatesprovidesthegroupsorganisingtheseactivitieswitheconomicandmilitaryresourcesthatoftenoutstripthoseoftheauthorities,therebyweakeningthemevenfurther.

Whentheseupheavalsoccurinacountrywithafragilesenseofnationalunity,wherethebordersresultingfromdecolonisationencloseconsiderableethnic,linguisticorreligiousdiversity,andwherethereisnostrongnationalprojecttoreplacethestruggleagainstthecolonisers,thelikelihoodofcivilwarisfurtherincreased.

AfailedStateleadstogreatsufferingforthepopulationswhoareitsvictims,duetothephysicalviolenceofcivilwar,includingmasssexualviolence.Butitalsoleadstomuchhighernaturalmortalityrates,sincethedestructionofinfrastructureandtheabsenceofbasiclevelsofhealthcaremeansthattheslightestdiseasecanbefatal.

ForEuropeandforFrance,thispoliticalandhumanitarianchallengeisalsoastrategicissue,sincemanyoftheStatesconcernedareonEurope’sdoorstep,inAfrica,acontinentwhichisnowatacrossroads.Ifthenextfewdecadesconfirmtheeconomictake-offinsub-SaharanAfrica,where5%annualgrowthhasbeenachievedoverthelastfiveyears,thecontinentmaybecomeanengineofglobalgrowthandmakeastrongcontributiontoEuropeanprosperity.Thegrowinginterestshownbymanyemergingpowers(Brazil,China,theGulfStates,India)inAfrica–whosepopulationispredictedtoexceedthatofChinaby2030–isnotconfinedtoenergyproductsandrawmaterials.ItillustratesthenewawarenessofAfrica’spotential.

However,sub-SaharanAfricaisalsoanareaofmajorfragility:between2003and2012,sometenStateshavebeenshakenbypoliticalcrisesorcivilwars,andthisiswheremostUNpeacekeepershavebeendeployed,sometimesforovertenyears.Twopotentiallyverydifferentfuturescouldtakeshapeoverthenexttwentyyearhorizon,dependingonwhetherthecontinentseesareductionoranincreaseinthenumberofungovernedorweaklygovernedareas.Butonethingiscertain:nowhereistherangeofpossibilitiesaswideopenasontheAfricancontinent.

Therisksassociatedwithweaknessaremoreinsidiousthanthreatsrelatedtopower,sincetheyarenotastangibleastraditionalpowerstrugglesandtheir


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impactisfeltmuchlater,whentheinternationalcommunityisconfrontedwithabreakdowninorderwhichitneedsurgentlytoresolve.Itisthenfacedwithadilemma:eithertoletchaossetinor,onthecontrary,tointerveneandriskbecomingthefocusofhostility,withoutbeingabletorelyonanysolidnationalpartners.Inthenewstrategiclandscape,itisthereforeparticularlyimportanttoidentifyanyrisksofweaknessasearlyaspossible,inordertocounterthembeforetheycanwreakmosthavoc.

D . Threats and risks intensified by globalisation

The2008WhitePaperhadalreadyidentifiedthemultipliereffectsofglobalisation,whichshrinksandunifiesthestrategiclandscapeandbringscloserboththreatsrelatedtopowerandrisksofweakness.Itactsbothasanacceleratorandanamplifier,forbetterorforworse.

Globalisationhasthusgeneratedanunprecedentedmovementoftrade,releasingtheconsiderablegrowthpotentialthathasledtotheremarkabledevelopmentoftheemergingcountries.Ithasenabledhundredsofmillionsofpeople,chieflyinAsia,toescapefrompoverty,swellingtheranksofthemiddleclassesinthedevelopingcountriesatarateunprecedentedinthehistoryofhumankind:theOECDestimatesthat,by2030,overhalfoftheworld’smiddleclasseswillbeinthedevelopingcountries.Thedistinctionbetweendevelopinganddevelopedcountriescouldthereforegraduallyloseitsrelevance.

Severaldecadesofsustainedgrowthonaglobalscalehave,however,beenaccompaniedbyanever-increasingpressureonresourcesandanenvironmentalimpactthatisspirallingoutofcontrol.Theresultingtensionscoalescearoundaccesstowater,landandagriculturalproducts,mineralandenergyrawmaterialsincludingstrategicmaterials,andcontrolovertheroutesusedtotransportthem.

Globalisationhasalsobroughtwithitanincreaseininequality.Withinindividualcountries,especiallythedevelopedcountries,technologicalprogressseemstobeleadingtoanincreaseintheincomeofthebestqualifiedworkersandafallintheincomeoflesser-skilledworkers.Globalisationisalsocontributingtoanincreaseininequalitybetweennations,wheresomeofthemarenotincludedinglobaltrade.Inthemostfragilecountries,theinequalitiesthisgeneratesmaybeanadditionaldestabilisingfactor.


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TheexplosionintangibleandintangibleflowsmakesitincreasinglydifficultforStatestocontroltheircontentanddestination,astheywereabletodopreviouslyinthecircumscribedareasoverwhichtheyheldsway.Thismakesitmoredifficulttocombatillegaltrafficking,whichisconsequentlytendingtospread.Theincreasingshareofmaritimetransportininternationaltradegivesrisetonewasymmetricthreats,asthespreadofpiracyshows.Owingtotheavailabilityofrapidtransportsystems,whichenablehealthriskstospreadfasterandonalargerscale,Statesarecompelledtolookfornewwaysofpreventingpandemics.Likewise,theinstantcommunicationenabledbytheInternetforcesthemtomobiliseagainstthespreadofcomputerviruses,whoseeffectscanbedevastating.

Furthermore,thespeedwithwhichinformationcancirculateandtheimpactithasinallareasofactivityhasenabledallmannerofcrisis-whetherpolitical,economicorfinancial-tospreadrapidly.Italsomakesitmorecomplicatedtomanagethesecriseswhich,forthemostpart,recognisenobordersandcancausechainreactionswhoseconsequencesaredifficulttopredict.

Thespreadoftechnologiesthataccompaniesglobalisationhasmajorimplicationsforthewaythreatscandevelop.Atthelowestlevel,thiscouldinvolveusingcellphonestotriggerimprovisedexplosivedevices(IEDs).Atanintermediatelevel,itcouldbetheacquisitionofadvancedweaponsystemsbysecond-tierpowers,aswellasbynon-Stategroups-aswhenHezbollahlaunchedmissilesagainstanIsraeliship.Atthehighestlevel,itcouldfacilitatetheproliferationofballisticmissilesandweaponsofmassdestruction.

Thesedifferentdevelopmentscould,especiallyintheeventofabreakdowninsecurity,createtheconditionsforterroristgroupstoobtainweaponsofmassdestruction.Whileitremainshighlyunlikelythatnon-Stateplayerswillbeabletoacquirenuclearweapons,themanufactureof“dirtybombs”fromradioactivematerialscannotberuledout.Manufactureanduseofchemicalweaponshaveanevenhigherdegreeofprobability.Althoughmanufactureofbiologicalweaponsformilitarypurposesdemandscomplexknow-how,thepotentialuseofbiologicalagentsbyterroristsremainspossibleandcouldhaveveryseriousconsequences.

Fortunately,themostlikelyactsofterrorismdonotincludetheextremescenarioinvolvingweaponsofmassdestruction.Butevenifweaponsofmassdestructionarenotused,theseactsofterrorismcanhaveadestabilisingeffect


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thatgoeswellbeyondtheirdirectimpact,sincethepowerofthemodernmediaconsiderablymagnifiestheirpsychologicalandpoliticalimpact.

FacedwithStatesthathavepowerfuldefenceandsecurityresources,butwhosepopulationsarealivetotherisk,terrorismhasbecomeamodeofactionutilisedbyadversarieswhoignorealltherulesofconventionalwarfaretooffsettheirinadequateresourcesandtoachievetheirpoliticalobjectives.Strikingciviliansindiscriminately,theviolencetheydeployaimsfirstandforemosttotakeadvantageofthefactthattheirbrutalimpactcanswaypublicopinionandthusconstraingovernments.Theimmediate,globalcoveragetheseattacksreceiveensuresmaximumresonanceamongstthepopulationoftheStatestargetedinthisway,andalsothroughouttheworld.

Thepublicitythattheythusenjoyalsohelpstomaintaintheterroristphenomenon.Itencouragestheself-radicalisationofisolatedindividualswhoareattractedbytheideathattheiractionswillhaveaglobalimpactreflectingtheextentoftheresentmentthattheyharbour.TheroleoftheInternetshouldbestressedhere:itenablestheseindividualstojoinvirtualcommunitieswithwhichtheycanidentify,thusprovidingterroristorganisationswithaneffectiverecruitmentchannel.

Morethantenyearsafterthe9/11attacksanddespitethemajorprogressachievedinthecombatagainstterrorismworldwide,thelevelofthreatremainsextremelyhigh.SystematicactionbytheUnitedStatesanditsalliesagainstAl-Qaidahasachievedsubstantialresults,withtheremovalofOsamabinLadenandtheweakeningofthemovementhecreated.Despitethemediaimpacttheygenerate,actsofterrorismhavenotachievedthepoliticaleffectshopedforbytheirperpetrators.Nevertheless,therearenosignsoftheterroristthreatdiminishingintheshortormediumterm;indeed,itappearstobeevolvingandspreadinggeographically.AgainstabackdropoffragileorfailedStates,terroristgroupsareoperatinginhithertosaferegionswheretheylatchontolocalconflictsandattempttoradicalisethem;thisishappeningintheSahel-SahararegionaswellasinnorthernNigeria,Somalia,Syria,Iraq,theArabianPeninsulaandtheAfghanistan-Pakistanarea.ClaimingallegiancetoAl-Qaida,theyhaveanindependentoperationalcapabilityandseektoachieveaglobalimpactbydirectlytargetingWesterninterests.Theymayinciteradicalisedindividualspresentonourterritorytoturntoactionandjointhemintheirefforts.SomeStatescouldalsobetemptedtoreturntotheterroristfold.Thethreatofhome-grownterrorismlikelytodamagenationalsecurityexistsevenonourownterritory.


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Operatingmodeshavealsoevolvedsince2008,particularlywithrespecttoexplosives,whicharenoweasierforgroupsorindividualstoacquireormake,thankstotheInternetandinformationtechnologies,andthegrowthintrafficking.Atatimewhentargetedkillingsandkidnappinghavebecomemorecommon,thehypothesisofamajorterroristattackidentifiedinthepreviousWhitePapercannotberuledout.

Informationsystemsarenowpartandparcelofoursocieties,butalongsidetheconsiderableopportunitiesitbrings,theinterconnectionofinformationsystemspresentsanewsourceofvulnerability.AsidentifiedinthepreviousWhitePaper,thethreatsandrisksposedbyuniversalaccesstocyberspacehavebeenconfirmed,whetherintheformofattacksonsystemsresultingfromdeliberateacts,oraccidentalfailuresthatjeopardisetheoperationofcriticaldigitalinfrastructure.

Therapiddevelopmentofdigitalinfrastructurehasnotalwaysbeenaccompaniedbyacorrespondingefforttoprotectit,withtheresultthatcyber-attacksarerelativelyeasyandcheaptocarryout.Thestealthwithwhichtheyareperformedmakesitdifficulttoidentifytheperpetrators,whomaybeStateornon-Stateactors,althoughthemostsophisticatedattacksrequirecomplexorganisation.Alarge-scaleattackonadigitalinfrastructuredemandsdetailedknowledgeoftheintendedtarget,knowledgethatcanbeacquiredthroughprevioussmaller-scaleattacksintendedtotestthetarget,orthroughinformationobtainedbyothermeans.

Severaltypesofthreataredevelopingincyberspace.Atthelowestlevel,theyareanewformofcriminalityanddonotspecificallyconcernnationalsecurity:theftofpersonaldataforpurposesofblackmailorembezzlement,identitytheft,traffickingofprohibitedproducts,etc.Ontheotherhand,nationalsecurityisthreatenedbyattemptstoinfiltratedigitalnetworksforpurposesofespionage,regardlessofwhethertheytargetStateITsystemsorthoseofcompanies.Anattackdesignedtodestroyortakeremotecontrolofcomputersystemsusedtomanageessentialinfrastructure,automatedcontrolsystemsofpotentiallydangerousindustrialsystems,nottospeakofweaponssystemsorstrategicmilitarycapabilities,mighthaveveryseriousconsequences.

Cyberspacehasthusbecomeanareaofconfrontationassuch.Thepossibility-envisagedbythepreviousWhitePaper-ofamajorcyber-attackonnationalinformationsystemsinascenarioofcyberwarfareconstitutesanextremelyseriousthreatforFranceanditsEuropeanpartners.


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Outerspacehasbecomecrucialtotheoperationofessentialservices.Inthemilitaryfield,ourstrategicautonomyisdependentonfreeaccesstoanduseofspace,whichmakeitpossibletopreserveanddevelopthetechnologicalcapabilitiesonwhichthequalityofourdefencesystemand,notleast,thecredibilityofournucleardeterrent,depend.

Thepossibilityofaggressioninspaceismorelikelyasprogressismadeinanti-satelliteweaponry,especiallylow-orbitsatellites.Furthermore,theriskofcollisiontowhichtheyareexposedgrowsasthenumberofobjects-especiallydebris-increasesintheorbitswheretheyarestationed.FranceandGermanypossesstheresourcesthatcouldserveasabasistodevelopaEuropeanspacesurveillancecapability.

The2008WhitePaperidentifiedsomenatural,healthandtechnologicalrisksthatareliable,owingtotheirscale,todisruptoursocieties.Eventssincethenhaveconfirmedtherealityoftheserisks.Severaleventshaveshownhowvulnerableoursocietiesaretonaturalrisks:theoutbreakoftheA/H1N1influenzaepidemicin2009;in2010,theparticularlydeadlyearthquakeinHaitiandtheeruptionoftheIcelandicvolcano,Eyjafjöll,whichdisturbedinternationalairtraffic;inMarch2011,theFukushimadisaster,broughtaboutbyanaturaldisasterandleadingtoamajornuclearaccident,andHurricaneSandyintheautumnof2012.

Certainclimatechangestudiessuggestthatthescaleorfrequencyofextremeeventsmayincreaseandfurtherweakentheregionsthatarealreadymostvulnerabletothem.Thepreciseregionalconsequencesofglobalwarmingoverthenextfewdecadesarestillveryuncertain.However,thereductioninArcticSeaicealreadyhasstrategicconsequencesandtheprospectofregularuseofnewArcticshippinglanesisdrawingcloser.

Intheareaofhealth,themovementofpeopleandgoods,theconcentrationofpeopleinmega-citiesandthefailureofhealthcaresystemsinsomeareasallprovidefertilegroundformajorcrisestooccur.Wefacetherisk,inparticular,ofanewhighlypathogenicandlethalpandemiccaused,forinstance,bytheemergenceofanewvirusthatcrossesthespeciesbarrier,orbytheescapeofavirusfromabiocontainmentlaboratory.


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Beingdependentoncomplexvitalinfrastructure,workingonthe“justintime”principleandindailycontactwiththeentireworld,oursocietiesmayberapidlyandseverelydisruptedbyeventsthatinitiallyaffectamerefractionofthepopulation.Alackoforganisationthatisinitiallyquitelimitedmayrapidlyspreadandgrowintoathreattonationalsecurity.

Ourcountryremainsexposedtorisksandthreatsthatvaryintheirnatureandintensity.Beingdifficulttoquantify,theyareallthemoreinsidiousandhelptomaintainapervasivefeelingofinsecurity.Consequently,weneedtoreassessourprioritiesandtailorourresponsesaccordingly.


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Chapter 4

The strategic priorities

Thegrowingcomplexityofpossiblescenarioscallsforastrictprioritisationofourstrategicoptions.Whatarethemostprobablerisksandthreats?Whatimpactmighttheyhaveonoursecurity?Acomprehensiveanalysismusttakeanothercriterionintoaccount:willwebealoneinfacingrisksandthreatsorcanwe,incertaincases,countonthehelpofourAlliesandourEuropeanpartners?

AnsweringthesequestionsenablesustoprioritisethreatsandrisksanddirectFrance’sstrategicchoicesaccordingly.Thescaleofprioritiesgoverningthelevelandintensityofourpotentialengagementsisthereforestructuredasshownbelow: -protectthenationalterritoryandFrenchnationalsabroad,andguarantee

thecontinuityoftheNation’sessentialfunctions; -guaranteethesecurityofEuropeandtheNorthAtlanticspace,withour

partnersandallies; -stabiliseEurope’snearenvironment,withourpartnersandallies; -contributetothestabilityoftheMiddleEastandthePersianGulf; -contributetopeaceintheworld.

A . Protect the national territory and French nationals abroad, and guarantee the continuity of the Nation’s essential functions

Onthisissue,thedefenceandnationalsecuritystrategytakesthefollowingthreatsandrisksintoaccount: -aggressionbyanotherStateagainstthenationalterritory; -terroristattacks; -cyber-attacks; -damagesonscientificandtechnicalpotential; -organisedcrimeinitsmostseriousmanifestations; -majorcrisesresultingfromnatural,health,technological,industrialor

accidentalrisks; -attacksonFrenchnationalsabroad.


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Protectionofthenationalterritory,itspopulationandFrenchnationalsabroadisavitalandfundamentalobligationoftheState,whichmustalsoguaranteethecontinuityoftheNation’sessentialfunctions.

PreventinganydirectaggressionagainstthenationalterritorybyanotherStatewillalwaysbeanabsolutepriority.Although,fortunately,suchascenarioappearsunlikelytoday,wecannotruleoutthepossibilitythatachainofcircumstancescouldleadtoaseriousdeteriorationintheinternationalsituation:majorterroristorcyber-attack,closingofamaritimeorairspacecompromisingthestrategicsupplyroutesofnumerouspowers,implosionofaStatewithspillovereffectsontheregionaroundit;militaryaggressionagainstanallyoracountrycrucialtothestabilityofourenvironment.France’sengagementintheprocessofcrisisresolutioncouldthentriggeraggressionbyahostileState,precipitatingourcountryintoawarsituation.Thisthreathasalowdegreeofprobability,butitcannotbeignoredgivenitsextremepotentialseriousness.Inaddition,somenuclearpowers–recognisedordefacto–couldbetemptedtobrandishthreatsoruseblackmailinthecontextofaninternationalcrisis,againstusorourallies.

Theterroristthreatisstillhighuponthelistofthemostprobablethreats:alarge-scaleterroristcampaignwouldresultinsubstantialmaterial,psychologicalandhumandamage.Ifitweretostrikeseverallocationssimultaneouslyorsuccessively,itwouldhaveamuchgreaterimpactonthepopulationandtheriskofsecurityforcesbeingoverwhelmed.ThisimpactwouldbevastlymagnifiedifitweretoinvolveNRBC(nuclear,radiological,biological,chemical)attacks.

Cyber-attacksdonothavethesameimpactasterroristacts,giventhattheyhavenottodateresultedinanyfatalities.However,todayandevenmoreoverthetimeframeofthisWhitePaper,theyrepresentamajorriskgiventheirhighprobabilityandpotentialimpact.Attemptstoinfiltratedigitalnetworks(hacking)targetingtheState,operatorsofvitalimportanceandlargenationalorstrategiccompaniesoccursonadailybasis,althoughwecannotalwaysdistinguishwithcertaintybetweenattacksinitiatedbynon-StateplayersandthoseemanatingfromState-ledplayers.Largequantitiesofinformationofgreatstrategic,industrial,economicorfinancialvaluearestolen,oftenunbeknownsttothevictims.Therecurrenceofthistypeofinfiltrationtoday,notablyonthepartofStates,couldsuggestthatinformationisbeingmethodicallycollectedtofacilitatealarge-scaleattackinaconflictsituation.Suchanattackcouldeasilyparalysewholeswathesofacountry’sactivity,triggertechnologicalorecologicaldisastersandclaimnumerousvictims.Itcouldthereforeconstituteagenuineactofwar.


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TheNation’sscientificandtechnicalpotentialconsistsofallthetangibleandintangiblegoodscontributingtofundamentalandappliedscientificactivityandtechnologicaldevelopment.Numerousattemptsaremadetoattackthispotential,withtheaimofdivertingscientificandtechnicaldata.TheyarelikelytoharmtheNation’seconomicinterestsandcanalsocontributetoanincreaseinforeignmilitaryarsenals,proliferationofweaponsofmassdestructionordiversionforthepurposesofterroristaction.Giventheserisks,itisvitaltoprotectthispotential.

Organisedcrimenetworkscanirrigateillegalundergroundeconomies.Inmostcases,theymayhaveinternationalconnectionsandinsomecaseslinks–includingfinanciallinks-withterroristgroups.Thedisseminationofweaponsofwarandexplosivesislikelytoreinforcethecapabilitiesofcertaincriminalgroupsandmayeven,inextremesituations,leadtoseriousattacksonpublicordercompromisingthenormalfunctioningofinstitutions.

Theprobabilityofnatural(earthquakes,storms,tsunamis,floods,etc.),health(massivepandemic)ortechnologicalandindustrial(notablychemicalornuclear)risksismoredifficulttoassess,buttheycanhaveamajorimpact.TheStatehasanobligationtoprepareforsuchrisks,incontinentalFranceandinitsoverseasterritories.Anaturalortechnologicaldisastercanbringaboutseriousdysfunctionsinpublicandprivatestructuresandevenleadtoagreatnumberofvictims,withthoseinjuredoftenrequiringhighlyspecialisedcareandtreatment,particularlyintheeventofexposuretochemicalproductsornuclearradiation.Theycanalsotriggerdisturbancescreatinganadditionalfactorofinsecurity:panicamongthepopulation,refusaltoobeysecurityinstructionsorstayoutofforbiddenareas,looting,increaseindelinquency,etc.

Therisksandthreatstowhichtheoverseasterritories-wherealmostthreemillionofourfellowcitizenslive-areexposedposespecificproblemstodowiththeirgeographicaldistanceandtheirspecificcharacteristics.TheycallforspecificresponsesfromtheState.Particularattentionisrequiredgiventheirstrategicsituation,notablybecauseofthemanysubstantialresourcesexistingintheirmaritimespacesandtheillegalactivitiesbeingcarriedonintheirimmediatevicinity.

TheAntilles-FrenchGuianaregionisahubexposedtomultipleinfluences.TheUnitedStateshasastrongpresence,asdoCentralandSouthAmericancountries(Brazil,Mexico,Venezuela,etc.)andsomeEuropeancountriesthatretainintereststhere(Holland,Spain,theUnitedKingdom).Theregionrepresents


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astrategicchallengenotonlyforFrance,butalsoforEurope,becauseoftheKourouSpaceCentreinFrenchGuiana.Itisalsoaregionbesetbysubstantialsecurityproblemsduetonumerousillicittransnationaltraffickingactivities:drugs(halftheworld’scocaineisproducedintheregion),illegalgoldprospecting,moneylaundering,clandestineimmigrationandfishing,etc.,whichimpactonthesecurityofourfellowcitizensintheoverseasterritories.Furthermore,theriskofnaturaldisastersisparticularlyhighintheAntilles.Lastly,thepresenceofnumerousFrenchandEuropeannationalsinneighbouringcountriesincreasestheneedforafast-responsecapabilityforevacuationoperationsoroperationstorestoresecurity.OverandaboveissuesofsovereigntyandprotectionoftheFrenchpopulationlivingintheseterritories,Francemustthereforeassumetheresponsibilitiesarisingfromitspresenceinthiscomplexregion.

NewCaledoniaandthecommunitieslivinginFrenchPolynesiaandWallis-et-FutunamakeFranceapoliticalandmaritimepowerinthePacific.Francehassubstantialfishingandmineralresourcesinthisregion,asituationthatgivesitaccesstomanyregionalorganisations:theSouthPacificForum,theFisheriesAgency,etc.Itisourresponsibilitytodefendoursovereigntyinthispartoftheworldandalsotoguaranteethesecurityofourfellowcitizensinregionsexposedtoclimaticrisks,notablythroughtheFRANZAgreement(France–Australia–NewZealand).FrancecontributestothegeneralprotectionofpopulationsandresourcesinthePacificOcean.Inthiscapacity,itdevelopsrelationsofcooperationwithmanyneighbouringStates,particularlyAustralia,withwhichithasestablishedastrategicpartnership.

ReunionIslandandMayotteintheIndianOceanarepocketsofrelativeprosperityinthemidstofalessprivilegedenvironment,andstrategicallysignifiant.Asaneighbouringpower,FrancehasaresponsibilitytoprotecttheFrenchpopulationandcontributetofreedomofnavigationandthecombatagainstpiracyandhumantrafficking.TheIlesÉparses(ScatteredIslands)locatedinthemaritimenavigationzoneoftheMozambiqueChannelgiveFranceanexclusiveeconomiczonecovetedbyothercountriesduetothepossiblepresenceofoilandgasresources.ThesameistruefortheFrenchSouthernandAntarcticLands(TAAF),whichoffersubstantialfishingresources.

ThearchipelagoofSaint-Pierre-et-MiquelonislocatedclosetotheArcticandNorthAtlanticshippinglanesinanareawithsubstantialhydrocarbonresources.ThedevelopmentofthearchipelagoandprotectionofitspopulationrequireregionalcooperationwithCanadaanditsAtlanticprovincesthatrespectstheinterestsofallparties.


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ThenumberofFrenchnationalstravelingorresidingabroadiscontinuingtorise.Theirsecuritycanbethreatenedinpoorlycontrolledareas,eithercountrieswithinadequateStatestructuresormaritimezonesvulnerabletopiracy.WhileattacksaimedcollectivelyataparticularexpatriateFrenchcommunitywererarebetween2008and2012,kidnappinghas,conversely,becomeastructuralriskinnumerouscountries.Furthermore,ourfellowcitizensareregularlycaughtupinextraordinarysituations(coupd’état,civilwar,naturaldisasters,etc.)thatcallforemergencyaction.TheStatewillalwaysbeobligedtoconductoperationstoprotectFrenchcitizensexposedtothreatsthroughouttheworld.Inmostcases,wherenecessary,emergencyevacuationwillalsoconcernothernationalsfromEuropeanoralliedcountriesandmaygiverisetosharedoperationsbetweenthecountriesconcerned.

B . Guarantee the security of Europe and the North Atlantic space, with our partners and allies

MostoftherisksandthreatstowhichFranceisexposedareverylargelysharedbytheothercountriesoftheEuropeanUnionandtheAtlanticAlliance.Indeed,thesystemicdimensionofmajorrisksandthetransnationalnatureofthethreatshavebothincreased.

ThesametrendtowardsdejureanddefactosolidaritywithourEuropeanpartnerscanbeobservedregardingthethreatofaState-ledaggression.WhilenoneoftheEuropeancountries,includingFrance,istodaythreatenedbyadeclaredState-levelenemy,theprobabilityofdirectmilitaryaggressionagainstanotherEuropeancountrymustbetakenintoaccountintheglobalrangeofrisksandthreats.Inthisevent,Francewillcomplywithitscommitments,inespectofArticle5oftheNorthAtlanticTreaty5,andArticle42.7oftheTreatyonthefunctioningoftheEuropeanUnion6.

5 This article states «that an armed attack against one or more [of the parties to the Treaty] in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.»

6 This article states that « if a Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other Member States shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power, in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. This shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States. Commitments and cooperation in this area shall be consistent with commitments under the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, which, for those States which are members of it, remains the foundation of their collective defence and the forum for its implementation.”


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Likewise,mostoftherisksandthreatsareofidenticalconcernonbothsidesoftheNorthAtlantic.Theveryclose,in-depthnatureofourbilateralrelationswiththeUnitedStatesandCanada,ourcollectivedefencecommitmentsundertheNorthAtlanticTreatyandthecommonalityofourvaluesstructureadejureanddefactosolidaritybetweenus,whichhasbeendemonstratedseveraltimesinthelastfewyears.Francewillcontinuetofullyassumeitsresponsibilitiesinthisframeworkandactinaccordancewiththisspiritofsolidarity.

AwarenessofthissharedexposuretorisksandthreatshaspromptedtheMemberStatesoftheUniontodevelopcommoninstrumentstoconfrontthisrisktogetherwheneverpossible.Hence,aftertheterroristattackinMadridon11March2004,theEuropeanCounciladoptedadeclarationonthecombatagainstterrorism,statingthatterroristactsareattacksagainstthevaluesonwhichtheUnionisfounded.ThisdeclarationlaidthegroundworkforthesolidarityclauseintroducedbytheTreatyofLisbon,whichcameintoforceon1December2009.Theclause,whichcoversawidespectrumofrisksandthreats,statesthat“TheUnionanditsMemberStatesshallactjointlyinaspiritofsolidarityifaMemberStateistheobjectofaterroristattackorthevictimofanaturalorman-madedisaster.”TheTreatyprovidesforthepossibilityofmobilisingaverywiderangeofmeans,includingmilitary,tothisend.

TheStockholmProgramme,whichidentifiesasetofinternalsecuritypriorities7,andthecorrespondingstrategyadoptedbytheEuropeanCouncilareimportantmilestonestowardsachievingthisend.TheyreflectthedeterminationofalltheStatesoftheUniontoprovideacommonresponsetorisksandthreatsthatmightjeopardisetheirinternalsecurity.

Europemust,inparticular,havethecapacitytoprotectitsvitalinfrastructureanditsindustrial,scientificandtechnicalpotentialagainstattacksorcyber-attacksconductedbyStatesororganisationsmotivatedbyespionageorsabotage.

Furthermore,thestabilityofallthecountriesintheEuropeanspaceisanimportantpriority.TheBalkanwarsarerecedingintothepast,butthepersistenceofunresolvedterritorialorinter-communitytensions,whicharelikelytobeexacerbatedbytheeconomiccrisis,mayhavedestabilisingeffects:resolvingacrisissituationinthisnearspaceisthereforeaprimaryresponsibilityforEuropeans.

7 The Stockholm Programme, adopted in 2010, establishes the European Union’s priorities for the 2010-2014 period in the areas of police and customs cooperation, civil protection, legal cooperation in criminal and civil matters, the visa policy and questions of asylum and migration.


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C . Stabilise Europe’s near environment, with our partners and allies

ThesecurityoftheEuropeanUnioniscloselylinkedtothatoftheEuropeancontinentasawhole.ItisinEurope’s–andFrance’s–interestthatnothreatemergesinitsnearenvironment.Hence,thesecurityoftheEuropeanUnion’sneighboursisapriorityforFrance.LikeitsotherEuropeanneighbours,Francecannotaffordtochoosebetweenthedifferent“borders”ofEurope–theyareallofequalimportanceforthecontinent’slong-termsecurity.

Europe’seasternneighbourscontinuetorequirespecialvigilance.SomeoftheStatesemergingfromthebreak-upoftheUSSRandYugoslavia,someofwhichhaveappliedtojointheEuropeanUnion,remainfragile.Europe’senergydependenceonRussia,theCaucasusandCentralAsiaisstillhigh.RelationswithRussiamustbecontinuallymaintainedandconsolidated,inacontextwherepowerissuesandinterdependenciescoexistandaresometimesinopposition.

TheEuropeanUnionnowcountsRussiaasaneighbour,sincesomeofitsmembersshareacommonborderwithit.ConsolidatingstabilityontheeasternmarginsofEurope,basedonrelationsofcooperationwithRussiaintheframeworkofsolemnlyagreedprinciplesimposedover20yearsagobytheCharterofParis,isavitalchallengeforthesecurityofEuropeandhenceofFrance.

Turkey,anactivememberofNATO,occupiesasingularplaceinthesecurityofEurope:duetoitsgeographicalpositionanditshistory,itstraddlesseveralstrategicareas.Itsactionandregionalinfluence,economicdynamism,industrialandtechnologicalpotentialandthedensewebofrelationsbetweenitandtheEuropeanUnioncountries,includingFrance,makeitavaluableally.

TheMediterranean,astrategicborderoftheEuropeanUnion,hasbeenatthecentreofacommonhistoryforoverthreemillenniaandstrategic,economic,culturalandhumanrelationsareparticularlydense.TheveryclosehumanbondsestablishedwiththecountriesoftheMediterranean’ssouthernshoresandthedenseweboftradeandexchangesmaketheMediterraneanSeaastrategicspace.Weenjoymultiplecommoninterests(manybi-nationalcitizens,Frenchinvestments,strategicsupplies)andwesharecommonsecurityinterests,particularlyasconcernsterrorismandtrafficking.Inthisrespect,theMaghreb(NorthAfrica)hasparticularimportanceforFranceandforEurope,notablygiventheunstableconditionsfollowingtheArabrevolutions.TheriskofasecurityvoidinsomecountriesorregionsisapotentialchallengeforthewholeoftheMediterraneanandSouthernEurope.FranceandEuropehaveregularlybeen


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involvedincrisesarisingintheeasternMediterranean,includingLebanon,criseslinkedtotheIsrael-Arabconflict,Libyaand,today,Syria.

TheSahel,fromMauritaniatotheHornofAfrica,togetherwithpartofsub-SaharanAfrica,arealsoregionsofpriorityinterestforFranceduetoacommonhistory,thepresenceofFrenchnationals,theissuesatstakeandthethreatsconfrontingthem.Inaddition,theAtlanticfaçadeofAfricaisofspecialinteresttoEuropegiventhedevelopmentofrelationswithLatinAmerica.

InaregionwhereStatesoftenstruggletocontroltheirterritory,transnationaldynamicsgiverisetocriminalflowsandverydestabilisingillegaltrafficking(drugs,humanbeings,weapons,etc.).ThepossibilitythatwholeterritoriescanescapethecontrolofaStateoveralongperiodisastrategicriskofcrucialimportanceforEurope.

ThecrisisinMali,whichrequiredinterventionbyFrance,isanexcellentcaseinpoint.Itillustratestheimportanceoftheregionandtheseriousness,forEurope,ofthethreatsemergingthere.InternaltensionsinthenorthofMaliandbetweenthenorthandsouthofthecountry,combinedwithaweakeningofMali’sgovernment,fosteredtheestablishmentofterroristgroups.AftercapitalisingonthetraffickingendemictothispartoftheSahara,thesegroupswereabletoestablishrearbasesbeforethenseekingtotakecontrolofthewholecountry,threateningtotransformthewholeofthissub-regionintoahotbedofinternationalterrorism.

TheserisksofterrorismareemergingatatimewhentheGulfofGuineaisbecomingamajorfocusofAfricandevelopmentgivenitsdemographicandeconomicdevelopment.ForFrance,andalsofortheotherEuropeancountrieswhosehumanandeconomicpresenceintheregionisincreasing,thesecurityoflandandmaritimespacesisastrategicpriority.

SupportforestablishmentofacollectivesecurityarchitectureinAfricaisapriorityofFrance’scooperationanddevelopmentpolicy.Asacomplement,eightdefencepartnershipagreements(Cameroon,theCentralAfricanRepublic,Comoros,Djibouti,Gabon,IvoryCoast,Senegal,Togo)and16technicalcooperationagreementssupportAfricanStatesintakingresponsibilityforcontrollingtheirsecurity.Theseagreementsalsoofferourarmedforcesfacilitiesforanticipationandreaction.Lastly,twoemergingregionalpowers,SouthAfricaandNigeria,areleadingpotentialpartnersforEuropeandFrance.Thesecountrieshavemanystrengths:thankstotheirinfluenceandtheirdemographic,economic


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andmilitaryclout,theyarenowinapositiontomakeaneffectivecontributiontotheoperationalcapacitiesoftheAfricanUnion.

Notallourpartnersandalliesgivethesameweighttothestrategicimportance,forEurope,ofitseasternneighbours,theMediterraneanandthepartofAfricafromtheSaheltoEquatorialAfrica.However,forFrancethereisnodoubtthattheseregionsareofpriorityinterestforthewholeoftheEuropeanUnion,andthatacommonvisionoftherisksandthreatsisbothdesirableandurgent.ItisevenmoreimportanttoaffirmthiscollectiveEuropeanpriorityinthatourAmericanandCanadianalliesexpectustoassumeanessentialshareofourresponsibilitiesinregionswheretheyconsiderthemselvestobelessdirectlyconcerned.

D . Contribute to the stability of the Middle East and the Arabo-Persian Gulf

TheareastretchingfromtheeasternshoresoftheMediterraneantotheArabo-PersianGulfisapriorityinitself.Eachofthedifferentconflictsprevailingintheregionhavetheirowndynamic,buttheycannotbeunderstoodinisolationfromeachotherandthesecurityofthisregionmustbelookedatinitsglobality.TheArabo-PersianGulfhasparticularstrategicimportance:itsstabilityisamajorchallengenotonlyforFranceandalltheEuropeancountries,butalsofortheUnitedStatesandthebigemergingpowers.Thisregion,whereIran’sracetoacquirenuclearmilitarycapabilityengendersariskofproliferation,concentratesrisksofseriousconflictthatwouldhaveaglobalimpactontheplanet.Apartfromtheexistenceofstillsubstantialenergyreserves,itisoneofthemaintransitroutesfortheworldeconomy:theStraitofHormuzisthemandatorypointofpassageforapproximately30%ofglobaloilexports.

AconflictintheArabo-PersianGulfcouldhaveseriousandvariedrepercussions:obstaclestofreedomofnavigationintheStraitofHormuz,firingofballisticmissiles,destabilisationofcountriesintheregion.Throughtheplayofalliances,itcouldimmediatelytakeonastronginternationaldimensionandwoulddirectlyinvolveourcountry.TheUnitedStateshasdominantstrategicinfluenceintheregion,butFranceissteppingupitspresenceanddefencecooperation.IthasdefenceagreementswiththreeStatesintheregion(Qatar,KuwaitandUnitedArabEmirates)andhasestablishedajointmilitarybaseinAbuDhabi.AmilitarycooperationagreementhasbeensignedwithBahrainandFranceentertainscloserelationswithSaudiArabia.Intheeventofconflict,theIranianballisticmissilethreatwouldimmediatelyaffectallthecountriesintheregionandhence


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theFrenchbasesandstagingpostsinstalledthere.Inthiscontext,ourcapacitytoimplementouragreementsinclosecoordinationwithouralliesiscrucial.

E . Contribute to peace in the world

Francehasglobalinterestsjustifyingpreservationofanextensivediplomaticnetwork.Itspoliticalpositioningintheworld,thevaluesitdefends,itsterritorialandmaritimereachthankstoitsoverseasterritoriesanditsspecialculturalinfluencegiveourcountryinterestsonallcontinents.

Thedemographic,economic,politicalandmilitarycloutofAsiatodaymakeitaregionthatconcentratesimportantsecuritychallengesandinterests.Twoeconomicgiants–ChinaandIndia–haveemerged.NumerousothercountriessuchasIndonesia,Malaysia,Singapore,SouthKoreaandThailandaredemonstratingremarkabledynamismandacceptinggrowingresponsibilities.Japan,amemberoftheG8groupofcountries,isacrucialplayer.Asiathereforeplaysavitalroleinglobalisation.Todayitisthemaindriverofgrowthworldwide,butalsoaregionwheretherisksoftensionandconflictareamongthehighestintheworld.

ThesecurityoftheIndianOcean,amaritimeaccesstoAsia,isapriorityforFranceandforEuropefromthispointofview.Asatransitregionforinternationaltrade,theIndianOceanisattheheartofworldstrategicchallenges,asillustratedbythepermanentpresenceoftheUS,AsianandEuropeannavies.ThefactthattheEuropeanUnion’sfirstlarge-scalenavaloperationwastheAtalantaoperationagainstpiracyclearlyillustratestheimportanceoftheIndianOcean,notonlyforFrancebutforEuropeasawhole.AsaneighbouringpowerintheIndianOcean,Franceplaysaparticularrolehere,reinforcedbythedevelopmentofprivilegedrelationswithIndia.Astrategicpartnershipsignedin1998enablescooperationinareasthatconcernthemajorinterestsofbothcountries.FrancesupportsareformoftheUnitedNationsSecurityCouncilthatwouldcreateaplacefornewpermanentmembers,includingIndia.

InSouthAsia,theengagementoftheinternationalcommunityinAfghanistanhascontributedtocombatinginternationalterrorismandreinforcinglegitimateinstitutions.Butregionalstabilityremainsprecariousandpoliticalengagementnecessarytostabilisecertainfragilecountriesandreducetheriskofinter-Stateconflict.Franceconsidersthecombatagainstterrorismandnuclearproliferationtobeprimordial,togetherwiththesecurityofitsenergysupplies.


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Theseconsiderationsmakethisregiononeinwhichourcountryretainsstrategicinterests.

TheequilibriumofEastAsiahasbeenradicallytransformedbythegrowingmightofChina.Asthemajordriverofeconomicgrowthintheworldandaleadingfinancial,diplomaticandmilitaryplayer,Chinaisoneofthepowersthatstructuresglobalisation.Chinese-Frenchbilateralrelationshave,since1997,beencharacterisedbyaglobalpartnershipleadingtoaregularflowofhigh-levelpoliticalexchangesanddialogueencompassingalltopicsandareas,commensuratewithChina’snewimportance.

ThestrengtheningoftheAmericanmilitarypresenceintheregionmaycontributetocontroloftensionsinAsiaandfacilitaterolloutofstabilisinginstrumentsaimedatensuringpeacefulmanagementofdisputes.ButAmericanengagementdoesnotrelieveFrance,asapermanentmemberoftheUnitedNationsSecurityCouncilandasignatoryoftheTreatyofAmityandCooperationinSouth-EastAsia8,ofitsresponsibilities.FrancesupportstheroleoftheEuropeanUnionintheASEANRegionalForum(ARF)andiskeentoplayamoreactiverolewithregionalsecurityorganisations.Itenjoysrelationsofconfidencewithallthecountriesintheregion,notablywithSouthKoreaandJapan,andsupportsJapan’sbidtobecomeamemberoftheUNSecurityCouncil.Forourcountry,thestabilityofAsiaandfreedomofnavigationarediplomaticandeconomicpriorities.Alongsideitsallies,Francewould,intheeventofanopencrisis,makeapoliticalandmilitarycontributionattheappropriatelevel.

Throughdefencecooperation,Francecontributestothesecurityofseveralcountriesintheregion,notablyIndonesia,Malaysia,SingaporeandVietnam.Itbolstersitspoliticalengagementthroughanactivepresence,developmentofstrategicpartnershipsandintensificationofitscooperationnetworks.WithSingapore,ourleadingcommercialpartnerinSouth-EastAsiaandnumberthreeinAsia(afterChinaandJapan),itconductsregularpoliticaldialogueandveryclosecooperationindefenceandsecurity.

InthePacific,Francefullyassumesitsresponsibilitiesasapoliticalandmaritimepowerwithapresenceintheregion.ItsignedastrategicpartnershipagreementwithAustraliain2012,whichmarksthegrowingconvergenceofthetwocountries’interestsonagreatmanyinternationalandregionalmattersrelativetothePacific

8 The Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in South-East Asia was signed at the first ASEAN summit on 24 February 1976, in Bali (Indonesia).


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andtheIndianOcean.ItalsoconfirmsarenewedinterestinaFrenchpresenceonthepartofcountriesintheregion,seenasafactorofstabilityandasourceofimmediateassistance,particularlyintheeventofanaturaldisaster,thankstoFrance’spre-positionedresourcesintheoverseasterritoriesintheregion.

France’sengagementinLatinAmericaisnotconfinedtoitsterritorialpresenceontheSouthAmericancontinent.LatinAmerica’sgrowingimportanceontheinternationalstageisnowageopoliticalgiventhatreflectsthegenuinelymulti-polarnatureofthenewstrategiclandscape.Itcanbeseenintheeconomic,politicalandculturalrenaissanceunfoldinginthecountriesofthisregionandisexpressedthroughamultipolarvisionsharedlargelybyFrance.

Thelong-standingrelationsbetweenFranceandBrazilmovedintoanewchapterwiththelaunchin2006ofamulti-facetedstrategicpartnershipcoveringmilitary,space,energy,economicandeducationalissues.FrancealsosupportsBrazil’sambitiontoplayagrowingroleontheinternationalstageanditsbidtobecomeapermanentmemberoftheUnitedNationsSecurityCouncil.

Argentina,Chile,Colombia,MexicoandPeruarealsokeyregionalcountrieswithwhichFranceiskeentoestablishmorein-depthdialogueonstrategicchallengesanddefencecooperation.ThroughtheexchangesandcooperativeagreementstheyhaveestablishedbetweenthemselvesbutalsointheAsia-Pacificregion,thesefivedemocraciesbearwitnesstosuccessfulintegrationinglobalisation,markedbythedynamismofrelationsbetweenemergingcountries.


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Chapter 5

France’s engagement in the Atlantic Alliance and in the European Union

OurdefenceandnationalsecuritystrategycannotbeconceivedoutsidetheframeworkoftheAtlanticAllianceandourengagementintheEuropeanUnion.

Inthenewstrategicenvironment,whichisbothmoreunstableandmoreuncertain,therearethreeoptionsthatwouldbeillusoryforFrance: -goingitalone,inotherwordsdefendingsolelyourownvitalinterestsand

abdicatinganyregionalorglobalresponsibilities.OurstatusintheUnitedNations,ourhistoryandthescaleofourintereststhroughouttheworldmakethisoptionunrealisticandinopportune;

-delegatingourfuturesecuritytotheUSAandNATO.TheAtlanticAllianceisapillaroftheFrenchdefencepolicy,butitmusttakeintoaccountthedifferencesofprioritiesthatrequireeachmemberofthisAlliancetoassumetheirownresponsibilities;

-theoptionofanintegratedEuropeandefence.FrancereaffirmsitsambitionforacredibleandeffectiveEuropeandefencestrategy,butitcannotignorethestumblingblockstodevelopmentoftheEuropeanframework.

Thedefenceandnationalsecuritystrategyaimstocombinethemostpositiveaspectsofeachofthesethreeoptions:thesovereigntyofourdecisions,fullengagementinadynamicAtlanticAlliance,aproactiveandambitiousstancewithrespecttotheEuropeanUnion.

NATOandtheEuropeanUnionaredifferenttypesoforganisation.NATOisapolitical-militaryalliance,whereastheEuropeanUnionis,foritsmembers,aglobalprojectwithpolitical,economic,commercial,diplomaticandmilitarydimensions.


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A . France in NATO

Byre-joiningNATO’sintegratedmilitarycommandstructures,Franceintendedtotakebackitsrightfulplaceinthefunctioningofanorganisationofwhichitisoneofthefoundingmembers.ForFrance,nowfullyengagedintheAtlanticAlliance,thisfulfilsthreeessentialfunctions.First,itguaranteesthecollectivedefenceofitsmembers.Secondly,itisanimportantinstrumentofthestrategicpartnershipbetweenthetwosidesoftheAtlantic.Thirdly,itactsasthecommonframeworkformilitaryactionwhenevertheAlliesagreetointervenetogethertorespondtosharedrisksandthreats.

Franceiskeentoincreasethestrengthofthemilitaryalliance,whichbringstogether28nationsdeterminedtoprovideajointdefenceagainstanyarmedaggression.Itwillbeparticularlyvigilantasconcernspreservationofanappropriatecombinationofnuclear,conventionalandanti-missiledefencecapabilities,inaccordancewiththeengagementsstatedintheStrategicConcept,whichreaffirmstheroleofnuclearweaponsasthesupremeguaranteeofsecurityandpillaroftheAlliance’sdefencedoctrine.TheindependentstrategicnuclearforcesoftheUnitedKingdomandFrance,whichhavetheirownroleofdeterrence,contributetoglobaldeterrenceandthesecurityoftheAllies.

ThestrengthoftheAtlanticAllianceresidesinthefactthatitisapolitical-militaryalliancebetweencountriessharingcommonvalues.Inthisrespect,FranceintendstofullyexploitthepoliticalframeworkoftheAlliancetodiscusswithitsalliesthecommonsecuritychallengesfacingthem.

Asaframeworkformilitaryaction,NATOdevelopsintimesofpeacetheproceduresandcommonstandardsessentialfortheinteroperabilityofitsforces.Itisorganisedtotakeactioninresponsetodifferenttypesofconflict,rangingfromcollectivedefencetoconductingstabilisationoperations.CollectivedefencemustremainthecornerstoneoftheAlliance,butitmustalsobeabletotakeactionincrisismanagementoperations,againstcross-cuttingthreatsandincollectivesecurityoperations.ThisengagementisessentialwhenitreflectsacommonwillonthepartoftheAlliestoacttogetherinaconcretemannerandwhentheaddedvalueoftheAllianceisclearlyestablished.TheAlliance’sinterventionsmust,ofnecessity,beembeddedintheframeworkofinternationallaw.Theymaybenefitfromthesupportoftheregionalorganisationsconcerned.Thefeasibilityandpoliticalexpediencyofsuchinterventionswillbeassessedonacase-by-casebasisandaccompaniedbyapoliticalpost-crisisstrategy.


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FranceisconvincedthatastrongandeffectiveAllianceservesitsowninterestsandthoseofEurope.ThedecisiontoawardthepositionofSupremeAlliedCommanderTransformation(SACT)toaFrenchgeneralofficerenablesFrancetoparticipateactivelyintheprocessofoverhaulingtheAlliance’smeansforaction.Inthiscapacity,Francewillcontinuetogiveprioritytoadaptingorganisationofcommandtothemostprobableoperationalengagements,rationalisingitsagencies,andimprovingforecastingandfinancialmanagement.Asamajorallyonthepolitical,militaryandfinanciallevels,FranceisalsoconvincedthatthevitalityoftheAlliancedependsoneachofitsmembersbeingassuredthattheirowninterestsarefullyrecognisedandencouragingthemtoassumealltheirresponsibilities.CommonfundingmustbestrictlycontrolledandreservedforpriorityprojectsandactivitiesthatbenefitalltheAlliesandreinforcetheirinteroperability,whichiscoretotheaddedvalueprovidedbytheAlliance.Inthiscontext,FrancewilltakecaretoensurethatthecapacityofNationswishingtoactindependentlyinotherframeworksisguaranteed.Franceitself,whilefullyengagedinthealliedmilitarycommand,intendstopreservethemeansofitssovereigntyinallcircumstances.Ontheindustriallevel,thecooperationframeworkarisingfromsmartdefence9shouldtakeintoaccounttheneedtopromoteprojectsinitiatedbytheEuropeandefenceindustry,inordertopreserveitsstrengthsincutting-edgetechnologiesandhigh-added-valueproduction.

NATOandtheEuropeanUnionarenotincompetition.Thetwoorganisationsarecomplementary,whetherinexternaloperationsorinitiativessuchascapabilitypoolingandsharing10andsmartdefence.Thankstotheirdifferentspecificcharacteristics,theyofferapaletteofresponsesallowingFranceanditsAlliestofaceuptoanincreasinglybroadspectrumofrisksandthreats.CloseandpragmaticcooperationbetweenthesetwoorganisationsisanimportantobjectiveforFrance.TheUSA’sengagementtoparticipateinEurope’ssecuritywillbestrongerifEuropeheedstheircalltosharetheburdenofmilitaryspending.ThissharingcannotbeenvisagedsatisfactorilyunlessitfostersdevelopmentoftheEuropeandefenceindustry.Francethereforeintendstoplayitsfullroleinbothorganisationstocontributetocollectivesecurity.

9 The smart defence initiative was launched by NATO’s Secretary General. It aims to optimise the Allies’ military spending through pooling, multinational acquisitions and common funding of allied capabilities. Based on three principles (multinational cooperation, specialisation where it makes sense and priority capabilities), this initiative is developed by the organisation’s Supreme Allied Command for Transformation (SACT).

10 The pooling and sharing initiative, developed within the European Defence Agency under the authority of the EU High Representative for foreign affairs and security policy, aims to develop pooling and sharing of military capabilities between Member States of the European Union. One of its objectives is to preserve the industrial and technological base of European defence and combine research and technology efforts (R&T) to preserve robust European capabilities.


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B . France in the European Union

FrancesharesthemajorityofthethreatsandrisksfacingitwithitsEuropeanpartners,thepragmaticcorollaryofthisfactbeingthatouractionwillbemoreeffectiveifweareabletorespondtothemtogether.Thisiswhy,intheframeworkofitsdefenceandnationalsecuritystrategy,FranceconsidersthatbuildingaEuropeanapproachtodefenceandsecurityisapriority.ConvincedthataEuropeanresponsewouldbegreaterthanthesumofnationalresponses,itlookstowardstheEuropeanUnionwiththedeterminationtocontributeFrance’sknowledgeofcrisesanditsproposalsconcerningtheresponsestobemadetothem.Inreturn,itiskeentobenefitfromtheknowledgeandproposalsofitsEuropeanpartners,butalsofromanexternalactionserviceplayingastrongerrole,notablyincrisismanagement,togetherwiththestrengthsofEuropeanUnionagencies(suchas,forinstance,theEuropeanDefenceAgencyandtheTorrejonsatellitecentre).

Francewillacttoensureemergence,intheEuropeanframework,ofastrategicvisiongroundedinsharedanalysisoftherisksandthreats,whethertheyconcernchallengesaffectingtheinternalsecurityoftheStatesoftheUnionorthecommonsecurityanddefencepolicy.ContactsbetweennationalparliamentsanddiscussionswithintheEuropeanParliamentwillcontributetoenhancingpublicunderstandingandacceptanceofthestrategicchallengesinvolved.

Thecurrentcontextmakesapragmaticrevitalisationofthecommonsecurityanddefencepolicy(CSDP)bothpossibleandurgent.Budgetconstraintsarepromptingasearchforgreaterefficacyinpublicspendingonsecurityanddefence.ThereorientationofUSmilitarycapabilitiesinfavouroftheAsiaPacificregion,atatimewhenpocketsofinstabilityhavedevelopedalongEurope’sbordersrequiretheStatesoftheUniontofaceuptotheirresponsibilities.Inthenext15to20years,crisissituationswillprobablyresultfromscenarioscallingforamultidimensionalresponse,notablyintheformofcomplexstabilisationoperations.Onthisperspective,theEuropeanframeworkissettobecomethereferenceframeworkinsituationsrequiringmobilisationofthewholerangeofcivilandmilitaryinstrumentsrequiredtoimplementaglobalapproachtocrises.Furthermore,FranceconsidersthatthepartnershipbetweentheUnitedStatesandtheEuropeanUnionwillbestrengthenedbythelatterassumingtheresponsibilitiesincumbentonitinmanagingcrisesaffectingitssecurity.

Franceconsidersthecommonsecurityanddefencepolicynotasanendinitself,butasa–civilandmilitary–instrumentservingthevitalinterestsof


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theEuropeanUnion.Europecannottakeabackseatinthegreatpowergameifitwishestocontributetobuildingamorestableinternationalorderinwhichitpromotesthevaluesonwhichitsidentityisbased.TheimpetusmustcomefromthehighestpoliticalleveloftheUnion,i.e.theEuropeanCouncil.ItmustdeterminetherolethatEuropeintendstoplayontheinternationalstageandthenatureoftheworldorderthatEuropewishestopromoteininternationalforumsandorganisationsandwithrespecttootherStates.Itmust,notably,initiateguidelinesonthreemajortopics:themissionsoftheCSDP,thecapabilitiestobedevelopedincommonandindustrialstrategiesrelatingtodefence.Atalatertime,aEuropeanUnionWhitePaper,whichwouldmoreclearlydefinetheUnion’sinterestsandstrategicobjectives,couldcontributetotheEuropeandebateonsecurityanddefenceandwouldbeanopportunitytoexpressasharedvision.

Thisimpetusgivenatthehighestpoliticallevelmustbesupplementedbyresolutelypragmaticimplementationincludingpreventionactions,jointexternalactions,commonweaponsprogrammesand,eventually,poolingofcapabilities.

SincestabilisationofEurope’sneighbourhoodrepresentsamajorelementofsecurityforallthemembercountriesoftheUnion,itistheresponsibilityoftheEuropeanstoactpreventivelyinemergingcrisisflashpoints.Followingonfrominitiativesalreadytaken,securityinthecountriesofaregionspanningtheSaheltoEquatorialAfrica,combattingallformsofterrorism,theMiddleEastpeaceprocess,assistanceforsuccessfulpoliticaltransitionsinsomeArabcountries,settlingconflictsintheCaucasus,andpeace-buildingintheBalkans,notablyinKosovo,areareasinwhichtheEuropeanUnionmustcontinuetodevelopitsactions.

With28civilandmilitaryoperationshavingbeenconductedsince2003,theEuropeanUnionhasalreadyacquiredrealexperienceincrisismanagementandpeacekeeping.TheseoperationshaveshownthatEuropeiscapableofengagementinexternaltheatresofaction.Theyhavemadeitpossibletotesttheeffectivenessofoperationalconcepts,whetherthecombatagainstpiracy,assistancewithrebuildingtheruleoflaw,reformofsecuritysystemsorpost-crisisstabilisation.

However,theseexternaloperationshavesofarhighlightedthelimitsoftheUnion’spoliticalwill.Theyhaveoftenbeenconductedinsupportoflargeroperationsoroperationswithaverylimitedtimeframe.Hence,eventhoughitisincreasinglyconfrontedwithcrisescallingformulti-dimensionalresponses,theEuropeanUnionhasnotyetcapitalisedonallthemeansavailabletothe


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CommissionandtheMemberStatestorolloutaglobalresponsetocrises.BettercoordinationofcivilandmilitaryresourcesisrequiredandtheUnion’sproceduresmustbeadaptedtoitsoperationalrole.

FranceiskeenfortheUniontotakeapragmaticapproachtostrengtheningtheresponsivenessandinterventioncapabilitiesoftheforcesthatcanbedeployedundertheCSDP.Commoneducation,training,availabilityandaforcegenerationbenefittingfrombettercoordinationbetweenEuropeanStatesareareaswhereprogressisbothurgentandfeasible.TheneedfortheEuropeanstobetterintegratecivilandmilitarymanagementofcrisesisoneofthelessonslearnedfromtheexperienceofthelast10years.

FrancewillstrivetomakeprogressinthisareawithUnionMemberStatesthatsharethesameambition.Itsuggestsmakingbetteruseofexistinginstitutionsandstructuresforconsultationandcapitalisingonallthepossibilitiesopenedupbytreaties,includingpermanentstructuredcooperationandenhancedcooperation.BilateralcooperationbetweenMemberStatesmustalsocontributetodevelopmentofbetter-integratedcapabilities,asillustratedbytheagreementssignedbyFrancewithGermany,theUnitedKingdomorothercountries,orbytheonewhichlinkstheBeneluxcountries.

ThewilltoprojectpowerandinfluenceonlymakessenseifitisbuiltonthecapacityofStatesholdingthisambitiontomobilisecrediblecivilandmilitaryresources.Givenitscapabilities,FranceisoneoftheMemberStateslikelytoplayadrivingroleinthedevelopmentofaEuropeandefencecapability.Itwillensurethatithasthecriticalcapabilitiesrequiredfordeployment(intelligence,surveillance,in-flightrefuelling,strategictransport,etc.),whilealsoseekingtopoolthecorrespondingprogrammeswiththeStatesbestequippedtomakeacontributiontothem.

ThisperiodofsharpbudgetcontractioninalltheEuropeancountriesshouldbeseizedasanopportunitytoorganisemutuallyagreedcapabilityinterdependencies.Forexistingcapabilitiesorthosecurrentlybeingacquired,FrancefirmlyintendstoengageinthepoolingandsharinginitiativeadoptedbyDefenceministersoftheEuropeanUnionin2010.Asconcernsthisobjective,itemphasizestheimportantroleplayedbytheEuropeanDefenceAgency,whichmusttakeresponsibilityforidentifyingprogrammesthatcouldbedevelopedincommon,testingtheirfeasibilityandputtingthestrategyintopractice.


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FrancenotesthatwithOCCAR(jointorganisationforarmamentscooperation),EuropecanofferStatesthataremembersoftheorganisationanappropriateinstrumentformanagingprogrammes.Furthermore,itconsidersthatcooperationinitiativeswithoneormoreStatesinthefieldofarmamentsmustbeenvisagednotonlyasalternativesorsubstitutesbutasadditionalleversforencouragingaEuropeancapabilitydynamicthatmightalsoattractStateswithmoremodestresources.

DevelopmentoftheEuropeandefencemarketandconsolidationoftheEuropeanDefenceTechnologicalandIndustrialBase(EDTIB)intheweaponssectorisoneofourcountry’sstrategicpriorities.Intheframeworkofsmartdefence,implementedwithinNATO,Franceintends,withitsEuropeanpartnersintheAlliance,topromotecapabilityinitiativesthatcontributetosupportoftheEDTIB.Inthisrespect,itisimportantfortheNATOsmartdefenceandEuropeanUnionpoolingandsharinginitiativestobecoordinated,primarilythroughsoliddialoguebetweenNATOandtheEDA.Furthermore,Franceispleasedthatintherun-uptotheEuropeanCouncilmeetingofDecember2013,theCommissionhasinitiatedworkonspecificdefenceissues,therebyillustratingthespecificnatureofthedefenceindustrysectorintheEuropeanmarket.

Substantialprogressinintegrationandcoordinationhasalreadybeenmadeinthefieldofsecurity.The2010-2014StockholmProgrammeandtheinternalsecuritystrategyapprovedbytheEuropeanCouncilhasgivenEuropeaholisticapproachtothemajorinternalsecurityissuesthatrecognisesthecontinuitybetweeninternalandexternalsecurityandexpressesthesolidarityexistingbetweenMemberStates.However,theinternalsecuritystrategyhasnotyettackledcertainprogrammesforactionwhoseimplementationrequiresaspecificapproach(forinstance,protectionofcriticalEuropeaninfrastructure,reinforcingpoliticalcoordinationintheeventofamajorcrisis,etc.).FrancewouldliketoseecontinuedandmoreintensiveeffortstobuildaEuropeanapproachininternalsecurity,andextensionofthisapproachtootherareas,leadingtoformulationofamoreintegratedstrategy.Itisthereforekeentodevelopcommonprojectsalongthesamelinesasthecooperativeinitiativesalreadyconductedinthelegal,migrationandhealthsectors.ItwouldalsoliketoseedevelopmentofinitiativesleadingtopoolingofinternalsecurityequipmentmadeavailablebyMemberStates.


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Chapter 6

Implementing the strategy

France’sstrategyhasevolvedovertime.Inthe1972WhitePaper,itschieffocuswasnucleardeterrence.Inthe1994WhitePaperandthedecisionmadetoprofessionaliseourforcesin1996,ourcapabilityforconventionalexternalactionwasseenasthecoreofourpolicyandourresources.The2008WhitePaperwasmarkedbyextensionofourstrategytonationalsecurity.Today,changesintheinternationalandsecurityenvironmentcallforgreaterconvergencebetweenthefivemainstrategicfunctionsidentifiedin2008,whichremainfullyvalid:knowledgeandanticipation,deterrence,protection,preventionandintervention.

Toachievetheobjectivesdefinedbyourstrategy,protection,deterrenceandinterventionstructuretheactionofthedefenceandnationalsecurityforces.Protectionremainstheprimaryobjectiveofourdefenceandnationalsecuritystrategy.Itcannotbeguaranteedwithoutthecapabilityfordeterrenceandintervention.NucleardeterrenceprotectsFrancefromanyState-ledaggressionagainstitsvitalinterests,ofwhateveroriginandinwhateverform.Itrulesoutanythreatofblackmailthatmightparalyseitsfreedomofdecisionandaction.OurcapabilityforinterventionoutsidethenationalterritorygivesstrategicdepthtoFrance’ssecuritystance.Itbolstersthecredibilityofourdeterrencecapabilityandallowsthecountrytodefenditsstrategicinterestsandhonouritsalliances.

Protection,deterrenceandinterventionarethereforehighlycomplementary.Theirimplementationentailsacapacitytoknowandanticipatetherisksandthreatstowhichweareexposed,evenifstrategicshiftsarealwayspossible.Theyalsorequireanupstreamcapacitytopreventcrisesthatcouldnegativelyimpactourenvironment.

ThisisthefoundationforthepolicyenablingrationaliseduseofStateresourcesandcoherentorchestrationoftheroletobeplayednotonlybythedifferentStateadministrations,butalsobylocalandregionalgovernment,companies


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andinstitutionsbelongingtostrategicsectors(energy,communications,health,food,etc.).

A . Knowledge and anticipation

Theknowledgeandanticipationfunctionhasparticularimportancesinceacapacityforautonomousassessmentofsituationsiskeytofree,sovereigndecisionmaking.Thisfunctioncoversintelligenceandforesight,inparticular,andpermitsthestrategicanticipationthatinformsaction.Itisalsoaconditionoftheforces’operationaleffectivenessandcontributestoeconomicuseoftheresourcesavailabletothemtoperformtheirmissions.

Thiscapacityenablesustoengage,infullknowledge,inactionsthatareincreasinglycoordinatedorevenconductedincommonwithourpartnersandallies.Frominformationgatheringtowell-informedpreparationofpoliticalandoperationaldecisions,goodknowledgeofthestrategicandtacticalenvironmentisessentialforpreventingrisksandthreatsandneutralisingthemwhenpreventionhasfailed.

Intelligenceplaysacentralroleintheknowledgeandanticipationfunction.Itirrigateseachoftheotherstrategicfunctionsofourdefenceandnationalsecuritystrategy.Itmustbeusedbothtoguidepoliticalandstrategicdecision-makingandtoplanandconductoperationsonthetacticallevel.Moreglobally,itinformsourforeignpolicyandoureconomicpolicy.Aparticulareffortmustthereforebedevotedtoitinthecomingperiod,takinginbothhumanresourcesandthetechnicalcapacitiesforgatheringandexploitingdata.Humanintelligence(HUMINT),electronicintelligence(ELINT)andimageryintelligence(IMINT)arecomplementaryandindivisible.Thefullvalueofintelligenceisderivedfromcombiningthedatagatheredfromthesethreechannels.

Inaccordancewiththerecommendationsformulatedbythe2008WhitePaper,governanceoftheintelligenceserviceshasbeenreorganisedaroundthenationalintelligencecoordinator.AsadvisortothePresidentoftheRepublicandcarryingoutsomeofhismissionsonbehalfofthePrimeMinister,hecoordinatestheactionoftheintelligenceservicesandensurescooperationbetweenthem.Hisrolemustbestrengthened,notablyasconcernspoolingofresourcesandbudgetappropriation.


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Alsoestablishedin2008,thenationalintelligencecouncil,whichmeetsunderthechairmanshipoftheHeadofState,isresponsibleforstrategicsteeringofintelligence.Inthefuture,itwillformulateanationalintelligencestrategywhosemainoutlineswillbemadepublic.Thisstrategy,areferencedocument,willstrengthenthelegitimacyofintelligenceactivities.

Cooperationbetweenthedifferentserviceshasalsobeenencouragedbytheemergenceofan“intelligencecommunity”composedofsixservices:twowithageneralremit,theDGSE(externalsecurity)andtheDCRI(internalintelligence),andfourspecialisedservices,theDRM(militaryintelligence),theDPSD(defenceprotectionandsecurity),theDNRED(customsintelligenceandinquiries)andTRACFIN(moneylaunderingandfinancialfraud).Theexperienceofthepastfouryearshasshowedthatthisintelligencecommunityencouragestrustbetweenthedifferentservicesandbetterorganisationofinformationsharing.TheIntelligenceAcademy,createdin2010andplacedundertheauthorityofthePrimeMinister,istasked,notably,withdesigning,organisingandrollingoutinitialandcontinuedtrainingprogrammesforintelligenceservicespersonnel.ItcontributestostrengtheningbondsandtotheemergenceofasharedculturewithintheFrenchintelligencecommunity.Thiscommunityisthebackboneofamoreglobalstructurewhichcan,whererequired,callonnumerousotherStateservicesanddepartments.

Inviewoftheevolutionofthreats,particularattentionwillbepaidtointernalintelligencegathering.ItisnecessarytostrengthentheDCRI(internalintelligence)giventhehighpriorityofsomeofthemissionsentrustedtoit,notablyforpreventingterroristactsonthenationalterritory.Aprocessofreflectionwillbeinitiatedontheorganisationofthisdirectorate,thehumanresourcesavailabletoitanditsplaceintheorganisationoftheMinistryoftheInterior.Thisreflectionwillincludetheconditionsforbettercoordinationbetweeninternalintelligenceandoperationalintelligence-gatheringbyalltheservicesresponsiblefornationalsecuritymissions,particularlythegendarmerie.

Francemustalsotakecaretopreserveanintelligence-gatheringandprocessingplatformcommensuratewithitsinternationalambitionsandthethreatswithwhichitisconfronted.Itmustdevotetheresourcesnecessarytopursuingtheeffortsalreadymadetosecureanintelligencegatheringandexploitationcapabilityessentialforautonomousassessmentofsituations.Itmustalsopursuepoolingoftechnicalintelligenceacquisitionresources,akeyprincipleforequippingitsservices,whilealsotakingcaretostrengthentheassociatedhumanexpertise.


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Amongtheseresources,spaceintelligencecapacitieshaveaprivilegedplace,whethernationalorsharedwithourEuropeanpartners,sincesatellitesenableacquisitionofinformationoverthewholesurfaceoftheglobeandguaranteeasatisfactorylevelofmonitoringandalert.Effortstopoolresourcesmustalsomakeitpossibletodelivertheproductsrequiredforplanningandconductingoperations.Thelifecycleofsatellitesissuchthattheyhavetoberegularlyreplaced,apointthatmustbetakenfullyintoconsideration.Thedevelopmentofaspaceobservationcapabilitywillberationalisedtocoordinatedual-usemilitaryandinstitutionalprojectsandfacilitatecomplementaritywithusefulproductsavailableinthemarket,whereverpossible.

Electronicintelligence(ELINT)isakeycomponentofthisplatform.Thefirstidentificationofasiteofinterestorthefirstperceptionofathreatisveryoftenobtainedthroughelectronicintelligencegathering.Asconcernsimageryintelligence,spacecapacitiesareapriority.Theyarenecessarytoidentify,localiseprecisely,discriminateandtargetthematerialrealityofrisksandthreats.Inthefieldofimageryintelligence(IMINT),spacecapabilitiesareapriority,sincetheycanidentify,preciselylocateandtargetthetangiblerealityofrisksandthreats.Spacecapabilitiesarealsonecessaryforsovereignassessmentoftheballisticthreatandearlywarning,hencedeterrence.

Thecostofspace-relatedintelligenceandthepoliticaladvantagesofsharedunderstandingofsituationsshouldpromptEuropeancountrieswithcapabilitiesinthisfieldtoundertakemuchmoresystematicpoolingofresources.Franceiswillingtoapplyanapproachbasedonmutualinterdependenciesinthefieldofspaceintelligence.

Acquisitionofintelligencealsoreliesonthecombinedimplementationofair,landandnavalplatforms,whetherornotdedicated,thatallowsacquisitionofreal-timeinformation.

AnalysisoftherequirementshighlightsFrance’sneedtofieldapermanentcapabilityinseveraltypesofequipment.Themedium-altitudelong-endurance(MALE)dronesequippedwithIMINTandELINTsensorscandetect,locateandtrackpotentialtargets.Tacticaldronesprovidedirectintelligencesupportforforcespresentincrisisregions.Lightsurveillanceandreconnaissanceaircraftandnew-generationreconnaissancepodsarealsoindispensable,withrecentoperationsconfirmingtheimportanceoftheseairbornesensors.


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Thenewimportanceofcyber-threatscallsfordevelopingourintelligenceactivityandthecorrespondingtechnicalexpertiseinthisarea.Thiseffortshouldallowustoidentifytheoriginofattacks,assesstheoffensivecapabilitiesofpotentialadversariesandinthiswaycountertheiraction.Identificationandoffensiveactioncapabilitiesareessentialtoimplementingapossibleandappropriateresponsetosuchattacks.

Intelligenceactivitiesandsecretoperationsarebecomingmoreimportantinastrategiccontextmarkedbythegrowingroleofnon-Stateplayers.Theincreaseinresourcesimposedbythesedevelopmentsmustbeaccompaniedatthesametimebyareinforcementofstrategicpilotingandassessmentofintelligencebytheexecutivearmandanextensionoftheroleoftheparliamentarydelegationforintelligence11toenableParliamenttoexerciseitscontrolovergovernmentpolicyinthisfield,inaccordancewiththeConstitution.ThisvigilanceisessentialtopreserveandreinforcethelegitimacyofanactivitythatismakingagrowingcontributiontothesecurityoftheNation.

DuetothedevelopmentoftheInternet,theknowledgeandanticipationfunctionincreasinglyreliesonexploitationofopensourcestosupplementgatheringandexploitationofconfidentialinformation,bothintheframeworkofstrategicanalysisandduringacrisis.Wemustthereforehavespecifictoolsforanalysingmultimediasources–inparticularforcrisis-managementassistance–anddevelopingtoolsforsharingopensourcesattheministerialandinter-ministeriallevels.

Accordingtothe2008WhitePaper,strategicforesight,whichentailsdetectionofmajortrendsliabletogeneratepotentialcrisesandstrategicshifts,wastobethefocusofa“significantandpriority”effort.However,despitethequalityoftheagenciesinvolvedandtherecognisedexpertiseoftheplayers,theStatehasnotdevotedsufficientefforttogivingthisfunctionaplacecommensuratewithitsimportance.

11 The parliamentary delegation for intelligence, created by the Law of 9 October 2007, is composed of four deputies and four senators. The chairmen of the standing committees of the Assemblée Nationale and the Senate responsible respectively for internal security and defence matters, are automatically members of the delegation. The other members are appointed by the chairman of each Assembly to guarantee representation of all viewpoints. The chairman of the delegation will be alternately, an deputy or a senator, automatically members of the delegation and presiding for a one-year term.


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Amechanismmustbesetupintheministriesconcernedtoensureinternalcoordinationofforward-lookingresearch,aimedatidentifyingtheneeds,definingaworkscheduleandvalidatingtheconclusionsandrecommendations.Thecoherenceofthisworkwillbeensuredbyaninter-ministerialprocessundertheauthorityofthePrimeMinisterbytheSGDSN(generaldirectoratefordefenceandnationalsecurity).Itwillbetaskedwithdefiningtheprioritiesandstrategicguidelines,formulatinganannualinter-ministerialworkscheduleandcoordinatingtheforward-lookingresearchconductedintheministriesconcerned.TheSGDSNwillcoordinatetheworkofvalidatingtheinter-ministerialrecommendationsandwillensurethattheyaretakenintoaccountindecision-makingprocesses.

TheState’sstrategic-foresightapproachmustbesupportedbyindependent,pluri-disciplinaryandoriginalstrategicreflection,capitalisingontheresearchcarriedoutinuniversitiesandspecialisedinstitutes.Despitetheprogressaccomplishedoverthelastfewyears,Frenchstrategicresearchcontinuestobehamperedbyinadequatecriticalmass,whichlimitsitsinternationalresonance.Effortsaimedatpromotingstrategicreflectionandsupportingresearchinthefieldsofdefenceandsecuritywillbepursued.

However,reinforcementofresearchresourceswillnotproduceallthehoped-foreffectsontheState’scapacityforanticipationunlessitbecomesmoreopentoindependentreflection.TheStatecanonlybenefitfromincreasedaccesstotheexpertiseofacademicresearch,togetherwiththatofnon-governmentalorganisationsandcompanies.Fortheirpart,universityresearcherswillmakeacontributionmorecloselyadaptedtotheneedsoftheStateiftheyaregiventheopportunitytoexperiencetherealityofadministrativeresponsibilities.Thisreciprocalopennessisessentialtoimproveourcapacityforanticipation,whichrequiresanopenmind,curiosityandawillingnesstochallengedominantviews.

B . Deterrence

NucleardeterrenceisintendedtoprotectFrancefromanyState-ledaggressionagainstitsvitalinterests,ofwhateveroriginandinwhateverform.France’sdeterrencecapabilitycontributesbyitsveryexistencetothesecurityoftheAtlanticAllianceandthatofEurope.TheexerciseofournucleardeterrencecapabilityistheresponsibilityofthePresidentoftheRepublic.


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Ourdeterrencecapabilityisstrictlydefensive.Theuseofnuclearweaponswouldonlybeconceivableinextremecircumstancesoflegitimateself-defence.Inthisrespect,nucleardeterrenceistheultimateguaranteeofthesecurity,protectionandindependenceoftheNation.Itensures,permanently,ourindependenceofdecision-makingandourfreedomofactionwithintheframeworkofourinternationalresponsibilities,includingintheeventofanythreatofblackmailthatmightbedirectedagainstusintheeventofacrisis.Nucleardeterrenceisthereforeembeddedinthemoreglobalframeworkofthedefenceandnationalsecuritystrategy,whichtakesintoaccounttheentirespectrumofthreats,includingthoseconsideredtobeunderthethresholdofourvitalinterests.

Thenuclearforcesincludeanairborneandanocean-goingcomponentandtheireffectiveness,adaptabilityandcomplementarityenablepreservationofaninstrumentthatremainscredibleoverthelongerterminafast-changingstrategiccontext,whilebeingstructuredinaccordancewiththeprincipleofstrictsufficiency.ThesimulationfacilitiessetupbyFranceafterthehalttonucleartestingguaranteesthereliabilityandsafetyofitsnuclearweapons.

Franceintendstocontinuefullyassumingitsresponsibilitiesanddutiesasanuclearpowerontheinternationalstage.Inthiscapacity,itworksactivelyinfavourof“generalandcompletedisarmamentunderstrictandeffectivecontrol”,theobjectivesetforthinArticleVIoftheTreatyontheNon-ProliferationofNuclearWeapons(NPT).Itpursuesitseffortstopromotequantitativereductionandlimitqualitativeupgradingofnucleararsenalsthroughouttheworldandtocombattheproliferationofweaponsofmassdestruction,notablynuclearweaponsandtheirdeliverysystems.Likewise,itstronglyadvocatesthattheseeffortsbegeneralisedattheinternationallevel.Tothisend,itactivelysupportstheentryintoforceoftheComprehensiveNuclearTestBanTreatyandinitiationofmultilateralnegotiationsconcerningatreatytobanproductionoffissilematerialsfornuclearweapons,togetherwithimplementationofanimmediatemoratoriumonproductionofthesematerials.

SincedismantlingitsnucleartestingsiteinthePacific,Francehascontinuedtosetanexamplebytakingunilateralmeasures,suchastheirreversibledismantlingofitsinstallationsforproducingfissilematerialsfornuclearweapons.Ithasindicatedthatitsarsenalincludesfewerthan300nuclearwarheads.Francewasthefirstcountrytotaketheseconcretestepstowardsnucleardisarmament.Inthisrespect,itappliestheprincipleofstrictsufficiencyinmaintenanceofitsnucleardeterrencecapability,i.e.atthelowestpossiblelevelinviewofthestrategiccontext.


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Therearestronglinksbetweennucleardeterrenceandconventionalcapabilities.Deterrence,whichguaranteesprotectionofourvitalinterests,givesthePresidentoftheRepublicfreedomofactioninexercisingFrance’sinternationalresponsibilities,indefenceofanallyorapplicationofaninternationalmandate.Inthissense,itisdirectlylinkedtoourinterventioncapability.Furthermore,someoftheresourcesassignedtothenuclearforcescanbeusedforconventionaloperationsonthedecisionofthePresidentoftheRepublic.Thishasbeenthecaseinnumerousrecentoperations.Thecredibilityofaforceofdeterrencewouldbeweakenedwithoutconventionalcapabilities.Preservationofacredible,independentandautonomousforceofdeterrenceenablesustoinvestincapabilitiesthatarevaluableforotherstrategicfunctions.Becauseofitshigh-levelrequirementsintermsofeffectiveness,reliabilityandsafety,nucleardeterrencefeedsourresearchanddevelopmenteffortsandcontributestotheexcellenceofourdefenceindustry.Italsoplaysadrivingroleinimprovingourtechnologicalaptitudes.

C . Protection

Ourdefenceandnationalsecuritystrategymustguaranteeourterritorialintegrity,provideeffectiveprotectionforFrenchcitizensagainstalltherisksandthreatsthatcouldhaveamajorimpact,preservethecontinuityoftheNation’smajorvitalfunctionsandstrengthenitsresilience.Implementationofthefunctionofprotectionconcerns,firstofall,thenationalterritoryandregionswithlargeorvulnerableoverseasFrenchcommunities.Theexistenceofsuchcommunitiesislikelytogiverisetointerventionsoutsidethenationalterritory,whichmaybeconductedincooperationwithpartners,notablywhereFrenchnationalsabroadliveinclosecontactwithoverseasnationalsofpartneroralliedcountrieswhomustalsobeprotected.TheprotectionfunctionmayalsobeimplementedinoperationsontheterritoryofEuropeanUnionStates,pursuanttothesolidarityclausecontainedintheTreatyonthefunctioningoftheEuropeanUnion.

Aglobalapproachisessentialgiventheproteananddiffusenatureoftherisksandthreats,theirdiversityanduncertaintiesastohowtheymayevolve.Wemustbeabletoanticipateappearanceofrisksandthreats,preventthemmaterialisingandreactrapidlyiftheydomaterialise.ThisrequiresmobilisingandorganisingtheactionofnumerousStateandnon-Stateplayers.


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Thegreaterourcapacitytoanticipatemajorcrises,assesstheirimplicationsandrepercussionsinadvanceandhencepreparetheresponsetobeimplemented,thegreaterwillbeouraptitudetodealwiththesecrises.Thefunctionofprotectioncannotbefullyassuredunlesswereinforceourcapacitytoanalyserisksandensurethatthisanalysisismethodicallytakenintoaccountinthenationalintelligencestrategy.

ThenatureoftherisksalsorequiresresponsiveandflexiblemethodsofinterventiontoguaranteetheresilienceoftheNation.Acrisisoflowormediumintensitycandegenerateveryrapidly.Thepublicauthoritiesmustthereforebecapableofinterveningwithoutdelaytoinitiaterescueoperationsforvictimsandrestorenormallivingconditionsorthefunctioningofactivitiesthatmighthavebeenseriouslycompromised,asquicklyaspossible.Todealwithverydifferentcontextsandrapidchangesintheintensityofthreatsandrisks,thepublicauthoritiesmustbeabletorelyonthemostversatileandinteroperableresources.Restorationofthenormalfunctioningofthecountrycannotbeachievedwithoutadvancepreparationofalltheplayersinvolvedincrisismanagement.Inpractice,itiscrucialtoformulateoperationalplansforinterventionasafunctionofthedifferenttypesofforeseeablesituationsandtodrawupaninventoryoftheresourcestobecalledon.

ThediversityoftheplayersinvolvedincrisisresponsederivesfromthechoicesFrancehasmadeintheorganisationofsocietyandinitsdiplomaticcommitments.Accordingly,theStatemustconceiveandconductitsactioninliaisonwithseveralplayersandatdifferentlevels:onthenationallevel,whereitorchestratestheactionofthepublicservices,localandregionalgovernmentandoperatorsofvitalinfrastructureandnetworks;andontheinternationallevel,particularlyintheframeworkoftheEuropeanUnion.

TheprimaryresponsibilityforensuringprotectionagainsttherisksandthreatsthatmightaffectthelivesofFrenchcitizensonthenationalterritoryisbornebythecivilministriesandtheirregionaloutposts,incoordinationwithlocalandregionalgovernmentandpublicandprivateoperators.Thenationalpolice,thegendarmerie,customs,civilsecurity,themunicipalpoliceandtheintelligenceservicesoperatingonthenationalterritorycontributetothismission.

TheprimarymissionofthearmedforcesistoensuretheprotectionoftheNationagainstanythreatofamilitarynature.Theyareresponsibleforpermanentlyensuringthesecurityoftheterritory,itsairspaceanditsmaritimeapproaches.TheycontributetotheState’sactioninthemaritimeenvironment.Intheevent


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ofamajorcrisisandattherequestofthecivilauthority,thearmedforcescanprovideassistance,includingplanning,commandanddeploymentresources,whichareparticularlysuitedtothemostserioussituations.Theymayalsobecalledoninimplementationofcertainpreventivecampaigns,suchastheVigipirateplan,theHéphaïstosmissionstocombatforestfires,ortheparticipationoflandresourcesspecialisedinNBCprotection.

ThescaleofactsofpiracyoffthecoastofSomaliahaspromptedStatestodeploynavalunitstocounterthisphenomenon.FrancehasplayedanimportantroleinthisresponsebydeployingFrenchNavyvesselsandparticipatingintheactionoftheEuropeanUnion(theAtalantaoperation).Inaddition,protectionteamsconsistingofarmedmarinescanbepostedonnon-militaryvessels.Torespondtotheneedsofmaritimetransportsecurity,andwhereitisnotpossibletocallonFrenchNavyprotectionteams,wewillbestudyingappropriatealternativesolutions.

Closecooperationbetweencivilandmilitaryplayersisessentialinpreparingtheresponsetothemostseriouscrisesthatmightrequiretheinvolvementofthearmedforces.Aneffectiveandcoordinatedresponsemustbeorganisedinadvance.Intheframeworkofpreparationofoperationalinterventionplans,itisimportantthatthesecurityforcesandthearmedforcesbenefitfromappropriatecommontrainingtogivethemthepracticalknow-howrequiredforlarge-scaleinterventiononthenationalterritory.

Ourprotectionneedsalsorequirepreservationorreinforcementofacertainnumberofcriticalcapabilities:fortheMinistryofDefence,whichintervenesinsupportofthecivilauthorities,butalsointheframeworkofpermanentstructuresaddressingthefunctionofprotectionincontinentalFranceandtheoverseasterritories,andalsofortheotherministriesconcerned.

InaccordancewiththeChicagoSummitof20May2012,Franceparticipates-intheframeworkofNATO-intheprogrammeforcommondevelopmentofasystemofcommandaimedatcoordinatingresourcescontributingtodefenceagainstballisticmissiles.Thiscapability,whichispurelydefensive,cannottaketheplaceofdeterrence,butitmay,understrictpoliticalcontrolandonconclusionofareasonableeffortsharedwithourallies,playacomplementaryroleagainstalimitedballisticthreat.Inthisrespect,Franceconsidersanti-missiledefenceinatheatreofwarandearlywarningsystemsapriority.ItintendstoencouragetheinvolvementofEuropeanindustryinthisproject.


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D . Prevention

PreventionconcernsboththenationalterritoryandFrance’sactionoutsideitsborders.Implementationtakesinformulationofnationalandinternationalnormsaswellasthecombatagainsttrafficking,disarmamentandpeace-building.

Thedevelopmentofnormsensuringsatisfactoryprotectionagainstnaturalandtechnologicalrisksisacrucialaspectofprevention.ActivitieshavinganimpactontheenvironmentandpublichealtharealreadygovernedbyasolidsetofnormswithastrongEuropeandimension.

Ontheinternationallevel,thelessonsdrawnfromthecrisesofthe1990sledtodevelopmentoflegalinstrumentstocombatproliferation,improvecontrolofsensitivetechnologiesandarmscontrol.ThetoolsavailabletotheinternationalcommunityhavebeensupplementedbytheactionoftheG8andtheProliferationSecurityInitiativeagainstproliferationofweaponsofmassdestruction.Francewillcontinuetoparticipateactivelyinreinforcingandharmonisingthesestandards,monitoringcompliancewiththemandbroadeningtheirscopeofapplication.

PreventioncallsforacapacityofanticipationgroundedinaccurateknowledgeoftherisksandthreatsthatenablestheStatetoidentifyrisksbeforetheybecomethreats.Ouranalysesandforecastsareintendedtobesharedanddiscussedwithcountriesororganisationsconcernedbythesamechallenges,andparticularlywithourEuropeanUnionpartners,likewiseourpreventionandpeace-buildingstrategies.

PreventionisparticularlyrelevantwhenappliedtostabilisationpoliciesaimedatStatesincrisis.Itisgenerallylesscostlyand,ultimately,lessdifficulttoconsolidatethestabilityofacountrythathasnottippedoverintocivilwar,thantorestorepeaceinacountrythathasexperiencedit.Furthermore,anyexternalinterventioninasituationofopenconflictisinevitablyexposedtounpredictabledevelopments,includingtheriskofexacerbatingtheconflictthatonesoughttoremedy.FrancethereforeconsidersitaprioritytoassistfragileStateslocatedinregionslikelytoaffectitssecurity.

Thepeace-buildingstrategy,anessentialcomponentofpreventionandcrisisresolutionoverthelongerterm,respondsfirsttothepoliticalobjectiveofconsolidatingalegitimateStateauthoritycapableofexercisingitssovereigntyoveraterritory.Hence,freeandtransparentelectionsareonedimensionoflegitimacy.However,theycanexacerbatetensionsifthewinnermisuseshis


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victoryoriftheresultsarecontested.Aprocessofpoliticalaccompanimentisnecessarytoestablishaminimumdegreeoftrust–ifnotfullapproval–betweenthedifferentcomponentsofacountryandwithregardtotheState’sauthority.Ifthisminimumtrustisnotbuiltup,theStatewillencounterthegreatestdifficultiesinestablishingamonopolyovertheuseofforce,andeachethnic,politicalorreligiousgroupwillprefertorelyontheirownforcestoensurethesecurityoftheirmembers.However,aState’scapacitytoensurethesecurityoftheentirepopulationisanessentialelementofitslegitimacy.

Peace-buildingthereforerequiresaglobalapproachthatincludesinaconsistentpoliticalstrategyalltheleversavailabletotheinternationalcommunitytocometotheaidofcountriesincrisisorthreatenedbyacrisis.Itmay,invaryingproportionsdependingonthesituation,includemilitary,police,judicial,civiladministrationanddevelopmentaidcomponents.

Intheframeworkofthisglobalapproach,Franceattachesparticularimportancetothepoliticaldimensionofprevention,ontheonehand,andontheothertoconsolidatingtheruleoflawandreformingsecuritysystems.Here,FrancewillcontinuetoactivelysupporttheUnitedNations’politicalfacilitationefforts.

ReformofaState’ssecuritysystemsaccordingtoanintegratedapproachmusttakeinreformofthepolice,thearmy,customs,thejusticesystemandprisonadministration.CooperationinthefieldofinternalsecurityisofcrucialimportanceforthestabilityoftheStatesinwhichitisconductedandmustbepursued.Incountrieswherethearmycontinuestoplayakeyrole,reformofthedefenceapparatustakesonparticularimportance.Francehaslongexperienceinthisfield.Political-militarydialogue,defenceandsecuritycooperationandassistanceintrainingforeignarmedforcesarethetraditionaltoolsofitsinternationalaction.ThisdefenceandsecuritycooperationmustbedifferentiatedbetweenStatesthatsimplyneedtoreinforcetheirmilitaryandsecurityapparatusandthoseinwhichtheveryfoundationsofStateauthorityarenotassured.ItmusttakeintoaccountthepotentialfragilityoftheStatesconcerned.ItisthereforeimportanttoensurethatthesecooperativeventuresarebettercoordinatedinaglobalapproachtoconsolidationofStatestructures.

Peace-buildingandpreventionstrategiesaremulti-formstrategiescallingondiversifiedresources.Theirchancesofsuccesswillbeincreasediftheyareperceivedbythepopulationsconcernedaslegitimateandiftheyanswertheirneeds.Inthisrespect,implementation,whereverpossible,inthewiderframeworkofcoordinationofeffortsattheEuropeanlevel,willincreaseboth


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availableresourcesandtheirlegitimacy.TheemergenceofasharedvisionoftheUnion’sinterestsinthefieldofpreventionshouldfacilitateaglobalEuropeanapproachtocrisismanagement,togetherwithformulationofacommonconceptfortrainingarmedforcesandsecurityforces.ThiswillincreasetheeffectivenessoftheactionconductedbyMemberStatesoftheEuropeanUnion.

Thepositioningofmilitaryforcesincountrieswithwhichweenjoyprivilegedlinksorincertainmaritimeregionsisatthepointofconvergenceofthestrategicfunctionsofprevention,intervention,knowledgeandanticipation.TheseforcescandeterStateornon-Stateplayersfrominstigatingopenconflictsoractionsofregionaldestabilisation.Theyhavetheabilitytoengageinactionscontributingtocontrolofterritoryandpeace-buildingorinoperationstoevacuateFrenchnationals.Theycontributetotheknowledgeandanticipationfunctionthankstothespecialisedresourcesavailabletothemandtheircontactwithlocalplayers.Alongtheselines,Franceisabletorelyonpermanentnavaldeploymentinoneortwomaritimeregions,onitsUnitedArabEmiratesbaseandonseveralsitesinAfrica.AsconcernsAfrica,thesesiteswillberestructuredtogiveusaflexibleandrapid-reactioncapabilityadaptedtothepresentandfutureneedsofthiscontinent.Thisrestructuringshould,inparticular,privilegeabettercontributionbyourforcesinassistingourallies,toincreasingAfricans’capacitytomanagethecrisesoccurringinthecontinent,tointelligencegatheringandthecombatagainsttraffickingandterrorism.

E . Intervention

Externalinterventionrespondstoatripleobjective:ensuringtheprotectionofFrenchnationalsabroad;defendingourstrategicinterestsandthoseofourpartnersandalliesandexercisingourinternationalresponsibilities.ItgivesthecrucialstrategicdepthtoFrance’ssecuritystance,whetherthismeanspreventingexacerbationofacrisisorputtinganendtoasituationofopenconflictthatmightendangeroursecurityinterests.

Overandabovetheresourcesrequiredtoprotectthenationalterritory,Franceintendstohavemilitarycapabilitiesenablingittotakeactioninpriorityareastoitsdefenceandsecurity:theregionsonthefringesofEurope,theMediterraneanbasin,partofAfrica(fromtheSaheltoEquatorialAfrica),theArabo-PersianGulfandtheIndianOcean.ThesecapabilitiesenableFrancetomakeitscontributiontointernationalpeaceandsecurityinotherpartsoftheworld.


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TheFrencharmedforcesmustbeabletointerveneinthreetypesofoperationsintheseregions: -operationsconductedonanautonomousbasis,suchasevacuationofFrench

orEuropeannationals,counter-terrorismoperationsorresponsetoattacks; -operationsaspartofacoalition–intheframeworkoftheEuropeanUnion,

anestablishedalliancesuchasNATOoronanadhocbasis–inwhichFrancemaytaketheinitiativeandcommandorinwhichitwillexerciseadominantinfluence;

-operationsaspartofacoalitioninwhichFrancewillmakeacontribution,butwherecommandisentrustedtoanalliednation,mostcommonlytheUnitedStates.

Changesinthestrategiccontextmaymakeitnecessaryforourcountrytotaketheinitiativeinoperationsor,morefrequentlythaninthepast,assumeasubstantialshareoftheresponsibilitiesinherenttoconductingmilitaryaction.Francethereforemakestheprincipleofstrategicautonomythemainpillarofitsexternalinterventionstrategy.Itwilldevelopthecriticalcapabilitiesallowingittotaketheinitiativeandactautonomously,butalsotomobiliseitsalliesandpartners.

Themajorityofexternaloperationswill,however,continuetobeconductedincoalition.Toensureitspositionasaleadingplayerinacoalitioninwhichitdoesnothavecommand,Francemustbeabletorelyoncapabilitiesallowingittoretainitsfreedomofdecisionandactioninallcircumstancesandexertaninfluenceonthegeneralconductofoperations.

Ourarmedforcesmustbeabletorespondtothediversityofthreatsandcrisissituationsliabletoaffectoursecurity,ourvaluesorourinterests.

Theymustbeabletoconductcoerciveoperationinahigh-intensitysituation,notablyinascenariowhereadeteriorationoftheinternationalsituationmightobligethemtoenterintomilitarycombatwiththearmedforcesofanotherState.Intheseconventionalconflicts,militaryactionwillaimtousesuperiorforcetocounterthepoliticalwilloftheadversary,byneutralising–throughacampaignofattrition,forinstance-thesourcesofitspower(militaryapparatus,centresofpower,high-valueeconomictargets,etc.).Ourforcesmaybeconfrontedbyanadversarypossessingorganised,well-commandedandcomplementarycapabilitiesthatmightbebackedbyeffectiveweaponssystems,suchassubmarines,fighterplanes,sophisticatedground-airdefencesystems,cruise


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missilesandremote-controlledvehicles.Themissionofthearmedforcesisenvisagedoverashortperiod,fromseveralweekstoseveralmonths.

Inordertoacquireandretainoperationalsuperiorityoverouradversaries,conductofthesecoerciveengagementswillbecoordinatedinallfiveenvironments(earth,air,sea,outerspaceandcyberspace).Technologicalsuperiorityinthefieldsofintelligence,range,power,precisionandcoordinationoftheresourcesofthethreecomponentsofthearmedforceswillbeessential.

FacedwithsituationsarisingfromthefragilityofcertainStates,thearmedforcesmustalsobeabletoengageincrisismanagementoperations.Inthiscapacitytheymaybeconfrontedwithirregularadversariesusingasymmetricaloperatingmethods(suicide-attacks,ambushes,hostage-taking,improvisedexplosivedevices,actsofpiracy,etc.).Suchadversaries,non-Stateplayersinmostcases,willdisposeofforcesofvaryingdegreesofcoordinationorwithprimarilyunsophisticatedweapons.Theywillenjoystrongresilienceandwillseektobogourforcesdowninterrainwheretheycanmeltawaybutwhichareunfavourableforourforces(e.g.urbanandcoastalregionsor,conversely,desertormountainousregions).Inthistypeofoperation,ourforcesareobligedtooperateinacomplexlegalenvironment,giventheabsenceofdeclarationofwar,confrontingadversariesthatrefusetoobeythelegalrulesgoverningarmedconflict.

Thesecrisismanagementoperationsarelikelytotakevariedforms,includingpeace-keeping,interposition,securingthemaritimeorairapproachesoffailedStates,combatingtrafficking,piracyorterrorism,assistancetoagovernmentorcounter-insurrection.Theirprincipalpoliticalobjectivewillbetorestoreandmaintainthesecurityconditionsrequiredfornormallife.Inadifficultprocessthatcangiverisetosurgesofviolence,theaimwillbetoforceadversariestolaydowntheirarmsratherthantoseektodestroythem.Theseoperationswillrequireourforces,inalltheircomponents,toestablishcontrolovervastareas,whichinturnrequiresdeployingasufficientnumberofforces.Theywillbecharacterisedbylong-termengagementthatmightcontinueoverseveralmonthsorevenseveralyears.

Therearealsointermediateortemporarysituationsinwhichourforceswillhavetoadapttotheemergenceof“hybridthreats”.Whetheronaone-offormorepermanentbasis,somenon-StateplayersmightcombineasymmetricalmeansofactionwithState-levelresourcesorhigh-techcapabilities,acquiredorstolen.Thesehybridthreats,whichcanreducethetechnologicaladvantage


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ofthemoreadvancedcountries,arefacilitatedbythegrowingavailabilityoflow-costtechnologiesandthefacilitationofarmstraffickingduetoglobalisation.TheforcesofcertainStates,hamperedbyoperationalinferiority,mayhaverecoursetoasymmetricalmethodsofaction,leadingtoahybridisationofthethreatinconventionalconflicts.Theseadversaries’methodsofactionmaycombinesimultaneoususeofconventionalandunconventionalapproaches.Intheframeworkofcrisismanagementoperations,theymayleadtoahardeningoftheconflict.Ourforcescould,onanirregularbasis,beforcedtoconductseveraltypesofoperationsimultaneously.Theymustthereforebecapableofdeployingbothpermanentresourcesallowingactionsofcoercionandlocalattritionincentresofpopulation,andresourcesrespondingtotheneedtocontrolvastareas,ofteninsupportoflocalsecurityforces.Tothisend,theymustbeabletodemonstrategreatresponsiveness,ahigh-levelcapacitytoadapt,andbenefitfromappropriateprotectionagainstpossibletacticalsurprises.Theirprimaryobjectivewillbetocreateconditionsforacessationofhostilitiesonthepartofallbelligerents.

Crisisresolutionincreasinglyrequiresanintegratedapproachentailingclosecoordinationofcivilandmilitaryactionsatalllevelsincludingontheground.Ascrisisresolutionprogresses,themilitaryoperationshouldsupplementprimarilyciviloperationsinvolvingreconstruction,re-establishingtheoperationofpublicinstitutionsandrestoringbasiceconomiccapacities.


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Chapter 7

The resources required to implement the strategy

The2009-2014militaryprogramminglaw,whichbroketheprioritiesoftheprecedingWhitePaperdownintoplanningobjectives,providedfortheresourcesallocatedtoDefencemissionstobestabilisedinitially,thentoincreaseby1%annuallyoverinflationbeginningin2012.Budgetallocationsweresupplementedbyrevenuesfromthesaleofstatepropertyandfrequencies.Thelawalsoprovidedforthesavingsgeneratedinpersonnelandoperatingexpensesduetosubstantialreductioninthesizeofthearmedforcesandreformofsupportfunctionstobereallocatedinfavourofequipment.

Implementationofthemilitaryprogramminglawsince2009hasenabledcontinuedmodernisationofFrance’smilitarycapability,whichhascontributedtothesuccessoftheFrencharmedforces,notablyintheIvoryCoastandLibyain2011andalsoinMaliin2013.

However,theeconomiccrisishasinvalidatedtheforecastsusedasabasisforthisprogramme.Asearlyas2010,thepluriannualpublicfinancesactfor2011-2014officiallyrecognisedlowergrowthintheDefencebudgetthanthatinitiallyprojected.AstheCourdesComptes(CourtofAuditors)notedinJuly2012,theplannedreductionscompromisedtheachievementoftheobjectivesofthe2008WhitePaperandtheinvestmentprogrammeofthe2009militaryprogramminglaw.Furthermore,thereformsinitiatedproducedonlypartofthehoped-foroperationalsavings,despitefullcompliancewiththeintendedreductionsinpersonnel.

Thisnewfinancialsituationcalledforamajorreadjustmentofthe2009militaryprogramminglaw.Theadjustmentsmadein2010(thedeferredlaunchofsomeprogrammes,reductionsinscheduledequipmentmaintenance)werenotsufficienttorestorethebalancebetweencontractualcommitmentsandavailableresources.


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Thisbalancemustbere-established.InadifficultcontextfortheMinistryofDefence,confrontedwiththeneedtorenewmostofitsmajorequipmentandmaintainanoperationalcapabilityessentialtotheeffectivenessofthearmedforces,itmustbeconsistentwiththeGovernment’sobjectiveofrestoringthebalanceofpublicaccountsby2017,toinitiatethereductioninthenationaldebtandpreservethecountry’ssovereigntyandstrategicautonomy.Thisobjectiverequiresasubstantialreductioninthegrowthofpublicspending.

France’sdefencespendingwillamountto€364billion(2013value)forthe2014-2025period,ofwhich€179billion(2013value)between2014and2019,theperiodcoveredbythenextmilitaryprogramminglaw.Thisappropriation,whichwillcombinebudgetallocationsfortheDefencemissionandexceptionalresources,willallowfortheconstructionofanewarmedforcesmodelthatmeetstherequirementsofgeneralandmilitarystrategyasdescribedaboveandisadaptedtodefenceandnationalsecurityrequirements.

A.Anoperationalcontractandanarmedforcesmodeladaptedtothenewcontext

Ourarmedforcesmustbeorganised,equippedandtrainedtocarryouttheirmissionsofprotection,deterrenceandinterventionoutsidethenationalterritory.Thechangesinourinternationalenvironmentdeterminefourguidingprinciplesforourarmedforces,whichtakentogetheroutlineanewmilitarystrategy.

¡Four guiding principles

Preservationofourstrategic autonomy,whichguaranteesfreedomofdecisionandaction,isthefirstprincipleofourstrategy.ThisstrategicautonomymustallowFrancetotaketheinitiativeinoperationsthatitmaydeemnecessarytopreserveitssecurityinterestsand,whereapplicable,federatetheactionofitspartners,particularlywithintheEuropeanUnion.Thisprinciplerequiresustopreservetheresourcesthatgiveusfreedomofassessment,planningandcommand,whilealsofavouringthecriticalcapabilitiesthatformthebasisofourfreedomofaction.Thesecapabilitiesareessentialtodefendingourvitalinterestsandallowingustotaketheinitiativeinsimple,predictableoperations(jointforcecommand,intelligenceandtargetingcapabilities,specialforces,combatresourcesincontactwiththeadversary);theyarealsocrucialtoourcapacitytoplayanimportantroleinacoalitioninordertopreserveourautonomy(campaignofprecisionstrikesdeepintohostileterritory,independent


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capabilityoffirstentryinatheatreofoperation,commandcapabilityenablingustoassumetheroleofleadnationinamedium-scaleinter-alliedoperationoraninfluentialrolepreservingoursovereigntyinamulti-nationaloperation).Thesecapabilitiesmust,inparticular,enableustoplayafullrolewithintheEuropeanUnionandassumeallourresponsibilitieswithintheAtlanticAllianceandNATOcommandstructures.

Thesecondprincipleisthe consistency between our armed forces model and predictable scenarios requiring engagement of our forces . Theymusthavehigh-levelcapabilitiesallowingthemtorespondtothreatsofuseofforcebyforeignstates:ourforcesmustbeabletorespondintheeventthatamemberstateoftheEuropeanUnionorNATOistargetedbydirectaggressiononthepartofanotherstate,andalsointheeventthatwemaybepromptedtotakeactionpursuanttoourdefenceagreementsoragainstacountryinbreachofinternationallaw.Theymustalso,andsometimessimultaneously,beabletoconductlong-termcrisiscontroloperationsfacedwiththreatsarisingfromtheexistenceoffragileorfailedstates.Lastly,ourforces,incollaborationwithotherstateagencies,musthavethecapacitytoreactrapidlytoprotectthecountryandtheinfrastructureorinstitutionsessentialtoitseconomicandsociallife,againstglobalthreats(cyber-threats,terrorism,actsthatendangersecurityofsuppliesandnatural,healthortechnologicalrisks).

The principle of differentiation of forcesasafunctionofthemissionstheyarecalledupontocarryoutisintendedtopreserveanddevelopourcapacityforactionovertheentirespectrumofpossibleactions.Ourarmedforcesareconfrontedwithcrisesorconflictswithwidelydifferingmilitarycharacteristics,whethertheyinvolvepreservingadeterrencecapability,protectingthenationalterritory,participatingincrisiscontroloperationsorcombatingstate-supportedarmedforces.Thisprincipleofdifferentiationentailsasitsfirstpriorityequippingandtrainingtheforcesengagedinprotectingthenationalterritory,thosepreservingourmeansofdeterrence,thoseinvolvedincrisismanagementandthoseinvolvedincoerciveactions,asafunctionoftherequirementsspecifictotheirmission,therebyrenderingthemmoreeffectiveintheirparticularfieldofaction.Italsoenablessubstantialsavingsbyfinancingthemostexpensiveormoderncapabilitiesonlywheretheyareindispensableand,inparticular,fortheforcestaskedwithcombatingstate-leveladversaries.Itiscrucialtodefinethiscriticalcorefordecisionsinvolvingrenewalandmodernisationofourequipment.


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Lastly,theprinciple of pooling scarceandcriticalcapabilitiesoverseveralmissionsmesheswiththatofthedifferentiationofforces.Thisprincipleconsistsinallocatingthecoreofmulti-purposecapabilitiestoseveralfunctions(protection,deterrence,outsideintervention),dependingontheneedstowhichtheymustrespond.Fortheintelligenceservices,itleadstotheapplicationofaruleforpoolingsomeoftheirmostadvancedtechnicalresourcestothebenefitofalltheagenciesengagedinnationalsecurity,underthesupervisionofthenationalintelligencecoordinator.Lastly,itentailsparticularlysignificantdevelopmentsatthelevelofEuropeandefence,allowingustorapidlyseekapoolingofthecapabilitiesessentialforactionfromourEuropeanpartnerswithoutdirectlyimpactingourstrategicautonomyandfreedomofaction.Applicationsanddevelopmentsofthisprinciplearetobefound,mostnotably,inthefieldsofspaceobservation,airtransportandair-to-airrefuelling,monitoringtheatresofoperationsandlogisticsinregionsimpactedbycrises.

¡ Operational contract

The armed forces’ operational contractisbasedontheimplementationoftheseprinciples.ItdescribestheresourcesavailabletothenationandCommanderinchieftoconductthemissionsassignedtothearmedforces.Theeffectivenessofourarmedforcesisgovernedbythreeconditions.Theymust,first,beabletorelyonthecohesionofthedifferentunits,itselfbasedonmilitaryvaluesandonthecompetenceofpersonnelthankstohigh-leveltraining.Secondly,theymustpossessanenhancedcapacitytooperateinsynergyacrosstheland,seaandaircomponents,downtothelowesttacticallevels.Thirdly,theymustbeabletorelyonstrongleadershipinthedifferentunitsconsistentwiththeirmissions,inordertoguaranteepreservationofknow-howandacteffectivelywithinprescribedalertthresholds,whilealsocontrollingtherisksassociatedwithengagements.

Thefirstdutyofourarmedforcesinvolves permanent missions.Deterrencewillcontinuetobebuiltaroundtwopermanentcomponents–seaandair.Intheframeworkofthestrategicfunctionofprotection,thepermanentmissionstaskedwithland,airandmaritimesecuritywillbepreservedunderthesameconditionsastoday.Theengagementofthearmedforcestosupporthomelandsecurityandcivilsecurityintheeventofamajorcrisiscouldinvolveupto10,000personnelfromthelandforces,togetherwithappropriateresourcesprovidedbythenavyandtheairforce.Tocarryoutthesedifferentprotectivemissions,wemay,wherenecessary,callonresourcesthatcanbesecondedinparticularcircumstancesbyourinterventionforces.Thisglobalstancewill


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besupplementedbycyber-defenceresources,whicharesettoexpandinthenextfewyears.

Inthefieldofprevention,thearmedforcesmodelallowspermanentdeploymentinoneortwomaritimeregions,useoftheUnitedArabEmiratesbaseandpre-positioningfacilitiesinseveralbasesinAfrica.

Thepermanenceofthestrategicknowledgeandanticipationfunctionwillbeguaranteedbystrategicintelligencecapabilitiesaswellasreinforcedsurveillanceandelectromagneticinterceptionresources(notablyviaacombinationofsatellites,theatreandtacticalsurveillancedrones,interceptionsystemsandpayloadsspeciallyadaptedtoaircraft,navalvesselsandlandvehicles).

Toguaranteeitscapabilityforautonomousreactionintheeventofacrisis,Francewillhaveanational emergency force of5,000troopsonstandby,enablingittoconstitutean immediate reaction joint force(FIRI)of2,300troops,thatcanbemobilisedtointerveneoveraradiusof3,000kmfromthenationalterritoryoraforeignbase,insevendays.Franceremainscapableofimmediateactionwithinthisseven-daydeadlinethroughuseofairborneresources.

Theimmediatereactionjointforce(FIRI)willbecomposedofspecialforces,acombinedlandgroupof1,500menequippedwitharmouredvehiclesandhelicopters,anavalgroupconsistingofoneforceprojectionandcommandvessel(BPC),10fighterjets,tacticaltransportplanes,maritimepatrolaircraftandair-to-airrefuellingaircraft,alongwiththeassociatedcommandandcontrolmeans.

Thearmedforcesmustalsocarryoutnon-permanent missions of intervention outsideourborders.Inthiscapacity,theymay,first,beengaged,simultaneouslyandonalong-termbasis,inmorethanonecrisis management operation . Theymustbecapableofconductingthistypeofoperationonalong-termbasisintwoorthreedistincttheatres,oneasamajorcontributor.

Alltheforcesengagedinthiscapacityinallthetheatresconcernedwillbecomposedofthefollowingresources,togetherwiththeassociatedcommandandsupportfunctions: -specialforcesandthesupportfunctionsrequiredtoaccomplishtheirmission; -theequivalentofacombinedforcesbrigaderepresenting6,000to7,000land

troops,equippedprimarilywithwheeledarmouredvehicles,mediumtanks,


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firesupportandbattlefieldorganisationresources,aswellasattackandtacticalhelicopters;

-afrigate,acombinedforceprojectionandcommandvessel(BPC)andanuclearattacksubmarine,dependingonthecircumstances;

-twelveorsojetfighters,attachedtothedifferenttheatresofoperation.

Thenatureoftheoperationsortheneedtoenhancetheirsecuritymayrequireuseofadditionalresourcesenablinglong-rangestrikesfromairornavalplatforms.

Lastly,ourforcesmusthavethecapabilitytoengageinamajor coercive operation, whileretainingtheabilitytofulfilpartoftheirresponsibilitiesinexistingtheatresofoperation.Withadequatenotice(currentlyevaluatedatapproximatelysixmonths),andafterrestructuringtheresourcesalreadyengagedinongoingoperationsforalimitedperiod,thearmedforcesmustbecapableofcarryingoutaprimarilycoerciveoperationinvolvinghigh-intensitycombatinacoalition.Theymustbecapableofassumingpartialorfullcommandofsuchanoperation.Frenchparticipationintheseoperationswillbebasedonengagementofajointforcewithanindependentcapacitytoassessthesituation,informationalsuperiority,andacapacityfortargetedandhigh-penetrationstrikes.Inthisrespect,theFrencharmedforceswillretainthecapacitytoparticipateinafirstentryoperationinacombattheatreinvolvingallthreeforces.

Inthisframework,Francemustbeabletodeploythefollowingresources,togetherwiththeassociatedcommandandsupportfunctions: -specialforces; -uptotwocombinedbrigadesrepresentingaround15,000landtroops,

possiblyreinforcedbyalliedbrigadestoconstituteaNATO-typedivision,ofwhichFrancecouldassumethecommand;

-upto45fighterjetsincludingnavalones; -theaircraftcarrier,twocombinedforceprojectionandcommandvessels

(BPC),akeycoreofnationalescortvesselscomprisedprimarilyoffrigates,anuclearattacksubmarineandnavalpatrolaircraft.ThepermanenceofthisjointairandseacapabilitycouldbeassuredbytheAnglo-FrenchjointexpeditionaryforceprovidedforbytheLancasterHouseagreements;

-resourcesneededtoguaranteethefunctionsofcommand,intelligenceandlogisticsfortheoperation(transport,health,fuel,munitions,spareparts).

Oncompletionofthisengagement,Franceshouldretainitscapacitytodeployacombinedjointforcecapableofparticipatinginacrisismanagementoperationoveralongperiod.


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¡The armed forces model

Lookingto2025,theFrencharmedforceswillpossesscommandandcontrolcapabilitiesenablingthemtoguarantee-atalltimesandatthestrategiclevel-operationalcommandandnationalcontroloftheforcesdeployed.Theywillalsobeabletoplanandconductoperationsautonomouslyorasleadnationinamulti-nationaloperation,andtocontributeatthehighestleveltomulti-nationaloperations.Thearmedforceswillthereforebeabletodeploytheatreofoperations-levelcommandandlogisticalcoordinationsystemsinallthreeenvironments12fordivision-levelorequivalentoperations13.Intheframeworkofamajorengagement,notablywithinNATO,thearmedforceswillpreservethecapacitytosetupcommandstructuresforland,seaandairforcesatarmycorpslevel14orequivalent.

Developmentofourcapabilitiesinintelligence,informationprocessinganddisseminationisapriorityfortheperiodofplanningupto2025.Technicalintelligence-gatheringsystemswillbereinforced,relying,inparticular,onsystematicpoolingofthecapabilitiesofthedifferentservices.Initiativestomodernisehumanresourcesmanagementwillbestrengthened.Tobolsterourcapacityforautonomousassessmentofsituations,effortswillfocusonspaceandaircomponents,bothintermsofimagingandelectromagneticinterception(electromagneticspaceintelligenceCERESandtheopticalcomponentoftheMUSISspaceimagingsystem,surveillanceandobservationdrones,andspecially-equippedaircraft).Wewillproposepoolingofsatellite-derivedintelligencetoourEuropeanpartners,likewisethecapacitytodeployandexploitsurveillancedrones.Lastly,automatedprocessingofinformationandinteroperabilitybetweenintelligence-gatheringserviceswillbeanotheravenueforaction.

Prioritywillalsobegiventodevelopmentofmilitarycyber-defence capacities,incloseliaisonwithintelligenceactivity.Francewilldevelopanapproachbasedonacyber-defenceorganisationcloselyintegratedwiththearmedforces,madeupofdefensiveandoffensivecapacitiestoprepareorsupportmilitaryoperationsTheoperationalorganisationofthearmedforceswillthereforeincorporateanoperationalcyber-defenceplatform,consistentwiththeoperationalorganisationandstructureofourarmedforcesandadaptedtothespecificcharacteristicsofthissphereofcombat:unifiedtotakeinthelesserimportanceofbordersinthis

12 Land, sea and air forces, as well as special operations.13 Level described as Smaller Joint Operations in NATO vocabulary.14 Equivalent to the NATO level of Major Joint Operations.


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space;centralisedfromtheplanningandoperationscentreofthejointgeneralstafftoguaranteeaglobalvisionfromtheoutsetandaquickmobilizationoftheneededresources;andspecialised,sinceitrequiresappropriateexpertiseandpractices.ThemissionofthetechnicalcomponententrustedtotheDGA(Defenceprocurementagency)willbetheabilitytounderstandandanticipatethreats,developupstreamresearchandcontributeitsexpertiseintheeventofanITcrisisaffectingtheMinistryofDefence.

Thespecial forceshaveproventobeanelementofutmostimportanceinallrecentoperations.Theyareparticularlysuitedtothegrowingneedforflexible,in-depthemergencyreactiontohostileorcomplexsituations.Theyofferthemilitarycommandandthepoliticalauthoritiesarangeofsuitableoptions,oftenbasedonsurprise.Theyhaveadirectchainofcommandandspecificrecruitmentcriteria.Theirpersonnelandcommandresourcesandtheircoordinationwiththeintelligenceserviceswillbereinforced,togetherwiththejointcharacteroftheircommand.

Thelandforceswillhaveunitsadaptedtothediversity,duration,geographicdispersalandhardeningofoperations.Theywillprovideanoperationalcapabilityofapproximately66,000deployabletroops,includingspeciallandforces,sevencombinedbrigades,back-upandoperationalsupport,pre-positionedunitsandunitsintheoverseasterritories.Thecombined-forcecombatbrigadeswillbeorganisedaroundthreecomplementarycomponents.Twobrigadeswillbetrainedforfirstentryandcoercivecombatagainstheavilyarmedadversaries.Threeothermulti-purposebrigadeswillbeprimarilyequippedandtrainedforcrisismanagement.Lastly,twolightbrigadeswillbecapableofinterveninginspecificanddifficultenvironmentsoratveryshortnoticetoassistpre-positionedforcesorwithindedicatedemergencymodules.Continuedeffortstoimprovedigitalisationandappropriateoperationalpreparationwillguaranteecohesionbetweenthesethreecomponentsandtheircapacitytoprovidereciprocalreinforcement.Theseforceswill,inparticular,haveattheirdisposalaround200heavytanks,250mediumtanks,2,700multi-purposearmouredandcombatvehicles,140reconnaissanceandattackhelicopters,115tacticalhelicoptersandsome30tacticaldrones.

Thenavywillcontributetonucleardeterrencewiththenavalaviationnuclearforceandthroughpermanentnuclear-powered,ballisticmissile-carryingsubmarinepatrols.Theywillalsohavethecapacitytoundertakehigh-intensityormajor-crisisoperationsthankstotheirhigh-level,multi-purposecombatcapabilitieswithpowerfulandaccuratefiringsystems,easilyintegratedin


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multi-nationaloperations,andwiththeabilitytoassumecommandofsuchoperations.Theywillbeorganisedaroundouraircraftcarrier,nuclear-poweredattacksubmarines,combinedforceprojectionandcommandvessels(BPC)andanti-aircraftandmulti-missionfrigates,supplementedbylesspowerfulcombatunitstoavoidprematurelywearingoutthepotentialofmorepowerfulforcesandpreservesufficientresourcestoensureamaritimepresence.ThenavalforcesalsoincludelightunitsequippedtocontrolthemaritimespacearoundcontinentalFranceanditsoverseasterritories:surveillancefrigates,patrolboatsandsupportvessels.Theywillthereforehaveattheirdisposalfournuclear-powered,ballisticmissile-carryingsubmarines,sixnuclear-poweredattacksubmarines,oneaircraftcarrier,15front-linefrigates,some15patrolboats,sixsurveillancefrigates,threecombinedforceprojectionandcommandvessels(BPC),maritimepatrolaircraftandamine-warfarecapacitysuitablefortheprotectionofourapproachandfordeploymentinoperationsoutsidethenationalterritory.

Theair forcewillcontinuetoensurepermanentdeploymentoftheaircomponentofthemissionofdeterrenceandprotectionofnationalairspaceanditsapproaches.Theywillcontinuetobemodernisedtohaveavailableafleetoftop-class,multi-purposeaircraftgivingthemthecapabilityforfirstentry,situationassessment,interoperability,deep-penetrationstrikes,strategicandtacticaltransportandsupportinggroundmanœuvresasrequiredinamajorconflict.Theywillalsocontinuetofieldasufficientnumberofaircraft,thankstotheextensionoftheservicelifeofolderbuthigh-levelspecialisedaircraft,notablyformissionsofterritorialprotectionandcrisismanagement.Operationalpreparationwillbedifferentiated,withparticularemphasisonfieldinganinitialarrayofveryrapid-reactionforcesoverthewholespectrumofoperations.Thisapproachwillbesupportedupstreambyupgradingfighterpilottraining.Relyingonapermanentcommandandoperationalcentre,interoperablewithourAllies,theairforcewillinclude225fighteraircraft(airforceandnavalaviation),togetherwithsome50tacticaltransportaircraft,7detectionandsurveillanceaircraft,12multi-rolerefuellingaircraft,12theatresurveillancedrones,severallightsurveillanceandreconnaissanceaircraftand8medium-rangesurface-to-airmissilesystems.

Thegendarmerie nationale,anarmedforceattachedtotheMinistryoftheInteriorandemployedonaday-to-daybasisforinternalsecuritymissions,isamajorassetthankstoitsmilitaryorganisation,themilitarystatusofitspersonnel,itspresencethroughouttheterritory,itsoperationalreserveanditsmobilegendarmerieforces.Itconstitutesagovernment-controlledreserve


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accustomedtocarryingoutoperationsinchaoticenvironments.Itwilldeployitspivotalcapabilities–helicopters,armouredlawenforcementvehicles,securenationaltransmissionnetwork–whichsupplementtheresourcesofthearmedforcesandwhichwillbepreserved.Itprovidesessentialsupporttothearmedforcesthankstospecialisedgendarmerieunits(sea,air,armament,nuclearweaponssecurity),throughthemilitarypoliceserviceanditson-goingengagementinexternaloperations.Onthenationalterritory,itsuniquestatusasanarmedforceattachedtotheMinistryoftheInteriorenablesittorespondrapidlytocrisissituationsornaturaldisasters,anditcanthereforebedeployedalongsidethearmedforces.

Lastly,thearmedforceswillcontinuetorelyonthejointagenciesthatcontributetotheireffectiveness,intheatresofoperationandonthenationalterritory.Theyinclude,amongothers,theFuelService,theJointDirectorateforInfrastructureandInformationSystemNetworks,thearmedforcessuppliesdepartment,supportservicessuchasthejointstructureresponsibleformaintainingdefenceaviationequipmentandland-basedequipmentinoperationalconditionandthefleetsupportdepartment.

Thejoint forces health servicealsoplaysacrucialroleinsupportingtroopsandinourdefenceandnationalsecuritystrategy.Itplaysavitalroleinguaranteeingtheoperationalengagementofthearmedforcesanditscapacitiesarealsousedincrisismanagementoperations.IthasuniquecapacitiesforactinginNBCenvironments,inbothoverseasoperationsandonthenationalterritory.Itwillbecapableofimplementinganoperationalhealthintelligenceplatformcomposedofasetofinterventionmodulesthatcanbedeployedatshortnoticeandoveralongperiodforalltypesofarmedforcesmissions,notablytoprotectpopulations.Thisrolewillbeconsolidated,inparticular,byanambitiousreformfosteringnewsynergiesandbettercoordinationandcomplementaritywiththepublichealthservice.

Looking to 2025,thenewarmedforcesmodelwillhelpfillsomeexistinggapsincapability,forinstanceinthefieldofintelligenceanddrones.However,itdoesimplylengtheningtheservicelifeofsomeequipment,withasharpincreaseinaverageage,togetherwithtemporarylimitationsincapabilities,whichcouldbepartlymitigatedbyEuropeansupportorpoolinginitiatives.Itcorrespondstoarampingupofourdefenceinvestment,theeffectsofwhichwillfeedthroughfromtheendofthenextmilitaryprogramminglaw,andwillenabletherenewalofdeterrencecapabilityandconventionalequipment.Thisiswhythearmedforceswillbeorganised,intheframeworkoftheprincipleofdifferentiationof


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forces,tomakebetteruseofolderequipment,whileatthesametimemakinguseofthecapacitiesofmodernequipmentasdeliveriesproceed.

Thisnewarmedforcesmodelwillgeneratefurtherrestructuringandadaptationofitsformat.Thesemeasureswillallowourarmedforcestoexecutealldefinedoperationalcontracts,whilealsoimplementingsubstantialmeasurestorationaliseandmodernisepublicaction.Asaconsequenceofmodificationsinoperationalcontracts,some34,000positionswillbeeliminatedintheMinistryofDefenceoverthe2014-201915period.Theywillprimarilyconcernsupportfunctions,administrationandservices.

B.Theglobalapproachinmanagingexternalcrises

Consolidatingfragilestatesorrestoringtheirstabilityrequiresimplementingasetofcomplementaryandconsistentactionsineveryfield.Greatercoordinationisnecessaryintheframeworkofaglobalinter-ministerialandmultilateralapproachwiththeaimofoptimisingtheuseoflimitedresources.

Acrediblecapabilityforpreventionandcivilian-militarycrisismanagementisoftheutmostimportancetoourdefenceandnationalsecuritystrategy,whichmustbeabletorelyonstrengthenedcivilianresourcesandconsolidatedorganisation.The2008WhitePaperalreadyobservedthisfactandin2009aninter-ministerialstrategyforcivilian-militaryexternalcrisismanagementwasformulated,undertheauthorityoftheMinistryofForeignAffairs.Theexperiencegainedinrecentcriseshasshownthatourciviliancapacitiesforactionsofpreventionandinpost-conflictreconstructionarestillinadequatedueinparttothefailuretocreateconditionsallowingeffectiveandcoordinatedmobilisationoftheministriesinvolved.Itisthereforeadvisabletore-energisetheinter-ministerialstrategy.

France’spreventionpolicyaimstopreventtheemergenceofhotspots,particularlyinournearenvironment.Itisdirected,inpriority,towardsfragilestateswhosesituationhasadirectimpactonEuropeandouroverseasterritories.Asubstantialshareofourdevelopmentaidmustthereforebedirectedtowardsthesecountries,intheframeworkofaglobalinter-ministerialpolicy.Defenceandsecuritycooperation,operationalassistancetoforeignarmedforcesandourpre-

15 Including more than 10,000 under the 2009-2014 military programme act.


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positionedforcesareallinstrumentsthatmustcontributetotheconsistencyofourapproachtoprevention.

Thiseffortatbringingdifferentpartsoftheadministrationtogetherwillbebasedonsharedanalysisofrisksbytheagenciesconcernedandwillgiverisetoregularupdatingof“regional-basedstrategies”validatedatinter-ministeriallevel.Likewise,ourcapacitytoreactwillrelyonaninter-ministerialintelligenceandearlywarningsystem,thatmustdetectandanalyseasearlyaspossibletheindicatorspresagingacrisis.

If,despitethesepreventiveefforts,Franceiscalledontoparticipateinacrisismanagementoperation,theinterventionforcesmustbesupplemented,assoonaspossible,byspecialisedciviliancapacities.Suchdeploymentmustbecloselycoordinatedwithmilitaryaction,whichinturnmustcreatetheminimalsecurityconditionsrequiredforsustainablestabilisationallowingcivilianpersonneltoconducttheiroperations.

Themodusoperandiforimplementingthisglobalapproachincrisismanagementmustbeanticipatedandplannedasearlyaspossible,ideallyupstreamofanyintervention.Priordefinitionofpost-crisisstrategiesandmobilisationofthecorrespondinghumanandmaterialresourcesdemandrigorouscoordinationattheinter-ministerialandmultilaterallevels,whichmustbesupportedbytried-and-testedorganisationandprocedures.

Tothisend,Frenchinterventionshouldbeorganisedaccordingtothefollowingprinciples: -atthestrategiclevel,geographicalpriorities,particularlyintermsof

intelligence,anticipationandprevention,mustbeclearlydeterminedandvalidated/authorisedatthepoliticallevel.TheCommitteeforcivilian-militarycrisismanagementwillcoordinatethemonitoringandyearlyupdatingofthesepriorities.Adocumentwillbepublisheddetailingourinter-ministerialstrategyintheareaofpreventionandcivilian-militarymanagementofcrises;

-attheoperationallevel,theapprovedinterventionmustbesupportedbyanoperationalpolicyandvalidatedinter-ministerialprocedures.Itmustallowformedium-andlong-termactiondrawingonbothdiplomacyofinfluenceandeconomicdiplomacy.Itmustalsobecapableofrapidramp-upupintheperiodprecedingacrisis.Itwillbesupportedinsuchsituationsbytheestablishment,attheMinistryofForeignAffairs,ofrapid-responsestructurescomposedofsecondedpersonnelrepresentingthedifferentministerial


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departmentsconcerned.Theselight,rapid-reactionstructureswillremainoperationalthroughoutthecriticalperiod;

-Thisglobalinter-ministerialapproachmusttranslateintodelegationandsharedshoulderingofresponsibilitiesinthecrisistheatresoastomakesurethattheactionstakenareadaptedtotherealityontheground.

Thereinforcementofcivilianactiononthegroundentails,firstandforemost,rapidmobilisationofcivilianexpertise,notablyincriticalspecialities(publicsecurity,customs,publicadministration,judicialauthorities,civilengineering,etc.).Aproactiveapproachthatrecognisesinternationalexpertiseinthepublicadministrationshouldenableustoensuretheavailabilityofciviliancapacitiescommensuratewithourambition.Therosterofvolunteerexpertswecancallonmustthereforebeconsolidated,broadenedandregularlyupdatedincoordinationwiththeadministrationsandspecialisedoperators(France-ExpertiseInternationale,CIVIPOL,etc.).Thisworkofidentificationandmobilisationmustalsobeaccompaniedbyaneffortinthefieldoftrainingforagentsinciviliancrisismanagementoperations,simplificationofadministrativeproceduresandadaptationofthestatusoftheagentsdeployed.

Thisinter-ministerialapproachmustbeembeddedintheframeworkofoureffortstoimprovetheEuropeanUnion’scrisismanagementcapabilities.Effectiveimplementationoftheglobalapproach,whichisaprioritythemeoftheEuropeanUnion’sexternalaction,willallowustotranscendthedisagreementsthatmayarisebetweenmemberstatesaboutgivingpriorityeithertocivilianormilitarymanagementofcrises.Itwillthereforereinforcethecommonsecurityanddefencepolicy(CSDP).

TheEuropeanUnionenjoyspoliticallegitimacyandtheinstitutionsandresourcesenablingittointerveneinthefullspectrumofcrises.TheTreatyofLisbon,whichestablishedtheEuropeanExternalActionService(EEAS)underthedirectauthorityoftheVice-PresidentoftheCommission/SeniorrepresentativeoftheEuropeanUnionforforeignpolicyandsecurity,gavetheUnionstructuresandresourcesallowingittoexerciseitsresponsibilitiesintheinternationalarena.TheUnionhasthereforebecomeoneofthefewinternationalorganisationsthatpossessalltheresourcesenablingittoplayaneffectiveroleinpotentialorconfirmedcrisisspots.

Thereisaneedtoworktowardsbettercoordinationofinstitutionalplayers,intergovernmentalandEUpoliciesandcrisismanagementinstruments,whethercivilianormilitary.Inparticular,coordinationbetweentheEEASandalltheunits


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thatremainunderthecontroloftheCommission,notablythoseconcernedwithissuesofdevelopment,humanitarianaid,civilprotectionandpublichealth,mustbesimplifiedandstrengthened.LikewisetheEEASmustbeabletorelyondirectlinkswiththeagenciesattachedtotheCSDP,andespeciallywiththeEuropeanDefenceAgencyandtheEuropeanUnionSatelliteCentre.ItisalsoessentialtoimprovethestructureofcrisismanagementfinancingbytheEuropeanUniontoensurethatitrespondstotheserequirementsofdecompartmentalisationandoperationalefficiency.

Withtheaimofstrengtheningtheoperationaldimensionofthecommonsecurityanddefencepolicy,weshouldstrivetoachieveabetterbalancebetweencivilianandmilitarycapacitiesofstrategicplanningandconductofoperations,withaminimumrequirementthattheybebasedinthesamelocation.Moregenerally,paralleldevelopmentofcivilianandmilitarycrisismanagementcapabilitiesguaranteesthepossibilityofaglobalapproach,whichshouldleadtoareinforcementofthepowersoftheEuropeanUnion’sspecialrepresentativeintheatresofcrisis.Themilitarycommittee,supportedbytheworkundertakenbytheEuropeanUnionJointStaff,mustcontinuetobeasourceofproposalsforthemilitarycontributiontotheglobalapproach,bothinoperationsandinavailablecapacities.

Whileawaitingacommonstrategicvisionandaforeignpolicyconsensus,aEuropeandefencepolicywillbebuiltupthroughoperationsinwhichcivilianandmilitarycapabilitieswillcomplementandmutuallyreinforceeachother.

C.Meansforpreventionandmanagementofcrisesinthenationalterritory

Basedonriskassessment,ournationalsecuritystrategymustorganisediversifiedresponsestopreventandmanagemajorcrisesinthenationalterritory.

¡Risk assessment

Riskassessmentmustbethecornerstoneofprotectionpoliciesimplementedintheframeworkofourdefenceandnationalsecuritystrategy.Byassessingthelikelihoodofoccurrenceofthedifferentrisksthatcouldbeposedtonationalsecurity,togetherwiththenatureandintensityoftheirpotentialimpact,itcanenlightenthepublicauthoritiesonthepriorityactionstobeputinplace.


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Riskassessmentiscloselylinkedtoknowledgeaboutthevulnerabilitiesofpotentialtargetsandthecapacitytodirect,gatherandexploitintelligence.Itmakesitpossibletoprepareandadaptrelevantpreventionandprotectionprocedures(forsuchneedsasorganisation,planning,acquisitionanddevelopmentoftechnicalcapabilities).

ThenationalriskassessmentapproachinitiatedincompliancewiththerecommendationsofthepreviousWhitePaperconstitutesapriorityavenueforwork.Itmustleadontoformulationofaglobalassessment,allrisksandsectorscombined,byassociatingalltheministriesandpublicandprivateorganisationscrucialtotheresilienceofthenation.Launchedin2010,thisworkshouldbecompletedbefore2014.Itwillsupplementnationalsecurityplanningandenrichthecapacity-basedapproachthatwillbeinitiatedbythestateatthelevelofdefenceandsecurityzonesinthemainreservoirsofrisks.ItwillalsogiveFrance,inthistimeframe,thecapacitytocontributeeffectivelytoformulatinganimprovedinteriorsecuritystrategyattheEuropeanlevel.Thisapproachmustbefedbymorespecificanalyses.Sector-basedstrategiesbytypeoftargetoressentialfunction(transport,logisticschains,communication,etc.)willallowforanadjustmentoftheprotectionpoliciesforthesectorsunderconsideration.Theme-basedanalyseswillbeaimedatimprovingknowledgeofandassessingriskswithahightechnicalortechnologicalcomponent(nuclear,radiological,biological,chemical,explosive–NRBC–E–risksandcyberneticrisks,forinstance),anddirectingdevelopmentofnewprevention,detectionandprotectiontechnologies.CooperativeinitiativesestablishedwithourEuropeanandinternationalpartnerspursuingsimilarapproacheswillenablepoolingofsector-basedriskanalysesandincreasethereliabilityofourrespectivemethods.

¡Protection of the territory and its surroundings

Territorialprotectionimplies,firstofall,guaranteeingcontrolandsurveillanceofnationalareasandoftheirsurroundings(continentalFranceandtheoverseasterritories),topreventundesirableintrusions,illegalflowsandhostileacts.Themissionincumbentonthestategovernsourpermanentsecuritystance,i.e.allthemeasuresimposedonland,atseaandintheair,spaceandcyberspacetoprotectthecountryinallcircumstancesfromaggression,evenofalimitednature,againstitsterritoryoritsinterests.

Thankstotheircoverageoftheterritory,thenationalpoliceandthegendarmerieensurecontinuoussurveillancethatshouldenabletheanticipationofthreats


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tonationalsecurity.Intheeventofaconfirmedthreatorofaseriouscrisis,theseforcescanbesupplementedbythearmedforces.

Thestate’sactioninthemarineenvironment,bynatureinter-ministerialandcoordinatedatthecentrallevelbytheGeneralSecretariatfortheSea,isintendedtoguaranteetheprotectionofnationalinterests,thesafetyoflifeandpropertyatsea,thecombatagainstillegalactivitiesandtheprotectionoftheenvironment.FrancewillsupportthedevelopmentofintegratedmarinesurveillancebytheEuropeanUniontoenhanceourknowledgeofandcapacitytoanalysetheactivitiestakingplaceintheseenvironments,whiletakingcaretoensurethatthiscommonpolicytakesintoaccountourcountry’sparticularmaritimecharacteristics.

TheresourcescurrentlyimplementedbytheFrenchNavyare,toalargeextent,directedtowardstheaccomplishmentofthismissionandothermissionscontributingtothedifferentstrategicfunctions.Hence,thecombatagainstdrugsmugglingoutsideterritorialwatersresortstosuchresourcesaslightfrigates,maritimesurveillanceaircraftandthespecialforces.Alimitednumberofspecificcapabilitiesarerequiredforsomeofthesemissions,suchasthepreventionandthetreatmentofpollution.

AirsecurityguaranteestherespectofFrance’ssovereigntyinitsairspaceandthedefenceoftheterritoryagainstanyaerialthreat.Theaccomplishmentofthismissionrequiresnationalcapabilitiesforassessingthethreatandcounteringitwithadaptedandproportionateresources.Italsorequiresin-depthstrategicexpertisetoassessanaerialthreatwithsufficientadvancenotice,asprovidedbycross-borderagreementsandthesettingupofthenewNATOAirCommandandControlSystem.Francewill,moreover,ensurethatdefenceandsecurityrisksaretakenintoaccountinthe“SingleEuropeanSky”project.Itwill,notably,ensurethatthisinitiativewillpreservetrainingareasforitsmilitaryaircraft.ItwillcloselymonitoranytechnicalmodificationsthatmaybeimposedontheseaircraftbytheEuropeanUnioninthisframework.

Withthemultiplicationofdebrisinspaceandtheemergenceofpotentialdirectattacksonsatellites,theprotectionofouterspaceisnowamajorchallengegiventheimportanceoftheservicesandmissionscarriedoutbyspacecraft.Francewillsupportinternationalinitiativesaimedatpromotingthesustainabledevelopmentofspace.Itwillcontinuetodevelopspacesurveillancecapabilitiesinordertopreserveitsindependentassessmentofthesituationinspace.AEuropeanapproachtothistopicofmutualinterestwillbepromoted,taking


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advantageofexistingresourcessuchastheGRAVESradaranddevelopingnewconcreteprojects.Ablueprintwillbeestablishedorganisingthespacesurveillancemissionandthedifferentactorscontributingtoit.Theprotectionofthelandinfrastructureusedtooperatespacesystemswillbereinforced.

¡The fight against terrorism

Terrorismisamajorandpersistentthreatrequiringmaintenanceatahighlevelofalertofthesystemsputinplacebythestate.Thisplatformisembeddedinaglobalapproachthataimsto: -preventrisks,bydetectingandneutralisingillegalflows,protectingthe

territoryagainsthostileintrusionanddevelopinggovernmentinitiativestocombatradicalisation;

-protectparticularlyvulnerableareas,air,landandseatransportnetworks,thecountry’sessentialinfrastructureandsensitiveinformationsystems;

-anticipatechangesinthethreatbypreservingtechnologicalsuperiorityinthedetectionofexplosives,telecommunications,videosurveillance,protectionofinformationsystems,biometricsandprotectionagainstnuclear,radiological,biological,chemicalorexplosiverisks(NRBC-E).

ThegovernmentVigipirateanti-terrorismplanenablesaglobalapproachtotheterroristthreatbothonthenationalterritoryandtoourinterestsoutsideFrance.Itensuresthemobilisationofthedifferentministries,localandregionalauthorities,operatorsofessentialinfrastructureandinstitutions,andcitizens,toreinforceourlevelofprotection.Thisplatformmustbemodernisedtobolsteritseffectiveness.

Bilateralandmultilateralcooperationmustbereinforcedtoenhancetheexchangeofinformationandassessmentsbetweencountriesexposedtothesamethreat.Thiscooperationwill,inaddition,enablebetterintegrationofthecontinuitybetweeninternalandexternalsecurity.

¡Guaranteeing the continuity of vital functions

Since2006,thestatehasbeendeployingapolicytoenhancethesecurityofactivitiesofvitalimportance,whichappliesto12sectorsofactivity16andaims

16 The activity sectors considered to be of vital importance, as defined by the ruling of 2 June 2006, are: State civil activities – Judicial activities – State military activities – Food – Electronic communications, audiovisual and information systems – Energy – Space and Research – Finances – Water management – Industry – Health - Transportation.


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toassessandprioritiserisksand,subsequently,toformulatemeasurestodealwiththem.Thispolicy,basedonthecloseassociationofthedifferentoperators,willbeupgradedtotakebetterintoaccountalltherisksandthreatsandensurethecontinuityofessentialfunctions.Thisupgradingwillalsoaimtofurtherraisetheawarenessofallpublicandprivateactorsandprovidebetterinformationtocitizens.Tothisend,educational,trainingandcommunicationinitiativeswillbeconductedfortargetedgroups.

¡ The fight against cyber-threats

Theactionsinitiatedinconnectionwiththeanalysesandrecommendationscontainedinthe2008WhitePaperinthefieldofcyber-defencehaveenabledFrancetoreachacrucialmilestoneinrecognisingthisthreatandrollingoutthenecessaryresponses.However,thecontinuedgrowthofthisthreat,thecontinuingincreaseintheimportanceofinformationsystemsinthelifeofoursocietiesandtheveryrapiddevelopmentoftechnologies,requireustomoveontoyetanotherleveltomaintaintheprotectionanddefencecapabilitiesrespondingtothesechanges.Thesefactorsnowrequireaverysubstantialincreaseinthelevelofsecurityandthemeanstodefendourinformationsystems,bothinordertopreserveoursovereigntyandalsotodefendoureconomyaswellasemploymentinFrance.Thehumanresourcesdevotedtothistaskwillthereforebeappreciablyreinforced,onthesamescaleastheeffortsmadebyourBritishandGermanpartners.

Thecapacitytodetectandprotectourselvesagainstcyberattacksandtoidentifythoseresponsibleforthemhasbecomeanelementofnationalsovereignty.Tosucceedinthisendeavour,thestatemustsupporthigh-levelscientificandtechnologicalexpertise.

Thecapacitytoproducesecuritysystems,onafullyautonomousbasis,notablyinthefieldsofcryptologyandattackdetection,is,inthisrespect,anessentialcomponentofnationalsovereignty.Anannualbudgetallocationearmarkedforinvestmentwillenabledesignanddevelopmentofhigh-levelsecuritysystems.Specialattentionwillbepaidtothesecurityofelectroniccommunicationsnetworksandtheequipmenttheyrelyon.PreservationofaneffectivenationalandEuropeanindustryinthissectorisanessentialobjective.

Reinforcingthesecurityofstateinformationsystemsisessentialandanambitioussecuritypolicywillbeputintoplace.Itwillbebased,mostnotably,onmaintainingthehigh-securitynetworksservingstateauthorities,anappropriatepolicyof


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publicprocurementandappropriatemanagementofmobilecommunicationsequipment.Itwillbesupplementedbyapolicyofawareness-buildingdirectedatdecentralisedstateadministrations,regionalauthoritiesandtheirpublicestablishmentsandattheprincipalusersofthecyberspace.Statecyber-securityalsodependsonthatofitsproductandservicesuppliers,whichmustbereinforced.Clauseswillbeincludedincontractstoguaranteetherequiredlevelofsecurity.

Asforactivitiesofvitalimportanceforthenormalfunctioningofthenation,thestatewilldefinethesecuritystandardstobemetwithrespecttoITthreats,bymeansofanappropriatelegislativeandregulatoryprocedure,andwillensurethatoperatorsadoptallnecessarymeasurestodetectandhandleanysuchincidentaffectingtheirsensitivesystems.Thisprocedurewillspecifytherightsandobligationsofpublicandprivateactors,particularlyinrelationtoaudits,themappingoftheirinformationsystems,notificationofincidentsandthecapacityofthenationalagencyresponsibleforthesecurityofinformationsystems(ANSSI),and,whereapplicable,ofotherstateagencies,tointerveneintheeventofaseriouscrisis.

ThenationalpolicyofresponsetomajorITattacksisbasedontheprincipleofaglobalapproach,itselfbasedontwocomplementaryaspects: -theimplementationofarobustandresilientposturetoprotectstate

informationsystems,operatorsofessentialinfrastructureandstrategicindustries,pairedwithanoperationalorganisationtodefendthesesystems,coordinatedbytheofficeofthePrimeMinisterandsupportedbyclosecooperationofthedifferentstateagencies,toidentifyandqualifyasearlyaspossibleanythreatstowhichourcountryisexposed;

-acapacityforaglobalandappropriategovernmentalapproachtoattacksofvariednatureandmagnitude,relyinginitiallyonalldiplomatic,judicialorpoliceresources,butwithoutrulingoutprogressiveuseofMinistryofDefenceresourcesintheeventthatnationalstrategicinterestsarethreatened.

Withinthisnationalpolicy,aproactiveITcapacityassociatedwithanintelligencecapabilitymakesasubstantialcontributiontoacyber-securityplatform.Itcontributestoqualifyingthethreatandidentifyingitsorigin.Itcanalsoanticipatecertainattacksandconfiguretherequiredmeansofdefence.AproactiveITcapabilityenrichesthepaletteofpossibleoptionsavailabletothestate.Ittakesindifferentstages,moreorlessreversibleandmoreorlessdiscreet,proportionatetothemagnitudeandseriousnessoftheattacks.


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Moregenerally,thesecurityoftheinformationsocietyasawholerequireseachindividualtobemadeawareoftherisksandthreatsandtoadapttheirbehavioursandpracticesinconsequence.ItisalsoimportanttoincreasethenumberofexpertstrainedinFranceandtoensurethatITsecurityisintegratedinalladvancedITtrainingandeducation.

Anambitiouscyber-defencepolicyrequiresthedevelopmentofcloserelationsbetweentrustedinternationalpartners.Relationswithprivilegedpartners,andinfirstplacetheUnitedKingdomandGermany,willbestrengthened.AttheEuropeanlevel,FrancesupportstheimplementationofaEuropeanpolicyaimedatstrengtheningprotectionagainstcyber-risksforessentialinfrastructureandelectroniccommunicationsnetworks.

¡The protection of the nation’s scientific and technical potential

Asfortheprotectionofthenation’sscientificandtechnicalpotential,in2012Franceadoptedanewprocedureaimedatpreventingthediversionorcaptureofknowledgeandknow-howvitaltoitsfundamentalinterests.Thisprocedurereliesespeciallyonsettingupanetworkofrestrictedregimezones(ZRR)governedbycommonrulesofspecialprotectioninthemostsensitiveresearchandproductionunits,inboththepublicandprivatesectors.

¡The fight against weapons’ proliferation and trafficking

Franceactivelyparticipatesinmultilateralactionaimedatcombatingtheproliferationofweaponsofmassdestruction,mostnotablythatconductedattheEuropeanleveltoharmoniseprovisionsaimedatcriminalisingactivitiesofproliferationandhenceincreasingthecommondeterrenteffect.

Substantialeffortsmustalsobemadetocombatarmstrafficking,inparticularsmallarmsandassociatedammunition.ApartfromreinforcingnationalandEuropeanlegalmeans,wewillreinforceassistancetocountriesthathavebecomevictimsofarmstraffickingbutdonotpossessthemeanstocontrolarmstrade.Implementationofthetreatyonthearmstrade,towhichtheEuropeanUnionandFrancehavemadeaconsiderablediplomaticcontribution,willbefacilitated.

Atthenationallevel,Francehasimplementedasetofprocedurestocontroltheexportofthesegoods,technologiesandknow-how,buttheproceduresarenotyetsufficientlyintegrated.Inter-ministerialreflectionwillbeinitiatedtoreinforcetheefficiencyofcontrolandsynergiesbetweenthedifferentexisting


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procedures.Itcouldaimtobringthedifferentinstrumentsforcontrolofcivilianandmilitarytechnologiesintendedfordefenceandsecurityapplicationstogetherunderasingleauthority.

¡The fight against drug trafficking and human trafficking

Thecombatagainstthesetypesoftraffickingmustbereinforcedbyconsolidatingtheactionspursuedsince2008.Essentialcoordinationbetweenadministrativeaction(includingthatoftheintelligenceservices)andjudicialactionwillbereinforced.Itis,moreover,essentialtoreinforcetheroleandcapabilitiesoftheEuropeanagencyFRONTEX,whichmustbedevelopedinkeepingwiththeneedtocontroltheuseofourresources.

Theeffortsundertakentostepupthefightagainstdrugtraffickingwillbedevelopedintheland,airandmaritimeenvironments.Withrespecttothelatterenvironment,Francewillseektopromotethepossibilityofdestroyinginterceptedcargosatseaattheinternationallevel.Inthisframework,itwillstrivetoenterintoindividualagreementswiththestatesunderwhoseflagthevesselsaresailing,aninitiativethataimstodissociatethetreatmentoftheinterceptedcargosfromthatoftheshipandpersonsaboard.Itwillalsoseektodevelopbilateralorregionalagreementsallowingjudicialproceedingstobebroughtbyneighbouringstatesfollowinginterceptionatsea.

Thisobjectiveimpliestheavailabilityofcapacitiesofinterventioninourterritorialwatersandbeyond,inparticularagainsthigh-speedcraft,andincreasingoperationalcapacitiesforimplementingpublicactiontodetectbreachesofthelawandapprehendtheperpetrators.Intheoverseasterritories,Francewillreinforcethemonitoringofinter-islandtraffictoguaranteebetteruseoflimitedinterventioncapacity.

¡Improving the state’s capacity to respond to crises

UndertheimpetusoftheprecedingWhitePaper,thestate’scapacitytorespondeffectivelytomajorcrisissituationshasmadesubstantialprogress.Theinter-ministerialcrisisunit(CIC)allowsthePrimeMinister,inliaisonwiththePresidentoftheRepublic,totakepoliticalandstrategiccontrolofgovernmentaction,withoperationalcontrolbeingplacedundertheresponsibilityofaspeciallyappointedminister(inprincipletheMinisteroftheInteriorforcrisesaffectingthenationalterritoryandtheMinisterofForeignAffairsforexternalcrises).Ourterritorialorganisation,whosearchitectureisstructuredonthedépartements


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anddefenceandsecurityzones(sevenincontinentalFranceandfiveintheoverseasterritories)hasprovenitsworth.Itmustcontinuetoberampedupbyconsolidatingthezoninglevelthroughreinforcementoftheinter-ministerialgeneralstaffofdefenceandsecurityzones.

Inacrisissituationjustifyingtheirintervention,thearmedforceswillactattherequestofthecivilianauthority,undermilitarycommand,tosupportorsupplementtheinternalsecurityforces(policeandgendarmerie,firebrigadeandciviliansecurityorganisations).

Theconsolidationofcrisismanagementorganisationmustbesupplementedbyadaptinggovernmentandregionalplanninginstruments.Planningshouldmakeitpossibletoidentifyalltheactorsthatcancontributetocrisisresolutionandlistallthecapacitiesonwhichthestatemustbeabletocount.Itmusttakeintoaccounttheabilitiesandcapacitiesoflocalandregionalgovernmentsandinvolvetheminpreparingandimplementingthesecrisismanagementprocedures.Informationandcommunicationactionsmustbeincorporatedinthisplanningandregulargovernmentexercisesmusttestitsvalidity.Feedbackgeneratedfrompastcrisesmustbesystematicallytakenintoconsideration.

ItalsoappearsnecessarytofostercoordinationmechanismswithintheEuropeanUnion.Inthisrespect,Franceadvocatesthedevelopmentofinstrumentsandproceduresforjointriskassessingandbetterdefiningofcommoncrisismanagementprevention,preparationandcoordinationprocedures.Furthermore,astandardisationprocedurewillbeinitiatedaroundquestionsaffectingcontinuityofessentialfunctionstosetupcommonrulesintermsoforganisation,systemsandproceduresatthenationalandEuropeanlevels.

¡French overseas territories

Inthecontextoftensionsaroundaccesstoresources,Francemusthavethecapacitytoaffirmitssovereigntyanddefenditsinterestsinitsoverseasterritories.Inotherwords,itmustbeabletomonitor,controlandifnecessarytakemilitaryactiontocounterathreatthatcouldjeopardisetheintegrityofitsnationalterritory.Thisthreat,whichwouldmostlikelybeofanon-statenature,callsforavisible,deterrentpresenceofmilitaryforces.Inthelesslikelycaseofastate-ledthreat,Francemustbeabletorapidlydeployappropriatemeansofintervention.Thisrequirespreservingpointsofentry(portsandairports)andmaintainingcertaincapabilities.


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The2008WhitePaperestablishedtheprincipleofaligningthesizeofthemilitarypresenceintheoverseasterritorieswiththeneedscorrespondingstrictlytothemissionsofthearmedforcesandareinforcementofcivilianresources.Thisprincipleshouldprovideaglobalguaranteeofthecontinuityofthedefenceandsecuritymissionsincumbentonthestate.Itshouldensurethepreservationofsovereignty(inremoteandisolatedregions),thefightagainsttrafficking,thefightagainstillicitfishing,thefightagainstillegalgoldprospecting,theprotectionoftheFrenchGuianaspacecentre,andthemanagementofnaturaldisastersandofpublicordercrises.

Thenewbreakdownofcontributionsdemandedfromeachministryhasonlypartlytakeneffectandmajorequipmentquestionsremaintobeaddressed,bothinthenavalandairsectors.Hence,todaythereisasignificantriskofinadequateshort-andmedium-termcapability,whichcouldpreventthestatefromcontinuingtosatisfactorilyfulfilallthemissionsincumbentonitintheseoverseasterritories.

Therecommendationsofthe2008WhitePaper,whichprovidedforarampingupofciviliancapabilities,areconfirmedandtherelevantministriesmusttakestepstoensuretheyhavethenecessaryequipment.Foreachtypeofmission,poolingofcapacitieswillbeapriorityconcernandthestakeholdersmust,asof2013,formulateafive-yearprogrammeofpooledequipment.Militarypresenceintheoverseasterritoriesmustbestructuredtotakeintoaccountthedefenceandsecurityproblemsspecifictoeachterritory.

Defenceandsecurityintheoverseasterritoriesmustsystematicallytakeintoaccounttheirparticularregionalenvironment.Forinstance,inthefightagainstillicitfishingandgoldprospectingintheFrenchGuianaorirregularimmigrationinMayotte,Francemustendeavourtoinvolveitsneighbours,notablyBrazilandtheUnionoftheComoros,incombattingthesethreatsandtheirconsequences.

¡Capacity objectives for the national territory

Theprotectionandsecurityobjectivesdefinedbythedefenceandnationalsecuritystrategymustpromptpublicauthoritiestodeterminethecapacities,notablyintermsofequipment,tobemadeavailabletothecivilianandmilitaryforcestoeffectivelyperformthemissionsincumbentontheminthisrespect.Thecivilianministrieshavenotyetfullyimplementedthisapproach.


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Tothisend,itisadvisable,initially,toidentifyallthecriticalcapabilitiesthatshouldbeavailabletothecivilianministries.Inthiswaytheyshouldbeabletoprogrammethedevelopment,acquisitionorreplacementofthosedeemedtobeinadequateorevenlacking.Thisisessentialtoguaranteetheabilityoftheadministrationsinquestiontorespondeffectivelytotheobjectivesofthedefenceandnationalsecuritystrategyandtoimprovecivilian-militaryplanningintheeventofacrisisonthenationalterritory.UndertheauthorityofthePrimeMinister,theGeneralSecretariatforDefenceandNationalSecurity(SGDSN)willtakeresponsibilityforthisapproachincollaborationwithalltherelevantministries(interior,overseasterritories,ecologyandsustainabledevelopment,economyandfinance,health,agriculture).Thisshouldresult,from2013,intheestablishmentofageneral,inter-ministerialcontractthatwilldefinetheciviliancapacitiesrequiredformissionsrelativetonationalsecurity.

Inparallelwiththisprocess,theMinistryoftheInterior,inliaisonwiththeothercivilianministries,willfosterthecoordinationofallthepublicandprivateagenciesthatbearsomeresponsibilityforensuringthecountry’scapacityforresilience.Inpriority,thismeanstheregionalauthoritiestowhichthelawsofdecentralisationhavetransferredcriticalcompetencies,especiallyintermsoflocalpublicservices.Majoroperatorsofvitallyimportantservicesandinfrastructurewhichhavespecificresponsibilitiesinmaintainingthecontinuityofthecountry’sessentialfunctionswillalsobeassociated.Basedonacensusofexistingresourcesandknow-howandusinganassessmentofcommonrisksandsecurityobjectivesforeachdefenceandsecurityzone,thisworkshouldidentifytheeffortstobemadebyeachactortoguaranteetheavailabilityofappropriatecapacitiesforcrisismanagementinthenationalterritory.Thiswillgiveprefectsaclearvisionofallthecapacitiesavailabletothemundersuchcircumstances.Theprocessmustbeconductedbetweennowand2016.Itwillbeaccompaniedbythereinforcementoftheinter-ministerialgeneralstaffforeachzonebytherelevantministries.

¡The European dimension of national security

FranceintendstoseizetheopportunitiesarisingfromthereviewoftheStockholmProgrammein2014topromoteaEuropeansecurityproject.WemustalsocapitaliseonthecreationoftheInternalSecurityFund,theimplementationofthe“security”componentofHorizon2020,andtheworkconcerningthesolidarityclauseandtheremodellingcoordinationarrangementsintheeventofacrisistopursuethisobjective.Onthispoint,Franceproposesstrengtheningtheconsistencyofthedifferentsector-basedpoliciescurrentlyimplementedby


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theUnioninthefieldsofprotection(terrorism,crisismanagement,businesscontinuity,NRBC-E,cyber-security)anddevelopmentofsecuritytechnologies.ThistypeofglobalprojectcanbecarriedoutwithintheUnion’scurrentlegalframeworkandislikelytoreinforcetheeffectivenessofnationalpoliciesofparticularimportancefortheEuropeanpeoples.Rolloutofthisprojectisanessentialsteptowardstheemergenceofacommon,sharedconsciousnessofEurope’ssuperiorinterests.

Sincenumeroussecuritymissions(police,customs,marinesurveillance,civilsecurity,firebrigade,etc.)needtobenefitfromreliableandprecisepositioningandnavigationfacilities,FrancewillcontinuetosupporttheEuropeanGalileonavigationsatelliteprogramme.

D . The women and men serving defence and national security

Inordertoguaranteethepermanentsecurityanddefenceofthenation,thestatepossessesforcescapableofinterveningatitscommand.TheyconsistofthewomenandmenworkingfortheMinistryofDefenceandtheMinistryoftheInterior(police,gendarmerieandciviliansecurity).Thesepersonnelarerecognisedfortheircompetenceandaretrainedtodealwithmultiplechallenges.Theysharecommonvaluesandhavechosen,eachaccordingtoher/hisstatus,toservetheircountry.Thankstothem,thecountryisabletodealwithalltypesofcrisesandthereforehasadutyofsolidaritytowardsthem.Thesecurityandemergencyinterventionforcesareorganisedtoprovidecompleteandpermanentcoverageoftheterritoryintheareasofintervention,intelligenceandemergencyassistance.Inexceptionalcircumstances,localandregionalgovernmentandnon-profitorganisationsmaybeaskedtocontributetheireffortsalongsidethestate.

Since2008,defenceandnationalsecuritystructureshaveundergonemajorchangesinaccordancewiththerecommendationsoftheprecedingWhitePaper.Organisationalchangeshaveobligedthewomenandmenworkingforthedefenceandnationalsecurityforcestodealwithradicaltransformations.FortheMinistryofDefence,thesechangesled,between2008and2012,tothelossofapproximately40,000jobs,aprogrammeimplementedrigorouslyaccordingtothedefinedtimetable.Thesereformscouldnothavebeenimplementedwithoutthemobilisationofallpersonnel,civilianandmilitary,buthaveneverthelesshadaneffectontheirlivingandworkingconditionsand,hence,ontheirmorale.


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Overandabovetheconditionsinwhichtheyperformtheirwork,defenceandnationalsecuritypersonnel,whethercivilianormilitary,mustbeabletofullyplaytheirroleascitizensinthelifeofthecommunity.Formilitarypersonnel,theserightsandobligationsmustbeexercisedincompliancewiththepreservationoftheneutralityofthearmedforces,whichmustnotparticipateinanypartisandebate.

Societyawardsthemonopolyofarmedforcetoarms-bearingcitizenstoguaranteethesecurityofall.TheRepublicassignsasingularmissiontothesecitizens,whichimposesdiscipline,loyaltyandaspiritofsacrifice,inreturnforwhichtheybenefitfromthegratitudeofthenationandaprotectivestatus.Militarypersonnel,calledontoserveatanytimeorinanyplaceandeventosacrificetheirownlives,constituteaspecificgroup:theymaybecalledontoserveincombatsituations,inthenameofthenation,intheframeworkofstrictrulesofengagement.Thisparticularpositioningconfersrightsandresponsibilitiesonmilitarypersonnelwhicharecodifiedinaspecialstatusthatmustbepreserved–evenwhileitmustadapttochangesinsociety–andguaranteedtopeopleinvolvedinarmedserviceorwhoseparticularconditionsofemploymentwarranttheirbeingcoveredbythisstatus,includinginthefieldofinteriorsecurityorciviliansecurity.Militarypersonnel,whoareallliabletomobilisationandboundtorespectthesameobligations,benefitfromtheprincipleofuniquemilitarystatus,recognisedbythelawin1975andreaffirmedin2005.

Byvirtueoftheinherentrequirementsofoperationalmissions(availability,mobility,distance),thearmedforcesmustatalltimesbeabletocountonyoungpersonnelwiththephysicalabilitytoperformthesemissions.Therequirementofyouthhasacrucialandrestrictiveimpactonthemanagementofmilitaryhumanresourcesasitimposesahighturnoverofoperationalforces.Thisneedforpermanentandwell-organisedflowsofrecruitmentanddeparturescallsforthereinforcementofthecurrentpolicywhichgivespreferencetorecruitmentundercontractovercareer-basedrecruitment.

Potentialrecruitsmustbeclearlyinformedoftheparticularconstraintsofemploymentinthearmedforces.Tofostertherecruitmentofyoungpeopleinthearmedforces,theprecariousnatureoftheearlypartofamilitarycareermustbeoffsetbyopportunitiesforpromotioninrankandinmilitaryunitsandaccesstotrainingtodeveloptheirskillsandqualificationsthatalsopreparethemforareturntocivilianlife.Workingandlivingconditions,togetherwithdirectandindirectremuneration,mustremainattractive.


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The2008WhitePaperrecommendedanewbalance,withintheMinistryofDefence,betweenmilitaryandcivilianpersonnel,bycallingformilitarypersonneltoberefocusedonoperationalfunctionsandspecialisationofcivilianpersonnelinadministrativeandsupportfunctions.Implementationoftheprogrammetocut40,000jobsbetween2008and2012,outofthe54,900providedforbythe2008WhitePaperfortheperiodbetween2009and2015,didnotdoenoughtocompletethisrebalancing,whichmustbepursuedinaproactivemanner.Thegoalistohaveeachcategoryofpersonnel,civilianandmilitary,refocusontheircoreactivity.

Officersrecruitedbycompetitiveexaminationmustbenefitfromcareerstatus,buttheflowofsuchrecruitmentsmusttakeintoaccountthenewformatofthearmedforces.Thisnewformatwillleadtoatargetpyramidofpersonnelbyrankandadefinedtrajectoryforachievingit.Fornon-commissionedofficersandpettyofficers,thetransitionfromcontract-basedemploymenttocareer-basedemploymentmustallowtheselectionofthebestelements,whowilleventuallyoccupytechnicalandsupervisoryfunctions.Apartfromperpetuatingthecriticalcompetenciesessentialtothesatisfactoryfunctioningofthearmedforces,thispossibilityofpromotionisoneofthemaindriversofsocialmobilitywithinthearmedforces.

Thecontinuedfallinapplicationsfornon-commissionedmilitarypersonneldespiteadepressedlabourmarketoftenpreventsthemilitaryestablishmentfromguaranteeingasufficientlyrigorousselectionofcandidates,whomustdemonstrateunquestionablephysicalcapacitiesandpsychologicalequilibrium.Anotherdifficultyisthefactthatyoungenlisteduniformedsoldiersarepresentfortooshortatime,whereasencouraginglongerengagementoftheseyoungpeoplewouldnotonlygeneratesavingsinrecruitmentandtrainingbutisalsoanimportantdriverforenhancingtheprofessionalismofourarmedforces.

Thehumanresourcesmodelforthedefencesectormustnowmeettwoimperatives.Structurally,itentailscontinuouspersonnelturnover,whichmeansthatincomingandoutgoingpersonnelflowsmustalwaysbeadequatewiththeneedsoftheMinistryofDefence.Ontheshorterterm,wemustinthenextfewyearsadapttheMinistry’sworkforcetothenewarmedforcesmodelandtheneedtomodernisepublicaction.Toolsforsteeringthereductioninpersonnelaretodayinadequatetorespondtothissecondimperative.TheMinistry’shumanresourcespolicywillthereforeincludeamajorprogrammeofreformtoaccompanythesocial,humanandeconomicimpactofthecomingchanges.Newprocedureswillbeputintoplaceformanagingandsteeringthereduction


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inpersonnel,togetherwithanappropriateplatformofassistanceforofficersreturningtocivilianlife.Thesepermanentmeasurescouldincludenewrulesofstatus,alongsideanefficientsystemforsupportingofficersandfacilitatingtheirreturntocivilianlife.TheseinstrumentsareintendedtoguaranteetherobustnessoftheMinistry’snewhumanresourcesmodeloverthelongerterm,andmustrespecttherulesofequityandtransparency.

OptimisedmanagementofMinistryofDefencepersonnelmusttakeparticularaccountoftherequirementtocontrolpayrollcostsandtherelatedexpenditures,whichwaslackingintheperiodjustcompleted.Tothisend,thereductioninpersonnelandchangesinorganisationoftheMinistryofDefencemustprompta“flattening”oftheworkforcepyramid.Reformedgovernanceofhumanresourcesmanagementwillenablebettercontrolandconsistencybetweenorganisation,workforceandpayrollcosts.

TheMinistriesofDefenceandtheInteriormustcontinuetotakeintoaccountcertainimportantpersonalconstraintsandfacilitatethebalancebetweenmilitarylifeandprivatelife:spouse’swork,children’seducation,acquisitionofahome.Furthermore,militarypersonnelmustenjoybettervisibilityconcerningtheirmobilityandcareerprospects.Thisrequiressettingupaclearpolicyforforward-lookingjobsandskillsmanagement,intheshortandmediumterm.

Civilianpersonnelinthedefencesectorarethesecondpivotguaranteeingtheconsistencyofourdefencesystem.Themajorchallengeinmanagingthesepersonnelistoguaranteetheemployabilityofoperativesoverthelongertermanddeveloptheirpotential.Selectiverecruitmentprocedures,thehigh-leveltechnicalcompetenciesofthesepersonnelandthefactthattheyexerciseawiderangeofactivitiesintheadministrative,technical,socialandparamedicfunctionsarevaluableassetsforthedefencecommunity,ofwhichtheyareanintegralpart.Thecivilianhumanresourcesmanagementpolicymustguaranteethecontinuedrecruitmentofasufficientnumberofhigh-levelcivilianoperatives.Forward-lookingjobsandskillmanagementmustallowtheidentificationofpositionswhereafunctionalanalysisshowsthattheycouldbeheldbycivilianpersonnel.Recognitionofthejobs,roleandpositioningoftheseoperativesrequiresformalstructuringofopen-endedprofessionalpaths,associatedwithaproactivepolicyofcontinuingtraining.Mobilityofcivilianpersonnelmustbeencouraged;itmustnotprejudicepromotionandmustbesupportedinanequitablemanner.Thisisamajorchallengeintheadaptationofourdefencecapability.


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Trainingofdefenceandnationalsecuritypersonnelisofprimaryimportance,bothintermsofthedegreeofformalstructuringofprofessionalpathsandthenumberoftrainingsessionsconducted.Sinceinitialtrainingofthepersonnelrecruitedconstitutesonlyaverybasicplatform,itmustbesupplementedbyadditionaltrainingduringtheiremploymentandbebetterrecognisedintheassessmentofpersonnel.

Thepolicyconductedinthisareaisamajorfactorofattractiveness.Forthearmedforces,itintroducesacostthatisjustifiedbutwhichmustbecontained.Substantialeffortshaverecentlybeenmadetointroducepoolingbetweenthearmedforcesandestablishcloserrelationsbetweenthemilitarytrainingsystemandthenationaleducationsystem.Thisapproachshouldbepursuedbyfurtherdevelopinginteractionsbetweentheneedsofthearmedforcesandtherecognitionofindividualskillsacquired,whichwillfacilitatethereturnofmilitarypersonneltocivilianlife.Itwouldalsobedesirabletosupplementthesetrainingactionswithaninter-ministerialmobilitypolicyformanagementpersonnelfosteringprofessionaldevelopmentandsharingofbestpractices.

Specialeffortsmustbemadetoestablishlinksbetweenofficer-traininginstitutions,whilerespectingtheirmilitaryidentity,andcivilianinstitutionsatthesamelevel,inlinewithcurrentplanstobringaboutagroupingofelitecollegesanduniversitiesandtherebycreateastandardsystemofdiplomas.Otheralliancescanbeenvisagedfornon-commissionedofficertechnicaltrainingschoolsandschoolsattachedtotheDGA(Defenceprocurementagency).Likewise,trainingprogrammesthatcannotbeprovidedincivilianinstitutionswillcontinuetobeconductedinmilitarytrainingcentresandcolleges,butmustalsobeopentocivilians,includingpeoplefromtheprivatesector.

Inparallel,weshouldaimfortherecognitionofeverytrainingprogrammeinthefieldofdefenceandsecurity,whereverpossible,bythedeliveryofaciviliandiploma.CloserlinksbetweentheMinistry’strainingcentresandnationaleducationinstitutionswouldfacilitatethisconvergenceofdiplomasand,notably,theirrecognitionthroughregistrationinthenationalindexofprofessionalcertification(RNCP).Thisestablishmentofcloserlinkscouldalsobeaccompaniedbyapolicyaimedatencouragingandsupportingpersonneltoobtainvalidationoftheirprofessionalexperience(VAE).Weneedtogiveastrongimpetustoimplementinganacross-the-boardpolicyofdistancelearning,whichwill,inparticular,enabletheoptimisationoftrainingtimeandcostsandreducetheleavesofabsencefromtheirunitsforpersonnelundergoingtraining.


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Trainingforcivilianpersonnelisintendednotonlytoadaptoperativestotheirjobandworkstationbutalsotoguaranteetheiremployabilitythroughouttheirprofessionallives.Inacontextcharacterisedbythetrendtowardsalengtheningoftheactiveworkinglife,italsosupportstheirplanstosetupprofessionalprojectsthroughacareers-advisoryserviceandthisserviceshouldbeimproved.Tothisend,weshouldbeseekingabetterfitbetweenthetrainingneedsexpressedbyoperativesandthoseexpressedbyministryemployers.Theformulationofaninter-ministerialtrainingcatalogue,theestablishmentofasystemthatencouragescivilianoperativestoapplyfortrainingandthat,inreturn,guaranteesadvancementintheirprofessionallivesareamongthemeasuresthatshouldcontributetoaglobalimprovementofthetrainingsystem.

Consultationandinternaldialoguewithinthedefenceandnationalsecurityarmedforcesisbasedonspecificinstitutionsandrulesthatgivemilitarypersonnelavoiceatthenationalandlocallevels,whilerespectingthelimitationsimposedbytheirgeneralstatusintermsoftherighttostrikeandformtradeunions.Thisoriginalorganisationmustbegivenfurtherimpetusinthecurrentcontextofreforms.Acapacityfordialogueisindispensableinordertomaintaintrustbetweenalltheechelonsofthechainofcommandandreinforcethelegitimacyofconsultationstructures.Consultationandinternaldialoguealsohelpsupportchangebyallowingsupervisorypersonneltoexplaintheobjectivespursuedandthemethodsadopted.Italsoallowsthemtoreporttheconcernsofpersonneltotheministriesinvolvedinausefulandeffectivemanner.Generaltrendsinsocietyareencouragingaspirationstoself-expressionanddirectparticipation.Existingcommunicationtechniquesallowforthedevelopmentofcomplementarymethodsofinternaldialogue(theme-basedforums,onlineconsultationtools)andcanusefullybroadenparticipation.

Militarypersonnelarenotindifferenttotrendsaffectingtheirconditionortheconstraintsattachedtoarmedservice.Allthesefactorsareleadingtoachangeininternaldialoguewithinthearmedforces.

Whilemilitarypersonnel,likeallcivilservants17,haveadutyofdiscretionandrespectofthehierarchy,consultationstructuresareanareaallowingdirectandfreeexpressionbetweentheministryandthemilitarycommunity.Theroleofconsultationwillbedevelopedtoenlightentheministryindecision-makingonfundamentalissuesconcerningtheconditionandstatusofmilitarypersonnel.Themethodsfororganisingsuchconsultationaredescribedinaconsultation

17 pursuant to Article 26 of the law of 13 July 1983


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Charterthatprovidesassurancesprotectingfreeexpressionandtheworkofmembersofthesestructures.Toensurefreedomofexpressionwithinsuchstructures,theseassuranceswillbereinforced.ImplementationoftheCharterwillbeassessedtocheckthatitrespondscorrectlytotheobjectivespursued.Simultaneously,supportwillbegiventotheentirehierarchyinitsfundamentalresponsibilitytoconductconsultationandtakeintoaccounttheexpectationsofthemilitarycommunity.Tomaintainthisdirectlinkbetweenmembersofthemilitarycommunityandthechainofcommandandensureitsconsistency,localconsultationstructureswillbereformedandstrengthened.Thisreformwillaimtoestablishapointofequilibriumthatdoesnotcompromiseeitherthebasicprinciplesofthegeneralstatusofmilitarypersonnelortheobligationsspecifictotheiractivity,ortheresponsibilitiesandcommandcapacityofthemilitaryhierarchy.

Thecredibilityofthesestructures,bothnationalandlocal,mustbebolsteredbystrengtheningtheirlegitimacy.Thisrequiresachangeintheircompositionandmethodsforappointingmembers.Itmustalsoinvolvedevelopingtheexpertiseofrepresentativesofmilitarypersonnelbyprovidingspecifictraining.Atthesametime,communicationconcerningtheadvancesachievedthroughtheworkofrepresentativesintheseconsultationstructuresmustbestrengthened,toinformtheentiremilitarycommunityandacknowledgetheactionofthesestructures’members.Workwillalsobeconductedbetweensessionsinapermanentliaisongroup.Thecreationofparticipativeonlinetoolswouldenableon-goingreportingofinformationandauthorisecontinuedexchangesonthemesrelatingtothemilitarycondition.Attheministeriallevel,effortsmustbemadetofullyintegratethesenewmediaintheinternalcommunicationpolicy,notablybydevelopinganactivereactionandresponsecapacity.

TheMinistryofDefenceparticipatesinciviliansocialdialogueintheframeworkofthereformofsocialdialogueresultingfromtheBercyaccordsof2June2008.Thelawof5July2010providedfornumerousconsultationstructures,atboththecentralandlocallevels,whichenablesdenselocalcoverageinkeepingwiththenewministerialstructures.Adaptationofthestructureofsocialdialoguemustcontinue,takingintoaccountthespecificfeaturesandchangesinorganisationoftheMinistryofDefence.

Itisadvisabletoencouragemilitarypersonneltospeakupandmakeacontributiontothepublicorinternaldebate.Thisrightmustbeofferedtoallmilitarypersonnel,particularlythosecalledontoserveinresearchcentresortrainingfacilities.


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Thisfreedomofexpressionmustbeexercisedinaccordancewiththeirdutyofreserveandtheobligationsattachedtotheirstatus.

Reserveforcesdemonstratethestrongdesireofallsectionsofthenationtoguaranteeourcountry’ssecurityandcontributetoitsdefence.TheyarealsoanintegralpartofthenewarmedforcesmodeldefinedinthisWhitePaper,sincetheyprovidesupportforthedefenceandnationalsecurityforces–indeed,thelatterwouldbeunabletoperformalltheirmissionswithoutthereserveforces,notablyinthenationalterritoryorintheeventofacrisis.

Themilitaryreserveforcesaremadeupofanoperationalcomponentandacitizencomponent.Theoperationalcomponentitselfhastwocomponents:first,anengagementreservecomposedofvolunteers(civiliansorformermilitarypersonnel)calledontoserveinexternaloperationsoronthenationalterritory.Theyactinsupportofpersonnelinactiveunits,maintainthedefencemindsetandcontributetomaintenanceofthelinkbetweentheNationanditsarmedforces.Thesecondoperationalreserveiscomprisedofformermilitarypersonnelboundbyanobligationofavailabilityforserviceduringthefiveyearsfollowingtheirdeparturefromthearmedforces.Intheeventofamajorcrisis,thePrimeMinistermay,pursuanttothelawof28July2011,callonthenationalsecurityreserve(RSN),whichentitlesthestatetomobilisereservistsattachedtothearmedforces,thegendarmerieandthenationalpolice,aswellasthoseattachedtothedifferentcivilianreserveforces.

Toensurethattheoperationalreservehasthecapabilitytoperformthemissionsentrustedtoit,itshould,inpriority,attractmenandwomenpreparedtoserveatleast20daysayearoveraperiodofseveralyears.Someofthemmay,byvirtueoftheiroperationalduties,becalledupformuchlongerperiods(from90to120days)andbedeployedunderthesameconditionsasmilitarypersonnelintheactiveforces.Thismeansthatappropriatebudgetresourcesmustbeallocatedfortrainingandleadershipactionsandtofinancetheoperationaldeploymentofthesereservists.Italsomeanssimplifyingalltheprocedures,particularlyadministrative,thatauthorisesuchdeployment.Theavailabilityforservicereserve,usedexclusivelyintheeventofaseriouscrisis,mustbereformedtoallowmorerapidandbetter-targetedmobilisation.Weshouldinadditionorganisetherampingupofnewcomponentsoftheoperationalreservespecialisedinareasinwhichthedefenceandsecurityforceslackstrongexpertise.Thisisthecase,notably,forcyber-defenceandadedicatedcomponentwillbesetupwithintheoperationalreserve.Itwillcontributetotheresilienceofthenation


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andwillbeplannedandorganisedspecificallytogivetheMinistryofDefenceaenhancedcyber-defencecapacityintheeventofamajorITattack.

Thecitizenreserveiscomposedofmenandwomenwithastrongawarenessofsecurityanddefenceissues,whovolunteertheirtimetoservethearmedforces.Thepeopleparticipatinginthisreservepromoteadefencemindsetandpassontheirknowledgeofthedefencesectortotheciviliansector.Thesebridgesbetweenthedefencesectorandcivilsocietyareessential:thisreservemustbedevelopedanditsuseoptimisedtoservetheMinistryofDefence.Inviewofthemanyandgrowingchallengesinthefieldofcyber-defence,acitizenreservewillbeorganisedanddevelopedinthisarea,mobilising,inparticular,youngtechniciansandITexpertsinterestedinsecuritychallenges.Particularattentionwillalsobepaidtodevelopingthenetworkoflocalreservistsinvolvedinyouthandcitizenshipeducation.Thisnetwork,rolledoutinunderprivilegedneighbourhoodsandruralareas,isanimportantconnectiontotheworldofdefenceandnationalsecurityforyoungpeople.

Reservecapacitiesandpersonnelmustsimultaneouslyrespondtotheneedsofthearmedforcesandadapttothepossibilitiesofcivilsociety.Therequirementsofmilitaryandleadershiptrainingmusttakeintoaccountthedifficultiesexperiencedbycompanieswhentheyareobligedtoforegotheservicesofanemployeeoveralongperiod.Thisisthemainreasonwhythereserveforcescannotreplacetheactiveforcesofdefenceandnationalsecurity.However,effortsmustbepursuedtoensurestrongsupportfrompublicandprivateleadersfortheprincipleofthemilitaryreserveandencouragethemtomakeaconcretecontribution.Itwouldalsobeadvisabletoincreasetheproportionofreservistswhoarenotformermilitarypersonnel,toenhancelinksbetweenthenationandthearmedforces.EffortstosolidifythecontinuedloyaltyofoperationalreservistswillbereinforcedthroughrecognitionoftheirimportancefordefenceandnationalsecuritywithinFrenchsociety.

Thenation’ssupportforthepoliciesimplementedinthefieldofdefenceandnationalsecurityiscrucialtojustifytheeffortstheyentail.Likewise,recruitmentandrecognitionofthemilitaryprofessions,thepopulation’ssupportfortheactionofthearmedforces,togetherwiththecapacityforresilienceintheeventofacrisisdependlargelyonthebondbetweentheseforcesandFrenchsociety.Itisthereforeofvitalimportancetomaintainanddevelop,amongourcitizens,adefenceandsecuritymindset,whichistheexpressionofacollectivewillbasedonthecohesionofthenation.Reservistshaveaparticularlyimportantroleinthisrespect.Theinitiativestakeninthisareabyteachers,thankstothe


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“trinômesacadémiques”(structuresetuptoestablishcloserlinksbetweendefenceandeducation)andbyelectedrepresentatives,throughtheDefencecorrespondents,mustalsobebetterrecognisedandpromoted.

Apartfromraisingchildren’sawarenessduringtheirschooling,animportantwayofdevelopingthisdefencemindsetisprovidedbytheDefenceandCitizenshipDay(JDC).Whilerefocusingthisinitiativeonitsprimaryremittobuildawarenessofthedefencemindset,someimprovementscouldbeintroduced.Itcouldbemademoreefficientifthecontentoftheeventwereadaptedandtheeventitselfrepositionedaspartofglobalcivileducation.MoreactiveparticipationbytheMinistryoftheInterior(policeandfirebrigade)andtheMinistryofEducationmustalsobeconsidered,especiallyintheframeworkofrevampedprotocolswiththeMinistryofDefence.

Therearealsootherchannelsforpreservingandreinforcinglinksbetweenthearmedforcesandsociety.Thankstoitsrichheritage(historicmonuments,museums,archives,libraries,etc.),whichshouldbeshowcased,defenceisthestate’ssecondmostimportantculturalcontributor.Thisheritage,madeavailabletothegreatestnumberofpeople,cannourishastronglinkbetweentheFrenchandthedefencemission.Likewise,thepolicyaimedatpromotingremembranceofpasteventsmustcontinuetoevolvetomodernisetheimageofnationalcommemorations,whichareanimportantrelayofRepublicanvalues.Communicationonthemeaningofthemessageconveyedbytheseceremoniesmustbeadaptedtocontemporarysociety,therebypromotingtheconceptsofself-sacrifice,dedicationandnationalunity.

Defenceeducationmustaddressgenerationsthathavenotperformedmilitaryservice.CentresandinstitutionstrainingyoungpeopleforpublicserviceandtheIHEDN(Instituteofadvancednationaldefencestudies),includingtheirregionaloutposts,mustplayakeyrolehere.Thecitizenreservecouldalsoparticipateinthismission.

Aspecial,priorityeffortmustbeaddressedtofuturepublicandprivatemanagers.Weconsideritessentialthatthesegroupsbenefit,atoneormoretimesduringtheirtrainingandeducation,fromclassesonthedefenceandnationalsecuritystrategy.Weshoulddevelopopportunitiesforadhoctrainingmodulesorperiodsofimmersioninunitsofthearmedforcesforsecondaryschoolanduniversitystudents.Whileitmightbeadvisableforthistypeofinitiationtoeventuallybeprovidedacross-the-boardinallhighereducationinstitutions,itwillneedtobeimplementedonagradualbasis.Tobeginwith,itcouldberolledoutinalimited


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numberofestablishmentswhosestudentshavethestatusofcivilservants(theNationalschoolofadministration(ENA),theEcolesnormalessupérieuresinParis,Cachan,Lyon,Rennes,theEcolenationaledelamagistratureandtheEcolepolytechnique).

Duetotherecentdefencerestructuring,thearmedforcesarenolongerpresentincertainpartsofthenationalterritory.Thissituationmustbeoffsetbyadaptingcommunicationtofostersharedknowledgeandin-depthdialoguebetweenthenationanditsarmedforces.Furthermore,intheframeworkofinitiativesaimedatrejuvenatingtheEducation-Defenceprotocol,wemightconsiderintroducingmodulesondefence-relatedsubjectsininitialandongoingteachertraining,togiveteacherstherequiredknowledgetosubsequentlyteachdefencetoyoungpeople.

Militarypersonnel,likemanyotherprofessions,aretodayincreasinglycomingundertheobservationofthecriminaljusticesystem.Whilethisfactdoesnotposeanydifficultiesinprinciplewithrespecttotheactivitydeployedbymilitarypersonnelintheframeworkofthepreparationofthearmedforces,itdoes,conversely,arouseanxietiesinthemilitarycommunitywithrespecttomilitaryoperationsandactualcombat.Giventhissituation,whiletakingintoaccountfamilies’needsforinformationandrecognition,weshouldprotectmilitarypersonnelfromunnecessary“judicialisation”oftheiraction.Thiscouldforinstancetaketheformofreinforcingtheproceduralguaranteesgiventomilitarypersonnelengagedinexternaloperations,togetherwithreflectiononadaptingcriminalproceduresapplicabletoactionincombatwhentheyorganise,commandorparticipateinmilitaryintervention.

E . The defence and security industry

ThedefenceindustryisakeycomponentofFrance’sstrategicautonomy.Italsocontributestoacoherentpolitical,diplomaticandeconomicambition.ItalonecanguaranteethesecuresupplyingofequipmentsupportingoursovereigntyandofcriticalweaponssystemsandensurethatitmatchesoperationalneedsasdefinedbytheMinistryofDefence.ThesamereasoningisvalidfortheEuropeanUnion,whosestrategicpositionwillbestrengthenedbypreservingonitsterritoryadefenceindustrythatcoversalltheweaponssystemsrequiredforamoderndefencecapability.


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TheFrenchdefenceindustry,thefruitofcontinuinginvestmentdatingbackmanyyearssupportedbyanationalambitionforstrategicandtechnologicalautonomy,coversallthesectorsthatcontributetobuildingacoherentdefencecapability(nuclear,aviation,space,missiles,landoperations,electronics,optics,etc).

ThedefenceindustryalsomakesasignificantcontributiontotheFrencheconomyandenjoysalevelofexcellenceplacingitamongtheworldleaders,especiallyforexport.Itcomprisesover4,000companies,withalargenumberofsmallandmediumenterprises(SMEs),whichgenerateanoverallrevenueof€15billionandemployaround150,000peopleincluding20,000highlyqualifiedexperts.Dependingontheyear,itexports25%to40%ofitsoutputandthereforemakesapositivecontributiontoourcountry’sbalanceoftrade.Characterisedbyaveryhighlevelofresearchanddevelopment,itbolstersourtechnologicalcompetitiveness,includingintheciviliansector,whereitpermeateslargesectionsofnationalandEuropeanindustry(aviation,space,security,electronics,informationandcommunicationtechnologies,energy,etc.).Inreturn,thedefenceindustry’sgrowingrecoursetodual-purposetechnologiesandcomponentsdevelopedbythecivilianmarketopensupthesupplychaintoothersuppliers,bothnationalandEuropean.

BudgetcutsinFranceandtherestofEuropewillhaveamajorimpactontheFrenchdefenceindustry,animpactthatmaybefeltevenmoresharplyinthatitisconcentratedinafewbasinsofemployment.Today,theEuropeandefenceindustryhasevidentover-capacitycomparedtoanticipateddemandintheEuropeanmarket.Furthermore,contractionofthenationalandEuropeanmarketisoccurringatatimewheninternationalcompetitionisincreasing,whetherfromtheUnitedStates–wherebudgetpressureispromptingtheUSindustrytoincreaseitsexporteffort–aswellasfromEuropeanUnioncountries,Russiaandsomeemergingcountrieskeentodeveloptheirpositionsintheworldarmamentsmarket.

Twoobjectivesmustbepursued:weneedtopreserveacertainnumberofkeytechnologicalcapacitiesessentialtoourstrategicautonomy,andtosecurethefutureofthedefenceindustryforeconomicandsocialreasons.Ourresponsemustthereforecombinesupportforscientifictraining,researchanddevelopment,changesinthedefenceequipmentmaintenancepolicy,anactiveexportpolicy,anewapproachtoEuropeancooperationinthedefenceindustry,andanindustrialdefencepolicyadaptedtotheneweconomicandstrategicsituation.


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PreservingresearchanddevelopmentcapabilitiesincertainkeytechnologiesisapriorityandjustifiesperiodicassessmentbeingcarriedoutbytheMinistryofDefence.Atatimewhenthebattlefieldisseeingrapidchanges,aparticulareffortisrequiredtomaintaintheexpertisecommandedbyFrenchindustryatahighlevelofglobalexcellenceandtopreserveourcapacitytodevelopnewtechnologiesandnewtypesofweapons.Intheabsenceofanimmediatestrategicthreat,butconfrontedwithafast-changingandveryunpredictableenvironment,thedevelopmentofprototypeswillbemaintained,toconsolidateourcapacitytointegratetheinnovativetechnologies,whetherofcivilianormilitaryorigin,requiredforweaponssystemsandequipment.Inordertoanticipateinnovationsandthebreakthroughstheymaybringabout,continuoustechnologymonitoringmustcoverallthecountrieswithhightechnologicalcapacityandincludeinitsscopeciviliantechnologiesofpotentialmilitaryinterest.

Inthiscontext,maintainingasignificantvolumeofpubliccreditstofinanceupstreamstudiesanddevelopmentsisofstrategicimportance.Aninterruptionofworkinstrategicallyimportantdesignandengineeringofficeswouldleadtoirreversiblelossesofexpertiseandwouldhavelong-lastingsocialrepercussions.

Thisriskisaggravatedbythelengtheningservicelifeofequipment,whichcanleaveresearchanddevelopmentteamswithoutanynewprojectsforseveralyears.Adevelopmentaimedatsystematicallyincorporating-frominitialconceptionofarmamentsprogrammes-thepossibilityofsuccessiveversionsorstandards,alongthelinesofthecivilianequipmentmodel,couldpartiallymitigatethisdanger.Itwouldalsohavetheadvantageofdelayingequipmentobsolescenceandofferingexportclientsthepossibilityofinclusioninaprocessofprogressiveimprovementoftheirequipment,fosteringtheestablishmentofsustainablepartnerships.

Theoperationalreadinessservicesofequipmentmustbetackledthroughaproactivepolicyaimedatincreasingtheefficiencyoftheprocess.Deliveryofnewequipmentwithmaintenancecoststhatmaybehigherthanforolderequipmentandthemandatorylengtheningoftheservicelifeofexistingequipmentmakethisaparticularlyimportantissue.Weshould,therefore,carryoutananalysisofmaintenanceactivitiestodeterminethemosteffectivebreakdownbetweenequipmentwhosemaintenanceshouldcontinuetobetheresponsibilityoftheMinistryofDefenceforreasonsofoperationalavailability,andequipmentwhosemaintenancecanbeentrustedtoindustry.Wemustalsolookatthemeritsofinnovativecontractualarrangementswiththedefenceindustry.


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GiventheongoingshrinkingofnationalandEuropeanmarkets,anactiveexportpolicy,outsideEuropeinparticular,iscrucial.France’sarmamentsexportpolicyisanimportantaspectofourdefenceandsecuritypolicyandalsoofourgrowthstrategy.Itprovideseffectiveandcompetitivesolutionsmeetingtheneedsofalliedandfriendlycountries.Thelargestcontractsobtainedwillsupportsustainablepolitical,military,economicandindustrialpartnershipsatastrategicleveloverthelongerterm.

Francewillcontinuetosupportcompanies’exportefforts.InstrictcompliancewithitsEuropeanandinternationalcommitments,itwillmobiliseitsgovernmental,industrialandtechnologicalexpertisetodevelopthecapacitytoassistmajorpartners.Structuredinsuchawayastopreservetheknow-howessentialtooursecurityandtothelong-termcompetitivenessofourcompanies,thetechnologytransfersthatmayresultwillallowustoreinforcetheindustrialbaseofFrance’sdefencesector,bystabilisingourpresenceinhigh-growthmarketsoverthelongerterm.FrenchSMEswillbegivenspecificguidancebyprofessionaldefenceorganisations,withthesupportofthestate,toallowthemtootobenefitfromthesetechnologytransfers.

Thecontroloftransfersofequipment,technologiesandknow-howinthefieldofarmamentsanddual-usegoods,apartfromcontributingtothepreservationofinternationalsecurityandtothepreventionofproliferation,helpsprotectourtechnologicalexpertiseinacontextoffiercecompetition,whereprotectingintellectualandindustrialpropertyhasbecomeanextremelyimportantstrategicissue.Weneedtoreflectonestablishingcloserlinksbetweenthedifferentinstrumentsforcontrolofcivilandmilitarytechnologieswithdefenceandsecurityapplications,withaviewtomakingthesystemmoreeffective,bothforthestateandtheindustrialistsconcerned.

WemusttakeonboardthegrowingintegrationofEuropeanstrategicinterestsandtheEuropeandefenceindustry.ThetransferofdefencegoodswithintheEuropeanUnionhasalreadybeensimplified.ThisstreamliningofproceduresshouldalsocoverexportsoutsidetheEuropeanUnion.Here,consultationwithourEuropeanpartnersisnecessarytoharmonisenationalexportproceduresconcerningequipmentdevelopedincommon.

Anactiveresearchanddevelopmentpolicytogetherwithadditionaleffortstodevelopexportsarevital,buttheseeffortswillnotsufficetoguaranteethevitalityoftheFrenchdefenceindustry,inviewofthescaleofthechangesitisfacing.Radicalqualitativebreakthroughsentailingin-depthchangesincooperation


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intheareaofdefenceprogrammes,andalsoindustrialrestructuringareinevitable,inFranceandtheotherEuropeancountries,tosecurethefutureofthedefenceindustry.ThischallengeisthesameforallEuropeancountrieswithasizeabledefenceindustry.TheEuropeanCommissionhaslaunchedamajorinitiativeregardingtheEuropeandefenceindustry.Thisinitiativeshouldbeanopportunitytoreaffirmthestrategicroleofthisindustry,whichrequiresaspecificapproach,notablyinviewofArticle346oftheTreatyonthefunctioningoftheEuropeanUnion.

Armamentprogrammesconductedonacooperativebasiscanbringbenefits,providedthatwecanavoidcertaindangers.Tooofteninthepast,cooperativeprogrammeshaveledtoabuild-upofmultiplespecificationsandspirallingcostsduetotheabsenceofaprojectmanagerorprojectownerwiththenecessaryauthoritytoimposediscipline.Likewise,theprincipleoffairreturnhasbeenperverted:insteadofgivingpreferencetothebestofexistingexpertiseandcapacities,theconcerntoacquirenewexpertisehasoftenledtoduplications,resultinginredundantandscatteredcapacities.Sharingofdevelopmentandproductionactivitiesmustnowbeorganisedaccordingtoastrictprincipleofindustrialefficiencyandeconomicperformance.

TheprogressrecentlymadebyFranceandtheUnitedKingdominthemissileindustryillustratesboththefeasibilityandrelevanceofthisapproachbetweenpartnerswillingtoembarkonapathoffreelyconsentedinterdependence.FranceiswillingtoextendthesettingupofcommonframeworkstosupportcommontechnologicalandindustrialcapacitiesintootherfieldsandtootherEuropeanpartners.ThegoalmustbetobuildupaneconomicallyviableindustrialbaseforEuropeandefence,relyingonspecialisedandcomplementarycentresofexcellence,thedistributionofwhichtakesintoconsiderationrealexistingexpertiseandtheinvestmentsalreadymade,inafairandbalancedway.

Harmonisation,betweenEuropeancountries,oftheoperationalspecificationsandtimetablesforequipmentreplacementwillfacilitatesettingupsuchprogrammes.Experienceshowsthatitwillnotgoaheadwithoutstrongpoliticalimpetus.Franceaffirmsitswillingnesstoimplementsuchanapproach.TheadvantagesoftheprocessofindustrialpoolingandsharinginitiatedintheEuropeanframeworkareveryrealandfurtherworkonthepoolingoftestingandexperimentationresourcesmustbepursued.


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Differentinstitutionalframeworksexisttosupportcooperationinthefieldofarmaments.FrancewillcontinuetosupportNATOinitiativesconcerningacquisition,andwilltakecaretoensurethattheEuropeanindustryplaysastrategicrolehere.Furthermore,itconsidersthatitisurgenttoexploitallthepotentialitiesoftheEuropeanDefenceAgency(EDA)andOCCAR(Organisationforjointarmamentcooperation).ThesetwoagenciesofferanappropriateandeffectiveframeworkforstrengtheningthequalityofEuropeancooperationinthedefenceindustry,whetherthismeansharmonisingrequirementsorformulatingandmanagingprogrammes.Franceconsiders,inparticular,thattheEDAshouldplaytheroleofacatalystcapableofsettinginmotion–veryfarupstream–futuretechnologicalandindustrialcooperativeinitiativesbetweenEUpartners.Inthefuture,aEuropeanarrangement,basedonthecurrentcooperationbetweentheEDAandOCCAR,shouldallowStatesthatsowishtoacquireequipmentincommonunderthesameconditionsasNATOagencies.Furthermore,FrancewillstrivetoimplementthecodeofconductoncooperationadoptedintheframeworkoftheEDA.

CooperationinarmamentsprogrammeswillnotpreventindustrialrestructuringontheEuropeanscale.ThelastmajorreorganisationsoftheFrenchindustrialsceneinthefieldofdefencedateback,forthemostpart,totheendofthe1990s.Changesareinevitable.

Thestatetodayholdslargedirectinterestsinseveraltop-rankingdefencecompanies,publicandprivate.Itspolicyasshareholder,whichwillnotbelimitedtoaconservativemanagementofitsassets,willbereconsidered,companybycompany,inadynamicmanagementapproach.Themainprioritieswillbesupportingcompaniesintheirstrategicchoices,controllingsovereignty-relatedactivities,reinforcingtheEuropeandimensionofthedefenceindustryandsupportingdevelopmentandprotectionofcriticaltechnologies.

ThestatewilltakecaretopreservecentresofexcellenceinFrancewhilealsofacilitatingEuropeanconsolidation,whenevereconomicandstrategicrationalesconverge.Inthiscontext,thestatewilluseallthemeansavailabletoit,asshareholder,clientandsourceoforderstofacilitatethenecessarychanges.Itmay,whereapplicable,takestakesinthecapitalofcriticalSMEstocontributetotheirdevelopment.

Inviewofthechallengesassociatedwithcommandofcriticaldefencetechnologies,Francewill,withitsEuropeanpartners,examineinstrumentsthatshouldbeputinplacetoreinforcetheprotectionofsensitiveEuropeanactivitiesinvolving


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defenceandsecurityinterests.Wewillbeexaminingproceduresforenhancedinformationbetweenmemberstatessoastoinformtheirdecisionsinthisfield.Theseinstrumentsmustforinstancebeadaptedtothespecialcaseofsmallandmediumenterpriseswhichconstituteamajorsourceoftechnologicalinnovationandwhichmakeavitalcontributiontopreservingourleadinthisfield.

Effortsmustalsobemadetoimplementalong-termpolicyforsecuringsuppliestoFranceandEurope,particularlywithrespecttostrategicmaterials.Atthenationallevel,thismustleadtostrengtheningrelationsbetweenthestateandcompaniestobuildasharedvisionoftherisksandthesolutionsthatcanbeenvisaged.AttheEuropeanlevel,itisadvisabletostrengthenconsultationbetweenmemberstatesandimplementaEuropeanpolicyofriskanalysisandpreservationofcompaniespossessingrareexpertise.

Despitetheoverlapbetweentechnologiesapplicabletodefenceandthoseapplicabletosecurity,thetwoindustrialrealitiesareverydifferent.Thebusinessmodelofthesecurityindustryispositedonamuchwiderrangeofpotentialcustomers(states,regionalauthorities,publicandprivateoperators).

Supportedbyrapidworldgrowth,theFrenchsecurityindustrycurrentlyrepresents€6billioninturnoverandasubstantialnumberofhighlyqualifiedjobs.Italsorepresentsaround€3billioninturnoverfromrelatedservices.Itenjoysverystrongpositions,witnessthedynamismofitsexports(55%ofitsoutput).Ithasbotheconomicandstrategicimportance:thestateandoperatorsofessentialinfrastructuremustbeabletorelyontrustedsupplierscapableofsatisfyingtheirneedsattherightcostandinatimelymanner.Wemustthereforetakeastrategicandglobalapproachtothesecurityindustry,enablingustodevelopandsupportaneconomicactivitywithahighexportcomponentinamarketexperiencingveryfiercecompetition.

Securityisnowrecognisedasanimportantfieldofresearch.Theimplementationofapolicyofresearchandinnovationisaprerequisiteforpositioningourindustriesinnichemarketswithstrongpotential.

France’sstrategywillintegratetheEuropeandimension,whichisveryimportantinthisfield.Allthedifferentplayers(industrialists,researchersandendusers)willnowbeabletocallmoresystematicallyontheEuropeansecurityresearchprogramme.


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However,thesecuritymarketremainsfragmented,bothintermsofsupplyandofdemand.Wemustcreatetheconditionstofavourtheindustrialisationofinnovativesecuritysolutionsthatareaffordableandcompetitiveintheexportmarketsonalargerscale.Consequently,aninter-ministerialpolicywillbeformulatedwiththeaimoforganisingaglobalindustrialsecurityindustry.Itwillbesteeredbyaglobalcommitteebringingtogetherthemainstakeholdersinthedevelopmentoftechnologiesandthemarketinthissector.

Thisglobal-sectorpolicywillformulateaforward-lookingvisionofourneeds,whichwillberegularlyupdated.Itwillidentifythecriticaltechnologiesandcapacityrequirementsonwhichthesectorshouldfocus.ItwillorganisethedifferentsourcesofR&Dfundingtoguaranteesupportforprojectsthroughouttheirdevelopment.Itwillsetupplatformsfortheevaluationoftechnologiesbyusersandwillharmonisetheexpressionofpublicrequirementswiththeaimofpoolingprocurement.Lastly,itwilldevelopapolicyofexportsupportandapolicyofstandardisationatthenational,Europeanandinternationallevels.ItwilleventuallybeintegratedineffortsmadeattheEuropeanlevel.


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Summary and conclusion

TheWhitePaperonDefenceandNationalSecuritydescribesanationaldefenceandsecuritystrategythatrestsontwoessentialandcomplementarypillars:France will preserve its sovereignty,bymakingsureitretainsresourcestoactandinfluenceevents;andit will contribute to international security, byensuringitsactionenjoysnationalandinternationallegitimacy.

Giventhatthelevelofriskandviolenceintheworldisnotdecreasingandthatdefencespendingisrisingsharplyinmanyregions,particularlyinAsia,the risks and threats that France must face up to are continuing to diversify:traditionalthreatsofforce,giventheambiguousnatureofthedevelopmentofmilitarypowerbysomestates;thethreattoourownsecurityposedbyweakstatesunabletoexercisetheirresponsibilities;risksorthreatsamplifiedbyglobalisation:terrorism;threatstoFrenchnationalsabroad;cyber-threatsandorganisedcrime;thespreadofconventionalweapons;theproliferationofweaponsofmassdestructionandtheriskofpandemicsandtechnologicalandnaturaldisasters.Facedwiththeserisksandthreats,themilitaryoperationsinwhichFrancehasbeeninvolvedinrecentyears(Afghanistan,IvoryCoast,Libya,Mali…)showthatmilitaryactionremainsanimportantpartofoursecurity.

The White Paper confirms the relevance of the concept of national security asawayofrespondingtothesedevelopments.GoingbeyondmereprotectionoftheterritoryandthepopulationagainstexternalaggressionattributabletoStates,thisconceptembodiesalargerambition,i.e.theneedtomanagealltherisksandthreats,directorindirect,likelytohaveanimpactonthelifeofthenation.TheWhitePaperadoptsaholisticapproachbasedonthecombinationoffivestrategicfunctions:knowledgeandforesight,protection,prevention,deterrenceandintervention.Protection,deterrenceandinterventionarecloselylinkedandstructuretheactionofthedefenceandnationalsecurityforces.Theirimplementationentailsacapacitytoknowandanticipatetheriskandthreatstowhichweareexposed,evenifstrategicsurprisesremainpossible.Theyalsorequireanupstreamcapacitytopreventcrisesthatcouldnegativelyimpactourenvironment.

Our defence and national security strategy cannot be conceived outside the framework of the Atlantic Alliance and our engagement in the European Union.ThesetwocomplementaryorganisationsprovidearangeofresponsesenablingFranceanditsAlliestofaceuptoaverybroadspectrumofrisksand


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threats.HavingregaineditscompleteplaceinthefunctioningofNATOasfull-fledgedmember,FrancepromotesastrongandeffectiveAllianceservingitsowninterestsandthoseofEurope.Atthesametime,itbelievesthatinthecurrentcontext,whereinEuropeiscalledontoassumeagreatershareofresponsibilityforsecurity,apragmaticoverhauloftheEuropeansecurityanddefencepolicyisvital.ByclarifyingthedirectionthatFrancehasdecidedtotakeinordertoensureitssecurity,theWhitePaperoffersthebasisforin-depthdialoguewithEUmemberstateswithaviewtopromotinganewambitionrelyingonorganised–ratherthandefacto–Interdependencies.FrancewillcontinuetosupportEuropeaninitiativesaimedatsharingandpoolingmilitarycapabilities.

¡Protection

Protecting the national territory, our fellow citizens and the continuity of the Nation’s essential functions are core to our defence and national security strategy.Thearmedforcesareresponsibleforpermanentlyensuringthesecurityoftheterritory,itsairspaceanditsmaritimeapproaches.Inaddition,thecivilianministries,incoordinationwithlocalandregionalgovernmentsandpublicandprivateoperatorsareresponsibleforensuringprotectionagainsttherisksandthreatsthatmayaffectthelivesofourfellowcitizensonthenationalterritory.Intheeventofamajorcrisis,thearmedforcescandeployupto10,000personnelfromthelandforcesinsupportofinteriorsecurityandciviliansecurityforces,togetherwithappropriateresourcesprovidedbytheseaandairforces.TheWhitePaperprovidesforaglobal inter-ministerial contract,formulatedundertheauthorityofthePrimeMinisterstartingin2013,whichwilldefinetheciviliancapabilitiesrequiredfornationalsecuritymissions.Inparallel,lookingto2016,theMinistryoftheInteriorwilldeviseanapproachthataimstoinvolveregionalgovernments,togetherwithoperatorsofvitalimportancewithspecificresponsibilitiesinensuringthecontinuityofessentialfunctionsandinpreservingtheresilienceofthenation.

Withrespecttotheprotection of France’s overseas territories,themilitarypresencedeployedintheseareaswillbestructuredonthebasisofarigorousanalysisofthesecurityanddefenceproblemsspecifictoeachterritoryconcerned.Inparallel,civiliancapabilitieswillberampedup.Afive-yearprogrammeofpooledequipmentwillbedefinedasearlyas2013tooptimisethecapabilitiesavailableintheoverseasterritories.

Beyondtheterroristthreat,whichhasnotdecreasedinimportancesince2008andisstilloneofthemostclearthreats,theWhitePaperhighlights


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thefrequencyandpotentialimpactofcyber-attacksagainstourinformationsystems.Thissituationrequiresusto upgrade very significantly the level of security of information systems and our means for defending them.Inviewofthisfact,asignificanteffortwillbemadetodevelopourcapacitytodetectattacksincyberspace,identifytheiroriginand,whereourstrategicinterestsarethreatened,implementanappropriateresponse.Legislativeandregulatorymeasureswillbeinitiatedtoreinforcetheobligationsofoperatorsofvitallyimportantservicesandinfrastructuretodetect,notifyanddealwithanyITincidentaffectingtheirsensitivesystems.

¡Deterrence

Being strictly defensive, nuclear deterrence protects France from any state-led aggression against its vital interests, of whatever origin and in whatever form .Itrulesoutanythreatofblackmailthatmightparalyseitsfreedomofdecisionandaction.Inthissense,itisdirectlylinkedtoourcapacityofintervention,andindeedthecredibilityofourforceofdeterrencewouldbeweakenedifwedidnothaveconventionalresourcesforintervention.Thenuclearforcesincludeanairborneandaseabornecomponentandtheireffectiveness,adaptabilityandcomplementarityenablethepreservationofaninstrumentthatremainscredibleoverthelongerterminafast-changingstrategiccontext,whilebeingstructuredinaccordancewiththeprincipleofstrictsufficiency.

¡Intervention

Theexternalinterventionofourforcesrespondstoa triple objective: ensuringtheprotectionofFrenchnationalsabroad,defendingourstrategicinterestsandthoseofourpartnersandallies,andexercisingourinternationalresponsibilities.Tothisend,Franceintendstohaveatitsdisposalmilitarycapabilitiesenablingittotakeactioninregions of vital importance toitsdefenceandsecurity:theperipheryofEurope,theMediterraneanbasin,partofAfrica(fromtheSaheltoEquatorialAfrica),theArabo-PersianGulfandtheIndianOcean.ThesecapabilitiesenableFrancetomakeitscontributiontointernationalpeaceandsecurityinotherpartsoftheworld.

Changesinthestrategiccontextmaymakeitnecessaryforourcountrytotaketheinitiativeinoperationsor,morefrequentlythaninthepast,assumeasubstantialshareoftheresponsibilitiesinherenttoconductingmilitaryaction.France considers that the greater its autonomous capacity for initiative and action, the greater will be its contribution to a collective response and its ability


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to mobilise allies and partners.Francethereforeconsiderstheprinciple of strategic autonomyasthemainpillarofitsexternalinterventionstrategy.Itwillensurethatithasthecapabilitiesgivingitfreedomofassessment,planningandcommand,togetherwiththecriticalcapabilitiesthatformthebasisofitsfreedomofdecisionandoperationalaction.

Ourarmedforcesmustbeabletorespondtothediversityofthreatsandcrisissituations.Theymustbeabletoengageincoercive operationswherethegoalofneutralisingtheadversary’spolitical-militaryplatformcallsforaveryhigh-leveltechnologicalresponse;theymustalsobeabletoengageincrisis management operationsaimedatrestoringconditionsfornormallifeandinvolvingcontroloflargeareasoveralongperiod.Inintermediateortemporarysituations,ourforcesmustalsoadapttotheemergenceof“hybrid threats”,wherecertainnon-stateadversariesmightcombineasymmetricalmeansofactionwithstate-levelresourcesorhigh-techcapabilities.

Toguaranteeitscapabilityforautonomousreactionintheeventofacrisis,France will have a permanent national emergency force of5,000menonalert,enablingittoconstituteanimmediatereactionjointforce(FIRI)of2,300menthatcanbemobilisedtointerveneoveraradiusof3,000kminsevendays.Francewillbeabletorelyonpermanentnavaldeploymentinoneortwomaritimeregions,onitsUnitedArabEmiratesbaseandonseveralbasesinAfrica,structuredinsuchawayastoallowaflexibleandrapid-reactionresponseadaptedtothepresentandfutureneedsofthiscontinentandoursecurity.

Asconcernsnon-permanent missions, thearmedforceswillbecapableofengaging, simultaneously and on a long-term basis, in crisis management operations in two or three distinct theatres, oneasamajorcontributor.Theforcesengagedinthiscapacitywillbecomposedoftheequivalentofajoint-forcebrigaderepresenting6,000to7,000landtroops,alongwithspecialforces,therequiredseaandaircomponentsandtheassociatedcommandandsupportmeans.Withadequatenotice,andafterrestructuringoftheresourcesalreadyengagedinoperationsinprogress,thearmedforcesshouldbecapableofengagement within a coalition and for a limited term in a single theatre of action in a major coercive operation,withtheabilitytoassumecommandofthisoperation.Francewillbeabletodeployuptotwocombinedbrigadesrepresentingaround15,000landtroops,specialforces,navalandaircomponentsandtheassociatedcommandandsupportmeans.


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¡Knowledgeandanticipation

Ourcapacityforsovereigndecisionandautonomousassessmentofsituationsreliesontheknowledgeandanticipationfunction,inwhichakeyroleisplayedbyintelligence, a field in which we will be stepping up our efforts.Technicalintelligencegatheringandexploitationcapacitieswillbereinforced,whiletheprincipleofpoolingofacquisitioncapacitiesbetweenserviceswillbesystematicallyapplied.Wewillalsobedevelopingourspaceelectromagneticandimageintelligencecapability,andFrancewillbewillingtoimplementanapproachbasedonfreelyconsentedinterdependencesbetweenEuropeanpartners.Francewillbeequippedwithapermanentcapabilityinmedium-altitudelong-endurance(MALE)dronesandtacticaldrones.Inviewoftheevolutionofthreats,particularattentionwillbepaidtointernalintelligencegathering.Thegreaterresourcesdevotedbythenationtointelligencegatheringwillgohandinhandwithareinforcementoftheexecutivearm’scapacityforstrategicsteeringandassessmentofintelligenceandanextensionoftheroleoftheparliamentarycommitteeforintelligencetoenableParliamenttoexerciseitscontrolovergovernmentpolicy,inaccordancewiththeConstitution.

¡Prevention

Thedefenceandnationalsecuritystrategyisbasedonacrediblepreventionandcivilian-militarymanagementofcrisescapability,whichmustbesupportedbyareinforcedinter-ministerial strategy and organisationallowingeffectiveandcoordinatedmobilisationoftheresourcesoftheministriesinvolved.Thisapproach,steeredbytheMinistryofForeignAffairs,willbegroundedintheframeworkofFrance’seffortstoimprovetheEuropeanUnion’scrisismanagementcapabilities.

¡Abudgeteffortcommensuratewithourstrategy

Althoughthefinancialcrisisthathasbefallentheworldcouldhavepromptedittoloweritsguard,France will continue to devote substantial resources to defence .Defencespendingwillamountto€364billion(2013value)forthe2014-2025period,including€179billion(2013value)for2014-2019,theperiodcoveredbythenextmilitaryprogrammeact.Thisappropriationwillallowtheconstructionofanewarmedforcesmodelthatmeetstherequirementsofourstrategyandisadaptedtodefenceandnationalsecurityrequirements,whilebeingconsistentwiththeGovernment’sobjectiveofrestoringthebalanceofpublicaccountsandhencepreservingoursovereigntyandstrategicautonomy.


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¡Thearmedforcesmodel

Theconceptionofourarmedforcesmodelisstructuredaroundfourguidingprinciples,whichtakentogetheroutlineanewmilitarystrategy: -thepreservationofourstrategic autonomy, whichrequiresustohavethe

criticalcapabilitiestotaketheinitiativeinthemostprobableoperations; -consistency betweenourarmedforcesmodelandpredictablescenarios

requiringengagementofourforcesinconflictsandcrises,i.e.thecapacitytoundertakebothcoercive,firstentryoperationsinatheatreofwar,andcrisismanagementoperationsacrossawiderangeofscenarios;

-the differentiationofforcesasafunctionoftheirmissionsofdeterrence,protection,coercionandcrisismanagement.Thisnewprincipleofrelativespecialisation,whichalsoaimsatincreasingtheeffectivenessandefficiencyoftheforcesineachtypeofmission,consistsinassigningthemostexpensivecapabilitiesonlytothoseforcestaskedwithcombatingstate-leveladversaries.

-pooling, whichconsistsinusingthosecapabilitieswhicharescarceandcriticalforseveralmissions(protectionofapproaches,deterrence,externalintervention)orseekingfromourEuropeanpartnersapoolingofthecapabilitiesessentialforaction.

Lookingto2025,theFrencharmedforceswillpossesscommandandcontrolcapabilitiesenablingthemtoguarantee–atalltimesandonthestrategiclevel–operationalcommandandnationalcontroloftheforcesdeployed,andtoplanandconductindependentoperationsorasleadnationinamulti-nationaloperation.Particularimportancewillbeplacedondevelopingintelligenceandtargetingcapabilities,specialforces,accuratedeep-penetrationstrikeandcombatincontactwiththeadversary,andanautonomouscapacityforfirstentryoperationsinatheatreofwar.

The special forceshaveprovedtobeanelementofutmostimportanceinallrecentoperations.Theirpersonnelandcommandresourceswillbereinforced,alongwiththeircapacityforcoordinationwiththeintelligenceservices.

Theland forceswillofferanoperationalcapacityof66,000deployabletroops,including,inparticular,sevencombinedbrigades,twoofwhichwillbetrainedforfirstentryandcoercivecombatagainstheavilyarmedadversaries.Theseforceswill,inparticular,haveattheirdisposalaround200heavytanks,250mediumtanks,2,700multi-purposearmouredandcombatvehicles,140reconnaissanceandattackhelicopters,115tacticalhelicoptersandsome30tacticaldrones.


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Thenaval forces willhaveattheirdisposalfourballisticmissile-carryingsubmarines(SSBN),sixattacksubmarines,oneaircraftcarrier,15front-linefrigates,some15patrolboats,sixsurveillancefrigates,threeforceprojectionandcommandvessels,maritimepatrolaircraftandamine-warfarecapacitytoprotectourapproachesandfordeploymentinexternaloperations.

Supportedbyapermanentcommandandoperationalcentre,interoperablewithourAllies,theair forces willinclude,mostnotably,225fighteraircraft(airandnaval),togetherwithsome50tacticaltransportaircraft,sevendetectionandairsurveillanceaircraft,12multi-rolerefuellingaircraft,12theatresurveillancedrones,lightsurveillanceandreconnaissanceaircraftandeightmedium-rangesurfacetoairmissilesystems.

¡Thewomenandmenservingdefenceandnationalsecurity

The nation’s defence and security rely on women and menwithrecognisedcompetencies,whosharecommonvaluesandhavechosen,eachaccordingtotheirstatus,toservetheircountryandfellowcitizens.InaccordancewiththerecommendationsoftheprecedingWhitePaper,defenceandnationalsecuritystructureshaveundergonemajorchangessince2008.FortheMinistryofDefence,thesechangesled,between2008and2012,tothelossofapproximately40,000jobsoutofthe54,900providedforbythe2008WhitePaperforthe2009-2015period.InordertoadapttheMinistryofDefenceworkforcetothenewarmedforcesmodelandtheneedtomodernisepublicaction,some34,000jobswillbeeliminatedbetween2014and2019(includingover10,000inrespectofthedownsizingalreadydecidedin2008).

Newprocedureswillbeputinplaceformanagingandsteeringtheforthcomingchanges.Theywillincludeamajorprogrammeofreformtoaccompanythesocial,humanandeconomicimpactofthesechanges,includinganadaptedplatformofassistanceforthereturntocivilianlife.Inthisframeworkofreform,wewillbedevelopingconsultationandinternaldialoguewithinthedefenceandnationalsecurityforces,notablybyoverhaulingmilitaryconsultationstructures.


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¡Thedefenceandsecurityindustry

Thedefenceindustryisa key component of France’s strategic autonomy.Withover4,000companies,itmakesasignificantcontributiontooureconomy,scientificandtechnologicalinnovationandjobcreation.InacontextmarkedbytheshrinkageofthenationalandtheEuropeanmarketandfierceinternationalcompetition,theWhitePaperreaffirmsthecrucialneedtopreserveaworld-classdefenceindustryinFrance,enablingourcountrytoretainthetechnologicalcapacitiescrucialtoitsstrategicautonomy.Thispolicywillbedevelopedaroundfourprincipalthemes: -preservingasubstantialresearchanddevelopmentbudget; -supportingtheeffortsofourcompaniesabroadtoincreasethevolumeof

theirexports,withinthestrictframeworkofourmechanismsofcontrolandourEuropeanandinternationalcommitments;

-systematicallyexploringallavenuesforcooperationinthefieldofarmaments.TheprogressrecentlymadebyFranceandtheUnitedKingdominthemissileindustryillustratesthefeasibilityandrelevanceofthisapproach.FranceiswillingtoextendthesettingupofcommonframeworkstosupportaneconomicallyviableindustrialbaseforEuropeandefenceintootherfieldsandtootherEuropeanpartners;

-capitalisingonalltheresourcesavailabletothestate,asshareholder,clientandsourceoforders,tofacilitatetheindustrialrestructuringrequiredontheEuropeanscale.


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Achevéd'imprimerenjuillet2013parlePôlegraphiquedeTulle

France(MinistèredelaDéfense/SGA/SPAC)

ImpriméenFranceDépôtlégal:juillet2013

Documents

FRENCH WHITE PAPER - globalsecurity.org · FRENCH WHITE PAPER DEFENCE AND NATIONAL SECURITY. 2013 FRENCH WHITE PAPER DEFENCE AND NATIONAL SECURITY. 23 A.FraFnc re:e 3 EAru 2 A. r:AurA:cnEA:orp